G.R. No.

164858
November 16, 2006
HENRY P. LANOT, substituted by MARIO S. RAYMUNDO, Petitioner,
CHARMIE Q. BENAVIDES, Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Facts
On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot ("Lanot"), Vener Obispo ("Obispo"), Roberto Peralta ("Peralta"), Reynaldo dela Paz ("dela Paz"),
Edilberto Yamat ("Yamat"), and Ram Alan Cruz ("Cruz") (collectively, "petitioners"), filed a petition for disqualification8 under
Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio were
candidates for Pasig City Mayor, while Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor in the 10 May
2004 elections. The case was docketed as SPA (NCR-RED) No. C04-008.
Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated
campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government;
(2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing
billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren
in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him.
In his Answer filed on 29 March 2004,9 Eusebio denied petitioners allegations and branded the petition as a harassment case.
Eusebio further stated that petitioners evidence are merely fabricated.
Director Ladra conducted hearings on 2, 5 and 7 April 2004 where she received the parties documentary and testimonial evidence.
Petitioners submitted their memorandum 10 on 15 April 2004, while Eusebio submitted his memorandum 11 on 16 April 2004.
The Issues
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction
The Ruling of the Court
Our review of the factual findings of the COMELEC, as well as the law applicable to this case, shows that there is no basis
to disqualify Eusebio. Director Ladra recommended the disqualification of Eusebio for violation of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC First Division approved Director Ladras recommendation and disqualified
Eusebio.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits an election campaign or partisan political activity by a
candidate outside of the campaign period. Section 79 of the same Code defines candidate, election campaign
and partisan political activity as follows:
SECTION 79. Definitions. As used in this Code:
(a)
The term candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who
has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties;
(b)
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall
include:
(1)
Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate;
(2)
Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3)
Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4)
Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or
oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5)
Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination
for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not be considered as election
campaign or partisan election activity.
Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or
criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be
construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an
election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a candidate. Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who has filed a
certificate of candidacy to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a
candidate. The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan
political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of
the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation
of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no particular candidate or candidates to
campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80
ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done outside the campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such
last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of
candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of
candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed
outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29
December 2003, was a candidate when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March
2004.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Based on the findings of Director Ladra, the questioned acts attributed to Eusebio all occurred before the start of the
campaign period on 24 March 2004. Indeed, Director Ladra applied Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against
Eusebio precisely because Eusebio committed these acts outside of the campaign period. However, Director Ladra
erroneously assumed that Eusebio became a candidate, for purposes of Section 80, when Eusebio filed his certificate of
candidacy on 29 December 2003.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a candidate, for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,
only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by Director Ladra and
affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a candidate, one who has filed his certificate of candidacy,
during the commission of the questioned acts.
Eusebio asserts that Section 11 of RA 8436 exculpates him from any liability for the questioned acts. Eusebio points
out that Section 11 contains the following proviso:
Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period: x x x
Eusebio theorizes that since the questioned acts admittedly took place before the start of the campaign period, such acts
are not unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate.
We find no necessity to apply in the present case this proviso in Section 11 of RA 8436. Eusebios theory legalizes
election campaigning or partisan political activities before the campaign period even if a person has already filed his
certificate of candidacy based on the election periods under existing laws prior to RA 8436. Under Eusebios theory,
Section 11 of RA 8436 punishes unlawful acts applicable to a candidate only if committed during the campaign period.
By definition, the election offense in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot be committed during the campaign
period. On the other hand, under Eusebios theory, unlawful acts applicable to a candidate cannot be committed outside
of the campaign period. The net result is to make the election offense in Section 80 physically impossible to commit at
any time.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We find no grave abuse of discretion in the 10 May 2004 Advisory of Chairman
Benjamin S. Abalos and in the 21 May 2004 Order of the Commission on Elections En Banc. We SET ASIDE the 20 August
2004 Resolution of the Commission En Banc since respondent Vicente P. Eusebio did not commit any act which would
disqualify him as a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
SO ORDERED.

ROSALINDA A. PENERA,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR,
G. R. No. 181613 September 11, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the 14 May
2007 elections.
On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a
Petition for Disqualification[4] against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to
her political party,[5] for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the
campaign period. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-224.
Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007
Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the
people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Attached to the Petition were the Affidavits of individuals[6] who witnessed the
said incident.
Penera alone filed an Answer[7] to the Petition on 19 April 2007, averring that the charge of premature campaigning was
not true. Although Penera admitted that a motorcade did take place, she explained that it was simply in accordance with the usual
practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which
dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. In fact, Penera claimed, in the motorcade held by her political party, no person
made any speech, not even any of the candidates. Instead, there was only marching music in the background and a grand
standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the motorcade. Finally, Penera cited Barroso v. Ampig[8] in her
defense, wherein the Court supposedly ruled that a motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their COCs was not a form of
political campaigning.
Also on 19 April 2007, Andanar and Penera appeared with their counsels before the ORED-Region XIII, where they
agreed to submit their position papers and other evidence in support of their allegations.[9]
After the parties filed their respective Position Papers, the records of the case were transmitted to the COMELEC main
office in Manila for adjudication. It was subsequently raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.
While SPA No. 07-224 was pending before the COMELEC Second Division, the 14 May 2007 elections took place and, as
a result thereof, Penera was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Sta. Monica. Penera soon assumed office on 2 July 2002.
On 24 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution in SPA No. 07-224, penned by Commissioner
Nicodemo T. Ferrer (Ferrer), which disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, for engaging in
premature campaigning, in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the
campaign period.
The questions of law
The dissenting opinion, however, raises the legal issue that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9369, provides a new definition of the term candidate, as a result of which, premature campaigning may no longer be
committed.
Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public
office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of
parties.
Republic Act No. 8436,[32] enacted on 22 December 1997, authorized the COMELEC to use an automated election system
for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. The statute
also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines, computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt
new electoral forms and printing materials. In particular, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 provided for the specifications of the
official ballots to be used in the automated election system and the guidelines for the printing thereof, the relevant portions of which
state:
SECTION 11. Official ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative,
referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by

surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of
Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120)
days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president,
shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which
he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11,
1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice
President, Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as petitions for registration and/or
manifestation to participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the
filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998. (Emphases ours.)
On 10 February 2007, Republic Act No. 9369[33] took effect. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 amended Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 8436 and renumbered the same as the new Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436. The pertinent portions of
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, now read:
SECTION.15. Official Ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or the
size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the proposition
to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays must be
constructed to present the names of all candidates for the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise,
the electronic displays must be constructed to present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential
pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote
and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot.
Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and
uniformly indicated using the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot,
as preferred by the female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly
indicated using the same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspector shall affix her/her signature to authenticate
the official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy
within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate
shall effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding
a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and
employees in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso factor resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of
candidacy. (Emphases ours.)
In view of the third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the Dissenting Opinion argues that
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code can not be applied to the present case since, as the Court held in Lanot v. Commission on
Elections,[34] the election campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the prohibited premature campaigning, should be
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates. Under present election laws, while a
person may have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not be considered a candidate until
the start of the campaign period. Thus, prior to the start of the campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan
political activity designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate to public office because there is no candidate to
speak of.
According to the Dissenting Opinion, even if Peneras acts before the start of the campaign period constitute election
campaigning or partisan political activities, these are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code given that she
was not yet a candidate at that time. On the other hand, Peneras acts, if committed within the campaign period, when she was
already a candidate, are likewise not covered by Section 80 as this provision punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the
prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, is practically impossible to commit at any
time.
We disagree. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended.
A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, would readily reveal that that it
did not contain an express repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal is one wherein a statute
declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed.[35] Absent
this specific requirement, an express repeal may not be presumed.

Although the title of Republic Act No. 9369 particularly mentioned the amendment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, or the
Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an
Automated Election System x x x, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, As Amended x x x.
(Emphasis ours.),
said title explicitly mentions, not the repeal, but the amendment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Such fact is indeed very
material. Repeal of a law means its complete abrogation by the enactment of a subsequent statute, whereas the amendment of a
statute means an alteration in the law already existing, leaving some part of the original still standing. [36] Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code is not even one of the specific provisions of the said code that were expressly amended by Republic Act No. 9369.
Additionally, Section 46,[37] the repealing clause of Republic Act No. 9369, states that:
Sec. 46. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 9369 is a general repealing clause. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms
of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.[38]
Well-settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored. In order to effect a repeal by implication,
the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile
and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for
inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used
in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short
of that standard does not suffice.[39]
Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of
declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge
to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect
to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government.[40]
To our mind, there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible
to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.
The following points are explanatory:
First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly provides that [i]t shall be unlawful
for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election
campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign period. Very simply, premature campaigning may be
committed even by a person who is not a candidate.
For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that [w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is an election
campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside of the campaign period,[41] is clearly erroneous.
Second, Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines election campaign or partisan political activity in the following
manner:
SECTION 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:
xxxx
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the
election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start
of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her
COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a
person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
speeches,etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we
can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. Also, conversely, if said
person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said
period as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as
there is no candidate, whose disqualification may be sought, to begin with. [42]
Third, in connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which
provides that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,
does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be
disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated
that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with
impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start
of the campaign period), can already committhe acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the
campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only
after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts
constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially
becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning,
shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a
candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her
candidacy.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election
Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is not only very possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and
consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law.
The laudable and exemplary intention behind the prohibition against premature campaigning, as declared in Chavez v.
Commission on Elections,[43] is to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between the popular
or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The intention for prohibiting premature
campaigning, as explained in Chavez, could not have been significantly altered or affected by Republic Act No. 8436, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, the avowed purpose of which is to carry-on the automation of the election system. Whether the election
would be held under the manual or the automated system, the need for prohibiting premature campaigning to level the
playing field between the popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and the lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the
other, by allowing them to campaign only within the same limited period remains.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 24 July
2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and en banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224 are
hereby AFFIRMED. In view of the disqualification of petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera from running for the office of Mayor of Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte, and the resulting permanent vacancy therein, it is hereby DECLARED that the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is
the rightful successor to said office. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 4 March 2008 is hereby ORDERED lifted. Costs
against the petitioner.

[G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002]

TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there
until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. [2] From 1970 to 1973,
petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. [3] Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy
in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making
several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000. [4] Subsequently,
petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171[5] to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved
on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate
of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November
13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was
approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.[6] On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy
stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years. [7]
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection,
sought the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only
about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was
voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On
May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.[8] He subsequently took his oath of
office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following findings:
Respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in
1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10,
2000 as would qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance with the one-year residency requirement of
Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1)
year residency requirement contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be
elected.
All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American
citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by
[repatriation] cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in
days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by
whatever formula of computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001
elections.[9]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002.
Hence this petition.
I.
(b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondents petition for cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected
with a margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition filed by private
respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis added)
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall
apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes
cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted
for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their
disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of
candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections,
should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella v. COMELEC[19] andSalcedo II v.
COMELEC,[20] the candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for cancellation were voted for and,
having received the highest number of votes, were duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the
second, reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the latter
had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation but on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections, dated
July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. 134047. December 15, 1999]
AMADO S. BAGATSING, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, and JAIME LOPEZ, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSE L. ATIENZA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In this petition for certiorari petitioners seek to annul and set aside the Resolution dated June 4, 1998 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) First Division directing the proclamation of private respondent as Mayor of the City of Manila for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack, or excess, of jurisdiction.
The backdrop of the instant case reveals the following antecedent facts:
Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda and Jaime Lopez and herein private respondent Jose L. Atienza were
candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 18, 1998, seven (7) days after the elections, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a complaint for disqualification
against private respondent, docketed as SPA No. 98-319, on the ground that the latter allegedly caused the disbursement of public
funds in the amount of Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand (P3,375,000.00) Pesos, more or less, within the
prohibited forty-five-day period before the elections in violation of Article 22, Section 261 (g) (2)[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. The alleged disbursement was intended to be distributed in the
form of financial assistance to the public school teachers of the City of Manila who manned the precinct polls in that city during the
elections.
On May 20, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division)* issued an order suspending the proclamation of private respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it appearing that the evidence presented consisting of disbursement voucher and the general payroll
evidencing payment to the teachers in the form of financial assistance dated May 5, 1998, in violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which provides:
SEC. 68 Disqualifications. - Any candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, (c)
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Section 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any Section 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v and cc,
sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived hi (sic) statues (sic) as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws (Sec. 25, 1971 EC) (underscoring ours).
show a probable cause of commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification, and the evidence in support of
disqualification is strong, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila is hereby directed to complete the canvassing of election returns of
the City of Manila, but to suspend proclamation of respondent Jose L. Atienza, Jr. should he obtain the winning number of votes for
the position of City Mayor of Manila, until such time when the petition for disqualification against him shall have been resolved.
The Executive Director of this Commission is directed to cause the immediate implementation of this Order.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On May 21, 1998, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and sought to set aside the afore-quoted order
directing the suspension of his proclamation as mayor.
On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division)* handed down a resolution granting the motion for reconsideration,
ratiocinating thusly:
The Commission En Banc finds correct respondent's reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 for his cause. The Resolution,
promulgated by the Commission in order to formulate the rules governing the disposition of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act 6646 otherwise known as the Electoral Reform
Law of 1987, pertinently provides:
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed after the elections against a candidate
who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred
for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after the elections but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall
nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the
Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of
the respondent with the Court before which the criminal case is pending and the said Court may order the suspension of the
proclamation, if the evidence of guilt is strong.
The applicability of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 on cases of such nature as the one at bench, had been upheld by the Supreme
Court in Lozano vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. 94628, October 28, 1991, when it declared:

Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The COMELEC Rules of
Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in general. Hence, as between a specific and a general
rule, the former shall necessarily prevail.
It is thus, a good law which could govern this case.
Considering therefore, that the petition for disqualification was filed after the election but before respondent's proclamation, the
Commission En Banc, conformably with Resolution No. 2050, hereby dismisses the same as a disqualification case but refers
Petitioners' charges of election offense against respondent to the Law Department for appropriate action. [3]
The decretal portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission FIRST DIVISION hereby GRANTS the Motion to lift the order of
suspension of respondent's proclamation. The Order of the First Division suspending respondent's proclamation as City Mayor of
Manila is SET ASIDE. The City Board of Canvassers of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to CONVENE, COMPLETE the CANVASS
and PROCLAIM the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes for said position. Petitioners' complaints against respondent
for violation of the Omnibus Election Code is hereby referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.
SO ORDERED.[4]
That same day at around eleven oclock in the morning, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended
Proclamation of Respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a
Second Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent before COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila reconvened at three oclock in the afternoon of the same day, June 4,
1998, and proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.[5]
On June 25, 1999, without waiting for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration pending before the COMELEC en
banc, petitioners filed the instant petition to set aside the June 4, 1998 resolution of the COMELEC's First Division.
Records reveal, however, that said motion for reconsideration pending before the COMELEC en banc was denied in its Order
of July 2, 1998 at the instance of herein petitioners themselves for the reason that they had already filed a petition before this Court
docketed as G.R. No. 134047.[6]
The instant petition seeks to strike down as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion COMELEC First Division
Resolution dated June 4, 1998 dismissing the petition for disqualification and referring the case to the COMELECs Law Department
for preliminary investigation, based on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Petitioners contend that Resolution No. 2050 had already
been nullified by the decision of this Court in Sunga vs. Comelec.[7] Such being the case, petitioners argue that the COMELEC
should be compelled by mandamus to assume jurisdiction and continue to hear and decide the disqualification case.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:
WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a number of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of the provisions of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987;
WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of this nature and the
manner of disposing of the same have not been uniform;
WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the disposition or disqualification cases contemplated under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, there is a strongly felt need to lay down a definite policy in the
disposition of this specific class of disqualification cases;
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, the Commission en banc:
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of cases of disqualification filed by
virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987:
1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a
candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been
committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in fact
commit the acts complained, the Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such
candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or an (sic) motion of any of the
parties, refer the complaint to the law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive
power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be
availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election.
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act No.
6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification
case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall,
nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the
Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of
the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the
proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral and shall
submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission en bancwithin five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the Information for filing with the appropriate
court.
The above-quoted resolution covers two (2) different aspects:
First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired into by
the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry
results in a finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was not

resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law
Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a candidate (a) who has
not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be
dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of
the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the
proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
Petitioners contend that Resolution No. 2050, upon which the COMELEC anchored its dismissal of the disqualification case, is
no longer a good law since it has been nullified in toto by this Court inSunga v. COMELEC.[8]
Contrary to petitioners' contention, nowhere did the Court strike down COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 in Sunga. There, we
held that:
xxx We discern nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case
filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the
Commission to refer the complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether the acts complained of have in fact
been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for
disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a
disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the
proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.
Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case.--Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong (italics supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word 'shall' signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to
proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification
case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively
requires. xxx[9]
The ruling in Sunga is not applicable to the case at bar. There, the complaint for disqualification was filed prior to the May 8,
1995 elections. Under Section 6 of R.A. 6646, where the complaint was filed before the election but for any reason, a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before the election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the COMELEC shall continue with the trial and hearing of the case. Thus, the facts in Sunga fall under the
contemplation of Section 6, namely: (1) the complaint for disqualification was filed before the election; (2) for any reason, the issue
of disqualification was not finally resolved before the election; and (3) the candidate sought to be disqualified is voted for and
received the winning number of votes. Consequently, the COMELEC should have continued with the hearing and decided the case
on the merits. Instead, COMELEC erroneously dismissed the disqualification case and referred the matter to the Law Department
for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect of the case. The deleterious effect of the premature and precipitate dismissal was
pointed out by this Court, thus:
xxx A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the
disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine
before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant
would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would
not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of
the law.[10]
In sharp contrast, the complaint for disqualification against private respondent in the case at bar was lodged on May 18, 1998
or seven (7) days after the 1998 elections. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050, the complaint shall be dismissed as a
disqualification case and shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the COMELEC. Under this
scenario, the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election which may be either before or after the proclamation of the
respondent candidate.
The COMELEC in Sunga obviously misapplied Resolution No. 2050 in dismissing the disqualification case therein simply
because it remained unresolved before the election and, in lieu thereof, referring it to its Law Department for possible criminal
prosecution of the respondent for violation of the election laws. Notably, there is nothing in paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 2050
which directs the dismissal of the disqualification case not resolved before the election. It says the COMELEC may motu propio or
on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an instrument of the latter in the
exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws.
The referral to the Law Department is discretionary on the part of the COMELEC and in no way may it be interpreted that the
COMELEC will dismiss the disqualification case or will no longer continue with the hearing of the same. The reason for this is that a
disqualification case may have two (2) aspects, the administrative, which requires only a preponderance of evidence to prove
disqualification, and the criminal, which necessitates proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. Where in the opinion of the
COMELEC, the acts which are grounds for disqualification also constitute a criminal offense or offenses, referral of the case to the
Law Department is proper.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC should have proceeded and continued with the trial of SPA No. 98-319 and rendered
judgment as the law and evidence would warrant, invoking Section 6 of R.A. 6646.
We do not agree. Section 6 explicitly applies only to any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified before an election. The section provides further that if for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment

before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest xxx. There is no provision in R.A. 6646 that
treats of a situation where the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election. If the intention of the law is for the COMELEC
to hear and decide disqualification cases filed after the election, it would not have made a distinction between cases
filed before and after the election. Section 6 would not have used the word before preceding an election. Thus, the need for
implementing rules as embodied in Comelec Resolution No. 2050 which provide that any complaint for disqualification based on
Section 6 of R.A. 6646 is filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed
as a disqualification case, but the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of COMELEC.
The applicability of Resolution No. 2050 on disqualification cases was in fact upheld by this Court in Lozano vs. Yorac, [11] the
Court said:
xxx Resolution No. 2050 was passed by reason of the variance in opinions of the members of respondent commission on matters
of procedure in dealing with cases of disqualification filed pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election code in relation to Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646, or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, and the manner of disposing of the same had not been
uniform. Hence, the COMELEC decided to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of these disqualification cases. With this
purpose in mind, the commission en banc adopted Resolution No. 2050. xxx
xxx
xxx Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The COMELEC Rules of
Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in general. Hence, as between a specific and a general
rule, the former shall necessarily prevail.
xxx[12]
It bears stressing that the Court in Sunga recognized the difference between a disqualification case filed before and after an
election when, as earlier mentioned, it stated that the referral of the complaint for disqualification where the case is filed before
election is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after
the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation winners, wherein it was
specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.
Why there is a difference between a petition for disqualification filed before and after the election proceeds from the fact that
before the election, the question of disqualification is raised as an issue before the electorate and those who vote for the candidate
assume the risk that should said candidate be disqualified after the election, their votes would be declared stray or invalid
votes. Such would not be true in the case of one filed after the electorate has already voted. [13]
Petitioners further postulate that the proclamation of private respondent on June 4, 1998 is void because it was made without
awaiting for the lapse of the five-day period for the finality of decisions rendered by a division in special actions," citing Sec. 13 (c)
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure providing that unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or
resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions and Special cases. xxx
We find this contention without merit.
The mere filing of a petition for disqualification is not a ground to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate. In the
absence of an order suspending proclamation, the winning candidate who is sought to be disqualified is entitled to be proclaimed as
a matter of law. This is clear from Section 6 of R.A. 6646 providing that the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified
is suspended only if there is an order of the COMELEC suspending proclamation. Here, there was no order suspending private
respondents proclamation. Consequently, private respondent was legally proclaimed on June 4, 1998.
Neither did the COMELEC err in not ordering the suspension of private respondent's proclamation. The second paragraph of
paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 provides that where a complaint is filed after the elections but before proclamation, as in this
case, the complaint must be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department for preliminary
investigation. If before the proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information
has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of respondent
with the court before which the criminal case is pending and that court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence
of guilt is strong.[14] It appearing that none of the foregoing circumstances obtain herein as there is no prima facie finding of guilt yet,
a suspension of private respondent's proclamation is not warranted. The mere pendency of a disqualification case against a
candidate, and a winning candidate at that, does not justify the suspension of his proclamation after winning in the election. To hold
otherwise would unduly encourage the filing of baseless and malicious petitions for disqualification if only to effect the suspension of
the proclamation of the winning candidate, not only to his damage and prejudice but also to the defeat of the sovereign will of the
electorate, and for the undue benefit of undeserving third parties.[15]
Before we end, we take note that when petitioners filed the instant petition on June 25, 1999, they had before the
COMELEC en banc a pending motion for reconsideration of the June 4, 1998 resolution of the First Division. The Court does not
look with favor the practice of seeking remedy from this Court without waiting for the resolution of the pending action before the
tribunal below, absent extraordinary circumstances warranting appropriate action by this Court. This makes a short shrift of
established rules of procedure intended for orderly administration of justice.
The COMELEC (First Division) in its June 4, 1998 resolution correctly referred petitioners complaint for disqualification to its
Law Division for appropriate action. There being no temporary restraining order from this Court, that body as an instrument of the
COMELEC should have continued with its task of determining whether or not there exists probable cause to warrant the criminal
prosecution of those who may be liable for the alleged election offenses.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The respondent Commission on Elections is hereby directed to
RESOLVE with great dispatch the pending incident relative to the preliminary investigation being conducted by its Law Department.

[G.R. No. 130681. July 29, 1999.]

