Journal of Contemporary African Studies

Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2010, 119!135

Rape of the Congo: Understanding sexual violence in the conflict in the

Democratic Republic of Congo
Sara Meger*
The University of Melbourne, Australia
Though the occurrence of rape in the conduct of war is by no means historically
new, research into its causes and functions has only really begun in the past
couple of decades. War rape is a difficult phenomenon about which to generalise,
considering the variances in context and actors involved. This article, however,
attempts to synthesise existing literature through the analysis of a case study that
can enhance our understanding of rape as a weapon of war and the contextual
conditions that facilitate its use. Applying this theoretical framework to the
extreme war rape occurring in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this
article offers insight into understanding the function of sexual violence in the
ongoing conflict in the DRC. In particular, this article argues that the use of rape
as a weapon in the Congos bloody war must be understood in relation to both
social constructs of masculinity and the politics of exploitation that have shaped
much of the countrys history.
Keywords: sexual violence; conflict; Congo; women and war; rape

Rape has been a constant aspect of warfare throughout history and in todays civil
conflicts, it is a systematic and brutal weapon used against civilian populations. In
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), rape has been one of the most prolific
weapons of the civil war affecting the countrys eastern provinces since 1998. The
scale of sexual violence being perpetrated in the DRC is unparalleled in any previous
or current conflict, as it has been perceived as a particularly effective weapon to
subdue, punish, or exact revenge upon entire communities (Pratt and Werchick 2004,
7). Sexual violence has been called a defining feature of the conflict in the DRC
(Erturk 2008, 6). Human rights non government organisations (NGOs) estimate that
hundreds of thousands of women and girls in the DRC have been raped in the
conflict since 1998, with a large proportion of state and non-state group offences
structured around rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage aimed at the complete
physical and psychological destruction of women with implications for the entire
society (ibid, 7). A 2007 progress report submitted to the General Assembly found
that serious abuses were occurring daily and being committed by armed forces, the
police, and militarised non-government forces alike (Pacere 2007).
Most often, the phenomenon of rape in war is dismissed as an unfortunate side
effect, part of the expected rapelootpillar that inevitably accompanies warfare.
However, research has shown that the use of sexual violence in war is far more
complex and systemic than these traditional explanations can account for. This
*Email: sameger@unimelb.edu.au
ISSN 0258-9001 print/ISSN 1469-9397 online
# 2010 The Institute of Social and Economic Research
DOI: 10.1080/02589001003736728
http://www.informaworld.com

120 S. Meger
article attempts to explain the function of sexual violence in the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Through an analysis of theories on the use of sexual
violence in conflict, and an assessment of data collected by NGOs and the United
Nations on the sexual violence being perpetrated in the DRC, this article offers an
insight into understanding the function of sexual violence in the ongoing conflict in
the DRC. In particular, this article argues that the use of rape as a weapon in the
Congos bloody war must be understood in relation to both social constructs of
masculinity and the politics of exploitation that have shaped much of the countrys
history.
This article argues that rape in the conflict in the DRC is best understood from
two dimensions: the individual motivation of combatants and the structural
influences that perpetuate the conflict. The article finds that individual motivation
is largely informed by social constructions of masculinity, which construct sexual
violence as an effective weapon of conflict. What exacerbates it use, however, is the
political economy of the conflict, in which the chaos of the conflict enables the illegal
exploitation of mineral riches found in the region. These two dimensions are
inextricably linked, and the most thorough understanding of the use of rape in the
conflict in the Congo comes from understanding the interaction of these two
dimensions.
Sexual violence in war
Due to its prominence throughout history, sexual violence in warfare is often
dismissed as an inevitable and unfortunate feature of conflict. It is not surprising
that this view is widely held, given that sexual violence has appeared in virtually every
conflict in history. Sexual violence in war is most commonly explained by reliance on
two myths: firstly, that the male soldiers have unfulfilled sexual urges and an
irrepressible sex drive, and secondly, that the prevalence of wartime sexual violence is
an anomaly caused by the disruption of normal morals and rules of society, caused
by the conflict.
However, sexual violence in war takes many more forms than simply the
gratification of individual male soldiers. In Maneuvers (2000), Enloe identifies three
conditions under which soldiers perpetrate acts of sexual violence. These are: 1)
recreational rape occuring when soldiers are not adequately supplied with accessible
women; 2) national security rape ! a tool employed by a nervous state; and 3)
systematic mass rape used as an instrument of open warfare. Within these she
identifies a number of patterns of sexual violence, such as: rape by a male soldier of a
woman he identifies as a foreigner; rape by a group of invading soldiers to force
women of a different ethnicity to flee the region; rapes of captured women by soldiers
of one group aimed at humiliating the men of an opposing group; and, rape of
women by men as a morale-boosting reward after battle (Enloe 2000, 109!10). What
Enloe emphasises in her analysis of these forms of sexual violence used in war is the
need to identify the strategy of war rape in these patterns. She asserts that it is often
when military strategists hold beliefs about gendered division of labour that they can
be tempted to exploit these divisions through the use of sexual violence against
women (ibid, 134).
The second myth, that sexual violence is the outcome of the anarchical situation
that erupts from conflict and leads to an abandonment of usual norms, does not

