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What philosophy is has been a question that has been subject to a great deal of debate. A broadly
acceptable answer to this question would be that philosophy is a means to understanding all
facets of our reality. It is a tool in which rational inquiry into questions regarding our current
existential circumstances can be initiated, processed, justified and concluded. However, how this
tool is used and for what purpose it is used for is very much open to debate. Thus, the purpose of
this paper is to not only denote what I interpret philosophy to be, but also what it ought to be.
The is-ought distinction made here is vital in that it acts as the central point behind the majority
of this paper. I hold that philosophy cannot be descriptive, for if this is so, it serves no functional
purpose beyond simply gaining a greater amount of knowledge. It must have a direct effect on
the way in which we act and live our lives, for if it does not then there is no justifiable purpose
for even attempting to initiate inquiry at all.

Firstly, I will describe what philosophy is. It is a way in which we are able to gain a better
informed understanding of our existence. All branches of philosophy ranging from ethics to
epistemology stem from this fundamental search; the only difference is the perspective from
which these lines of inquiry are approached from. To use epistemology and ethics as examples
these two branches of philosophy explore entirely different notions, the former exploring what
knowledge is and how we achieve it, and the latter examining notions of goodness and
wrongness within our ideology and actions. What unites these two seemingly separate schools is
that they are both ways in which we gain a greater understanding of our current positions within
existence. Knowledge is an aspect of our selves, as is morality. Even other topics such as
phenomenology, truth, and objectivity can be seen to stem from the original pursuit of
knowledge regarding our existential circumstances in that they question other aspects of what

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constitutes the gestalt that is reality. This is the essence of what philosophy can be described as
the pursuit of explanations and justifications for any and all possible aspects of existence.

In light of this, several philosophers have argued that science should supersede philosophical
inquiry as the results given by science are not only observable, but also repeatable. While
repeatability does not necessarily lead to the transformation of a theory into accepted fact, it does
justify a much high probability that it is correct. In comparison, the methodology behind
philosophy, that is, argumentation and reasoning rather than strict empiricism, is much less
precise and leads to conclusions that remain fully theoretical and empirically inconclusive. I
reject this position on the grounds that scientific inquiry also stems from the same fundamental
question that philosophy attempts to address. The main difference between philosophy and
science is the perspective from which the question is approached from. Philosophy attempts to
explain generalities while science examines specificities, and this is what gives it its separate
identity within the field of academia. They complement each other by filling the gaps of
knowledge that each undoubtedly lack by taking these separate approaches, and thus both are
required in order to further the project of a holistic understanding of existence. In a sense, the
term metaphysics is a misnomer. Science is founded upon the same metaphysical ground that
philosophy is also based upon through its examination of previously unexplainable phenomena
within existence. All questions are innately metaphysical questions, for any question that we
make must be one that refers to a state of existence or an aspect of reality that we are unsure
about.

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The description made so far has been one strictly outlining the methodology behind philosophy.
The general purpose behind philosophy has also been stated: to gain greater knowledge about
existence as a whole. However, I hold that this passive view is not what philosophy ought to be.
There must be a pragmatic element to it, some justifiable practical end goal that philosophical
inquiry attempts to grasp at. Without normative power, philosophy devolves into
purposelessness. Fundamentally, philosophy is a method to accumulate knowledge about our
existential conditions, but if we remove normativity from the conclusions that we draw,
knowledge simply becomes something that is gained but never utilized. I hold that the notion that
gaining knowledge is good in and of itself is a misconception. If we examine a hypothetical
situation in which an individual manages to gain all of the possible knowledge in the world, this
feat is only good insofar as this wealth of knowledge is used to inform actions and decisions that
have direct consequences upon the world. An individual who simply accumulates knowledge but
never utilizes it to inform their actions has much less practical value than another who has little
knowledge but actively uses what they know to inform negative or unconsciously ignorant
practices. This is the crux behind my view on the massive importance of normativity within
philosophy - knowledge by itself carries no essential value. It is not an end, but a means to the
betterment of a practical end. The reason why one traditionally places a high value on knowledge
is because of the ability for it to greatly benefit and inform action. Philosophy is the pursuit of
knowledge - therefore, if our understanding of it is descriptive, it also is valueless until the
conclusions drawn from it are used in a beneficial manner.