JOSE V. LORETO, in representation of his minor child JOSE P. LORETO III, Petitioners, v. RENATO BRION, RODOLFO
BUTALID and REYNALDO ATIENZA, in their capacity as Chairman and Members respectively of the Board of Election
Supervisors, Respondents.
Jose Loreto III ran for president of the Pambayang Federasyon Ng Mga Sangguniang Kabataan, Baybay, Leyte Chapter in the July
5, 1996 elections. The other candidates were Paul Ian Veloso and Ruphil Baoc.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On July 3, 1996, a pre-election protest against Paul Ian Veloso was lodged before the Board of Election Supervisors composed of
respondents herein for violation of DILG Memorandum Circular No. 96-115, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2834, prohibiting certain
acts of campaigning in the Sangguniang Kabataan Pederasyon elections.
In the July 5, 1996 elections, Paul Ian Veloso obtained the highest number of votes but his proclamation as winner was suspended
as the evidence of his guilt in the pre-election protest was strong. Jose Loreto, III garnered the second highest number of votes.
On August 6, 1996, the Board of Election Supervisors promulgated a Resolution disqualifying candidate Paul Ian Veloso and ruled
that the elected Vice President of the chapter should assume the office of President. The resolution became final and
executory.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Petitioner Loreto took his oath of office and discharged the duties and functions of President of the SK Municipal Federation but was
unable to collect the salaries pertaining to the office on account of the absence of the required proclamation papers.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court to compel the Board of Election Supervisors to direct the
local election committee to proclaim him.
The Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner Loreto had lost in the SK Pederasyon elections and the fact that
the winning candidate was later on disqualified and his being a second placer did not entitle him to be proclaimed as President.
Petitioner Loreto filed this petition for review on certiorari on an alleged pure question of law. The lone issue is as follows:chanrobles
law library
"Whether or not the trial court was correct in declaring that petitioner was not qualified to assume the presidency of the Sangguniang
Kabataan Chapter of Baybay, Leyte in lieu of a disqualified candidate since the petitioner is a mere second placer to the deposed
winner."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner relies on Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides that "any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for and the votes cast for him shall not be counted," and claims that in view of the final judgment
declaring Paul Ian Velosos disqualification, the votes that were obtained by Veloso fall in the category of stray or invalid votes.
When he was disqualified, it was as if he was no candidate at all in the eyes of the law and the effects of the final judgment of
disqualification retroacts to the time the case was filed.
In its Comment, public respondent cites the doctrine laid down in a long line of cases that a second placer cannot be considered the
winner in place of a disqualified winning candidate.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
In his reply, petitioner stresses that nowhere in Section 6 of R.A. 6646 is it mandated that the protestee be disqualified by final
judgment prior to or before the date of election. On the contrary, the fact that the provision mandates that votes cast for a candidate
disqualified by final judgment be not counted presupposes that an election has already been held.
Public respondent counterargues in its rejoinder that it is immaterial whether the petition for disqualification against a candidate was
filed before the elections or after the elections as the subsequent finding that a candidate is disqualified cannot retroact to the date
of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. Hence, the votes cast in favor of the disqualified winning candidate will still
be valid and the second placer does not become the automatic winner.
"The rule therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the

highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
6chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The rationale for the rule is explained in Benito v. COMELEC 7 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the
peoples right to elect officials of their choice." 8
and more emphatically in Aquino v. COMELEC, 9 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . We cannot, in another shift of the pendulum subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner
has been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a minority
view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English court decisions. These decisions neglect the
possibility that the runner-up though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number that the votes
they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is
absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters choice. Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by
the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable
that the result among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate,
would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among no choices could lead to a shifting of votes to
candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have
obtained the majority or plurality of votes cast where an ineligible candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the
votes." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

[G.R. No. 125629. March 25, 1998]

MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of
Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for reelection in the same municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint[2] for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of
using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint[3] with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time
with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election
Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition[4] for
disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details
of the violations committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.
In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995,[5] the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for
investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted
not to submit any evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion,
Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report [6] to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that
Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on
vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of
any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended
to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C.
Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties and functions of the office.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the corresponding
informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations[7] for various elections offenses were
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the
COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.
On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion
for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for
disqualification
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the disqualification case against private
respondent Trinidad.
Held:
The legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion,
i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose
a positive duty which must be enforced.[11] The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains
unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a
quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of
its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with
statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative
rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that
matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or
administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC
of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v.
COMELEC[12] this Court held Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and
proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the

exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private respondents
petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into
this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC x x x x Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be
precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may
easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996 Resolutions of the COMELEC are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B.
Trinidad, for disqualification, and ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 102925 March 5, 1992
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE represented by ZOILO DEJARESCO, JR., as its Past Chairman and President, and FRAULIN
A. PEASALES as its Corporate Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by HON. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, its Chairman; HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE
and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, respondents.
G.R. No. 102983 March 5, 1992
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTERS SA PILIPINAS; MAKATI BROADCASTING NETWORK; MOLAVE BROADCASTING
NETWORK; MASBATE COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC., RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC.; ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING CORP.; FILIPINAS BROADCASTING; RADIO PILIPINO CORP.; RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.;
EAGLE BROADCASTING CORP.; MAGILIW COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC.; for themselves and in behalf of the
mass media owners as a class; ANDRE S. KHAN; ARCADIO M. CARANDANG, JR.; MALOU ESPINOSA MANALASTAS;
MIGUEL C. ENRIQUEZ; JOSE ANTONIO K. VELOSO; DIANA G. DE GUZMAN; JOSE E. ESCANER, JR.; RAY G. PEDROCHE;
PETER A. LAGUSAY; ROBERT ESTRELLA; ROLANDO RAMIREZ; for themselves as voters and in behalf of the Philippine
electorate as a class; ORLANDO S. MERCADO and ALEJANDRO de G. RODRIGUEZ; for themselves as prospective
candidates and in behalf of all candidates in the May 1992 election as a class,petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question raised by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 11 (b)
of Republic Act No. 6646.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time
for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in
the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of
credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship,
because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content,
namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to
election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers
and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and
opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known
as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited
under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of
the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes
except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall
take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 and 92 of B.P. Blg. 881, known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, which provide respectively as follows:
Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general
circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication
shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec

Space" wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall beallocated, free of charge,
equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is
circulated.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as "Comelec
Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all
radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are
hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
(Emphasis supplied)
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by
preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale
or donation of print space and air time "for campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections
("Comelec"). Upon the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec
space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television stations. Further,
the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and "Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial
basis among all candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.
No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act
No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election Code). That objective is of special importance and urgency in a
country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of
society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty line." It is supremely important,
however, to note that objective is not only a concededly legitimate one; it has also been given constitutional status by the terms of
Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision
or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,"
as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information
campaigns and forums among candidates." 1
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and
freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a
special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the
special importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate
to the purity and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have governance
over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the
rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most
democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given
constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access
to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." 2
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of
exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among
candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in somelimitation of the rights of free speech and
free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying
limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the
party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion. 3
Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon basic principles relating to the police power of the
State and the requisites for constitutionally valid exercise of that power. The essential question is whether or not the assailed
legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision
or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The
Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations
during election periods.
In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and extent of the limitations resulting from
the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential considerations. It is important
to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain
important limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of
the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January
1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period
from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports
to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation,4 of print space and air time for
"campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or

television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of
government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so
long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In
sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for
by candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not restrict either the reporting of or the expression of
belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for office constitutes
the critical distinction which must be made between the instant case and that ofSanidad v. Commission on
Elections. 5 In Sanidad, the Court declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which provided as follows:
Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers During the plebiscite campaign period, on
the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall
use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the plebiscite mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the
ratification or adoption of the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167
constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier,
"for no justifiable reason." The Court, through Medialdea, J., said:
. . . [N]either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean
that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in the plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory
basis." 6 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by
or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a
fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the
newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate
"Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions
materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial
remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the
presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out. It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught
in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that the possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority
involved, for there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the
Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much the same considerations should be borne in
mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in mass
media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once
again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or
commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television
stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal information and communication operations. Section 11 (b)
does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal operations
of media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within
their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious functionary of [a] repressive government"
dictating what events or ideas reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV screens.
There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limitpaid
partisan political advertisements to for a other than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass
media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The
limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II
(26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of
the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations
of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and
Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be
expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry
about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J. remonstrates, however, that "t[he] financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life
that cannot be corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in
the prohibition under challenge is that while the rich candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows
him to spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his strained rival." True enough Section 11 (b) does not, by
itself or in conjunction with Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code, place political candidates on complete and perfect
equality inter se without regard to their financial affluence or lack thereof. But a regulatory measure that is less than perfectly
comprehensive or which does not completely obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone constitutionally
infirm. The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in governmental regulation. All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is
that the regulatory measure under challenge bear a reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. That the
supervision or regulation of communication and information media is not, in itself, a forbidden modality is made clear by the
Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves
may be seen to be not unduly repressive or unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media
reporting of and commentary on pronouncements, activities, written statements of the candidates themselves. All other fora remain

accessible to candidates, even for political advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity are, after all, designed
to benefit the candidates themselves.
Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded.
Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless
electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political
commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be
supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set. But it is rarely that simple. For the
candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may
directly or indirectly own or control the stations or channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very
real sense, listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." 8
The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly
intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and
objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive
audience. The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least
as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises
to maximize their revenues from the marketing of "packaged" candidates.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed
materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length.Provided,
That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas providedin paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public
or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the
campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own
residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one:Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code on lawful election
propaganda which provides:
Lawful election propaganda. Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not more than eight
and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two feet by three
feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of
said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That
said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be
removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize after
due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity
to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general
circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been granted.
(Section 37, 1978 EC)
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides:
Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under
Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or
publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster
areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at
the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party:Provided, That such posters or election
propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of

and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) and not exceeding three (3)
feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be
removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar
as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the
petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving
vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally,
the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election
Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."
The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether
public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
First the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article
III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of
Rights provision on this basic freedom.
All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred
freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945]; Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970])
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly
every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine
how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to
convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well
include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. (New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 686 [1964]; cited in the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Babst v.
National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]) Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open
debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is
the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, supra)
The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic freedoms in order to
promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests
individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election campaign
cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free,
honest, and orderly elections.
We recognize the fact that under the Constitution, the COMELEC during the election period is granted regulatory powers vis-avis the conduct and manner of elections, to wit:
Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forms among candidates in connection
with the object of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. (Article IX(c) section 4)
The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991) and its companion cases underscores how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between
permissible regulation of election campaign activities and indefensible repression committed in the name of free and honest
elections. In the National Press Club, case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even
as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements. The gray area is rather wide and we have to go
on a case to case basis.
There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the opinion of
some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate.
For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem inequitable or oppressive, a court
case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process, by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection.
We cannot act instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of
the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the
electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC,
should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not
antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know
are unduly curtailed.
There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National Press Club v. Commission on Elections (supra) case but all of us were
unanimous that regulation of election activity has its limits. We examine the limits of regulation and not the limits of free speech. The
carefully worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows that regulation of election campaign activity may not
pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression
of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory
measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political advertisements, with some rather strong dissents, in National Press Club, we
find the regulation in the present case of a different category. The promotion of a substantial Government interest is not clearly
shown.
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City
Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished
citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing
instrument to be stilled:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the individual's freedom
ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where
the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the
great, the indispensable democratic freedom secured by the first Amendment . . . That priority gives these
liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the
limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice . . .
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not
doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on
due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion
would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in
public danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]). (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political
party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince
others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private
vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press
Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and
commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can
we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who
pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.
Second the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444, 82 L ed 949, 58 S Ct 666, the Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting all
distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia, without a license, pointing out that so broad an
interference was unnecessary to accomplish legitimate municipal aims. In Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147,
84 L ed 155, 60 S Ct. 146, the Court dealt with ordinances of four different municipalities which either banned or
imposed prior restraints upon the distribution of handbills. In holding the ordinances invalid, the court noted that
where legislative abridgment of fundamental personal rights and liberties is asserted, "the courts should be
astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions," 308 US, at 161. In Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 84 L ed 1213, 60 S Ct. 900, 128 ALR
1352, the Court said that "[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society," but pointed out
that in each case "the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to
infringe the protected freedom." (310 US at 304) (Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479 [1960]
The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14)
inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily,
the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of
it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire,
use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and
disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley's Bl. Com.
127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])
As earlier stated, we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles, the
candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who

consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the
citizen of his right to free speech and information:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the
preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of
distribution, it must be fully preserved. The danger of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal
methods leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that
stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, the naked restriction of the
dissemination of ideas." (Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943])
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden
of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any
place, whether public or private, except in the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person
cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front door or on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will
certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the
statute or regulation, may do.
The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's
living room or bedroom. This is delegation running riot. As stated by Justice Cardozo in his concurrence in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan (293 U.S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 446 [1935), "The delegated power is unconfined and vagrant . . . This is delegation running riot. No
such plentitude of power is susceptible of transfer."
Third the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as
regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest
of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.
Under section 26 Article II of the Constitution, "The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, . . . while
under section 1, Article XIII thereof "The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, andpolitical inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." (Emphasis supplied)
It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs
the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not
the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers
or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to
freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting
on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
. . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any
public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of
government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the
topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with
which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority,
either substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to
pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical. corollary
of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live
up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. (Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, supra)
The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to speak
and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs which concern us.
Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political change. (Cf. New York Times
v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of candidates and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost
all voters cannot name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who are aspiring to
be elected to public office.
There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may
accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the
name; he is espousing ideas. Our review of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its effects in today's particular
circumstances. We are constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on
Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 132231. March 31, 1998]

EMILIO M. R. OSMEA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law
of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes, except to the Commission on Elections.[1] Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming
elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmea is candidate for President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor
of Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections[2] have called into question the validity of the very premises of that [decision].[3]
There Is No Case or Controversy to Decide,

Only an Academic Discussion to Hold

NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged freedom of speech and of the
press.[4] In urging a reexamination of that ruling, petitioners claim that experience in the last five years since the decision in that case
has shown the undesirable effects of the law because the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field,
[but] actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidate[s][5] by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to
pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and
handbills.
No empirical data have been presented by petitioners to back up their claim, however. Argumentation is made at the
theoretical and not the practical level. Unable to show the experience and subsequent events which they claim invalidate the
major premise of our prior decision, petitioners now say there is no need for empirical data to determine whether the political ad
ban offends the Constitution or not.[6] Instead they make arguments from which it is clear that their disagreement is with the opinion
of the Court on the constitutionality of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and that what they seek is a reargument on the same issue already
decided in that case. What is more, some of the arguments were already considered and rejected inthe NPC case.[7]
Indeed, petitioners do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the law. They do not complain that
they have in any way been disadvantaged as a result of the ban on media advertising. Their contention that, contrary to the holding
in NPC, 11(b) works to the disadvantage of candidates who do not have enough resources to wage a campaign outside of mass
media can hardly apply to them. Their financial ability to sustain a long drawn-out campaign, using means other than the mass
media to communicate with voters, cannot be doubted. If at all, it is candidates like intervenor Roger Panotes, who is running for
mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, who can complain against 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. But Panotes is for the law which, he says, has
to some extent, reduced the advantages of moneyed politicians and parties over their rivals who are similarly situated as ROGER
PANOTES. He claims that the elimination of this substantial advantage is one reason why ROGER PANOTES and others similarly
situated have dared to seek an elective position this coming elections.[8]
What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply the holding of an academic exercise. And since a majority
of the present Court is unpersuaded that its decision inNPC is founded in error, it will suffice for present purposes simply to reaffirm
the ruling in that case. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This is what makes the present case different from the overruling
decisions[9] invoked by petitioners.
Nevertheless, we have undertaken to revisit the decision in NPC v. COMELEC in order to clarify our own understanding of its
reach and set forth a theory of freedom of speech.
No Ad Ban, Only a Substitution of

COMELEC Space and COMELEC

Time for the Advertising Page and
Commercials in Mass Media

The term political ad ban, when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the
sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the
candidates space and time in the media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of
advertising.
Thus, 11(b) states:
Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited in Section 85 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
....
(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any person making use of the
mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence
from his work as such during the campaign period.
On the other hand, the Omnibus Election Code provisions referred to in 11(b) read:
SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any
other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as Comelec Space wherein candidates can
announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission
among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978 EC).

SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as Comelec Time
which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended
so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
The laws concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with ensuring media equality between candidates with
deep pockets, as Justice Feliciano called them in his opinion of the Court in NPC, and those with less resources.[10] The law is part
of a package of electoral reforms adopted in 1987. Actually, similar effort was made in 1970 to equalize the opportunity of
candidates to advertise themselves and their programs of government by requiring the COMELEC to have a COMELEC space in
newspapers, magazines, and periodicals and prohibiting candidates to advertise outside such space, unless the names of all the
other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are mentioned with equal prominence. The validity of the law was
challenged in Badoy, Jr. v. COMELEC.[11] The voting was equally divided (5-5), however, with the result that the validity of the law
was deemed upheld.
There is a difference in kind and in severity between restrictions such as those imposed by the election law provisions in
question in this case and those found to be unconstitutional in the cases cited by both petitioners and the Solicitor General, who has
taken the side of petitioners. In Adiong v. COMELEC[12] the Court struck down a regulation of the COMELEC which prohibited the
use of campaign decals and stickers on mobile units, allowing their location only in the COMELEC common poster area or
billboard, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or his political party, or at his residence. The Court found the restriction
so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned car.[13] Nor was there a
substantial governmental interest justifying the restriction.
[T]he constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as
regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, Section 1 in relation to Article IX(c) Section
4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the
paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the
regulation are of marginal significance.[14]
Mutuc v. COMELEC[15] is of a piece with Adiong. An order of the COMELEC prohibiting the playing of taped campaign jingles
through sound systems mounted on mobile units was held to be an invalid prior restraint without any apparent governmental interest
to promote, as the restriction did not simply regulate time, place or manner but imposed an absolute ban on the use of the
jingles. The prohibition was actually content-based and was for that reason bad as a prior restraint on speech, as inhibiting as
prohibiting the candidate himself to use the loudspeaker. So is a ban against newspaper columnists expressing opinion on an issue
in a plebiscite a content restriction which, unless justified by compelling reason, is unconstitutional. [16]
Here, on the other hand, there is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the
fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is
a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 of
the Constitution, which provides:
The commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and
air time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge,
to the candidates. In effect, during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the
commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates.
Nor can the validity of the COMELEC take-over for such temporary period be doubted.[17] In Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robbins,[18] it was held that a court order compelling a private shopping center to permit use of a corner of its courtyard for the
purpose of distributing pamphlets or soliciting signatures for a petition opposing a UN resolution was valid. The order neither
unreasonably impaired the value or use of private property nor violated the owners right not to be compelled to express support for
any viewpoint since it can always disavow any connection with the message.
On the other hand, the validity of regulations of time, place and manner, under well-defined standards, is well-nigh beyond
question.[19] What is involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass
media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and air time to give all candidates equal time and space for
the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
In Gonzales v. COMELEC,[20] the Court sustained the validity of a provision of R.A. No. 4880 which in part reads:
SEC. 50-B. Limitation upon the period of Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity. - It is unlawful for any
person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group, or association of persons, whether or not a political party or
political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the period of one
hundred twenty days immediately preceding an election involving a public office voted for at large and ninety days
immediately preceding an election for any other elective public office.
The term Candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether or not
said person has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate.
The term Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity refers to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or
promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office which shall include:
(a) Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate;
(b) Holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a candidate or party; . . .

In Valmonte v. COMELEC,[21] on the other hand, the Court upheld the validity of a COMELEC resolution prohibiting members
of citizen groups or associations from entering any polling place except to vote. Indeed, 261(k) of the Omnibus Election Code
makes it unlawful for anyone to solicit votes in the polling place and within a radius of 30 meters thereof.
These decisions come down to this: the State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period as well as
campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the mass media skews the political process
and subverts democratic self-government. What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates because of the
views expressed in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason.
Law Narrowly Drawn to Fit

Regulatory Purpose

The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to
achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on speech,
as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.
Petitioners and the dissenters make little of this on the ground that the regulation, which they call a ban, would be useless any
other time than the election period. Petitioners state: [I]n testing the reasonableness of a ban on mountain-skiing, one cannot
conclude that it is limited because it is enforced only during the winter season. [22] What makes the regulation reasonable is precisely
that it applies only to the election period. Its enforcement outside the period would make it unreasonable. More importantly, it
should be noted that a ban on mountain skiing would be passive in nature. It is like the statutory cap on campaign expenditures,
but is so unlike the real nature of 11(b), as already explained.
Petitioners likewise deny that 11(b) is limited in scope, as they make another quaint argument:
A candidate may court media to report and comment on his person and his programs, and media in the exercise of their
discretion just might. It does not, however, follow that a candidates freedom of expression is thereby enhanced, or less
abridged. If Pedro is not allowed to speak, but Juan may speak of what Pedro wishes to say, the curtailment of Pedros
freedom of expression cannot be said to be any less limited, just because Juan has the freedom to speak. [23]
The premise of this argument is that 11(b) imposes a ban on media political advertising. What petitioners seem to miss is
that the prohibition against paid or sponsored political advertising is only half of the regulatory framework, the other half being the
mandate of the COMELEC to procure print space and air time so that these can be allocated free of charge to the candidates.
Reform of the Marketplace of Ideas,
Not Permissible?

