Contract and Delict

Cases
19. Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, et.al., G.R. No. 156109,
November 18, 2004;
20. Spouses Guanio vs. Makati Shangrila-Hotel and Resort, Inc., G.R. No. 190601,
February 7, 2011;
21. Padilla, et.al.vs. CA, G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984;
22. PNCC vs. CA, G.R. No. 159270, August 22, 2005;
23. NPC vs. Heirs of Noble Casionan, G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008;
24. Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA, G.R. No. L-53401, November 6, 1989;
25. Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals;
26. Tison and Jabon vs. Spouses Pomasin, et.al., GR No. 173180, August 24, 2011;

Page 1 of 43

19. Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, et.al., G.R. No.
156109, November 18, 2004;
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004] KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by
ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner, vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A.
GAMUROT and ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students agree to abide by the
standards of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in the form of manuals that are distributed to the
enrollees at the start of the school term. Further, the school informs them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay.
Consequently, it cannot, after the enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other than
those it specified upon enrolment.
The Case
[1]

[2]

Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to nullify the July 12, 2002 and the November 22,
2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541. The
decretal portion of the first assailed Order reads:
[3]

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action.

[4]

The second challenged Order denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of
Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her
relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance Revolution, the proceeds of
which were to go to the construction of the schools tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two
tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets
with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final
examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to
pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics,
her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The
next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take
their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioners pleas
ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCSTs
policy.
[5]

On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and
Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as moral damages; at
least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorneys fees.
[6]

On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy
of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher
Education (CHED).
In her Comment to respondents Motion, petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was
unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for damages arising from respondents
breach of the laws on human relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.
On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In granting respondents Motion to Dismiss, the trial court noted that the instant controversy involved a higher institution
of learning, two of its faculty members and one of its students. It added that Section 54 of the Education Act of 1982 vested
in the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) the supervision and regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the
[7]
CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy.

Page 2 of 43

In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action without, however,
explaining this ground.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on pure questions of law.

[8]

Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a civil action exclusively for damages based
on violation of the human relation provisions of the Civil Code, filed by a student against her former school.
Whether or not there is a need for prior declaration of invalidity of a certain school administrative policy by the Commission
on Higher Education (CHED) before a former student can successfully maintain an action exclusively for damages in regular
courts.
Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for damages
[9]
based upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on human relations filed by a student against the school.
All of the foregoing point to one issue -- whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable.
The Court, however, sees a second issue which, though not expressly raised by petitioner, was impliedly contained in her
Petition: whether the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioners alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the
propriety of PCSTs academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative body
tasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to protect, foster and promote the right of all citizens to
[10]
affordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is accessible to all.
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy
[11]
beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the courts.
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case.
[12]
In Factoran Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,
comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first
been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct
[13]
their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. x x x.
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her
final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would
not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents acts could no longer be
undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative
[14]
body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial
[15]
system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award
[16]
damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within
[17]
the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioners action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of
[18]
the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Sufficient Causes of Action Stated in the Allegations in the Complaint
[19]

As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal. A
complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming the facts that are alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a
[20]
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint.

Page 3 of 43

A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged facts. In their Motion
to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of petitioners allegations, and they admitted that x x x the crux of plaintiffs
[21]
cause of action is the determination of whether or not the assessment of P100 per ticket is excessive or oppressive. They
thereby premised their prayer for dismissal on the Complaints alleged failure to state a cause of action. Thus, a
reexamination of the Complaint is in order.
The Complaint contains the following factual allegations:
10.

In the second week of February 2002, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot, in connivance with PCST,
forced plaintiff and her classmates to buy or take two tickets each, x x x;

11.

Plaintiff and many of her classmates objected to the forced distribution and selling of tickets to them
but the said defendant warned them that if they refused [to] take or pay the price of the two tickets
they would not be allowed at all to take the final examinations;

12.

As if to add insult to injury, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot bribed students with additional fifty points
or so in their test score in her subject just to unjustly influence and compel them into taking the
tickets;

13.

Despite the students refusal, they were forced to take the tickets because [of] defendant Rachelle A.
Gamurots coercion and act of intimidation, but still many of them including the plaintiff did not attend
the dance party imposed upon them by defendants PCST and Rachelle A. Gamurot;

14.

Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her own two tickets because aside form the fact that she could
not afford to pay them it is also against her religious practice as a member of a certain religious
congregation to be attending dance parties and celebrations;

15.

On March 14, 2002, before defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot gave her class its final examination in the
subject Logic she warned that students who had not paid the tickets would not be allowed to
participate in the examination, for which threat and intimidation many students were eventually forced
to make payments:

16.

Because plaintiff could not afford to pay, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot inhumanly made plaintiff sit
out the class but the defendant did not allow her to take her final examination in Logic;

17.

On March 15, 2002 just before the giving of the final examination in the subject Statistics, defendant
Elissa Baladad, in connivance with defendants Rachelle A. Gamurot and PCST, announced in the
classroom that she was not allowing plaintiff and another student to take the examination for their
failure and refusal to pay the price of the tickets, and thenceforth she ejected plaintiff and the other
student from the classroom;

18.

Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take the examination but all defendants could say was that the
prohibition to give the examinations to non-paying students was an administrative decision;

19.

Plaintiff has already paid her tuition fees and other obligations in the school;

20.

That the above-cited incident was not a first since PCST also did another forced distribution of tickets
[22]
to its students in the first semester of school year 2001-2002; x x x

The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first, breach of contract; and second, liability for tort.
Reciprocity of the School-Student Contract
[23]

In Alcuaz v. PSBA, the Court characterized the relationship between the school and the student as a contract, in
[24]
which a student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. Two years later, in Non v. Dames
[25]
II, the Court modified the termination of contract theory in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship between the
school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to complete
[26]
it. Except for the variance in the period during which the contractual relationship is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and
Non were unanimous in characterizing the school-student relationship as contractual in nature.
The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide
students with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
[27]
students agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.
The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception -- upon enrolment of the student.
Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior and discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to
new students at the start of every school year. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the
terms of payment.

Page 4 of 43

In practice, students are normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the balance to be paid
before every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to pay their financial obligation is regarded as a valid
ground for the school to deny them the opportunity to take these examinations.
The foregoing practice does not merely ensure compliance with financial obligations; it also underlines the importance
of major examinations. Failure to take a major examination is usually fatal to the students promotion to the next grade or to
graduation. Examination results form a significant basis for their final grades. These tests are usually a primary and an
indispensable requisite to their elevation to the next educational level and, ultimately, to their completion of a course.
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is better educated than another.
Nevertheless, a students grades are an accepted approximation of what would otherwise be an intangible product of
countless hours of study. The importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting where education is generally the gate
pass to employment opportunities and better life; such grades are often the means by which a prospective employer
measures whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or skills for a particular profession or trade.
Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic standards, completion of
academic requirements and observance of school rules and regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing their
completion of the course enrolled in.
[28]

The obligation on the part of the school has been established in Magtibay v. Garcia, Licup v. University of San
[29]
[30]
Carlos and Ateneo de Manila University v. Garcia, in which the Court held that, barring any violation of the rules on the
part of the students, an institution of higher learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.
We recognize the need of a school to fund its facilities and to meet astronomical operating costs; this is a reality in
[31]
running it. Crystal v. Cebu International School upheld the imposition by respondent school of a land purchase deposit
in the amount of P50,000 per student to be used for the purchase of a piece of land and for the construction of new
buildings and other facilities x x x which the school would transfer [to] and occupy after the expiration of its lease contract
over its present site.
The amount was refundable after the student graduated or left the school. After noting that the imposition of the fee
was made only after prior consultation and approval by the parents of the students, the Court held that the school committed
no actionable wrong in refusing to admit the children of the petitioners therein for their failure to pay the land purchase
deposit and the 2.5 percent monthly surcharge thereon.
In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It
exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students taking the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of
their ability to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the
school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we stressed that the school-student contract is imbued with
public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory
[32]
and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. Sections 5 (1) and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution
provide:
The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and
shall take appropriate steps to make such declaration accessible to all.
Every student has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements.
The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982:
Section 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following
rights:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula
and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.
Liability for Tort
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of
their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and
[33]
unworthiness; as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second
semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly caused
her extreme humiliation, mental agony and demoralization of unimaginable proportions in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26
of the Civil Code. These provisions of the law state thus:

Page 5 of 43

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal condition.
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution,
however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract
[34]
may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, from which we quote:
x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether
express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was
awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted,
however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airlines liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a
contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was not all that revolutionary, for
even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr.
Justice Fisher elucidated thus: x x x. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the
source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x x
[35]
x.
Academic Freedom
In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to academic freedom. We are not impressed. According to
present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself
[36]
(1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. InGarcia v. the
[37]
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, the Court upheld the respondent therein when it denied a
female students admission to theological studies in a seminary for prospective priests. The Court defined the freedom of an
academic institution thus: to decide for itself aims and objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outside
[38]
coercion or interference save possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
[39]

In Tangonan v. Pao, the Court upheld, in the name of academic freedom, the right of the school to refuse
readmission of a nursing student who had been enrolled on probation, and who had failed her nursing subjects. These
instances notwithstanding, the Court has emphasized that once a school has, in the name of academic freedom, set its
[40]
standards, these should be meticulously observed and should not be used to discriminate against certain students. After
accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege on its contractual obligation on grounds other than those made
known to, and accepted by, students at the start of the school year.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents, and that it should
not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts complained
of. That will have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED
to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

Page 6 of 43

20. Spouses Guanio vs. Makati Shangrila-Hotel and Resort, Inc., G.R. No. 190601, February
7, 2011;
THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES LUIGI M. GUANIO and

ANNA HERNANDEZ-GUANIO,

G.R. No. 190601

Petitioners,
Present:

- versus -

MAKATI
SHANGRI-LA
HOTEL
and RESORT, INC., also doing
business under the name
of
SHANGRI-LA HOTEL MANILA,
Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES,
Chairperson, J.,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
February 7, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.
For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners)
booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati (the hotel).
Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an initial food tasting. Petitioners
claim that they requested the hotel to prepare for seven persons the two of them, their respective parents, and the
wedding coordinator. At the scheduled food tasting, however, respondent prepared for only six.
Petitioners initially chose a set menu which included black cod, king prawns and angel hair pasta with wild mushroom
sauce for the main course which costP1,000.00 per person. They were, however, given an option in which salmon, instead
of king prawns, would be in the menu at P950.00 per person. They in fact partook of the salmon.
Three days before the event, a final food tasting took place. Petitioners aver that the salmon served was half the size
of what they were served during the initial food tasting; and when queried about it, the hotel quoted a much higher price
(P1,200.00) for the size that was initially served to them. The parties eventually agreed on a final price P1,150 per
person.
A day before the event or on July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and forged their contract.