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121

adequately explain the often organised, systematic, and legitimated use of rape by
armed forces in many modern conflicts. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the
use of rape did not reflect a situation of anarchy or a lack of cohesion in the Serbian
military but was rather part of an institutionalised and systematic war strategy
(Bennett 1994, 24!5). Morris (1996) asserts that even during peacetime, military rates
of sexual violence are significantly higher than military rates of other violent crime.
Her findings dispel the anarchy myth, since they show that military personnel act
disproportionately violently towards women, even in the absence of conflict.
Furthermore, even when the conflict ends and men lay down their arms, the postconflict environment remains hostile towards women (Pankhurst 2008, 3). Women
are often targeted post-war for having gained financial independence, having
assumed male roles, or having adopted urban and/or educated lifestyles. In many
post-conflict societies there are forceful attempts to define womens roles and rights
as secondary to those of men, and to restrict womens behaviour (ibid, 4). This
structural subordination is, of course, coupled with the fact that even after the end of
conflict women continue to be raped by soldiers, policemen, former combatants, and
peacekeepers (Walsh 2008; Kandiyoti 2008; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002).
What this shows is that wartime rape cannot be so easily extricated from sexual
violence perpetrated against women during times of peace. The prevalence of sexual
violence in times of conflict is a reflection of the social attitudes towards women even
in peacetime (Seifert 1994), and can be seen as a continuance of the violence women
experience in times of peace, . . . the difference [is] only in quantity, intensity and
visibility (Boric 1997, 39). This argument is furthered by Olujic (1998), who argues
that the use of sexual violence in conflict is an effective war strategy because of preexisting sociocultural dynamics that attach concepts of honour, shame and sexuality
to womens bodies. The connecting factor is the association of mens sexuality with
aggression, something Dworkin (1993) refers to as the sexual politics of aggression
and the sexual politics of militarism. What distinguishes wartime sexual violence is
that, in addition to exploiting the social and interpersonal dimensions of violence as
found in peacetime rape, sexual violence in warfare assumes a political and/or
economic dimension, in which the systematic abuse of women in conflict is a strategy
by which to terrorise a population, communicate a political message between men, or
to strip women of their economic and political assets (Turshen 2001, 55).
Key to understanding the politics of sexual violence in conflict is the concept of
masculinity. Though a simple definition of masculinity would rely on a gender binary
in which particular traits associated with maleness are defined as masculine,
feminist theory has long recognised that the characteristics most valued as masculine are socially constructed, thus masculinity must be understood as not a natural
trait, but something that must be achieved before ones peers (Barker 2005; Connell
2003). Research on the construction of masculinity in Nigeria found that both men
and women hold expectations of mens roles and both genders expect men to be
evaluated on the degree to which they fulfil social expectations of masculinity
(Barker 2005). The military is a patriarchal institution based on violence and hypermasculine ideology. This article adopts the feminist understanding of patriarchy as
the structure of social, cultural, and political institutions in which power and social
value are disproportionately endowed upon men as a group at the expense of women
as a group. As a system, patriarchy rewards behaviour that can be interpreted as antiwoman and oppressive. As an institution, the military socialises soldiers to be

122 S. Meger
aggressive and to devalue women and feminine traits. Sexual violence, it has been
argued, is inherent to the institution, as evident from the history of sexual violence
against women perpetrated by militaries throughout history and continuing today
(Brownmiller 1975; Jeffreys 2007). According to Jeffreys (2007, 18) this masculinity
is deliberately created by militaries . . . which enable men to other women and
understand themselves as masculine. Thus, the occurrence of sexual violence in
warfare is not entirely surprising, as it can be understood as a product of the hypermasculine climate of abuse and antipathy towards women.
When examining the relationship between masculinity and the behaviour of
soldiers, most clearly visible are the expectations of soldiers of physical prowess and
possession of control. Military institutions tend to foster the physical and violent
forms of masculinity to the point that masculinity becomes inextricably associated
with an ability and willingness to commit violence (Baaz and Stern 2008). The sexual
politics of aggression in military masculine culture is evident when one examines
how thoroughly saturated military language and training is with misogynist sexual
imagery (Niarchos 1995). Gray (in Niarchos 1995, 670) believes that anyone
entering military service for the first time can only be astonished by soldiers
concentration upon the subject of women and, more especially, upon the sexual act.
It is this misogynist focus of militarism that leads to violence against women. Even
when this militarism is outside the context of war, women suffer the consequences of
the socialised hyper-masculinity, patriarchy, and concern for national security. The
relationship between the military institution and misogyny is made clearer by the
work of OToole (2007), who believes that while gender role socialisation encourages
all men to objectify women and sexualises violence against women, it is necessary to
understand why it is that not every man rapes. She concludes that male rape
subcultures, such as the fraternity subculture and the sport subculture (which
encourage strong boundary maintenance, secret rituals, and hypermasculinity)
encourage the perpetration of sexual violence against women. This is due to two
key factors in masculine subculture dynamics: firstly, that strong identification with a
group leads to a replacement of individual ethics; and, secondly, that socialisation
within such subcultures contributes to group sexual aggression (OSullivan 1993).
From OTooles work on masculine subcultures, it is easy to see how the armed
forces can constitute a similar rape subculture, since war and the conduct of warfare
is mans work, and bravery in warfare is considered the ultimate test of manhood
(Brownmiller 1994, 51). It is in a context of masculinity and male sense of power that
sexual violence in war occurs. Brownmiller (1975, 64) argues that it is
in the nature of any institution in which men are set apart from women and given power
of the gun that the accruing owner may be used against all women, for a female victim
of rape in war is chosen not because she is a representation of the enemy, but precisely
because she is a woman, and therefore an enemy.

