20128871

Truth in Thomas Aquinas
Author(s): John F. Wippel

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Dec., 1989), pp. 295-326
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TRUTH INTHOMAS AQUINAS*

JOHN F. WIPPEL
is well-known
J. HOMAS aquinas
truth
that
thing.
better
consists
that
(De veritate).
of the
adequation
so,
intellect
and
Most
definitions.
a thing,
importantly,
he there
of the
might
(what
ditions
pointed
the
regarding
is heavily
to Aquinas
neoplatonic
especially
and Avicenna.
The
out,
nature
the
of truth
two
traditions
had
truth
of truth
As various
truth").1
time two general
tra
appeared.
already
of being.
It was
One
known
emphasizes
the writings
of Augustine,
through
Anselm,
more
as an
stresses
truth
other,
Aristotelian,
or
and reality,
truth of the intellect.
of
Both
own thinking,
as we
Aquinas's
a
to
of earlier
did appeal
defi
variety
his own view, and this suggests
that
influenced
and
in developing
were
not
as one might
mind
"logical
to Thomas's
prior
of truth
a notion
truth") along with truth
be called
and
of mind
adequation
these
traditions
deeply
see.
But he could
shall
nitions
a number
considers
he develops
be called "ontological
have
view
and
his literary
is
corpus
on
1 of his Disputed
Questions
in addition
to describing
truth as an
of being (what might

intellect
the
intellect
in qu.
offered
Even
Truth
scholars
defended
the
adequation
no discussion
of this within
Perhaps
known
than
of other
for having
between
of an
so opposed
to one
in Thomas's
another
think.2
This is the first part of a two-part

article which will be continued
in the March
1990 issue of the Review
of
Metaphysics.
1
This terminology
truth" and "logical
is not
("ontological
truth")
but
found in Thomas's
has
been
used
themselves,
long
writings
by later
of scholastic
"St.
See, for instance, R. J. McCall,
philosophy.
interpreters
on Ontological
12 (1938): 9-29; J.
Thomas
Truth," The New Scholasticism
"Le probl?me
Vande Wiele,
dans la philosophie
de la v?rit? ontologique
de
52 (1954): 521-71.
saint Thomas," Revue philosophique
de Louvain
2
on these two earlier traditions
see Vande
For historical
background
522-27 (on Aristotle),
532-35 (on Avicenna),
527-31 (on Augustine),
Wiele,
and 543 for summarizing
remarks.
Vande Wiele
neglects
Unfortunately,
Anselm's
role as a source for the truth of things (ontological
For
truth).
Review
of Metaphysics
43
(December
1989):
295-326.
Copyright
1989
by
Metaphysics

the Review
of
296
JOHN F. WIPPEL
to set
In order
views
book
from
on truth,
this
the
paper
stage
will
for
closer
begin
examination
with
his
1, dist.
19, qu. 5 of his commentary
1 of this question
In article
about
1252.
on
earliest
of Aquinas's
discussion
the Sentences,
he asks whether
in
dating
truth
is to be identified with the essence of a thing.3 In developing his

three different kinds of things which
reply Thomas distinguishes
terms may
the mind;
illustration
or stones.
from
One type enjoys

and total being outside
signify.
complete
that is, independently
from the mind's
consideration.
In
as
Thomas
such
cites
entities
human
complete
beings
no
A second
in
itself
type enjoys
reality
independently
the mind,
a foundation
operation
Thomas
dation
for
cites
or chimeras.
but depends
reality,
and formal
realization.
upon
dreams
instance,
in extramental
its complete
universals
and
in extramental
reality;
to be universal,
in this
truth
places
or a universal
Thomas
for
third
the
As
kind
has
intellect's
illustrations
some foun
enjoys
but that which makes
time to be time,
an
intellectual
upon
depends
operation.
third class.4
time.
Each
of these
see M. J. Lapierre,
In
usage of Anselm's
definition,
"Aquinas'
of Anselm's
Definition
of Truth," Sciences
18
terpretation
eccl?siastiques
zu Thomas von Aquin,
Cf. A. Zimmermann,
(1966): 413-41.
"Bemerkungen
15 (1982): 247-61, esp.
Mediaevalia
1,"Miscellanea
Quaest. disp. De veritate
on Truth.
Medieval
rei et
248-55; J. A. Aertsen,
Reflections
Adaequatio
intellectus
of Amsterdam,
Nov. 9,1984),
(Inaugural Address, Free University
see the dissertation
5-6.
Also
Sein-Wahrheit-Wort.
by R. B. Schmitz,
von Aquin
und die Lehre von der Wahrheit
Thomas
der Dinge
(M?nster,
Schmitz
also refers to a Bonn dissertation
1984), 398-401.
by W. Reiner
in der Hochscholastik,
des Wahrheitsbegriffes
Die
mann, Zur Problematik
von
mit dem Wahrheitsbegriff
des Aquinaten
Anselms
Auseinandersetzung
I have not seen.
which
Canterbury
(Bonn,
1928),
3
"Utrum veritas sit essentia rei." Scriptum
super libros Sententiarum,
ed. P. Mandonnet
(Paris, 1929), vol. 1, p. 484. For the dating of Thomas's
I shall follow J. A. Weisheipl,
works
Friar
Thomas d Aquino.
His Life,
With
and Addenda
D.C.:
Thought and Works.
Corrigenda
(Washington,
of America
Catholic University
Press,
1983).
4
In I Sent,
remarks
about this third class:
p. 486. Note Thomas's
autem sunt quae habent fundamentum
in re extra animam,
sed
"Quaedam
eorum quantum
rationis
ad id quod est formale,
est per
complementum
enim est aliquid
Humanitas
animae, ut patet in universali.
operationem
cum non sit extra animam
in re, non tarnen ibi habet rationem
universalis,
multis
sed secundum
in in
communis;
aliqua humanitas
quod accipitur
ei per operationem
intellectus
tellects
adiungitur
intentio, secundum quam
. . Similiter
est de tempore..
dico de veritate,
dicitur species: et similiter
in re, sed ratio eius completur
per actionem
quod habet fundamentum
eo modo quo est."
On this see
intellectus,
quando scilicet apprehenditur
F. Ruello, La notion de v?rit? chez saint Albert le Grand et chez saint Thomas
d Aquin
(Louvain-Paris:
B?atrice-Nauwelaerts,
1969), 179-227.
Thomas's

TRUTH INTHOMAS AQUINAS
297
if truth has a foundation

in extramental
Accordingly,
an operation
as truth
its nature
is perfected
only through
a thing as it really
the intellect
intellect?when
is.
grasps
Thomas
firmation
cites
the
oft-quoted
physics 6 to the effect that while

and
good
not quite
translation
say
this,
from
mediately
of
physics
existence
a confirming
name
being
from
the Arabic
are
present
more
(esse)
Meta
the medieval
accompanied
on the Metaphysics.5
however,
text
Greek
which
commentary
In con
Aristotle's
truth and falsity exist in the soul,
in things.
In fact, Aristotle's
is given
but this reading
by
goes beyond Aristotle,

essence
and existence
(esse)
existence
thing's
the
exist
of Averroes's
lation
finds
evil
text
reality,
by the
does
Latin
the Latin
trans
im
Thomas
to his meta
by appealing
both
Since
and
quiddity
on the
in a thing,
truth
is grounded
so than upon
its quiddity.
Thomas
for
argument
is imposed
(ens)
(esse).
this
in the grammatical
by reason
on a thing
fact
that
its esse.
of
He adds that it is only through the operation of the intellect which

the
grasps
esse
of a thing
as
it is by becoming
thing that the relation of adequation

relation
And it is in this
that
the nature
of truth
adequation
(ratio)
we
see
in this earliest
Thomas
text,
already
of truth as adequation.
of
Therefore,
the view
Given
truth
about
ments
that
to that
assimilated
is completed.
consists.6
defending
esse causes
of this, Thomas
concludes
that a thing's
to be present
in the intellect.
He also com
that thing
in the intellect
in prior fashion
the nature
of truth exists
all
to its existence
in the
thing.
He
recalls
Aristotle's
example
of the
see Metaphysics
6.4.1027b25-27:
"for
In I Sent, p. 486. For Aristotle,
is not as if the good were true, and
falsity and truth are not in things?it
in
in thought"
in itself false?but
the bad were
(W. D. Ross translation
ed. J. Barnes, vol. 2 [Princeton: Princeton
The Complete Works of Aristotle,
Press, 1984], 1623). But this is the reading given by the medieval
University
Averroes's
of the Arabic which accompanied
Latin translation
commentary
on the same.
In VIMetaph.
See Averroes,
(Venice, 1562), vol. 8. fols. 151 vb
152ra: "Verum enim et falsum non sunt in rebus, sicut bonum et malum,
sed sunt in cognitione."
ut verum sit sicut bonum et falsum sicut malum,
on this see fols. 152rb-152va.
And if one may
For Averroes's
commentary
on this same text, he must have
own commentary
judge from Thomas's
this.
See his In
had a similar
reading at hand at the time he prepared
Aristotelis
XII
libros Metaphysicorum
(Turin-Rome,
1950), bk. 6,
expositio
lect. 4, nn. 1230-1231.
6
In I Sent, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, p. 486: "Cum autem in re sit quidditas
eius
in esse rei magis
et suum esse, veritas
fundatur
sicut
quam in quidditate,
et in ipsa operatione
et nomen entis ab esse imponitur;
intellectus
acci
esse rei sicut est per quamdam
similationem
ad ipsum, completur
pientis
ratio veritatis."
relatio adaequationis,
in qua consistit

298
JOHN F. WIPPEL
different
the
in which
ways
hot
the
and
cold
can be predicated.
Thus
"healthy"
causes
other
account
for the presence
of
is
not
said
of
in
these
"healthy"
primary
the
and
term
in an animal;
but
fashion
but of the animal,
and of the others
with
only by analogy
as
an
it
of
is
animal.
truth
is
in
said
"healthy"
predicated
So, too,
a
of
fashion
of truth
the intellect,
and of
insofar
primary
proposition
as the latter
is a sign of the truth which
is present
in the intellect.
as a thing causes
It is only insofar
truth to be present
to the intellect
health
that truth
is said of the thing
itself.
(In developing
this point
Thomas
also
that a thing
is said to be true because
it is nat
reason
of
a cor
fitted
its
external
to
appearances
urally
by
produce
rect understanding
of itself
in the intellect.
are
And
other
things
notes
to as
referred
of
their
themselves.
gold
"false"
external
but
they are naturally

a false
to produce
because
appearances
for
Consider,
instance,
by
understanding
which
appears
something
reason
of
to be
is not.)7
Both kinds of truth?truth

are
suited
or traced
reduced
of the intellect and truth of a thing?
to God
back
as
to their
first
principle.
This
is because God's being is the cause of all other being (esse) and his
is the
understanding
cause
of all
other
Therefore
knowing.
he
is
the first truth just as he is the first being, for each and every thing
stands in relation to truth just as it does to being (esse). It is for
this
reason,
2 that
truth
for
truth
the
and
Thomas
first
cause
continues,
of being
to the maximum
true
in it Thomas
can
see
of being
in Aristotle
that Aristotle
is identical
shows
with
the
inMetaphysics
cause
first
of
is interesting
some
a theory
for
of
finding
justification
as well
as a theory
of truth of intellect.)8
degree.
(This
passage
1
In I Sent,
d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, p. 486. Note
in particular:
"Unde dico,
secundum
quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis,
quod est in cognitione
use of the example of health to illustrate how
intellectus."
For Aristotle's
in different ways but always by reason of reference
being can be predicated
to a first, see Metaphysics
4.2.1003a33-b6.
8
see In I Sent,
see Metaphysics
For Thomas
For Aristotle
p. 487.
causes derivative
"so that which
2.1.993b26-31:
truths to be true is most
true. Therefore
the principles
of eternal things must be always most true;
for they are not merely
sometimes
true, nor is there any cause of their
are the cause of the being of other things,
so
being, but they themselves
that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth" (Barnes
Vande Wiele
insists that there is no doctrine
of on
ed., vol. 2, p. 1570).
truth in Aristotle,
but while discussing
tological
this, he does not refer to
de la v?rit? ontologique,"
the present passage
On
("Le probl?me
522-25).
that the truth Aristotle
here has in mind
the other hand, Reale emphasizes
truth" and not the logico-epistemological
is "ontological
truth of which he