Petitioners argue that the reasoning of NPC is flawed, because it rests on a misconception that Art. IX-C, 4 mandates the
absolute equality of all candidates regardless of financial status, when what this provision speaks of is equality of opportunity. In
support of this claim, petitioners quote the following from the opinion of the Court written by Justice Feliciano:
The objective which animates Section 11(b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor
candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests.[24]
The Court meant equalizing media access, as the following sentences which were omitted clearly show:
Section 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes except
to the Commission on Elections (Comelec). Upon the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code
require the Comelec to procure Comelec space in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and
Comelec time on radio and television stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate Comelec
space and Comelec time on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within the area served
by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.[25]
On the other hand, the dissent of Justice Romero in the present case, in batting for an uninhibited market place of ideas,
quotes the following from Buckley v. Valeo:
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.[26]
But do we really believe in that? That statement was made to justify striking down a limit on campaign expenditure on the
theory that money is speech. Do those who endorse the view that government may not restrict the speech of some in order to
enhance the relative voice of others also think that the campaign expenditure limitation found in our election laws[27] is
unconstitutional? How about the principle of one person, one vote,[28] is this not based on the political equality of voters? Voting
after all is speech. We speak of it as the voice of the people - even of God. The notion that the government may restrict the speech
of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others may be foreign to the American Constitution. It is not to the Philippine
Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of that document.
Indeed, Art. IX-C, 4 is not the only provision in the Constitution mandating political equality. Art. XIII, 1 requires Congress
to give the highest priority to the enactment of measures designed to reduce political inequalities, while Art. II, 26 declares as a
fundamental principle of our government equal access to opportunities for public service. Access to public office will be denied to
poor candidates if they cannot even have access to mass media in order to reach the electorate. What fortress principle trumps or
overrides these provisions for political equality?
Unless the idealism and hopes which fired the imagination of those who framed the Constitution now appear dim to us, how
can the electoral reforms adopted by them to implement the Constitution, of which 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to 90 and
92 are part, be considered infringements on freedom of speech? That the framers contemplated regulation of political propaganda
similar to 11(b) is clear from the following portion of the sponsorship speech of Commissioner Vicente B. Foz:
MR. FOZ. . . . Regarding the regulation by the Commission of the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges
or concessions granted by the Government, there is a provision that during the election period, the Commission may
regulate, among other things, the rates, reasonable free space, and time allotments for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This has to do
with the media of communication or information.[29]
On the Claim that the Reforms

Have Been Ineffectual

Petitioners contend that 11(b) is not a reasonable means for achieving the purpose for which it was enacted. They claim that
instead of levelling the playing field as far as the use of mass media for political campaign is concerned, 11(b) has abolished
it. They further claim that 11(b) does not prevent rich candidates from using their superior resources to the disadvantage of poor
candidates.
All this is of course mere allegation. As stated in the beginning, what petitioners claim to be the nations experience with the
law is merely argumentation against its validity. The claim will not bear analysis, however. Assuming that rich candidates can
spend for parades, rallies, motorcades, airplanes and the like in order to campaign while poor candidates can only afford political
ads, the gap between the two will not necessarily be reduced by allowing unlimited mass media advertising because rich candidates
can spend for other propaganda in addition to mass media advertising. Moreover, it is not true that 11(b) has abolished the
playing field. What it has done, as already stated, is merely to regulate its use through COMELEC-sponsored advertising in place of
advertisements paid for by candidates or donated by their supporters.
It is finally argued that COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time are ineffectual. It is claimed that people hardly read or watch
or listen to them. Again, this is a factual assertion without any empirical basis to support it. What is more, it is an assertion
concerning the adequacy or necessity of the law which should be addressed to Congress. Well-settled is the rule that the choice of
remedies for an admitted social malady requiring government action belongs to Congress. The remedy prescribed by it, unless
clearly shown to be repugnant to fundamental law, must be respected. [30] As shown in this case, 11(b) of R.A. 6646 is a permissible
restriction on the freedom of speech, of expression and of the press.
Dissenting, Justice Panganiban argues that advertising is the most effective means of reaching voters. He adverts to a
manifestation of the COMELEC lawyer that the Commission is not procuring [Comelec Space] by virtue of the effects of the
decision of this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272. [31]
To be sure, this Court did not hold in PPI v. COMELEC that it should not procure newspaper space for allocation to
candidates. What it ruled is that the COMELEC cannot procure print space without paying just compensation. Whether by its
manifestation the COMELEC meant it is not going to buy print space or only that it will not require newspapers to donate free of
charge print space is not clear from the manifestation. It is to be presumed that the COMELEC, in accordance with its mandate
under 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and 90 of the Omnibus Election Code, will procure print space for allocation to candidates, paying
just compensation to newspapers providing print space.
In any event, the validity of a law cannot be made to depend on the faithful compliance of those charged with its enforcement
but by appropriate constitutional provisions. There is a remedy for such lapse if it should happen. In addition, there is the
COMELEC Time during which candidates may advertise themselves. Resolution No. 2983-A of the COMELEC provides:
SEC. 2. Grant of Comelec Time. Every radio broadcasting and television station operating under franchise shall
grant the Commission, upon payment of just compensation, at least thirty (30) minutes of prime time daily, to be known
as Comelec Time, effective February 10, 1998 for candidates for President, Vice-President and Senators, and effective
March 27, 1998, for candidates for local elective offices, until May 9, 1998. (Emphasis added)
Failure of Legislative Remedy Bespeaks

of More than Congressional Inaction

The fact is that efforts have been made to secure the amendment or even repeal of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. No less than
five bills[32] were filed in the Senate in the last session of Congress for this purpose, but they all failed of passage. Petitioners claim
it was because Congress adjourned without acting on them. But that is just the point. Congress obviously did not see it fit to act on
the bills before it adjourned.
We thus have a situation in which an act of Congress was found by this Court to be valid so that those opposed to the statute
resorted to the legislative department. The latter reconsidered the question but after doing so apparently found no reason for
amending the statute and therefore did not pass any of the bills filed to amend or repeal the statute. Must this Court now grant
what Congress denied to them? The legislative silence here certainly bespeaks of more than inaction.
Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions[33]

In Adiong v. COMELEC[34] this Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in a case sustaining a
Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the posting of campaign signs on public property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US
789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118[1984])[35]
This test was actually formulated in United States v. OBrien.[36] It is an appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like
11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions, they are not imposed because of the content of the speech. For this
reason, content-neutral restrictions are tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v.
COMELEC,[37] prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite
must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are
censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible
overbreadth and vagueness.
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations which, like 11(b), are not concerned with
the content of the speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. [38] A deferential
standard of review will suffice to test their validity.
Justice Panganibans dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that media ads do not partake of the real
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the peoples cardinal right to choose their
means of expression and of access to information. The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all
free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful student of constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the
criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech cases. For the criminal law is necessarily concerned with the line at which
innocent preparation ends and a guilty conspiracy or attempt begins.[39] Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining the
constitutional validity of laws which, like 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with
their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to
drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.

The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content-based restrictions distort
public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular
speech. No such reasons underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the OBrien test in this case, we find that 11(b) of R.A.
No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information for the purpose of ensuring
equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any
restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.
________________
The Court is just as profoundly aware as anyone else that discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the government established by our Constitution. But it is
precisely with this awareness that we think democratic efforts at reform should be seen for what they are: genuine efforts to
enhance the political process rather than infringements on freedom of expression. The statutory provision involved in this case is
part of the reform measures adopted in 1987 in the aftermath of EDSA. A reform-minded Congress passed bills which were
consolidated into what is now R.A No. 6646 with near unanimity. The House of Representatives, of which petitioner Pablo P. Garcia
was a distinguished member, voted 96 to 1 (Rep. Eduardo Pilapil) in favor, while the Senate approved it 19-0. [40]
In his recent book, The Irony of Free Speech, Owen Fiss speaks of a truth that is full of irony and contradiction: that the state
can be both an enemy and a friend of speech; that it can do terrible things to undermine democracy but some wonderful things to
enhance it as well.[41] We hold R.A. No. 6646, 11(b) to be such a democracy-enhancing measure. For Holmess marketplace of
ideas can prove to be nothing but a romantic illusion if the electoral process is badly skewed, if not corrupted, by the unbridled use
of money for campaign propaganda.
The petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April 28, 1994 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.
I
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon
petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final
M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo,
pp. 10-13).
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
We dismiss the petition.
II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer
of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of
the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the
election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of
contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the
statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with
electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which
the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or
registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply
with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated on January 13,
1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the

National and Local Elections on

May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five
(5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of
the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing
by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them to
comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the
elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said
obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to file the
statement required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection with the
electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which
the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In
addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a
"non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the
law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v.
Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated
(Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew
the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one
who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]),
issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions
and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the
statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where
public interest is involved. We apply the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate.
One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling
the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the
elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are
prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are
authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United States, as well
as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting the
amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am
Jur 2d, Elections 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the statements and to
prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d,
Elections 289). These statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors,
and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky.
263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford
[Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v.
Saylor, supra.)
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the
short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any
contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a
statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has
received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it
is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities
which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative
fine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

LIBERAL PARTY, represented by its President Manuel A.

Roxas II and Secretary General Joseph Emilio A. Abaya,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 191771

Present:

versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NACIONALISTA PARTY,

represented by its President Manuel B. Villar and
NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION, allegedly
represented by its Chairman Faustino S. Dy, Jr.,
Respondents.
--

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
May 6, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This case poses to the Court, at this very late stage of our election period, issues involving the registration of political
coalitions, the grant of accreditation to the dominant parties under the first time ever automated election system in the country, and
validity of the COMELEC en bancs (en banc) authority to act on the registration of political coalitions.
The challenged ruling is a Per Curiam Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)[1] dated April 12, 2010 in
SPP-10-(DM) granting the application for registration of the Nacionalista PartyNationalist Peoples Coalition (NP-NPC or coalition)
and deferring the question of the coalitions dominant minority status to a future resolution. The challenge comes from the Liberal
Party (LP)[2] through a petition for certiorari and prohibition[3] with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or a status quo
order. We issued a status quo order through our Resolution of April 20, 2010.
I.

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

a.

General Background

On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of
petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752, providing,
among others, for the rules for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the dominant majority party, the
dominant minority party, ten major national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010 elections. Resolution No. 8752
also set the deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation on February 12, 2010 and required that accreditation applicants be
registered political parties, organizations or coalitions.
On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same
date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC)
and asked that it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections.[4] It was
docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 that it was an accreditation case.
On February 23, 2010, the LP filed its Opposition[5] to the NP-NPCs petition on the following grounds:
1)

The NP-NPCs petition should be denied since it was not a duly registered coalition of political parties at
the time of filing of their petition for accreditation as dominant minority party;

2)
3)
4)
5)

The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for registration as a coalition because
the petition should have been first brought before the proper Division;
The petition for registration as a coalition was filed with the Clerk of the Commission instead of the Law
Department in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
The petition for registration as a coalition was filed beyond the August 17, 2009 deadline set by the
COMELEC; and
The respective chapters, incumbents and candidates of the NP and the NPC separately cannot be taken
into account for purposes of accreditation as dominant minority party because the NP-NPC as a coalition is
an entirely different entity.

The COMELEC issued an Order dated February 16, 2010 and a Notice of Hearing on February 17, 2010 setting for
hearing the petitions for accreditation for the purpose of determining the dominant majority party, dominant minority party, ten (10)
major national parties and two (2) major local parties in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections. Among the petitions set for
hearing were the LPs and the NP-NPCs petitions for accreditation as the dominant minority party.[6]
On March 9, 2010, the LP presented Rep. Lualhati Antonino (a member of the NPCs National Convention) as its
witness.[7] Rep. Antonino testified, among others, that the NPC National Convention did not authorize its National Central
Committee to enter into a coalition with the NP,[8] and that neither the National Convention nor the general membership was ever
consulted about the merger with the NP.[9]
On March 10, 2010, the NP-NPC presented former Gov. Faustino Dy, Jr. as its witness to refute Rep. Antoninos
testimony.[10] On March 15, 2010, the LP and the NP-NPC filed their respective Memoranda.[11]
b.

The Assailed COMELEC Resolution

On April 12, 2010, the en banc granted the NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition through the Resolution
assailed in the present case. In the same Resolution, theen banc deferred the resolution of the NP-NPCs application for
accreditation as dominant minority party.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the en banc citing Baytan v. Comelec[12] held that the registration of coalitions involves the
exercise of its administrative powers and not its quasi-judicial powers; hence, the en banc can directly act on it. It further held that
there is no constitutional requirement that a petition for registration of a coalition should be decided first by a division. In Baytan, the
Court held that the Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative powers in the Commission on Elections, while
providing that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions. Thus, the en banc can act directly on matters falling within its
administrative powers.
The en banc ruled further that although the NP-NPCs failure to file the petition with the Law Department constituted a
violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules), the en banc has the discretion to suspend the application of the
rules in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases; [13] in any case, the authority to approve or deny the Law Departments
recommendation on the registration of the coalition rests with the en banc.
On the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the en banc held that no rule exists setting a deadline for the registration of
coalitions. It opined that the registration of a coalition is simply a recognition by the COMELEC of a political reality. It held that if the
NP-NPC is genuine, then the approval of its registration by the COMELEC is a mere recognition of an operative fact.
On the merits, the en banc found that both the NP and the NPC have validly agreed to join forces for political or election
purposes. It held that the NP-NPC satisfactorily submitted all the documentary requirements to prove the mergers validity. It
opined, too, that if the Constitution and By-Laws of either the NP or the NPC was violated by the merger, the representatives or
members of either party possess the legal standing to question the coalition; the LP, a stranger to the internal dynamics of both
parties, does not have this required standing.
The en banc noted that no representative from either the NP or the NPC ever filed any formal opposition to the NP-NPC
petition for registration and accreditation. It thus concluded that hardly any controversy existed for it to resolve. At the same time, it
disregarded Rep. Antoninos testimony, since she lost her NPC membership when she admitted support for the candidacy of Sen.
Manuel A. Roxas II the Liberal Party candidate for vice-president a ground provided under the Constitution

and By-Laws of the NPC.[14]

c.
The Sarmiento Dissent
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented on various grounds.[15] First, he ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc
had no jurisdiction over NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition and accreditation as dominant minority party.
Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules governs the registration of coalitions. Rule 32 is found under Letter F of the Rules entitled
Special Proceedings. According to Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules, the Commission sitting in two (2) Divisions, shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases falling under special proceedings, with the exception of the accreditation of citizens arms of
the COMELEC. The dissent concluded that the present petition is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC sitting in Division and not
of the COMELEC sitting en banc, citing Villarosa v. COMELEC.[16]
Commissioner Sarmiento secondly took the position that the relaxation of the Rules is inappropriate in the present case.
In general, election laws may be divided into three parts for purposes of applying the rules of statutory construction. The first
part refers to the provisions for the conduct of elections that election officials are required to follow; these provisions are merely
directory. The second part covers those provisions that candidates for office are required to comply with and are necessarily
mandatory. The last part embraces those procedural rules designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the
elections; this requires liberal construction. The NP-NPCs petition falls under the second part, so the applicable requirements of
law are mandatory. The dissent argued that the relaxation of the rules is not applicable to the present case, because it does not
involve the determination of the will of the electorate; thus, the rules governing the registration of coalitions should be construed
strictly and not liberally.
Commissioner Sarmientos third point is that no valid coalition was formed between the NP and the NPC.
He pointed out that the Constitutions and By-Laws of both parties require that the parties respective National Conventions
give their approval before their parties can enter into any coalition agreement with another political party. The dissent found that the
records are bereft of any proof that the National Conventions of both the NP and the NPC authorized their officers to form the NPNPC. The dissent held that the action of the Executive Committees of the NP and the NPC in issuing the Joint Resolution (declaring
the NP-NPC merger) was a clear violation of the parties Constitutions and By-Laws and was thus ultra vires and void.
The dissent also branded the NP-NPC as a sham whose sole purpose was to secure dominant minority party status. The
Commissioner noted that members of the NP and NPC are pitted against each other and are vying for the same election positions
an absurd situation in a coalition, since no alliance for a common cause can exist if members of the component parties are
competing against each other for the same positions.
Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out as his last point that the NP-NPC cannot seek accreditation as the dominant
minority party without the requisite recognition by the COMELEC.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 requires that only political parties duly registered with the COMELEC may seek
accreditation as a dominant party. At the time the NP-NPC filed its petition for accreditation on February 12, 2010, it was still
seeking registration as a coalition of political parties. By filing the petition, both the NP and the NPC admitted that the COMELEC
had not extended any recognition to their coalition; without the requisite recognition and registration, the NP-NPC could not seek
accreditation as the dominant minority party for the May 10, 2010 elections.
The dissent also noted that the NP-NPC could no longer seek accreditation since the deadline for filing a petition for
accreditation had lapsed. Finally, while the NP and NPC are both duly accredited political parties, their recognition cannot benefit
the NP-NPC, since the latter seeks accreditation as an entity separate and distinct from both the NP and the NPC.
II. THE PETITION
The LP now assails the April 12, 2010 COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, as
follows:
1)
The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain petitions for registration of
political coalitions;
2)
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the registration of the purported NP-NPC
coalition despite the lapse of the deadline for registration;
3)
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the registration of the purported NP-NPC
coalition despite patent and manifest violations of the NPC Constitution and By-Laws; and
4)
The purported NP-NPC coalition is a bogus, sham and paper coalition that makes a mockery of the
electoral process.[17]
In support of its petition, the petitioner attached the Sworn Affidavits of two prominent members of the NPC, namely: Atty.
Sixto S. Brillantes (the current NPC Legal Counsel) and Daniel Laogan (a member of the NPCs National Central Committee) to
show that the NP-NPC was entered into without consultations; much less, the approval of the NPCs National Convention which was
not even convened.[18]
a.

Comments from the OSG and the COMELEC

On April 27, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment. The OSG
manifested that the duty to appear and defend on their behalf and on behalf of the COMELEC falls on the respondents, since they
are the real parties interested in upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution. The COMELEC, as a mere nominal party, does not
need to file a separate comment. We responded to the OSGs manifestation by requiring the COMELEC to file its own comment,
which it did on May 4, 2010.
On the merits, the OSG argues that the present petition is premature. It notes that the petitions real thrust is to foreclose
the possibility that respondent NP-NPC would be declared the dominant minority party in the coming May 10, 2010 elections. The
OSG emphasizes that the assailed COMELEC Resolution only affirmatively resolved the registration of the NP-NPC, not its
accreditation. Thus, the petitions core issue is not yet ripe for adjudication. As expressly indicated in the assailed Resolution, the
accreditation has yet to be the subject of a coming separate resolution.
The OSG also argues that no violation of due process attended the registration process, since the petitioner was given the
opportunity to be heard. The OSG notes that the petitioner filed its Opposition to the NP-NPCs application for registration and
accreditation before the COMELEC. In addition, hearings were scheduled and held where the COMELEC allowed the petitioner to
submit its evidence, both testimonial and documentary.
The COMELECs comment is practically a reiteration of the rulings in the assailed Resolution, heretofore
summarized. For this reason, we shall no longer reflect on and repeat the COMELECs positions in detail.
b.

The NP-NPC Coalitions Comment

In their Comment, the respondents argue that the present petition should be dismissed outright since it is plagued
with procedural infirmities.
First, the respondents contend that the petitioner violated Section 5(2) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which requires that
the petition be accompanied by certified true copies of such material portions of the record the petition referred to. The respondents
point out that the petitioner failed to attach the required certified true copies of the documents to its petition.
Second, the respondents argue that the petitioner unjustifiably failed to implead the NP-NPC as a party to the present
case. The respondents contend that NP-NPC is a real party-in-interest, as well as an indispensable party without the participation of
which no final determination of the case can be secured.
Third, the respondents argue that the present petition raises mere errors of judgment that are not within the Courts
authority to act upon under its certiorari jurisdiction, since the present petition merely assails the en bancs appreciation of facts and
evidence.
On the merits, the respondents aver that the en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the registration of
the NP-NPC.
First, the respondents argue that that the en banc had jurisdiction to entertain their petition for registration of the NPNPC. The respondents emphasize that the NP-NPCs registration falls within the ambit of the COMELECs administrative powers;
hence, the en banc properly assumed jurisdiction over their petition.
The respondents cite Baytan v. COMELEC[19] as authority for its position. The Court held in this cited case that the
COMELECs administrative powers include the registration of political parties and coalitions under Section 2 (5) of Article IX of the
Constitution. The Court also ruled that since the Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative powers in the
Commission on Elections while providing that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two Divisions, the en banc can act directly on
matters falling within its administrative powers.
Second, the respondents also contend that their petition for registration as a coalition is not time-barred. They argue that the
August 17, 2009 deadline applied only to political parties; and to parties, organizations and coalitions under the party-list
system. The respondents emphasize that there is no deadline for petitions for the registration of coalition of parties, since
COMELEC Resolution No. 8646 has not specifically set a deadline. Thus, they conclude that the August 17, 2009 deadline applies
only to the registration of new and unregistered political parties, and not to the registration of coalitions between previously
registered political parties such as the NP and the NPC.
Third, the respondents point out that the NP-NPC was validly formed, and that the requisite approvals were duly
obtained. The respondents contend that the en bancs factual findings on the formation of the coalition and the submission and
approval of the requisite documents are supported by substantial evidence, and thus are final and binding on this Court. The
respondents emphasize that the 1993 Revised Rules of the NP does not require the approval of the National Convention for
purposes of coalescing with another political party; neither do the Rules confer on the National Convention the power to approve a
coalition with another political party. Similarly, the respondents point out that the NPCs Constitution and By-Laws is silent on and
does not confer any power to approve a coalition with another political party. The respondents emphasize that they cannot violate a
non-existent requirement; Rep. Antonino in fact affirmed that there is no specific provision in the NPCs Constitution and By-Laws
relating to a coalition with another party.
The respondents argue that NPC Chairman Dys testimony adequately showed that the NP-NPC was entered into after
meetings and consultations with party members and the NPC national organization; in fact, 70%-75% of those consulted supported
the coalition. The respondents also aver that it is a common party practice that the NPC National Convention decides through a
series of small meetings of leaders and members, whether to arrive at a consensus.

The respondents point out that, to date, no member of the NP or NPC has ever expressed his or her objection to the NPNPC. The respondents emphasize that the wisdom of entering into a coalition is strictly an internal matter; and no third party such
as the LP, not even the courts, can interfere. The respondents cite Sinaca v. Mula[20] as authority that political parties are generally
free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision.
Fourth, the respondents contend that Commissioner Sarmientos thesis that the coalition is a sham since they are fielding
contending candidates is baseless. As explained in the hearings, the NP and NPC agreed on an arbitration procedure to settle
these conflicts, although no arbitration has taken place to date, since the registration of the NP-NPC has not attained finality.
Fifth, the respondents contend that the newspaper reports presented by the petitioner to show that there was no valid NPNPC is inadmissible and carries no probative value for being hearsay. The respondents further argue that the affidavits of Atty. Sixto
Brillantes and Daniel Laogan, attached to the present petition, are inadmissible as the Court cannot receive evidence or conduct a
trial de novo under its certiorari jurisdiction. In addition, the respondents argue that the affidavits are hearsay evidence, since Atty.
Brillantes and Daniel Laogan were never presented during the hearings before the en banc and were not subjected to crossexamination. Finally, the respondents point out that the subject matter of Atty. Brillantes affidavit is covered by the attorney-client
privilege; he was the NPCs general counsel who represented the NPC in all legal proceedings.
III. THE ISSUES
The parties positions raise the following issues for resolution:
1.

Preliminary Issues:
a.
Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical infirmities?
b.
Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled
NP-NPC issue?
c.
Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, timebarred?
i. Is the NP-NPC an operative fact that the COMELEC simply has to note and recognize
without need of registration?
2. Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the petition?
3. On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed
the registration of the NP-NPC?
a. Was due process observed in granting the registration?
b. Did the coalition take place as required by law:
i. in terms of compliance with internal rules of the NP and the NPC?
ii. in terms of the consent to or support for, and the lack of objection to, the coalition?

IV. THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

a.

Preliminary Considerations

1.

The technical and procedural questions

We have indicated many times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical and procedural objections is the
nature of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues are solely confined to the parties private interests and carry no
massive ripple effects directly affecting the public,[21] but have viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues
raised when grave public interests are involved. [22] Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical and procedural where
Court intervention has become imperative.[23] Thus, we have recognized exceptions to the threshold issues of ripeness [24] and
mootness[25] of the petitions before us, as well as questions on locus standi.[26] We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities
where the issues raised, because of the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or weight as precedents
deserve the Courts attention and active intervention.[27]
We see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of interests involved which are indisputably important to the
coming electoral exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the
benefits these recognitions provide particularly, the on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to official election
results; theper diems from the government that watchers of accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the printing, storage
and distribution of ballots that the dominant-party status brings constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if
only in terms of the ready information enabling them to react faster to developing situations.[28] The value of these advantages
exponentially rises in an election under an automated system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are
question marks to some. To the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of equitable
party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small measure to transparency and to the elections
credibility.

Thus, our focus is on the core issues that confront us and the parties, by-passing the technical and procedural questions
raised that do not anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and concentrating as well on
the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties involved and the COMELEC can move on to their assigned timesensitive roles and tasks in the coming elections.
We note that while the respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the petition, their objection is a formal
one as they do not deny the existence and basic correctness of these attachments. We see no resulting harm or prejudice therefore
if we overrule the objection raised, given the weight of the counterbalancing factors we considered above. [29]
We do not likewise find the failure to formally implead the NP-NPC a sufficient reason to dismiss the petition
outright. Without any finally confirmed registration in the coalitions favor, NP-NPC does not legally exist as a coalition with a
personality separate and distinct from the component NP and NPC parties. We find it sufficient that the NP and the NPC have
separately been impleaded; as of the moment, they are the real parties-in-interest as they are the parties truly interested in legally
establishing the existence of their coalition. Again, we find no resulting harm or prejudice in the omission to implead NP-NPC, as
the component parties have voiced out the concerns the coalition would have raised had it been impleaded as a separate and
properly existing personality.
The respondents next argue that the petitions cited grounds are mere errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This objection can be read as a facial objection to the petition or
as a substantive one that goes into the merits of the petition. We will discuss under the present topic the facial objection, as it is a
threshold issue that determines whether we shall proceed to consider the case or simply dismiss the petition outright.
A facial objection is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous
applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. After due consideration,
we conclude that the petition passes the facial objection test.
In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[30] the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, gave a very succinct exposition of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in relation to
errors of law. The Court then said:
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is
limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
xxxx
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of
jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of
the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently,
an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble
through the original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the
purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis either of the law
or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the
court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province
of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment
appeal is the remedy. [Emphasis supplied.]
The most obvious ground cited in the petition that, if properly established, would constitute grave abuse of discretion is the
alleged unwarranted action of the en banc in acting on the registration of the NP-NPC when the COMELECs own Rules of
Procedure provides that registration is under the jurisdiction of the Division at the first instance. This alleged error is more than an
error of law. If this cited ground is correct, then the en banc acted without legal authority and thereby committed a jurisdictional
transgression;[31] its action, being ultra vires, would be a nullity.

