PART II

This is Part II of my paper titled The Unsettling Unfairness of the IRP Regime the first part
of which appeared in the last issue of The Verdict (Fall 2013).
I concluded Part I of this paper with the following paragraph:
I urge the public, the legislature, the defence bar and the media to be cognizant of the
consequential issues with the new regime and its potential for a culture of abuse,
evidence of which is already being seen. Hopefully the Court of Appeal decision will go
some long way to eclipsing these concerns by finding many aspects of the legislated
scheme unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeal case referred to is Sivia v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor
Vehicles), which was heard by a three Justice panel in March 2013 and is currently under
reserve.37
For completeness I also observe that an appeal is being prosecuted attacking the constitutionality
of the statutory alterations made by the Province (Bill 46) in response to Justice Sigurdsons
lower court decision in Sivia. Post-Sivia Grounds for Review
The changes to the grounds of review implemented by Bill 46 have been canvassed in detail in
Part I of my paper. Generally speaking, the new grounds permit a review of the IRP based on:
(1) the reliability of the ASD results; and (2) whether the police officer advised the driver of the
right to a second test on a second ASD, and if a second test was performed, whether it was
carried out with a different ASD and whether the IRP was issued on the basis of the lowest of the
two readings. These new grounds do not make the process any fairer, for the following
reasons.

(a)

37

Ground Relating to the Reliability of the ASD

The lower court decision is reported as Sivia v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2011 BCSC
1639.

In Sivia, Mr. Justice Sigurdson found that in some circumstances there can be serious issues
concerning whether an ASD accurately reflects blood-alcohol readings. 38 Amongst other
reliability concerns: (i) an ASD does not provide a reading of a drivers actual blood-alcohol
level; (ii) an ASD has no mechanism to warn of residual mouth alcohol, which can lead to a false
warn or fail result; (iii) an ASD may fail to function if the force or volume of a breath
sample does not come within its operating parameters; and (iv) an ASD retains no record of what
was actually measured.
The evidence considered by an adjudicator in support of the proper functionality and reliability
of the ASD is provided solely by the police, namely, evidence in the Report and the Certificate
of Qualified ASD Calibrator 39 that indicates the type, serial number and the calibration and
service expiry dates for the unit. A copy of the Certificate is attached as an appendix to this
paper.
This evidence provides little or no opportunity for the driver to challenge the reliability of the
ASD result. The driver cannot contradict the functionality of the ASD because the unit used is
not available for examination. Indeed, without a scientifically valid analytical control, such as
running a control sample at the time of the subject test, it is not possible to verify the units
proper functioning at the time the test is performed.
Other information relevant to the reliability of the ASD is also unavailable. The driver does not
receive information as to repairs and/or maintenance to the unit, or calibration check sheets. And
the OSMV will not allow an adjournment to provide time for the driver to obtain disclosure of
such materials if available from other sources.
The other issue bearing on the reliability of the ASD result is whether the officer operated the
unit properly. Yet it is impossible to challenge the officer on this issue because he or she is not
made available for cross-examination.

38

Ibid. at para. 292.

A Certificate of Qualified ASD Calibrator is a document prepared by an officer who is a qualified to calibrate an
ASD.
39

The problems regarding whether the ASD was working properly at the time in question, and
whether it was operated properly by the officer in administering the test, are serious enough. But
the challenges facing counsel grow even more daunting given the pre-printed wording contained
in Box #14 of every single police Report: Any ASD tests referred to in this Report were
conducted by a qualified ASD operator and the ASD units were functioning properly.
At the end of the day, the only information before the adjudicator concerning the functionality of
the ASD or the reliability of its result will come from the officer. Adjudicators adopt the
presumption that the ASD is working properly if the information supplied by the officer supports
this conclusion. And they use this presumption to dismiss out of hand affidavit evidence from
the driver, and perhaps other witnesses, which implicitly calls into question the reliability of the
ASD result based on the amount of alcohol consumed.40
In sum, provided the police officer fills in a warn or fail result on the sworn Report, and the
ASD calibration and service expiry dates line up, there is little or no prospect for a successful
review based on the issue of the functionality, operability, or reliability of the ASD test.

