1

Francisco vs dumlao
Remedial Law Res Judicata Unlawful Detainer will not bar a subsequent action for Quieting of Title
The properties of Francisco Depra and Agustin Dumlao were adjoining each other. In 1972, Dumlao built
his house however, he unwittingly built the kitchen portion of his house on Depras land. Depra then sued
Dumlao for unlawful detainer. During pre-trial, the parties agreed that Dumlao was a builder in good faith.
Eventually, the trial court ruled that both parties were in good faith but then a forced lease was ordered
whereby Dumlao retains the kitchen but he shall pay a rental to Depra at P5.00 per month. But Depra
refused to receive the rental payments from Dumlao, instead, Depra filed an action for quieting of title
against Dumlao. In his defense, Dumlao raised the defense of res judicata considering that the nature and
purpose of the initial unlawful detainer case and that of the subsequent quieting of title case is ejectment.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the subsequent case of res judicata is barred by prescription due to the prior case of
unlawful detainer.
Held:
No. The action for quieting of title is not barred by reason of res judicata. The cause of action in the
unlawful detainer case involves possession while the cause of action in the quieting of title case involves
ownership. Furthermore, the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land.

CASE DIGEST: Madrid v. Mapoy

FACTS:
Spouses Mapoy are the owners of two parcels of land in Sampaloc Manila with combined area of 270
square meters both with certificate of title under their name. On April 4, 1988, the respondents-plaintiffs
sought to recover possession of the properties through an accion publiciana filed against Gregorio Miranda
and two other defendants, one of which is Francisco Madrid.
Mapoy alleged that they acquired the properties from Spouses Castelo under a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1978. Mirandas countered that Gregorio Miranda owned the properties by virtue of an oral
sale made in his favor by the original owner, Vivencio Antonio.
Madrid, for his part, claimed that he occupied the property in 1974, and constructed a house on this portion
in 1989 with the permission of Bernardo (son of Miranda)
RTC ruled in favor of respondents-plaintiff. An appeal was made but dismissed by the CA holding that the
certificate of title in the name of the respondents-plaintiffs serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the properties. Also, the reliance on their alleged continuous occupation is misplaced
since petitioner-defendant Madrids occupation could not have been in the concept of an owner, as he
recognized Gregorio Miranda as the owner.
ISSUES:
Who must have the possession of the property?
HELD:
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However,

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where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who
between or among the parties has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is not conclusive on
the issue of ownership.Under this legal situation, resolution of these conflicting claims will depend on the
weight of the parties' respective evidence.
As a rule, the Court is not duty-bound to again analyze and weigh the evidence introduced and considered
in the trial. The trial court findings, when affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and are not open for
our review on appeal.

CASE DIGEST: Sps Padilla v. Sps. Velasco

FACTS:
Respondents are the heirs of Dr. Artemio A. Velasco died single and without any issue on 1949. During his
lifetime, Artemio acquired a lot with a total area 7,791 square meters situated at Pagsanjan, Laguna which
he bought from spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial, evidenced by a deed of sale executed in 1944.
In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as trustees by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan in favor of spouses Solomon.On October 14, 1991, respondents filed a complaint
for accion publiciana against petitioners before the RTC.
Petitioners contends that the Solomon bought the property from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan as evidenced
by a deed of sale dated September 4, 1987 and they are authorized by the same spouses to enter the land
and introduce improvements therein. They futher claim that the bank acquired it from public auction after
the mortgage executed by the alleged owner Valeriano Velasco was foreclosed due to failure in paying his
debt. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents which the CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the spouses Solomon acquired the subject property from its lawful owner in good faith
and for value.
II. Who, as between the parties, have a better right of possession of the subject property.
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana has already prescribed
HELD:
The instant case is for accion publiciana, or for recovery of the right to possess. The objective of which is to
recover possession only, not ownership.
RTC ruled, which were affirmed by the CA, that respondents were able to establish lawful possession of
the subject property when the petitioners occupied the property. Evidences presented proved that the
respondents are legally entitled to the possession of the subject property. It is a long-standing policy of the
Supreme Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are
generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.
The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed. The action was filed with the RTC
on October 14, 1991. Petitioners dispossessed respondents of the property in October 1987. At the time of
the filing of the complaint, only four (4) years had elapsed from the time of dispossession. An accion
publiciana prescribes after the lapse of 10 years.

