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To cite this article: Jonathan Rose (2010) The Branding of States: The Uneasy Marriage of Marketing
to Politics, Journal of Political Marketing, 9:4, 254-275, DOI: 10.1080/15377857.2010.520238
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2010.520238
JONATHAN ROSE
Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada
One would not normally think of nations as diverse as Jordan, Poland, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada as having much in common.
Among them are advanced liberal democracies, a former communist country,
and a quasi-democratic monarchy. Despite the breadth of ideological
opinion among them and the significant difference in things such as fundamental freedoms, equality, and degree of industrialization, these five nations
are alike in at least one significant way. Each of them has used advertising
and public relations companies to market themselves both internally as a
way of shoring up domestic public opinion for the regime and, more fundamentally, externally as a way of projecting a brand image to businesses,
leaders, and the public in other nations. If some are to believed, the rise of
the branded state has taken nation-states down paths they have not traveled.
Does state branding represent a shift in what states have always done, or has
the intrusion of marketing and public relations companies forever altered
traditional functions of nation-states? This article argues that while the
Address correspondence to Jonathan Rose, Department of Political Studies, Queens
University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L 3N6. E-mail: jonathan.rose@queensu.ca
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The roots of state branding can be found long ago in the early 20th
century. It was then when the historical and deep connections among governments, political parties, and advertising firms were formed. In Canada,
Reginald Whitaker writes that the link between ad agencies and the Liberal
party were forged after World War I. Whitaker writes that if experts could
package and sell a war, presumably they could package and sell the Liberal
party (1977, p. 222), and in foreshadowing the Gomery Inquiry of 2005 that
examined links between the governing Liberal party and advertising agencies, Whitaker goes on to suggest that In Canada, government and political
advertising are inextricably linked (1977, p. 219). Like many developments
in modern political communications, the United States was one of the early
advocates of using public relations and spin to change public opinion about
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private as well as public goods. In the 1930s and 1940s, George Gallup urged
the government to extol the power of opinion polling to counter the effect of
entrenched interests and to provide it guidance. Gallup thought polling was a
democratizing trend and a tool of accountability (see Robinson 1999,
pp. 4041) and, in doing so, established the dependency of modern governments on private polling firms. In addition to establishing the link between
public relations officials and government, the US was also one of the first
to embrace eagerly the connection between political parties and advertising.
This shouldnt be a surprise. At present, the United States spends more
money on advertising than 66 other nations combined, including all of the
other members of the G-7 economies (Rotzoll and Haefner, 1996, p. 2). In
the political realm, advertising is almost the sole currency. For example,
the cost of mounting a senatorial seat, much of which is spent on advertising,
can average more than $5 million (Newman, 1999, p. 14). In the 2008 presidential election, Democratic Party candidate Barack Obama spent over $42
million in one week in October on TV ads.
The blurring of the political and commercial is not just confined to the
United States. In Britain, political parties do not broadcast advertisements
during elections but instead major parties are granted five party election
broadcasts (PEBs). According to Scammell and Semetko, as the audience
share of the PEBs have dwindled, the trends and tactics associated with marketing have increased (1995, pp. 819). Political parties increase the media
coverage the PEB gets by holding press conferences to announce the hiring
of a Hollywood director or using a tactic called the Benetton strategy,
described by Scammell and Semetko as the deliberate injection of close-tothe-bone emotive material in the hopes of providing hostile reaction from
rival politicians and thereby creating a news story (1995, p. 21). The Labour
government of Tony Blair has moved with great vigor in embracing the
commercial aspects of politics, whether that is increasing press officers, relying to a greater extent on pollsters, or being the countrys largest spender on
advertising, as it was in 2001 (Scammell, 2003, p. 133). The reliance of
political parties on marketing may provide one clue as to why states are
relying on the same advertising and public relations firms when they form
governments.