In sum,
discussion.
Thomas
has
intellect
insofar
as
the
but
only
sense
other
same
truth
the
and
things
truth
in this
is assigned
of
to the
of
their
to
corresponds
to things them
is then assigned
because
to produce
capacity
truth in the fullest and most perfect
Finally,
to God
is assigned
levels
sense
of a thing
grasp
Truth
analogically,
truth in the intellect.
three
complete
intellect's
that thing as it is in itself.

selves,
out
singled
full and
in the
Truth
299
causes
he
because
both
the acts
of knowing
of all other
this discussion
that
from
it is clear
time,
sense
in the full and primary
It is here, apparently,
intellect.9
for
reserves
Thomas
as
it insofar
that
the being
of all
At the
intellects.
it is present
in
it best meets
its descrip
as an adequation
of the intellect
and the thing known.
to end our investigation
If we were
of Thomas's
of truth
theory
at this point, a number
of questions
would
remain
unanswered.
For
tion
(1) if, as Aquinas

because
analogically
here maintains,
instance,
only
is truth
tellect,
of their
and
formally
selves or only in the intellect?

transcendental?
merely
formal
as the cause
and
to cause
to things
in the in
in things
present
them
(2) Is truth regarded by Thomas as
sense may
(3) In what
of truth of intellect
intrinsic
human), would
ability
intrinsically
is assigned
truth
truth
(4)
way?
truth exist
truth be assigned
to God?
or also in some
in creatures,
no mind
or
If there were
(divine
in any way at all?
(5) If truth in the
sense has a foundation

in a thing's
being and in its existence
so
or
more
in
than
its
does essence
essence,
play any
(esse)
quiddity
truth?
first operation?that
role in grounding
(6) Is the intellect's
it forms
and knows
what
are?sufficient
concepts
whereby
things
formal
for one
to grasp
truth,
operation?composing
Thomas
cites a number
or must
and
one move
dividing?in
of definitions
on to the
order
of truth
intellect's
to do
from
so?
earlier
second
(7) Since
thinkers,
how does he fit them together?

Most
metaphysics
from the standpoint

these questions
of
among
important
to answer
in light of Thomas's
and most
difficult
various
and
See G. Reale, The Concept of First Philosophy
speaks in 6.4, and 9.10.
trans. J. Catan
the Unity of the Metaphysics
of Aristotle,
(Albany, N.Y.:
of New York Press,
State University
1979), p. 40 and n. 114 (pp. 58-59).
on Metaphysics
from his commentary
later discussion
Cf. Thomas's much
nn.
Aristotle's
discussion
Thomas
of
295-98.
lect.
2,
brings
2,
together
in bk. 6 (see note 5 above) by noting that
truth of being with the discussion
a thing's esse is the cause of the true knowledge
the mind has of that thing
(see n.9 298).
to truth on the created
This remark should be restricted
level.
See
section 3 below for Thomas's
of truth to God.
application

JOHN F. WIPPEL
300
truth
concerning
I Sentences
of
theologiae
will
shed
effort
we
of being,
1252, and
then
Although
light on Thomas's
raised, we shall devote
treatments
explicit
commentary
treatments
view
on
his
his
in De
I (ca. 1259), and Summa

gentiles
same
of these
texts
consideration
contra
some
just
to brief but
Aquinas's
with
begin
in turn
take
I of 1266.10
tions
to determine
shall
1 of 1256, Summa
qu.
veritate,
In our
is the first.
discussions
answers
to some
of the other
of this
sections
subsequent
of each of them.
ques
paper
1. Truth in the Intellect and Truth of Being

1: In I Sent,
dist
1 of this text, Thomas
Text
art.
sense
perfect
Truth
is assigned
and
applies
to things
in the
truth
produce
is formally
and
truth
trinsic
fashion.
One
from
text
this
that
in qu. 5,
19, qu. 5. As we have now seen,
in the complete
has indicated
that truth
as
to
truth
it
in
the intellect.
exists
only
insofar
only analogically,
intellect.
We may
immediately
as
they can
ask whether
or only in ex
in things,
present
J. Vande Wiele,
has concluded
commentator,
Thomas
has transferred
truth from the mind
to
intrinsically
but only by extrinsic

I take Vande Wiele
to
denomination.
things,
mean
is
not
this
that
truth
in
present
by
really
intrinsically
things.11
can be gleaned
more
from Thomas's
Nonetheless,
something
perhaps
discussion
As
in qu. 5 concerning
will
the
be recalled,
is this:
rected
objection
"Whether
truth
truth
question
explicit
is the essence
or argument
in support
harks
back to two earlier
question
to Augustine's
Soliloquies,
of being.
"the
true
to which
art.
1 is di
of a thing."12
The first
answer
to this
of an affirmative
definitions
is that which
of truth.
is."
And
According
according
to another definition, apparently that offered by Philip the Chan

cellor, "the true is the undividedness of being (esse) and that which
10
For
Friar Thomas dAquino,

these dates see Weisheipl,
358-59, 362
63,359-60,361.
11
"Le probl?me
de la v?rit? ontologique,"
548-49.
He reasons
that
terms are related to a primary
term only by a relation of
when secondary
in question
to the secondary
of the notion
reason, application
analogates
denomination.
Such is true in the case of health and
is only by extrinsic
in the transferring
such is also true, Vande Wiele
of the notion of
argues,
to a thing.
He stresses
that the relation of things
truth from the intellect
to the human
intellect
is a pure relation of reason.
12
See note 3 above.


is."13
true
by
reason
of truth,
identical.14
pletely
Thomas
proposes
of all,
the
is
everything
is
act
the
of
being
(esse)
is true in the formal
and everything
are com
it seems
that truth and essence
it enjoys
being
since each
Therefore,
essence.
sense
continues
Therefore,
as
insofar
the
verb
two
esse may
301
objection,
But
(esse).
each
and
to this objection.
replies
in two ways:
(1) insofar
possible
be taken
First
as
the
term being (ens) signifies the essence of things as when being itself
is divided
into
the
ten
supreme
genera
(in simpler
or (2) insofar
to extramental
reality);
points
a
effected
signifies
composition
by the soul;
being
(or dividing).
judges by composing
(ens) as true
in the second
"that which
Chancellor
is, when
When Aristotle
the
intellect
describes being
he is using
inMetaphysics
5, continues
Thomas,
being
to the true as
So too, when
refers
way.
Augustine
is realized when
that truth
is," it is as if he were
saying
it is said of that which

it is taken
that
as
insofar
terms,
as the verb esse
as
the
Philip's
is. And the same may be said of truth when
undividedness
definition).15
of
esse
In other
and
words,
that
which
in this
is (as in
sur
rather
13
see Soliloquia
For Augustine
II, c. 5. n. 8 (CSEL 89.56): "Ergo illud
dico et sic defini? nee vereor ne definitio mea ob hoc improbetur,
quod nimis
For this see Philip's
brevis est; nam verum mihi videtur esse id quod est."
de bono, q. 2, ed. N. Wicki
Summa
1985), vol. 1, p. 13: ". . .
(Bern: Francke,
esse et eius quod est."
verum est indivisio
Cf. p. 11. Philip's work
(ca.
In
treatise on the transcendentals.
the first medieval
1230) is apparently
of truth, Philip views truth as a property which
definition
his preferred
to an intellect:
to being in itself, without
"Verum
any reference
pertains
see Vande Wiele,
For discussion
enim dicitur sine respectu ad intellectum."
bei Thomas von Aquin
"Die Transzendentalienlehre
535-38; J. A. Aertsen,
und philosophischen
in ihren historischen
Motiven," Mis
Hintergr?nden
see the earlier
19 (1988): 94-95.
Also
cellanea Mediaevalia
study by H.
La 'Summa
transcendentales.
"Le premier
trait? des propri?t?s
Pouillon,
42
Revue n?oscolastique
de philosophie
de bono' du Chancelier
Philippe,"
40-77.
(1939):14
The final part of the objection
In ISent,
d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, pp. 484-85.
dicitur verum, secundum quod habet esse. Esse
reads: "Ergo unumquodque
veritate
formaliter
autem est actus essentiae.
Ergo cum unumquodque
et essentia."
idem sit veritas
sit verum, videtur quod omnino
15
". . .dicendum,
In I Sent, p. 488. Note especially:
quod esse dicitur
rerum prout
ens
uno
essentiam
secundum
modo
significat
quod
dupliciter:
com
dividitur
per decem genera; alio modo secundum
quod esse significat
ens
text.
V
et
istud
anima
Philosophus,
quam
facit;
Metaph.,
positionem
verum
cum
verum.
est
id
elicit
Et
similiter
quod
Augustinus,
14, appellat
quod est; quasi dicat: Verum est quando dicitur de eo quod est; et similiter
For
est indivisio esse et eius quod est."
intelligitur
quod dicitur: Verum
see Metaphysics
5.7.1017a 31-35.
Aristotle

JOHN F. WIPPEL
302
Thomas
move,
prising
tioned
Even
definitions.
to reinterpret
seems
each
proposes
though
that we might
being, he suggests
two
the
to refer
last-men
to
truth
of
shift its focus to truth of the in
tellect.
the
On
hand, Thomas
counter
that
other
a second
proposes
possible
reply.
the
not
definitions
in
refer
One might
simply
question
as
to truth taken
in its complete
insofar
but only to truth
meaning,
in reality.
in or has a foundation
to either
it is grounded
According
in
Thomas
here
his
view
that
remains
then,
unwavering
approach,
in the
truth
out more
his understanding
fully
truth and being.

really
without
According
the
its truth.
Therefore,
from
its truth.17
even
conceptually
In reply, Thomas
without
be understood
It may
ways.
true
unless
another
without
mean
to exist.
is held
being
without
usage
Thomas
another
that
sense,
it is also
also
counters
Thus
in this
way,
is truth
one
being
because
intelligible
also
thinking
intellect.16
in that he
of the relationship
one
the claim
can
that
be
may
interpreted
be understood
cannot
cannot
(esse)
being
or true.
be understood
be understood
cannot
thing cannot
in two different
unless
of animal.
can
the other
without
at all
be understood
even
we
differ
one
But this might
Thus
not
does
be understood
cannot
that we
between
if things differ either
of them
of a thing cannot
essence
of a thing
that
as meaning
that we
of
the
other.
thinking
of the
is helpful
to that objection,
or even merely
conceptually,
But the essence
the other.
without
the
sense
primary
reply to the second objection
Thomas's
brings
and
complete
think
cannot
According
understand
acknowledges
of it as true; but the converse
being without
thinking
as true without
we cannot
think of something
also
be taken
in
of one
thing
of human
think
to this
second
or think
does
of a
not hold?
thinking
of
it as
a being. From this Thomas concludes that being (ens) is the intel
If this text suggests that
lect's first conception.18 Truth is not.
16
"Vel potest dici, quod definitiones
istae dantur de vero non secundum
sed secundum
sui rationem,
illud quod fundatur
in re" (p. 488).
completam
17
In I Sent, p. 485. Note the conclusion
of the argument:
"Ergo es
re neque ratione."
sentia rei et veritas non differunt
?eque
18
In I Sent, p. 488: "Dupliciter
enim dicitur aliquid non posse intelligi
sine altero.
Aut ita quod unum non possit intelligi si non ponatur alterum
esse; et sic dicitur quod esse non potest
intelligi sine vero, sicut etiam non
sine hoc quod est esse intelligibile.
Sive ita quod quan
potest
intelligi
unum, intelligatur
intelligitur
documque
alterum, sicut quicumque
intelligit