(b)

Grounds Relating to the Second ASD Analysis

Prior to Bill 46, a police officer, upon issuing an IRP, was not expressly required to inform the
driver that a second test could be administered, and adjudicators refused to read the legislation so
as to implicitly require the officer to do so. 41 The officer was required to do no more than
administer a second test if requested by the driver. How would a driver know of the right to
receive a second test, if not told by the officer? He or she wouldnt, meaning that drivers
typically did not request a second test.
In an attempt to remove the unfairness of this Catch-22 scenario, Bill 46 amended the IRP
regime to impose an express obligation on the police officer to inform the subject driver of the
right to a second test. The amended legislation does not, however, expressly require the officer
to advise the driver that the lower of the two tests is to prevail, and adjudicators have refused to
40

I do want to note that the one defence has gained some traction is mouth alcohol; particularly if a police officer
allows that this residual factor could have been present.
41
See Sample Case 1, included as an appendix to this paper.

read this requirement into the legislation.42 The unfairness thus persists, because many drivers
will not exercise their right to have a second test performed unless they know that there may be
some benefit, and there is nothing to lose, in doing so.43

(c)

Review on Basis that the Ability to Drive is Affected by Alcohol

In a 2013 decision called Wilson v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 44 the
Court held that as a precondition to issuing an IRP the driver must not only register a warn
reading upon providing a breath sample into an ASD, but in addition the officer must conclude
that the drivers ability to drive is affected by alcohol.45 More specifically, and crucially, Wilson
holds that registering a warn reading is not without more sufficient basis for an officer to
conclude that the drivers ability to drive is affected by alcohol. 46 The reasoning in Wilson
arguably applies to fail readings as well.
Yet Wilson is under appeal, and in addition there is a judicial review matter, currently under
reserve, in which the Province is arguing that Wilson is contrary to binding authority and so
should not be followed, and even if correct should not be extended to fail cases.47

Unlawful Demands Are Off-Limits on a Review for a Fail or Warn

The legal authority to make the breath demand upon which an IRP is based comes from s. 254(2)
of the Criminal Code. Section 254(2) allows an officer to make an ASD demand only where the

42

See Sample Case 2, included as an appendix to this paper. It is interesting to note that this reasoning is
inconsistent with Box 7 of the OSMV Report, which asks the officer to indicate whether the driver was informed
that the results of the lower test would prevail.
43
There are many other unfair issues relating to this ground of dispute including the requirement that the driver
request a second test forthwith, even though there is no corresponding requirement on the police to advise the driver
of his right to a second test forthwith. Further, there is no requirement on the police officer to administer the second
test forthwith.
44
Wilson v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2013 BCSC 1638
45
Ibid, para 19.
46
Ibid, paras 20-21.
47
Richardson v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), Vancouver Registry No. S-137725.
.

officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person was driving a vehicle with alcohol in his or her
system within the preceding three hours.48 Yet the IRP regime does not make the absence of
lawful grounds for an ASD request a valid basis for overturning a prohibition on review, at least
in the case of an IRP issued in response to a warn or fail reading. By contrast, an unlawful
demand is a valid basis upon which to revoke a prohibition imposed on a driver who refused or
otherwise failed to comply with an ASD demand, because the legislation provides for revocation
if the refusal was based upon a reasonable excuse.49
Police officers are thus able to make unlawful ASD demands with impunity, at least in the
context of the IRP regime, unless the driver refuses and files for review. The rather odd result is
that a driver has a better prospect on review where he or she refuses to provide a sample than
where he or she provides a warn or fail sample. This is borne out by the OSMVs Research
and Data Unit Report on Alcohol-Related Driving Prohibitions Served in British Columbia
between September 2010-November 2011 (attached as an appendix to this paper), which shows
greater success rates on review for refusals as opposed to fail results.