The intersection between political party marketing and state branding
suggests at least two things about the discourse of politics. First, a study of
modern politics cannot be divorced from an understanding of the role of
symbolic handlers who routinely organize, plan, and manage the communications of political actors. Increasingly, there is a divorce between the
thoughts of a leader and his or her words. This further perpetuates cynicism
among a public weary of seeing politicians as empty vessels for prepackaged
messages. A infamously leaked memo from the Philip Gould, Tony Blairs
strategy and polling advisor, admits that the public sees the Labour Party
as spin, no substance (Scammell, 2003). Ronald Reagans speech writer,
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Peggy Noonan, argues that this cynicism is a result of speech writers who are
paid to write sound bites and wrap speeches around them (Noonan, 1990,
p. 73). Roderick Hart (1987) argues that the tremendous increase in the
number of speeches that leaders must give necessarily means that we know
less about the leaders than we did before the advent of electronic media.
All of this creates not only a devaluation of politics but, in fact, an abdication
of governing, according to Newman (1999).
The disconnect between the true thoughts and words of political leaders
versus those orchestrated by their public relations consultants and its
intended effect of obfuscating the nature of this relationship has been
observed by others also: Many countries make considerable efforts to
cultivate their images abroad, especially in the US and Europe. As a rule,
no precise linkage between commissioned [public relations] activities and
what appears in the mass media can be traced. Typically, one can do little
more than guess at what suggestions were made, which were excepted,
and how they were implemented. The precise nature of intervention remains
somewhat of a mystery (Kunczik, 2003, p. 121). Western leaders mouth
platitudes about transparency and accountability intended for consumption
by domestic audiences while simultaneously condemning their developingworld counterparts for the absence of the same qualities. The reality is that
political accountability, transparency, and public input in the policy formulation process is at its most camouflaged in precisely those nations most able
to afford, and most experienced at using, the marketing strategies of the
public relations firms they employ.
Metaphor has been a central element in creating brand segregation
between the developing world and the US in particular. According to Ivie,
metaphor has been a powerful rhetorical technique of American foreign
policy in particular. He argues that:
Democracy, as a motivating term in US political culture, is readily
identified with war through the ubiquitous trope of disease and related
metaphorical vehicles that participate in a wider rhetorical universe of
decivilizing imagery. This convergence of the language of democracy
and war translates the barbarism of a distempered domestic demos into
the savagery of a threatening external Other, exacerbating perceptions
of peril that sustain an improbable quest for national security through
global domination (Ivie, in Beer and Landtsheer, 2004, pp. 7578).
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The state branding literature argues that public relations is used by all
states to serve different purposes, but always as a tool of enhancing state
legitimacy. While there is a well-developed literature on political party advertising, those scholars who study state branding remind us that the advertising
of states behavior between elections is as noteworthy as party advertising
during elections. In both cases, the logic of advertising is the same in that
it invites a certain associative logic that is both powerful and easy to communicate via television. Kathleen Hall Jamieson argues forcefully that the
visual grammar of television is associative and that a person adept at visualizing claims in dramatic capsules will be able to use television to short-circuit
the audiences demand that those claims be dignified with evidence (Hall
Jamieson, 1988, p. 13). In other words, visual claims are more effective than
verbal claims at making arguments without evidence. The branded state,
with its emphasis on the aesthetic and the politics of the emotion, represents
the extension of the triumph of the visual over verbal. Fan notes that: As
there is no tangible offer in a nation brand, its attributes are difficult to define
or describe. The only benefits a nation brand could create for its audience are
emotional rather than functional (2005, p. 8).
Advertising may be the most common form of mass persuasion that we
come across in our lives. Arguably, it rivals almost all other institutions in
terms of influence and pervasiveness. It infuses our habits, customs, and
language. It shapes our mores and reinforces class, gender, and racial distinctions. It is one of the first forms of literacy learned by children. Given all this,
it is not a surprise that among American children one of the most easily
recognized and familiar icons is Joe Camel, a cartoon character designed
to sell cigarettes (see Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.). Gillian Dyer
suggests that it could be argued that advertising nowadays fulfils a function
traditionally met by art or religion (Dyer, 1986, p. 2). For states that want to
reach out to disaffected youth, advertising provides a vehicle that is perfect in
terms of audience reach but quite imperfect in terms of democratic dialogue.