[1]

Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondents representatives, Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales
Manager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would; their guests complained of the delay in
the service of the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable; the hotels waiters were rude and
unapologetic when confronted about the delay; and despite Alvarezs promise that there would be no charge for the
extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the three-hour extension of
the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day.
Petitioners further claim that they brought wine and liquor in accordance with their open bar arrangement, but these
were not served to the guests who were forced to pay for their drinks.
Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (respondent) and received an
apologetic reply from Krister Svensson, the hotels Executive Assistant Manager in charge of Food and Beverage. They
nevertheless filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
In its Answer, respondent claimed that petitioners requested a combination of king prawns and salmon, hence, the
price was increased to P1,200.00 per person, but discounted at P1,150.00; that contrary to petitioners claim, Marquez and
Alvarez were present during the event, albeit they were not permanently stationed thereat as there were three other hotel
functions; that while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the sudden increase of
guests to 470 from the guaranteed expected minimum number of guests of 350 to a maximum of 380, as stated in the
[2]
Banquet Event Order (BEO); and that Isaac Albacea, Banquet Service Director, in fact relayed the delay in the service of
the meals to petitioner Luigis father, Gil Guanio.

Page 7 of 43

Respecting the belated service of meals to some guests, respondent attributed it to the insistence of petitioners
wedding coordinator that certain guests be served first.
On Svenssons letter, respondent, denying it as an admission of liability, claimed that it was meant to maintain goodwill
to its customers.
By Decision of August 17, 2006, Branch 148 of the Makati RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the following:
1)

The amount of P350,000.00 by way of actual damages;

2)

The amount of P250,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3)

The amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4)

The amount of P100,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.

With costs against the defendant.

[3]

SO ORDERED.

In finding for petitioners, the trial court relied heavily on the letter of Svensson which is partly quoted below:
Upon receiving your comments on our service rendered during your reception here with us, we are in fact,
very distressed. Right from minor issues pappadums served in the soup instead of the creutons, lack of
valet parkers, hard rolls being too hard till a major one slow service, rude and arrogant waiters, we have
disappointed you in all means.
Indeed, we feel as strongly as you do that the services you received were unacceptable and definitely not
up to our standards. We understand that it is our job to provide excellent service and in this instance, we
have fallen short of your expectations. We ask you please to accept our profound apologies for causing
[4]
such discomfort and annoyance. (underscoring supplied)
The trial court observed that from the tenor of the letter . . . the defendant[-herein respondent] admits that the services
[5]
the plaintiff[-herein petitioners] received were unacceptable and definitely not up to their standards.
[6]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 27, 2009, reversed the trial courts decision, it holding that the
proximate cause of petitioners injury was an unexpected increase in their guests:
x x x Hence, the alleged damage or injury brought about by the confusion, inconvenience and disarray
during the wedding reception may not be attributed to defendant-appellant Shangri-la.
We find that the said proximate cause, which is entirely attributable to plaintiffs-appellants, set the
chain of events which resulted in the alleged inconveniences, to the plaintiffs-appellants. Given the
circumstances that obtained, only the Sps. Guanio may bear whatever consequential damages that they
[7]
may have allegedly suffered. (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of November 18, 2009, the present petition
for review was filed.
The Court finds that since petitioners complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of proximate cause finds no
application to it:
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions
involving breach of contract. x x x The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is
no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But,
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
[8]
created. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
RCPI v. Verchez, et al.

[9]

enlightens:

In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force
of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the
contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon

Page 8 of 43

the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy
serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include his expectation interest, which is his
interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed, or his reliance interest, which is his interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract not been made; or his restitution interest, which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for
their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to
create a new duty, that is, to make RECOMPENSE to the one who has been injured by the failure of
another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of
his exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his
ensuing liability. (emphasis and underscoring in the original; capitalization supplied)
The pertinent provisions of the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract between the parties read:
4.3 The ENGAGER shall be billed in accordance with the prescribed rate for the minimum
guaranteed number of persons contracted for, regardless of under attendance or non-appearance of the
expected number of guests, except where the ENGAGER cancels the Function in accordance with its
Letter of Confirmation with the HOTEL. Should the attendance exceed the minimum guaranteed
attendance, the ENGAGER shall also be billed at the actual rate per cover in excess of the minimum
guaranteed attendance.
xxxx
4.5. The ENGAGER must inform the HOTEL at least forty eight (48) hours before the scheduled
date and time of the Function of any change in the minimum guaranteed covers. In the absence of such
notice, paragraph 4.3 shall apply in the event of under attendance. In case the actual number of
attendees exceed the minimum guaranteed number by ten percent (10%), the HOTEL shall not in
any way be held liable for any damage or inconvenience which may be caused thereby. The
ENGAGER shall also undertake to advise the guests of the situation and take positive steps to
[10]
remedy the same.
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. It is also
[11]
defined as the [f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract.
The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to inform
respondent of the change in the expected number of guests. The observation is reflected in the records of the
case. Petitioners failure to discharge such obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5 of the parties
contract provide, respondent from liability for any damage or inconvenience occasioned thereby.
As for petitioners claim that respondent departed from its verbal agreement with petitioners, the same fails, given
that the written contract which the parties entered into the day before the event, being the law between them.
Respecting the letter of Svensson on which the trial court heavily relied as admission of respondents liability but
which the appellate court brushed aside, the Court finds the appellate courts stance in order. It is not uncommon in the
hotel industry to receive comments, criticisms or feedback on the service it delivers. It is also customary for hotel
management to try to smooth ruffled feathers to preserve goodwill among its clientele.
Kalalo v. Luz holds:

[12]

Statements which are not estoppels nor judicial admissions have no quality of conclusiveness, and
an opponent whose admissions have been offered against him may offer any evidence which serves as an
explanation for his former assertion of what he now denies as a fact.
Respondents Catering Director, Bea Marquez, explained the hotels procedure on receiving and
processing complaints, viz:
ATTY. CALMA:
Q

You mentioned that the letter indicates an acknowledgement of the concern and that there was-the
first letter there was an acknowledgment of the concern and an apology, not necessarily
indicating that such or admitting fault?

Yes.

Is this the letter that you are referring to?

If I may, Your Honor, that was the letter dated August 4, 2001, previously marked as plaintiffs
exhibits, Your Honor. What is the procedure of the hotel with respect to customer concern?

Page 9 of 43

Upon receipt of the concern from the guest or client, we acknowledge receipt of such concern, and
as part of procedure in service industry particularly Makati Shangri-la we apologize for whatever

inconvenience but at the same time saying, that of course, we would go through certain
investigation and get back to them for the feedback with whatever concern they may have.
Q

Your Honor, I just like at this point mark the exhibits, Your Honor, the letter dated August 4, 2001
identified by the witness, Your Honor, to be marked as Exhibit 14 and the signature of Mr. Krister
[13]
Svensson be marked as Exhibit 14-A.

xxxx
Q

In your opinion, you just mentioned that there is a procedure that the hotel follows with respect to
the complaint, in your opinion was this procedure followed in this particular concern?

Yes, maam.

What makes you say that this procedure was followed?

As I mentioned earlier, we proved that we did acknowledge the concern of the client in this case
and we did emphatize from the client and apologized, and at the same time got back to them in
whatever investigation we have.

You said that you apologized, what did you apologize for?

Well, first of all it is a standard that we apologize, right? Being in the service industry, it is a
practice that we apologize if there is any inconvenience, so the purpose for apologizing is mainly
to show empathy and to ensure the client that we are hearing them out and that we will do a
[14]
better investigation and it is not in any way that we are admitting any fault.
(underscoring
supplied)

To the Court, the foregoing explanation of the hotels Banquet Director overcomes any presumption of admission of
breach which Svenssons letter might have conveyed.
The exculpatory clause notwithstanding, the Court notes that respondent could have managed the situation better,
it being held in high esteem in the hotel and service industry. Given respondents vast experience, it is safe to presume that
this is not its first encounter with booked events exceeding the guaranteed cover. It is not audacious to expect that certain
measures have been placed in case this predicament crops up. That regardless of these measures, respondent still received
complaints as in the present case, does not amuse.
Respondent admitted that three hotel functions coincided with petitioners reception. To the Court, the delay in
service might have been avoided or minimized if respondent exercised prescience in scheduling events. No less than quality
service should be delivered especially in events which possibility of repetition is close to nil. Petitioners are not expected to
get married twice in their lifetimes.
In the present petition, under considerations of equity, the Court deems it just to award the amount of P50,000.00
[15]
by way of nominal damages to petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were subjected to during to the event. The Court
[16]
recognizes that every person is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Respondents
lack of prudence is an affront to this right.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 27, 2009 is PARTIALLY REVERSED. Respondent is, in
light of the foregoing discussion, ORDERED to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to petitioners by way of nominal damages.
SO ORDERED.

Page 10 of 43

21. Padilla, et.al.vs. CA, G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984;
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction
and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal
ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY
RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE
ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and
FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David
Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino,
Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually
helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their
stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said
stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods,
wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the
amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the
incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is
a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose
Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages
in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,
jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this
proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding of
grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in
finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave
the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison
terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of

Page 11 of 43

P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary
damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are
acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants
the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal
liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed, not
on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic)
complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered
actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS
AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY
AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974
THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS
THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS
CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL
ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN
UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic)
'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974
THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION
AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CAG.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED
ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring
the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a
consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the
criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect
that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the
doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623;
People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us,
the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no
dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of
the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly
constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against the
person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?

Page 12 of 43

From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. But the
law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they
were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege
the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by
means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be
informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid
information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by
the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3
(c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant
case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties
contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the
complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein
is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied
institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr.
v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the
civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid
down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and,
where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the
same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes
due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided
by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the
damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia,
96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by
certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not
arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue,
4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

Page 13 of 43

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or
not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of
a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz
Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which
Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil
liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an
accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal
considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of
malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in
his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper
accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a
manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved
in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process
has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of
innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by
all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of
applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would
mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort,
and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the
defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in
said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the
premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal
of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out
from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this
case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have
not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the
order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to
the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not
present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had
them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take
possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted
away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se
is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises
to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was
a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and had
its contents carted away. They state:

Page 14 of 43

On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of
Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and
members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the
store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the
municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls
for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity
and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in
the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly
liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the
two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or
one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save
the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take
advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other
independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should
be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act or
omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the
same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution
of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any
significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in
the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused after
acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of
the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a
reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not
because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of
acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A
separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible
mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding
damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the
criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil
liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for
burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice
which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not
possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate
civil action mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one
of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility,
and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each

Page 15 of 43

other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of
the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should
the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right
to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced
or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a
judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and De la Fuente,
JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
De Castro, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr. J., is on leave.

