North American Philosophical Publications

Are There Nonexistent Objects?

Author(s): Terence Parsons
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 1982), pp. 365-371
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American

Philosophical

Paper

Quarterly

presented

at

the

56th Annual

Meeting

of

the

Philosophical Association, Pacific Division,

Sacramento, California, March 25-27, 1982

American

1982

Volume 19,Number 4, October

VIII. ARE THERE NONEXISTENT

OBJECTS?

TERENCE PARSONS
tion of this paper is devoted to an explanation
of
this point.
I want to begin by examining a typical dialogue
of the sort that makes
it appear that "there are"

question that I have been asked to address

The
"Are there nonexistent
objects?"1
that I will give is "Yes." I cannot hope to

THE

is
answer

any certainty that this is the correct

I will try to say what the best
However,
evidence is in its favor, and Iwill try to answer the
establish

with

and "there exist" are synonymous.

answer.

to

chief

objections
discussed elsewhere.2
The
things

evidence

this

that

view

I have

is that this is entailed

or

presupposed
by things that we believe and that we
have good evidence
for. I will give examples
below. The two main sorts of objection
that I will
to the effect that the
discuss here are (1) objections
things

that we

believe

do not

in fact

entail

only

This
The

that we use in ordinary

language. By
"some F," or "an F," or "at least one F" we
"some existing F," "an ex?
usually communicate
or
one existing F." And one
least
"at
isting F,"
natural
of
this is that the word
explanation
so that these pairs
"exists" is logically redundant,
of phrases are all synonyms. However,
that is not
tifier words

using

"There Are" Mean

"There Exists?"

One of the most

typical respnses to the claim:
"There are things that do not exist" is that this can?
not possibly
be true; it cannot possibly
be true
it is inconsistent,
and it is inconsistent
because "there are" just means "there exist." And
so the claim: "There are things that do not exist"
just means "There exist things that do not exist,"

the only

Let me apparently change

and focus on a couple

would

the very
otherwise communicate

and

it is a wrong

the subject for a mo?

of other dialogues:

C: Did you put out a fork with each plate?

D: Each plate? Heavens no! There must be millions
of plates just here in California alone. I'm not Super?

we make
state?
we
"there are"
very often
same information
that we

the words

explanation,

ment

and this is clearly inconsistent.

I acknowledge
Now
that when
ments

possible

one.

because

using
communicate

passage.3

is a bad joke, but it illustrates a good point.

joke only works because in his first statement

Meinong's
writings, and he does this not by saying
"there exists" but merely by saying "there is." And
this is typical, I think, of virtually all of the quan?

of the latter sort.

I. Does

a nonexistent

the information
that
Speaker A communicates
there is an existent passage of a certain sort in

or

that there are nonexistents,

and (2) ob?
presuppose
to
the
effect
the evidence,
that, whatever
jections
the conclusion
that there are nonexistents
could
not possibly be true. Iwill begin with an objection

it is:

Speaker A: There is a passage in one of Meinong's

works in which he gives up the belief in nonexistent
objects.
Speaker B: Oh no, that seriously undermines a paper
that Fm writing.
Speaker A: Oh I wouldn't worry if I were you; it's

not

in favor of the view that there are

that do not exist

Here

man,

you

know.

E: At least two heifers and three steers have the initial

symptoms of hoof and mouth disease.
F: Well, have you called the vet?
E: What for? Ours are OK. I was talking about ones
in China.

by using the words

exist." But this is not because
the two
are
and
it
not
does
show
synonymous,
phrases
that there could not be things that do not exist. In
of our use of
fact, a proper
understanding
language suggests just the opposite. The first sec
"there

I think that these dialogues

illustrate the very same
that is operative
in the first
linguistic phenomenon
one. Speaker C clearly communicates
to D a ques
365

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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