Scammell notes that this exact tactic was used by the government of Margaret
Thatcher in trying to sell her social policies to the British public. Great
effort and a huge amount of public funds were spent by her administration
trying to convince voters that her radical policies were having their desired
effect; however, the objective facts contradicted the governments public
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The impact of years of socialization and the reinforcement of a dominant frame will profoundly affect the symbols that we recall when we think
about a state. Repositioning something as complex and, often, contradictory
as the image of a nation-state is made even more difficult because of the
resistance individuals have to changing long-held perceptions amidst the
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invited to make inferences between the images and the logo. The ramifications for vodka, clothing, or beer are one thing, but they are quite another
for nation-states. Fan also expresses concern that political leaders are placing
greater emphasis on the value of branding their nations than is warranted by
the evidence of its success. He states that:
Nation branding has been vaunted as a panaceasomething equivalent
to a grand national economic development strategydesperately needed
by developing countries. . . . Nation branding is believed to be able to
work miracles and solve many of the worlds problems, for example,
the poverty gap between the North and the South. It is undeniable that
branding is an extremely powerful tool, but it is equally important to
realize that branding is only one part of a marketing strategy [that] itself
is a part of the whole business strategy. Branding will not work if other
components of the strategy (finance, R&D, production, distribution) fail
to deliver what the customers want. Nation branding is no exception
(Fan, 2005, p. 11).
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The logo was an attempt to reposition the Polish brand in the evercrowded European marketplace. Its traditional emblem, a white eagle, was
deemed as too common (Germany, Russia, and the United States all have
eagles as their national emblems). The kite logo tried to break the connotation of Poland from its military past and rebrand the nation as a peaceful,
cosmopolitan, and modern. According to the focus groups conducted by
DDB Corporate Profiles, among the negative connotations of Poland were
words such as gray, cold, vodka, poor, white, unsmiling, friendly, sad,
boring, hard-living, fast-driving, car stealing, argumentative, chauvinistic,
chaotic, and anti-Semitic (Boxer, 2002).
While the jury is still out on the verdict over the success of Polands
rebranding, the British excursion into the world of branding suggests that it
might work in the short term, but our perceptions persist long after the campaign is over. Wolff Olins, a British marketing company, was hired by Tony
Blairs government in 1998 to rebrand the UK. Focus groups had reported that
the product of the UK was associated with imperialism in many parts of the
world (Wolff Olins Web site, 2004). While the logo of the Union Jack was
widely known, it too was seen as quaint and strongly associated with the
brands other adjuncts: the royal family, rain, and bad food. Wolff Olins suggested that Great Britain could seem like a more hip and happening place if it
erased the Great from its name and ditched the Union Jack (Boxer, 2002,
p. 1). The British think tank Demos, in an important document that influenced
the Blair governments thinking on branding, argued that the UK brand had
six core values: institutions, empire, industry and language, culture, religion,
and sport (Leonard, 1997, pp. 2126). These ought to form the core of any
newly branded Britain. The result was the Cool Britannia campaign that
included a radically changed British Airways livery, a pop version of God
Save the Queen, and a campaign that targeted international media. The latter
yielded a Newsweek cover story that declared London as the coolest city on
the planet. The attention this overt campaign received in the press might
suggest some immediate success, but public opinion polls tell a different
story. A survey conducted in 1999 and 2000 of young opinion-leaders in 28
countries found little change in the perception of Britain as a result of the
branding effort. Their description of Britain as weak on creativity and
innovation, not to mention class-ridden, racist, and cold (Economist, 2002,
p. 31) suggests that a failure of the Cool Brittania campaign to change any core
values. Further studies by the UK polling firm MORI and the British Council
have echoed this, finding that attempts to change Britains image have not
so far succeeded and there is a general ignorance and vagueness about
Britain and what it is like (OShaughnessy and OShaughnessy, 2000, p. 63).