And yet, the systematic and prevalent use of sexual violence in conflict begs the
question of its function. This article has already discussed the conditions under
which Seifert (1994) identifies the use of rape. She also identifies five interpretations
of sexual violence in conflict: 1) as an integral part of warfare; 2) as an element of
male-to-male communication, usually in the form of symbolic humiliation of ones
opponent; 3) as a means of reaffirming ones own masculinity; 4) as a tool with which

Journal of Contemporary African Studies 123

to destroy the culture of ones opponent; and 5) as the outcome of misogyny (to this
end, Seifert gives the example of Serbian rape of Serbian women during the Yugoslav
war: Thus women are raped not because they are enemies, but because they are the
objects of fundamental hatred that characterises the cultural unconscious and is
actualised in times of crisis (Seifert 1994, 65). Equally important to the physical
consequences of rape in war are the psychological consequences it has for ones
opponent. Rape can play a significant role in differentiating the warring factions by
fostering the mutual rejection and externalisation of the other (Bennett 1994, 29). In
most cultures, rape exploits core themes of honour, shame, family and identity
(Nordstrom 1994, 16). Thus, rape is used with the objective of not just destruction,
but also total humiliation, effectively demoralising and undermining the solidarity of
the victimised group with long-term consequences (Bennett 1994, 34).
Given its prevalence and success as a strategic weapon of war, the integral
question becomes: why do some soldiers and some armed groups rape during conflict
and not others? In her analysis of conflicts in which sexual violence is noticeably
absent, Wood (2009, 2006) finds that it is not the nature of the conflict itself that
determines use of sexual violence, but rather the nature of the groups involved. Wood
finds that, compared with other forms of violence used by armed groups against
civilians, instances of rape occur in sharply varying proportions. This prompted her
to seek an explanation not for why sexual violence is often employed as a weapon of
war, but why it is not employed in the conflicts in which war rape is less common.
What she finds is that the absence of sexual violence in a groups repertoire of
violence relates to the degree of internal hierarchy and discipline within the group,
and also how strong of an ideological basis the group has. She finds the two
indicators related in that the ability to maintain strict internal discipline by armed
groups is largely dependent on a strong ideological basis for that group, the latter of
which should be understood as groups fighting on behalf of a particular social group
in defence of those perceived injustices committed against that group.
Often, government forces have far less ideological basis on which to draw
members. Perhaps it is for this reason that Butler et al. (2007) find the incidence of
sexual violence by members of state forces is driven by individual out-of-control
agents. Relying on data for 163 countries for 2003, Butler et al. find that sexual
violence employed by state security forces during conflict is more likely in situations
in which there is low level of control over public officials. This is especially the case
for financial oversight, since the level of financial corruption in a political system is
robustly associated with the extensiveness of sexual violence committed by policemen
and soldiers (Butler et al. 2007, 680). They also find that ethnic conflict or
fractionalisation is not an explanatory factor in the use of sexual violence in conflict,
because when agency variables are included in the analysis ethnic divisions are not
statistically significant.
The problem with Butler et al.s analysis of their findings, however, is the
suggestion that commanding officers do not want the sexual violence to occur, nor
are they aware of its occurrence, nor do they have the ability to enforce discipline
over their troops. What would be expected if this were the case, then, would be the
absence of sexual violence in the presence of commanding officers, and most
prevalent amongst troops out in the field. However, no such pattern can be
identified in the use of sexual violence in conflict. What this means is that sexual
violence is implicitly sanctioned or at very least tacitly allowed through the highest

124 S. Meger
levels of the military structure amongst the forces for which sexual violence does exist
in their repertoire of violence (Leiby 2006, 8). What can also be discerned from these
analyses is that the groups most likely to allow for soldiers to use sexual violence are
those that are financially motivated (such as government forces or militia groups in
resource-rich countries).
Another variable that needs to be considered when determining what factors lead
groups to use sexual violence is masculinity. The question must be raised regarding
masculinity and masculine subcultures: is it that some militaries are not as
masculine as others? If it is the case that constructions of hegemonic masculinity
are created and reinforced in military institutions, is it possible to quantify a degree
of masculinity that correlates with the extent to which a group commits acts of sexual
violence? Higate and Henry (2004) look at constructions of masculinity in relation to
sexual exploitation by peacekeepers in relation to just such a question. What they
argue is that constructs of masculinity are diverse, and that military subcultures
create masculine identities and practices that are also shaped by varying religions,
classes, and backgrounds. Therefore, they expected that in groups for whom other
identity factors are stronger than masculine identity, less sexual violence would be
employed. What they found in their analysis of peacekeeping forces is that
intersections of hegemonic masculinity with these other identity factors can have
an influence over soldiers behaviour, provided there is sufficient deterrence in the
form of enforced moral codes.
What these studies emphasise is something feminists have been claiming for
decades: that the implicit tolerance by military commanders and political leaders is
that rape is a natural, if regrettable, aspect of war, a view informed by socialised
ideas of masculinity and femininity, leading to the condoned use of sexual violence as
a weapon of war (Farwell 2004, 389). Also reinforced is the feminist argument that
the tacit allowance of sexual violence is largely related to womens social position and
a given societys moral codes. The danger of identifying particular causes of wartime
rape can be stripping individual soldiers of the agency involved in the commission of
such acts. However, there is a structural element that varies the degree to which an
armed group engages in sexual violence. What apparently differentiates armed
groups that use sexual violence from those that do not is the degree to which that
group can impose discipline hierarchically to prevent soldiers in the group from
engaging in sexual violence ! whatever the rationale for this restraint may be from
the position of the commanders.
The Democratic Republic of Congo
The sexual violence being perpetrated in the DRC is taking place in the context of a
protracted and brutal civil conflict that dates back to 1998. The conflict is often
referred to as Africas World War due to the fact that the DRC is inextricably
embedded in the larger context of other local conflicts; the proximity of the
Rwandan genocide, the Sudanese civil war, the Ugandan civil war, and the Angolan
civil war. This combined with strategic alliances formed between government forces
of these countries and internal militia groups has led to the emergence of a war
zone with the DRC falling in the middle (Reyntjens 1999, 241; Nest 2006; Prunier
2009).