366

tion regarding the plates that are then in use by

them: by using the word "plate" he "meant" "plate
that he
in use
and D's
pretense
by us,"
this is only a bad joke. But this is
misunderstood
not because the phrases "plate" and "plate in use
they are not. In fact, if
by us" are synonymous;
were
D
could not make the joke
synonymous,
they
E's use of the phrase "two heifers"
communicates
the notion "two of our heifers," but
The ex?
not because the phrases are synonymous.
at all. Likewise

is rather

planation
interchanges

In ordinary
range of things

this.

a limited

linguistic
are under

and both speaker and hearer take the

discussion,
common
nouns
that they use to be implicitly
to these
such an
restricted
things.4 Without
be

would

communication

assumption

extremely

if not

difficult,
Now what

impossible.
about "there are" and "there exist"?
the same informa?
Do these often communicate
or because
tion because
they are synonymous,

to peculiar
statements.
In?
responses
appropriate
stead, it is the responses that are peculiar and the
Not only is
initial statements that are appropriate.
in such contexts,
the equivalence missing
but or?
a
without
modern
dinary people
philosophical
don't even get the joke when
shown
education
such dialogues.
to show that there are at
I take such dialogues
in
least some perfectly ordinary everyday contexts
speakers assume that at least some of the
do not exist. This does not
things under discussion
by itslf establish that there are things that do not

which

exist, but it does show that "there are" and similar

with phrases such as
phrases are not synonymous
"there exist," and it shows that the claim "There
are things that do not exist" is a substantive
claim
that cannot
of verbal

in this story
G: One of the detectives
Sherlock Holmes)
has
inspired more
criminology

than

real

any

tives

in that

and

exist,

story

has.

detective

H: You must be pulling my

leg. None
so

(namely,
amateur

there

of the detec?

aren't

any

such

things. So none of "them" could possibly have in?

spired anything.
I: It's very strange; that unicorn that I dreamed about
last

night

bore

very

strong

resemblance

to my

psychiatrist.

J: I guess you need more

you

know

that

there

aren't

than a psychiatrist;
any

don't

unicorns?

K: Meinong thought that some things don't exist.

L: How peculiar; how could anyone think that some
things that exist don't exist. Are you sure that the
poor fellow hasn't been mistranslated?5
awful jokes depends on
these perfectly
that in the context in question a word
supposing
If this
"some existing."
such as "some" means

Each

of

equivalence were correct,

be jokes at all, but would

the dialogues would not

rather contain perfectly

dismissed

on ground

inconsistency.

II. When

in which
it is
in contexts
they are often used
that it is only existing things that are
understood
under discussion?
The answer will be clear if these
in contexts
in which
phrases function differently
are three
no such assumption
Here
is made.
that presuppose
such contexts:
dialogues

be automatically

Does Our Use of a Term Commit

Us to a Referent?

is an important difference
to a thing that does not exist,
to refer. We succeed in
and (ii) failing altogether
a
not exist when we use
to
that
does
thing
referring
or the description
the name "Sherlock Holmes"
in the Conan Doyle novels."
"the chief detective
I believe

between

that

there

(i) referring

fail to refer at all when

such as "the chief detective

We

we use a description
in Alice
in Wonder?

land.99

logic is sometimes explained as the study of

terms which
fail to refer to existing
"singular
am
If
I
free
logic is a study of two
right,
things."
Free

kinds of singular
quite different
terms which fail to refer to existing
because they fail to refer altogether;
"the
chief

terms.

Some
so

things do

examples are
and "the
of France"

existing present king

in Alice
in Wonderland.99
detective

Other

terms fail to refer to existing things because they

succeed in referring to things that do not exist; ex?
are "Sherlock
and "the chief
Holmes"
amples
in
Scarlet.99 These terms
detective of The Woman
behave
referring

that succeed in
ways. Those
to nonexistent
things may appear in con

in different

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ARE THERE NONEXISTENT OBJECTS?