303

is a conceptual
distinction
to deal
it also appears
there
its truth,
than with
that
Thomas
not merely
In art.
are
as
truth
to truth
assign
of the intellect.
2 of this
same
by reason
nature
of truth
true
the
some
in fact
does
involves
to truth
importance
of being,
all
asks whether
things
he again
reminds
us,
an
existence
and
(esse)
Both of these
power.
truth.
As
a thing's
of a cognitive
both
on the part
act of apprehension
This
Thomas
question
of the uncreated
of a thing and
of being
rather
leads us to suspect
being
truth
with
directly
intellect.
in the
it exists
the
between
are to be traced back to God as first efficient and first exemplar

cause.
in its own
entity
exists
participates
in the formal
pates
in its own light by which
Nonetheless,
is one truth?the
each
created
that
and
by the uncreated
all other
of which
exemplated
by reason
cause.
sense,
insists
also
Thomas
Nonetheless,
both
that
existence
particular
it judges correctly, a light which

light.
Hence
it
(esse) whereby
intellect
partici
created
every
every
is one
there
divine
is
esse
as dependent
their
upon
its own esse as well.
So too,
exist
things
creature
has
are true
which
all other
things
divine?by
cause.
as they depend
and efficient
insofar
upon it as their exemplar
reason
are
truths
in
there
created
also
many
things by
Nonetheless,
sense
is said to be true in the formal
of which
each
(formaliter).19
there
in mind
have
In saying
this, does Thomas
He has concluded
that
truth of the intellect?
in created
of his
be
restricting
non
of which
each
there
is true
intelligit
e converso:
animal.
quia
verum
Et hoc modo
non
est
'esse' potest
in ratione
entis,
or only
truths
of being
are many
formally.
he must,
one might
that
argue
discussion,
as it exists
to truth
his conclusion
previous
hominem
sed
things
by reason
truth
in the
intelligi
sed
ens
In light
therefore,
intellect.
sine vero,
in ratione
. . . Unde etiam patet quod ens est prima conceptio

intellectus."
19
". . .nihilominus
Note
In ISent,
in particular:
tarnen
pp. 491-92.
res particip?t
suum esse creatum,
quo formaliter
est, et unus
quaelibet
intellectus
lumen per quod recte de re iudicat, quod
quisque
particip?t
. . . Unde dico, quod sicut est
a lumine increato.
quidem est exemplatum
a
unum esse divinum
sicut
omnia
effectivo
quo
sunt,
principio
exemplari,
est diversum
res
tarnen in rebus diversis
nihilominus
esse, quo formaliter
veri.
est;
ita
etiam
est
una
veritas,
scilicet
divina,
qua
omnia
vera
sunt
...
verae
sunt plures veritates
in rebus creatis, quibus dicuntur
of Thomas's
On the significance
remark about every thing
in its created esse whereby
it exists
in the formal sense for
participating
see my "Thomas Aquinas
his metaphysics
of participation,
and Partici
in Studies
in Medieval
ed. J. F. Wippel
pation,"
Philosophy,
(Washington,
of America
D.C.: Catholic University
Press,
1987), 144-48.
nihilominus
formaliter."

JOHN F. WIPPEL
304
On
the other
such
no such
hand,
a restricted
stated.
is explicitly
to be offset by his reply
restriction
seems
reading
Moreover,
to the first
objection.
That
many
tained
contests
claim
Thomas's
that there are
directly
objection
as
It
Thomas
has main
truths.
himself
created
out,
points
in the preceding
that true is predicated
article,
analogically
things in which truth is present just as health is

analogically of healthy things. But there is really only
of the various
predicated
one
numerically
healthy
Therefore
things
as
are
health
the subject
that
it seems
said
an animal
of which
by reason
of health,
and urine
there
as
one
is only
truth
to be
its sign, and so forth.

all other
by which
to be true.20
to this
In replying
early texts on analogical
be predicated
analogically
Thomas
one
offers
He
but
may
something
The
analogy
(1)
not
to the
order
of
notion
of
in terms of
things
to the
order of
applies
only
of existence;
for the perfection
is
health
meaning,
one
in
the
The
animal.
realized
analogate,
only
(2)
analogy
actually
not
to
but
the
order
the
of
to
order
existence
of
may
meaning.
apply
priority
and
posteriority,
not to the order
the
the
Although
of different
analogically
interesting
that
predication.
in any one of three ways.
of meaning
alone
to the order
apply
case
as
in
the
of
health.
existence
(esse),
is predicated
of his most
notes
may
health
is said
analogy
in the same mean

different
share equally
when
things
happens
even though
the perfection
signified
by the common
ing or intention,
in the same way
in the different
analo
term does not enjoy being
This
gates.
In the order
vocity.
Thomas
of meaning
a very
offers
it is said of terrestrial
both
one
does
medieval
order
entities.
of meaning
of substance
may
apply
as when
existence,
being
(ens) is said
and
that
is in this way
truth,
goodness,
of God and creatures.
Hence
analogically
analogy
by such names
their existence
because
subjects
truths,
must
be present
in God
have
but
analogy
insofar
example?body
and of celestial
to the
not
and
all
such
(3) Finally,
and
and
the
order
uni
as
the
of
It
accident.
names
the perfections
in creatures
are
said
signified
in terms
of
in varying
of perfection.
And
degrees
(esse), though
cannot
in
be
and similar
different
present
perfections
one
must
to
existence
there
be distinct
(esse),
according
only
and thus, many
truths.21
truth
20
In I Sent, p. 491.
21
In I Sent, p. 492. Though
the text is too long to permit
introduces
the three kinds of analogy
here, note that Thomas

full citation
as applying
305

This
if truth
is predicated
in analogical
fash
as
it
is
in
creatures
creatures,
present
intrinsically
truth differs
from health.
In this respect,
therefore,
text
ion of God
well
as
in God.
But,
we
may
that
indicates
and
Thomas
ask, would
this
apply
being or only to truth of the intellect?

answer
here
perhaps
it seems
wish,
this
clear
enough
Truth
truth of the intellect.

well.
Still,
Thomas
truth taken strictly

to which
proprie),
see more
of this
truth
inition
endorse
this
it would
seem,
in things as
present
some
without
conclusion
as
such
does not
as we might
his claim
to
the difference
(proprie) and truth taken broadly (im

in later writings.22
appeal
But
we
shall
below.
for this
be found
in
may
support
reading
to the second objection.
to that objection,
According
or rightness
of rectitude
Anselm's
def
(rectitudo).
can
as "rectitude
which
be grasped
only by the mind"
reply
is a kind
of truth
is clearly
But
intended.
it seems
things,
true things
temporal
which
all
no need
he will
is intrinsically
of
additional
Some
Thomas's
not
or distinctions,
qualifications
between
would
Though Thomas
as explicitly
quite
he does not restrict
question
that
to truth
conclusion
to hold
In his
reply
that
if one
serves
time
that
correspond
there are many
Thomas
as
the measure
is only one
as their measure.
Hence
to follow
acknowledges,
there
for all
truth
to
there
is
truths.23
as
the
objection
implies,
"vel secundum
intentionem
tantum, et non secundum
esse," "Vel secundum
esse et non secundum
et
and "Vel secundum
intentionem
intentionem,"
is of concern to us, he
As regards
the third kind, which
secundum
esse."
in intentione
"et hoc est quando neque parificatur
continues:
communi,
et accidente;
et de talibus
in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia
neque
eorum
communis
habeat
oportet quod natura
aliquod esse in unoquoque
rationem maioris
sed differens
secundum
vel minoris
de quibus dicitur,
Et similiter dico, quod veritas, et bonitas, et omnia huiusmodi
perfectionis.
suum
Unde oportet quod secundum
dicuntur analogice de Deo et creaturis.
esse omnia haec in Deo sint, et in creaturis
secundum
rationem maioris
cum non possint
esse secundum
ex quo sequitur,
et minoris;
perfectionis
unum esse utrobique,
veritates."
On this text see B.
quod sint diversae
La doctrine de l'analogie de l'?tre d'apr?s saint Thomas d'Aquin
Montagnes,
Publications
Universitaires,
1963), 60-61, and his reference
(Louvain-Paris:
"En torno a un famoso texto de santo
to J. Ramirez,
for fuller treatment
8 (1953): 166-92.
sobre la analogia,"
Tom?s
Sapientia
22
For this see our discussion
below of texts from De veritate, Summa
I.
contra gentiles,
and Summa
theologiae
23
c. 11: "Possumus,
see De veritate,
For Anselm
igitur, nisi fallor,
sola perceptibilis."
See S. Anselmi
definir? quia veritas est rectitudo mente
t. 1, vol. 1
ed. F. S. Schmitt,
Cantuariensis
Opera Omnia,
Archiepiscopi
as
191.
For
the
p.
Constatt,
presented
1968),
objection
(Stuttgart-Bad
by
see In I Sent, p. 491.
Thomas

JOHN F. WIPPEL
306
that
is a kind
truth
nature
if the
Hence,
commensuration
intellect
must
by
relationships
is the cause of all other
by the divine
be measured
its first
a
is to be perfected,
it must
include
to an intellect.
But different
things
to different
intellects.
the
Because
truth
of
of a thing
in different
stand
divine
of rightness
and commensuration.
Therefore
must
within
be included
the nature
of truth.
of measure
note
the
principle.
intellect,
Anselm
Accordingly,
that a thing is said to be true when

been
within
ordered
to our
related
as
such
causes
things.
is measured
since
Our
are
The human
intellect).
not measure.
does
and
measures,
one first measure
they
intellect
Thomas
of truth;
veritate
But
our
intellects
measure
not
does
knowledge
it has
are
things
take their
created
them.24
by
is not measured
which
second
in his De
writes
From all of this it follows that the divine

measure
thing
is measured
it fulfills that to which
intellect.
divine
intellects
from
knowledge
but
things
the
created
every
things,
for everything
intellect
else.
by anything
are also measured
is measured
is the first
Created
(by
the
things
divine
(by its objects),

that
concludes,
therefore,
but there are many
second
there
but
is only
measures
just
are many
he
also
concludes
created
things.
Accordingly,
a
are many
because
truth
involves
there
that
truths,
presumably
an intellect
and there are many
between
and a measure,
relationship
even
were
measures.
In
if
he
there
created
fact,
adds,
only one
as
there
measure
truth;
of
for
it would
still not follow
that
there
is only
truth,
is not a measure
but a commensuration
truth
itself
There
could be different
adequation.
same measure.25
one
to
the
and
things
creatures
be related
would
in different
one
or
in different
commensurations
For
many
instance,
to the divine
fashion
different
intellect.
24
see the whole
7 in
of chapter
For Anselm
In I Sent,
pp. 492-93.
185-86.
his De veritate, Schmitt
ed.,
25
est
divinus
"Sic ergo intellectus
In I Sent, p. 493. Note especially:
ut mensura
surata;
prima,
intellectus
non
autem
res
mensurata:
noster
est
autem
mensuratus
est
mensura
et
non
secunda,
mensurans."
men
For
see J. McEvoy,
more on Thomas's
of measure
"The Divine
understanding
as the Measure
in Studies
of Being
in Platonic
and Scholastic
Thought,"
see
note
in
110-11.
in Medieval
Also
esp.
19), 107-13,
Philosophy
(cited
et l'existence
the general
d'un
study by G. Isaye, La th?orie de laMesure
16.1 (Paris: Beau
maximum
de Philosophie
selon saint Thomas, Archives
E.
P.
Foundations
of the Hierarchy
chesne, 1940);
Mahoney,
"Metaphysical
to Some Late-Medieval
of Being According
and Renaissance
Philosophers,"
and Medieval,
ed. P. Morewedge
in Philosophies
Ancient
(New
of Existence
York: Fordham
Press,
1982), 169-72
(with richly documented
University