Other Charter Violations Are Irrelevant to Review Process

An unlawful demand by definition constitutes a breach of s. 8 of the Charter. As noted in the
preceding discussion, such a breach is not a valid basis for revoking a prohibition under the IRP
review process. It warrants mentioning that other Charter breaches appear equally irrelevant
under the IRP regime in determining whether a prohibition should be upheld on review. 50
Simply put, adjudicators have taken the position that Charter breaches are not listed in the
legislation as grounds upon which an IRP can be revoked, and that as administrative reviewers

48

The wording in s. 254(2) has been judicially amended to account for a flaw that, if left uncorrected, would result
in the provision permitting ASD demands in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that the individual was driving
with alcohol in his or her system within the preceding three hours: see R. v. Jaycox 2012 BCCA 365.
49
MVA, s. 215.5(1)(c) and (4)(c). See, e.g., Cully v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2005
BCSC 110, para. 21.
50
Whether the IRP regime itself violates various other Charter provisions, most especially ss. 10(b) and 11(d), will
be decided by the Court of Appeal in Sivia, as mentioned earlier in this paper.

they have no jurisdiction to exclude evidence or provide any other constitutional remedy under s.
24 of the Charter.51
In my view, there is considerable unfairness to this approach, especially with respect to the s.
10(b) right to counsel. Roadside access to counsel is easily obtained in the age of cell phones,52
and can be very useful to a driver who is being asked to provide an ASD sample. For instance,
counsel can advise the driver to request that the police hold off administering the ASD test for 15
minutes if there is a real concern about residual alcohol in the mouth, which as already noted can
cause false warn or fail results. Counsel can also advise a driver who is unsure whether to
comply with the ASD demand as to the legal requirement that he or she do so absent any
grounds to believe there is a reasonable excuse for refusing.
It is true that criminal courts have held that a breach of the right to counsel in the context of an
ASD demand is justified under s. 1 of the Charter, but this conclusion is based on the fact that in
criminal matters the ASD result is not used as evidence to help convict the accused but rather for
the limited purpose of grounding a subsequent demand that another breath sample be provided
using a (much more accurate) approved instrument at the police station. In sharp contrast, under
the IRP regime the ASD result is used, usually by itself, to justify the imposition of significant
penalties on the driver, and not merely as a stepping-stone to obtain evidence that is admissible

51

The adjudicators view is supported by Doman v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2001
BCSC 1730; Helgesen v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2002 BCSC 1391, para. 6; Holosko
v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2007 BCSC 399, para. 22. Query, however, whether it
conflicts with the more recent decision in R v. Conway 2010 SCC 22. Conway holds that an administrative tribunal
has the jurisdiction to decide Charter issues provided that: (a) it has the express or implicit jurisdiction to resolve
matters of law; and (b) the legislature has not clearly demonstrated an intention to withdraw Charter issues from its
purview. If these questions are answered in the affirmative, the only bar to the tribunal granting a Charter remedy
will arise if its statutory scheme clearly precludes it from doing so; i.e. where the remedy sought is not the kind of
remedy that the legislature intended would fit within the statutory framework of the particular tribunal. Relevant
considerations in this regard include the tribunals statutory mandate and function.
52
As noted in the next paragraph in the text, a breach of the s. 10(b) right in the context of roadside ASD demands
has been held to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter in the criminal context. It must be noted that the argument
that the widespread availability of cell phones undermines the s. 1 justification in criminal cases has recently been
rejected in Jaycox, above Note 11 at para. 42. It can nonetheless be argued that the s. 1 justification applicable in
criminal matters should not apply in the IRP context, for the reasons set out in the next paragraph.

at trial. Given this distinction, the justification for excusing the s. 10(b) breach under s. 1
appears much less convincing in the IRP context.53

Adjudicators and Their Decisions on Review

In Spencer v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 54 Mr. Justice McEwan
pointed out that, as far as the IRP review hearing goes:
The process set out in the Motor Vehicle Act for administrative suspensions obviously
limits due process. That does not mean, however, that within those limits the dictates of
fairness are truncated. A tribunal handicapped by the fact that hearings are not in person,
that evidence is not sworn, that there is no cross-examination, and that imposes no duty
on the officer to provide all the relevant material (including recordings of the event),
lacks most of the means by which courts or other tribunals ordinarily discern the truth.55
In the case before him, Mr. Justice McEwan quashed the adjudicators decision to affirm
the IRP, and ordered a rehearing to be conducted on the basis that:

the police are not deemed to have a credibility advantage, but that the case be
determined impartially on the evidence;

the evidence not be unfairly parsed to create standards that are unknown to and
unknowable by, the petitioner;

such parsing as takes place recognize the deficiencies or gaps in the police
record as well as those in the petitioners evidence;

if there is insufficient evidence to decide the case, it be resolved in favour of the

petitioner, in line with the proper allocation of the burden of proof and the
concept of a balance of probabilities.56