=
Jupiter,"
tingently true identities (e.g., "Zeus
=
of the
the chief detective
"Sherlock Holmes
true
in
Conan Doyle novels"),
they may appear
is
sentences (e.g., "Pegasus
atomic (nonnegative)
are
to
normal
and
logical
subject
they
winged"),
laws such as universal
(e.g., from
specification
"All fictional detectives are cultural artifacts" and
is a fictional detective" we may
"Sherlock Holmes
is a cultural artifact").
that fail entirely to refer to none of the
Terms
above. I suspect that many
(though certainly not
in free logic are
of
the
controversies
ongoing
all)
a
to
of
this
because
failure
appreciate
ongoing
infer

"Sherlock

Holmes

distinction.
So far I have been making
can we
them. How
porting

claims without

sup?

tell which

singular
I think that this is
into two questions:
best divided
(1) How can we
tell which
of the claims
that we make
using
singular terms are true?, and (2) How can we tell
terms refer and which

of

which

the

true

do not?

claims

that we make

using
referents

singular terms commit us to there being

for such terms? The first question
is a very general
one; I will return to it in the last section. In this
section
which

and the next

uses of which

I will discuss

the question of
terms commit us to

singular
those terms having referents. To give you an idea
of where I am heading, my intuitions on this mat?
ter are that:

(1) If I say "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective"

then I am commited to their being a referent for
"Sherlock

Homes."

(2) If I say "The detective in that story does not exist"

then

Imay

or may

not

be

committed

to a referent

for

"the detective in that story." I might be attributing

nonexistence to a certain fictional detective, in which
case I would be so committed; on the other hand I
might instead be denying the proposition that such
and such a detective does exist, inwhich case Iwould
not be so committed. (In short, I agree with Russell
that such sentences have the two interpretations that
he would attribute to the description's having either
primary

or

secondary

occurrence.)

(3) If I say "The average American male has 1.37

children" then I am not committed to a referent for
"the

One

average

reason

historically

American

male."

for dwelling on such examples

is that
a belief in nonexistent
has
been
objects

linked with

367

the view

that "every grammatically

stands for an object,"
phrase
denoting
where denoting phrases are identified not by their
use or meaning
but solely in terms of their gram?
matical
form.6 Such a view puts "the average man"
on a par with both "Sherlock Holmes"
and "the
correct

inAlice

detective

in Wonderland,99

and fails to do

and the like. It also

justice to scope ambiguities
as Russell pointed out.7 We
leads to inconsistency,
need a more sophisticated
view than this, and one
can be articulated
that hopefully
and tested in a
to
that
way
appeals
ordinary
nonphilosophical
evidence.
is going to sound disappointingly
I propose
that a use of a sentence
a grammatically
correct singular term

My proposal
old-fashioned.

involving
commits the user to a referent
case
it commits
the user
of the original

generalization
a sentence

of

of

to a referent
to a sentence

the

form

"...i..."

commits

user

the

for 7' just in case it commits

its user
of the form "There is something such

...it..." Now

that

for that term just in

to the existential
claim. That is, a use

tests of this sort are often

to be appropriate
if applied
been paraphrased
already

to sentences
into

taken

that have

some

kind

of

idiom. This is not what I am suggesting.

canonical
I am suggesting that the test be applied to real live
uses of English sentences. The advantage of this is
that the test depends mostly on what people mean
they speak in ordinary
language about or?
of
and is relatively
dinary matters,
independent
The disadvantage
philosophical
presuppositions.

when

is

that

somewhat
insist on
seemingly
judgments.)
the test:

sentences
are often
in question
stilted, and this affects our judgment.
(I
the test being exactly applied because
can
our
trivial
alter
rewordings

the

Here

are what

I take to be results of

(1) A normal use of "My birthday present arrived

yesterday"

does

commit

one

to

"There

is something

such that it arrived yesterday."