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

125

Arguably, one of the primary motivations for the involvement of external actors
in the DRC is the vast mineral wealth contained in the countrys eastern provinces,
the exploitation of which has shaped much of the Congos history (Nest 2006).
When, in 1996, Laurent Kabila, backed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army and
Ugandas People Defence Force, led a coup against long-serving Zairean President
Mobutu, it was supported by revenue generated from mineral commodities, which
the alliance promised to private foreign companies in exchange for financial support
! something Michael L. Ross describes as a booty futures market (in Nest 2006, 23).
Once instated as president, Kabila began to rely more heavily on international
Western support and, according to Dunn (2002), demonstrated a lack of gratitude to
the alliance that put him in power. In 1998, Kabila attempted to purge Rwandans
from high-ranking positions within his government, which was met with another
attempted coup orchestrated by Rwanda and Uganda. What saved Kabila from
being overthrown was the support of Zimbabwe and Angola, both countries that had
a vested interest in accessing Congolese mineral resources for the maintenance of
their own failing domestic economies.
When direct intervention failed, the Ugandan and Rwandan governments began
providing support for anti-government rebel groups in the eastern regions of the
DRC, and seemed content to maintain the political vacuum in this resource-rich
region, as it allowed each country de facto control and access to the area. With the
support of these foreign governments, rebel groups such as the Rassemblement
Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), and the Mouvement pour la Liberation du
Congo (MLC) formed and maintained fighting against the Laurent Kabila (and after
his assassination, Joseph Kabilas) government, as well as community-based rebel
groups, known as Mai Mai, formed to defend their local territory from all of the
other actors involved.
A number of extra-national militia groups are also involved in the conflict, one of
the most prominent of which is the Forces Democratiques de la Liberation du Rwanda
(FDLR), comprised largely of Rwandan Interahamwe ge nocidaires, responsible for
most of the killings in Rwanda. The FDLR are very active in eastern provinces of the
DRC in illegal mining activities and are largely considered by NGOs to be most
responsible for the atrocities committed against civilians. Until very recently, much of
the actual warfare was due to pro-Tutsi militia groups, accusing the Congolese
government of not sufficiently protecting the Congolese Tutsis from the violence
being perpetrated by the FDLR in North and South Kivu provinces, waging conflict
against both the Congolese army and the FDLR. The most prominent of these
groups is the Congre`s National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), led by Laurent
Nkunda until January of 2009, and widely considered to be supported by the
Rwandan government. In January 2009, the CNDP split and Laurent Nkunda was
arrested in Rwanda, where he is still being held without charges at the time of
writing. Despite the arrest of Nkunda, extreme levels of violence continue in the
eastern provinces of the DRC, with complex and shifting configurations of alliances
between the Congolese army, FDLR, Mai Mai groups, and newly emerging rebel
groups. The constant shift in alliances and confusing array of rebel groups involved
in the fighting has meant that at various times, all groups have been either allies or
enemies of the Congolese government, largely depending on its relationship with
Rwanda at any given time.

126 S. Meger
Sexual violence in the DRC
There is no doubt that rape is a method in this environment to create continued
instability ! dominance is very prominent. And it is without question the worst
environment that I have seen.
Colonel Roddy Winser, UN Peacekeeper Chief of Staff Eastern DRC
Division
(quoted in Jackson 2007).