Page 16 of 43

22. PNCC vs. CA, G.R. No. 159270, August 22, 2005;
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159270. August 22, 2005]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODRIGO
ARNAIZ, REGINA LATAGAN, RICARDO GENERALAO and PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
[1]

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699
affirming, with modification, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-64803.
The Antecedents
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang,
Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and
Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to
enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) via Dau-Sta. Ines from Mabalacat, and via Angeles from
[2]
Magalang, and exit at San Fernando going to its milling factory. The TRB furnished the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC) (the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
[3]
Expressways) with a copy of the said request for it to comment thereon.
On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX on the following terms and conditions:

[4]

(MOA), where the latter

1.

PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy;

2.

Said trucks will stay on the right lane;

3.

A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at the rear end of the convoy with a sign which should read
as follows: Caution: CONVOY AHEAD!!!;

4.

Tollway safety measures should be properly observed;

5.

Accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be the
responsibility of PASUDECO;

6.

PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their stalled trucks immediately to avoid any inconvenience to the
other motorists;

7.

This request will be in force only while the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang
Maragul via Magalang remain impassable.

PASUDECO furnished the PNCC with a copy of the MOA.

PASUDECO that it interposed no objection to the MOA.

[5]

In a Letter

[6]

dated October 22, 1992, the PNCC informed

At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Eduardo
Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX. They saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle
[7]
portion of the north and southbound lanes of the road. They placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and southbound
lanes, including lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of the obstruction. Sendin, Ducusin and Pascual
proceeded to the PASUDECO office, believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was the only milling company
in the area. They requested for a payloader or grader to clear the area. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECOs
equipment supervisor and transportation superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was available as it was still
[8]
very early. Nonetheless, Mallari told them that he would send someone to clear the affected area. Thereafter, Sendin and
company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started
clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road. The men left the area at around
5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and
transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was already
[9]
approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers. Sendin went to his office in Sta. Rita,
[10]
Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the necessary report.
[11]

At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing, Inc., was
[12]
driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour. He was
with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo Generalao; they were on their way to Baguio to attend their
[13]
grandmothers first death anniversary. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned
turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane.

Page 17 of 43

Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla investigated the matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the road, on both
[14]
lanes, which appeared to be flattened.
[15]

On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC in
the RTC of Manila, Branch 16. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-64803. They alleged, inter alia, that through its
negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with
uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and
PNCC failed to put up emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of such spillage; and
that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained
by Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car. They prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered for the plaintiffs, ordering the
defendants jointly and severally:
(a) To pay unto plaintiff Rodrigo Arnaiz the sum of P100,000.00 representing the value of his car which was
totally wrecked;
(b) to pay unto plaintiff Regina Latagan the sum of P100,000.00 by way of reimbursement for medical
expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, and the sum ofP30,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages;
(c) To pay unto plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and Ricardo Generalao the sum of P5,000.00 by way of
reimbursement for medical expenses; and
(d) To pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; plus the costs of suit.
Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs which the Honorable Court may find due them in the premises.

[16]

[17]

In its Answer, PNCC admitted that it was under contract to manage the North Luzon Expressway, to keep it safe for
motorists. It averred that the mishap was due to the unreasonable speed at which Arnaizs car was running, causing it to
turn turtle when it passed over some pieces of flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the proximate cause of the mishap was
PASUDECOs gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and its failure to clear and mop up the area completely. It also
alleged that Arnaiz was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed.
The PNCC interposed a compulsory counterclaim
PASUDECO.

[18]

against the plaintiffs and cross-claim

[19]

against its co-defendant

PASUDECO adduced evidence that aside from it, there were other sugarcane mills in the area, like the ARCAM Sugar
[20]
Central (formerly known as Pampanga Sugar Mills) and the Central Azucarrera de Tarlac; it was only through the
[21]
expressway that a vehicle could access these three (3) sugar centrals; and PASUDECO was obligated to clear spillages
[22]
whether the planters truck which caused the spillage was bound for PASUDECO, ARCAM or Central Azucarera.
On rebuttal, PNCC adduced evidence that only planters trucks with PSD markings were allowed to use the
[23]
tollway; that all such trucks would surely enter the PASUDECO compound. Thus, the truck which spilled sugarcane in
[24]
January 1993 in Km. 72 was on its way to the PASUDECO compound.
[25]

On November 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Latagan, dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao
for insufficiency of evidence. The case as against the PNCC was, likewise, dismissed. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
I.

ORDERING defendant PASUDECO:

1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:

a. P25,000 = for actual damages
b. P15,000 = for moral damages
c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees
P50,000
2. To pay costs of suit.
II. The case is DISMISSED as to defendant PNCC. No pronouncement as to costs. Its counterclaim is, likewise,
DISMISSED.
III. The claims for damages of plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and Ricardo Generalao are hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

Page 18 of 43

[26]

Both the plaintiffs Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao and defendant PASUDECO appealed the decision to the CA. Since
[27]
the plaintiffs failed to file their brief, the CA dismissed their appeal.
Resolving PASUDECOs appeal, the CA rendered judgment on April 29, 2003, affirming the RTC decision with
modification. The appellate court ruled that Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but that such negligence was merely
contributory to the cause of the mishap, i.e., PASUDECOs failure to properly supervise its men in clearing the affected
area. Its supervisor, Mallari, admitted that he was at his house while their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the appellate
court held both PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and severally, liable to Latagan. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed DECISION is hereby MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered
declaring PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and solidarily, liable:
1.

To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:

a. P25,000 = for actual damages
b. P15,000 = for moral damages
c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees

2.
SO ORDERED.

To pay costs of suit.

[28]

The PNCC, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
alleging that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND MAKING
[29]
PETITIONER PNCC, JOINTLY AND [SOLIDARILY], LIABLE WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT PASUDECO.
The petitioner asserts that the trial court was correct when it held that PASUDECO should be held liable for the mishap,
since it had assumed such responsibility based on the MOA between it and the TRB. The petitioner relies on the trial courts
finding that only PASUDECO was given a permit to pass through the route.
The petitioner insists that the respondents failed to prove that it was negligent in the operation and maintenance of the
NLEX. It maintains that it had done its part in clearing the expressway of sugarcane piles, and that there were no more piles
of sugarcane along the road when its men left Km. 72; only a few scattered sugarcanes flattened by the passing motorists
were left. Any liability arising from any mishap related to the spilled sugarcanes should be borne by PASUDECO, in
accordance with the MOA which provides that accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to
this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO.
The petitioner also argues that the respondents should bear the consequences of their own fault or negligence, and
that the proximate and immediate cause of the mishap in question was respondent Arnaizs reckless imprudence or gross
negligence.
The Court notes that the issues raised in the petition are factual in nature. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court, and while there are exceptions to the rule, no such exception is present in this
case. On this ground alone, the petition is destined to fail. The Court, however, has reviewed the records of the case, and
finds that the petition is bereft of merit.
The petitioner is the grantee of a franchise, giving it the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain
[30]
toll facilities covering the expressways, collectively known as the NLEX. Concomitant thereto is its right to collect toll fees
for the use of the said expressways and its obligation to keep it safe for motorists.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
[31]
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
[32]
do. It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to observe that degree of care,
[33]
precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. The Court
[34]
declared the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith, viz:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be

Page 19 of 43

supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person
or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on
the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is
[35]
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for
motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on
[36]
[37]
the ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have
foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the
morning.
The petitioner cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan was
not a party thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA:
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of
the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by
virtue of a private agreement, to other parties.
PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still
pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the situation demands. There should have been sufficient warning devices considering that there were
scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway.
The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that Arnaizs car ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled from a hauler
[38]
truck.
Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or
injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA.
PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the
emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagans
injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. As the Court held in the vintage case of Sabido v.
[39]
Custodio:
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more
persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury
to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for
the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted
from the acts of the other tort-feasor. ...
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,
and solidary, to wit:

[40]

the Court declared that the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint

It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It
is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he
is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the
injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by
them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does
not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his
acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their

Page 20 of 43

concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Thus, with PASUDECOs and the petitioners successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily
[41]
liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.
Anent respondent Arnaizs negligence in driving his car, both the trial court and the CA agreed that it was only
[42]
contributory, and considered the same in mitigating the award of damages in his favor as provided under Article 2179 of
the New Civil Code. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
[43]
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Even the
petitioner itself described Arnaizs negligence as contributory. In its Answer to the complaint filed with the trial court, the
petitioner asserted that the direct and proximate cause of the accident was the gross negligence of PASUDECO personnel
which resulted in the spillage of sugarcane and the apparent failure of the PASUDECO workers to clear and mop up the area
[44]
completely, coupled with the contributory negligence of Arnaiz in driving his car at an unreasonable speed. However, the
petitioner changed its theory in the present recourse, and now claims that the proximate and immediate cause of the mishap
[45]
in question was the reckless imprudence or gross negligence of respondent Arnaiz. Such a change of theory cannot be
allowed. When a party adopts a certain theory in the trial court, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for
to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
[46]
justice and due process.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699, dated April 29, 2003, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Page 21 of 43

23. NPC vs. Heirs of Noble Casionan, G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008;
THIRD DIVISION

NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 165969

Petitioner,

- versus -

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN,

Respondents.

November 27, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
PETITIONING power company pleads for mitigation of awarded damages on ground of contributory negligence. But is
the victim in this case partly to blame for his electrocution and eventual demise?
[1]

This is a review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which found the National Power
Corporation (NPC) liable for damages for the death of Noble Casionan due to electrocution from the companys high tension
transmission lines.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the trial court are as follows:
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time of the incident that claimed his life
on June 27, 1995. He would have turned 20 years of age on November 9 of that year. Noble was originally from Cervantes,
Ilocos Sur. He worked as a pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet.
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of the
community. Sometime in the 1970s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV)
traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the
ground to only about eight to ten feet. This posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed to the danger of
electrocution especially during the wet season.
As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute safety
measures to protect users of the trail from their high tension wires. On June 18, 1991 and February 11, 1993, Pablo and
Pedro Ngaosie, elders of the community, wrote Engr. Paterno Banayot, Area Manager of NPC, to make immediate and
appropriate repairs of the high tension wires. They reiterated the danger it posed to small-scale miners especially during the
wet season. They related an incident where one boy was nearly electrocuted.
In a letter dated March 1, 1995, Engr. Banayot informed Itogon Mayor Cresencio Pacalso
that NPC had installed nine additional poles on their Beckel-Philex 60 KV line. They likewise identified a possible
rerouting scheme with an estimated total cost of 1.7 million pesos to improve the distance from its deteriorating lines to the
ground.
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles
for their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried one pole horizontally
on his shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed
through the trail underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place.
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of
the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when the tip
of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor

Page 22 of 43

rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Their co-workers heard Melchors shout for help and
together they brought the body of Noble to their camp.
A post-mortem examination by Dra. Ignacia Reyes Ciriaco, Municipal Health Officer of Itogon, Benguet, determined
[2]
the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation, secondary to electrocution. She also observed
a small burned area in the middle right finger of the victim.
Police investigators who visited the site of the incident confirmed that portions of the high tension wires above the
trail hung very low, just about eight to ten feet above the ground. They noted that the residents, school children, and
pocket miners usually used the trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires. The trail was the only viable way since
the other side was a precipice. In addition, they did not see any danger warning signs installed in the trail.
The elders and leaders of the community, through Mayor Cresencio Pacalso, informed the General Manager of
NPC in Itogon of the incident. After learning of the electrocution, NPC repaired the dangling and sagging transmission lines
and put up warning signs around the area.
Consequently, the heirs of the deceased Noble filed a claim for damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Benguet. In its answer, NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the safety of the high tension
transmission lines. It averred that there were danger and warning signs installed but these were stolen by
children. Excavations were also made to increase the necessary clearance from the ground to about 17 to 18 feet but some
towers or poles sank due to pocket mining in the area.
At the trial, NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution because the
victim did not suffer extensive burns despite the strong 69 KV carried by the transmission lines. NPC argued that if Noble
did die by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence. The company counter-claimed for attorneys fees and cost of
litigation.
RTC Disposition
On February 17, 1998, the RTC decided in favor of respondents. The fallo of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
NPC as follows:
1. Declaring defendant NPC guilty of Negligence (Quasi-Delict) in connection with the death of
Noble Casionan;
2. Ordering NPC as a consequence of its negligence, to pay the plaintiffs Jose and Linda
Casionan, as heirs of the deceased, Noble Casionan, the following Damages:
a.