(2) A normal use of "The average American male has
1.37 children" does not commit one to "Something is
such that it has 1.37 children."
(3) A normal use of "The king of France is not bald"
may or may not commit one to "Something is such
that it is not bald" depending on how it is intended: as

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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

368
a statement

about

the king

or as a rejection

of France,

of the claim that the king of France is bald.

(4) A

use

normal

of

cats"

is not

(which

even

four

has

"Agatha

commit one to "Something

cats"

does

is such that Agatha

not

has it

grammatical).

"Systematically
Expressions."9
Misleading
to Ryle, anyone who agrees with the
According
of the preceeding
considerations
section has been
are
mislead
certain
which
by
expressions

(5) A normal use of "Five plus seven equals twelve"

does commit one to "Something is such that it plus

systematically
are
question

seven

because

twelve."8

equals

(6) A normal use of "Sherlock Holmes is the chief

detective in the Conan Doyle novels" commits one to
"Something is such that it is the chief detective in the
Conan

novels."

Doyle

(7) A normal use of "The unicorn I dreamed about

last night reminds me of my psychiatrist" commits one
to "Something is such that it reminds me of my
(I am not sure whether or not "He only stayed for
sake" commits one to "Something
is such
Agatha's
that he only
commitment.

stayed for it." I think there is no such

On the other hand there is a ten?

dency to read the sentence as if it were similar to

"He only stayed for Agatha's
where
well-being,"
seems to be present.)
the commitment

The

in

expressions

or

which,
descriptions
of their grammatical
similarity to names
and descriptions which have referents,
lead us into
or
too
that
to have,
have,
they
purport
thinking
referents. But in fact they are not the sort of ex?
even purport to refer. To take a
uncontroversial
because of
illustration,

which

pressions

relatively
the grammatical

similarities between "the average

one
"the president
of the U.S."
think that the former, like the latter, is an
might
expression which purports to refer to a unique ob?
ject. In fact it does not purport to refer at all; it
has a quite different
role in sentences
in which
it
occurs. Ryle does not tell us what this latter role is,
and

American"

psychiatrist."

misleading.
all names

I think

but

that
Now

nonetheless.

include our above

one

can appreciate
his point
it is clear that Ryle would also
uses of "Sherlock Holmes"
and

of "the unicorn

III. Systematically

Expressions

Misleading

a test for telling

I proposed
us to there
terms
commit
singular

In the last section

which

uses of

for those terms. Supposing

that
being referents
test to be a good one, the situation is this. There
are some claims that we are inclined to make and
that we think we have good reason to make. When
we make these claims, we use language in such a
way

as to commit

to our singular

ourselves

terms

some
understood,
having referents. As commonly
of these terms refer to nonexistent
things (if they
refer at all). Assuming
the test to be a good one,
the good
we make

evidence
turns out

that we have

for the claims

to be evidence

that

for there being

things that do not exist.

to a popular
Now according

tradi?
philosophical
tion, to accept a test of the sort given in the last
to a naive
section
is to fall victim
view of
a
view
whose
have
been
known
language,
dangers
for decades.
naive

view

One

of

the classic

is to be found

expos?s of this
in Gilbert Ryle's essay,

I dreamed about last night" in the

same category as "the average American;"
we are
in even thinking that such terms purport
mistaken
to refer, let alone in thinking that they succeed in
doing so. This is what Ryle says, but is he right? I
will devote
to a
the remainder
of this section
of this question.
discussion
are two tests to be found
There
in Ryle's
or
us
to
not
an ex?
that
allow
tell
whether
writings
in a systematically
used
being
I think
that both
tests are
way.
misleading
somewhat plausible, but that neither of them casts
I have drawn.
serious doubt on the conclusions
pression

is

Regarding

the first test, here

are we

How

to discover

is what

in particular

Ryle

says:

cases

whether

an expression is systematically misleading or not? I

suspect that the answer to this will be of this sort. We
meet with and understand and even believe a certain
expression such as "Mr. Pickwick is a fictitious per?
son" and "the Equator encircles the globe." And we
know that if these expressions are saying what they
seem
follow.