Since the outbreak of war in 1998, Congolese women have been victims of rape on a
scale never seen before (Nolen 2005, 56) with sexual exploitation of women and girls
as young as six months old being committed by all armed groups in the country,
including United Nations peacekeepers (Lynch 2004, A27). In the single month of
June 2008, over 2,200 rapes were reported in the province of Nord Kivu, alone
(Lewis 2008). This is despite the latest peace agreement signed 23 January 2008 by 22
armed groups and the government of the DRC, a deal which, according to the UN,
has been violated 200 times in the 180 days immediately following the agreement
(Lewis 2008).
In the last 10 years, hundreds of thousands of women and girls in the DRC have
been raped (Jackson 2007; Kimani 2007). Between 2005 and October 2007, more
than 32,000 cases of rape and sexual violence were registered in South Kivu alone, a
number suspected to be less than half of all incidents (Holmes 2007). Although many
Congolese attribute the majority of sexual violence to the Interahamwe (Christine
Schuyler Deschryver in Jackson 2007), all armed groups in the DRC are implicated
in the sexual violence, including the national armed forces of the DRC (FARDC)
and the national police force (Pace re 2007). Even Mission de lOrganisation des
Nations Unies en Republique democratique du Congo [United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo] (UN MONUC) peacekeepers
have been found to be buying sexual slaves from villagers in exchange for milk and
bread (Jackson 2007). One woman, Androsi, a 27-year-old widow from the town of
Bukiringi, was raped in the morning by DRC soldiers and again by militia soldiers
the same afternoon (Briggs 2007, 168).
Many of the victims of sexual violence in the DRC have been subjected to horrific
mutilation that goes far beyond mere rape. A condition called fistula is caused by
genitals traumatised by the destructive insertion of guns and sticks into the womens
vaginas that tears the walls of the vagina and rectum and leave many permanently
incontinent (Jackson 2007). According to Falconberg (2008), [a]fter gang raping
women and girls, soldiers are piercing their labia and padlocking their vaginas shut.
Hot plastic as well as sticks and bayonets are being inserted into the women. Sixmonth-old girls have been raped to death. . . . To intensify the cruelty, soldiers are
even shooting women in the vagina. Upon his return from visiting the Congo in
2007, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, wrote
an opinion piece on the conflict in the Los Angeles Times, in which he repeated an
account he had heard of a woman who was returning from working her fields when
she was accosted by seven soldiers who gang-raped her. The last rapist forced the
barrel of his gun inside her and pulled the trigger, literally blowing apart her genitals
(11 October 2007). Clearly, this intensity of violence constitutes more than simple
assault, and rather is a systematic means of terrorising the civilian population.

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

127

In a detailed study of sexual violence occurring in south Kivu, Ohambe et al.

(2004, 33!4) found that, by far, the most prevalent form of rape against women in the
province is gang rape, with an average of 4.5 attackers per victim. In addition,
analysis of the interviews suggests that 70% of the rapes were planned in advance
with a specific aim in mind: to terrorise, loot, rape and then leave (Ohambe et al.
2004, 34). In an interview, one victim described her experience:
A few moments after the Interahamwe arrived in the village I heard my neighbour
screaming. I looked out the window and I saw some men, all holding rifles. Immediately,
I wanted to run away and hide but three of them turned up at our house. My husband
pretended to be asleep . . . They grabbed me roughly. One of them restrained me, while
another took my [chili pepper] pestle and pushed it several times into my vagina, as if he
was pounding. This agony seemed to be a never-ending hell . . . then they suddenly left.
For two weeks, my vagina was discharging. I was operated on, you can see . . . [the
woman pulled up her gown] . . . I have to relieve myself into a bag tied to an opening in
the side of my belly. They also killed my husband and my son (quoted in Ohambe et al.
2004, 34).

Understanding the violence against women in the DRC requires an understanding of the social context in which these acts are taking place. Women in the
DRC are disproportionately disadvantaged socially and economically. The war
exacerbated these disadvantages and many women and girls have been forced by the
war and poverty into prostitution as a means of survival, making them even more
vulnerable to sexual violence (Ohambe et al. 2004, 26).
In addition to the social and economic consequences of the sexual violence in the
DRC, 91% of women are reportedly suffering from behavioural problems, most
commonly self-loathing, excessive sweating, insomnia, nightmares, memory loss,
aggression, anxiety, a sense of dread, and withdrawal into themselves (ibid, 42).
Many rape victims are ostracised from their communities, abandoned by their
husbands and families, who hold the victims responsible for the sexual violence they
endured.
All this adds up to a grim picture for the women who are single and has a profound effect
on their mental equilibrium ! especially in a country like the DRC where encouraging a
high birth rate remains deeply entrenched in its culture. Women who have suffered sexual
violence and who as a result will not be able to fulfil the reproductive role that society
assigns to them often find themselves judged for it (Ohambe et al. 2004, 42).

The extent of the sexual violence and community response has, Ohambe et al.
(2004, 43) argued, created dysfunction in the family unit, which in some cases is no
longer in a position to play the role of guardian of moral and ethical values, leaving
many children who witness the violence deeply traumatised, with serious social
consequences.
Impunity persists for crimes of sexual violence in the eastern DRC; despite
reforms to legislation aimed at combating the tide of sexual violence, few
perpetrators are ever punished (Pace re 2007; Kimani 2007). From January to July
2008, only a handful of perpetrators have been arrested for crimes of sexual violence
and only a small number of soldiers and police officers have been prosecuted for their
crimes (Human Rights Watch Congo Advocacy Coalition 2008, 3). John Prendergast
and Colin Thomas-Jensen (2007) found in their research of impunity for sexual

