Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business

and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession.
If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more
lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111
ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation
which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am

quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies
and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be
made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the
Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work.
And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members
of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases
they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the
trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such
as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "modelmaking" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity
of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily
in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional

context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly
with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what
it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a
single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and
some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff
large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs
of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate
legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with
the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs
of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action,
or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization.
This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand.
In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while
the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to
the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization
and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and
the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the
nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation
is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder
in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional
forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned
from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both
to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may
be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change

to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of

"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession.
The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues,
including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star",
"The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit
to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?;
or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served
as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former CoChairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod
also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (19861987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for
the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer
(such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an
official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can
be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2)
borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of
default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United
States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting

and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international

business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that
they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel
in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation,
U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one
or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis issine qua non for
foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said:
"They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle
and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo,
"The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal,
Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority
to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of
its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of

whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc.
. . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law
practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only
by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas
of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN
In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against
his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends
his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases
brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said
motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of
proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendantappellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the
reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support
of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417,
decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of
the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May
30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's
motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the
Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza
case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza
the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on
the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his
petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him
after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until
he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17
resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has
no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file
a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall
be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's
eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can
thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and
behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out
the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out
the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to
them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his

petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But
he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the
noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the
highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court
in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on
your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with
any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to
face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way
of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is
current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have
told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack
the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We

waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed
your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your
Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional
right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy
name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public
opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of
things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must
end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold
the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice,
we must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have
been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We
have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a firstimpression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions forcertiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role
of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide
"only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond
the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of
the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms
the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same
three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give
reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons
not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this
Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of
the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial

discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating
its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call
for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his
appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court
in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought
to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time,
and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three
days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a
case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.
Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing

the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to
the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves
do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally,
is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a
"whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to
surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see
fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery
of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The
reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a

fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that
flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and
to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an
able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those
in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under
such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient
to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all
insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration
of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the timehonored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency
and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial
system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice
the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error,
of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a
group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took
Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that
the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of
an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election
to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement
that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by
an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of
such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re
Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who
had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the
judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political

manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of
the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people.
Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law
into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted.
The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in
the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together
with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court
into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that
the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with
the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only
when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an
independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil
rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties,
and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that
judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court,
as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or
act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties

devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable
inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts,
or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial
officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against
the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the
administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional
misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case
of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and
who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article
in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of
having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court
suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements
of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all,
could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts

or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in
such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer
wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short
of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank,
or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can
formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require
fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every rightminded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the
insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and
his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an
angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to
assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult

otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have
no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication."
18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of
this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised
the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations
of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from
the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were
paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no
right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation
to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355,
20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official
act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown,
fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are
ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it
in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because
of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the
people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil
example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has
been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter
of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1
N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused
attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in
which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common
sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the
attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says

the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as
principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they
may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to
the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a
cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the
attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him
[the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As
recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case,
we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State,
22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a
suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a
gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for
criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved
such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered,
even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional

misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding
that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and
never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason
for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without
such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in
utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to,
the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the
source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and
his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He
there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this
Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the

press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as
to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to
his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of
the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken
from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586,
594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of
one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the

Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this
Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It
makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this
Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it
has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation.
It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements
of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into
question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity,
need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the
protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to
his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted
to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing
an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after
the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually,
this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect
that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the
punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the

first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision

which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the
contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is
the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them
is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty.
Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in
the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy
disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is
altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge
of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct
of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the
right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this courthas the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them
from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy
of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right,
but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege
of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally
held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one
is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of
right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and
sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object
of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as
a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile
insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated
acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members
as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of
an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its
members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last
resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to.
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the
Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this
Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us

no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of
law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded
as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that
it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once
again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of
Appeals for their information and guidance.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch
12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents. ULANDU
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990
decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over
private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San
Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At
that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the
Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention at
the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam
around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained
in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man,
including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private
respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,[1] the latter accepted cases and continued
practicing law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion
seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated
July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No.
4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since
it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in
his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for
his arrest should forthwith be issued?"[2] Mis spped
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order
and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion
seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for
clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such
arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario
the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del
Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when
Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and
the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial
courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he
shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not
allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The
trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is
to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case
No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court
to defend himself. Spped
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of the offense.[3] He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against
him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.[4] Let it be stressed
that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10)
years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to
continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at
the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go
out of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the trial court for a lawful
purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San
Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the
other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine
Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries
to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of
the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation
and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the
OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same

parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing
them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by
such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under
Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by
the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person
liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and
sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended
that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.[7]