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The failure of the Cool Brittania campaign offers an important lesson for
all branding exercises. Branding, like advertising, cannot work in opposition
to strongly felt preexisting beliefs. The campaign failed because it did not
represent the reality of modern Britain and seemed implausible to outsiders
looking in. More troubling is that this branding exercise offered little to
those who wish to change the material conditions that underlie Britain.
The Economist had this blunt assessment: So unless the government can
concoct a new image that accurately reflects the best of modern Britain, its
rebranding campaign will achieve little more than lining the pockets of the
advertising and public relations industry (Economist, 1997, p. 43).
The reluctance of political leaders to tackle structural problems in
the economic and social spheres and, instead, to opt for superficial, cosmetic,
and symbolic changes via branding has been observed by other authors.
Fan (2005, p. 11) cites the apparent success and the necessary underlying
factors that were already in place of the Spanish governments attempt
to change its nations brand image, as evidence of the need to view
economic=social reform and the branding of a nation as two inextricably
linked processes. He argues that:
To the proponents of nation branding, Spain has provided a most
successful example of rebranding a nation. However, this is a kind of
misunderstanding. The change in the national image of Spain is the result
of fundamental changes in its political, economic, and social systems
[that] have taken place over the past 20 years or so, not the result of some
wishful campaigns in nation branding. Branding might have played a role
in the transformation, but its importance should not be exaggerated.
In contrast, Zimbabwe is a country with rich tourist resources, but
under the tyranny of the current regime the country is unable to exploit
these market opportunities. Before political reform takes place there is
no role for nation branding.
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particular (Beers, 2002). She has described the United State as a beautiful
brand and television as a fast delivery system for the American governments message (McKenna, 2003, p. 2). Examining its failure might provide
some insight into why state branding is likely to be not successful.
Many of the techniques used are not more evolved than the propaganda
attempts of 60 years ago. Efforts in Afghanistan such as dropping pamphlets
that show women being beaten by the Taliban or distributing radios that are
only able to receive Voice of America have failed miserably (see Leonard,
2002, p. 48). Crude tag lines on the pamphlets such as Is this the future
you want for your women and your children? did not resonate with an audience whose primary concerns lay elsewhere. Otherssuch as the $15 million
Shared Values campaign, featuring Muslims talking in glowing terms about
their life in the United Stateswere quietly and quickly scrapped by the State
Department (McKenna, 2003, p. 2). The goal of the Shared Values campaign
was to use advertising to make the argument that the US was a misunderstood place. The radio, print, and television ads showed Muslims of all ages
extolling the virtues of living in the United States. One ad showed a young
Lebanese-born woman with her three smiling children at a school softball
game saying, I didnt see any prejudice anywhere in my neighborhood after
September 11 (Perlez, 2002, p. A1). Designed to be broadcast in a number of
Islamic countries, the US government found them rejected by nations that
would not accept paid programming from a foreign country. The campaign
was decried as being Muslim as apple pie by some who thought it did not
respond to the perceived problems in US policies but merely papered them
over with ads. In Indonesia, an ally in the war on terror and one of the few
Islamic nations that has shown support of US policies, the ads were seen as
not relevant to Muslims concerns (Murphy, 2003). While perhaps not
directly attributable to the ad campaign, the percentage of Muslims there
who view the US favorably has fallen from 75 percent in 1999 to 61 percent
in 2002, according to a US Department of State=PEW poll (Murphy, 2003).