to

be

But

saying,
it turns

certain
out

that

other

propositions

the naturally

will

consequen?

tial propositions "Mr. Pickwick was born in such and

such a year" and "the Equator is of such and such a

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ARE THERE NONEXISTENT OBJECTS?

thickness" are not merely false but, on analysis, in
contradiction with something in that from which they
seemed to be logical consequences. The only solution
is to see that being a fictitious person is not to be a
person

of

a certain

sort...10

Has Ryle said anything here that would cast doubt

on the view that "Mr. Pickwick"
succeeds in refer?
a
to
That
nonexistent
may depend on
ring
thing?
about what fictional ob?
assumptions
are
most
like. The
natural view is that such
jects
things are pretty much the way we conceive them
to be when we read the stories in which
they
so that Mr. Pickwick would actually be
originate,
additional

a (nonexistent)
person who actually took part in
certain
Another
view,
escapades.
possible
a
not
is
that
is
Mr.
Pickwick
however,
person at
attri?
all, but ismerely a thing that has personhood
to
it
in
On
certain stories.11
this latter view,
buted
Ryle has said nothing at all that would cast doubt

This

that
principle
sional contexts

Probably Ryle intended to attack what I have

called the more natural view, the view according
to which
have
fictional
the
objects
actually
are
sorts
of
that
ordinary
properties
they
in their stories.12 But even here
on this view
I think his argument
fails. Granted,
Mr. Pickwick
actually has the property of being a
person, as Ryle suggests, and even has the pro?
understood

to have

for these
perty of "having been born sometime,"
are both properties
to have
that he is understood
in the story. But Ryle is wrong
to think that it
from this that there is some particualr time
such that Mr. Pickwick has the property of having
been born then. This does not follow on the view
follows

in question,
for the story does not specify a time at
which Mr. Pickwick was born, nor does it follow
on general logical principles. The form of the in?
ference in question
is this:
From: x has the property of there being a time at
which he was born,
Infer: there is a time, t, such that x has the property
of having been born at t.

depends on a property abstraction

to fail when nonexten
is known
are concerned,
to
and according

it also fails in many

over nonexistent
quantification
a
has
taken
things. Ryle
principle of limited val?
a
to
in which
it does
and
it
domain
idity
applied
not hold.13
to Ryle's
Let me turn briefly
second test for
This is not
systematically misleading
expressions.
the view under
cases involving

discussion,

a test that he ever articulates,

but it is one that he
a
a
in which he
Here
bit.
is
passage
quite
to
the phrase "the idea of taking a
applies the test

uses

holiday":
.. .the statement "the idea of taking a holiday has
to be
just occured to me" seems grammatically
analogous

to "that

dog

has

just

bitten

me."...But

the

appearance is a delusion. For while I could not restate

my

complaint

against

the dog

in any

sentence

not

con?

taining a descriptive phrase referring to it, I can easily

do so with the statement about "the idea of taking a
holiday," e.g., in the statement "I have just been
thinking that Imight take a holiday."14

on there being aMr. Pickwick.

For this latter view
agrees with Ryle in holding that fictional persons
are not persons of a certain sort. It disagrees with
that there are fictional persons,
Ryle in holding
but Ryle's argument has not touched this point.

inference

369

seems to be that if a sentence containg a

can be paraphrased
description
by one
name or definite descrip?
without a corresponding
tion, then we should not treat the original definite
as a referring expression.
description
The claim
definite

to apply
when Ryle attempts
Unfortunately,
this test to the sentence "Mr. Pickwick
is a fiction"
the test
fails. Ryle
two different
attempts
The first one is "some subject of
paraphrases.
attributes
has
the attributes
of being
called
and being a coiner of false propositions
Dickens
and pseudo-proper
names."15 This clearly fails as a
since
paraphrase
Dickens'
characters

it fails

to

is being

of
specify which
identified as fictional.