The sorts of concerns expressed in Spencer are equally evident in the more recent decision
of Scott v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles).57 In Scott, Mr. Justice

53

It must be acknowledged, however, that the argument I have set out here is expressly rejected in Sivia, above Note
1 at paras. 331-75. Of course, as noted earlier in this paper, the decision in Sivia regarding s. 10(b) is currently the
subject of an appeal.
54
Spencer v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2011 BCSC 1311.
55
Ibid, para. 52.
56
Ibid, para. 63.
57
Scott v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2013 BCCA 554.

Schultes and the Court of Appeal were highly critical of the adjudicators credibility
assessment because:

the drivers affidavit evidence was rejected as being improbable largely on the
basis that it conflicted with the evidence of three witnesses outlined in the
officers report, yet the adjudicator failed to note that the driver had submitted
affidavits from three other individuals whose evidence supported her version of
events;

the drivers failure to respond to two aspects of the police report was treated as
a basis for accepting these facts as true, which improperly presupposed a
baseline reliability in the report that the driver was compelled to refute, and in
any event failed to appreciate that, in the circumstances, the failure to respond
was wholly understandable;

circular reasoning was used to reject aspects of the drivers affidavit evidence;

the narrative in the police report was found to be reliable simply because it was
detailed, which amounted to an improper failure to assess the weight to be
given to the narrative.58

The adjudicators reasoning was held to be fundamentally flawed and illogical;59 no adjudicator
acting reasonably would have approached the assessment of credibility in this way. 60 The
decision was therefore set aside and a rehearing of the drivers IRP review was ordered.61
Most lawyers who have experienced the frustration of acting on an IRP review will agree that
adjudicators consistently or even usually ignore the principles that should guide a proper and fair
credibility assessment. As the comments in Spencer and Scott adroitly recognize, the review
process is difficult to categorize as anything but imbalanced. This imbalance is accentuated on
many files where a predisposition against a driver by certain adjudicators seems to be at play.
The culture creates an unsettling apprehension.

58

Ibid, paras. 23, 32-37.

Ibid, paras. 23, 32.
60
Ibid, para. 24, 36.
61
Ibid, para. 32.
59

I will address these and other problems concerning adjudicators in the remainder of this section.
It is helpful to begin by setting out a general problem, raised in Spencer, as to whether
adjudicators are properly trained to carry out reviews under the IRP regime.

(a)

Adjudicators Are Ill-Equipped to Make Fair Determinations on Review

There is a real concern that adjudicators are ill-equipped to undertake reviews in a fair and
competent manner. In this respect, I agree with the following comments by Mr. Justice McEwan
in the Spencer case:
The statutory scheme raises many questions beyond those put in issue in this case. The
unfairness inherent in the approach taken by the delegates in both Gilles and here certainly
hints at larger questions about whether the delegates are equipped with the degree of
training or independence necessary to conduct fair hearings, or to demonstrate that they do
so. I think it highly anomalous that a person who challenges a speeding ticket may appear
personally before an independent and legally trained judicial justice of the peace, while the
often far more serious consequences of the administrative prohibition provisions of the
Motor Vehicle Act are adjudicated in this stripped-down manner. The compelling social
objective of removing drinking drivers from the road cannot justify a process that is
incapable of reliably differentiating between those who have and those who have not
offended. This case and Gilles give rise to a concern that the scheme is seriously flawed.
Whether or not that is, in fact, so, will have to await a day when these broader issues are
more squarely before the court.62
Its also worth noting that, unlike judges or other individuals who carry out administrative
reviews, adjudicators often use pseudonyms in performing their functions under the IRP regime.
This fact led Mr. Justice McEwan to further comment in Spencer:
Deference on the part of the reviewing court does not include ascribing to the delegate [i.e.
adjudicator] a seer-like insight into truth that no court would ascribe to itself. This is
particularly so when the delegate is faceless, nameless (and therefore unaccountable),
possessed of unknown qualifications, and carrying out an essentially judicial, as opposed to
a specialized, function.63 [emphasis added]

(b)
62
63

Adjudicators Show Decided Preference for Police Evidence

Spencer, above Note 21 at para. 60.