Quinagoran v CA
Facts:
The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of
Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC Cagayan.
They alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they

3
inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz.
Quinagoran started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property, by tolerance of the heirs.
The heirs asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial building on the
property but petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot.
The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed lot and to be paid the amount
of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated.
Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the lot which he owns
adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under
controversy would not be more than the said amount. He likewise avers that it is an indispensable
requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property involved.
The heirs maintain that the contention of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before the RTC that the
assessed value of the disputed lot is below P20,000.00 is based on the assessed value of an adjacent
property and no documentary proof was shown to support the said allegation. It also contended that the tax
declaration which petitioner presented, together with his Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on the
basis of which he claims that the disputed property's assessed value is only P551.00, should also not be
given credence as the said tax declaration reflects the amount of P56,100.or the entire property.
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion publicciana and
therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of the property. The CA affirmed decision
of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of
the property involved?
Held:
NO. Jurisdiction lies in the MTC.
The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless of
the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between
those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro
Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In Atuel v. Valdez, the Court likewise expressly stated that:
Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the
regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve x x x possession
of real property. However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not
exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court

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exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.
In the case, Quinagoran maintains that there should be such an allegation of the assessed value of
the real property to determine jurisdiction. However, nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of
the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the
RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or
market value of the land.
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject
property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the
RTC are null and void. The CA also erred in affirming the RTC.

DOMINICA CUTANDA V. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA

335 SCRA 418

FACTS:
PR brought an action for recovery of possession of parcels of land they alleged to have been
owned by their grandfather and later on inherited by his children. They intended to work personally
on
the
lands
but
was
frustrated as it was being occupied by the petitioners. PR then prayed that they be declared owners of
1/5 of the subject real properties and that petitioners be ordered to return to them said properties.
Trial
court
held
that
the
petitioners
owned
the
land
through
prescription.

HELD:
Private respondents action is barred by prescription. An accion publiciana to recover the right to
possession and to be declared owners of the subject lands. Their complaint surely put in issue the
ownership of the lands. It may thus be properly treated as an accion reivindicatoria. These two
remedies must be availed of within 10 years from dispossession. \
Sabitsana vs. muertegui
in 1981. Garcia sold his lot to Juanitoi Muetregui. The land was occupied by juanitos father and brother and
they paid real property taxes over the land from 1980 up to 1998.
In 1991, Garcia sold the same tot he Muerteguis family lawyer, atty sabitasan, Jr. he also paid real property
taxes in 1992, 1993 and 1999.
When Juanito's Father passed away, his his applied registration and coverage of the land under Public
Land Act but atty Sabitsana opposed this, claiming that he is the owner of the lot sought to be registered.

5
Muertegui, Jr. filed for quieting of title and preliminary injunction against Sabitsana. However, Sabitsana
insisted that the RTC where the action was filed does not have jurisdiction over the case since the subject
matter involves title to or interest in a parcel of of land which the assessed value is merely P1,230.
RTC Ruling: The RTC found in favor of the Muerteguis and declared DOS of 1981 valid and preferred while
that entered by Garcia and Sabitsana are void and of no legal effect. It declared further that sabitsana was
not a buyer in Good Faith.
This decision was appealed to the CA.
CA Ruling: The Ca affirmed the RTC's decision in toto. The instant appeal was likeqwwise denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact that the assured value of the subject
land was of only P3,450.00
Held:
Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title under rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action
to quiet title or remiove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC./
Due to Sabitsana's letter- opposition to respondent's application for registration, said respondent was
prompted to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for title by obtaining a declaration of his
right. This, thus, Is an action for declaratory relief, which falls withing the RTC's jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
63 of ROC. This is true regardless of the value of the property in question.

Chung vs. Mondragon

The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely:
"(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the
real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy."
Petitioners cannot, on the pretext of maintaining a suit for quieting of title., have themselves declared as
Andreas heirs so that they may claim a share in the land. If they truly believe that they are entitled to a
share in the land, they may avail of the remedies afforded to excluded heirs under the Rules of Court, or
sue for the annulment of OCT No. 22447 and seek the issuance of new titles in their name, or recover
damages in the event prescription has sent.