P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son Noble Casionan;

b.

P100,000.00 as moral damages;

c.

P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

d.

P52,277.50 as actual damages incurred for the expenses of burial and wake in
connection with the death of Noble Casionan;

e.

P720,000.00 as the loss of unearned income; and

f.

P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost of suit; and

3. Dismissing the counter claim of the NPC for lack of merit.

[3]

The RTC gave more credence to the testimony of witnesses for respondents than those of NPC who were not
actually present at the time of the incident. The trial court observed that witnesses for NPC were biased witnesses because
they were all employed by the company, except for the witness from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The RTC found:
Melchor Jimenez was very vivid in his account. He declared that he and Noble Casionan cut two
bamboo poles, one 14 feet and the other about 18 feet. The shorter bamboo pole was carried by Noble
Casionan and the longer bamboo pole was carried by him. And they walked along the trail underneath the
transmission lines. He was following Noble Casionan. And when they were going uphill in the trail and
Noble Casionan was to turn left in a curve, the bamboo pole of Casionan swung around and its tip at the
back touched for one or two seconds or for a split moment the transmission line that was dangling and a
buzzing sound was heard. And Casionan immediately fell dead and simply stopped breathing. What better
account would there be than this? Melchor Jimenez was an eye witness as to how it all
[4]
happened. (Emphasis added)
The RTC ruled that the negligence of NPC in maintaining the high-tension wires was established by preponderance
of evidence. On this score, the RTC opined:

Page 23 of 43

2. On the matter of whether plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant NPC, obviously,
they would have. x x x This negligence of the NPC was well established and cannot be denied because
previous to this incident, the attention of NPC has already been called by several requests and demands in
1991, 1993 and 1995 by elders and leaders of the community in the area to the fact that their transmission
lines were dangling and sagging and the clearance thereof from the line to the ground was only 8 to 10
feet and not within the standard clearance of 18 to 20 feet but no safety measures were taken. They did
[5]
not even put danger and warning signs so as to warn persons passing underneath. (Emphasis added)
Disagreeing with the ruling of the trial court, NPC elevated the case to the CA. In its appeal, it argued that
the RTC erred in ruling that NPC was liable for Nobles death. Further, even assuming that Noble died of electrocution,
the RTC erred in not finding that he was guilty of contributory negligence and in awarding excessive damages.
CA Disposition
On June 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of moral damages is REDUCED to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and the award of
[6]
attorneys fees in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is DELETED.
The CA sustained the findings of fact of the trial court but reduced the award of moral damages from P100,000.00
to P50,000.00. The CA further disallowed the award of attorneys fees because the reason for the award was not expressly
stated in the body of the decision.
Issues
The following issues are presented for Our consideration: (i) Whether the award for damages should be deleted in
view of the contributory negligence of the victim; and (ii) Whether the award for unearned income, exemplary, and moral
[7]
damages should be deleted for lack of factual and legal bases.
Our Ruling
I
That the victim Noble died from being electrocuted by the high-tension transmission wires of petitioner is not
contested by petitioner. We are, however, asked to delete or mitigate the damages awarded by the trial and appellate courts
in view of what petitioner alleges to be contributory negligence on the part of the victim.
As a rule, only questions of law may be entertained on appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The finding of negligence
on the part of petitioner by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is a question of fact which We cannot pass upon since it
[8]
would entail going into factual matters on which the finding of negligence was based. Corollary to this, the finding by both
courts of the lack of contributory negligence on the part of the victim is a factual issue which is deemed conclusive upon this
Court absent any compelling reason for Us to rule otherwise.
But even if We walk the extra mile, the finding of liability on the part of petitioner must stay.
Petitioner contends that the mere presence of the high tension wires above the trail did not cause the victims
death. Instead, it was Nobles negligent carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his death. It insists that Noble was
negligent
when
he
allowed
the
bamboo
pole he
was
carrying
to touch
the
high
tension
wires. This is especially true because other people traversing the trail have not been similarly electrocuted.
Petitioners contentions are absurd.
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during trial,
the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines
were properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not
have been electrocuted.
Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the
[9]
victim. In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the responsibility of maintaining the rails
for the purpose of preventing derailment accidents belonged to the company. The company should not have been negligent
in ascertaining that the rails were fully connected than to wait until a life was lost due to an accident. Said the Court:
In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence
notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing the
deductions made by the trial court.
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by
protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish
plates. Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 " thick which are attached to the
rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with

Page 24 of 43

special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the scene
of the accident.
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose, inter alia, of preventing
derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not
discharged. According to Jose Reyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision
of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times
when such derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should therefore have taken more
prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its
[10]
negligence.
Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Nobles part.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
[11]
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
On the other
hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
[12]
he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.
There is
contributory negligence when the partys act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm
[13]
or put his life in danger.
It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured
[14]
which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
[15]
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. If indeed there
was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for
damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the
contributory negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on this score:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that
he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and
body. This Court held then that the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence as there was no showing that the
caboose where he was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of
[16]
impending danger.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no
warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension
wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the area.
[17]

In Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the
violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be
prevented by the statute. In said case, the allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the injured party who violated
traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon was struck down. We quote:
x x x The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident
may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without
legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at all, it is
but indicative of Villagracias failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, which would
then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is not determinative
of Villagracias negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent
upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances
reasonably require. To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the
violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracias behavior in relation to the
contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
xxxx
Under
American
case
law,
the
failures
imputed
on
Villagracia
are
not grievous enough so as to negate monetary relief. In the absence of statutory requirement, one is
not negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a horn, bell, or other warning devise onto a bicycle. In
most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not constitute negligence as a matter of law but
is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played a causal part in producing a collision
with a motorist. The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance,

Page 25 of 43

may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a motorist as long as
the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the collision; however, the absence of such lights will
not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was well illuminated by street lights, if
substitute lights were present which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible, if the motorist saw the bicycle in
spite of the absence of lights thereon, or if the motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle even if it
had been equipped with lights. A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes may support a
finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition was a
contributing cause of the accident.
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with
accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or
mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure and the injury
sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation inSanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation
of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Aonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the
[18]
proximate or contributory cause of the latters injury. (Emphasis added)
That the pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave their transmission lines
dangling. We quote with approval the observation of the RTC on this matter:
The claim of NPC that the pocket miners have no right to operate within the area of Dalicno,
Itogon, Benguet as there was no permit issued by DENR is beside the point. The fact is that there were
not only pocket miners but also there were many residents in the area of Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon,
Benguet using the trail. These residents were using this trail underneath the transmission lines x x
x. They were using this trail even before the transmission lines were installed in the 1970s by NPC. The
pocket miners, although they have no permit to do pocket mining in the area, are also human beings who
have to eke out a living in the only way they know how. The fact that they were not issued a permit by the
DENR to do pocket mining is no justification for NPC to simply leave their transmission lines dangling or
hanging 8 to 10 feet above the ground posing danger to the life and limb of everyone in said community. x
[19]
x x (Emphasis added)
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its
liability.
II
We now determine the propriety of the awards for loss of unearned income, moral, and exemplary
damages.
From the testimony of the victims mother, it was duly established during trial that he was earning P3,000.00 a
month. To determine the compensable amount of lost earnings, We consider (1) the number of years for which the victim
would otherwise have lived (life expectancy); and
(2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the
deceased. Life expectancy is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. The second factor is computed by
multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the
creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily
computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning
capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary
[20]
living expenses)].
We sustain the trial court computation of unearned income of the victim:
x x x the loss of his unearned income can be computed as follows: two-thirds of 80 years, minus
20 years, times P36,000.00 per year, equals P1,440,000.00. This is because Noble Casionan, at the time
of his death, was 20 years old and was healthy and strong. And, therefore, his life expectancy would
normally reach up to 80 years old in accordance with the above formula illustrated in the aforesaid
cases. Thus, Noble Casionan had 60 more years life expectancy since he was 20 years old at the time of
his death on June 27, 1995. Two-thirds of 60 years times P36,000.00 since he was earning
about P3,000.00 a month of P36,000.00 a year would be P1,440,000.00.
However, in determining the unearned income, the basic concern is to determine the damages
sustained by the heirs or dependents of the deceased Casionan. And here, the damages consist not of
the full amount of his earnings but the support they would have received from the deceased had he not
died as a consequence of the unlawful act of the NPC. x x x The amount recoverable is not the loss of
the entire earnings but the loss of that portion of the earnings which the heirs would have received as
support. Hence, from the amount of P1,440,000.00, a reasonable amount for the necessary expenses of
Noble Casionan had he lived would be deducted. Following the ruling in People v. Quilaton, 205 SCRA
279, the Court deems that 50 percent of the gross earnings of the deceased of P1,440,000.00 should be
deducted for his necessary expenses had he lived, thus leaving the other half of aboutP720,000.00 as the

Page 26 of 43

net earnings that would have gone for the support of his heirs. This is the unearned income of which the
[21]
heirs were deprived of.
[22]