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass
the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking
the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable
by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused
or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not
reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against
the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of
fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the
good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks
of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the
use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4thJudicial Sharia District
in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of
a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only
practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service
therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated,

but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would
diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a
public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to
take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom
until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions
upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron
S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petitionseeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same
is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 244

March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted
to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application
for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due
course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he
claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (19401941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April,
1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would
also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd
semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not
have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact
that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And
the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

THIRD DIVISION
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St.,Pasay City,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154464

Present:

- versus JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Public Respondent.
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St.,Pasay City,
Private Respondent.

TINGA, J.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Acting Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court
assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002[1] and July 31, 2002[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein
petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to
voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for
and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for
Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court[3] that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written
permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a
party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of
a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not
allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the
next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,[4] praying for the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the
respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge
Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.[5]
In an Order[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that
throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her
voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration[7] of the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.[8] In the same Order, the trial
court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence,
and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his
appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not
Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are
applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138A, in an Order[10] dated July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns
the following errors:

I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE
LATTERS BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34
OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A
PARTY LITIGANT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID
NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH
AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE
COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the
respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself
from trying the case.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not
exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court
where the application therefor will be directed.[11]A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed
with the Court of Appeals.[12] The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if
warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.[13]
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is
cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when
the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who
make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is
necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1.
Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum
and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by
the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
thePhilippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for
and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf
because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioners appearance, the court a
quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which
eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a
recognized schools clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which
provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace,
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the
contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any

case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the
aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of
the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation.[14] Considering that a party personally conducting
his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice
law,[15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his
own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of
Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his
right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must,
therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A,
when the basis of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for
conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a
non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No.
19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited
law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may
appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard
by himself and counsel,[16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be
waived.[17] The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado,[18] where we declared that
even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the
rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous
concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in
a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance,
effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case,
petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate
the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision
of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to
represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias
and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged
negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes. Ok? Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested
conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith
and confidence in the respondents impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative
case[19] against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack
of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case
and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not
inhibit herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,[20] as voluntary inhibition
is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on
whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case before her.[21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR.,
Complainants,

A.C. No. 8096

Present:

- versus -

ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD

BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR,
JR., AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA,
Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

July 5, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335[1] passed on July 17,
2008 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 071953. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case filed by the complainants against the
respondents.
The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), hired
respondent Atty. Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006.[2] The
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Commission on Audit (COA) gave their
consent to the employment of Atty. Ignes.[3] However, controversy later erupted when two (2) different
groups, herein referred to as the Dela Pea board and Yaphockun board, laid claim as the legitimate
Board of Directors of KWD.
On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Pea board filed Civil Case No. 1793[4] for
Injunction and Damages, seeking to annul the appointment of two (2) directors, Joselito T. Reyes and
Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with Director Allan D. Yaphockun whose hostility to the
present Board of Directors, the Dela Pea board, is supposedly of public knowledge.

On January 18, 2007, the Dela Pea board also adopted Resolution No. 009 [5] appointing
respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private collaborating
counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under the direct supervision and control of Atty.
Ignes.
Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24 for
Indirect Contempt of Court[6] entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General
Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V. Cabucay, et al. On February 19, 2007, they also filed Civil
Case No. 1799 for Injunction and Damages[7] entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented
herein by its General Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J. Vargas. On March 9, 2007, KWD
and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental complaint[8] in Civil Case No. 1799.
Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 079[9] dated February 16, 2007, the OGCC had approved the
retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated that the
retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007.
In its letter[10] dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gombas insistence that
the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated,
the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract anytime without need of judicial action; that OGCCs
grant of authority to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable circumstances; and
that the termination of Atty. Igness contract was justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities
Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that said
board had terminated Atty. Igness services and requested to hire another counsel.
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority, complainants filed a
disbarment complaint[11] against the respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1953. Complainants alleged that respondents filed SCA Case No. 50-24
and Civil Case No. 1799 as counsels of KWD without legal authority. They likewise stated in their
position paper[12] that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD even after the OGCC had confirmed the
expiration of Atty. Igness contract in its April 4, 2007 manifestation/motion[13] in Civil Case No. 1796-25
entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel
Gomba v. Supreme Investigative and Security Agency, represented by its Manager Efren Y. Cabucay.
In his defense,[14] Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can validly represent KWD
until April 17, 2007 since Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contracts pre-termination. Atty. Mann also