307
This text is interesting in that it seems to offer two focal points

which justify one in assigning truth to being. A created being may
as measured
regarded
by
And
truth
of
being.
enjoying
to be understood
of its ability
the
be
intellect.
as
and therefore
intellect,
as true because
also be regarded
divine
it may
to produce
truth
truth of being.
by and
in a created
it enjoys
therefore,
Again,
3 of this same question
Thomas
asks whether
He replies
that because
eternal
truths.
the nature
In art.
many
is completed
grounded
through
in a thing's
will
follow
from
one's
an act
esse,
view
the
eternal
existence
one
eternal
one
eternal
esse, the divine,

He goes
truth.
There
is only one completely

esse of all other
things
The
of
of the
one's
about
and
intellect,
view
there
are
of truth
truth
because
is
about
the eternity
of truth
of things
existence
and
that there
he holds
is only
the eternal
intellect.
Since
he quickly
concludes
that there
on to say the same of immutable
and
immutable
totally
is mutable,
at
least
is only
truth.
the divine.
being,
in the sense
that if
left to fend for themselves,

speaking,
they were
ontologically
they
no truth as found
in creatures
would
be nothing.
is ab
Therefore,
if we speak
Thomas
of truth
necessary.
Moreover,
adds,
solutely
as its nature
no in
of the intellect,
is perfected
insofar
by reason
immutable
of its nature
the
tellect
and
is eternal
divine.
except
Even
so, much
truth
of being
eternal
of Thomas's
the
(esse), whether
and truth of creatures.
being
truth
is to be assigned
even
some intrinsic
fashion,
that
an operation
requires
Text
years,
2: De
discussion
veritate,
to qu. 1 of the De
veritate
has
been
directed
to
or the non
of God
being
seems
to be assuming
he
Again
or created,
to being, whether
in
divine
nature
its complete
and perfect
though
on the part
qu.
here
eternal
of some
1. With
of 1256.
intellect.26
this we
While
move
forward
the whole
a few
of question
zu Erkenntnis
als Massverh?ltnis
bei Ar
notes); H. Seidl, "Bemerkungen
von Aquin," Miscellanea
16.1 (Berlin
istoteles
und Thomas
Mediaevalia
New York, 1983), 32-42.
26
In I Sent, pp. 495-96.
Note especially:
"Unde sicut esse unum tan
tum est aeternum,
ita una tantum veritas.
scilicet divinum,
Similiter
de
est quod de mutabilitate
mutabilitate
veritatis
idem dicendum
essendi.
. . . Quorumdam
vero esse est mutabile
solum secundum
vertibilitatem
in nihil, si sibi relinqueretur;
et horum veritas
est per
similiter mutabilis
in nihil, si sibi relinqueretur."
vertibilitatem
On this see A. Maurer,
St
Thomas
and Historicity
Press,
Marquette
(Milwaukee:
University
1979),
and Eternal
32
Studies
23-32; also his "St. Thomas
Truths," Mediaeval
(1970): 91-107.

308
JOHN F. WIPPEL
1 is directed
1 explicitly
to truth, article
asks: "What
is truth?"
a parallel
between
the need
by drawing
to
of
demonstration
order
things
principles
subject
in the order of conceptu
which
is first
and the need for something
as most
known
the intellect
first conceives
But that which
alization.
Thomas
his
begins
response
in the
for first
and
into which
states
Avicenna
other
be added
to a genus
added
to present
superadded
anything
within
included
being
any such nature
ments,
in being.
a problem.
from without
to being
that
He
As
in the way
as Thomas
be
some
Thomas
to a subject.
in such fashion
itself; but,
that might
also
is being
(ens), as
all
Therefore
conceptions
of his Metaphysics.
must
arise
from
to being
or an accident
be
share
its other
at the beginning
of the intellect
conceptions
This seems
being.
ing can
all
it resolves
added
from
draws
support
cannot
that being
be a genus.27
the Metaphysics
that something
From
this Thomas
concludes
sense
other
mode
themselves
is
implication
not actually
would
supreme
hand,
which
genera,
something
is not more
substance
may
Corresponding
and the nine
be said
particularized
to add
itself
claim
Aristotle's
can be said
of being
may
in
to add
which
in
happen
is expressed
Thus
there
different
is
are
modes
to these modes
are
accidents.
the
to being
(restricted
com
immediately
to being must
a mode
are derived.
puts
it, noth
a difference
is
The
in the
that
to being
it expresses
only
name
itself.
This
is not expressed
the
"being"
by
It may
two different
be that the mode which
ways.
or
some more
of being.
special mode
particularized
to which
of entity,
the
different
according
degrees
of being
the ten
to
addition
On
a
by expressing
in extension)
than
27
references
ed., vol. 22.1, pp. 4-5; all subsequent
Opera Omnia, Leonine
see his Liber de philosophia
For Avicenna
for De veritate are to this edition.
E. Peeters,
1977), pp. 31-32.
prima I, c. 5, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain-Leiden:
von
see Aertsen,
bei Thomas
"Die Transzendentalienlehre
For discussion
and Creature.
Thomas Aquinas's
Nature
92-95; Aertsen,
Way of
Aquin,"
"L'id?e de transcen
Thought
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 144-47; S. Breton,
chez Saint Thomas
in
dental et la gen?se des transcendentaux
d'Aquin,"
"The
Saint Thomas
d'Aquin
(Paris, 1963), 45-74; M. Jordan,
aujourd'hui
on the Transcendental,"
of Esse: Re-reading
Thomas
The Tho
Grammar
der Transzen
mist 44 (1980): 1-26; H. Seidl, "Die aristotelischen
Quellen
von Aquin, De ver, q. 1, art. 1," Philo
bei Thomas
dentalien-Aufstellung
For Aristotle's
denial that being
80 (1973): 166-71.
sophisches Jahrbuch
Note how Thomas
summarizes
is a genus see Metaphysics
3.3.998b22ff.
this thinking:
"Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum
natura
additur generi vel accidens
quo differentia
subiecto, quia quaelibet
est essentialiter
ens" (p. 5).

309
as being or, as Thomas

is as general
itself, but which
being
phrases
which
follows
upon every being.28
it,
Thomas
goes on to argue that there are five distinct modes which
as being
are as broad
itself or, to use non-Thomistic
in extension
there are five transcendental
language,
such a general
mode
follow
upon
may
as that being
is in itself, or insofar
being
If it follows
else.
the mode
upon
express
may
every
being
any
being
is in relation
that
being
This mode
affirma
refer
corresponding
The negation
which
follows
(1) a thing
(res).
or in itself
is its undividedness
taken absolutely
as
being
that
the essence
expresses
we may
to its essence
Thus
as
either
being
the mode
of being.
insofar
to something
is in itself,
being
as that
insofar
about
something
If affirmatively,
tively or negatively.
of the being,
and
properties
to any
upon
every
from
itself.
(2) one, or unity.29

by
as the being
upon every being
only insofar
to something
in
this
two
also
is in relation
different
may happen
else,
as it is viewed
as
follow upon a being
The mode may
insofar
ways.
case
we
In
from
other
refer
to
this
divided
it as
every
may
being.
the name
is expressed
If the mode
follows
(3) "something"
"what"
another
described
as one
to as
Or
"something"
the mode may
to or
in agreement
can
happen
in agreement
istotle writes
that
it is, as it were,
thereby
In other words,
if a being
is
it is not divided
from itself,
it is referred
meaning
(aliquid),
aliud
quid).
(quasi
as
insofar
insofar
follow
as
upon
it is divided
every
with
being
else.
something
reason
of something
from
other being.
every
as it is conformed
insofar
Thomas
argues
that
this
to which
it belongs
to be
only by
with
the
soul.
Ar
Thus
else, specifically,
everything
that the soul is in a certain
all things.30
fashion
But
a cognitive
and an appetitive
When
power.
as in agreement
we consider
with
of
the appetitive
power
any being
it as (4) good.
And when we consider
it
the soul, we may
describe
in the
soul
28
De
expressus
there
veritate,
sit modus
is both
p. 5.
Note
generalis
"Alio modo
in particular:
consequens
omne
ens
ita quod modus
. ."
29
"non autem
De veritate,
invenitur
p. 5. Note
especially:
aliquid
affirmative
dictum absolute
quod possit accipi in omni ente nisi essentia
eius secundum
quam esse dicitur, et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in
in principio Metaphysicae,
hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam
quod
ens sumitur
sed nomen rei exprimit
vel es
ab actu essendi
quidditatem
omne ens absolute
autem consequens
est indivisio,
sentiam
entis; negatio
et hanc exprimit
hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens
indivisum."
30
De
veritate,
p. 5.
For Aristotle
see De
anima
3.8.431b21.

310
JOHN F. WIPPEL
as
in agreement
we
may
course,
with
refer
to
is the
fact
the cognitive
it as (5) true.31
that
of being
or, if you will,
there
is no suggestion
that
erty
soul?the
immediate
now
intellect?
introduced
truth
as a transcendental.
So far
truth
or
taken
to us, of
as a prop
interest
formally
in this
text
is
intrinsically
to truth of the intellect.
restricted
Thomas
similation
observes
immediately
of a knower
is said
assimilation
or
agreement
is formally
perfected.
it is this conformity
of knowledge.
But
is that it be conformed
as
is known
conformity
intellect and the thing.
an as
involves
knowledge
so
so
much
such
that
known,
that
to something
to be the cause
relation of being to intellect

This
Of
has
Thomas
of the
power
an
the
first
to the intellect.
of
adequation
the
it is in this that the nature of truth
And
If we
ask,
or adequation
such
upon
what
therefore,
of thing
and
truth
adds
to being,
intellect.
Knowledge
follows
while
the
thing
conformity.
Therefore,
a
of
an
to
is
is
of
effect
truth.32
thing
prior
truth, knowledge
entity
In this context
to be concentrating
on truth of
Thomas
appears
In
so
he
has
with
truth
understood.
And
any
event,
being.
begun
now he has distinguished
three moments,
in the order of nature,
I
of
the
if not necessarily
in the order of time.
First,
or entity.
there
is the added note
Secondly,
assume,
a thing
of being to an intellect
there
nally,
the intellect.
(or adequation
there
is simply
of conformity
of intellect and thing).
Fi
is the
of the
And
could be taken as referring

yet that conformity
of any created
to the divine
or to
entity
intellect,
to produce
of itself
in a human
ability
knowledge
the part of
knowledge
thing
second moment?adequation
of intellect
the nature
of truth
is formally
Thomas
perfected,
resulting
It is in the
and
thing?that
has written.
on
to the adequation
a created
entity's
or to the adequation
of the human
with
intellect
any being
it understands.
Thomas
does not exclude
any of
Though
or
of
of thing and intellect,
ways
taking
adequation
conformity
intellect,
or entity
these
in his explicit discussion
of truth in this text he has at least begun
31
De veritate, p. 5. Note
in particular:
".
ad intellectum
hoc nomen verum."
exprimit
32
De
veritate,
pp.
5-6.
".
. .
prima
ergo
. . convenientiam
comparatio
entis
vero entis
ad
intel
lectum est ut ens intellectui

quae quidem concordia
concordet,
adaequatio
et rei dicitur, et in hoc formaliter
intellectus
ratio veri perficitur.
Hoc est
conformitatem
ergo quod addit verum
sive adaequa
super ens, scilicet
tionem rei et intellectus,
ad quam conformitatem,
ut dictum est, sequitur
rei: sic ergo entitas
rei praecedit
rationem
veritatis
sed cognitio
cognitio
est quidam veritatis
effectus."