Another allegation of an ultra vires act is that the COMELEC, by appropriate resolution, ordered that August 17, 2009 be
the cut-off date for the registration of parties, and yet approved the registration of NP-NPC long after this cut-off date had passed
without any valid justification or reason for suspending the rule. For the en banc to so act was not a mere error of law. The grant of
registration was an act outside mandatory legal parameters and was therefore done when the COMELEC no longer had the
authority to act on it. In this sense, it is a proper allegation of grave abuse of discretion under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
In our view, these jurisdictional challenges to the en banc Resolution, if established, constitute ultra vires acts
that would render the Resolution void.
b.

Prematurity

Is the present petition premature, since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC accreditation
issue?
This is another threshold issue, raised this time by the OSG, and we rule that the OSGs objection has no merit.
The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for registration as a coalition and
accreditation as the dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and
in fact decreed the NP-NPCs registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation aspect of the petition.
The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters that are
substantively distinct from each other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election
laws;[32] accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered
parties.[33]
Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules regulate the registration of political
parties, organizations or coalitions of political parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by COMELEC Resolution No.
8752, Section 1 of which states that the petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the Commission who shall docket it
as an SPP (DM) case, in the manner that the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC was docketed. While the registration of
political parties is a special proceeding clearly assigned to a Division for handling under the COMELEC Rules, [34] no similar clear-cut
rule is available for a petition for accreditation as a dominant party. We thus make no statement on this point, as it is not a matter in
issue.
Under the circumstances of the present case where the registration was handled at the en banc, action at the COMELEC
ended upon the en bancs issuance of the assailed Resolution; under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules, a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling is a prohibited pleading, except in election offense cases. Any request for accreditation that
may be filed is conceptually a separate matter for the COMELEC to handle. Thus, after the en banc issued the assailed Resolution
resolving the NP-NPCs application for registration as a coalition, the COMELECs part in the registration process was brought to a
close, rendering the Resolution ripe for review by this Court.
The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling the accreditation of the respondent NP-NPC; the petition
expressly and frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and restraining order to prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a
coalition that is not registered as a party. The combination of a petition for certiorari and for prohibition under the circumstances of
the present case is fully justified, as the registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with and in fact
sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried
out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing
of a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected as a logical remedial move; otherwise,
accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its
avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event the accreditation that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take
place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorari questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the
nullification of a past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection based on prematurity is
shown to be completely groundless.
c.

Timeliness

Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, time-barred?
This issue, raised by the petitioner, strikes at the heart of the petition that the assailed COMELEC Resolution passed
upon, and that the divided en banc decided in the NP-NPCs favor.
Our short answer to the question posed is: yes, the NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition is timebarred. Thus, the en banc was wrong in ordering the out-of-time registration of the NP-NPC coalition.
Admittedly, Resolution No. 8646 simply states that August 17, 2009 is the [L]ast day for filing petitions for registration of
political parties, without mentioning organizations and coalitions in the way that the three entities are separately mentioned under
Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules. Resolution No. 8646, however, is
simply a listing of electoral activities and deadlines for the May 10, 2010 elections; it is not in any way a resolution aimed at
establishing distinctions among political parties, organizations, and coalitions. In the absence of any note, explanation or reason

why the deadline only mentions political parties, the term political parties should be understood in its generic sense that covers
political organizations and political coalitions as well.
To rule otherwise is to introduce, through a COMELEC deadline-setting resolution, a meaning or intent into Section 2(5),
Article IX-C, which was not clearly intended by the Constitution or by the COMELEC Rules; Resolution No. 8646 would effectively
differentiate between political parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the other.
In fact, no substantial distinction exists among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify creating
distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Such distinctions in the deadlines for the registration of political organizations and
coalitions, if allowed, may even wreak havoc on the procedural orderliness of elections by allowing these registrations to introduce
late and confusing signals to the electorate, not to mention their possible adverse effects on election systems and procedures. This,
the en banc very well knows, and their lack of unanimity on the disputed point of timeliness shows how unusual the majoritys
reading has been.
The en bancs failure to follow its own rules on deadlines may, at first blush, be a negligible error that does not affect its
jurisdiction (assuming for the sake of argument that the en banc has the authority to act at the first instance). An examination of
Resolution No. 8646, however, shows that the deadline for registration cannot but be a firm and mandatory deadline that the
COMELEC has set.
We note in this regard that the registration of parties is the first in a list of election-related activities that peaks in the voting
on May 10, 2010. This list takes into account the close step-by-step procedure the COMELEC has to undertake in implementing the
automated election system (AES). We note, too, that a closely related activity is the holding of political conventions to select and
nominate official party candidates for all election positions, scheduled on October 21, 2009, [35] and November 20, 2009 was the
deadline for the filing of the certificates of candidacy for all elective positions an undertaking that required the candidates
manifestation of their official party affiliation. There is also a host of election activities in which officially registered parties have to
participate, principally: the examination and testing of equipment or devices for the AES and the opening of source codes for
review;[36] the nomination of official watchers;[37] and the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots wherein accredited
political parties may assign watchers.[38] Of course, registered political parties have very significant participation on election day,
during the voting and thereafter; the COMELEC needs to receive advance information and make arrangements on which ones are
the registered political parties, organizations and coalitions.
All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but be mandatory; the whole electoral exercise may fail
or at least suffer disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason, the COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected
applications for registration for having been filed out of time. A case in point is the application of the political party Philippine
Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.,[39] where the COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been filed out of time, [40] among
other grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might not have been the only political party whose application for registration was
denied at the COMELEC level for late filing. We are sure that all these other organizations would now cry foul and rightly so
because of the denial of their applications on the ground of late filing, when the NP-NPC has been made an exception without
rhyme or reason.
Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change (as contrasted to an ad hoc change or a
suspension of the deadline in favor of a party in the course of application), the en banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register political
parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Effectively, the mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should
have been satisfied and was not. Where conditions that authorize the exercise of a general power are wanting, fatal excess of
jurisdiction results.[41]
Separately from the above consideration, we view the en bancs position that the deadline for registration is only for
political parties and not for organizations and coalitions to be preposterous, given the importance of the participation of political
parties in the election process and the rigid schedules that have to be observed in order to implement automated elections as
efficiently and as harmoniously as possible. We note that the COMELEC has not even bothered to explain why it imposed a
deadline applicable only to political parties, but not to political organizations and coalitions. In our view, this kind of ruling was
patently unreasonable, made as it was without basis in law, in fact or in reason; and was a grave abuse of discretion that
fatally afflicted the assailed COMELEC Resolution.[42]
1.

The Operative Fact Issue

Other than the matter of timeliness which is an open-and-shut consideration under the clear deadline imposed, the more
important issue is raised by the statement in the assailed Resolution that the coalition was an operative fact that the en banc could
note and thereafter recognize, thereby implying that coalitions of political parties may not need any separate registration if the
component parties are already registered.
Whether one party would coalesce or work together in partnership, or in close collaboration with another party for
purposes of an electoral exercise, is a matter that the lawas a rule does not and cannot regulate. This is a part of the freedom of
choice derived from the freedom of individuals constituting the political parties to choose their elected leaders, [43] as well as from the
concepts of democracy and sovereignty enshrined in our Constitution. [44] This is a freedom, too, that cannot but be related to
individuals associational rights under the Bill of Rights.[45] We mention this freedom, as it was apparently the basis for the operative
fact that the assailed COMELEC Resolution spoke of. In effect, the assailed Resolution implied that registered political parties are
well within their right to coalesce; and that this coalition, once proven, should already bind the COMELEC, rendering registration a
mere recognition of an operative fact, i.e., a mere ministerial formality.

We categorically reject this COMELEC position and its implication; the freedom to coalesce or to work together in an
election to secure the vote for chosen candidates is different from the formal recognition the Constitution requires for a political
party, organization or coalition to be entitled to full and meaningful participation in the elections and to the benefits that proceed from
formal recognition. Registration and the formal recognition that accompanies it are required, as the words of the Constitution
themselves show, because of the Constitutions concern about the character of the organizations officially participating in the
elections. Thus, the Constitution specifies religious and ideological limitations, and in clear terms bars alien participation and
influence in our elections. This constitutional concern, among others, serves as a reason why registration is not simply a checklist
exercise, but one that requires the exercise of profound discretion and quasi-judicial adjudication by the COMELEC.[46] Registration
must be undertaken, too, under the strict formalities of the law, including the time limits and deadlines set by the proper authorities.
Explained in these terms, it is easy to discern why the operative fact that the assailed Resolution speaks of cannot
simply be equated with the formal requirement of registration, and why this process should be handled in all seriousness by the
COMELEC. To carry this statement further, the Constitution itself has spoken on the matter of registration and the applicable
processes and standards; there can be no dispute about the wisdom, propriety, reasonableness or advisability of the constitutional
provision and the standards and processes it imposed. Only the people as a sovereign can dwell on these matters in their
consideration of the Constitution in a properly called political exercise. In this sense, the question of whether a coalition of
registered parties still needs to be registered is a non-issue for being beyond the power of this Court to resolve; this Court can only
rule that the Constitution has set the norms and procedures for registration, and these have to be followed.
To sum up, political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be
recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different
legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce
with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their
members democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure
the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be
accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these constitutional terms.
2.

The Jurisdictional and Other Questions Raised

Aside from the threshold and timeliness questions we have extensively discussed, this case raises other important
questions as well that, without the time constraints the coming elections impose on us, would have been fertile areas for discussion
in exploring the limits and parameters of COMELEC authority on the registration of coalitions. These questions, however, are not for
us to answer now, given our time constraints and the decisive impact on the present case of our ruling on timeliness. Thus, we
reserve for another case and another time the answers to these no less important questions.
We solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the
registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party registration raises critical election
concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The
COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures the Constitution and our
laws impose.
In light of the time constraints facing the COMELEC and the parties as the election is no more than a week away, we find it
compelling to declare this Decision immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and, accordingly, NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated April 12, 2010 in the application for registration of the Nacionalista PartyNationalist Peoples Coalition as a political coalition, docketed as SPP-10-(DM). The Commission on Elections is DECLARED
BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition in the May 10, 2010 elections for lack of the requisite
registration as a political coalition. This Decision is declared immediately executory. No costs.

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS

V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G.
VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ,
SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO,
SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ,
HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G.
MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 188920

Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,

- versus -

Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and
Promulgated:
J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA,
Respondents.
February 16, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a leadership dispute within a political
party. In this case, the petitioners question their expulsion from that party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders
conducted by the respondents.
Statement of the Facts and the Case
For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in order.
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his
partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr.
(Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement
without consulting his party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but,
when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with
Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition[1] with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify
the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and
the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP
Constitution,[2] party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.
On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006
assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to people power, wherein the LP majority removed
respondent Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also said that the amendments[3] to the original LP Constitution, or the
Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and
the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,[4] partially granting respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the
March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of

petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga
Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed
to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.
Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a
resolution,[5] granting respondent Drilons petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that
the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and
that, as a consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine
NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons
associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of the
NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R.
Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory
and prohibitory injunction[6] before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary
general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which
elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to
have been based on a list appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as
common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103 members.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting
and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of guests during the meeting. Atienzas allies allegedly
raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and railroaded the proceedings. He suspended the
meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienzas allies.
On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP president faithfully complied with the
provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the
NECO members because supervening events changed the bodys number and composition. Some NECO members had died,
voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did
not run in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public office
also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became NECO members upon respondent Drilons
nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was
not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening circumstances.
Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned
for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that
NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitionersDefensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their
party membership when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster of
LP members.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted that the
May 2007 elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made
incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or
won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which
elected Roxas as LP president was not properly convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a
membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter
that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
The Issues Presented
Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:
1.

Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; and

2.
Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to question
Roxas election.
Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:
3.
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership that elected
respondent Roxas as LP president;

4.
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the validity of the
NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and
5.
Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s constitutional right to due process by
the latters expulsion from the party.
The Courts Ruling
One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to
implead the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction against the NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to the case.[7]
But petitioners Atienza, et al.s causes of action in this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.s disenfranchisement of
Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders and in the illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were
supposedly excluded from the elections by a series of despotic acts of Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among
these acts are Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilons railroading of
election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.
Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the LP is not an
indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.s prayer for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.s acts and the reconvening of
the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.
Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to question the election
of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined
other political parties.[8] As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the action.
But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[9] legal standing in suits is governed by the real parties-in-interest
rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest. And real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising
petitioners Atienza, et al.s lack of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically
assume the truth of the allegations in the petition.
Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as
LP members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and
that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If Atienza, et al.s allegations were correct, they would
have been irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as
members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using the correct list of NECO members. To this extent,
therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Courts decision
in this case. Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this petition.
Three. In assailing respondent Roxas election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the NECO members
allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in the partys
60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the
earlier cases before the COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Courts decision in the earlier cases, said
Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Courts ruling when they removed
Atienza as party chairman and changed the NECOs composition.[10]
But the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program was drawn before the May
2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in the NECO membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the amended
LP Constitution required. Respondent Drilon adopted the souvenir program as common exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove
that the NECO, which supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had been improperly convened. It cannot
be regarded as an immutable list, given the nature and character of the NECO membership.
Nothing in the Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership should be pegged to the partys
60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not
intend the NECO membership to be permanent. Its Section 27[11] provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent senators,
members of the House of Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in good standing for at least six
months. It follows from this that with the national and local elections taking place in May 2007, the number and composition of the
NECO would have to yield to changes brought about by the elections.
Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership had to be dropped. Newly elected ones
who gained the privilege because of their offices had to come in. Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away, resigned
from the party, or went on leave could not be expected to remain part of the NECO that convened and held elections on November
26, 2007. In addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party president to nominate persons of
national stature to the NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to the admission of 12 NECO members
nominated by respondent Drilon when he was LP president. Even if this move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.s way
of ensuring their election as party officers, there was certainly nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP Constitution.

The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. explained in
details how they arrived at the NECO composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders.[12] The explanation is logical and
consistent with party rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the
NECO that elected Roxas as LP president.
Petitioner Atienza claims that the Courts resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as party chairman with a term,
like respondent Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Courts
resolution. But the Courts resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections
29[13] and 46[14] of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any officer for cause as it saw fit.
Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled on the
composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh
heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes.[15]
But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of petitioners
Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the
COMELECs finding as upheld by this Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO
held.
While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their faction, they did not specify who these
members were and how their numbers could possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party
leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did
Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al.
were totally unsupported by evidence.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on the party leadership
issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such
claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be
settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
What is more, some of petitioner Atienzas allies raised objections before the NECO assembly regarding the status of
members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the election, implying that its membership, whose composition has
been upheld, voted out those objections.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all
controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the
state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled
in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections[16] that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also
declared in another case[17] that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the
persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought
before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the
amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national
elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to
local elective posts.[18] In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the benefit of its official
candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The
resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.[19]
Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or
discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and
the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et
al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings[20] and are, therefore, covered by the due
process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.[21]
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process
standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or
functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function.[22] The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of
the
states
powers
thus,
apply
too,
to
administrative
bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is
generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect
ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter
case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted
encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private
parties.[23]
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its
citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the
right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state,
to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to
other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is
a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of
law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary
matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to
free association. In Sinaca v. Mula,[24] the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by
allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and
open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.[25]
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP president but
refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on
the COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline,
in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.

[G.R. No. 147589. June 25, 2003]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its Secretary-General,
MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW
SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE
LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL
ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under Organizations/Coalitions of Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION; LABAN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under Political Parties of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 25, 2003]
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG
BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Before the Court are Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list participants. The ultimate question raised is this: Aside
from those already validly proclaimed[1] pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates that
should be proclaimed winners? The answer to this question is circumscribed by the eight-point guideline given in our June 26, 2001
Decision in these consolidated cases, as well as by the four unique parameters of the Philippine party-list system:
First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.[2]
The Antecedents
To fully understand the matter on hand, we deem it wise to recapitulate some relevant antecedents.
On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision requiring Comelec to do the following:
x x x [I]mmediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections,
the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes
as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance
report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any winner during the last partylist election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.[3]
Comelecs First Partial
Compliance Report
In its First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, Comelec recommended that the following party-list participants be
deemed to have hurdled the eight-point guideline referred to in the aforementioned Court Decision:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA)

AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!)
LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL)
ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN)
ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA (ABA)
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)
SANLAKAS

It also recommended the disqualification of the following party-list participants for their failure to pass the guidelines:

MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA (MAD)

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC)

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP)

ABAG PROMDI (PROMDI)

NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC)

LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS)

CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC)

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP)

BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG (BUHAY)

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED)

COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO)

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION (NCIA)

ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG INDUSTRIYA NG AKLAT, INC. (AKLAT)

THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST (FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND PEOPLE) ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (MARCOS
LOYALIST)

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CREBA)

BIGKIS PINOY FOUNDATION (BIGKIS)

AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO (AKSYON)

In response to this Report, the Court issued its August 14, 2001 Resolution which partially lifted its May 9, 2001 Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO). The Court did so to enable Comelec to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the last party-list
election, with the caveat that all proclamations should be made in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant
case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000, on how to
determine and compute the winning parties and nominees in the party-list elections.
In another Resolution dated August 24, 2001, the Court again partially lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to proclaim
AKBAYAN and BUTIL as winning party-list groups, in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but
also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000.
In its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Comelec,
recommended that -- except for the modification that the APEC, BUHAY, COCOFED and CIBAC be declared as having complied
with the guidelines set forth in the June 26, 2001 Decision in the instant cases [--] the Partial Compliance Report dated July 27,
2001 be AFFIRMED.[4] But because of (1) the conflicting Comelec reports regarding the qualifications of APEC and CIBAC and
(2) the disparity in the percentage of votes obtained by AMIN, the Court in a Resolution dated November 13, 2001, required the
parties to file within 20 days from notice their respective final position papers on why APEC, CIBAC, and/or AMIN should or should
not be proclaimed winners in the last party-list elections.
Thereafter, in another Resolution dated January 29, 2002,[5] the Court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously
been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance Report.
Thus, in the same Resolution, the Court once more lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to proclaim APEC and CIBAC
as winners in the party-list elections. The Court said:
we accept Comelecs submission, per the OSG, that APEC and CIBAC have sufficiently met the 8-point guidelines of this Court
and have garnered sufficient votes to entitle them to seats in Congress. Since these issues are factual in character, we are inclined
to adopt the Commissions findings, absent any patent arbitrariness or abuse or negligence in its action. There is no substantial
proof that CIBAC is merely an arm of JIL, or that APEC is an extension of PHILRECA. The OSG explained that these are separate
entities with separate memberships. Although APECs nominees are all professionals, its membership is composed not only of
professionals but also of peasants, elderly, youth and women. Equally important, APEC addresses the issues of job creation,
poverty alleviation and lack of electricity. Likewise, CIBAC is composed of the underrepresented and marginalized and is concerned
with their welfare. CIBAC is particularly interested in the youth and professional sectors.[6]
To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial Compliance Report and its amendments, the following
nominees were validly proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBAYAN
(Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC (Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).
Comelecs Second Partial
Compliance Report

In its Second Compliance Report dated August 22, 2001 and received by this Court on August 28, 2001, Comelec recommended
that the following party-list participants[7] be deemed qualified under the Courts guidelines:
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

ABANSE! PINAY
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, AT HANAPBUHAY (AKO)
ALAGAD
SENIOR CITIZENS/ELDERY SECTORAL PARTY (ELDERLY)
ALL TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ATUCP)
MARITIME PARTY (MARITIME)
ANG BAGONG BAYANI OFW LABOR PARTY (OFW)
ANIBAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGINGISDA, AT MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA KATIPUNAN (AMMMA)
ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN)
ALYANSA NG MGA MAY KAPANSANAN SA PILIPINAS (AKAP)
MINDANAO FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION, INC. (MSCFO)
WOMENPOWER, INC. (WPI)
AGGRUPATION AND ALLIANCE OF FARMERS AND FISHERFOLKS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AAAFPI)
ALL WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS (AWATU)

In the same Compliance Report, the poll body classified the following party-list groups as unqualified:

GREEN PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION (GREEN PHIL)

PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP)
ANG LAKAS NG BAGONG KOOPERATIBA (ALAB)
PARTIDO NG MARALITANG PILIPINO PINATUBO PARTY (PMP-PINATUBO)
REBOLUSYONARYONG ALYANSANG MAKABANSA (RAM)
BAYAN NG NAGTATAGUYOD NG DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOGIYA AT LAYUNIN, INC. (BANDILA)
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION (BAGONG BAYANI)
KABATAAN NG MASANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL)
AARANGKADA ANG MGA HANDA ORAS-ORAS (AHOY)
PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (PMA)
ALLIANCE TO ALLEVIATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER, INC. (AASENSO KA)
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO SOSYALISTA NG PILIPINAS (PDSP)
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CUP)
ATIN (FORMERLY ABANTE BISAYA)
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC)
ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS CONSULTANTS AND DESIGNERS, INC. (ABCD)
LIBERAL PARTY (LP)
CITIZENS DRUGWATCH FOUNDATION, INC. (DRUGWATCH)
ALAY SA BAYAN PARA SA KALAYAAN AT DEMOKRASYA (ABAKADA)
ASOSASYON NG MGA TAGA INSURANCE SA PILIPINAS, INC. (ATIP)
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW)
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR PLANTERS (NFSP)
KABALIKAT NG BAYAN PARTY (KABALIKAT)
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN)
BANTAY BAYAN FOUNDATION PARTY, INC. (BANTAY-BAYAN)
ABANTE KILUSANG KOOPERATIBA SA GITNANG LUZON [AKK COALITION]
GREEN PHILIPPINES (GREEN)
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO)
ALLIANCE FOR GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY (AGAP)
ALYANSA NG KOOPERATIBANG PANGKABUHAYAN PARTY (ANGKOP)
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (NAD)
PEOPLE POWER PARTY (PEOPLE POWER)
PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGICAL COUNCIL (PTC)
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, INC. (PLAM)
PROFESSIONAL CRIMINOLOGIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCAP)
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT, AND PEACE (JEEP)

Comelecs Final Partial

Compliance Report
In its Final Partial Compliance Report dated September 27, 2001 and received by the Court a day later, Comelec recommended that
the following be considered as qualified party-list participants:
24. NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRICYCLE OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(NACTODAP)
25. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION, INC. (SCFO)
26. TRIBAL COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TRICAP)
27. PILIPINONG MAY KAPANSANAN (PINOY MAY K)
28. VETERANS CARE AND WELFARE ORGANIZATION (VETERANS CARE)
29. UNION OF THE FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. (OCW-UNIFIL)

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (DA)

