1. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC, GR No.

190582,
April 8, 2010
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the
First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed
Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed
Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit
Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
FACTS:
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and transgender) community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this
Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting
of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition
for registration with the COMELEC.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds
that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and
advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied
accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for
not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC,
Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not
conform to the teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought
reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld the First
Assailed Resolution.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme
Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant
Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the
issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the

COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing

the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
HELD:
1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that No law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. The
Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the nonestablishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and
the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than
relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed
Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is
able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. The government must act for
secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt
immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the Office of the
Solicitor General agrees that there should have been a finding
by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or
are committing immoral acts. Respondent have failed to
explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Under our system of
laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through
normal democratic means. Freedom of expression constitutes
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any

compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the

Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one. Laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis
as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. This is in
accord with the countrys international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. The principle of non-discrimination as it
relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the
UDHR and the ICCPR should be recognized. The Constitution and
laws should be applied uninfluenced by public opinion. True
democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous
debate due to conflicting opinions.
The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009
in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and the COMELEC was
directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list
accreditation.
3. STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL
G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006
Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco, and
Sebastian Chua
Respondents: Ronaldo V. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and
Lorna E. Estrella
Ponente: J. Puno
Facts:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated August 03, 2004 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of
the Labor Arbiter. The following facts were presented:
(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the
company;
(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the
company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the
company. He married her on June 27, 1998. Prior to the
marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they
decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant
to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned
on June 20, 1998.

(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the

company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee whom
she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded
them
pursuant
to
the
aforementioned
company
policy. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign
voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an
illegal company policy.
(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the
company. She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co-worker, whom
petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella
impregnated. The
company
allegedly
could
have
terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to
resign on December 21, 1999.
(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with coworker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as a married
but a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she
discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed
her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to
company policy.
(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and
had to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days as advised by
the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital. On December 21,
1999 but she found out that her name was on hold at the
gate. She was directed to the personnel office and handed
a memorandum that stated that she was being dismissed
for immoral conduct. Estrella was asked to submit an
explanation but she was dismissed nonetheless. She
resigned because she was in dire need of money and
resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter.
On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents Motion
for Reconsideration through a Resolution.
On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and
declared that:
(a) The petitioners dismissal from employment was illegal:
(b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the
petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority
rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal
until actual reinstatement; and
(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners
attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the award and the
cost of the suit.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:
The issues raised by this petition are:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject
1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constituional
rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of
Article 136 of the Labor Code: and
(2) Whether or not the respondents resignations were far
from voluntary.
Held:
(1) No. The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995
policy/ regulation is violative of the constitutional rights
towards marriage and the family of employees and or
Article 136 of the Labor Code:
(ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall
be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall
be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.)
Two types of employment policies involve spouses:
(1)no-spouse employment policies - policies banning only
spouses from working in the same company
(2)anti-nepotism employment policies - those banning all
immediate family members, including spouses, from
working in the same company
In the US, there is what they call as bona fide occupational
qualification exception, that is, unless the employer can prove that
the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction
based on marital status and there is no better available or
acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business
purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee
based on the identity of the employees spouse. And to justify a
bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two
factors:
(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related
to the essential operation of the job involved; and
(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be
unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

In the Philippines we employ the standard of reasonableness of the

company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational
qualification requirement. This was illustrated in the cases of
Duncan Association of Detailman vs. Gaxo Wellcome (2004) and
PT&T v. NLRC (1997). These cases instruct us that the requirement
of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the
questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to
prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity.
In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable business necessity. The
employees were hired after they were found fit for the job, but
were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Star Paper
failed to show how the marriages of the employees could be
detrimental to its business operations.
The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to
each other will be less efficient.
4. Yrasuegui v. PALG.R. no. 168081. Oct. 17, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Yrasuegui, an international flight steward of Philippine
Airlines Inc. (PAL) was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to
the weight standards of the airline company.
In consequence thereof, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against PAL before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Te Labor
Arbiter ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. It also
issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of the
petitioner without loss of seniority and other benefits, and also the
payment of backwages. Respondent PAL appealed to the NLRC
which affirmed the LAs decision. Respondent PAL appealed to the
Court of Appeals. CA reversed the NLRC case.
Issue:
Was the dismissal valid?
Held:
SC upheld the legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however,
should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social
justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not
for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e)
of the Labor Code. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. voluntariness basically means that the just
cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external

force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs

through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual
neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although
it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a
particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can
show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification
for performing the job.
Argument that BFOQ is a statutory defense must fail
The Constitution,the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277or the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Meiorin Test (US jurisprudence) in determining whether an
employment policy is justified.
(1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a
purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;
(2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
necessary to the
accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and
(3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose.
In Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,this Court held that in order to
justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove:
(1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and
(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially
all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used
because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier,
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers it transports.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that
cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to

inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the

passengers when something goes wrong.
Entitled to separation pay, even if terminated for just
cause
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed
employee as an act social justice, or based on equity. Provided
the dismissal:
(1) was not for serious misconduct; and
(2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.
Thus, he was granted separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2)
months pay for every year of service.