stated that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007 in deference to the OGCCs stand. Attys.
Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed Atty. Manns defense.[15]
On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation[16] before the IBP with the following
attachments: (1) the transcript of stenographic notes taken on January 28, 2008 in Civil Case No. 1799,
and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008 of the January 7, 2008 Order dismissing Civil Case
No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD and Ms.
Gomba. He also signed the notice of appeal.
In his report and recommendation,[17] the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held that Atty.
Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and he was
unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil
Case No. 1799 in February and March 2007.
As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that they
be fined P5,000 each for appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to do so, per Santayana v.
Alampay.[18] The Investigating Commissioner found that they failed to secure the conformity of the
OGCC and COA to their engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case because
respondents had no authority from the OGCC to file the complaints and appear as counsels of KWD in
Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1796-25. Complainants point out that the
retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007; that the Notice of Appeal filed by
Atty. Ignes, et al. in Civil Case No. 1799 was denied per Order dated April 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for being filed by one not duly authorized by law; and that the authority of Attys. Viajar, Jr.
and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm since Resolution No. 009 of the Dela Pea board lacks the
conformity of the OGCC. As a consequence, according to complainants, respondents are liable for
willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so.

In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent KWD had expired on April 17,
2007, but he and his fellow respondents stopped representing KWD after that date. He submits that
they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without authority. In their comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and
Nadua propound similar arguments. They also say that their fees were paid from private funds of the
members of the Dela Pea board and KWD personnel who might need legal representation, not from
the public coffers of KWD. In his own comment, Atty. Mann submits similar arguments.
After a careful study of the case and the parties submissions, we find respondents administratively
liable.
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for OGCC and COA conformity if a
GOCC hires private lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal basis of this rule. Under
Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the OGCC which shall act
as the principal law office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9,[19] issued by
President Estrada on August 27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms
to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the
written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as
the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or
employment of a private lawyer or law firm. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel
Corporation,[20] we listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1)
private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case
may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured.
In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear as counsels of KWD?
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as collaborating
counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records shows that Atty.
Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel. While the 4th Whereas Clause of Resolution No.
009 partly states that he and Atty. Ignes presently stand as KWD legal counsels, there is no proof that
the OGCC and COA approved Atty. Naduas engagement as legal counsel or collaborating
counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their appointment as collaborating
counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no approval from the OGCC and COA.
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the private counsel of Phividec
Industrial Authority in Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that said private counsel of Phividec

Industrial Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to file the expropriation case in Phividecs behalf
considering that the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied with.[21] Thus,
Resolution No. 009 did not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as collaborating
counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not notified of the pre-termination of his own retainership
contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating
counsels.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his authority
as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership contract for one (1) year
effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as true that he was not notified of the pre-termination
of his contract, the records still disprove his claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17,
2007.
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP
on March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the transcript of stenographic notes[22] in Civil Case No. 1799
taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the extremely urgent motion for the
immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was compelled to ask
him why he seeks the return of KWD properties if he filed the motion as counsel of Ms. Gomba. When
the RTC noted that KWD does not appear to be a party to the motion, Atty. Ignes said that KWD is
represented by Ms. Gomba per the caption of the case. Atty. Ignes also manifested that they will file a
motion for reconsideration of the orders dismissing Civil Case No. 1799 and Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC
ruled that it will not accept any motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD unless he is authorized by
the OGCC, but Atty. Ignes later filed a notice of appeal[23] dated February 28, 2008, in Civil Case No.
1799. As the notice of appeal signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly authorized by law, the
RTC, in its Order[24] dated April 8, 2008, denied due course to said notice of appeal.
As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January 28, 2008 was merely as counsel
of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself, however, when he said that Ms. Gomba represents KWD per the
case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion sought the return of the facilities of KWD to its Arellano
Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a motion with the interest of KWD in mind. The notice of
appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of KWD after his
authority as counsel had expired. This fact was not lost on the RTC in denying due course to the notice
of appeal.
Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority?