PILIPINO WORKERS PARTY (PWP)
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS (PARP)
ALLIANCE OF RETIRED POSTAL EMPLOYEES AND SENIOR CITIZENS, INC. (ARPES)
AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. (ARBA)
FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FEJODAP)
GABAY NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO PARTY (GABAY-OFW)
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OF SETTLERS (AASAHAN)
ALLIANCE FOR YOUTH SOLIDARITY (AYOS)
PARTY FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS AND EMPOWERMENT AND RE-INTEGRATION (POWER)
KILOS KABATAAN PILIPINO (KILOS)
KALOOB-KA ISANG LOOB PARA SA MARANGAL NA PANINIRAHAN (KALOOB)
ALYANSA NG MGA MAMAMAYAN AT MANDARAGAT SA LAWA NG LAGUNA, INC. (ALYANSA)
DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (DFP)
PARTIDO KATUTUBONG PILIPINO (KATUTUBO)

Further, the Comelec recommended the disqualification of the following party-list groups:

AALAGAHAN ANG ATING KALIKASAN (ALAS)

PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS (PSAE)

PARTIDO PARA SA DEMOKRATIKONG REPORMA (PDR)

CONSUMERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CONSUMERS)

CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (CONSLA)

PEOPLES PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND GOOD GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY
AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT (PAG-ASA)

AHONBAYAN, INC. (AHONBAYAN)

ANGAT

SAMA-SAMA KAYA NATIN TO FOUNDATION, INC. (KASAMA)

A PEACEFUL ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP, FRIENDSHIP, SERVICE MOVEMENT (APO)

PHILIPPINE DENTAL ASSOCIATION (PDA)

PUSYON (BISAYA) PILIPINO (PUSYON)

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)

CITIZENS ANTI-CRIME ASSISTANCE GROUP, INC. (CAAG)

ASA AT SAMAHAN NG KARANIWANG PILIPINO (ASAKAPIL)

BUSINESSMEN AND ENTREPRENEURS ASSOCIATION, INC. (BEA)

UNITED ARCHITECTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (UAP)

ABAY PAMILYA FOUNDATION, INC. (ABAY PAMILYA)

PEOPLES REFORM PARTY (PRP)

COALITION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND WELFARE (COALITION 349)

RIZALIST PARTY (RP)

NATIONAL URBAN POOR ASSEMBLY (NUPA)

ALLIANCE FOR MERITOCRACY (AFM)

BALIKATAN SA KABUHAYAN BUHAY COALITION (BSK)

BANTAY DAGAT, INC. (BDI)

CONFEDERATION OF HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION FOR REFORMS IN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENT, INC.
(HOMEOWNERS)

PORT USERS CONFEDERATION, INC. (PUC)

LABAN PARA SA KAPAYAPAAN, KATARUNGAN, AT KAUNLARAN (KKK)

BONDING IDEALISM FOR NATIONAL HUMAN INITIATIVE (BINHI)

KATIPUNAN NG MGA BANTAY BAYAN SA PILIPINAS (KABAYAN)

FEDERATION OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF PHIL. VETERANS, INC. (LAHING VETERANO)

PRIME MOVERS FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS (PRIMO)

PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF CITIZENS FOR DEMOCRACY (PACD)

COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS (CAP)

TAPAT FOUNDATION, INC. (TAPAT)

ALLIANCE FOR ALLEVIATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND TRUST PARTY (AKA)

ANG IPAGLABAN MO FOUNDATION (AIM)

PHILIPPINE MINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT (PMSEA)

BICOL SARO PARTY (BSP)

AABANTE KA PILIPINAS PARTY (SAGIP BAYAN MOVEMENT) (APIL)

PHILIPPINE PEOPLES PARLIAMENT (PPP-YOUTH)

SPORTS AND HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (SHAF)

KILUSAN TUNGO SA PAMBANSANG TANGKILIKAN, INC. (KATAPAT)

CITIZENS FOUNDATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES AND INJUSTICES, INC. (CITIZEN)

NACIONALISTA PARTY (NP) (Withdrew participation in the party-list election)

SANDIGANG MARALITA (SM)

ONEWAY PRINTING TECHNICAL FOUNDATION, INC. (ONEWAY PRINT)

PHILIPPINE JURY MOVEMENT (JURY)

ALTERNATIVE ACTION (AA)

DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY (DWP)

SECURITY UNITED LEAGUE NATIONWIDE GUARDS, INC. (SULONG)

ORGANISASYONG KAUGNAYAN NASYONAL SA PAG-UNLAD (O.K. NAPU)
PAMBANSANG SANGGUNIANG KATIPUNAN NG BARANGAY KAGAWAD SA PILIPINAS (KATIPUNAN)
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (NCCO)
NATIONWIDE ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMERS, INC. (NACI)
LUZVIMINDA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (LEDFI)
TINDOG PARA HAN KABUBUWASON HAN WARAYNON (TINDOG WARAY)
FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (FLRF)
KATRIBU MINDANAO, INC. (KATRIBU)
DEMOKRATIKONG UGNAYAN TAPAT SA SAMBAYANAN (DUGTUNGAN)
KATARUNGAN SA BAYAN TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG SAMBAYANAN (KABATAS)
GO! GO! PHILIPPINES MOVEMENT
PAMBANSANG SAMAHANG LINGKOD NG BAYAN, INC. (PASALBA)
PHILIPPINE REFORMIST SOCIETY (PRS)
GABAYBAYAN (GAD)
ALUHAY NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. (ALUHAI)
ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT TO ENHANCE THE NATIONAL AGENDA (OSMEA)

All these Compliance Reports have already been affirmed by this Court except that, in regard to the First Compliance Report, it
agreed -- as earlier stated -- to add APEC and CIBAC to the list of qualified groups.
Other Significant
Orders and Pleadings
Under its Resolution No. NBC-02-001,[8] Comelec motu proprio amended its Compliance Reports by, inter alia, adding four more
party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001
elections.
In its Comment dated November 15, 2002, the OSG opined that Comelec acted correctly in revising its Party-List Canvass Report
No. 26, so as to reflect the correct number of votes cast in favor of qualified party-list parties and organizations.[9] Consequently, it
moved to lift our TRO with respect to COCOFED, BUHAY, SANLAKAS and PM, because [a]s shown in the revised COMELEC
Party-list Canvass Report No. 26, movants BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM received 4.25%, 3.35%, 2.21% and 3.17%,
respectively, of the total votes cast[10] in the May 14, 2001 party-list election.[11]
It added that the proclamation by the COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM (as well as all other qualified parties
and organizations which received at least 2% of the total votes cast in the same party-list election) as winners in the said party-list is
in order.[12]
However, in its November 25, 2002 Comment, the OSG contended that NCIA, which is not a qualified party or organization per the
Comelec [First] Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, cannot be proclaimed as winner in the last party-list elections.[13] It
also recommended that ABAs Motion to lift the TRO with respect to its proclamation should be likewise granted, because it is a
qualified party or organization that hurdled the 2% threshold in the last party-list elections. For, ABA received 3.54% of the votes
cast in the said party-list elections, as shown in COMELEC Resolution No. NBC-02-001. ABAs proclamation as winner is therefore
in order.[14]
Preparatory to resolving the present Motions and in observance of due process, the Court resolved on February 18, 2003 to require
the parties, including the OSG, to submit their respective Position Papers on the following issues:
1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,[15] Grego v. Comelec[16] and related cases should be deemed applicable to the determination of
winners in party-list elections
2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualified for having failed to meet the eight-point
guideline contained in our June 26, 2001 Decision should be deducted from the total votes cast for the party-list system during the
said elections
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon the claims of the OSG that the initial recommendation contained in Comelecs First
Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, regarding BUHAY and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that these two party-list
groups should be deemed qualified.
Qualification of
BUHAY and COCOFED
In recommending the disqualification of BUHAY for being most probably merely an extension of the El Shaddai, a religious group,
Comelec said in the above-mentioned Report:
Upon hearing the case for BUHAY, the Commission determined that, based upon BUHAYs declarations of intent in its constitution,
upon its avowed platform of government which both mirror the sentiments of the El Shaddai Movement and upon the
circumstances surrounding its relationship with the El Shaddai Movement, BUHAY is most probably merely an extension of the El

Shaddai. In this light, it is very likely that the relationship between the leader of the El Shaddai, and the nominee of BUHAY is less
a matter of serendipity than an attempt to circumvent the statutory prohibition against sects or denominations from participating in
the party-list elections.[17]
In the same Report, Comelec also stated that COCOFED did not deserve a seat in the House of Representatives, because it was
allegedly an adjunct of the government. Explained the Commission:
COCOFED is a sectoral party representing the peasantry. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization of coconut farmers and
producers, established in 1947. It has no religious affiliations. However, the records indicate that it is an adjunct of the government.
COCOFEDs Amended By-Laws specifically provides that:
The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority or his duly authorized representative shall automatically be a member of the
National Board.
The Philippine Coconut Authority is an administrative agency of the government which receives support and funding from the
national government. Thus, to have the Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority sit on the National Board of COCOFED
clearly amounts to participation of the government in the affairs of candidate which, as this Court has said, would be unfair to the
other parties, and deleterious to the objectives of the law.
Furthermore, in the Articles of Incorporation of COCOFED, it declared, as one of its primary purposes, the obtaining of possible
technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources.[18]
On the other hand, in its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the OSG -- in representation of the poll agency -- argued that
the above findings of the Comelec in regard, inter alia, to BUHAY and COCOFED are not supported by substantial evidence and,
thus, should be modified accordingly. This opinion is buttressed by the OSGs Comment dated November 15, 2002.[19]
The OSG stressed that the Comelec report on BUHAY was merely anchored on conjectures or speculations. On COCOFED, the
OSG explained that the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the COCOFED
National Board has already been deleted as early as May, 1988.
It added that while the primary purposes of COCOFEDs Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization to help explore and
obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources x x x, this
statement does not by itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or
assisted by the government.
We are convinced. For the same reasons that we concurred in the earlier accreditation of APEC and CIBAC, we accept the OSGs
position that indeed Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY and COCOFED.[20]
Therefore, we now add these two groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier mentioned and thereby increase the total to 46.
We shall now take up the main question of which parties/organizations won during the last party-list election.
Legal Effect of the Disqualifications
on the Total Votes Cast
The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of many party-list organizations has reduced the total number
of votes cast for the party-list elections. Because of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law has now been
allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.
Recall that under Section 11(b)[21] of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act), only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system are entitled to have a seat in the House of Representatives. The critical question now is
this: To determine the total votes cast for the party-list system, should the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be
deducted? Otherwise stated, does the clause total votes cast for the party-list system include only those ballots cast for qualified
party-list candidates?
To answer this question, there is a need to review related jurisprudence on the matter, especially Labo v. Comelec[22] and Grego v.
Comelec,[23] which were mentioned in our February 18, 2003 Resolution.
Labo and Grego
Not Applicable
In Labo, the Court declared that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office.[24] In other words, the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered stray.
However, this rule would be different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case,
the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed

elected.[25] In short, the votes cast for a notoriously disqualified candidate may be considered stray and excluded from the
canvass.
The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Grego, which held that the exception mentioned in Labo v. Comelec is predicated
on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the
electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[26]
Note, however, that the foregoing pronouncements (1) referred to regular elections for local offices and (2) involved the
interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6646.[27] They were not meant to cover party-list elections, which are specifically governed by RA
7941. Section 10 of this latter law clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition not entitled
to be voted for shall not be counted:
SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first vote is a vote for candidate for membership of
the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or coalition he wants
represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to
be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.
(Emphasis supplied)
The language of the law is clear; hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but merely for application.[28] Likewise, no recourse to
extrinsic aids is warranted when the language of the law is plain and unambiguous.[29]
Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego is that these cases involve single elective posts, while the present controversy
pertains to the acquisition of a number of congressional seats depending on the total election results -- such that even those
garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed winners depending on their compliance with other requirements.
RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives and is the controlling law in matters pertaining
thereto. Since Labo and Section 6 of RA 6646 came into being prior to the enactment of RA 7941, the latter is a qualification of the
former ruling and law. On the other hand, Grego and other related cases that came after the enactment of RA 7941 should be
construed as inapplicable to the latter.[30]
Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualified party-list groups from the total votes cast under the party-list system will reduce
the base figure to 6,523,185. This means that the two-percent threshold can be more easily attained by the qualified marginalized
and under-represented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of disqualified party-list participants will increase and broaden the
number of representatives from these sectors. Doing so will further concretize and give flesh to the policy declaration in RA 7941,
which we reproduce thus:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered, national and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Need for Patience
and Perseverance
BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates disqualified after the holding of the party-list
elections will result in the instability of the system. The reason is that qualified party-list candidates would be encouraged to seek
the disqualification of the other candidates for the sole purpose of attaining the needed percentage of the votes cast. Although such
scenario may be possible, we believe that the perceived instability can be alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past elections,
Comelec now has the herein qualified and disqualified participants list, which can be used for future elections; and (2) in the light of
recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec will now be guided accordingly when accrediting new candidates for the next party-list
elections and will be able to set the period for accreditation in such time and manner as to enable it to determine their qualifications
long before the elections are held.
Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance to have the marginalized and under-represented sectors ably represented in Congress.
The controversies churned during the 1998 and the 2001 party-list elections should further embolden, not distract, the nation in the
process of implementing a genuine and sound Philippine-style party-list system. At this point, the Court needs to stress what it said
in Veterans:
[T]he dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and
organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the States lawmaking body.
It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information and dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be
more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in
time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.[31]

We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for computing the number of nominees that the
party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission on
Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates conform to the principle of
proportional representation mandated by the law.
The Party-List Winners
As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast
for the party-list system. In the present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of
votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified
party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast
nationwide.
Accordingly, we will now tally and rank the qualified party-list participants during the last elections, pursuant to the approved
Comelec Compliance Reports[32] and our various Resolutions in these consolidated cases. Based on our foregoing discussion, we
will deduct the votes obtained by the 116[33] disqualified candidates from the total votes cast for the May 14, 2001 elections. The
votes for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as reported in the
Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure
representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold
for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.
To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. Be it remembered that the Commission recommended for qualification
only 42 party-list candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants we approved in
our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED) per our earlier discussion in this ruling. Table No. 1
below-lists the 46 qualified parties.
Table No. 1[34]
Rank
Group
(%)

Party-List

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

BAYAN MUNA
APEC
AKBAYAN!
BUTIL
CIBAC
BUHAY
AMIN
ABA
COCOFED
PM
SANLAKAS
ABANSE! PINAY
AKO
ALAGAD
ELDERLY
ATUCP
MARITIME
OFW
AMMMA
ANAKBAYAN
AKAP
MSCFO
WPI
AAAFPI
AWATU
NACTODAP
SCFO
TRICAP
PINOY MAY K
VETERANS CARE
OCW-UNIFIL
PWP
DA
PARP
ARPES
ARBA
FEJODAP

Votes Cast
Percentage to
Total Votes Cast

1,708,253
802,060
377,852
330,282
323,810
290,760
252,051
242,199
229,165
216,823
151,017
135,211
126,012
117,161
106,496
103,273
98,946
97,085
65,735
63,312
54,925
49,914
46,831
43,882
42,149
38,898
37,470
35,807
32,151
31,694
29,400
24,182
24,029
23,297
22,497
22,345
21,335

26.19
12.29
5.79
5.06
4.96
4.46
3.86
3.71
3.51
3.32
2.31
2.07
1.93
1.80
1.63
1.58
1.52
1.49
1.01
0.97
0.84
0.76
0.72
0.67
0.65
0.60
0.57
0.55
0.49
0.49
0.45
0.37
0.37
0.36
0.34
0.34
0.33

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
Total

GABAY OFW
AASAHAN
AYOS
POWER
KILOS
KALOOB
ALYANSA
KATUTUBO
DFP

17,777
16,787
15,871
13,050
11,170
9,137
7,882
6,602
6,600
6,523,185

0.27
0.26
0.24
0.20
0.17
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.10

The Winners and

Their Nominees
Using simple mathematics, we find that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid
votes cast. Two percent of this number is 130,464. Hence, only those qualified parties that obtained at least 130,464 votes may be
declared winners. On this basis, the winners are as follows:
Table No. 2
Rank
Group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Party-List

BAYAN MUNA
APEC
AKBAYAN!
BUTIL
CIBAC
BUHAY
AMIN
ABA
COCOFED
PM
SANLAKAS
ABANSE! PINAY

Votes Cast
Percentage to Total
Votes Cast (%)
1,708,253
802,060
377,852
330,282
323,810
290,760
252,051
242,199
229,165
216,823
151,017
135,211

26.19
12.29
5.79
5.06
4.96
4.46
3.86
3.71
3.51
3.32
2.31
2.07

We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in accordance with the formula in Veterans. For
purposes of determining the number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest number of votes) is
considered the first party. The applicable formula[35] is as follows:

Number of votes of first party =

Total votes for party-list system

Proportion of votes of first party relative to

total votes for party-list system

Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent:

1,708,253
6,523,185

26.19%

Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3) seats. This finding is pursuant to our ruling in Veterans, the
pertinent portions of which we reproduce as follows:
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast
for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall
have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to
any additional seat.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It
cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same
formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the
total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three
seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only
six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution,

therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of
the first party. [36]
As adverted to earlier, the issue of whether additional seats should be allocated to APEC, AKBAYAN, BUTIL and CIBAC will not be
addressed in this Resolution; a separate Motion (with Supplemental Motion) challenging their entitlement thereto has been filed by
BAYAN MUNA and is still pending completion as of this writing. Hence, we shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be
allocated, if any, to the other qualified parties BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY.
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats for First Party
Votes Cast for First Party
= 290,760
1,708,253

= 0.51
Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.[37] It is entitled to only one qualifying seat like all the
other qualified parties that are ranked below it, as shown in Table No. 3:
Table No. 3
Rank Party-List

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

APEC
AKBAYAN!
BUTIL
CIBAC
BUHAY
AMIN
ABA
COCOFED
PM
SANLAKAS
ABANSE! PINAY

Votes

Percentage(%)

802,060
377,852
330,282
323,810
290,760
252,051
242,199
229,165
216,823
151,017
135,211

Additional
Seats[38]

12.29
5.79
5.06
4.96
4.46
3.86
3.71
3.51
3.32
2.31
2.07

n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c
0.51
0.44
0.42
0.40
0.38
0.26
0.24

In sum, the above-named party-list winners, excluding those with a separate pending challenge, are entitled to the following
congressional seats:
1.
BAYAN MUNA
two additional seats]
2.
BUHAY
3.
AMIN
4.
ABA
5.
COCOFED
6.
PM
7.
SANLAKAS
8.
ABANSE! PINAY
Epilogue

three (3) seats [one qualifying and

one qualifying seat only

one qualifying seat only
one qualifying seat only
one qualifying seat only
one qualifying seat only
one qualifying seat only
one qualifying seat only

The determination of the winners in the last party-list elections has been neither easy nor simple. The novelty of the party-list
system in our country necessarily demanded careful study and deliberation by the Court. Principles and precedents in other
democracies of the world have not been very helpful, because our party-list law (RA 7941) has earmarked unique parameters,
giving rise to an equally distinctive Philippine-style party-list system. Our difficulties have also been aggravated by the less than firm
actions of the Commission on Elections referred to earlier, which had to be reversed based on the OSGs later submissions.
To help all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections, speed up the process of determining the party-list winners in the
future, we deem it wise to summarize the implementing process we followed in this Resolution, as follows:
1.
After the promulgation of our Decision on June 26, 2001, we directed Comelec to conduct a factual determination as to which
of the various party-list candidates had passed the eight-point guideline we instituted in that Decision. Although we gave Comelec
only 30 days to undertake the work, it was able to submit its Final Compliance Report only on September 27, 2001.
2.
Of the various parties and organizations[39] which Comelec allowed to participate in the 2001 party-list elections, it
recommended -- in its three Compliance Reports to the Court -- 42 to be qualified. Later on, four more groups were added, for a
total of 46.

3.
Next, we determined which of the 46 qualified parties garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system. To do so, we subtracted the votes obtained by the disqualified candidates from the total votes cast. Those parties,
organizations and coalitions that had obtained at least two percent of this balance were declared winners.
4.
After identifying the winners, we determined, by using the formulas mandated in Veterans v. Comelec, how many nominees
each winning party was entitled to.
5.
The foregoing process would have been finished long ago and the winners proclaimed before the end of the year 2002, had
Comelec been more resolute and exacting in the factual determinations contained in its Compliance Reports.
6.
In the interest of due process, the Court required Position Papers on the issue of whether the votes of disqualified candidates
should be deducted from the total votes cast nationwide.
7.
The two rollos of these two consolidated cases contain about 14,000 pages, because almost all of the original party-list
participants filed -- some repeatedly -- motions, pleas, position papers and so on, which all needed attention. Thus, the Court had to
devote an enormous amount of time and effort poring over, understanding, and ruling upon these submissions.
8.
In the interest of speedy justice, this matter was deliberated upon; and this Resolution was discussed, finalized and
promulgated by the Court within weeks after it had received the last Position Paper mentioned in item 6 above.
IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the winners can truly be made much more expeditiously, now that there are precedents to
guide all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections. For one thing, Comelec already has the herein base list of 46
qualified parties. For another, given the lessons and experiences in these proceedings, it can now more speedily, more carefully
and more prudently pass upon the qualifications of new candidates. Such process can even be done in advance under such rules
and regulations it may issue, consistent with the law and with our Decisions and Resolutions here and in Veterans, to pre-qualify
participants well in advance of the elections.
In closing, the Court hopes that, with each bit of wisdom they learned and after the arduous journey they experienced in our one-ofa-kind Philippine-style party-list system, the marginalized and under-represented sectors of our country will be accorded everwidening opportunities to participate in nation-building, so that they can help develop -- in peace and harmony -- a society that is
just, humane, progressive and free.
WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes cast in the last party-list elections, the
following qualified participants are DECLARED elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS
and ABANSE! PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections to proclaim -- upon finality of this Resolution -- these winners and
their respective nominees, we hereby partially LIFT our Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001, in regard to them only. It
is made permanent in regard to the rest that did not qualify and win.