The

second attempted paraphrase

is "some subject
has the attribute of being a book or a
sentence which could only be true or false (/"some?

of attributes

one was called

'Mr. Pickwick'."16 This iswrong for

a chief one being that it does not

reasons,
link with fiction.
do
Ryle's paraphrases
not work, and no one has been able to improve on

many
make

any

them in the last fifty years. Perhaps

is not systematically

"Mr. Pickwick"
all.

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that is because
misleading

at

370
IV. Are

There

Really

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Nonexistent

Things?

play reporting of immediate exerience. The entities

under this scheme?the
values of bound variables
?

No

doubt

will

agree with
philosophers
so
I
as it is
have
said
insofar
far,
everything
as a contribution
to "descriptive
meta?

almost
taken
physics."

many

They will
suggest
the everyday beliefs

that

I have

But

I have

failed

been

things.
naive point of view and address
is whether
which
there actually
tent things.
Probably
this point.

to challenge
this
the real question,
are any nonexis?

little of substance

very

now

can be said at

we

have learned that if we

By
begin by rejecting all of our ordinary beliefs, then
no conclusions
if we reject
follow at all, whereas
our
are deter?
of
then
conclusions
them,
only part
we
mined
have arbitrarily
chosen to
by the part

It is merely
to express the fact that we are faced
a choice, a choice of whether or not to adopt
a language that uses quantifier
idioms in connec?
tion with

common

nouns

that describe

things of
the sort in question.17
If Carnap
is right, the only
say is that many
thing that I can reasonably
are
in
wrong
philosophers
thinking they have good
reasons for rejecting a form of language that other
use with

people

comfort.
that more

can be said on such

we
can make our pragmatic
thinks that
choices rationally,
if we take into account notions
such as simplicity. Here
is a passage
in which he
we
in
should
believe
explains why
physical objects:
that we have devised
the most
Imagine...
Quine
issues. He

economical

University

thinks

set of

concepts

adequate

Irvine

of Calif ornia,

to

the

play-by

events

of

still find,

no

subjective

should

conceptual

as perceptions
of one object,
of experience
ty of our stream

scheme,

pur?

we

reduce

the

to a manageable

complexi?
con?

ceptual simplicity.18
The

claim

is that it is legitimate
to assume
are physical
objects
because,
among
other
this shared
things,
assumption
greatly
I claim that
reports of our experiences.
simplifies
it is legitimate to assume that there are nonexistent
that

here

there

for exactly the same reason?it

simplifies
in exactly the same way.
reports of our experiences
Let me give an example.
I tell you the
Suppose
objects

following:
I've dreamed about the same
a row. It looks a lot like a dog
the way it talks reminds me of
tually I'm growing quite fond
that it will be back tonight.

keep. Because of this, Carnap thought that to pose

a question of the form "Are there really things of
such and such a sort" is to pose a pseudo-question.
with

a physicalistic

that

doubt,

individual

suppose,

or reflection. We

porting to talk about external objects, offers great ad?

vantages in simplifying our over-all reports. By bring?
ing together scattered sense events and treating them

of everyday people
describing
without
out
philosophical
training, and pointing
that these beliefs involve a commitment
to nonex?
istent

let us

are,

sensation

This

could

be a serious,

unicorn three nights in

I once owned, though
my grandmother. Ac?
of it, and I'm hoping

informative
The

report

of a

shared

meaningful
experience.
assumption
that there is something
that I have been dreaming
about tells you as much about my dream exper?
ience as the assumption
that there are physical
objects does when I report my waking experiences.
It would be just as difficult
to translate my dream
into
terms as it
report
purely phenomenological
would

be

to

translate

of
reports
perceptual
into such terms.
that our belief in physical objects
Quine
is a convenient
nonexistent
myth.19
Perhaps
no
are
are
no worse
better
But
off.
objects
they

physical

objects
thinks

off.