The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents willfully and deliberately
appeared as counsels of KWD without authority. One, respondents have admitted the existence of
Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are aware of our ruling in Phividec.[25] Thus, we
entertain no doubt that they have full grasp of our ruling therein that there are indispensable conditions
before a GOCC can hire private counsel and that for non-compliance with the requirements set by
Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel would have no authority to file a case in behalf of a
GOCC. Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD without complying with what the rule
requires. They signed pleadings as counsels of KWD. They presented themselves voluntarily, on their
own volition, as counsels of KWD even if they had no valid authority to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents authority as counsels of KWD which question was
actually raised earlier in Civil Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify KWDs
counsels[26] dated February 21, 2007 and during the hearing on February 23, 2007[27] respondents still
filed the supplemental complaint in the case on March 9, 2007. And despite the pendency of this case
before the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to be reminded by the RTC that he needs OGCC authority to file an
intended motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD.
With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that respondents are innocent of the
charge even if they insist that the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann, as
collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers of KWD. To be sure, the facts were clear
that they appeared as counsels of KWD without authority, and not merely as counsels of the members
of the Dela Pea board and KWD personnel in their private suits.
Consequently, for respondents willful appearance as counsels of KWD without authority to do so,
there is a valid ground to impose disciplinary action against them. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and should be imposed only for the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any

punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish the end
desired.[28] InSantayana,[29] we imposed a fine of P5,000 on the respondent for willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The respondent therein also appeared as
private counsel of the National Electrification Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from the
OGCC and COA.
Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of P5,000 on each respondent.
On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully narrating what had happened
after the RTC issued four (4) orders on March 24, 2007 and on April 13, 2007 in Civil Case No.
1799.[30] As willingly revealed by complainants, all four (4) orders were nullified by the Court of
Appeals.[31] We are compelled to issue a reminder that our Code of Professional Responsibility requires
lawyers, like respondents, to always show candor and good faith to the courts.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed on July
17, 2008 by the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John
Rangal D. Nadua are found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without
authority to do so and FINED P5,000 each, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this
Resolution. They are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents personal records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

VALERIANO F. NUEZ,
Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2255-RTJ)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus CARPIO MORALES,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, Regional Trial

Court,

Promulgated:

Branch 135, Makati City,

Respondent.

June 30, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Sinumpaang Salaysay[1] dated April 22, 2005 filed by complainant Valeriano F.
Nuez with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay of
Branch 135 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, charging the latter with grave abuse of
authority.
Complainant alleged the following in his complaint:
Complainant was a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall. On April 1, 2005,
at around five oclock in the afternoon, he parked the government vehicle which he was driving, an L300 van with plate number SFN-767, at the basement of the Makati City Hall and left the key in their
office because drivers were not allowed to bring such vehicles home. After the flag ceremony on April 4,
2005, complainant went to the Office of the Engineering Department where he received an
Order[2] from respondent Judge, directing the former to appear before the latter on that same day at ten
oclock in the morning and to explain why he occupied the parking space allotted for respondent Judge.
When complainant appeared before respondent Judge, the latter asked him if he had a lawyer.
Although complainant replied in the negative, respondent Judge still further questioned the
complainant. Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in respondent
Judges space, and that he did not know that such space was reserved for respondent Judge.

However, respondent Judge refused to accept complainants apology and, instead, found the latter
guilty of direct contempt of court for using the formers parking space, sentencing complainant to five
(5) days imprisonment and a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).[3] Respondent then ordered the jail
guard to bring complainant to the City Jail in Fort Bonifacio, where the latter was incarcerated for two
days. On April 5, 2005, complainant was released after filing a Motion for Reconsideration[4] and paying
the fine of P1,000.00.
In his Comment[5] dated June 27, 2005, respondent Judge alleged that judges were assigned their
respective parking spaces in the basement of the City Hall of Makati City. Respondent Judge, in
particular, placed a marker with his name at the space allotted to him, facilitating the orderly parking
which allowed him to work as early as seven oclock in the morning, almost daily. He stated that he
already programmed his activities to maintain and/or improve his present position as the third ranking
judge for the year 2004 among the RTC judges of Makati City.
Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time in question, he was set to dispose a criminal
case, and over the weekend, had even conceptualized the matter on how to administer the proceedings
to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case. However, the inconsiderate and improper parking
of complainant disturbed his train of thought as to the intended disposition of his cases.
In addition, respondent Judge recounted that there were similar incidents which happened to him.
Sometime in August 2002, Allan Macrohon, Rodrigo Gonzales, and Redeem Ongtinco caused an
overflow of water into the chambers of respondent Judge, damaging his computer system at the old
RTC. On March 18, 2005, Venancio P. Inonog, security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit Section
of Makati City, also parked his vehicle at respondents parking slot. On April 12, 2005, John Panaligan,
electrician of the Makati City Hall, erroneously switched off the electrical outlets of respondent Judges
sala.
Respondent Judge cited Macrohon, Gonzales, Ongtinco, Inonog, and Panaligan in contempt on the
ground that they disrupted respondent Judges performance of official duties. In turn, Macrohon et al.,
Inonog, and Panaligan all filed their respective administrative complaints[6] against respondent Judge.
On November 25, 2005, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be redocketed as a
regular administrative matter, and that respondent Judge be fined ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for
grave abuse of authority.[7]
In its Resolution[8] dated March 15, 2006, the Court referred the administrative case to Associate
Justice Renato Dacudao of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within