[G.R. No. 152163. November 18, 2002]

SABDULLAH T. MACABAGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAMAEL M. SALACOP, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On May 22, 2001, petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the winning
candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner had a lead of 198 votes over his adversary,
private respondent Jamael M. Salacop.
On June 1, 2001, private respondent filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) against petitioner and the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors, as well as the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, docketed as SPC01-234, to annul the elections and the proclamation of candidates in the Municipality of Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. Private
respondent alleged that there was a massive substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures in
Precincts Nos. 19, 20, 28 and 29, and a failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of
Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus rendering the election process in those
precincts a sham and a mockery and the proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity. Private respondent further averred that if
his petition were to be given due course, he would win by a margin of one hundred ninety-four (194) votes over the votes of
petitioner. He thus prayed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that the election results
in Precincts 19, 20, 28 and 29 be ordered set aside and considered excluded and the proclamation of the winning candidates in the
said municipality be ANNULLED to reflect the genuine desire of the majority of the people.
All other reliefs, deemed just and equitable under the circumstances are likewise prayed for.[1]
In support of his petition, private respondent appended thereto photocopies of random Voters Registration Records (VRRs)
evidencing the fraud and deceit that allegedly permeated the electoral process, as well as affidavits tending to prove that serious
irregularities were committed in the conduct of the elections in the subject precincts.[2]
In his answer, petitioner denied the truth of the material allegations in the petition and averred that it raised a pre-proclamation
controversy. He further alleged that the grounds relied upon by private respondent would be proper in an election protest but not in
a pre-proclamation controversy.[3]
The COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and on February 11, 2002, issued an order directing the Election Officer of
Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, to bring to and produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the questioned
precincts for technical examination:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to direct Mr. Ibrahim M. Macadato, the Election Officer
of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur to produce the subject original VRRs of the questioned precincts here in Manila for the appertaining
technical examination.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In the same order, the COMELEC declared that contrary to petitioners claims, the petition did not allege a pre-proclamation
controversy. The Commission characterized the petition as one for the annulment of the election or declaration of failure of election
in the municipality, a special action covered by Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, the COMELEC set
aside the docketing of the petition as a Special Case (SPC) and ordered the redocketing thereof as a Special Action (SPA). After its
examination of the evidence submitted by petitioner, the COMELEC concluded that there was convincing proof of massive fraud in
the conduct of the elections in the four (4) precincts that necessitated a technical examination of the original copies of the VRRs and
their comparison with the voters signatures and fingerprints. The COMELEC further noted that since the lead of Macabago was
only 124 votes vis--vis the 474 voters of the contested precincts, the outcome of the petition would adversely affect the result of the
elections in the Municipality. In issuing said Order, the COMELEC relied on its broad powers under the 1987 Constitution and the
pronouncement of this Court in Pantaleon Pacis vs. Commission on Elections,[5] and Tupay Loong vs. Commission on Elections, et
al.[6]

Forthwith, petitioner filed with this Court the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, praying for the reversal of the February 11, 2002 order of the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner alleged that:
6.1.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF AND PASSED UPON THE PETITION IN SPC NO. 01-234 IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3, RULE 3 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
6.2.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS ORDER ON FEBRUARY 11, 2002 FOR THE TECHNICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE VOTERS REGISTRATION RECORDS OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS OF PRECINCT NOS. 19, 20, 28 & 29 OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SAGUIARAN, LANAO DEL SUR.[7]
The kernel issues posed in the case at bar are (a) whether petitioners recourse to this Court under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, is in order; and (b) whether the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition of private respondent and in issuing the
assailed Order.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was impelled to file the instant petition without first filing with the COMELEC a motion for a
reconsideration of its order because under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for a reconsideration of an interlocutory
order of the COMELEC En Banc is a prohibited pleading, and that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order. Private respondent on the other hand insists that under Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a special civil action for certiorari filed with this Court is proper only for the nullification of a final order
or resolution of the COMELEC and not of its interlocutory order or resolution such as the assailed order in this case.
Section 1, Rule 64, as amended, reads:
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.[8]
Under Section 2 of the same Rule, a judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC may be brought by the aggrieved party
to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65, as amended, except as therein provided. We ruled in Elpidio M. Salva, et al. vs. Hon.
Roberto L. Makalintal, et al.[9] that Rule 64 of the Rules applies only to judgments or final orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions. The rule does not apply to interlocutory orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions or to its administrative orders. In this case, the assailed order of the COMELEC declaring private respondents petition to
be one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of a failure of elections in the municipality and ordering the production of
the original copies of the VRRs for the technical examination is administrative in nature.[10] Rule 64, a procedural device for the
review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under Rule 65 from
administrative orders of said Commission issued in the exercise of its administrative function.[11]
It bears stressing that under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, judicial power is vested in the courts. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Judicial power is an antidote to and a safety net against whimsical, despotic and
oppressive exercise of governmental power. The aggrieved party may seek redress therefrom through the appropriate special civil
action provided by the Rules of Court. As to acts of the COMELEC, the special civil action may be one for certiorari pursuant to
Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution.
As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari.[12] But
when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may seek redress from this Court via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules.[13]
Private respondent cannot find solace in the pronouncement in Ruperto Ambil, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.[14] because
the subject matter of the petition therein was an interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC. This Court held that the remedy
of the aggrieved party was first to file a motion for a reconsideration of the order with the COMELEC En Banc. The raison detre
therefor is that under Rule 3, Section 6(c) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, any motion for a reconsideration of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division of the COMELEC has to be referred to and resolved by the Commission sitting En Banc. A
motion for reconsideration filed with the COMELEC En Banc of an order, ruling or resolution of a Division thereof is a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy therefrom.
We now resolve the second issue. Irrefragably, the petition before the COMELEC does not pose a pre-proclamation controversy as
defined in Article XX, Section 241 of Republic Act No. 7166, thus:
SEC. 241. Definition. A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission.[15]

Pre-proclamation controversies are properly limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before
said Board relating to particular election returns to which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections
subsequently reduced to writing. The proceedings are summary in nature; thus, the reception of evidence aliunde, e.g. the original
copies of the VRRs, is proscribed. In fine, in pre-proclamation proceedings, the COMELEC is not to look beyond or behind election
returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns.[16] Issues such as fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process,
the resolution of which would compel or necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear to be prima
facie regular, on their face, are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy. Such issues should be posed and resolved in a
regular election protest.[17]
In his petition with the COMELEC, private respondent alleged that fraud and irregularities allegedly perpetrated by unscrupulous
individuals who substituted for the registered voters and voted for the latter in the subject precincts, in conspiracy with the Board of
Election Inspectors, or abetted by the members thereof, attended the electoral process in the subject precincts. The fraud and the
irregularities catalogued by private respondent required the reception of evidence aliunde. As stated earlier, such grounds are not
proper bases for a pre-proclamation controversy but are appropriate for a regular election contest within the original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. Indeed, the Court held in Dimangadap Dipatuan vs. Commission on Elections, et al.:[18]
That the padding of the List of Voters may constitute fraud, or that the Board of Election Inspectors may have fraudulently
conspired in its preparation, would not be a valid basis for a pre-proclamation controversy either. For, whenever irregularities, such
as fraud, are asserted, the proper course of action is an election protest.
Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper grounds in an election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to
declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a
relative few. Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the
losers will always cry fraud and terrorism (GAD vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665).
Neither is private respondents petition before the COMELEC one for declaration of a failure of elections in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur.
Section 6, Article 1 of R.A. No. 7166 provides when a failure of election occurs
SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by the law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing,
call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably
close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect (Sec. 7, 1978 EC).[19]
Under Section 5, Article 1 of the aforementioned law, the matter of the postponement or declaration of failure of election and the
calling of a special election as provided for in Section 6, shall be decided by the COMELEC sitting En Banc by a majority of its
members:
SEC. 5. Postponement of election. The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as
provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote
of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of
the election. (Sec. 4, p. 1, RA 7166).[20]
Before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of two (2) conditions
must be established, namely: (a) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was
voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; (b) the votes cast would affect the result of the election. The Court
declared in Ricardo Canicosa vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,[21] that there are only three (3) instances where a failure of
election may be declared, namely:
x x x (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (c) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.[22]
While fraud is a ground to declare a failure of election, such fraud must be one that prevents or suspends the holding of an election,
including the preparation and transmission of the election returns. Failure to elect must be understood in its literal sensewhich
is, nobody emerges as a winner.[23] The barefaced fact that a candidate has been proclaimed and has assumed office does not
deprive the COMELEC of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation.[24] A petition for the annulment of election is
not the same as one involving a pre-proclamation controversy. In the fairly recent case of Tomas T. Banaga, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.[25] with a factual backdrop similar to this case, the Court held:
We have painstakingly examined the petition filed by petitioner Banaga before the COMELEC. But we found that petitioner did not
allege at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Neither did he aver that although there was voting, nobody was
elected. On the contrary, he conceded that an election took place for the office of vice-mayor of Paraaque City, and that private
respondent was, in fact, proclaimed elected to that post. While petitioner contends that the election was tainted with widespread

anomalies, it must be noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud must be such that it prevented
or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation and transmission, custody and canvass of the election
returns. These essential facts ought to have been alleged clearly by the petitioner below, but he did not.
Private respondent alleged in his petition with the COMELEC En Banc that the elections ensued in the subject precincts and that
petitioner herein emerged as the winner and was in fact proclaimed as such by the Board of Election Inspectors.
In sum then, the grounds alleged by private respondent in his petition before the COMELEC are those for a regular election protest
and are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; nor is such petition one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of
failure of elections in the municipality of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC should have ordered the dismissal of the petition
instead of issuing the assailed order. The COMELEC thus committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the same. The error is correctible by the special civil action for certiorari.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed order is SET ASIDE. The petition of herein private respondent
with the public respondent is DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest, the period for the filing of which
is deemed suspended by the filing of the petition before the Commission on Elections which gave rise to the petition at bar.

[G.R. No. 160428. July 21, 2004]

HADJI RASUL BATABOR, petitioner, vs. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS, BOARD OF
ELECTION INSPECTORS OF PRECINCTS NOS. 3A, 4A and 5A, BARANGAY MAIDAN, TUGAYA, LANAO DEL SUR, and
MOCASIM ABANGON BATONDIANG, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The power to declare a failure of elections should be exercised with utmost care and only under circumstances which demonstrate
beyond doubt that the disregard of the law has been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to
distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever; or that the great body of voters
have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise. There is failure of elections only when the
will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must as far as
possible be respected.[1]
Before us is a petition for certiorari[2] with application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, assailing
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Bancs Resolution dated October 9, 2003 in SPA No. 02-295 (Brgy.). In this
Resolution, the COMELEC denied Hadji Rasul Batabors petition seeking: (a) the declaration of failure of election in Precincts 3A,
4A and 5A of Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur; (b) the annulment of the proclamation that Mocasin Abangon Batondiang is
the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Maidan; and (c) the holding of a special election in the questioned precincts.
In the synchronized July 15, 2002 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Hadji Rasul Batabor, petitioner, and Mocasim
Abangon Batondiang, private respondent, ran as opposing candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan,
Tugaya, Lanao del Sur. It was petitioners re-election bid being then the incumbent Punong Barangay.
The result of the election shows that private respondent won as Punong Barangay, garnering 123 votes, as against petitioners 94
votes, or a difference of 29 votes.
In due time, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Maidan.
Bewailing the outcome of the election, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare a failure of election in Precincts 3A,
4A and 5A of Barangay Maidan, docketed as SPA No. 02-295 (Brgy.). The petition alleges that during the election, the voting
started at around 8:30 oclock in the morning. It was temporarily suspended during the lunch break and was to resume at 1:00
oclock in the afternoon of that day. But after lunch, the Chairwoman of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Precincts 3A, 4A
and 5A suddenly tore all the unused official ballots. Thus, the voting was not continued. The BEI then padlocked the ballot boxes.
At that time, petitioner was not present. Despite the note of Election Officer Taha Casidar directing the BEI to resume the voting,
the latter did not allow the remaining voters to vote. Thus, petitioners relatives and followers, numbering more than 100, were not
able to cast their votes.
In his comment, private respondent averred that petitioners allegations are not supported by substantial evidence. It was petitioner
who padlocked the ballot boxes as shown by the affidavit of Comini Manalastas. During the counting of votes, petitioners wife,
daughter and son actually witnessed the same. Besides, petitioners allegations can be properly ventilated in an election protest
because the issues raised are not grounds for declaration of a failure of election.
On October 9, 2003, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution[3] denying the petition.
Petitioner now contends in his petition for certiorari before us that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his petition in SPA No. 02-295 (BRGY.). He reiterates his allegations in his petition filed with
the COMELEC showing there was failure of election.
The Solicitor General, in his comment on the instant petition, vehemently disputes petitioners allegations and prays that the petition
be dismissed for lack of merit.
We dismiss the petition.
The power to declare a failure of election is vested exclusively upon the COMELEC.[4] Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code[5]
provides:

Section 6. Failure of Election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result
of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call
for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close
to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Explaining the above provisions, we held in Benito vs. Commission on Elections[6] that these two (2) conditions must exist before a
failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts due to fraud, force majeure, violence or
terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise
before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.
The familiar rule, as applied to this case, is that grave abuse of discretion exists when the questioned act of the COMELEC was
exercised capriciously and whimsically as is equivalent to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Such exercise of judgment must be done
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[7] It is not sufficient
that the COMELEC, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave.[8]
We find that the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners petition alleging a failure of
election. While the alleged 100 votes of petitioners relatives and supporters, if cast during the election, are sufficient to affect its
result, however, he failed to prove that the voting did not take place in precincts 3A, 4A and 5A. As found by the COMELEC, the
Statement of Votes and the Certificate of Canvass of Votes show that out of the 316 registered voters in the questioned precincts, at
least 220 actually voted. This simply shows that there was no failure of election in the subject precincts. Moreover, petitioners
allegation that the voting was not resumed after lunch break, preventing 100 of his relatives and followers to vote, is better ventilated
in an election contest. The COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution, held:
In the first place, the petitioner failed to show with certainty that the voting did not push through in the questioned precincts. In fact,
the Statement of Votes by Precincts show that out of the three hundred sixteen (316) registered voters in the questioned precincts,
two hundred twenty (220) or 69.62% of the registered voters actually voted. This high turnout in the number of registered voters
who actually voted is clearly not an indication of a failure of elections.
We cannot also help but notice that the instant petition seeks to declare a failure of elections and to annul solely the proclamation of
respondent Batondiang, the elected punong barangay. The prayer for annulment of proclamation does not extend to all the elected
and proclaimed candidates in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur. The Commission may not, on the ground of failure of
elections, annul the proclamation of one candidate only, and thereafter call a special election therefor, because failure of elections
necessarily affects all the elective positions in the place where there has been a failure of elections. To hold otherwise will be
discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws (See Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832 [1999]).
As pronounced by the Supreme Court in Mitmug vs. Commission on Elections (230 SCRA 54 [1994]), allegations of fraud and other
election irregularities are better ventilated in an election contest:
x x x, the question of whether there have been terrorism and other irregularities is better ventilated in an election contest. These
irregularities may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the electorate through the misdeeds
of a relative few. Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of innocent voters as losers
will always cry fraud and terrorism.
There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it
can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes,
regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their
votes, the same must still be respected. There is prima facie showing that private respondent was elected through a plurality of
valid votes of a valid constituency.[9]
We reiterate our ruling in Benito vs. COMELEC[10] that there is failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been
muted and cannot be ascertained. In the case at bar, this incident is not present.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

[G. R. No. 150312. July 18, 2002]

BAGO P. PASANDALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and BAI SALAMONA L. ASUM, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
A petition for declaration of failure of election must specifically allege the essential grounds that would justify the exercise of this
extraordinary remedy. Otherwise, the Comelec can dismiss outright the petition for lack of merit. No grave abuse of discretion
can be attributed to the Comelec in such a case because the Comelec must exercise with utmost circumspection the power to
declare a failure of election to prevent disenfranchising voters and frustrating the electorates will.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections en banc dated October 12, 2001
dismissing petitioner Bago P. Pasandalans (Pasandalan for brevity) petition to declare a failure of election.
Pasandalan and private respondent Bai Salamona L. Asum (Asum for brevity) were candidates for mayor in the Municipality of
Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
On May 23, 2001, Pasandalan filed a petition[2] before public respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec for brevity) seeking
to nullify the election results in Barangay Cabasaran (Precinct Nos. 9A, 10A, 11A and 12A), Barangay Deromoyod (Precinct Nos.
24A, 25A and 26A), Lamin (Precinct Nos. 29A and 30A), Barangay Wago (Precinct Nos. 46A, 47A and 48A), Barangay Meniros
(Precinct Nos. 32A, 33A and 34A), Barangay Bualan (Precinct Nos. 6A, 7A and 8A) and Barangay Pantaon (Precinct Nos. 38A and
39A), all of Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner alleged that on May 14, 2001, while voting was going on, some Cafgus stationed near Sultan Gunting Elementary School
indiscriminately fired their firearms causing the voters to panic and leave the polling center without casting their votes. Taking
advantage of the confusion, supporters of Asum allegedly took the official ballots, filled them up with the name of Asum and placed
them inside the ballot boxes. The incident allegedly marred the election results in Precinct Nos. 9A-12A, 24A-26A and 29A-30A.
In Precinct Nos. 46A, 47 and 48A, the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI for brevity) allegedly failed to sign their
initials at the back of several official ballots and to remove the detachable coupons. The BEI members allegedly affixed their initials
only during the counting of votes.
In Precinct Nos. 6A-8A, 32A-34A and 38A-39A, Pasandalan claims that Asums supporters, taking advantage of the fistfight
between Asums nephew and the supporters of candidate Norania Salo, grabbed the official ballots and filled them up with the name
of Asum.
Pasandalan contends that a technical examination of several official ballots from the contested precincts would show that only a few
persons wrote the entries.
On June 26, 2001, Asum filed an Answer denying Pasandalans allegation that the volley of shots fired on May 14, 2001 disrupted
the voting. Private respondent countered that the gunshots were heard around 2:35 p.m. and not at the start of the voting. On June
30, 2001, Asum was sworn into office and assumed the position of municipal mayor of the Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur.
On October 12, 2001, the Comelec issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of merit.[3]
Hence, this petition.
The Comelecs Ruling
The Comelec ruled that the power to declare a failure of election, being an extraordinary remedy, could be exercised only in three
instances: (1) the election is not held; (2) the election is suspended; or (3) the election results in a failure to elect. The third instance
is understood in its literal sense, that is, nobody was elected.
The Comelec dismissed the petition because none of the grounds relied upon by Pasandalan falls under any of the three instances
justifying a declaration of failure of election. First, the elections in the questioned precincts were held as scheduled. Second, the

gunshots heard during the casting of votes did not suspend the election as the voting continued normally. Third, Asum was elected
by a plurality of votes.
The authenticity and integrity of the election returns were left undisturbed throughout the preparation, transmission, custody and
canvass of the returns. Pasandalan alleges fraud and terrorism, in that there was massive substitution of voters, firing of guns to
frighten the voters, and failure of the BEI members to sign at the back of some official ballots and to remove the detachable
coupons. The Comelec ruled that these allegations are better ventilated in an election contest.
The Comelec did not give credence to Pasandalans evidence in support of his allegations of terrorism and fraud since the evidence
consisted only of affidavits executed by Pasandalans own poll watchers. The Comelec considered these affidavits self-serving and
insufficient to annul the results of the election. Thus, the Comelec dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The Issues
Pasandalan now assails the Comelecs dismissal of his petition, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SPA NO. 01-305 FOR ALLEGED LACK OF MERIT;
2. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT ANNULING THE ELECTION OR DECLARING A FAILURE OF ELECTION IN THE SIXTEEN (16)
QUESTIONED PRECINCTS;
3. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING AS ILLEGAL, NULL AND VOID AB INITIO THE PROCLAMATION OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF LUMBAYANAGUE, LANAO DEL SUR IN THE LAST MAY 14,
2001 REGULAR ELECTIONS AND MAY 30, 2001 SPECIAL ELECTIONS.[4]
The Courts Ruling
We rule that the petition is without merit. The Comelec correctly dismissed the petition for declaration of failure of election because
the irregularities alleged in the petition should have been raised in an election protest, not in a petition to declare a failure of election.
Under Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991,[5] the Comelec en banc is
empowered to declare a failure of election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). Section 6 of the Code
prescribes the conditions for the exercise of this power, thus:
SEC. 6. Failure of Election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for
the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Based on the foregoing provision, three instances justify a declaration of failure of election. These are:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.[6]
What is common in these three instances is the resulting failure to elect.[7] In the first instance, no election is held while in the
second, the election is suspended.[8] In the third instance, circumstances attending the preparation, transmission, custody or
canvas of the election returns cause a failure to elect. The term failure to elect means nobody emerged as a winner. [9]
Pasandalan asserts that the conditions for the declaration of failure of election are present in this case. The volley of shots from
high-powered firearms allegedly forced the voters to scamper away from the polling place, paving the way for Asums supporters to
write the name of Asum on the ballots. The gunfire also frightened Pasandalans poll watchers. The heavy firing allegedly
suspended or prevented the holding of elections in the contested precincts, resulting in failure to elect. The victory of Asum is thus
put in serious doubt.
We do not agree. Pasandalans allegations do not fall under any of the instances that would justify the declaration of failure of
election. The election was held in the 16 protested precincts as scheduled. At no point was the election in any of the precincts
suspended. Nor was there a failure to elect because of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes during
the preparation, transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. The alleged terrorism was not of such scale and

prevalence to prevent the holding of the election or to cause its suspension. In fact, the casting and counting of votes, the
preparation, transmission and canvassing of election returns and the proclamation of the winning candidate took place in due
course.
Courts exercise the power to declare a failure of election with deliberate caution so as not to disenfranchise the electorate.[10] The
fact alone that actual voting took place already militates against Pasandalans cause. Also, Pasandalans allegations of terrorism
and fraud are not sufficient to warrant a nullification of the election in the absence of any of the three instances justifying a
declaration of failure of election. Terrorism may not be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater
number of the electorate through the misdeeds of only a few,[11] absent any of the three instances specified by law.
To warrant a declaration of failure of election on the ground of fraud, the fraud must prevent or suspend the holding of an election, or
mar fatally the preparation, transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns.[12] The conditions for the declaration of
failure of election are stringent. Otherwise, elections will never end for losers will always cry fraud and terrorism.[13]
The allegations of massive substitution of voters, multiple voting, and other electoral anomalies should be resolved in a proper
election protest[14] in the absence of any of the three instances justifying a declaration of failure of election. In an election protest,
the election is not set aside, and there is only a revision or recount of the ballots cast to determine the real winner.[15]
The nullification of elections or declaration of failure of elections is an extraordinary remedy.[16] The party who seeks the
nullification of an election has the burden of proving entitlement to this remedy. It is not enough that a verified petition is filed. The
allegations in the petition must make out a prima facie case for the declaration of failure of election, and convincing evidence must
substantiate the allegations.[17]
In the instant case, it is apparent that the allegations do not constitute sufficient grounds for the nullification of the election.
Pasandalan even failed to substantiate his allegations of terrorism and irregularities. His evidence consisted only of affidavits. Mere
affidavits are insufficient,[18] more so in this case since the affidavits were all executed by Pasandalans own poll watchers. Factual
findings of the Comelec are binding on this Court.[19] Accordingly, the following findings of the Comelec in the instant case must be
respected:
xxx There was an allegation in the amended petition that while voting was taking place in Sultan Gunting Elementary School,
gunshots were heard causing the voters to scamper for safety and leave the polling center without having cast their votes.
However, other than his bare allegation and the pre-typed affidavits of his watchers, petitioner did not present substantial and
convincing evidence to support his claim. On the other hand, 1 Lt. Frederick Galang Pa of the 29th Infantry Battalion assigned in
Lumbayanague categorically declared in his affidavit that despite the gunshots which were heard at around 2:35 PM when the polls
were about to close, the voting continued normally. This statement was bolstered by the narrative report of Urangutan Mamailao,
Election Officer of Lumbayanague, on the conduct of the election in said municipality. The report was spontaneously prepared
when the incident happened. Taken in the light of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, these two
affidavits carry great weight. Third, the authenticity and integrity of the election returns are left undisturbed throughout the
preparation, transmission, custody and canvass thereof. There was no allegation, much less proof that the sanctity of the election
returns was defiled.
xxx
A thorough examination of the affidavits reveals that they suffer from both extrinsic and intrinsic invalidity. The form and the
contents of the affidavits were pre-typed, and all the affiants had to do was to fill-up the blank spaces for their names and precinct
assignments. This clearly shows that some other person prepared the affidavits and it is doubtful whether the affiants understood
the contents thereof before they signed them.
Also worth noting is the fact that the contents of the affidavits are identical. It is highly questionable why different persons have
exactly the same observation of different incidents. Even persons confronted with the same occurrence would have different
observations of the same incident because human perception is essentially affected by several factors like the senses, mental
condition, personal disposition, environment, etc.
Moreover, the affidavits contain inconsistent statements and incredible allegations which bolster the conclusion that they were
tailored to suit the needs of the petitioner. For example, the joint-affidavit of Badjomura Calauto and Macaruog Ampuan states that
they were in Barangay Cabasaran during the May 14 election when they saw the men of respondent fill-up the ballots in Precinct
Nos. 29A-30A of Barangay Lamin. The venue of voting for Barangay Cabasaran was Sultan Gunting Central Elementary School
while that of Barangay Lamin was Lamin Primary School. How they were able to witness said incident when they were miles away
from where it happened is mystifying. Besides, this is not the proper forum to challenge illegal voters. Even at the precinct level,
petitioners watchers are empowered to question any irregularity which they think may have been committed by any person or to
challenge the capacity of any person offering to vote. Failing to avail himself of this remedy, petitioner cannot now pass the burden
to innocent voters by calling for the annulment of the results of a validly held election.[20]
Pasandalan bewails the Comelecs dismissal of his petition without first conducting a technical examination of the questioned
precincts. Pasandalan claims that had the Comelec made a technical examination of the questioned precincts, the Comelec would
have discovered massive substitution of voters, terrorism, violence, threats, coercion, intimidation and other electoral frauds,
resulting in a failure of election. Pasandalan insists that a technical examination in this case would have been proper as in Typoco,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[21] which is also a case of failure of election.