with
the
second
Thomas
moments
now
formal
meaning
gustine's
(ratio)
and which
to the
refers
teristic of its being which

from
this
same
that
to the
Corresponding
truth is formally
second
incorrectly,
thing and an intellect."
Thomas
Anselm's
as
rectitude
does
this,
definition
as
been
Israeli:
the
can
is Au
it is
still
of being
which
which
the
by
the
Thomas
So
charac
"proper
defined
its
is."
for it." And
"undividedness
"Truth
to
is prior
its foundation,
moment?in
Thomas
which
the
as he
in which,
which
as
three
of truth
truth is "that which
a definition
perfected?is
to Isaac
ascribes
truth
serves
it has
as
Philip
that which
is."34
of
that
of a thing
truth
of these
each
has been established
perspective
the Chancellor
named
of
in his Soliloquies:
definition
too, Avicenna
in terms
and
seem,
with earlier definitions
to the first moment
Corresponding
truth
is defined
notes,
it would
to coordinate
attempts
immediately
he has just distinguished

to him.
known
the first),
(and by implication
truth of being.33
with
therefore
311
nature
now,
un
and
of
albeit
of a
adequation
here Anselm's
definition
also places
be perceived
is the
by
the mind
alone.
as it appears
rectitude
because
in
explains,
a
kind
of
Also
implies
adequation.
correspond
is Aristotle's
statement
in Metaphysics
4 that
he
ing to this moment

we speak
the true when
not to be."35
"what
is is said
to be or what
is not
is said
33
This should occasion no surprise,
of course, since in this context he
which
is dealing with general properties
follow upon every being.
34
De veritate,
to Augustine
see
For references
and Philip
pp. 5-6.
see Liber de philosophia
note 13 above.
For Avicenna
prima VIII, c. 6, ed.
S. Van Riet (Louvain-Leiden:
E. Peeters,
is
1980), p. 413. Here Avicenna
the necessary
truth:
discussing
being (God) and its perfections,
including
esse est veritas; veritas enim cuiusque rei est
"Quicquid autem est necesse
est ei; igitur nihil est dignius
esse ver
sui esse quod stabilitum
proprietas
itatem quam necesse
esse" (Italics mine.)
35
De veritate, pp. 5-6.
"Alio modo diffinitur
secundum
id in quo for
et sic dicit Ysaac quod 'Veritas est adaequatio
maliter
ratio veri perficitur,
et Anselmus
rei et intellectus,'
in libro De veritate
'Veritas est rectitudo
sola mente
enim ista secundum
perceptibilis',?rectitudo
adaequationem
et Philosophus
dicit IV Metaphysicae
dicitur?;
quandam
quod diffinientes
verum dicimus
esse quod est aut non esse quod non est'."
'cum dicitur
J. T. Muckle
out his inability
to find the definition
of
pointed
originally
no one else has managed
truth as adequation
in Isaac Israeli, and apparently
to do so.
See "Isaac Israeli's Definition
of Truth," Archives
d'Histoire
et litt?raire du Moyen Age 8 (1933): 5-8. Also see Aertsen, Me
doctrinale
on Truth, 6. For Anselm's
dieval Reflections
text see note 23 above.
For
see Metaphysics
Aristotle
4.7.1011b25-28.

JOHN F. WIPPEL
312
to
corresponding
Finally,
that results from it?truth

terms:
true
"the
is that which
is is shown";
and
moment?the
also:
"Truth
is that
"Truth
knowledge
of Poitiers
or manifests
declares
in his De vera religione:
Augustine
which
third
the
is defined by Hilary
in these
and
being"
is that whereby
to which
according
by
that
we
inferior
judge
Of
things."36
definitions
offered
the
in which
ment,
that
to truth of being and not merely
be applied
might
to
by Thomas
ascribed
as corresponding
to the second mo
is formally
the first two?
perfected,
Isaac
and that offered
by Anselm?
nature
truth's
from
intellect.
The
restricted
definition
taken
Aristotle,
And
to truth of the
is clearly
however,
in replying
to the first
as he had already
in the corpus,
Thomas
done
suggests,
objection,
first-mentioned
that Augustine's
definition
of truth as "that which
is" might
as referring
as perfected
be
Or it might
be taken
not
to
its nature
an
intellect.
in his
suggested
previously
to truth's
in reality,
foundation
an
a
of
to
through
adequation
thing
as Thomas
much
had
reinterpreted
only
on I Sentences
commentary
so as to refer
not to a thing's act of being (actus essendi) but only to the being
In
produced by the intellect when it judges (composes and divides).
other words, itmight be shifted from truth of being to truth of the
intellect.37
to objection
in replying
other
writes
4, Thomas
hand,
is a characteristic
not so
of being
but
entis),
(dispositio
a
nor
so
as
a
more
to express
to it
nature
distinct
particu
the
On
truth
that
as to add
larized
Truth
is something
which
is present
in every
of being.
name
not
it is
though
explicitly
expressed
by the
"being."38
we may
Thomas
would
in mind
have us bear
that
presume,
mode
being
even
Again,
what
truth
or conformity
to being
of adequation
is a relation
on truth of being.
to an intellect,
and here the focus
is again
Since much
in qu. 1, art. 1 has to do with
of the discussion
adds
are present
which
properties
so far as truth
is concerned,
is found and therefore,

being
ask which
truth of being, we may
wherever
with
36
De
see his De Trinitate

For
(PL 10.131).
veritate, p. 6. For Hilary
c.
c.
vera
see
36
31
34.151/CCSL
De
(PL
32.230-31);
religione,
Augustine
is completely
literal.
None of these citations
32.225).
(PL 34.147/CCSL
37
from the second solution:
"Vel dicendum
De veritate,
p. 6. Note
ibi secundum
quod cum dicitur verum est id quod est, li est non accipitur
com
actum essendi sed secundum
quod est nota intellectus
quod significat
.
.
ut
sic
in
scilicet
affirmationem
significat.
propositionis
prout
ponentis,
cum diffinitione
idem redeat diffinitio Augustini
supra inducta."
Philosophi
38
De
veritate,
p.
7,
"Ad
quartum.
. ."


is primary,
in things.
as
truth
can
this
considers
in the
it exists
of Thomas's
In light
on / Sentences,
we
plicitly
313
treatment
his
anticipate
easily
2.
issue in article
of different
is predicated
something
and priority,
it does not necessarily
causes
fashion
of that which
prior
or truth
intellect
earlier
as
in his
answer
it is present
commentary
ex
He
here.
Thomas
that when
replies
to posteriority
things
according
follow
it is predicated
in
that
it to be present
in the others.
in
it
is
that
in
which
fashion
of
its complete
Rather,
predicated
prior
nature
For instance,
and perfect
is first realized.
is said
"healthy"
in prior
fashion
because
it is in an animal
of an animal
that the
is first realized;
of health
this is so
or pro
to be healthy
it causes
because
true must
be said in prior fashion
of that
nature
and perfected
complete
even though medicine
is said
duces
the
health.
So too,
nature
of truth
is first realized.
The perfec
complete
or operation
in the terminus
tion of any motion
is present
of that
a
of
Therefore
the
motion
is
in
power
cognitive
present
operation.
the soul; for what
is known must
be in the knower
to the
according
in which
the
of
mode
the knower.
as
insofar
except
is present
in an
Consequently,
it is adequated
in prior
intellect
fashion.39
posterior
Thomas
immediately
to theoretical
knowledge
the practical
intellect.
causes
intellect
and measures
things
measured
serve
measured
In the
things.
by the
way
as measures
of our
the divine
intellect.40
by
case
is not
and
fashion,
this
qualifies
as distinguished
and
is in a certain
a thing
to an intellect.
said
Therefore,
in things
conclusion
by
to be
true
the true
in
only
it
restricting
from practical
knowledge
of practical
the
knowledge,
But the speculative
intellect
it knows.
things
intellect,
they
And
themselves
if these
are
also
39
See p. 8 for the statement
of the question:
"Secundo quaeritur utrum
inveniatur
in intellectu quam in rebus."
For Thomas's
principalius
see p. 9. Note
in particular:
". . . et quia bonum,
sicut dictum
response
verum autem dicit ordinem
entis ad appetitum,
ad in
est, dicit ordinem
dicit in VI Metaphysicae
inde est quod Philosophus
tellectum,
quod bonum
et malum
sunt in rebus, verum autem et falsum sunt in mente.
Res autem
non dicitur vera nisi secundum
unde per
quod est intellectui
adaequata,
invenitur
in rebus, per prius autem in intellectu."
posterius
veritas
40
De
intellectus
veritate,
noster
p.
9.
scientiam
".
. . ex
accipit,
quo
patet
mensurant
quod
res naturales,
a quibus
.
nostrum
intellectum
. .
sed sunt mensuratae

ab intellectu
in quo sunt omnia sicut omnia
divino,
. . ." As he had done in his commentary
artificiata
in intellectu
artificis.
on I Sentences,
dist. 19, Thomas
again refers to the divine intellect as mea
but
not
to
and measured,
natural
suring
measured,
things as measuring
and to our intellect as measured
but not measuring
natural
things (though
it does measure
artificial
See note 25 above.
things).