Some of this failure might be a result of attempting to reach the wrong
audience with the wrong vehicle. As the Cool Brittania campaign showed,
one cannot radically transform impressions of nation-states through branding
exercises. In the case of the US branding exercise, the target audience is the
non-elite 15- to 59-year-olds (Perlez, 2002, p. A1) rather than elite opinion
leaders, and the vehicle was advertisements, something with which Charlotte
Beers, a former ad executive, had some familiarity. The range of opinion
among this group, it is fair to say, must be quite broad, and any single advertisement will not resonate with the entire cohort. The diversity of beliefs
among target audiences is captured by John and Nicholas OShaughnessy,
who write that it is not easy for a nation, as opposed to a brand of product,
to have a consistent persona because a nation is such a constellation of
different images (OShaughnessy and OShaughnessy, 2000, p. 60). There
are few comparisons in commercial marketing where the audience is as
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Schrott, 1991). The power of the media to frame the issue is well-known to
those who study political ads and campaign communication. It is the reason
that political parties employ spin doctors post-debate or as advertising campaigns roll out. The same logic holds true for branding exercises: The success
or failure of a branding campaign is in part dependent on the way in which
the mass media have framed it. Cynicism among the media about the motive
of government seems to be sufficiently high that it is difficult to find a laudatory news story of any branding campaign. This cynicism seems to be warranted if one looks at the behavior of the president of the Czechoslovakian
National Council, who issued his countrys declaration of independence on
a Sunday for public relations reasons: Sunday was a slow news day, so it
would get more space in the worlds newspapers (Kunczik, 2003, p. 120).
Branding is not always about using government-sponsored advertising
or public relations. Often branding uses the tools of culture to persuade.
While dropping leaflets may prove to be ineffective, one of the most successful humanitarian operations in Afghanistan was UNICEFs inoculation program, which relied on using popular culture. Disseminating the importance
of inoculations through an Afghan soap opera on the BBCs Pashtun service
allowed 7 million children to be treated in 3 weeks (Teicholz, 2002). Less successful was the American internal branding exercise. The US Armys Taking
It to the Streets is an attempt to market the US army as a cool consumer
choice. Unlike the American governments external marketing campaign,
which was more like old-fashioned propaganda, Taking It to the Streets
was more of an attempt to use youth culture as moral suasion. Its hip-hop
flavored campaign complete with brightly painted Hummers and contests
that test potential recruits ability to climb up rock walls and shoot baskets
markets the army as an adjunct to lifestyle choices. Roving recruitment
vehicles that make customized dog tags connect hip-hop and urban culture
to the Armys recruitment goal of 100,000 enlistees (Joiner, 2003). Competing
with the blizzard of images and messages that the average young person
will see in a day demands that a variety of communication channels be
employed. Interactive Web sites, video games, and music and clothing all
help create a connection so that, in the words of the Armys ad agency,
theyre able to see the brand in a different light, as cool (Joiner, 2003).
These efforts may have only reinforced the notion that poor, black inner-city
kids are the labor source for American Armys interventions abroad and draw
attention to larger problems that plague the Army. The different results in the
US governments Afghanistan campaign and its Army recruitment campaign
might be explained by the different motivations of the audiences. Perhaps
using culture for branding exercises will work more effectively if audiences
have a reason to heed the message and if the appeal is to the motivations of
the audience instead of trying to win them over through arguments.
The US Armys efforts suggest that state marketing is so pervasive that in
some cases they cannot be distinguished from the culture of which they are
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The medium of this public debate was reason. Habermas had unwavering faith in the need and ability of the public to engage in reason. Rational
faculty was to be realized in rational communication, he argued. State
publicity, as Habermas called it, was antithetical to reason as it relied on
the secret chanceries of the prince (1989, p. 35).
For Habermas, the marketing of states further contributes to the
collapse of the public sphere and the demise of rationality in public
discourse. The transformation of the public sphere into a medium of
advertising was aided by the commercialization of the press (1989,
p. 189). Private enterprises evoke in their customers the idea that in their
consumption decisions they act in their capacity as citizens, the state has
to address its citizens like consumers. This is at odds with some authors
like Dick Pels, who argues that this trend creates greater information
density that that has enhanced the capacity for judgment of the average
citizen (2003, p. 60).
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AUTHOR NOTE
Jonathan Rose is associate professor of political studies at Queens University
in Kingston, Ontario, where he teaches courses on political communication
and Canadian politics.