Received

3,1982

February

NOTES
1. This

paper is to be presented
will be Alan Code,

participants

in a symposium
of the same title at the Pacific
Jaakko Hintikka
and Howard Wettstein.

Division

APA

meetings

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

inMarch

1982. The

other

ARE THERE NONEXISTENT OBJECTS?

371

2. Especially in "TheMethodology of Nonexistence," Journal of Philosophy LXXVI (1979) 649-62;Nonexistent Objects (New
Haven:

Yale University

3. This
4.

example

In logic

In a language

ference

whether

is patterned

Australian

6. B. Russell,
7. The

of discourse,"

in Richard

that Russell

Routley,

Exploring

Meinong's

Jungle

on

limitations

the range of one's

common

with

and Beyond

1981.

in October

nouns

(Research

quan?
no dif?

itmakes

of Social

School

p. 423.

1980),

states do not quite

explicitly

to be

in conjunction

always appear
or the nouns.

of Aesthetics

Society

14 1905.

vol.

Mind,

they are taken

and

forthcoming.

to the American

words

Canberra,

University,

"On Denoting,"

arguments

one

after

National

Topoi,

Objects."

in a talk given

Inwagen

in which quantifier
like English
are
to
taken
limit the quantifiers
they

example

Sciences,

van

"domains

called

of Fictional

Theories

"Fregean

1980);

after one by Peter

are often

such ranges

tifiers.

5. This

Press,

is patterned

show

this, but

see Parsons

of them do;

reformulations

simple

(1980),

2.

Chap.

8. Examples

that our commitment

not

see G.

(4) and (5) illustrate Frege's point

our ordinary
uses of number words;

from

9. G.

Ryle,

"Systematically

Misleading

(ed), Twentienth-Century

Expressions,"
The Analytic

Philosophy:

to numbers

Foundations

Frege,

Proceedings

the Aristotelian

of

(New York:

Tradition

arises

from our commitment

of Arithmetic

1931-32;

Society,

Free Press,

to arithmetic,

Blackwells,

(Oxford:

and

1950).

in M. Weitz
reprinted
are to the reprinted

references

1966). Page

version.
10. Ryle,

latter

that are being contrasted

that takes fictional

two views

12. This

on distinguishing

are called

properties

have held

at which

place

future

Much

contingents.

In case

the other

nuclear

more

symposiasts

14. Ryle,

op.

cit.,

p.

198.

15. Ryle,

op.

cit.,

p.

189.

1" and "Mod

"Mod

to actually

2" in Parsons
van

see P.

exist,

(1980)

7. For a version

chapter

"Creatures

Inwagen,

of

Fiction,"

of the

American

"ordinary"

properties

from others;

this is discussed

Parsons

throughout

(1980) where

even

fails

it is located.
needs

wish

a particle

in physics:

The

inference

also

to be said then this, of course;

to criticize

this account,

I hereby

may

fails

be located

for claims

in a given

someplace

about

the future,

see Parsons

(1980),

incorporate

the relevant

especially

given
chapters

portions

region without

there be?

an Aristotelian

view of

4 and 7 for discussion.

of that text into this paper.

16. Ibid.
17. R. Carnap,
18. W.

19. Quine,

op.

Semantics

"Empiricism,

V. Quine,

"On What
cit.,

pp.

or?

properties.

that the inference

ing any particular

objects

14 (1977).

vol.

Quarterly

view depends

13. Some

here are called

one

but

view,

Philosophical

dinary

p. 202.

cit.,

op.

11. The

There

and Ontology,"

Is," in From

a Logical

inMeaning
Point

and Necessity
of View

(Chicago:

(New York:

Harper

U.

of Chicago

& Row,

18-19.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1961),

Press,
p.

1956).
17.