JOHN F. WIPPEL
314
two
In terms
of adequation,
intellects.
According
natural
therefore,
to their adequation
fall
things
to the divine
they are said to be true because they fulfill that to which

finds
by God.
(Aquinas
as
of
truth
definition
classical
been
ordered
selm's
Augustine's
Avicenna.)
De
vera
To
this
I would
extent,
or the
of being
comment,
that
by
he has
Thomas
intellect
they have
confirmed
point
rectitude,
by the one
and
religione,
this
between
by An
in
offered
cited
from
is still
con
we refer
But when
truth of things.
reason
a
to
of its relationship
human
intellect,
by
a
it is naturally
to
is so described
because
the thing
apt
produce
an
awareness
correct
of itself within
such
Truth
of being
intellect.41
truth
sidering
to a thing as true
is still
at
issue.
Thomas
whatsoever,
to the divine
such
were
no human
things
continued
whatsoever.
no
to exist,
the nature
of truth
To put this another
way,
no
ex
of being.42
if
And
mind
truth
longer
enjoy
not
truth of intellect.
could
isted, they evidently
enjoy
we should
In summarizing
recall
that even
in this
things
intellect
still
in no way
remain
would
if there
that
be true by reason
of their relationship
things
In
other
would
of
intellect.
truth
words,
they
enjoy
nor divine
human
neither
intellect
if, per impossibile,
would
But
being.
while
remained
would
comments
also
discussion
Thomas has insisted that truth applies both to truth of the intellect
and
truth
of things
or being;
but
taken
in its primary
sense,
it refers
Only in the intellect does truth reach its
41
De veritate,
from Anselm
and Avicenna
p. 9. For the definitions
see notes 35 and 34 above.
see the first definition
For Augustine
cited in
note 36, though Aquinas
there (in article 1) included this under the third
moment
rather than under the second.
42
De veritate,
that Thomas
this by remarking
p. 9. Note
prefaces
a thing's
to the divine
that because
is prior to its
intellect
relationship
to a human
truth taken as a thing's adequation
to
intellect,
relationship
intellect
is prior to truth taken as a thing's adequation
the divine
to a
Also note: ". . . sed si uterque
human
intellect.
rebus rema
intellectus,
nentibus
per impossibile,
intelligeretur
auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis
on Thomas's
remaneret."
One might
part that
object to this admission
it implies a real separability
of being and truth, at least in created entities.
the hypothesis,
Under
being would endure without
being true. And what
can there be than this?
Hence
greater
sign of real distinction
being and
truth of being are not merely
but really distinct.
To this,
conceptually
counter
Thomas would
that the two are not really distinct;
for
probably
an impossible
in question
the separability
presupposes
situation,
namely,
of God's
the nonexistence
intellect
of God) and the con
(and therefore
of
creatures.
tinuing existing


fullness
both
Even
and
perfection.
in relation
to the
intellect.
Hence
of
definition
divine
to follow
as an
adequation
truth
in the order of nature,

the
that,
of thing and intellect
applies
between a thing and the divine intellect
and then only to the relationship

between
a thing.
on the latter re
If we concentrate
a thing and the human
between
intellect?in
the
it corresponds,
and
intellect
a human
lationship?that
order of nature
the
can again
thing
as true
be regarded
so, things may
to a human
intellect
and in relation
it seems
first of all to the relationship

to which
315
causes
thing
be referred
But truth as it exists
capacity.
in the
truth
to as true
intellect.
in itself
because
in the human
is not.43
fashion.
Truth
of being
primary
to
Thomas's
the
first
makes
reply
objection
tinction.
it does
According
But being
to the soul,
truth.
To
fashion
of a true
can
that
vertible.
to the
the
objection,
to things
pertains
that
is, to mental
counters
Thomas
that
this
Hence
the
it enjoys
this
intellect
is truth in
an
true
dis
interesting
are
and being
so (principalius)
entities.
Therefore
con
more
the
true
than
so does
is said
in primary
a
of
thing which
in either
taken
and only by consequence

intellect,
to that
is adequated
intellect.
But, he now adds,
are
convertible.
When
truth is said of things,
way the true and being
we
with
in
the
of
it is convertible
order
Hence
being
predication.
say
is being.
divine
and
to it.
But
true
in the order
so because
some
conversely.
be conformed
is true,
being
is because
intellect
equated
intellect?the
not
every
This
is also
when
is also
and
that
instance
every
every (finite) being

of making
capable
in the second
taken
convertible
of predication
being must
but
with
by way
of the
is adequated
true
to the
a human
intellect
way?as
truth
ad
of the
extramental
being,
though
of consequence.
This
is
to every
true intellect,
and
correspond
to mean
by this that every being must
can produce
to the divine
and every being
intellect;
of itself in a human
The important
intellect.44
point
I take
true knowledge
Thomas
to be retained from this text is that convertibility
of being and truth
43
This
is not yet to resolve completely

the question whether
according
to Aquinas,
truth is intrinsically
in things.
As we shall now see,
present
he adds some helpful
in article 4.
clarifications
44
see De veritate,
For the objection
p. 8. For Thomas's
reply see p.
10. From his reply note: ". . . quia secundum
quod (verum) dicitur de
rebus
quatum
et
cum
convertitur
intellectui
e converso.
ente
divino
per
enim
praedicationem?omne
et potens
adaequare
sibi
intellectum
. ."

ens
est
adae
humanum,
JOHN F. WIPPEL
316
of predication
intellect.
applies
4 Thomas
clarifies
in the order
of the
In article
to truth
only
his
thinking
of being,
divine
(proprie)
is present
either
as health
taken
intellect,
just
truth
is present
But
reason
to the
of their
other
things
relationship
intellect
divine
relationship
only because
to the health
things,
intellect,
by
taken
intellect or in the
in an animal.
is, in beings,
by
as health
is said of
that
just
or preserve
they produce
of an animal.
truth
truth
is present
strictly
in extramental
of
considers
one
is only
that
in a human
to truth
truth
concerning
This article
a little more
or truth of being
fully.
things
of
whether
the by now familiar
there
question
are true.45
which
Thomas
all things
responds
strictly
not
Therefore
or bear
truth
some
is in the
sense
in both primary
fashion
and in the strict
(pro
sense
in
in
It
is
human
intellects
the
strict
present
prie).
(proprie),
I take it, in comparison
in secondary
but only
fashion;
secondary,
with its presence in the divine intellect. And truth is present in

extramental
things only broadly speaking (improprie), that is to
sense.
in the strict
truth
It is present
is not taken
only when
some
on
of
to
in such things
their part
only because
relationship
two senses,
in one of the other
in the
taken
that is, as present
truth
or in the human
intellect
divine
intellect.46
say,
some question
text is interesting,
be raised
although
might
two points
its compatibility
with
made
already
by Thomas.
on / Sentences,
to his commentary
d. 19, qu. 5, art. 2, ad
According
as
are
in God and in
and
truth
such
present
1, perfections
goodness
This
about
by an analogy
of existence
to the order of meaning

and
applies
We
have
that
this
suggested
(esse).
early
to truth of being and not merely
referred
as we have also seen, in the corpus of this same article,
Thomas
creatures
the
text
And
order
states
that
in De
created
qu.
veritate,
formally
quation
consists
which
things
1, art.
of
the
are
restricting
to the present
in the
agreement
of intellect and thing.

such
true
1, Thomas
adequation
text, he restricts
or
Again,
to truth
truth
formal
has
written
conformity
sense.
that
Secondly,
truth
taken
known
as
ade
there we did not find him
of the
taken
intellect.
strictly
But
according
to
(proprie)
45
it
utrum
sit tantum una veritas
qua omnia sunt
"Quarto quaeritur
veritate, p. 11).
46(De
in intellectu
De veritate, p. 13. Note the key text: "Est ergo veritas
vero humano proprie quidem
in intellectu
divino quidem primo et proprie,
et secundario,
in rebus autem improprie
sed secundario,
per
quia nonnisi
duarum veritatum."
ad alteram
(Italics mine.)
respectum
vera"

317

as present
strictly
either
in an
intellect,
not
does
apply
intrinsically
This seeming
to
as
of
the
divine
how
things,
esse)
(secundum
as distinguishing
attribute
such
possession
whether
or human.47
can
it be
If truth
realized
taken
in them
or formally?
be resolved
if we take Thomas
may
inconsistency
a strict
or proper
between
of an
understanding
on the one hand,
and intrinsic
and formal
truth,
same,
on
the
other.
Accordingly,
he holds
that
truth is intrinsically present in things, and that it is formally present

to an intellect,
whether
this
they are adequated
or the human
intellect
be the divine
by which
they are measured
can
in
which
But
intellect
of themselves.
knowledge
they
produce
in them
insofar
as
we understand
to the present
text this holds
according
only when
we take truth
or improprie.
in the strict sense
truth broadly,
When
it is intrinsically
in some
and formally
in
present
only
(proprie),
tellect.
be raised
(At this point an objection
might
a
contrast
solution.
At times Thomas
draws
names
of God
properly
[proprie]
and
doing
against
between
my
proposed
predicating
so only metaphorically
47
of these texts above, pp. 304-5, and 310-11.
Con
See our discussion
on this point
to our difficulty
in interpreting
Thomas
tributing
correctly
to the example
of health.
Thus in In I Sent, d.
is his repeated
reference
to show that truth is said in
to this example
19, q. 5, a. 1, he appeals
fashion of truth of the intellect, and of a thing insofar as it causes
primary
truth in the intellect
(see above, pp. 297-98, and note 7). One should not
there holds that truth is not intrinsically
conclude from this that Thomas
his
in
to
The
See
present
things.
reply
obj. 1, art. 2 of the same question.
to the example
to argue that just as there is
of health
appeals
objection
an animal
as
is said to be healthy
numerically
only one health by which
its subject, with urine as its sign, etc., so too there seems to be only one
counters
Thomas
truth by which all other things are said to be true.
that
an
to
which
truth is said of God and creatures
according
analogy
applies
In other words,
and the order of being (esse).
both to the order of meaning
to creatures
and truth is not assigned
is not purely extrinsic,
the analogy
or to God in purely extrinsic
But in this same text Thomas
fashion.
refers
to another kind of analogy which applies only to the order of meaning,
not
this with the example of health.
to the order of being (esse). He illustrates
I conclude that when he likens the case of truth to that of health he wishes
one point?that
to things because
to make
truth is assigned
they cause
he distinguishes
the case of truth from that
truth in the intellect.
When
to make another point?that
of health
(reply to obj. 1, in art. 2), he wishes
in both the primary and secondary analogates,
truth is intrinsically
present
is not.
In the text from De veritate,
q. 1, a. 4, he again
though health
the point that truth is assigned
likens truth to health,
this time to make
to things because of their relationship
to an intellect.
He does not conclude
in things extrinsically,
from this that truth is only present
but that it is
in an intellect proprie and in things improprie.

318
JOHN F. WIPPEL
As regards
that which
vel symbolice].
names
certain
[their res significata],
[metaphorice
nify
directly
names
such
are
sig
of God
said
properly [proprie]; but this does not hold for the way inwhich they
These names must include no
signify [their modus significandi].
in
which
that
imperfection
they signify [res significata], even though
the way
the
include
however,
It is only
as a "lion."48
for
Thomas
Thomas
truth
includes
in their
res
names
those
among
imperfection
significata
in nonmetaphorical,
of God
albeit
which
can
and which
analogical,
therefore
intellect?
identifies
Yes,
Thomas
insist,
in created
entities?
say
analogy
to God
does
Thomas
then,
qu.
veritate,
only when we
erly?
truth
intellect
below
1, art.
take
4, when
truth
to a thing.
sense
This
3; for
he
Still, one
in God.
of being as
in light
answer,
it is realized
of Thomas's
in assigning
truth
[secundum
esse]
I
art.
d.
ad
19, qu. 5,
2,
Sent,
[In
1].
in mind
have
in our text from De
he
refers
broadly
or,
as present
to truth
to translate
I take him to mean by this that the meaning

in its strict
from truth
in section
of truth
again
But
of being and truth and in light of his
to an intrinsic
appeal
to creatures
both
and
What,
this
Iwould
Yes,
of the convertibility
defense
see
shall
truth of being and truth of intellect

would
may
as we
imply
be
fashion.
would Thomas say this of truth of being as distinguished

the
from
conclude
though itmay be, I do not think we should draw this
Tempting
of
that
instance,
not
in things
conclusion.
said
in this way,
Should we
in the present
text of truth
speaks
when
truth
is
taken
that he has
only
improprie
means
in mind
to say that truth
and therefore
distinction
in
of things
extrinsic
and
fashion?
only metaphorically
as present
the same
no
and can, therefore, be applied to
they signify [res significata]
God only metaphorically.