The Comelec is not mandated to conduct a technical examination before it dismisses a petition for nullification of election when the
petition is, on its face, without merit. In Typoco, petitioner Typoco buttressed his petition with independent evidence that compelled
the Comelec to conduct a technical examination of the questioned returns. Typoco filed a Motion to Admit Evidence to prove that a
substantial number of election returns were manufactured. Typoco claimed that the returns were prepared by only one person
based on the report of Francisco S. Cruz, a licensed examiner of questioned documents, who examined copies of the election
returns of Lakas-NUCD. In the present case, Pasandalan failed to attach independent and objective evidence other than the selfserving affidavits of his own poll watchers.
In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections,[22] we ruled that the Comelec could dismiss outright a petition for nullification of election if it
is plainly groundless and the allegations therein could be better ventilated in an election protest. In Banaga, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,[23] we reiterated this doctrine, thus Finally, petitioner claims that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed his petition motu propio. However,
the fact that a verified petition has been filed does not mean that a hearing on the case should first be held before Comelec can act
on it. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary
to declare a failure to elect are present. In their absence, the petition must be denied outright. Public respondent had no recourse
but to dismiss the petition. Nor may petitioner now complain of denial of due process, on this score, for his failure to properly file an
election protest. The Comelec can only rule on what was filed before it. It committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his
petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless, hence without merit.
Clearly, the fact that a verified petition is filed with the Comelec does not necessarily mean that a technical examination or a hearing
on the case should be conducted first before the Comelec can act on the petition. There is no grave abuse of discretion if the
Comelec dismisses the petition even without a technical examination or hearing if the petition fails to show on its face the existence
of any of the three instances required by law to declare a failure of election. The Comelec in this case correctly dismissed the
petition.
Pasandalan believes that notwithstanding the fact that actual voting took place in the questioned precincts, the election in this case,
just like in Basher v. Commission on Elections,[24] was illegal, irregular, and void.[25] Citing Basher, Pasandalan argues that the
peculiar set of facts in this case do not merely show a failure of election but the absence of a valid electoral exercise.[26]
The fact that an election is actually held prevents as a rule a declaration of failure of election. It is only when the election is attended
by patent and massive irregularities and illegalities that this Court will annul the election. Basher is an example of such a case.
In Basher, after a series of failed elections in Barangay Maidan, Municipality of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur during the 1997 barangay
elections, the election was reset to August 30, 1997. Due to the prevailing tension in the locality, the voting started only at around 9
p.m. and lasted until the early morning of the following day. Basher filed a petition for the nullification of election. The Comelec
ruled against a failure of election because actual voting had taken place. However, we overturned the Comelec ruling because the
election was unauthorized and invalid. The electorate was not given sufficient notice that the election would push through after 9
p.m. of the same day. Moreover, the voting did not comply with the procedure laid down by law and by Comelec rules as to the time
and place of voting. Thus, we held that the election was illegal, irregular and void. Consequently, we annulled the proclamation of
the winning candidate and ordered a special election.
Basher does not apply to this case. Unlike in Basher, the election in this case proceeded as scheduled, in accordance with law and
Comelec rules. None of the extreme circumstances that marred the election in Basher is present in this case. We have ruled that
there is failure of election only if the will of the electorate is muted and cannot be ascertained.[27] If the will of the people is
determinable, the same must be respected as much as possible.[28] In this case, the will of the electorate is readily discernible.
Pasandalan should have filed an election protest to substantiate his allegations of electoral anomalies, not a petition to declare a
failure of election.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of public respondent Comelec is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994

SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LUMBA-BAYABAO, LANAO DEL SUR, and DATU
GAMBAI DAGALANGIT, respondents.
Pimentel, Apostol, Layosa & Sibayan Law Office for petitioner.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
The turnout of voters during the 11 May 1992 election in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, was abnormally low. As a result, several
petitions were filed seeking the declaration of failure of election in precincts where less than 25% of the electorate managed to cast
their votes. But a special election was ordered in precincts where no voting actually took place. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) ruled that for as long as the precincts functioned and conducted actual voting during election day, low voter turnout
would not justify a declaration of failure of election. We are now called upon to review this ruling.
Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private respondent DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT were among the candidates for
the mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao during the 11 may 1992 election. There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the
municipality.
As was heretofore stated, voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-nine (49) precincts where the average voter turnout was
22.26%, i.e., only 2,330 out of 9,830 registered voters therein cast their votes. Five (5) of these precincts did not conduct actual
voting at all. 1
Consequently, COMELEC ordered the holding of a special election on 30 May 1992 in the five (5) precincts which failed to function
during election day. On 30 July 1992 another special election was held for a sixth precinct. 2
In the interim, petitioner filed a petition seeking the annulment of the special election conducted on 30 May 1992 alleging various
irregularities such as the alteration, tampering and substitution of ballots. But on 13 July 1992, COMELEC considered the petition
moot since the votes in the subject precincts were already counted. 3
Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of Lumba-Bayabao were also filed with
COMELEC by other mayoralty candidates, to wit:
1.
SPA No. 92-324: On 6 June 1992, private respondent Datu Gamba Dagalangit filed an urgent petition praying for the
holding of a special election in Precinct No. 22-A alleging therein that when the ballot box was opened, ballots were already torn to
pieces. On 14 July 1992, the petition was granted and a special election for Precinct No. 22-A was set for 25 July 1992. 4
2.
SPC No. 92-336: On 16 June 19992, Datu Elias Abdusalam, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to declare
failure of election in twenty-nine (29) more precincts as a result of alleged tampering of ballots 5 and clustering of precincts. 6 On 16
July 1992, the petition was dismissed. COMELEC ruled that there must be a situation where there is absolute inability to vote before
a failure of election can be declared. 7 Since voting was actually conducted in the contested precincts, there was no basis for the
petition.
3.
SPA No 92-368: On 20 June 1992, private respondent filed another petition, this time seeking to exclude from the
counting the ballots cast in six (6) precincts on the ground that the integrity of the ballot boxes therein was violated. 8 Again, on 14
July 1992, COMELEC considered the petition moot, as the issue raised therein was related to that of SPA No. 92-311 which on 9
July 1992 was already set aside as moot. 9
4.
SPA No. 92-347: On 1 July 1992, Datu Bagato Khalid Lonta, a fourth mayoralty candidate, filed a petition which in the
main sought the declaration of failure of election in all sixty-seven (67) precincts of

Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, on the ground of massive disenfranchisement of voters. 10 On 9 July 1992, COMELEC dismissed
the petition, ruling that the allegations therein did not support a case of failure of election. 11
On 8 July 1992, petitioner filed a motion to intervene in these four (4) petitions. 12 But COMELEC treated the same as a motion for
reconsideration and promptly denied it considering that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure such motion was a prohibited
pleading. 13
Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors was formed to conduct the special election set for 25 July 1992. Petitioner impugned
the creation of this Board. Nevertheless, on 30 July 1992, the new Board convened and began the canvassing of votes. Finally, on
31 July 1992, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.
On 3 August 1992, petitioner instituted the instant proceedings seeking the declaration of failure of election in forty-nine (49)
precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate were able to cast their votes. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin private respondent from assuming office.
On 10 August 1992, petitioner lodged an election protest with the Regional trial Court of Lanao del Sur disputing the result not only
of some but all the precincts of Lumba-Bayabao, del Sur. 14
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that with the filing of an election protest, petitioner is already deemed to have abandoned
the instant petition.
It may be noted that when petitioner filed his election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, he informed the trial
court of the pendency of these proceedings. Paragraph 3 of his protest states "[T]hat on August 3, 1992, your protestant filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 106270 assailing the validity of the proclamation of the herein protestee. . . ." 15 Evidently,
petitioner did not intend to abandon his recourse with this Court. On the contrary, he intended to pursue it. Where only an election
protest ex abundante ad cautela is filed, the Court retains jurisdiction to hear the petition seeking to annul an election. 16
The main issue is whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying
motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the petitions seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts
in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur. After all, petitioner argues, he has meritorious grounds in support thereto, viz., the massive
disenfranchisement of voters due to alleged terrorism and unlawful clustering of precincts, which COMELEC should have at least
heard before rendering its judgment.
Incidentally, a petition to annul an election is not a pre-proclamation controversy. Consequently, the proclamation of a winning
candidate together with his subsequent assumption of office is not an impediment to the prosecution of the case to its logical
conclusion. 17
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of a verified petition to declare a failure to
elect, notices to all interested parties indicating therein the date of hearing should be served through the fastest means available. 18
The hearing of the case will also be summary in nature. 19
Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the law is that a petition of this nature must be acted upon with dispatch only after hearing
thereon shall have been conducted. Since COMELEC denied the other petitions 20 which sought to include forty-three (43) more
precincts in a special election without conducting any hearing, it would appear then that there indeed might have been grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petitions.
However, a closer examination of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 2, Rule 26, thereof which was lifted from
Sec. 6, B.P. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, indicates otherwise. It reads
Sec. 2. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in
any precinct has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody of canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for
the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no
voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. 21
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome of the election. But, the first requisite is
missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since
actual voting and election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place, the results thereof cannot be
disregarded and excluded. 22 COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in denying the
petitions outright. There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant
the relief sought. For, the language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the calling of a
special election. 23

Indeed, the fact that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a hearing on the case will be held before COMELEC
will act on it. The verified petition must still show on its face that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are present. In the
absence thereof, the petition must be denied outright.
Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2) conditions in the petitions seeking to declare failure of election in forty-three
(43) more, precincts, there is no more need to receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.
Instead, the question of whether there have been terrorism and other irregularities is better ventilated in an election contest. These
irregularities may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the electorate through the misdeeds
of a relative few. 24 Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of innocent voters as losers
will always cry fraud and terrorism.
There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it
can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes,
regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. 25 Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast
their votes, the same must still be respected. There is prima facie showing that private respondent was elected through a plurality of
valid votes of a valid constituency.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

[G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000]

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of
speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible
elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of electionfixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental
problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc
Resolution No. 98-1419[1] dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives
from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same."
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast]
immediately."[2] The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner
ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and
desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact,
the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
The Issues
Petitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its
agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections."[3]
In his Memorandum,[4] the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up additional issues: (1) mootness and (2)
prematurity, because of petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition[5] is meritorious.
Procedural Issues: Mootness and Prematurity
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held
and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the
people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.[6]

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the
extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees."[7] Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being
invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the
dissemination of data derived therefrom.
The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies
before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of
justice,[8] when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,[9] when the decision or resolution sought
to be set aside is a nullity,[10] or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.[11]
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election
itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough
opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only
is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari is therefore justified.
Main Issue: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining
the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after
they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give
an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history,
exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass media, committed to report
balanced election-related data, including "the exclusive results of Social Weather Station (SWS) surveys conducted in fifteen
administrative regions."
It argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and
of the press. It submits that, in precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec
gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the petitioner's constitutional rights.
Public respondent, on the other hand, vehemently denies that, in issuing the assailed Resolution, it gravely abused its discretion. It
insists that the issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and
credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the
conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds
of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the [losers] in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and
anarchy."
Public respondent further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the
ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution;[12] and
relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.[13] It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner
"are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.
The solicitor general, in support of the public respondent, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised by any government agency and can in
general be manipulated easily. He insists that these polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official
tabulation of votes conducted by the Commission, as well as the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel.
Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more narrowly defined: May the
Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence
on the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands
on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. x x x [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political
and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."[14]
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.[15] In the landmark
case Gonzales v. Comelec,[16] this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.
The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the
people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.[17] It represents a
profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.[18] It means more

than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in
the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes,[19] we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we agree with.
Limitations
The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Such
freedoms could not remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all circumstances.[20] They are not immune to
regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.[21] While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such
thought in words and deeds has limitations.
In Cabansag v. Fernandez[22] this Court had occasion to discuss two theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to
such freedoms, as follows:
"These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases,
means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. x x
x"[23]
"The 'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, x x x may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent."[24]
Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. It implicitly did in its earlier decisions in Primicias v.
Fugoso[25] and American Bible Society v. City of Manila;[26] as well as in later ones, Vera v. Arca,[27] Navarro v. Villegas,[28]
Imbong v. Ferrer,[29] Blo Umpar Adiong v. Comelec[30] and, more recently, in Iglesia ni Cristo v. MTRCB.[31] In setting the
standard or test for the "clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of justice Holmes: "The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."[32]
A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to
prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the
time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.[33] The evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument.[34]
Justification for a Restriction
Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption. The power
to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity.[35] And it is respondent's burden to
overthrow such presumption. Any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows,[36] so it has been said.
To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown.[37] Thus:
"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."[38]
Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly, stifle
fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved.[39]
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of
information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.[40] We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which
would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech."[41] When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a
candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean
and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's
power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the
freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.[42]
True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe and accessible.
It has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in
order to justify a restriction of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting
must far outweigh them.
These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may be used to study
influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it
effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research.[43]

Comelec Ban on Exit Polling

In the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to
ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election. While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll and the broadcast of
the results thereof [are] x x x an exercise of press freedom," it argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof
creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the
tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly
unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x
is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral
process."
Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants
are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view
of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It
consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited
data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are
exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the
other.
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without
qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior
around the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting
centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to
create disorder or confuse the voters.
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information
and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and
unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived
of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices.
In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro,[46] the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the purposes of which was to prevent the
broadcasting of early returns, was unconstitutional because such purpose was impermissible, and the statute was neither narrowly
tailored to advance a state interest nor the least restrictive alternative. Furthermore, the general interest of the State in insulating
voters from outside influences is insufficient to justify speech regulation. Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper
editorials for the reason that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is impermissible, so is regulating speech via an exit poll
restriction.[47]
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of
communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and
reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought
about by exit surveys.
For instance, a specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed to
conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain to voters
that the latter may refuse to be interviewed, and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The pollsters may
further be required to wear distinctive clothing that would show they are not election officials.[48] Additionally, they may be required
to undertake an information campaign on the nature of the exercise and the results to be obtained therefrom. These measures,
together with a general prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly election.
For its part, Petitioner ABS-CBN explains its survey methodology as follows: (1) communities are randomly selected in each
province; (2) residences to be polled in such communities are also chosen at random; (3) only individuals who have already voted,
as shown by the indelible ink on their fingers, are interviewed; (4) the interviewers use no cameras of any sort; (5) the poll results
are released to the public only on the day after the elections.[49] These precautions, together with the possible measures earlier
stated, may be undertaken to abate the Comelec's fear, without consequently and unjustifiably stilling the people's voice.
With the foregoing premises, we conclude that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic
abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting
elections, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible
elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.
Violation of Ballot Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the
real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from
exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks
thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of

disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective
votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result
cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted
for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for
is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures
may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9, 1998 is made
PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
G.R. No. L-18894

June 30, 1962

ERNESTO TAJANLANGIT, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL L. CAZEAS, respondent.
Bengzon, Villegas and Zarraga for petitioner.
Fornier and Pefianco for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals declaring respondent Manuel L. Cazeas duly elected Mayor of
Dao, Antique, with a total of 1,564 vote as against a total of 1,563 votes received by petitioner Ernesto Tajanlangit, or a plurality of
one (1) vote.
Manuel L. Cazeas and Ernesto Tajanlangit were among the registered candidates for the office of mayor of the municipality of Dao,
province of Antique, in the general elections held on November 10, 1959, After the canvass of votes, the municipal board of
canvassers certified that Tajanlangit received a total of 1,570 votes and Cazeas a total of 1,567 votes. Accordingly, said board
proclaimed Tajanlangit elected by a plurality of three (3) votes.
Not satisfied with the result of the election, Cazeas filed an election protest before the Court of First Instance of Antique contesting
the results in seven (7) precincts of Dao, to which Tajanlangit filed his answer and counter-protest impugning the result in five (5)
precincts, two of which were later withdrawn by him during the trial. After the trial, the court rendered decision on October 5, 1960,
declaring Cazeas elected with a plurality of two (2) votes over Tajanlangit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on
July 31, 1961, declaring Cazeas elected by a plurality of one (1) vote over petitioner Tajanlangit.
Petitioner Tajanlangit interposed the present petition for review claiming that the Court of Appeals committed errors in its ruling over
16 ballots. On the other hand, respondent Cazeas counter-assigned errors involving 19 ballots.1wph1.t
We shall first rule upon the ballots disputed by petitioner.
Ballots Exhibits T-119, T-120 and T-121. These three (3) ballots were rejected by the Court of Appeals as marked ballots on the
strength of the evidence aliunde presented to the effect that the writing of the name "Guimson" on these three ballots pertaining to
Precinct No. 5 of Dao was part of a scheme to identify the voters. It is a settled rule in election contests that "the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals with regard to the evidence aliunde submitted by both parties are no longer open for review, the function of this
court being limited to determining if the appreciation made of said ballots by the Court of Appeals, apart from the evidence alluded
to, was made in accordance with law and ruling of this Court" (Hilao V. Bernados, G.R. No. L-7704, December 14, 1954). For this
reason, this Court can no longer disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals invalidating these three ballots.
Ballots Exhibits T-6 and T-94. These two (2) ballots were declared invalid by the Court of Appeals as marked ballots, the
distinguishing mark consisting of the names "Acsay" and "Lotilla" (Exh. T-6) and "Ledesma" (Exh. T-94) which were written in "big,
printed, bold and shaded letters" on said ballots. Petitioner contends that the writing of said names in printed letters and the other
names in ordinary script should be considered as having been done merely for clarity and emphasis and should not be considered
as identifying marks.
Upon examination of the ballots in question, we agree with the conclusion made by the Court of Appeals that the writing of the
aforesaid names "Acsay" and "Lotilla" in ballot Exhibit T-6 clearly appears to have been intended by the voter to serve as
identification marks. The names "Acsay" and "Lotilia" were written in extraordinarily big printed letters which can no longer be
considered as a mere variation of writing allowed in the preparation of a ballot. They are so prominent that even from a distance the
ballots are easily identified. The use of two kinds of writing appearing in this ballot is a good example of the exception provided for in
paragraph 18, Section 149 of the Revised Election Code, which provides that unless it should clearly appear that it has been
deliberately put by the voter to serve as identification mark, the use of two or more kinds of writing shall be considered innocent and
shall not invalidate the ballot. A ballot should be rejected where the manner in which the candidate's name is written gives the
impression of an intention to mark or identify the ballot (Villavert v. Lim, 62 Phil., 178).
The following authority in which the candidate's name was written in big Gothic letters is in point:

In this ballot all the names of the candidates voted for were written in ordinary writing with the exception of the name of "Teodulo
Bernados" which was written in big Gothic letters with a flower drawn underneath in the space for mayor. The Court of Appeals
declared this ballot to be valid vote for Bernados saying that such Gothic lettering merely shows the desire of the voter to attain
greater clearness and emphasis on his favorite candidate. This we consider to be error because such Gothic lettering can be
considered used in writing names on diplomas, certificates of merit, or other documents evidencing meritorious award, but not in
ordinary documents. When the voter wrote the name of Bernados in Gothic letters he must have done it with the evident intention of
placing a distinguishing mark on his ballot which necessarily invalidates it. This ballot should therefore be rejected. (Sec. 149, Rule
18, R.E.C.) (Hilao v. Bernados, G.R. No. L-7704, December 14, 1954).
Exhibit T-6 was, therefore, properly rejected as marked ballot.
We are however of the opinion that the ballot Exhibit T-94 wherein the name "Ledesma" was written in big printed letters can be
validated as being merely the expression of the voter to clarify or emphasize his vote in favor of Ledesma. As that word appears
written, it cannot be reasonably inferred that the intention of the voter was to mark the ballot. This is an instance where it can be said
that the two kinds of writing can be anchored under paragraph 8, Section 149, of the Revised Election Code, because the intention
to mark does not appear clear. The following authority supports this view:
Protestee objects to these ballots as marked for the reason that certain name or names of candidates were written in printed form or
writing, while the rest of the names were written in ordinary script. The objection is untenable because Rule 18, Section 149, of the
Revised Election Code, provides that the use of two or more kinds of writing shall be considered innocent and shall not invalidate
the ballots, unless it clearly appears that such kind of writing his been deliberately used by the voter to serve as identifying mark.
Here such intention does not appear (Hilao v. Bernados, G.R. No. L-7704 [1954]; De Alban vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-12083,
promulgated July 31, 1957). These ballots were, therefore, correctly admitted. (Gutierrez v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-14252, February 28,
1959).
Ballot Exhibit T-11. This ballot was invalidated by the Court of Appeals as a marked ballot because the names Bernardino
Dabandan, Alfredo Fernandez and Delfin Saymo, who were not candidates for any office and the last named person a registered
voter in the precinct where the ballot was cast, were written on the ballot. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
rejecting this ballot invoking the provision of paragraph 13, section 149 of the Revised Election Code, which provides that any vote
in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy shall be void and counted as a stray vote but shall not invalidate the
whole ballot.
We do not agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. There is no showing that this ballot was cast by registered
voter Delfin Saymo or that he wrote or signed his name thereon, which would have been sufficient to invalidate the same (Ferrer v.
De Alba, 54 O.G. 4255). In the absence of evidence aliunde that the aforementioned names of non-candidates were intended for
purposes of identification, the same shall be considered a stray votes which shall not invalidate the whole ballot (Par. 13, Section
149, supra). This ballot should be counted a favor of petitioner who was voted thereon for the office of mayor.
Ballot Exhibit T-25. This ballot was rejected by the Court of Appeals as an illegal ballot for having been prepared by two persons,
affirming the conclusion made by the lower court that the names appearing on the 4th line for senators and on the lines for governor
and vice-governor were written by one person while the other names appearing therein were written by another. The Court of
Appeals also reasoned that the different spelling of the name "Lopez" on the 4th line for senators and that of "Lopez" on the 2nd line
for councilors shows they were written by two different persons.
Upon examination of the ballot, we have noted that the names appearing on the 4th line for senators and on the lines for governor
and vice-governor were written with different pencil. The uphill alignment, pen pressure, slant as well as sizes of the letters in said
names are dissimilar with those of the other names written on the ballot. We agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeal that this ballot is null and void for having been filled by two distinct persons (Par. 23, Section 149, Revised Election Code).
Ballot Exhibits C-6, C-49, C-61, C-65, C-75 and C-76. These six (6) ballots were declared valid for respondent Cazeas by the lower
court and this ruling had not been assigned as error by petitioner in this appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner now questions the
validity of these ballots for the first time on appeal before this Court. Following our ruling in the case of Salalima v. Sabater (G.R. No.
L-14829, May 29, 1959), the validity of these ballots can no longer be questioned before this Court after the ruling of the lower court
was not included in petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals. To allow the petitioner to contest the validity of these ballots now
would be unfair not only to the respondent but also the Court of Appeals, both of whom were deprived, the former, of an opportunity
to present proof to destroy petitioner's claim, and the latter, to pass judgment upon the same (Quintia v. Bautista, 49 O.G., 2339).
Petitioner's assignment of error on these ballots cannot, therefore, be entertained.
Ballot Exhibit C-60. Immediately below the sixth line for councilors after the name "Secuban" which was written on said line, there
appears initials "FS" or "ES", which petitioner claims to be an identifying mark of this ballot. The Court of Appeals admitted this ballot
for respondent concluding that the letters "ES", which are the correct initials of candidate Eulalio Secuban, do not constitute a
distinguishing mark sufficient to invalidate the ballot. In the absence of any showing that the initials "FS" or "ES" were that of the
voter who cast this ballot or that said initials were placed thereon as an identification mark, this ballot was properly admitted for
respondent (Gutierrez v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-14252, February 28, 1959).1wph1.t
Ballot Exhibit C-86. This ballot contains the name "Dimas Portillo Batring" written on the last line for councilors. Petitioner contends
that the word or nickname "Batring" which is not the nickname of candidate Dimas Postillo is a distinguishing mark sufficient to
invalidate this ballot. On the basis of the evidence presented by the Court of Appeals concluded that there was "no clear