ninety (90) days from receipt of the records. On June 22, 2006, the Investigating Justice issued an Order
setting the said case for hearing.
The Investigating Justice submitted a Partial Report on September 6, 2006 in which he stated that
he had just finished receiving the evidence for the parties and required them to submit their respective
memorandum. He also asked for an extension of two months from September 20, 2006, or
until November 20, 2006, within which to submit his Final Investigation, Report and Recommendation.
In his Investigation, Report and Recommendation dated September 22, 2006, the Investigating
Justice concluded:

Based on the testimonies of both parties and their witnesses, the undersigned
Investigating Justice believes that the complainant was not the person who parked the
van on respondent judges parking slot, but rather that it was Oscar de los Reyes.
Complainant during the hearing maintained that he parked the L-300 van in the middle,
and not on the side, which was the parking slot assigned to respondent judge. Although
the witness, Oscar de los Reyes testified that, after buying merienda (on April 2,
2005), he parked the van at the same place, he failed to explain where exactly he parked
the van. Thus, we cannot discount the possibility that De los Reyes might have parked
the van at the same place, meaning the basement parking, but not necessarily on the
very same spot or slot.
But whether it was complainant or it was Oscar de los Reyes who parked the van,
it would not change or alter the fact that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
authority in holding the complainant in contempt of court for parking on his slot.
Respondent judge himself declared that had he known that it was De los Reyes who
parked the van he would not have asked complainant to explain, but instead De los
Reyes. x x x In addition, why still subject complainant to further humiliation by having
him handcuffed, like a common criminal, after citing him for contempt of court?
Obviously, respondent judge was really bent on citing for contempt of court the person
responsible for doing the parking in the parking slot which he believed, (perhaps
erroneously), was his assigned parking slot. Obviously, too, there is a streak of cruel
sadism, of pettiness or meanness, in respondent judges character, as it would seem
that he could not refrain from exhibiting such excesses as causing the manacling
(apparently in open court at that), of an unintentional offender like the complainant
herein, who had the misfortune to injure, if innocuously, his wounded pride and ego as
a judge.
xxxx
In this case, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds no reason why
complainants act of parking on the parking slot of respondent judge would constitute
contempt of court. It may have caused respondent judge some delay in immediately
parking his car that morning of April 4, 2005, but to say that the one-hour disruption

delayed the administration of justice would be stretching the logic of the situation too
much. According to respondent judge, time is of the essence in his decision-making
program. But the irony of it is that the amount of time respondent judge allotted in
hearing the explanation as well as the motion for reconsideration of complainant in this
case must have cost him more than the one hour he claimed he lost.
As justification for his actions, respondent judge said that because of the prior or
previous incidents he was convinced that the particular incident was intentional and
deliberate. Such reasoning is unacceptable. There was no showing that complainant or
Oscar de los Reyes intentionally or deliberately parked the van on respondent judges
slot in order to purposely annoy or irk him. And, even if it did annoy or irk respondent
judge, he should remember that, the power to cite persons in contempt is at his
disposal for purposes that are strictly impersonal, because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the official functions that they exercise
or perform.
Besides, it was unfair for respondent judge to assume that complainant knew of
the prior or previous incident, where respondent judge cited a driver for contempt of
court for parking on his parking slot, just because both drivers are employees of
the Makati City Hall; this is clearly a non-sequitur. And, assuming that complainant knew
of the said incident, this alone would not prove that what he did was intentional or
deliberate.
Neither would respondent judges allegation, that someone, an unknown person
inside, is orchestrating the filing of these cases against him for the chief or sole purpose
of harassing him, exonerate him of the charge. To begin with, he failed to present any
proof to substantiate this allegation. All he could point to are mere coincidences or
speculations. What is more, respondent judge seemed to have taken some kind of
pleasurable satisfaction in citing these complainants in contempt of court simply for
parking on the slot which he assumed was allot(t)ed to him; or for switching the lights
off in his office; or for accidentally drenching his computers. He, in fact, even admitted
having issued all these Orders to punish the complainants in these cases for disrupting
or disturbing him in performing his duties; hence, he cannot blame these persons for
filing a case or cases against him, as these persons must have felt aggrieved by his
actuations in precipitately citing them for contempt. Nor can he accuse an unknown
person of orchestrating all of these. All the cases or incidents he mentioned only
strengthened the undersigned Investigating Justices perception that respondent judge
has an unseemly propensity for abusing the power granted to him by law.
Respondent judge ought to be reminded that as a member of the bench, he is
expected to take recourse to the contempt power only as a last resort, when all other
alternative courses of action are exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining respect for the
court and its processes; and that when a less harsh remedy can be availed of by the
judge, he should at all times hesitate to use his contempt power, and instead opt for the
less harsh remedy.