If we assume that philosophy is descriptive, the only conclusions that can be drawn from it are is
statements statements that only define, rather than prescribe. It is imperative that philosophy

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does not remain as a method that simply produces these statements for the sake of themselves for
these are meaningless without an explicit or implicit suggestion as to how these are directly
relevant in ones life. I will use a classic thought experiment as an example of this, namely, a
scenario where our brains are placed in a vat and our experiences are mere simulations caused by
directed electric stimuli. A typical response to this scenario would be that we cannot ever truly
know whether or not this scenario is true or false, pointing out inherent problems with our
epistemology. Given that this perspective is justifiable, what relevance does this specifically
have on our current lives? Unless our conclusion regarding the given scenario directly affects our
practical lives, the entire thought experiment serves no purpose beyond gaining new avenues to
knowledge that are pragmatically ineffectual and thus devoid of value. It can of course be
argued that this thought experiment can in fact result in the betterment of a pragmatic end, made
possible through a constant state of self-reflexivity resultant from skepticism. Self-reflexivity
results in the increased likelihood of informed action, and informed action is also more likely to
produce effects that can anticipate and avoid negative outcomes. However, if the explicit
intention for this thought experiment is to promote a level of skepticism towards knowledge, it
moves from being an is statement to an ought statement, and it is again this movement away
from description to normativity that gives it its newfound value.

There is admittedly an issue present within my explanation of what philosophy both is and ought
to be, namely that the pragmatic ends that are produced by a subject within this conception are
ambiguous. A pragmatic difference in action must occur for philosophy to hold value, yet if we
cannot specifically observe or denote what these differences are, we have no ground to base our
valuations on. William James and Charles Peirce, two of the classical pragmatists that initially

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developed pragmatism, held differing views on how to approach this objection. Peirce held that
these effects were restricted to changes in rationale and behavior alone (1955), whereas James
held a weaker position where these effects could be as simple as a reinforcement of ones beliefs
(1995). Given these two positions, I hold that Peirces rejoinder provides a comparatively clearer
framework from which my pragmatic conception of philosophy is practicable. However, I further
hold that a change in rationale alone is not enough to justify value in a line of philosophical
thought unless it directly affects action. Of course, given causality, action cannot occur without
the prior effect of reasoning and justification behind it, either from a conscious or subconscious
level. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that a shift in reasoning directly has an effect on
action; there are many circumstances in which agents act in irrational ways that are detrimental
to both themselves and their relative community. Philosophy must be normative to have value,
but it must also be pragmatically so, for if it is not then the ought statements that it produces hold
no weight. A claim that we ought to think through a particular perspective does not necessarily
demand that we act in accordance to it.

Another objection to this definition of philosophy is that under this framework there is the
potential for particular lines of philosophical thought to be devalued and discarded on the
grounds that they produce no immediately discernible practical value. I fully accept this, but I do
not see it as an objection. There is no justification to pursue a line of inquiry into a topic with any
measure of depth unless it provides a practical, consequential effect on the individual. In the field
of philosophy where multitudes of unexplored questions exist and even those that are identified
are scrutinized and argued for and against ad infinitum, it is a practical impossibility to address
every aspect within it. What we must therefore attempt to do is focus on key concepts or schools

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of philosophy that we can clearly observe to have the potential for practical difference, such as
ethics. I stress that this does not reduce philosophy to ethics alone, but rather it simply
systemizes the philosophical process. Given that a justifiable pragmatic conclusion can be
reached within a singular line of philosophical thought, focus can be afterwards shifted towards
other, more pragmatically ambiguous schools of philosophy.

Philosophy should not focus specifically on ethics, but it is in itself ethical. It is a process of
rationally inquiring into current existential circumstances through lines of argumentation and
counter-argumentation, doing so not simply in the pursuit of knowledge but in an attempt to
utilize this knowledge in a way that betters ones practical circumstances. Knowledge is
intrinsically valueless unless it is utilized in some way; if philosophy is the pure pursuit of
knowledge, it is a project that is unjustifiable as it produces results that are valueless in and of
themselves. Once the focus of philosophy is shifted from the accumulation of knowledge to that
and the application of it for a practical benefit, it is no longer singularly descriptive and develops
into a field that is naturally normative. Thus, for it to hold any value, it must be both ethical and
pragmatic. This is conclusively what philosophy of any value both is and ought to be: a method
of inquiry into reality and metaphysical questions that develops conclusions which have a direct
pragmatic influence on ones thought processes and actions.

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Works cited
James, Williams. Pragmatism. New York: Courier Dover Publications, 1995. EBook.
Peirce, Charles Sanders. Ed. Justus Buchler. Philosophical Writings of Peirce. New York:
Courier Dover Publications, 1955. EBook.

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