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Republic vs mangotara
In an action for quieting of title, the subject matter is the title sought to have quieted. "Title" is not limited to
the certificate of registration under the Torrens System (i.e., OCT or TCT). Pursuant to Article 477 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property subject of the
action for quieting of title. The plaintiff need not even be in possession of the property. If she is indeed Doa
Demetrias sole heir, Vidal already has equitable title to or interest in the two parcels of land by right of
succession, even though she has not yet secured certificates of title to the said properties in her name.

VILLANUEVA vs CHIONG
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
FACTS:
Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married since Jan 1960 but wereseparated in 1975. During their
marriage, they acquired a certain lot. In 1985,Florentino sold half of the lot to petitioners. The petitioners
were asked to pay ininstallments and were allowed to occupy the lot and build a shop, house andstore.
When the petitioners demanded the respondents for the execution of thedeed of sale, Elisera refused to
sign it. RTC annulled the deed of absolute sale anddemanded the petitioners to vacate the lot and remove
all the improvementsthat they have introduced. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1.)WON the lot is an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal propertyof the couple?2.)
WON the sale by Florentino without Eliseas consent valid?
HELD:
1.)NO2.)It is not void but voidable.
RATIO:
1.)Since the property was acquired during the marriage of the couple andthe couple categorically declared
in the Memorandum of Agreement theyexecuted that the lot is conjugal, thereforeFlorentino did not
exclusively
own the property. Respondent s separation in fact did not affect theconjugal nature of their properties.2.)
Because the property is conjugal, consent of the spouse is needed beforethe other spouse can alienate the
property. The contract was annulledand the petitioners were asked to return to the respondents the land
withits fruits and respondents were asked to return the sum of P8,000 withlegal interest.

Heirs of Diaz vs. Virata

An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be availed of only when by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainants title to real property or any interest therein.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
Further, Article 47772 of the same Code mandates that in an action to quiet title, the party bringing the

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action must have a legal or, at least, an equitable title73 to the real property subject of the action and that
the alleged cloud74 on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. Verily, for an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale
claims for the peace of society.
Evangelista vs. santiago
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title,
must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
[32] Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or
legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or
to quiet title.

Robles vs CA
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show that they have title to the real property
at issue, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Buyers of unregistered real
property, especially banks, must exert due diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and sellers, lest
some innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure to observe such diligence may amount to bad faith and may
result in the nullity of the mortgage, as well as of the subsequent foreclosure and/or auction sale. Unless
the co-ownership is clearly repudiated, a co-owner cannot, by prescription, acquire title to the shares of the
other co-owners. Mesm
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
or any interest therein."
Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud
or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property.[9] It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[10] Also,
the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.[11]
Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-

8
owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the
co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.[12]
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the
petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits.[13]
Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation
of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his
share, as he in fact did.[14] Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the
co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of
ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the
disputed property by the petitioners as owners.

Seraspi vs. CA
The Court of Appeals, while ruling that petitioners were able to establish the identity of the property as well
as the credibility of their title the elements required to prove ones claim for recovery of property[2]
nonetheless held that the action was barred by prescription. Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals,[3] it held
that an action for recovery of title or possession of real property or an interest therein can only be brought
within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued. Since the action for recovery of possession and
ownership was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13) years after their predecessor-ininterest had been allegedly deprived of the possession of the property by private respondent, it was held
that the action had prescribed. Scsdaad
Arradaza involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more, the facts in that case arose before
the effectivity of the Civil Code. Accordingly, what was applied was 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which provides that title by prescription is acquired after ten (10) years, in whatever manner possession
may have been commenced or continued, and regardless of good faith or with just title. On the other hand,
what is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership
and other real rights by prescription.
The question, therefore, is whether private respondent has acquired the ownership of the two lands by
prescription. On this point, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending

9
on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.[4] Private
respondent contends that he acquired the ownership of the questioned property by ordinary prescription
through adverse possession for ten (10) years.
The contention has no merit, because he has neither just title nor good faith. As Art. 1129 provides:
Supremax
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition
of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through any of the modes
recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5)
succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7) prescription

C-j Yulo and Sones vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo
Facts: Petioner donated a parcel of land in calamba, laguna consisting of 41, 117 sq. mtrs. To herein
respondent corporation for the purpose of establishing a home for the aged and the infirm. However,
instead of building, respondent entered into leasing the properties. Thus, petitioner filed an action for the
revocation of donation for breach of the terms and conditions specified in the donation.
The RTC revoked the donation.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It ruled that the lease agreements entered into by the
respondent were merely casual breach of contract.
Issue: whether the donation may be revoked
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as:
(1) pure or simple
(2) emuneratory or compensatory;
(3) conditional or modal; and
(4) onerous.
A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest
form.
On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the
donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt.
A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future services or
where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is
inferior than that of the donation given.
Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more
precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more
than the thing donated.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is because,
unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an
onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this
regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 733 Donations with onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the
value of the burden imposed.