In quasi delicts, exemplary damages are awarded where the offender was guilty of gross negligence.
Gross
negligence has been defined to be the want or absence of even slight care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard
of the safety of person or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
[23]
them.
Petitioner demonstrated its disregard for the safety of the members of the community of Dalicno who used the trail
regularly when it failed to address the sagging high tension wires despite numerous previous requests and warnings. It only
exerted efforts to rectify the danger it posed after a death from electrocution already occurred. Gross negligence was thus
apparent, warranting the award of exemplary damages.
As to the award of moral damages, We sustain the CA reduction of the award. Moral damages are designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. It is not meant to enrich
the complainant but to enable the injured party to obtain means to obviate the moral suffering experience. Trial courts
should guard against the award of exorbitant damages lest they be accused of prejudice or corruption in their decision
[24]
making.
We find that the CA correctly reduced the award from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
As for the award for attorneys fees, well-settled is the rule that the reason for the award must be discussed in the
[25]
text of the courts decision and not only in the dispositive portion.
Except for the fallo, a discussion on the reason for the
award for attorneys fees was not included by the RTC in its decision. The CA thus correctly disallowed it on appeal.
WHREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 27 of 43

24. Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA, G.R. No. L-53401, November 6, 1989;
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID,
GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
Herman D. Coloma for petitioner.
Glicerio S. Ferrer for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Sought to be reversed in this petition is the Decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals' First Division, setting aside the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby set aside and another rendered in its stead whereby
defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs actual damages of P30,229.45; compensatory damages of
P50,000.00; exemplary damages of P10,000.00; attorney's fees of P3,000.00; plus the costs of suit in both
instances. (p. 27 Rollo)
Basically, this case involves a clash of evidence whereby both patties strive for the recognition of their respective versions of
the scenario from which the disputed claims originate. The respondent Court of Appeals (CA) summarized the evidence of
the parties as follows:
From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a
strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and
consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and
when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured
out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded
northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look
after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the
deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and
by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and
Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the deceased
screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing
so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio
Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the
water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building
which was four or five blocks away.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately.
With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the
police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then
the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were
out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of
the deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant
Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their
electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M.,
he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines.
Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided
to go to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As he turned right at the
intersection of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across the street "and the
other end was seeming to play with the current of the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding the Office of the
INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to the NPC Compound.
At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another inspection trip. Having learned of the
death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar
streets to which the body had been taken. Using the resuscitator which was a standard equipment in his jeep and
employing the skill he acquired from an in service training on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His
efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow
wound. Proceeding to the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them about the grounded lines of

Page 28 of 43

the INELCO In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of
power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
Many people came to the house at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar after learning that the deceased had
been electrocuted. Among the sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos
Norte. Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body at about 8:00 A.M. on June
29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left
palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" (Exh. C-1: p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, 1972) or a first degree
burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. (Exh. C-2, pp. 102-103, Ibid.) The
certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution" (Exh. I; p.
103, Ibid.).
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees, namely, Conrado
Asis, electric engineer; Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero, lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, presidentmanager of INELCO Through the testimonies of these witnesses, defendant sought to prove that on and even
before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area No. 9
which covered the residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero Street, did not suffer from any defect that might
constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had
been newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a public service operator and in line with its business of
supplying electric current to the public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to
persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant
had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to
them.
Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck the province of Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting to
streets of Laoag City under water, only a few known places in Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged
electric lines, namely, at the southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which was washed away and where the
INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the eastern part near the residence of the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in
the far north near the defendant's power plant at the corner of Segundo and Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the
far northwest side, near the premises of the Ilocos Norte National High School. Fabico Abijero, testified that in the
early morning before 6 o'clock on June 29, 1967 he passed by the intersection of Rizal and Guerrero Streets to
switch off the street lights in Area No. 9. He did not see any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity. What he saw
were many people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by the defense to show that the deceased could not
have died of electrocution Substantially, the testimony of the doctor is as follows: Without an autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not even a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real cause of death.
Cyanosis could not have been found in the body of the deceased three hours after her death, because cyanosis
which means lack of oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the color of the skin purplish, appears only in a
live person. The presence of the elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased (Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is not
sufficient to establish her death by electrocution; since burns caused by electricity are more or less round in shape
and with points of entry and exit. Had the deceased held the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her palm
would have been bigger and the injury more massive. (CA Decision, pp. 18-21, Rollo)
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid
CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer (Vide, Record on Appeal, p. 55, Rollo), petitioner advanced the theory, as a special
defense, that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only
to herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused
the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting,
thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. Petitioner then conjectures that the switch to said
burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that
early morning of June 29, 1967. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint but
awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which
issued the controverted decision.
In this petition for review the petitioner assigns the following errors committed by the respondent CA:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and error in considering the purely
hearsay alleged declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz as part of theres gestae.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and error in holding that the strong
typhoon "Gening" which struck Laoag City and Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967 and the flood and deluge it brought in
its wake were not fortuitous events and did not exonerate petitioner-company from liability for the death of Isabel
Lao Juan.
3. The respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and erred in not applying the legal principle of
"assumption of risk" in the present case to bar private respondents from collecting damages from petitioner
company.

Page 29 of 43

4. That the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in completely reversing the findings
of fact of the trial court.
5. The findings of fact of the respondent Court of Appeals are reversible under the recognized exceptions.
6. The trial court did not err in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees to defendant corporation, now petitioner
company.
7. Assuming arguendo that petitioner company may be held liable from the death of the late Isabel Lao Juan, the
damages granted by respondent Court of Appeals are improper and exhorbitant. (Petitioners Memorandum, p. 133,
Rollo)
Basically, three main issues are apparent: (1) whether or not the deceased died of electrocution; (2) whether or not petitioner
may be held liable for the deceased's death; and (3) whether or not the respondent CA's substitution of the trial court's
factual findings for its own was proper.
In considering the first issue, it is Our view that the same be resolved in the affirmative. By a preponderance of evidence,
private respondents were able to show that the deceased died of electrocution, a conclusion which can be primarily derived
from the photographed burnt wounds (Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2") on the left palm of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly
point to the fact that the deceased had clutched a live wire of the petitioner. This was corroborated by the testimony of Dr.
Jovencio Castro who actually examined the body of the deceased a few hours after the death and described the said burnt
wounds as a "first degree burn" (p. 144, TSN, December 11, 1972) and that they were "electrically charged" (p. 102, TSN,
November 28, 1972). Furthermore, witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after the deceased
screamed "Ay" and sank into the water, they tried to render some help but were overcome with fear by the sight of an electric
wire dangling from an electric post, moving in the water in a snake-like fashion (supra). The foregoing therefore justifies the
respondent CA in concluding that "(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no
other conclusion than that they were "burns," and there was nothing else in the street where the victim was wading thru
which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of defendant company" (CA Decision, p. 22, Rollo).
But in order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that the deceased was electrocuted, if such was really the
case when she tried to open her steel gate, which was electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install to
serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to said burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere
speculation, not backed up with evidence. As required by the Rules, "each party must prove his own affirmative allegations."
(Rule 131, Sec. 1). Nevertheless, the CA significantly noted that "during the trial, this theory was abandoned" by the
petitioner (CA Decision, p. 23, Rollo).
Furthermore the CA properly applied the principle of res gestae. The CA said:
Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller, and Aida Bulong, a salesgirl, were with the deceased during that fateful
morning of June 29, 1967. This Court has not been offered any sufficient reason to discredit the testimonies of
these two young ladies. They were one in the affirmation that the deceased, while wading in the waist-deep flood on
Guerrero Street five or six meters ahead of them, suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. When
they approached the deceased to help, they were stopped by the sight of an electric wire dangling from a post and
moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz also tried to approach the deceased, but he turned
back shouting that the water was grounded. These bits of evidence carry much weight. For the subject of the
testimonies was a startling occurrence, and the declarations may be considered part of the res gestae. (CA
Decision, p. 21, Rollo)
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; (3)
that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances (People vs.
Ner, 28 SCRA 1151; People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 959). We do not find any abuse of discretion on the CA' part in view of
the satisfaction of said requisites in the case at bar.
The statements made relative to the startling occurrence are admitted in evidence precisely as an exception to the hearsay
rule on the grounds of trustworthiness and necessity. "Trustworthiness" because the statements are made instinctively
(Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala. 182), and "necessity" because such natural and spontaneous utterances are more convincing
than the testimony of the same person on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31). Therefore, the fact that the declarant,
Ernesto de la Cruz, was not presented to testify does not make the testimony of Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong
hearsay since the said declaration is part of the res gestae. Similarly, We considered part of the res gestae a conversation
between two accused immediately after commission of the crime as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs. Reyes,
82 Phil. 563).
While it may be true that, as petitioner argues (vide petitioner's Memorandum, p. 135, Rollo), Ernesto de la Cruz was not an
actual witness to the instant when the deceased sank into the waist-deep water, he acted upon the call of help of Aida
Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo with the knowledge of, and immediately after, the sinking of the deceased. In fact the
startling event had not yet ceased when Ernesto de la Cruz entered the scene considering that the victim remained
submerged. Under such a circumstance, it is undeniable that a state of mind characterized by nervous excitement had been
triggered in Ernesto de la Cruz's being as anybody under the same contingency could have experienced. As such, We

Page 30 of 43

cannot honestly exclude his shouts that the water was grounded from the res gestae just because he did not actually see the
sinking of the deceased nor hear her scream "Ay."
Neither can We dismiss the said declaration as a mere opinion of Ernesto de la Cruz. While We concede to the submission
that the statement must be one of facts rather than opinion, We cannot agree to the proposition that the one made by him
was a mere opinion. On the contrary, his shout was a translation of an actuality as perceived by him through his sense of
touch.
Finally, We do not agree that the taking of Ernesto de la Cruz' testimony was suppressed by the private respondents, thus, is
presumed to be adverse to them pursuant to Section 5(e), Rule 131. For the application of said Rule as against a party to a
case, it is necessary that the evidence alleged to be suppressed is available only to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18
May 1955, 97 Phil. 953). The presumption does not operate if the evidence in question is equally available to both parties
(StaplesHowe Printing Co. vs. Bldg. and Loan Assn., 36 Phil. 421). It is clear from the records that petitioner could have
called Ernesto de la Cruz to the witness stand. This, precisely, was Linda Alonzo Estavillo's suggestion to petitioner's
counsel when she testified on cross examination:
Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how far did he reach from the gate of the house?
A. Well, you can ask that matter from him sir because he is here. (TSN, p. 30, 26 Sept. 1972)
The foregoing shows that petitioner had the opportunity to verify the declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz which, if truly adverse
to private respondent, would have helped its case. However, due to reasons known only to petitioner, the opportunity was
not taken.
Coming now to the second issue, We tip the scales in the private respondents' favor. The respondent CA acted correctly in
disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is
true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took
place. We subscribe to the conclusions of the respondent CA when it found:
On the issue whether or not the defendant incurred liability for the electrocution and consequent death of the late
Isabel Lao Juan, defendant called to the witness-stand its electrical engineer, chief lineman, and lineman to show
exercise of extraordinary diligence and to negate the charge of negligence. The witnesses testified in a general way
about their duties and the measures which defendant usually adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. From these
testimonies, the lower court found "that the electric lines and other equipment of defendant corporation were
properly maintained by a well-trained team of lineman, technicians and engineers working around the clock to
insure that these equipments were in excellent condition at all times." (P. 40, Record on Appeal) The finding of the
lower court, however, was based on what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what they
actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the occasion of theemergency situation brought about
by the typhoon.
The lower court made a mistake in assuming that defendant's employees worked around the clock during the
occurrence of the typhoon on the night of June 28 and until the early morning of June 29, 1967, Engr. Antonio Juan
of the National Power Corporation affirmed that when he first set out on an inspection trip between 6:00 and 6:30
A.M. on June 29, 1967, he saw grounded and disconnected electric lines of the defendant but he saw no INELCO
lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on Rizal Street was still closed. (pp. 63-64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972)
Even the witnesses of defendant contradict the finding of the lower court. Conrado Asis, defendant's electrical
engineer, testified that he conducted a general inspection of the franchise area of the INELCO only on June 30,
1967, the day following the typhoon. The reason he gave for the delay was that all their vehicles were submerged.
(p. 337, TSN, July 20, 1973) According to Asis, he arrived at his office at 8:00 A.M. onJune 30 and after briefing his
men on what to do they started out. (p. 338, lbid) One or two days after the typhoon, the INELCO people heard
"rumors that someone was electrocuted" so he sent one of his men to the place but his man reported back that
there was no damaged wire. (p. 385, Id.) Loreto Abijero, chief lineman of defendant, corroborated Engr. Juan. He
testified that at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 Engr. Juan came to the INELCO plant and asked the INELCO
people to inspect their lines. He went with Engr. Juan and their inspection lasted from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon. (pp.
460, 465, TSN, Jan. 28, 1975) Fabico Abijero lineman of defendant, testified that at about 6:00 on June 29, 1967
the typhoon ceased. At that time, he was at the main building of the Divine Word College of Laoag where he had
taken his family for refuge. (pp. 510-511, Ibid.)
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of
June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be inconstant vigil to prevent or avoid any
probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the
contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its
office. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies
must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of