128 S. Meger
violence in eastern DRC that the vast majority of citizens of the eastern Congo find
their livelihood inextricably tied to criminal activities of the armed groups: [t]hey are
suppliers of wives for the army and militia, labour for the landowners, and food
producers for the combatants who loot their harvests (Prendergast and ThomasJensen 2007, 3). Briggs (2007, 168) argues that the atmosphere of impunity has led to
a belief among soldiers and civilian men that they can perpetrate crimes of sexual
violence without consequence. And while MONUC has been assisting local
Congolese efforts at prosecuting crimes of sexual violence, the number of cases
that actually go to trial remains very low and because of the impunity, the population
of the DRC has lost confidence in the justice system (Pace re 2007, 16).
Explaining the use of sexual violence in the conflict in eastern DRC
It is impossible to explain the use of sexual violence in conflict by relying solely on
individual motivation or solely on systemic influences. From what has been witnessed
in the Congo, it is possible to identify both individual causes and structural
conditions to explain the prevalence of sexual violence in this conflict. In the case of
the DRC, three converging factors relate to explain the prevalence of sexual violence
in this conflict: economic ambition, hegemonic social constructions of masculinity,
and the general inability to enforce discipline among armed groups in the war.
Individual responsibility for the commission of sexual violence cannot be denied,
and the soldiers who participate in these crimes make the conscious decision to do so.
Explaining why individual soldiers are choosing to participate in the widespread
abuse of women requires an understanding of the social constructions of masculinity
both within Congolese society and, most importantly, within the military institution.
The militarised groups of the DRC are, like all militaries, a place where men learn to
associate violence with masculinity. Interviews conducted by Baaz and Stern (2009)
with members of the DRC armed forces found that most soldiers explained their
commission of sexual violence by relying on ideals of masculinity and the sexually
potent male fighter, which they explicitly contrasted with feminine qualities of
ineptitude (like a woman). In the words of one soldier those who are not able to
make it, we call them the inept, also sometimes women, the inept will run away
(quoted in Baaz and Stern 2008, 67).
Perhaps more interesting of their findings, though, was that most soldiers also
expressed fears of not being perceived as sufficiently masculine. Many expressed
anxiety over perceptions of not providing for their families, something that was
necessary to keep the women faithful. Soldiers expressed feelings of frustration and
powerlessness, saying We soldiers commit rape, why do we commit rapes? Poverty/
suffering. When we are not paid, or not paid at all. We are hungry. And I have a gun.
In my house my wife does not love me anymore. I also have a wish to have a good
life. . .. You have sex and then you kill her, if the anger is too strong (male corporal in
Baaz and Stern 2009, 511). Rape, for these men, was a way of reasserting their
masculinity, and fulfilling masculine sexual needs. The discourses of the soldiers
interviewed relied heavily on constructions of masculinity (and femininity), which are
formed and reinforced within the military institutions. The anxiety experienced by
the soldiers when faced with the impossibility of fulfilling their position as men is
largely what motivates individual soldiers, who rape as a means to reconstitute their
masculinity.

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

129

Many emphasise, however, that the rapes are not sexually motivated, and
underscore the malice with which the crimes are executed. One doctor at Panzi
Hospital in Goma explained, [The rape] is done to destroy completely the social,
family fabric of society (Pratt and Werchick 2004, 8). However, to deny the sexuality
of the act and argue that the commission is solely about power ignores the way
sexual desire has often been framed as a theatre of power while power has been
gendered. If the fundamental relationship of male to female was one of rule, then
sexual desire and intercourse were invariably mixed with relations of power (Baldwin
2002, 21). What is more useful in understanding the function of rape in the DRC is
Patricia Rozees typology, which breaks different categories of rape into: punitive
rape, status rape (which occurs as a result of differences in rank and hierarchy),
ceremonial rape, exchange rape, theft rape, and survival rape. All of these types
of rape are currently being witnessed in the eastern DRC (in Penn and Nardos 2003,
54!5).
What this typology suggests is a much deeper and more systemic causal influence
for the rapes in the DRC than can be explained simply by individual motivation. The
use of sexual violence is something being encouraged and exploited by groups in the
conflict, and there is necessarily a collective responsibility to the crime. Sexual
violence is being used to punish individuals, families and communities accused of
supporting the enemy, and to subjugate populations, both as tools of domination
and, the primary motivation of these groups, to terrorise the civilian population
enabling them access to and control over regional mines and vast mineral wealth held
in the eastern DRC. However, understanding the collective element of wartime rape
necessitates an understanding of the social dynamics that its use is based upon.
Understanding what, socially, makes rape such a successful tool of terror in the DRC
can aid the understanding of its practice.
Women in the DRC have a very low social status in both traditional and civil
domains predating the current conflict. Their inferior status is embedded in both the
legal code of the country, as well as in dominant social customs. Violence against
women is not uncommon in the DRC and in many regions it is perceived as
acceptable treatment of women. While rape existed prior to the outbreak of violence,
it most often took the form of the rape of a girl out on an errand, such as gathering
firewood or collecting water, by a male admirer. The two families usually resolved
the issue, often by marrying the two or requiring the perpetrator to pay some form of
restitution to the girls family (Pratt and Werchick 2004, 9). Social norms in much of
the DRC emphasise masculinity, and expectations are placed on men to have a high
sex drive, to obtain multiple partners, to bestow gifts in exchange for sex, to be
financial capable of purchasing one or multiple wives, and having the physical,
economic, and social power to protect their wives from other men (Mechanic 2004,
15). It is precisely these social ideas about masculinity and the appropriate roles of
men and women in Congolese society that have been exacerbated by the war.
A number of laws still exist in the Congo that make it clear that women are
subservient to men, including laws requiring a woman to seek her husbands
permission to open a bank account, accept a job, or buy or sell property. The
Congolese Family Code goes so far as to state that women must obey their husbands
as the head of household (Human Rights Watch 2002). Socially, women are
subordinated to men through customs that place women at a lower status than men.
Womens social status is highly dependent on their marital status. Literacy and