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As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the sole purpose of
pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such lease was authorized by the
donor by express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is
needed. Hence, considering that the donees acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the
donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor
would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the donation.
Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for all contracts
of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for revocation of the donation because
such a condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the donation, would constitute undue restriction of the
donees right of ownership over the donated property.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
Sumipat vs. Banga
The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat, acquired three parcels of land. The couple were
childless.
Lauro Sumipat sired five illegitimate children out of an extra-marital affair with Pedra Dacola, herein
petitioners.
Lauro Sumipat on his deathbed executed a Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quitclaim over the three
parcels of land, the petitioners. It was aleged that his wife Placida also signed in haste the instrument even
without reading and understanding its substance. Upon the death of Lauro Sumipat the properties were
administered wherein the 50% share of the fruits goes to placida. However, later on the shares of Placida's
share dwindled until she was receiving no more of the shares. Therefor she filed for the an action for the
nullity of titles and for the partition and recovery of ownership.
Held:
The deed covers three (3) parcels of land.[19] Being a donation of immovable property, the requirements
for validity set forth in Article 749 of the Civil Code should have been followed, viz:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until
and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where
the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else
not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.[20]

11
In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a
separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.
Calicdan vs cendena
760 square meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan
The land was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4, 1941. He was
survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all
surnamed Calicdan.
On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land
to respondent Silverio Cendaa,who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around
the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided until
his death in 1998.
On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and declared that
the donation was valid. Furthermore, it held that petitioner lost her ownership of the property by
prescription.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare hearsay testimony as
evidence of the donation made by Fermina.
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has become the rightful owner
of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It
is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive
prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without
need of title or of good faith.[13]
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[14] For purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one
of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any righ
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership.
Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by one who was not the
owner of the property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of
respondents possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals,[19] we held:
Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites, it could
still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a
private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership. In Pensader v. Pensader we
ruled that while the verbal donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the lands in question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which

12
may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession.
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, and declared respondent the rightful owner of the subject
property, not on the basis of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which is hereby declared void, but on
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
SHOPPERS PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.EFREN P.
ROQUE, respondent.
SPR entered into a lease agreement with the decesed Dr. Felipe C. Roque on a 2,000 square meter parcel
of land in novaliches, quezon city. After the demise of Dr. Roque, herein respondent sent a letter to SPR to
desist from enforcing the lease agreement because the subject property was donated to him by his
Parents, however the deed of donation was not annotated.
Issue: was the Lease Agreement rendered invalid by reason of the unannotated deed of donation?
Held. Yes. Ordinarily, a deed of donation need not be registered in order to be valid between the
parties. Registration, however, is important in binding third persons. Thus, when Felipe Roque entered
into a leased contract with defendant corporation, plaintiff Efren Roque (could) no longer assert the
unregistered deed of donation and say that his father, Felipe, was no longer the owner of the subject
property at the time the lease on the subject property was agreed upon. In donations of immovable
property, the law requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein
the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.[4] The Civil Code
provides, however, that titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not
prejudice third persons.[5] It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that
the donation be made in a public document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be
registered in the registry of Property.
However, SPR was aware prior to the constitution of the lease that the property no longer owned by Dr.
Felipe.
The petition was denied.
Hemedes vs. Ca
Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not
exist at the time of the transfer, having already been transferred to his sister.[30] Similarly, the sale of the
subject property by Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more
rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D.
Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.

RODOLFO
NOCEDA, petitioner,
DIRECTO, respondents.

vs. COURT

OF

APPEALS

and

AURORA

ARBIZO

Nephew: Noceda (defendant)

Daughter: Directo (plaintiff)
On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the
daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956,
extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan,
Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directos share

13
was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining
41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo

On the same date, plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant
Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina

However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was
executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land
went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each.