Page 31 of 43

petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to
a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to
note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding
typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept. 1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept.
1972), the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the
goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by
imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been
held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide
by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C.
Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts."
Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her
livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a
place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.
Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
petitioner's negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166).
But petitioner assails the CA for having abused its discretion in completely reversing the trial court's findings of fact, pointing
to the testimonies of three of its employees its electrical engineer, collector-inspector, lineman, and president-manager to the
effect that it had exercised the degree of diligence required of it in keeping its electric lines free from defects that may imperil
life and limb. Likewise, the said employees of petitioner categorically disowned the fatal wires as they appear in two
photographs taken on the afternoon of June 29, 1967 (Exhs. "D" and "E"), suggesting that said wires were just hooked to the
electric post (petitioner's Memorandum, p. 170, Rollo). However, as the CA properly held, "(t)he finding of the lower court ...
was based on what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on the
date in question, and not on the occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon" (CA Decision, p. 25,
Rollo). And as found by the CA, which We have already reiterated above, petitioner was in fact negligent. In a like manner,
petitioner's denial of ownership of the several wires cannot stand the logical conclusion reached by the CA when it held that
"(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no other conclusion than that they
were 'burns', and there was nothing else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the
dangling live wire of defendant company" (supra).
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken
lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation
set out in the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from
posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office (vide, CA
Decision, supra). The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was
not observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner. To aggravate matters, the CA found:
. . .even before June 28 the people in Laoag were already alerted about the impending typhoon, through radio
announcements. Even the fire department of the city announced the coming of the big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN,
March 13, 1975) At the INELCO irregularities in the flow of electric current were noted because "amperes of the
switch volts were moving". And yet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request
that defendant's switch be cut off but the harm was done. Asked why the delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he
"was not the machine tender of the electric plant to switch off the current." (pp. 467-468, Ibid.) How very
characteristic of gross inefficiency! (CA Decision, p. 26, Rollo)
From the preceding, We find that the CA did not abuse its discretion in reversing the trial court's findings but tediously
considered the factual circumstances at hand pursuant to its power to review questions of fact raised from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, formerly the Court of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129).
In considering the liability of petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in private respondent's favor: P30,229.45 in
actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory
damages, computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of
P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of
suit. Except for the award of P12,000 as compensation for the victim's death, We affirm the respondent CA's award for
damages and attorney's fees. Pusuant to recent jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147
SCRA 381), We increase the said award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total actual damages to P48,229.45.
The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the lower court was properly made by the respondent CA,
the charge of malice and bad faith on the part of respondents in instituting his case being a mere product of wishful thinking
and speculation. Award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith; there should
be no penalty on the right to litigate (Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage results from a person's exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110).
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent, except for the slight modification that actual damages be
increased to P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Page 32 of 43

25. Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals;

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119092. December 10, 1998]
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NICANOR BERNABE III, JOSEFINA
BERNABE, in their individual capacities and as HEIRS OF JASON BERNABE, JOHN JOSEPH BERNABE,
VICTOR IGNACIO, JULIETA ENRIQUEZ and RAMON ENRIQUEZ, RENE TABLANTE, LEOMAR MACASPAC,
JR., CHARITO ESTOLANO, NENITA SALUNOY, in their individual capacities and as HEIRS OF DALMACIO
SALUNOY, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a
Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several others. The accident took place at the
Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August 31, 1980. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died
was the driver. The Regional Trial Court of Makati found petitioners driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident and
accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorneys fees. Its decision was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. It is here for a review of the appellate courts decision.
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). They
had just visited the construction site of a company project at Lian, Batangas. The other passengers were family members
and friends whom they invited to an excursion to the beach after the visit to the construction site. The group stayed at Lian
beach until 5:30 p.m., when they decided to go back to Manila.
The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-4J, was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of the employees of PMCI.
Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway
in Imus, Cavite on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioners panel truck, bearing Plate
No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the opposite direction. The panel truck was on its way to petitioners plant in
Dasmarias, Cavite after delivering some linen to the Makati Medical Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a
jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused
his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the
Cimarron on the north-bound lane.
The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe and Dalmacio
Salunoy, died. Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken to various hospitals.
On December 4, 1980, private respondents filed this civil case for damages before the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig Branch, against petitioner.
On November 23, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, to which the case was transferred following the
reorganization of the judiciary, rendered judgment for private respondents. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
It is for the reasons stated above that the court is persuaded to award the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as proved in the
trial as follows:
Actual or compensatory expenses:
a. Charito Estolano

P35,813.87 (Exh. J)

b. Nicanor Bernabe III

20,024.94

& Josefina C. Bernabe

c. Julieta, Ailyn &

45,830.45 (Exh. QQ)

Josefina Enriquez
and Josefina Valeiro
d. Leonor Macaspac

2,740.00

e. Victor Rey Ignacio

14,820.64 (Exh. EEE)

f. Rene Tablante

10,032.40 (Exh. QQQ)

g. Nenita Salonoy, widow;

20,000.00

and Manilyn, children

Moral damages should also be awarded as follows:

Page 33 of 43

For the injuries sustained by:

a. Charito Estolano

P10,000.00 (Exh. F)

b. Julieta P. Enriquez

15,000.00 (Exh. MM)

c. Ailyn C. Enriquez

8,000.00 (Exh. NN)

d. Josefina R. Enriquez
e. Josefina P. Valerio
f. Nenita Salonoy
g. Nicanor Bernabe III
h. Josephine Bernabe

10,000.00 (Exh. OO)

2,000.00 (Exh. PP)
20,000.00 (Exh. DD)
8,000.00 (Exh. Q)
2,000.00 (Exh. R)

i. John Joseph Bernabe

10,000.00

j. Manilyn G. Salonoy

10,000.00 (Exh. EE)

k. Jack Salonoy

10,000.00 (Exh. JJ)

l. Leonor C. Macaspac

2,000.00 (Exh. AAA)

m. Victor Ignacio

8,000.00 (Exh. DDD)

n. Rene Tablanta

8,000.00 (Exh. FFF)

and finally the heirs of Jason Bernabe should be awarded the sum of P50,000.00 for the latters death. The heirs of
Dalmacio Salunoy should be given the sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages and unearned income.
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendant to pay the amounts aforecited and to
pay the further sum of P50,000.00 for attorneys fees and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
As already stated, the Court of Appeals, to which the decision of the trial court was appealed, affirmed the decision on
January 26, 1995. Hence, this appeal.
First. Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and, therefore, its
liability should be mitigated, if not totally extinguished. It claims that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of violation of traffic
rules and regulations at the time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed to
be negligent.
According to petitioner, the negligence consisted of the following:
1. The Cimarron was overloaded because there were from 20 to 25 passengers inside when the passenger
capacity of the vehicle was only 17.
2. The front seat of the Cimarron was occupied by four adults, including the driver.
3. The Cimarron had only one headlight on (its right headlight) as its left headlight was not functioning.
Petitioner cites Art. III, 2 of R.A. No. 4136, known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides that
No person operating any vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered carry
capacity and Art. IV, 3(e) which states that Every motor vehicle of more than one meter of projected width, while in use on
any public highway shall bear two headlights... which not later than one-half hour after sunset and until at least one-half hour
before sunrise and whenever weather conditions so require, shall both be lighted.
Petitioner asserts that the fact that its panel truck encroached on a portion of the lane of the Cimarron does not show
[1]
that its driver was negligent. Petitioner cites the case of Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, which allegedly held that the sudden
swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. Petitioner further claims that even
if petitioners swerving to the lane of respondents were considered proof of negligence, this fact would not negate the
presumption of negligence on the part of the other driver arising from his violations of traffic rules and regulations.
[2]

Petitioner likewise invokes the ruling in Mckee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, in which a driver who invaded the
opposite lane and caused a collision between his car and a truck coming from the opposite lane, was exonerated based on
the doctrine of last clear chance, which states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in that case should be applied to the present case. According to petitioner, although
the driver of the panel truck was initially negligent, the driver of the Cimarron had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident. However, because of his negligence (i.e., the aforementioned violations of traffic rules and regulations such as the

Page 34 of 43

use of only one headlight at night and the overcrowding at the front seat of the vehicle), he was not able to avoid a collision
with the panel truck.
We find the foregoing contention to be without merit.
First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision
between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or
legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of
[3]
law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says
that driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of
[4]
accident, that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was decreased visibility, and that the fact that the
[5]
vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded decreased [its] maneuverability. However, mere allegations such
as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause
of the injury.
Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case, there was no way either driver could have avoided the collision. The
[6]
panel truck driver testified:
Q.

You stated you were following a jeepney along the highway in Imus, Cavite, what happened afterwards, if any?

A.

The passenger jeepney I was following made a sudden stop so I stepped on the brakes.

Q.

Upon stepping on your brakes, what happened if any?

A.

The Mercedes Benz (panel) suddenly swerved to the left, sir.

Q.

How big was the swerving to the left?

A.

The distance which my vehicle swerved beyond the middle line or center line to the left was about this distance, sir
(witness demonstrating by using both hands the distance).