we might
refer to God
that when
such usage
is said
will
they signify
manner
in which
imperfect
names,
which
some reference
to
include
always
are
in
creatures.
realized
Other
they
or limitation
even
in that
imperfection
in which
includes
meaning
to truth as it is realized in things.
literally,
in things
improp
or definition
an adequation
or conformity
does not apply
in the same
He makes
of
of an
sense
this point by referring
48
See In I Sent, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet
ed., vol. 1, p. 131); d. 22, q.
he notes that wisdom,
and all
1, a. 2 (p. 535), where
goodness,
essentia,
names of this kind (those which Anselm
c. 15 it is
says inMonologium,
as regards
to be than not to be) are said of God proprie
better
the res
d. 35, q. 1, a. 1 (p. 811); De potentia,
q. 7, a. 5, and ad 2; Summa
significata;
contra gentiles
I, q. 13, a. 3. Cf. Summa
theologiae
I, c. 30 (for discussion
see Wippel, Metaphysical
Themes,
224-26).


as applied
to truth
that
In fact,
art.
6, Thomas
and
univocal
to its proper
shortly
this out
singles
and
metaphorically
in them.
in Summa
see,
Theologiae
between
as a difference
In the case
of univocal
of different things is present
I, qu.
16,
analogical
what
predication,
in each of them according
predication,
ratio]; but in analogical
[propria
of different
is predicated
What
analogically
one
to its proper meaning
in only
of them according
meaning
the case.
is not
is present
things
present
predication.
is predicated
this
shall
to things
be applied
only
that it is not intrinsically

as we
understanding
But it does not follow from this that he wishes
can
truth
or improper
as a broad
to things
of truth [improprie].
to say
319
[ratio], and it is from this that the same name
is applied
to the
the analogy
in question
holds whether
is
or
as
of
illustrated
intrinsic,
truth,
extrinsic,
purely
on other
That
issue can only be decided
by the case of health.
to say that truth
I conclude
that for Thomas
Hence
is
grounds.
For
others.
this
Thomas
as
in the
case
present in things only when it is taken improprie is not for him to

or that it is not
hold that it is said of them only metaphorically
to them.)
this aside
intrinsic
With
from
the De
out of the way,
veritate.
we may
return
to Thomas's
text
his distinction
between
making
taking
turns
to
he
the
at
directly
improprie,
question
proprie
one
are
Is there
all things
issue:
truth by which
true?
The
only
is only one, and from
it many
truth
of the divine
intellect
truths
truth
After
and
in human
derive
result
may
are many,
truth
human
intellects,
in a mirror.
But
just
assigned
intellect
if no human
remain
those
entities
face many
likenesses
in extramental
themselves.
Nonetheless,
of their relationship
things
by reason
to such things.
is in some sense
accidental
to such
intellect
in their
of their
as are
just as from one

the truths present
either
essences.
relationship
them
it accompanies
existed
And
to the
or could
the truth
divine
in inseparable
exist,
assigned
would
intellect
things
the
to the
Even
such
things would
to them by reason
also remain,
for
fashion.49
49
in particular:
De veritate,
Note
". . . veritates
autem
pp. 13-14.
Veritas
autem
quae sunt in rebus sunt plures sicut et rerum entitates.
ad intellectum
est rebus
quae dicitur de rebus in comparatione
humanum,
non esset
humanus
quodam modo accidentalis,
quia, p?sito quod intellectus
nec esse posset, adhuc res in sua essentia
sed veritas quae de
permaneret;
eis dicitur in comparatione
con
ad intellectum
eis inseparabiliter
divinum,
cum nec subsistere
eas in
divinum
comitatur,
possint nisi per intellectum
esse
producentem."

JOHN F. WIPPEL
320
comments
also
Thomas
so that
sense
are
is taken
truth
that when
proprie)
for each.
as
thing's
are
things
are
there
true
Thomas
being.)
named
true
not
from
is taken
intellects
(im
broadly
his
sense
strict
there
truth
is only one
is identified
from
form.
the health
But
truth which
present
when
intellect,
just
in an animal,
are said to be
they
to them, just as food is said to be healthy
that is intrinsic
with
things
in the things
themselves
are so named
from a form
is present
or improprie),
truth
that
by observing
the truth which
is
reply
from
intellect or in the human
to be healthy
an inherent
true by reason
of the
taken broadly
(truth
such
concludes
in the
present either in the divine

is said
but
entities;
because
is so, of course,
(This
the
and
in different
so that all things may be said to be true, there are still as
truths
as food
strict
in secondary
only
for the many
true things
things
(proprie)
truths
there are many
fashion,
(of intellect)
are
truths
which
there
also
and
many
exist,
one
same
truth
But when
for
and the
thing.
many
in the
to be true
said
from a
it to be so described.50
in it which
enables
present
quality
are true in the broad
sense by reason
In saying
of
that things
a form
to them, Thomas
in mind
has
their entity
that
is intrinsic
as adequated
to the divine
to make
intellect
and their
capacity
we
to human
intellects.
known
it
themselves
may
Again,
ask, does
follow from this that truth of being is intrinsically

No,
Thomas
cording
to
if we
would
reply,
its proper
definition.
take
or ac
strictly
(proprie)
if we take
he would
answer,
Yes,
truth broadly and improperly so as to identify

the
For
thing which
confirmation
has
of
present to them?
truth
it with
the being of
to be understood
the capacity
by some intellect.
turn to his reply
to the first ar
this we may
50
De veritate, p. 14. Thomas has also just noted that truth is present
in a thing by reason of its relationship
to the divine
intellect
in prior
to its presence
fashion
in a thing by reason of its relationship
to a human
intellect.
Therefore
the thing is said to be true more so (principalius)
by
reason of its relationship
to the truth of the divine
intellect
than to the
truth of the human
intellect.
Note
". . . si autem accipiatur
especially:
veritas
dicta secundum
vera, sic sunt
quam omnia dicuntur
improprie
plurium
verorum
plures
veritates,
sed
unius
veri
tantum
una
veritas.
De
nominantur
autem res verae a veritate
divino vel in
quae est in intellectu
intellectu
humano
sicut denominatur
cibus sanus a sanitate
quae est in
et non sicut a forma inhaerente;
animali
sed a veritate
quae est in ipsa re,
intellectui
vel intellectum
sibi
quae nihil aliud est quam entitas
adaequata
sicut a forma inhaerente,
sicut cibus denominatur
denominatur
adaequans,
sanus
a qualitate
sua,
a qua
sanus
dicitur."

321

for
gument
intellect
is a certain
truth
While
agreement
contrary.
sense
in
the
strict
not
it
is
present
(proprie)
thing,
and
is
strictly
(proprie)
the
divine
intellect.51
by
truth
for the contrary,
argument
are
which
of
the
said
exemplated
things
taken
second
proprie)
tra gentiles
are confirmed
I, c. 60, Thomas
he
arguments
These
(proprie) and when

later
by
in Summa
I and
I, c. 60.
gentiles
taken strictly
truth when
treatments
views
in Thomas's
I. In Summa
theologiae
to show that God
is truth.
attempts
when
that
acknowledges
true
the
concerning
taken broadly
to Aristotle's
contra
gentiles
In one of his
is taken
a thing
tinues,
a proper
way
6.4, for support.

Metaphysics
said to be true insofar
is sometimes
act
the
(proprie)
Avicenna's
by
confirmed
its own
of
as
as
strictly
Again he
Even
nature.
of truth
(im
con
Summa
it does not exist in things but in the intellect.
(proprie),
turns
contra
3: Summa
Text
in
to the
As he puts this in replying
both, but only in the intellect.

not
of
the
con
so, he
it achieves
This
in
usage
"the
is
char
proper
description
has been es
of each and every
thing which
(proprietas)
to a thing insofar
this applies
for it." As Thomas
tablished
explains,
a true awareness
in an
as it is naturally
to produce
of itself
suited
acteristic
intellect and insofar as it imitates its proper idea (ratio) in the divine
But
mind.
we
speak
Text
U: Summa
is in the
of the
intellect
his
essence.
again
intellect
intellect
so as
as
insofar
The
the
notion
to be applied
Therefore,
of a thing, God
or truth
I, qu. 16.
theologiae
that
the
terminus
argues
is understood.
which
with
is identical
of truth
Thomas
the
God
In article
(ratio)
to the
1 of this
of knowledge?the
is conformed
intellect
of truth
thing
of this, the thing itself is said to be true.
whether
is truth.52
question
true?
to a thing
from
is transferred
Because
understood.
But a thing is true only
51
in the text cited in the previous note to the effect
Note his comment
is in a thing is nothing other than that thing's entity
that the truth which
as adequated
intellect
to (the divine)
intellect or as adequating
(a) human
see p. 15.
for the contrary
to itself.
For the replies to the arguments
52
see note
Ed. Leonina Manualis
(Rome, 1934), p. 56. For Aristotle
see note 34. From Thomas's
text note: "res tarnen
5 above.
For Avicenna
vera dicitur,
actum propriae
naturae
interdum
secundum
quod proprie
as follows: ". . . inquan
definition
He explains Avicenna's
consequitur."
tum
talis
propriam
res
nata
est
sui rationem
de
se
quae
facer?
est
veram
in mente
aestimationem,
divina,
imitatur."

et
inquantum
JOHN F. WIPPEL
322
insofar
as
related
to an
to an
way
per se or per
in some
it is related
intellect
either
per se to that intellect on which
it can
and
intellect,
accidens.
It
it depends for its being.
be
is related
It is related
our
it can be known.
intellect
But
by which
on
a
not
to
is
based
what
it
per ac
thing
pertains
judgment
to it per se.
is
cidens
but on what
every
belongs
Therefore,
thing
sense by reason
to
of its ordering
said to be true in the unqualified
per
to an
accidens
about
on which
are said to be
it depends.
Thus
artifacts
our
reason
to
A
statement
is
intellect.
of
their
relationship
by
as it is a sign of truth
in the intellect.
Natural
true insofar
things
are true insofar as they attain
to a likeness
of their forms
(specierum)
that
intellect
true
in the divine
the
intellect,
remarks
but
thing
intellect
in replying
rather
existence
fashion
in
of their
by reason
But, as Thomas
fashion
principle.
to the third objection,
its very
in primary
truth exists
in secondary
as to their
in things
to an
relationship
Hence
intellect.
and
it is not the truth of a

causes
(esse) which
truth
in our
intellect.53
Thomas
to article
draws
6.
There
this
upon
he
same
in framing
his reply
reasoning
whether
there
is
again
only one
true.
in a certain
He
that
replies
once
asks
are
all things
by which
there
is only one such truth,
is predicated
univocally
something
truth
sense
in question
meaning
ferent
in each
is present
But when
(ratio).
things,
it is present
and
of different
of these
something
according
in a certain
sense
things,
not.
When
the perfection
to its proper
things
according
is said analogically
of dif
to its proper
in only
meaning
53
Art.
Summa
theologiae, Prima Pars
(Turin-Rome,
1950), pp. 93-94.
1 is entitled: "Utrum veritas sit tantum in intellectu."
Note from Thomas's
intellecta
ad intellectum
discussion:
"Res autem
potest habere
aliquem
Per se quidem habet ordinem
ordinem
vel per se, vel per accidens.
ad
suum esse; per accidens
a quo dependet
autem ad
secundum
intellectum
. . Iudicium autem de re non sumitur
a quo cognoscibilis
est..
intellectum
sed secundum
id quod inest ei per
id quod inest ei per accidens,
secundum
res dicitur vera absolute,
se. Unde
secundum
ordinem
ad
unaquaeque
. . . Sic ergo veritas
a quo dependet.
est in in
intellectum
principaliter
vero in rebus, secundum
secundario
ad intel
quod comparantur
tellectu;
esse
See from the reply to obj. 3: "Et similiter
lectum ut ad principium."
intellectus"
The point of
eius, caus?t veritatem
(p. 94).
rei, non veritas
this remark seems to be that if a thing is to be regarded as true only insofar
as it is related
to the divine
to some intellect,
and first and foremost
in
This
it can cause truth in our intellect by reason of its very esse.
tellect,
in In I Sent, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, that
view as expressed
squares with Thomas's
in reality,
truth in the intellect has a foundation
i.e., in a thing's esse.