In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121
in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only
29,845 square meters

Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by
plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement,
excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant
Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts (3)
and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded
from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed
the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the lower court.
The RTC of Iba, Zambales rendered judgement revoking the deed of donation.
The CA affirmed the lower courts decision

Issue: did the CA erred in revoking the deed of donation

Holding:
We also find unmeritorious petitioners argument that since there was no effective and real partition of
the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding
ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to
him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs
to private respondent Directo, thus petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent
Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the
property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. [31] The law
does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for
revocation.[32]
Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the right to enforce the same had
already prescribed since as admitted by private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first
week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986, thus more
than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondents share in Lot
1121. We are not persuaded. The respondent Court rejected such argument in this wise:
Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude
cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the
donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. As expressly stated, the
donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the
ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said
action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by defendant
Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year
prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week

14
of September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover,
defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it
was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the
time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It
is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one
(1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was
adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by preponderance of evidence. [33]He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
a mere allegation is not evidence.
TITO R. LAGAZO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO CABANLIT, respondents.
Catalina Jacob was one of the awardees of the properties located in V. Mapa, Old Sta Mesa, Manila, she
has constructed a house thereon, she also executed an SPA to authorize Eduardo Espanol (her son- inlaw) to accomplish all the necessary documents for the acquisition of the land. However, when she
transferred to Canada, she revoked said SPA. She then donated the property to Lagazo. Lagazo
discovered that Catalina Jacob was included in the delinquent list so he paid the arrears and remaining
instalments and declared the property in the name of the latter.
Lagazo demanded herein respondent to vacate the premises, he argues that the house and lot belongs to
him since he acquired it by virtue of a deed of donation executed in his favour by his Grandmother.
However, Cabanlit interposes ownership over the property since he bought from Eduardo Espanol.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of tito Lagaso.
The CA anchored its decision on the issue that the Donation was null and void by reason of non
acceptance of the done. Petitioner contends that the formalities of a donation should not apply in this case
since it is merely an onerous one.
Issue: whether or not the donation was simple or onerous
Held:
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous
donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than the
thing donated. 10 Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed
by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.\
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not be stated
on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose any charge, burden or
condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid for the
installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his
acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not
comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the arrearages and
balance and his assertion of his right of possession against private respondent clearly indicate his
acceptance of the donation.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the
purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the
donor as a condition for the donation.
As a pure or simple donation, the following provisions of the Civil Code are applicable:

15
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by
the donee.
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and the donee.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public instrument, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation and in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
Petition was denied. The plaintiff failed to prove his ownership superior over the defendant, the court
declared the parties to maintain their status quo over the subject property.
Vitug Vs. CA
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a
holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as
one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks
thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral
conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law";
bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and
Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F.
Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.
In the words of the Appellate Court: "Since private respondent and his late wife did not enter into a
marriage settlement before marriage, their property relationship was that of conjugal partnership governed
by the Civil Code. The system of conjugal partnership prohibits, as already mentioned, donation between
the spouses during the marriage, except that which takes effect after the death of the donor, in which case,
the donation shall comply with the formalities of a will (Arts. 133, 728, 805). To allow the prohibited donation
by giving it a cloak of aleatory contract would sanction a (modification) of a marriage settlement during
marriage by a mere stipulation. As mandated by Art. 52, the nature, consequences and incidents of
marriage, which is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution are governed by law, and not
subject to stipulation.

Bonsato vs. Ca and Josefa Utea

Domingo Bonsato executed two deeds of donation in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew
Felipe Bonsato. Herein respondents assailed said donations contending that it was a donation mortis causa
and that it did not conform to the proper formalities of a donation, hence, null and void. The Petitioners
contends that the donations were executed when the decedent was of sound mind, without pressure or
intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or
efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor
The RTC finds for the petitioners, the CA reversed the lower courts decision, declaring that the donations
were of mortis causa and nullified the same.
Issue: Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the
petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:

16
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed (Bautistavs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

Held:
We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term "donations mortis
causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name to designate those dispositions of property
that are void when made in the form of donations.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late
Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or
produce ("de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo"), a
reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor.
Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the
deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can
not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).