ATTY. ALILING:
Can we stipulate that it is 1 foot, Your Honor.
ATTY. GONZALES:
A little more, 1 1/2 feet.
ATTY. ALILING:
1 1/4 feet.
ATTY. GONZALES:
Between 1 1/4 and 1 1/2 feet.
The panel truck drivers testimony is consistent with the testimonies of private respondents that the panel truck went
[7]
out of control and simply smashed into the Cimarron in which they were riding. Thus, Nicanor Bernabe III testified:
Q:

And did you see how the accident happened?

A:

I just saw a glare of light. That is all and then the impact.

Q:

Where did you see that glare of light?

A:

Coming in front ahead of us.

Q:

When you say ahead of you, was it . . . ?

A:

Towards us.
....

Q:

And from what did those glare of light come from?

A:

Based on information I received, the light came from the headlights of a certain panel owned by Sanitary Steam
Laundry, Inc.
....

Q:

You said that the lights were going towards you. Now, at what pace did these lights come toward you?

A:

Fast pace.

Page 35 of 43

Charito Estolano, another passenger who was seated in front of the Cimarron, similarly testified that they just saw the
[8]
panel truck hurtling toward them. She said:
Q

Now, you said earlier that you were involved in an accident. What was that accident?

An approaching vehicle hit us.

Now, why do you know that there was the approaching vehicle?

There was a light which glared us and I knew that it came from a vehicle. We were blinded.

Where was this vehicle headed for?

Headed for Cavite.

Coming from?

Coming from Manila, I think.

So that, actually, in relation to your vehicle, it was coming from the opposite direction?

Yes, sir.

Now, you said that the light headed towards your vehicle. On which side of the highway was your Tamaraw vehicle
travelling at that time?

We were on the right lane.

Did you actually see this light from the vehicle coming from the opposite direction heading towards your vehicle?

Yes, sir.

And what happened after that?

After that, there was an impact.

All right. Will you tell the Court which bumped which?

We were bumped by the vehicle which was coming from the opposite direction.

The foregoing testimonies show that the driver of the panel truck lost control of his vehicle and bumped the
Cimarron. Hence, even if both headlights of the Cimarron were lighted, it would have been bumped just the same because
the driver of the panel truck could not stop despite the fact that he applied the brakes. Petitioners contention that because
of decreased visibility, caused by the fact that the Cimarron allegedly had only one headlight on, its driver failed to see the
Cimarron is without any basis in fact. Only its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only one headlight on. The police
investigator did not state in his report or in his testimony that the Cimarron had only one headlight on.
Nor is there any basis in fact for petitioners contention that because of overcrowding in the front seat of the Cimarron
there was decreased maneuverability which prevented the Cimarron driver from avoiding the panel truck. There is
absolutely no basis for this claim. There is nothing in the testimonies of the passengers of the Cimarron, particularly Charito
Estolano, who was seated in front, which suggest that the driver had no elbow room for maneuvering the vehicle. To the
[9]
contrary, from the testimony of some of the witnesses, it appears that the driver of the Cimarron tried to avoid the collision
but because of the emergency created by the speeding panel truck coming from the opposite direction he was not able to
fully move his Cimarron away from the path of the oncoming vehicle. We are convinced that no maneuvering which the
Cimarron driver could have done would have avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the
events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial.
All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver. As the trial
court noted, the swerving of petitioners panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioners driver was
running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.
Petitioners driver claimed that the distance between the panel truck and the passenger jeepney in front was about 12
[10]
meters. If this was so, he would have had no difficulty bringing his panel truck to a stop. It is very probable that the driver
did not really apply his brakes (which is why there were no skid marks) but that finding the jeepney in front of him to be in
close proximity, he tried to avoid hitting it by swerving his vehicle to the left. In the process, however, he invaded a portion of
the opposite lane and consequently hit the Cimarron. Indeed, the panel truck driver testified that his vehicle was running at
[11]
the speed of 60 miles per hour. He tried to correct himself when asked by petitioners counsel whether the panel truck
speedometer indicated miles or kilometers by saying that the speedometer measured kilometers and not miles, but on cross
[12]
examination his testimony got muddled.
Be that as it may, whether the driver meant 60 miles per hour (which could be 96.77 kilometers per hour) or 60
kilometers per hour, the fact remains that the panel truck was overspeeding because the maximum allowable speed for
[13]
trucks and buses on open country roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite, is only 50 kilometers per hour.

Page 36 of 43

The case of Bayasen, which petitioner invokes, cannot apply to this case. There was no swerving of the vehicle in that
case but skidding, and it was caused by the fact that the road was wet and slippery. In this case, the road was dry and
safe. There was no reason for the vehicle to swerve because of road condition. The only explanation for this occurrence
was human error.
Petitioners reliance on the McKee case is also misplaced. In that case, the driver of the vehicle at fault, a truck, had
an opportunity to avoid the collision but he ignored the signals from the other vehicle, a car, to slow down and allow it to
safely pass the bridge. In this case, there was no such opportunity given the Cimarron on the night of the
mishap. Everything happened so quickly that before the passengers of the Cimarron knew it, the vehicle had been bumped
by the truck.
Second. On its liability as employer of the negligent driver, petitioner contends that the non-submission of the NBI
clearance and police clearance of its driver does not mean that it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of its employees. It argues that there is no law requiring employees to submit NBI and
police clearance prior to their employment. Hence, petitioners failure to require submission of these documents does not
mean that it did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. On the other hand, it asserts
that its employment of Herman Hernandez as a driver means that he had passed the screening tests of the company,
including submission of the aforementioned documents. Petitioner maintains that the presumption is that the said driver
submitted NBI and police clearance.
Petitioner likewise contends that the Court of Appeals position that it failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees by not requiring its prospective employees to undergo psychological and physical tests
before employment has no basis in law because there is no law requiring such tests prior to hiring employees.
The petitioners contention has no merit. The Court of Appeals did not say that petitioners failure to submit NBI and
police clearances of its driver was proof that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection of its
employees. What the Court of Appeals said was that petitioners policy of requiring prospective employees to submit NBI
and police clearance and to have at least two (2) years experience as driver prior to employment was not enough to prove
the exercise of due diligence and that even this policy petitioner failed to prove by its failure to present the drivers NBI and
police records during the trial.
With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment, although no law
requires it, such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due diligence. As the trial court
[14]
said:
. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, were conducted on their would-be employees. No on-the-job
training and seminars reminding employees, especially drivers, of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were
done. There were no instructions given to defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency nor what to do after
an emergency occurs. There was even failure on the part of defendant to present its concerned employees 204 file. All
these could only mean failure on the part of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
[15]

Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the
selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law. In this case,
David Bautista, the office manager of petitioner in its Dasmarias plant, said that petitioner has a policy of requiring job
applicants to submit clearances from the police and the NBI. In the case of applicants for the position of driver they are
required to have at least two (2) years driving experience and to be holders of a professional drivers license for at least two
years. But the supposed company policies on employment were not in writing. Nor did Bautista show in what manner he
supervised the drivers to ensure that they drove their vehicles in a safe way.
Third. With respect to the question of damages, we find no reversible error committed in the award of actual damages
to private respondents. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of
[16]
loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. Here, the actual damages claimed by
private respondents were duly supported by receipts and appear to have been really incurred.
As to the moral damages awarded, we find them to be reasonable and necessary in view of the circumstances of this
case. Moral damages are awarded to allow the victims to obtain means, diversion, or amusement to alleviate the moral
[17]
suffering they had undergone due to the defendants culpable action. In this case, private respondents doubtless suffered
some ordeal because some of them lost their loved ones, while others lost their future. Within the meaning of Art. 2217 of
the Civil Code, they suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. An award of moral
damages in their favor is thus justified.
The award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jason Bernabe as death indemnity is likewise in accordance with
[18]
law. However, the award of P100,000 to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy, denominated in the decision of the trial court as
moral damages and unearned income cannot be upheld. The heirs were already included among those awarded moral
damages. Marilyn Salunoy was ordered to be paid P10,000, Jack Salunoy, P10,000, and their mother Nenita
Salunoy, P20,000, as moral damages. The amount of P100,000 was presumably awarded primarily for loss of earning
[19]
capacity but even then the amount must be modified. In accordance with our cases on this question, the formula for
determining the life expectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be determined by applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus

Page 37 of 43

the age of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46 years of age at the time of his death, as stated in his death certificate, then
his life expectancy was 22.6 years, or up to 68 years old.
Next, his net earnings must be computed. At the time of his death, Dalmacio Salunoy was earning more than P900.00
a month as bookkeeper at the PMCI so that his annual gross earnings was about P11,000.00. From this amount, about 50%
should be deducted as reasonable and necessary living expenses because it seems his wife occasionally finds work and
thus helps in the household expenses.
Based on the foregoing, his net earning capacity was P124,300.00 computed as follows:
net earning

life

capacity (x) = expectancy x [Gross annual income

x

[20]

[2 (80-46)]

less

reasonable & necessary living expenses]

[P11,000 - P5,500]

3
=

22.6

P124,300.00

5,500

In addition, the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should be paid P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
Finally, the award of attorneys fees should be disallowed as the trial court did not give any justification for granting it in
its decision. It is now settled that awards of attorneys fees must be based on findings of fact and law, stated in the decision
[21]
of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in the sense that the award of P100,000.00
denominated for moral damages and unearned income is deleted, and in lieu thereof the amount of P124,300.00 for loss of
earning capacity and the further amount of P50,000.00 for death indemnity are awarded to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy
and the award of P50,000.00 for attorneys fees is disallowed. In all other respects the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Page 38 of 43

26. Tison and Jabon vs. Spouses Pomasin, et.al., GR No. 173180, August 24, 2011;
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173180 Promulgated: August 24, 2011
ALBERT TISON and CLAUDIO L. JABON, Petitioners, -versus- SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN and
CONSORCIA PONCE POMASIN, DIANNE POMASIN PAGUNSAN, CYNTHIA POMASIN, SONIA PEROL,
ANTONIO SESISTA, GINA SESISTA, and REYNALDO SESISTA,Respondents
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
[1]

Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos,
Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City
[2]
while the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.
The opposing parties gave two different versions of the incident.
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father, was on board the jitney and seated on the passengers side. He
testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite
direction and encroaching on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causing
[3]
death and injuries to its passengers.
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite
lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of
the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks
of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The
[4]
tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.
Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter, Andrea Pomasin
Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and Abraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His other daughter Laarni, the
jitney driver, and granddaughter Annie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the hospital. His wife, Consorcia Pomasin,
another granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce, Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista,
[5]
Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained injuries. On the other hand, Jabon and one of the passengers in the tractor[6]
trailer were injured.
Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck, extended financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00
each immediately after the accident andP200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of Gregorios daughters. Cynthia, in
turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and
carelessness of petitioners. Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who perished in the accident
at P50,000.00 each; P500,000.00 for hospitalization, medical and burial expenses; P350,000.00 for continuous
hospitalization and medical expenses of Spouses Pomasin; P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; P250,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P30,000.00 for loss of income of Cynthia; P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P1,000.00 per court
[7]
appearance; P50,000.00 for litigation expenses; and cost of suit.
In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the accident. They
further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an amicable settlement by executing an
Affidavit of Desistance. Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners complained that respondents filed the instant complaint to
harass them and profit from the recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners counterclaimed for damages.
Petitioners subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in view of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by
[8]
Cynthia. The motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 7 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for
damages, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against plaintiffs
hereby DISMISSING the instant complaint considering that plaintiffs have authorized Cynthia Pomasin to
settle the case amicably for P200,000.00; and that the proximate cause of the accident did not arise from
[9]
the fault or negligence of defendants driver/employee but from plaintiffs driver.
The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing and reliable than that of
Gregorios, a mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is not as focused as that of the driver. The trial