130 S. Meger
education rates for women remain far lower than those for men. Very few women
hold positions of authority in civil society or politics.
In Congolese culture, women are generally perceived as the core of the
community, as they are the caregivers, child-bearers, nurturers, and workers for the
community. Their social role has been constructed as the locus or carriers of culture
(Kelly 2000, 50), and as such an attack on a woman in a given community is an
attack on that community. The intention of the attacker can be understood from two
dimensions: firstly, as a direct attack on an individual woman as a representative of
her gender or her community; and, secondly, the attack is a symbolic gesture, sending
a message to a second target, be it the womans husband, father, or other men of her
community (Card 1996). In Congolese family law, a man is bestowed with the duty to
protect his wife. It is particularly this role Congolese men have as protectors of
women and girls that makes sexual assault such an effective weapon in this conflict,
as it provides a clear demonstration of their inability to protect their women,
striking at their masculine identities.
The social position of women has encouraged impunity for the crimes being
committed as part of this ongoing conflict. Rape in Congolese society has
traditionally been considered a private issue, and something one member of the
transitional government was overheard dismissing as a womens issue that women
needed to deal with on their own (Pratt and Werchick 2004, 13). Even a MONUC
commander had told members of his team that rape was a normal behaviour of
soldiers and could be expected of men who had been in the field for a duration of
time (ibid). Even though rape is criminal under Congolese law, its definition is quite
limited; it is considered as a crime against the honour of the husband.
Where complaints have been made, prosecutions remain low, hindered by
outdated laws, the widespread impunity of combatants from justice, a refusal to
recognise the serious nature of sexual offences and insufficient attention to the needs
of the victims (Human Rights Watch 2005, 22). Even when authorities were open to
receiving complaints, efforts at prosecutions were frequently thwarted because
others with power or official position obstructed the effort to bring those responsible
to justice (Human Rights Watch 2005, 39). Often, commanding officers arrange for
their soldiers accused of sexual violence to be transferred elsewhere. As well,
investigations and prosecutions are hampered by reluctance to arrest or thoroughly
investigate fellow soldiers. Thus, the Human Rights Watch (2005, 42) finds that of
the cases that reach trial phase, few end in conviction, in part because those
prosecuting are from the same institution as the accused. What is more, due to
widespread corruption in the justice system in the DRC, bribes are commonly
accepted by judges and other officials to influence the outcome of an investigation or
trial (Human Rights Watch 2005, 42). Frederico Borello (2004, 24) found that
corruption dictates the outcome of most judicial proceedings in the DRC,
encouraged by the fact that judges salaries are below the DRC poverty line.
While the social status of women and social constructions of masculinity go far to
explaining why rape has become such a prominent feature in the conflict in the
Congo, perhaps equally explanatory is the economic dimension to the sexual
violence occurring in eastern DRC. It has been argued that the militia groups actively
maintain the chaos necessary to loot the DRCs vast resources, particularly gold, tin,
and coltan, a resource required for the making of mobile phones and electronics, of
which the DRC holds an estimated 80% of the worlds deposits (Jackson 2007). It is

Journal of Contemporary African Studies 131

estimated that $1 million of coltan is illegally exported every day. The DRC is
currently listed as the most corrupt country in the world, thanks in large part to
foreign demand for these precious resources (Hitchens 2008).
Literature on contemporary civil wars has found an increased use of violence
targeting civilians as a common weapon by which to pursue economic agendas. What
this literature fails to recognise, however, is the gendered nature of this style of
warfare. In the DRC, rape has proven a particularly effective tool of both symbolic
and physical subjugation and social disorder. With global demand for Congolese
resources continually rising, there is an economic incentive for local groups and their
international supporters to maintain the destabilisation in order that they may access
and mine these resources. Global Witness found in field research in 2008 and 2009
that all of the main warring parties are heavily involved in the mineral trade in the
provinces most affected. The two groups accused of causing the most harm are also
those most involved in the illegal exportation of minerals: FARDC and the FDLR.
The involvement of FARDC military personnel in mineral exploitation is widespread
and the system of financial compensation for that exploitation is well organised:
commanders are directly involved and the profits are channelled back up the
military hierarchy (Global Witness 2009, 25). According to one UN source, If a
person has a rank in the army, he has access to natural resources (quoted in Global
Witness 2009, 25). In addition to direct involvement in the mining of minerals, the
groups also kidnap locals and force them to work in the mines, extorting illegal
taxes on the civilian population as further income-generation (Global Witness
2009). The FDLR, specifically, have a stranglehold on south Kivus mineral trade,
including extorting minerals and money from the local miners, taxing the
commodities at roadblocks at a rate of 30% (Global Witness 2009, 5). And though
FARDC has claimed to be fighting the FDLR in the Kivu provinces, the two groups
often act in collaboration, creating agreements on controlling mining territories, and
sometimes sharing in the loot (Global Witness 2009).
This illegal exploitation of resources in eastern Congo has created a pervasive
shadow economy, which has been institutionalised to the point that the entire
country is reliant on the war-based economic exploitation occurring in the countrys
eastern provinces. While most reports on the illegal mining activities in the eastern
DRC focus on the militia groups involved in the mining and exportation, very little is
written about, which beyond the borders of the DRC are enjoying access to these
vast riches. Very little is said of the participation of Western corporate interests in
supporting the warring factions controlling the various mines in the DRC, often
wilfully and in alliance with regional and political authorities. A UN Panel of Experts
reported in 2002 119 different companies involved in the mining and transportation
of Congolese minerals, including a large number of British, American, Belgian and
South African firms. The report also found that of the 29 companies found in
violation of the law, many of them, though registered in Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, or
Zimbabwe, were actually front operations for Western firms. The same Experts
Report found that many of the companies involved in the illegal exportation of DRC
minerals contribute to the continuation of the conflict directly or indirectly,
deliberately or through negligence (UN Panel of Experts Report 2002, 32). What
this suggests is that it is not simply the greed of particular groups within the DRC
that motivate the continuation of conflict in the country, but rather the global