Thus, if respondent judge wanted to teach complainant a lesson, he could have

done so by merely reprimanding or admonishing him considering that when
complainant appeared before respondent judge he immediately begged for forgiveness.
Respondent judges act of citing complainant in contempt of court for parking on
his slot is a violation of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that A
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
xxxx
For the reasons heretofore stated, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds
respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of authority for using contempt as a retaliatory
measure aggravated in this case by a streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness or meanness,
in respondents character, as elsewhere indicated.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Notwithstanding the finding of guilt of the respondent judge, the undersigned
Investigating Justice deems that certain circumstances must be considered in imposing
the proper penalty.
It must be noted that respondent judge has a very good performance record. His
strong adherence to the Supreme Courts reminder that, members of the judicial
branch judges and judicial personnel alike to be conscientious, diligent and thorough
in the performance of their functions. At all time(s) they must observe the high standard
of public service required of them. is quite admirable and commendable. Also, he
already admitted his error in declaring complainant in contempt of court. All these may
be taken as mitigating circumstances which could alleviate his culpability.
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the undersigned Investigating
Justice hereby recommends that the respondent Judge be fined in the amount
of PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND (Php5,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution dated February 7, 2007, the Court referred the administrative matter to the OCA
for evaluation, report and recommendation, within thirty (30) days from notice, on the propriety of
consolidating the instant case with the other administrative cases filed against respondent Judge.
In its Memorandum dated March 30, 2007, the OCA observed that:

After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office
agrees with the Investigating Justices findings that respondent committed grave abuse
of authority in citing complainant in contempt of court. Respondent wrongly argues that

complainant delayed the administration of justice when he improperly parked the van
on respondents assigned slot which disrupted his scheduled disposition of cases.
Respondents reaction to the complainants mistake is exaggerated. The complainants
act may have caused inconvenience to the respondent but it could not delay the
administration of justice.
There is no evidence to show that complainant Nuez parked the van at
respondents slot purposely to annoy him or he was aware of the previous similar
incident which involved Venancio Inonog. In fact, complainant explained that his
mistake was not deliberate and he asked for respondents forgiveness. Respondent
likewise failed to substantiate his allegation that someone is orchestrating the filing of
administrative cases against him for the sole purpose of harassing him. The other
complainants cannot be faulted for filing the said cases as they may have felt aggrieved
by respondents actuations in citing them for contempt for flimsy and personal reasons.
xxxx
Respondents order dated April 4, 2005 citing complainant Nuez in contempt of
court betrays not only his ignorance as regards the Rule on Contempt of Court, but it
also shows his despotic nature. The fact that respondent had also declared Inonog,
Panaligan, Macrohon and two others in contempt of court shows that he does not
possess the judicial temperament which a judge should possess. x x x
The power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly with due regard to the
provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. It should be
exercised strictly for the preservation of the dignity of the court and its proceedings. In
the instant complaint, respondent exercised the said power in an arbitrary and
oppressive manner and for purposes that are purely personal.
The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the
judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places
his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence
in the integrity of the judiciary itself.
After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office
finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to respondents offense. This is not
respondents first offense. He had been administratively sanctioned for grave abuse of
authority and was ordered by the Court to pay a fine on June 21, 2006 in the case of
Panaligan v. Ibay docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972. In the case filed by Allan Macrohon,
et al., docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1970, respondent was ordered by the Court to pay a
fine of P25,000.00 for gravely abusing his authority and was also warned that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent
has another pending case filed by Venancio Inonog for the same charge. In the said case
of Allan Macrohon, et al. against respondent, the Court stated that the similarity of the
charges in these administrative complaints against him betrays a deplorable proclivity
for the use of contempt powers at the slightest provocation.