Ibid. at para. 58.

While the onus is on the officer to justify the prohibition on a balance of probabilities, 64
adjudicators typically show an overwhelming preference for police evidence whenever it
conflicts with that of the driver. This is so even where the police evidence is brief and the
drivers evidence detailed, sworn and supported by the sworn evidence of other witnesses.
For instance, the driver may swear an affidavit stating that something happened that is highly
relevant to the issues on review; e.g. she told the officer that she burped or drank alcohol five
minutes ago (which if true may cause a false warn or fail), or was having significant trouble
breathing due to an asthma attack (which if true may amount to a reasonable excuse for a failure
to blow). The police Report may be silent on the particular factual point, and the officer may
provide no further information in response to the drivers sworn assertion. Yet even in these
circumstances, the adjudicator will generally find a way to reject the drivers evidence, for
example by holding that police officers are trained to note things of relevance in their reports and
so the officers failure to mention the disputed fact must mean that it did not occur, or by
refusing to accept that the driver and his or her supporting witnesses could accurately recall
when the last drink was consumed.
Adjudicators routinely make these sorts of inferences, correct mistakes, interpret errors as
clerical, and make other highly dubious holdings in relying on challenged police evidence so as
to justify the IRP.

(c)

Case Law is Misunderstood by Adjudicators

Most OSMV adjudicators lack an understanding of case law or the reasons why case law has
been submitted by counsel for the driver. The concept of extracting a principle of law from a
case and applying it to the drivers matter is often lost on the adjudicator. The adjudicator might
purport to distinguish a case on the ground that it is not precisely identical to facts before him or
her, even though the fundamental principle espoused in the case applies squarely to the matter
under review.

64

Taylor v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2004 BCCA 641, paras. 7, 16; Spencer, above
Note 21 at para. 31; Scott, above Note 24 at para. 32.

10

(d)

Successful Reviews are Given No Precedential Value

On the rare occasion where an IRP is revoked by an adjudicator, the reasons provided are brief,
and thus may hold little value as a precedent. And where the reasons are capable of being used
as a precedent in another matter, adjudicators time and time again insist that they are not bound
by the decisions of their colleagues.

(e)

Judicial Review is Rarely A Viable Option

A driver can always bring a judicial review application for the purpose of attacking an
adjudicators unfavourable decision. But it is rarely worth doing so, for one or more of several
reasons.
First, the standard that the driver must meet on a judicial review application is very demanding.
Barring a clear error of law or jurisdiction, courts will only quash an adjudicators decision
where it is unreasonable. 65 Moreover, courts extend deference to the supposed expertise of
adjudicators in most areas related to the typical drinking and driving scenario, extending even to
what medical conditions might provide a reasonable excuse for failing to blow.66 Ultimately, if
there is some evidence upon which the adjudicators decision can reasonably be supported, the
court will not interfere on judicial review unless the adjudicators reasoning process was itself
unreasonable.67
Even if the driver has a good chance of succeeding on judicial review, he or she may lack the
financial resources to launch a court proceeding. There is also the problem of obtaining a stay
pending the courts decision on the judicial review; absent a stay, it is almost certain that the
prohibition will have ended by the time the court case is decided.68 Finally, the remedy on a
65

Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, paras. 47-49 (general discussion of reasonableness standard); Nagra v.
British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2010 BCCA 154 (reasonableness standard applied in ADP
case); Scott, above Note 24 at paras. 28-31 (IRP case).
66
Graham v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2012 BCSC 1168, paras. 46-56 (ADP case).
67
Scott, above Note 24 at paras. 28-31.
68
Of course, absent a stay a litigant who wishes to drive after the prohibition has ended will have to pay his or her
fine and enter/complete the various programs required under the IRP scheme.

11

successful review may simply be that the matter is sent back to an adjudicator for a new review
hearing, which given the problems inherent in the IRP review process is hardly cause for
optimism in terms of overturning the prohibition.