132 S. Meger
demand for the resources and, to a significant extent, the role of external actors who
stand to benefit from the cover the chaos of war provides for their illegal activities.
Clearly, none of the groups involved could be defined as ideologically-based
under Woods (2009) categorisation of armed groups least likely to commit sexual
violence. Instead, the rampant use of sexual violence by all armed groups in the
Congo is better explained by Butler et al.s findings ! that financially-motivated
groups are most likely to use sexual violence as a war strategy. Any allegiance or
claims of representation of a particular section of the population is more accurately
described as a fac ade for self-interested, financial agendas of these groups. And no
hierarchical structures exist that enforce norms against the use of rape. In fact, militia
groups responsible for some of the worst atrocities in the DRC have transformed
overnight into political parties and their leaders have been rewarded with highranking military or political positions. As already seen, the sexual violence being
perpetrated is not considered a significant issue by commanders, or politicians, in the
Congo, and the rampant impunity is evidence of the unwillingness to enforce norms
hierarchically. Beyond lack of enforcement, many militia members and army soldiers
are benefiting from their conduct, as former combatants are integrated into the
national army, often into high-ranking positions as a reward for laying down their
arms, or rewarded with political positions. Thus, the army, government institutions,
and even the government itself are composed of individuals responsible for some of
the most serious offences.
The conflict has stagnated what little regular economic activity existed in the
region, further impoverishing the civilians of the region. Thus, the DRC is currently
stuck in a cycle of fighting for financial gain, and fighting causing further
impoverishment. That the international community has thus far left the Congos
mineral economy out of peace talks has only served to legitimise the looting, in effect
converting the warring party into a surrogate state official.
Concluding remarks
What this article has shown is the complexity of understanding the causes of rape in
the conflict in the DRC. It is best understood from two dimensions: the individual
motivation and the structural influences. The article has shown these two dimensions
to be inextricably linked, and that the most thorough understanding of the use of
rape in the conflict in the Congo comes from understanding the interaction of these
two dimensions.
Individual agency cannot be discounted in accounts of the use of rape in conflict.
As this article has shown, the soldiers in the DRC engaging in rape are aware of their
actions and the violation of social norms that their actions constitute. However, what
we have also found is that the motivating factor for most individuals was the anxiety
to fulfil social expectations of masculinity, though the expectations are constructed in
such a way that the fulfilment of them is virtually an impossible task. Also evident
from the discourse used by the soldiers were the notions of femininity constructed by
Congolese society, which encourage both individual and social justification of the act
of rape.
From a structural perspective, the primary factors influencing the use of sexual
violence in this conflict are firstly the financial objectives of the groups involved, and
secondly the social attitudes toward the issue that discourage the enforcement of laws

Journal of Contemporary African Studies 133

relating to rape. Empirical studies have shown that warring groups most likely to use
sexual violence are those that are motivated by financial opportunity rather than
ideological cause. Although some of the groups involved in the conflict in the Congo,
such as the CNDP and the FDLR, may claim to be acting on the behalf of certain
communities (the Tutsis and Hutus, respectively), it seems apparent that their actual
objectives are control over and exploitation of mines in the provinces of the eastern
Congo. Sexual violence has proven an effective tool, and one of many employed to
instil fear in the civilian population, effectively restricting freedom of movement and
regular economic activity, giving the armed group the liberty to take over control of
that economic activity without interference. Because the groups involved in the
Congo do not rely on civilians for information, food, protection, or support, and
because they have no ambition to govern these same civilians, there are no factors
prohibiting this tool of destabilisation. As well, the widespread impunity for crimes
of sexual violence has also meant that there is very little to prohibit groups from
including it in their repertoire of violence.
What emerges from this study of the use of rape as a weapon of war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo are two clear policy requirements: the restriction of
the illegal exportation of Congolese gold, tin, coltan and other minerals; and, ending
impunity for crimes of sexual violence perpetrated in this conflict. Addressing
impunity for these crimes in the DRC will require more than just greater resources
for the judicial system, but also addressing the status of women generally in the
country and social values placed on concepts of masculinity and femininity.
Note on contributor
Sara Meger is a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne in the School of Social and
Political Sciences, where she is conducting research on the international political economy of
wartime sexual violence. She holds a Master of International Politics degree from the
University of Melbourne and is a recipient of the Melbourne International Research
Scholarship.

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