Taking into consideration that the instant complaint is a third transgression of a

similar offense, this Office recommends that respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay be
SUSPENDED for FOUR (4) MONTHS with STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

In its Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted
within 30 days from notice.
In its Resolution dated November 21, 2007, the Court deemed as served upon the complainant the
copy of the Resolution dated July 25, 2007 which was sent to complainant, but was returned unserved
with postmans notation RTS-Unknown.
In its Resolution dated March 3, 2008, after failure of respondent Judge to manifest whether he
was willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and
submitted as required in the Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court deemed the case for decision.
The issue which lies before this Court is whether respondent Judge can be held administratively
liable for grave abuse of authority in citing complainant for contempt of court.
The power to hold a person in direct contempt is provided for under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:
SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily
adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day or both, if it be a lower court.

In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.,[9] the Court held that the power to declare a person in contempt of court,
however plenary as it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never
allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties.
Respondent Judge averred that someone was out to harass and embarrass him, which was why six
different complaints were simultaneously filed against him, prompting him to cite the complainants for
contempt of court. He explained that the individual acts of the complainants were contemptuous,

including herein complainants improper parking, because they disrupted the speedy administration of
justice.
The Court disagrees. Aside from the fact that respondent Judge failed to substantiate his
allegation, the Court does not see how the improper parking by complainant, or by a certain Oscar dela
Cruz, could, even in the remotest manner, disrupt the speedy administration of justice. At most, it
would cause respondent Judge inconvenience or annoyance, but still, this does not fall under any of the
aforementioned acts for which a person could be cited for contempt. Neither does it appear from the
records, nor from the evidence presented, that complainant intended any disrespect toward respondent
Judge. In fact, upon being summoned, complainant immediately apologized for his mistake.
In Oclarit v. Paderanga,[10] the Court held that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised
on the preservative, not vindicative, principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. Courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal,
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the functions that
they exercise.
By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had already cited six persons for
contempt, including herein complainant. Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained complainant,
thereby preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, cited as follows:
SEC.2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any
court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or
prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of
such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the
judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the
petition be decided against him.

Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his integrity, which is
essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor.[11] In
addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary[12] state that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.

The Court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes gross misconduct.
Gross has been defined as flagrant and shameful, while misconduct means a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.[13] Under
Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is classified as a serious offense
punishable under the sanctions enumerated under the same Rule, Section 11 of which provides that:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1.
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that
the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2.

Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more
than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3.

A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In previous cases wherein judges cited persons for contempt without legal basis, the Court has
found respondents guilty of grave abuse of authority and usually imposed a penalty of reprimand with a
warning, or a fine of P5,000.00 with a warning.[14]
However, respondent Judge has been twice administratively sanctioned by the Court for the same
offense. In Panaligan v. Ibay,[15] respondent Judge was found to have abused his authority in citing a
person for contempt without sufficient legal basis, for which he was sentenced to pay a fine
of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be
dealt with more severely. In Macrohon v. Ibay,[16] he was again found liable for the same offense and
sentenced to pay a fine ofP25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
would be dealt with more severely.
In view of respondent Judges penchant for citing persons for contempt even without legal basis,
the Investigating Justice recommended that he be ordered to pay a fine ofP5,000.00 with a stern
warning, while the OCA recommended that he be suspended for four (4) months with a stern warning.
Considering that respondent Judge had opted to avail himself of the Optional Retirement under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1438,
effective at the close of office hours of August 18, 2007, which was approved by the Court (First
Division) per Resolution dated November 14, 2007,[17] provided that the amount of Four Hundred
Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos shall be retained/withheld from his retirement benefits to answer for
whatever adverse decision the Court may later impose upon him in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 (herein case)

and OCA IPI No. 05-2248-RTJ, the Court, therefore, deems it appropriate to impose a fine of P40,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority for
citing complainant Valeriano F. Nuez for contempt without legal basis, and is ORDERED to PAY a FINE of
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits, which in this case shall
be deductible from the Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) withheld from his retirement
benefits, per Resolution dated November 14, 2007.
SO ORDERED.