Unaccountability Risks Fostering a Pervasive Culture Abuse of Power

The IRP regime has now been in place for over three years. The amendments instituted through
Bill 46 in the wake of Sivia have, on paper at least, expanded the scope of review for the better.
Yet, as detailed above, the review process remains hopelessly unfair because of the overall lack
of due process afforded the driver and various problems regarding the adjudicators handling of
reviews. And, distressingly, it is arguable that the IRP regime will become even more unfair as
time passes, because of the very real risk that a culture of abuse will pervade the entire process,
the inevitable result of a system that is heavily skewed against the driver and lacks transparency
and accountability.
I say this because police officers are given substantial powers to impose serious penalties on
drivers with only a very limited scope for review, and adjudicators approach the review process
with a decided bias against drivers.

In these circumstances, it is only natural that those

administering the IRP regime will over time begin to cut corners and act arbitrarily in carrying
out their duties, whether consciously or not. Why wouldnt they, knowing that their actions are
subject to very little scrutiny? A system lacking due process, without checks and balances to
keep an overweening State in check, which falls far short of acceptable standards in terms of
transparency, portends a culture of abuse, and it is the citizens of this province who will bear the
brunt of this culture.
In Spencer, Mr. Justice McEwan stated:
One of the purposes for review mechanisms like these, apart from attempting to do
justice in individual cases, is to ensure that over-reaching behaviour on the part of state
agents is detectable and discouraged. This is certainly not possible if the tribunal starts
from the proposition that the police have no reason to be careless or inaccurate or
untruthful, and such a mind set will do nothing to discourage such behaviour if and when

12

it occurs. Human nature being what it is, a tribunal that assumes that such things never
happen virtually guarantees that they will.69
These are wise words. Unfortunately, the converse is equally true: a review process that is
unable to detect unfairness and over-reaching by the State will invariably encourage creeping,
harmful encroachments on our liberties as the States representatives grow to appreciate the
extent to which their actions are protected from any sort of searching review. Routine deferral to
decision-makers who exhibit the flaws identified in Spencer and Scott does nothing to enhance
the image of the administration of justice in British Columbia.
Of course, every right-thinking citizen wants to see an efficient and effective regime to control
the evils and tragedies of impaired driving. But in attempting to create such a regime, the
Province has created a bureaucracy that runs roughshod over civil liberties, due process, and the
rule of law itself. McEwan, J. could perhaps have closed his judgment in Spencer with a
quotation from another judge who was concerned by the states intrusions into the freedoms of
its citizens, the American judge William O. Douglas, who said:
As nightfall does not come at once, neither does oppression. In both instances, there is a
twilight when everything seems seemingly unchanged. And it is such twilight that we all
must be most aware of change in the air however slight- lest we become unwitting
victims of the darkness.70

Conclusion
The Government appears to find it politically advantageous to proclaim that the IRP legislation
represents the strictest impaired driving laws around. This claim simply isnt true, at least as a
general proposition. Those who have financial resources and dont depend on driving for their
employment are far less penalized by the IRP regime than they would be under the Criminal
Code. They pay for the fines and the programs imposed, and resume driving after three months.
It is lower income, rural and/or younger drivers who are more likely to be harshly affected
often for years because they cannot afford to pay for the mandatory post-prohibition programs.

69

Spencer, above Note 21 at para. 38.

William Douglas, The Douglas Letters: Selections from the Private papers of Justice William O. Douglas, Adler
& Adler, 1987, p. 162.
70

13

Those whose employment requires being able to drive may also suffer inordinately, as they lose
their jobs and they and their families suffer serious corollary effects from the loss of income.
The very real and substantial penalties that often flow from the IRP regime would be acceptable
if the review process were fair. But it is not. There is virtually no means of challenging the
word of the officer regarding what took place at the roadside, and the lack of checks and
balances in turn will almost inevitably lead to an arrogant undesirable police culture.
The cynical culture of the IRP regime should not be allowed to perpetuate. There is some hope
that the constitutional challenge in Sivia will receive a more comprehensive resolution from the
Court of Appeal. In the meantime, we must fight for just outcomes and a fairer regime as best
we can with the resources at our disposal.

14