323

one
of
name.
of an
them.
It
Again
he
animal,
is present
health
is from
this
the
that
receive
itself
are
said
is not
in primary fashion
truth is in the intellect

only in secondary
If we
intellect.
fashion
the
same
intellect
of truth
speak
primary
truth,
as
cundum
to which
each
theologiae, p.
aliquid praedicatur
rationem
propriam
Sed quando aliquid
propriam
as they
it exists
there
to be healthy.
If
or in urine,
some
of which
(see
and in things
to the divine
ordered
in the
intellect
are many
is likened
and
truths
there
in many
in one and
But
if we
by the one
to its own being.55
97. Note especially:

". . . sciendum
est quod,
eorum se
univoce de multis,
illud in quolibet
in qualibet
sicut animal
invenitur,
specie ani
se
dicitur analogice
de multis,
illud invenitur
in uno
rationem
according
one
1) that
article
(perprius)
are
the
truths may be present

Indeed, many
as it knows
insofar
different
things.
are true
in things,
all things
it exists
54
Summa
quando
cundum
malis.
insofar
speak of truth as
to its proper meaning,
fore according
different
intellects.
common
is said
"Healthy"
not
is
to say that
in an animal;
but it is from
in the medicine
really present
in
each
them
of
else
is present
by reason
thing
is a sign of health.54
and the other
produces
now recalls
Thomas
that he has explained
health
the
to the example
of health.
and of medicine.
This
turns
of urine,
else except
anywhere
of the animal
that the others
the health
others
eorum
tantum,
a quo
alia
denominantur.
non quod sanitas

et urina et medicina,
Sicut sanum dicitur de animali
sit
nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur
medicina
sana,
et urina, inquantum
est illius sanitatis
est illius san
effectiva,
inquantum
For an interesting
of this text, and for
itatis significativa."
discussion
criticism
of Cajetan's
that whenever
the ratio propria
is present
reading
in only the primary
all other applications
of a corresponding
referent,
common name must be extrinsic,
see Ralph Mclnerny,
The Logic of Analogy.
An Interpretation
of St. Thomas
(The Hague: M. Nijhoff,
1961), 18-23, 30.
a reading
As Mclnerny
such as Cajetan's
will be hard pressed
indicates,
to distinguish
terms from metaphors
Note
analogous
(see pp. 22,144-52).
on p. 147: "What distinguishes
name
comment
the analogous
Mclnerny's
is this: those things which do not verify the proper notion
from metaphor
name are nonetheless
if less so, signified
of the common
properly,
by it
it can properly
and consequently
This seems close to,
suppose for them."
I have defended
the position
above,
i.e., that
though not identical with,
in things improprie,
when Thomas
he does not
says that truth is present
mean
in them in purely extrinsic
fashion and metaphor
that it is present
of Mclnerny's
For additional
development
ically said of them.
position
see his Studies
in Analogy
1968), ch. 2 ("Metaphor
(The Hague: M. Nijhoff,
and Analogy").
55
in particular:
Summa
"Si vero loquamur de
theologiae, p. 97. Note
veritate
ritate,
secundum
quod
cui unumquodque
est
in
rebus,
assimilatur
sic
omnes
secundum
sunt
suam
verae
una
entitatem."

prima
ve
324
JOHN F. WIPPEL
In sum,
Thomas's
continues
therefore,
position
in primary
and proper
fashion
in the
as they bear some relationship
insofar
is realized
things
only
to his
According
when we
take
later
the
truth
texts,
term
"truth"
we apply
that
things
only when
the presence
in things,
of truth
some
to an intellect
relationship
is said
in the
If the thing is understood

intellect
(improprie)
to such
applies
to be present
in the
sense
strict
(proprie),
intellect
in
and
As
for
as
in terms of its relationship
as
its measure,
a thing per se.
truth
If we
taken
consider
to
broadly
such a
thing in terms of its ability to be known by created intellects,

taken
in
intellect.
broadly
(improprie).
to them only
it applies
insofar
is included
in our understanding
the divine
serves
intellect,
to an
truth
and
term
of them.
which
to be that
truth
to
does apply
broadly
(improprie)
it, but only per accidens.
case truth taken as adequation
adds to such a thing or entity
a relationship
to intellect.
of a being
to a created
The relationship
In each
intellect
and
does
has
been
any
real
addition
is a relation
criticized
to the
being
in question
of reason.56
for
this
last-mentioned
holding
as
to
insofar
it is true is only
assigned
being
of reason,
ex
is this not to make
truth of being
purely
In De veritate,
art.
does state
that the
qu. 21,
1, Thomas
If the
relation
added
either
trinsic?57
relation
entail
to Thomas
according
Thomas
point.
a relation
not
a relation
can only be
to being
by truth or by goodness
But in justifying
his additional
claim that the
of reason.
56
See De veritate,
asks whether
q. 21, a. 1, where Thomas
explicitly
to being.
the good adds something
After distinguishing
different ways
in
which
on the third
may add to something
something
else, he concentrates
of these?one
in the order of reason alone, so
thing may add to another
is included in the notion (ratio) of one which
that something
is not included
in the ratio of the other.
The good cannot add anything
to being so as to
or restrict
contract
it to a given class.
Therefore
it can only add to it
that
to the order of reason.
While
the one adds a
something
pertains
to being, the true and the good are said of being pos
of division
negation
Therefore
of reason: ". . . unde non
itively.
they can only add a relation
addere
nisi
relationem
sit
rationis
tantum"
quae
possunt
(De veritate,
Leonine
ed.,
vol.
22.3,
p.
593).
57
For a good statement
see Aertsen, Medieval
of this objection
Re
on Truth, 10-11.
Aertsen
attributes
this weakness
in Thomas's
flections
to his restricted
of relation.
explanation
understanding
Accordingly,
Thomas
cannot appeal to a real relation
in this case because he views every
as falling within
real relation
the category
of relation,
as
and therefore
an accident which
inheres in a substance.
Aertsen
laments
the fact that
on the transcendentals,
in his doctrine
has not taken into account
Thomas
of a real transcendental
the possibility
relation.

325

some
he offers
is nonmutual,
the being
relationship,
relation
In such a
precisions.
not really depend
upon
to
does not hold.
That
helpful
does
is related
which
but the converse

it is related;
in the case of truth?does
is related?the
intellect
the being
in question.
in some way upon the being
Thomas
illustrates
depend
to the relationship
and
between
science
this by appealing
(scientia)
to which
that
which
an object of scientific knowledge

the
upon
object,
of science
relation
the
object
to the
is only a relation
in all cases where
science
tinues,
fected.
Therefore
the
being
it is true
and what
measures
or perfects,
but
of
that
same
science depends
the
science.
the
to the
object
con
Thomas
holds,
as measure
and
of perfecting.58
as perfecting
text we may
this
as
The
and
that which
that
is per
are really
is perfected
related
the converse
does not obtain.
the true and the good add to the intelligible

relation
is viewed
From
is real;
object
of reason.
The
is measured
What
to that which
upon
depend
are related
things
or as that which
perfects
is measured,
which
(scibile). While
not
does
In other
content of
as
insofar
being
words,
intellect.
the
that
conclude
for Thomas
is only conceptually
related
to it.
If
that
related
intellect
is
while
really
it,
we were
that the relation
to stop here, we might
added
agree
by
we
relation
of
and
is only conceptual
truth to being
reason),
might
(a
as intrinsic
to being.
is no longer
fear that truth of being
regarded
insofar
thing
which
understands
if we
But
between
tween
mension
as
it is true
a being
or a
to the intellect
true
that
what
in mind
bear
which
measures
that which
and
and
perfects
Thomas
is introduced.
insofar
as
it is related
esse.
has
Thomas
that
holds
to the divine
as we
about
the
relation
or be
is measured,
is perfected,
another
di
a
that
is regarded
being
which
that which
also
said
intellect
seen
upon
which
it
from
have
other
for its very
texts,
This,
depends
to that which measures.
is measured
of that which
is a relationship
even
is a real relation,
this, we have now learned,
runs from a measure
is measured
to that which
which
And
ceptual.
Therefore
we
should
conclude
that when
we
though
is only
consider
that
con
truth
58
"scientia
De veritate, Leonine
ed., vol. 22.3., p. 593. Note especially:
a scibili sed non e converso.
relatio qua scientia
Unde
enim dependet
refertur ad scibile est realis, relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam
...
ut
est rationis
tantum.
alus quae se habent
Et ita est in omnibus
mensura
et perfectibile.
et mensuratum,
vel perfectivum
igitur
Oportet
entis addant respectum
perfectivi."
quod verum et bonum super intellectum

JOHN F. WIPPEL
326
to the divine
of a being's
relation
and
intellect
so
to
is
related
the
intellect.
viewed
divine
measure,
really
being
from that perspective,
of
when
viewed
entails
truth
being,
Therefore,
con
a real relation
not one that
to its divine measure,
is merely
of being
in terms
ceptual.59
(To be continued)
The Catholic University
of America
59
To this one might
object, what of the text cited from De veritate, q.
to that passage,
because
21, a. 1, at the end of note 56 above?
According
in positive
the true and the good are said (of being)
fashion,
they can only
answer
is of reason.
The simplest
is that there
add a relation which
to the relationship
himself
between
truth and any
Thomas
is restricting
on in that same article he comments:
A little farther
created
intellect.
ut philosophus
et
"verum enim est in mente
dicit in VI.
Metaphysicae,
ens in tantum dicitur verum
est conformatum
in quantum
unumquodque
verum ponunt
et ideo omnes recte definientes
vel conformabile
intellectui;
to
While
Thomas's
in eius definitione
intellectum."
focus here continues
to the nonmutual
be on truth of the intellect, his references
relations
be
tween a thing measured
and that which measures
have invited us to apply
a created thing and the divine
intellect.
this to the relation between


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Truth in Thomas Aquinas

Author(s): John F. Wippel

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TRUTH INTHOMAS AQUINAS*

truth") along with truth

of being (what might

This is the first part of a two-part

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is to be identified with the essence of a thing.3 In developing his

One type enjoys

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TRUTH INTHOMAS AQUINAS

if truth has a foundation

physics 6 to the effect that while

truth and falsity exist in the soul,

goes beyond Aristotle,

He adds that it is only through the operation of the intellect which

thing that the relation of adequation

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is said of the thing

they are naturally

Both kinds of truth?truth

of the intellect and truth of a thing?

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TRUTH INTHOMAS AQUINAS

truth in the fullest and most perfect

truth in the intellect.

that thing as it is in itself.

(1) if, as Aquinas

selves or only in the intellect?

(2) Is truth regarded by Thomas as

in any way at all?

(5) If truth in the

sense has a foundation

how does he fit them together?

from the standpoint

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I (ca. 1259), and Summa

1. Truth in the Intellect and Truth of Being

but only by extrinsic

to another definition, apparently that offered by Philip the Chan

Friar Thomas dAquino,

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TRUTH INTHOMAS AQUINAS

it is said of that which

is. And the same may be said of truth when

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shift its focus to truth of the in

truth and being.

But this might

if things differ either

reply to the second objection

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TRUTH INTHOMAS AQUINAS

are to be traced back to God as first efficient and first exemplar

in its own light by which

it judges correctly, a light which

. . . Unde etiam patet quod ens est prima conceptio

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things in which truth is present just as health is

its sign, and so forth.

in the same mean

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TRUTH INTHOMAS AQUINAS