Page 39 of 43

court concluded that Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The trial court likewise upheld the
Affidavit of Desistance as having been executed with the tacit consent of respondents.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular
collision. In support of such finding, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on Gregorios testimony that Jabon was driving the
tractor-trailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jitney. Based on the gravity of the impact and the damage
caused to the jitney resulting in the death of some passengers, the Court of Appeals inferred that Jabon must be
speeding. The appellate court noted that the restriction in Jabons drivers license was violated, thus, giving rise to the
presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident. Tison was likewise held liable for damages for his failure to
prove due diligence in supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the truck. Finally, the appellate court disregarded
the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia because the latter had no written power of attorney from respondents and
that she was so confused at the time when she signed the affidavit that she did not read its content.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is granted, and the trial courts Decision dated February 7,
2003 is set aside. Defendants-appellees are ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellants or their heirs the
following:
a) Actual damages of P136,000.00 as above computed, to be offset with the P200,000.00
received by plaintiff-appellant Cynthia Pomasin;
b) Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of each victim, to be offset with the balance
of P64,000.00 from the aforementioned P200,000.00 of civil indemnity received by plaintiff-appellant
Cynthia Pomasin. Hence, the net amount is computed at P37,200.00 each, as follows:
Narcisa Pomasin

P37,200.00

Laarni Pomasin

P37,200.00

Andrea P. Pagunsan

P37,200.00

Dionisio Perol

P37,200.00

Annie Jane P. Pagunsan

P37,200.00

c) Moral damages of P50,000.00 to each of the victims; and

d) Attorneys fees of 10% of the total award.

[10]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals in a
[11]
Resolution dated 19 July 2006.
The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact and law which lead back to the very issue litigated by the trial
court: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
[12]

The issue of negligence is factual in nature.

And the rule, and the exceptions, is that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are generally conclusive but may be reviewed when: (1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court are contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the inference
made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse
of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but
[13]
are contradicted by the evidence on record.
The exceptions to the rule underscore the substance and weight of the findings of the trial court. They render
inconclusive contrary findings by the appellate court. The reason is now a fundamental principle:
[A]ppellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with regard to the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses. The reason for this is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the
witneses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
The exceptions to this rule are when the trial courts findings of facts and conclusions are not
supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts of substance and value, likely to change the
outcome of the case, have been overlooked by the trial court, or when the assailed decision is based on a
[14]
misapprehension of facts.

Page 40 of 43

This interplay of rules and exceptions is more pronounced in this case of quasi-delict in which, according to Article
2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
[15]
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
These requisites must be proved by a preponderance
[16]
of evidence.
The claimants, respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish their claim or cause of action by
preponderance of evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition
[17]
to it.
The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than the opposite
conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision.
One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more
focused than that of a mere passenger. The trial court expounded, thus:
In the appreciation of the testimony of eye-witnesses, one overriding consideration is their
opportunity for observation in getting to know or actually seeing or observing the matter they testify
to. This most particularly holds true in vehicular collision or accident cases which oftentimes happen
merely momentarily or in the split of a second. In the case of a running or travelling vehicle, especially in
highway travel which doubtless involves faster speed than in ordinary roads, the driver is concentrated on
his driving continuously from moment to moment even in long trips. While in the case of a mere
passenger, he does not have to direct his attention to the safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as in fact
he may converse with other passengers and pay no attention to the driving or safe conduct of the travelling
vehicle, as he may even doze off to sleep if he wants to, rendering his opportunity for observation on the
precise cause of the accident or collision or immediately preceding thereto not as much as that of the
driver whose attention is continuously focused on his driving. So that as between the respective versions
of the plaintiffs thru their passenger and that of the defendants thru their driver as to the cause or
antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision in this case, the version of the driver of defendant
should ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of Plaintiffs vehicle, simply
because the attention of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver,
consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter testified to which is the
precise point of inquiry --- the proximate cause of the accident --- is more reasonably reliable. Moreover,
the passengers vision is not as good as that of the driver from the vantage point of the drivers seat
especially in nighttime, thus rendering a passengers opportunity for observation on the antecedent causes
of the collision lesser than that of the driver. This being so, this Court is more inclined to believe the story
of defendants driver Claudio Jabon that the jitney driven by Laarni Pomasin fell off the shoulder of the
curved road causing it to run thereafter in a zigzag manner and in the process the two vehicles
approaching each other from opposite directions at highway speed came in contact with each other, the
zigzagging jeep hitting the left fender of the truck all the way to the fuel tank, the violent impact resulting in
[18]
the lighter vehicle, the jitney, being thrown away due to the disparate size of the truck.
[19]

The appellate court labelled the trial courts rationalization as a sweeping conjecture and countered that
Gregorio was actually occupying the front seat of the jitney and had actually a clear view of the incident despite the fact that
he was not driving.
While it is logical that a drivers attention to the road travelled is keener than that of a mere passenger, it should
also be considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly circumstanced, and only as a general rule, so that, it
does not necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a driver and a passenger, the former is more
credible. The factual setting of the event testified on must certainly be considered.
The trial court did just that in the instant case. Contrary to the observation of the Court of Appeals, the relative
positions of a driver and a passenger in a vehicle was not the only basis of analysis of the trial court. Notably, aside from
Jabons alleged vantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trial court also took into consideration Gregorios admission
that prior to the accident, the jitney was running on the curving and downward portion of the highway. The appellate court,
however, took into account the other and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was their jitney that was going uphill and
when it was about to reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck running very fast and encroaching the jitneys lane.
We perused the transcript of stenographic notes and found that the truck was actually ascending the highway when
it collided with the descending jitney.
During the direct examination, Jabon narrated that the tractor-trailer was ascending at a speed of 35 to 40
kilometers per hour when he saw the jitney on the opposite lane running in a zigzag manner, thus:
Q:

Now, when you passed by the municipality of Polangui, Albay at about 5:00 of August 12, 1994,
could you tell the Court if there was any untoward incident that happened?

A:

There was sir.

Q:

Could you please tell the Court?

Page 41 of 43

A:

While on my way to Liboro coming from Sorsogon, I met on my way a vehicle going on a zigzag
direction and it even fell on the shoulder and proceeded going on its way on a zigzag direction.

Q:

Could you describe to the Court what was the kind of vehicle you saw running in zigzag direction?

A:

A Toyota-jitney loaded with passengers with top-load.

Q:

You said that the top[-]load of the jeep is loaded?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Could you please tell the Court what was your speed at the time when you saw that jeepney with
top[-]load running on a zigzag manner?

A:

I was running 35 to 40 kilometers per hour because I was ascending plain. (Emphasis
[20]
supplied).

In that same direct examination, Jabon confirmed that he was ascending, viz:
Q:

Could you please describe the condition in the area at the time of the incident, was it dark or day
time?

A:

It was still bright.

COURT: But it was not approaching sunset?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Was there any rain at that time?

A:

None sir.

Q:

So the road was dry?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

You said you were ascending towards the direction of Liboro, Camarines Sur, is that correct
at the time the incident happened?

A:

Yes sir.

[21]

(Emphasis supplied).

Upon the other hand, Gregorio, during his direct examination described the road condition where the collision took
place as curving and downward, thus:
Q:

Could you please describe the place where the incident happened in so far as the road condition is
concerned?

A:

The road was curving and downward.

Q:

And the road was of course clear from traffic, is that correct?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

And practically, your jitney was the only car running at that time?

A:

Yes sir.

[22]

(Emphasis supplied).

Significantly, this is a confirmation of the testimony of Jabon.

However, on rebuttal, Gregorio turned around and stated that the jitney was going uphill when he saw the tractortrailer running down very fact and encroaching on their lane, to wit:
Q:

Mr. Claudio Jabon, the driver of the trailer truck that collided with your owner jeepney that you were
riding testified in open Court on July 24, 1997 which I quote, while on my way to Liboro coming to
Sorsogon I met a vehicle going on a zig-zag direction and it even fell on the shoulder and
proceeded going on its way on zig-zag direction, what can you say about this statement of this
witness?

A:

We were no[t] zigzagging but because we were going uphill and about to reach a curved (sic) we
saw the on-coming vehicle going down very fast and encroaching on our lane so our driver
[23]
swerved our vehicle to the right but still we were hit by the on-coming vehicle. (Emphasis
supplied).

The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward and consistent. The recollection of
[24]
Gregorio veered from curving and downward to uphill.
On this point, Jabon and his testimony is more credible.

Page 42 of 43

The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial courts conclusion that
the jitney was indeed going downhill which, it may be repeated, was the original testimony of Gregorio that the road was
[25]
curving and downward.
It is this conclusion, prodded by the inconsistency of Gregorios testimony, that gives credence
to the further testimony of Jabon that the herein respondents jitney, loaded with passengers with top-load was running in a
[26]
zigzag manner.
Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the
loss of control of the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer.
There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractortrailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that
of a fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon should have swerved
to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an
instant, and, understandably in this case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size
of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill.
Clearly, the negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident.
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to
the restriction imposed on his drivers license,i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land
Transportation Office to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code 8 which would allow him to drive a tractortrailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal
presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However,
[27]
in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the
[28]
[29]
injury.
Likewise controlling is our ruling in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated thatnegligence per se,
arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In said
case, Aonuevo, who was driving a car, did not attempt to establish a causal connection between the safety violations
imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in
themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on Aonuevo is to
conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his
[30]
necessary burden of proving the cyclists own liability.
We took the occasion to state that:
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the
failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be
rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory
violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to
forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for
[31]
the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other.
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer drivers restrictions on his
license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office
merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.
Petitioners presented the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia to exonerate them from any liability. An
affidavit of desistance is usually frowned upon by courts. Little or no persuasive value is often attached to a
[32]
desistance.
The subject affidavit does not deserve a second look more so that it appears that Cynthia was not armed with
a special power of attorney to enter into a settlement with petitioners. At any rate, it is an exercise of futility to delve into the
effects of the affidavit of desistance executed by one of the respondents since it has already been established that
petitioners are not negligent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 94-3418 lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74,
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Page 43 of 43