identification of an intention to mark the ballot"; hence, it admitted the said ballot in favor of respondent. This Court can no longer
disturb this conclusion of the Court of Appeals which was based upon the evidence on record (Hilao v. Bernados, supra).
Ballot Exhibit T-4. On this ballot, the voter wrote the name "Juan C. Bajo" on the last line for councilors. The Court of Appeals
rejected this ballot as marked affirming the conclusion made the lower court that the writing of the name "Juan C. Bajo" a
disparagement of senatorial candidate Juan C. Pajo because "the voter probably meant the term "bajo" in a figurative sense to
express his opinion of Mr. Pajo." The Court of Appeals further stated that the word "bajo" is impertinent and offensive because in
Visayan dialect it means "bad smell."
We believe that this ruling is incorrect. In the first place, it is admitted that the word "bajo" has two meanings in Visayan dialect, i.e.,
"bad smell" and "a musical instrument." In the second place, an identification mark on a ballot cannot be presumed (Jaucian v.
Gallos, 55 O.G., 10394). In the third place, there is no evidence that the name "Juan C. Bajo" was deliberately written on the ballot
as a means to identify the voter. And in the fourth place, there being no candidate for councilor by the name of Juan C. Bajo, said
name shall be considered as a stray vote which shall not invalidate the whole ballot (Par 13, Section 149, Revised Election Code).
This ballot should, therefore, be counted in favor of petitioner who was voted thereon for the office of the mayor.
We shall now take up the ballots included in the counter-assignment of errors submitted by respondent.
Ballots Exhibits C-11, C-58, C-59, and C-85. These four (4) ballots were rejected by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
words appearing on the line for Mayor on the first two ballots are, "totally undecipherable" and on the last two ballots, the words
written an said line do not sufficiently identify the respondent. Respondent claims that the Court of Appeals committed error in not
counting these four ballots in his favor under the rule of idem sonans.
On Exhibit C-11, except for the letters, "Ma", the rest of the letters composing the word appearing on the line for mayor are illegible.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the vote contained on this ballot cannot be counted in favor of the respondent.
On Exhibit C-59, while the capital letter "M" was clearly written on the line for mayor the word following it is also illegible. The voter
appears to be illiterate. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the vote on this ballot cannot be counted in favor of respondent.
On Exhibits C-58 rind C-85, the words "Cadia" and "Cuans" appearing on the line for mayor, respectively, do not sufficiently identify
the candidate for whom the vote was intended. The rule of idem sonans, the test of which is whether the sound of the variant
spelling is the same or similar, does not apply to these two ballots. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that these last
two ballots cannot be counted in favor of the respondent.
Ballot Exhibit T-144. This ballot was admitted by the Court of Appeals as valid for petitioner under the rule of idem sonans.
Respondent contends that the word "Tafangu" written on the line for mayor does not fall under the idem sonans rule, and should be
rejected and discounted from petitioner.
We have examined the vote in question and found that although at first glance, the word written on the line for mayor may be read
as "Tafangu" a careful examination of the last two strokes shows that they were intended for the letters "i" and "t" after considering
the dot above the letter "i" and the failure of the writer to cross the letter "t" which has relatively a short stem. Thus, the word may he
read as "Tafangit". With a liberal application of the rule of idem sonans, we agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
vote is valid for the petitioner.
Ballot Exhibit C-27. This ballot was declared invalid by the Court of Appeals as having been prepared by two persons upon the
theory that the name "Cazeas" was written by a person other than the one that wrote the other names written thereon. After an
examination of the ballot, we agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals because this ballot clearly appears to have
been filed by two distinct persons (Par. 13, Section 149, Revised Election Code). This ballot is totally null and void.
Ballot Exhibit C-77. This ballot contains the name of a non-candidate, Julia Valdelion, written on the second line for senators.
Rejecting this ballot as marked, the Court of Appeals stated that the writings of the name "Julia Valdelion" after crossing out the
name "E. Cea" clearly indicates an intention to mark the ballot. Respondent contends that said court committed error in invalidating
this ballot invoking the provision on paragraph 13, section 149 of the Revised Election Code.
It appears that no evidence was presented to show that writing of the name Julia Valdelion was used as a means to identify this
ballot. There is no evidence that this ballot was cast by Julia Valdelion or that she wrote or signed her name thereon. This Court has
consistently held that where there is no evidence that the name of a person or persons, not candidates, were written on the ballot for
purposes of identification, said name or names shall be counted as stray vote but shall not invalidate the whole ballot in accordance
with the express provision of paragraph 13, section 149, of the Revised Election Code. We, therefore, hold that this ballot is valid
and should be counted in favor of respondent who was voted thereon for the office of mayor.
Ballot Exhibit T-139. This ballot contains the word "ietin" or "ilting" on the line for mayor. The Court of Appeals admitted this ballot in
favor of Ernesto Tajanlangit on the ground that the word is idem sonans with Esting, nickname of the petitioner, citing the cases of
Abrea vs. Lloren (81 Phil., 809, October 28, 1948) and Perez v. Bimeda (G.R. No. L-8495, April 27, 1955) to support its conclusion.
Respondent claims that the Court Appeals committed error in declaring a mere nickname as a valid vote for petitioner. In support of
his contention, he cites the recent case of Tabiana v. Abordo (Case No. 111, September 27, 1961), where the House Electoral
Tribunal held that a nickname alone without being accompanied with the name or surname of the candidate is an invalid vote.
Examining the ratio decidendi in the case of Abrea v. Lloren, supra, the reason why this Court admitted ballots containing only a
nickname was because 602 of the total number of 1,010 votes counted for Isabelo Lloren were cast by writing his nickname "Beloy";
and it had no alternative than to brush aside legal technicalities for the sake of "giving effect to the will of the people as freely and

clearly expressed on the ballots." In justifying the admission of 602 ballots containing the nickname "Beloy," this Court took into
consideration certain proven facts, to wit: (a) that in his certificate of candidacy candidate Lloren stated that he was known by the
nickname Beloy; (b) that Lloren distributed sample ballots containing only his nickname Beloy on the line for Municipal Mayor (c)
that the ballots containing only his nickname represent 60% of the total number of votes received by Lloren; and (d) that no
objection was interposed by the against the evidence presented by Lloren he was properly and commonly known by the nickname
Beloy; and no other candidate for mayor bears the same nickname. We believe, however that the Lloren case was an exception to
the general rule that in isolated ballots where a nickname only is written, without being accompanied by the name or surname of the
candidate, should not be given effect in accordance with paragraph 9, Section 149, in connection with Section 34 of the Revised
Election Code, which expressly provides that "certificates of candidacy shall not contain nickname of candidates." Thus, in a later
case, citing the case of Abrea v. Lloren, supra, it held that "As a general rule, isolated rotes in favor of a candidate designated by his
nickname only, that is, not accompanied by his name or surname, are invalid (paragraph 9, Section 149 of the Revised Election
Code (Campaner v. Alano, 46 O.G., 5029, December 16, 1948). This is the doctrine enunciated in the case of Tabiana v. Abordo,
supra, which we believe is applicable to the ballot in question. In view of the circumstances mentioned above obtaining in the case
of Abrea v. Lloren, supra, we believe that the doctrine laid down therein regarding nickname is inapplicable to the instant case. The
same is true with the case of Perez v. Bemida, supra, which was based on the Lloren case doctrine.
Moreover, in Section 149, paragraph 1, of the Revised, Election Code, it is provided that "any ballot where only the Christian name
or only his surname appears is valid (paragraph 1). In paragraph 9 of said section, it is also provided that the use of nicknames, if
accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote, except when such nicknames are used as a
means to identify the voters. From these provisions it may be inferred that the use of nickname only as a vote is not allowed or
permitted otherwise the vote would be invalid. Therefore, the present ballot (Exh. T-139) containing only the nickname of petitioner
is not a valid vote for him. This ballot should be discounted from petitioner.
Ballots Exhibits T-129, T-130 and T-131. These three (3) ballots contain printed stickers of senatorial candidate Jesus Cuenco
pasted on the spaces for senators. The Court of Appeals, however, declared these three ballots valid for petitioner upon its
conclusion, based on the evidence aliunde presented by the parties, that "the stickers were placed on the ballots after they were
read during the canvass and before the ballot boxes and election documents were finally turned in to the Municipal Treasurer
sometime in the afternoon of the following day." This finding of fact is no longer open for review by this Court; hence, the ruling of
the Court of Appeals admitting these three ballots in favor of petitioner should be upheld (Hilao v. Bernados, supra).
In connection with the three ballots referred to above, respondent makes mention of ballot Exhibit C-1, which was declared null and
void under the provision of paragraph 14, section 149 of the Revised Election Code, for containing a printed sticker of candidate
Angel V. Sanchez pasted on the line for vice-governor. Respondent contends that, applying the same ruling, ballots Exhibits T-129,
T-130 and T-131 should also be declared null and void. Respondent's contention is untenable because in this particular ballot,
Exhibit C-1, no evidence was presented to prove that the printed sticker was pasted on the ballot by some other person after the
voter had delivered the same to the election inspectors. It was, therefore, properly rejected.
Ballot Exhibit T-78. Respondent objected to this ballot as marked with the name "Jose de la Cruz" written on the 5th line for
senators. He contends that Jose de la Cruz was not a candidate for any office but was a registered voter in the precinct where this
ballot was cast. The Court of Appeals ruled that said name is only a stray vote and does not invalidate the whole ballot. In the
absence of evidence that the name Jose de la Cruz was used as a means to identify the ballot, or that the ballot was cast by him
where he wrote or signed his name thereon, we agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals admitting this ballot under the provision
of paragraph 13, section 149, of the Revised Election Code.
Ballots Exhibits T-83, T-84 and T-89. These ballots were objected to by respondent as marked ballots, the alleged distinguishing
mark consisting of the word "olo" written on the right hand margin of each ballot. Upon the evidence aliunde presented by the
parties, the Court of Appeals concluded "that the mark "olo" appearing on these ballots was placed thereon by some other person
after they had been cast by their respective voters." It ruled that the ballots are valid for petitioner. This finding of fact made by the
Court of Appeals based upon the evidence presented by the parties is no longer open for review by this Court (Hilao v. Bernados,
supra).
It is a well settled rule in election contests that the marks which shall be considered sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which
the voter himself deliberately replaced on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter (Valenzuela v. Carlos and Lopez de
Jesus, 42 Phil., 428). In other words, a mark placed on the ballot by a person other than the voter himself does not invalidate the
ballot as marked. We, therefore, uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals admitting these three ballots for petitioner.
Ballots Exhibits T-48, T-50, T-91 and T-107. These four (4) ballots were admitted by the Court of Appeals overruling the objection
interposed by respondent that the same were each prepared by two distinct persons. We have carefully examined the ballots in
question and we agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of these four ballots.
In resume, we find that three (3) ballots (Exhs. T-4, T-11 and T-94) were improperly rejected and should be counted in favor of
petitioner. One ballot (Exh. T-139) was, however, improperly admitted in favor of petitioner and should be deducted from him. With
these changes, petitioner received a total of 1,565 valid votes. We also find that one (1) ballot (Exh. C-77) was improperly rejected
and should be counted in favor of respondent. This will give him a total of 1,565 valid votes.
Since the result of this protest is a tie, it is necessary that lots be drawn between the two candidates as provide for in Section 170 of
the Revised Election Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified in the sense that petitioner and respondent should draw lots
to solve the tie as provided for in said section, without pronouncement as to costs.

[G.R. No. 143351. September 14, 2000]

MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and RICARDO V.
QUINTOS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 144129. September 14, 2000]
MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and RICARDO V.
QUINTOS, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
These cases, which were ordered consolidated on 15 August 2000, have their genesis in HRET Case No. 98-030,[1] an election
protest case filed by private respondent Ricardo V. Quintos (hereafter QUINTOS) against petitioner Amelita C. Villarosa (hereafter
VILLAROSA) before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereafter HRET).
VILLAROSA and QUINTOS were the only candidates for the office of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental
Mindoro in the 11 May 1998 synchronized national and local elections. On 27 May 1998 the Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed VILLAROSA as the winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes.
On 4 June 1998 QUINTOS filed an election protest against VILLAROSA[2] contesting the results of the election in all the 882
precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro on the following grounds: (1) the ballots were misread and counted in
favor of protestee; (2) there was rampant substitute voting, i.e., persons other than the registered voters voted; (3) violence and
intimidation were committed by protestee and her followers against known supporters of protestant to enhance protestees
candidacy; 4) previously prepared ballots for the protestee were deposited in the ballot boxes; and (5) illiterate Mangyan voters
voting for protestant were assisted by self-appointed assistors of protestee, who wrote JTV on the ballots contrary to the instruction
of said illiterate voters.
On 6 July 1998 VILLAROSA filed her Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim.[3] She counter-protested the results of the
election in 497 precincts.
During the preliminary conference conducted by the HRET on 6 August 1998, QUINTOS and VILLAROSA agreed on the following
facts:
1. Protestant and Protestee were registered candidates for and voted as Representatives, Lone Legislative District of Occidental
Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections;
2. On May 27, 1998, after canvass of returns, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Protestee Villarosa as the winning
candidate for having obtained fifty-five thousand four hundred (55,400) votes, or a margin of three thousand thirty-two (3,032) votes
over Protestant Quintos who was credited fifty-two thousand three hundred sixty-eight (52,368) votes;
3. All the precints in the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro functioned in the elections;
4. Protestant contests the results of the elections in all the precints of the eleven (11) municipalities comprising the Lone Legislative
District of Occidental Mindoro; upon the other hand, Protestee counter-protests the results of the elections in four hundred ninetyseven (497) precints;
5. Protestee is wife of JOSE T. VILLAROSA, who was Representative of the District in question for two terms, the last of which
ended on June 30, 1998; in his certificate of candidacy for the election of May 8, 1995, JOSE T. VILLAROSA wrote as his
nickname or stage name: JOE-JTV.
6. In her certificate of candidacy, Protestee wrote JTV as her nickname/stage name.
7. In her affidavit dated April 16, 1998 sent to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Occidental Mindoro, Protestee asked
that she be allowed to insert in her certificate of candidacy the name GIRLIE such that her name should read in full as MA.

AMELITA Girlie C. VILLAROSA as in every barangays [sic] of the Province of Occidental Mindoro she is known as Girlie
Villarosa;
8. In a letter dated March 27, 1998 sent by Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) Arsenio Guste of Occidental Mindoro to Director
Jose B. Balbuena, Law Department, COMELEC, the former notified the latter that the nickname of protestee in her certificate of
candidacy is JTV;
9. In his Memorandum dated May 10, 1998 to all Election Officers, PES Guste informed them that JTV is the authorized nickname
or stage name of protestee and that henceforth JTV, for all intents and purposes, in the appreciation of official ballots, should be
counted in her favor;
10. One Atty. Dan Restor of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, had filed with the COMELEC a petition to invalidate/cancel JTV as the
official nickname of the protestee; the petition was docketed as Election Matter No. 98-044; both Protestant and Protestee were not
made formal parties thereto;
11. In its Resolution of May 11, 1998, the COMELEC en banc unanimously granted the petition in Election Matter No. 98-044; it
ruled that the Protestee cannot use the nickname JTV considering that the same is not her nickname to which she is popularly
known. Protestees motion to reconsider the resolution was denied by the COMELEC in its Order of May 13, 1998; Protestee
thereafter filed with the Supreme Court a Special Civil Action for Certiorari to challenge the resolution and order, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 133927, which is still pending therein;
12. Per joint affidavit of Ms. Michelle Vizcarra and Mrs. Carmen Antonio (Annex D of Petition) a copy of the COMELEC Resolution
of May 11, 1998 in Election Matter No. 98-044 was received by PES Guste at around 4:00 p.m., but were seen by him at 4:20 p.m.
of May 11, 1998;
13. Before the filing of this protest, Protestant filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Protestee, which was docke[te]d
therein as SPA No. 98-342, on the grounds that protestee had given money or material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters or public officials performing electoral functions and committed acts of terrorism to enhance her candidacy. The case is
still pending.[4]
The parties further agreed and stipulated on the following issues:
1. Whether or not the votes JTV should be counted in favor of Protestee;
2. Recount and appreciation of ballots;
3. Damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses as alleged and prayed for by Protestee, and according to Protestant, as
indicated in prayer for other relief, just and equitable.[5]
The HRET thereafter required the parties to designate 25% of the protested and counter-protested precincts as their respective pilot
precincts pursuant to Rule 68 of the HRET Rules of Procedure.
During the revision, ballots bearing JTV, JTB, GTV, GTB, Jitivi, Gitivi, Jitibi and Gitibi on the line for Representative were
classified as ballots for VILLAROSA, which the revisors of QUINTOS objected to. Likewise, ballots bearing Girlie on the line for
Representative were classified as votes for VILLAROSA.
On 5 August 1999, QUINTOS filed a Motion to Withdraw Remaining Non-Pilot Protested Precincts.[6]
On 7 October 1999, after granting this motion, the HRET promulgated a resolution[7]stating that with QUINTOS withdrawal of the
remaining non-pilot protested precincts, QUINTOS impliedly limited the issue to
WHETHER OR NOT THE JTV VOTES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR OF PROTESTEE AMELITA C. VILLAROSA
On 9 December 1999 the HRET conducted an oral argument and heard QUINTOS and VILLAROSA on the aforestated issue.[8]
On 18 May 2000, the HRET promulgated Resolution No. 00-65[9] wherein it resolved to PROCEED with the revision of the ballots
in the remaining 75%; and DIRECT the Secretariat to continue with the revision. This resolution prompted VILLAROSA to file an
Omnibus Motion[10] praying for (1) the suspension of the revision of the ballots pursuant to HRET Resolution No. 00-65; (2) a
categorical ruling that all ballots cast for JTV are valid votes for VILLAROSA; and (3) the dismissal of the protest.
On 8 June 2000 the HRET issued Resolution No. 00-82[11] informing the parties that the Tribunal ruled on May 18, 2000, by [a]
vote of 5-4 of its members, not to count JTV and its variations as valid votes for Protestee Amelita C. Villarosa, the same being
considered stray ballots... [and that it] directed that the revision of ballots proceed with respect to the 75% counter-protest precincts.
On 14 June 2000, VILLAROSA filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 143351. She alleged therein that
the HRET gravely abused its discretion in (a) issuing the above-mentioned resolutions of 18 May and 8 June 2000 in that it violated
her right to due process when it disposed by a 5-4 ruling a vital election incident without stating therein the findings of fact and law
on which the resolutions were based; and (b) treating JTV votes as stray and invalid, resulting in the disenfranchisement of the
voters of Occidental Mindoro. She argued that JTV was her designated nickname in the official list of candidates submitted by the
provincial election supervisor to the COMELEC in Manila; it was the nickname she used in her posters, handbills and other election

propaganda throughout the campaign period. In her speeches during the rallies, she urged the voters who might have found her full
name difficult to write to simply vote JTV, as she had decided to use that nickname as a shortcut of her name as a married woman
under Article 370 of the Civil Code. Under this Article, a married woman may use (1) her maiden first name and surname and add
her husbands surname; (2) her maiden first name and her husbands surname; or (3) her husbands full name, but prefixing a word
indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
VILLAROSA then prayed that this Court issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. No.
143351 to enjoin the HRET from resuming the revision of the remaining ballots in HRET Case No. 98-030. The Court, however, did
not issue a TRO but required the HRET and QUINTOS to file a comment on the petition.
In his Comment, QUINTOS alleged that the petition in G.R. No. 143351 is premature because the HRET had not yet rendered a
decision on the election protest. The assailed resolutions of the HRET are not decisions or formal resolutions which, as mandated
by the Constitution, should set out the facts and the law on which they are based; nor are they acts which may be reviewed by
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As to the use of JTV as VILLAROSAs nickname, QUINTOS claims that the HRETs
ruling on the matter should be maintained because under Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code any vote containing initials only
shall be considered a stray vote. Moreover, VILLAROSAs use of such nickname was attended by bad faith, fraud and
misrepresentation, and could have been for no other purpose than to make voters believe that they are voting for her husband, who
was the Congressman of Occidental Mindoro for two terms and the incumbent Congressman at the time of the elections on 11 May
1998.
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment and took the position that JTV votes should be
declared valid and counted in favor of VILLAROSA, and to declare otherwise would frustrate the sovereign will of the people of
Occidental Mindoro.
No TRO having been issued by this Court, the revision of the ballots of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts went
on and was completed on 28 June 2000. Because of the ruling that JTV votes or votes consisting of variations of JTV are stray
votes, VILLAROSA lost 1,842 votes in the 75% counter-protested precincts and 4,336 votes in the 25% pilot precincts.
Accordingly, in its decision promulgated on 27 July 2000,[12] the HRET, by a vote of 5-4, (1) ruled that QUINTOS obtained 51,465
votes, while VILLAROSA garnered 48,617 votes; (2) declared QUINTOS as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Occidental Mindoro, having obtained the highest number of votes with a margin of 2,848 votes over VILLAROSA; and (3) ordered
VILLAROSA to vacate her office at the House of Representatives.
The HRET maintained that the issue of whether to count in favor of VILLAROSA votes for JTV or its variations necessitated a
determination of whether VILLAROSA was in fact generally or popularly known as such in the locality of Occidental Mindoro.
The HRET held against VILLAROSA for various reasons. First, in her affidavit asking for the insertion of GIRLIE between her given
name and surname she stated that she was known as GIRLIE in every barangay of the Province of Occidental Mindoro. This is an
admission that, indeed, her nickname is not JTV but GIRLIE. In fact, votes cast for GIRLIE were credited in her favor. Hence,
the counting in her favor of ballots bearing JTV votes on the line for Representative would be tantamount to injustice because that
would allow VILLAROSA to use two nicknames, GIRLIE and JTV, which would be in violation of the second paragraph of Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing candidates to use only one nickname or stage name by which they are generally or
popularly known in the locality. Moreover, Rule 13, Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code on appreciation of ballots provides:
The use of nicknames and appellations of affection and friendship, if accompanied by the first name or surname of the candidate,
does not annul such vote, except when they were used as a means to identify the voter, in which case the whole ballot is invalid;
Provided, That if the nickname used is unaccompanied by the name or surname of a candidate and it is the one by which he is
generally or popularly known in the locality, the name shall be counted in favor of said candidate, if there is no other candidate for
the same office with the same nickname.
The HRET thus agreed with the COMELEC in its resolution[13] that disallowed VILLAROSA to use JTV as a nickname because
the same was not her nickname with which she was popularly known. In other cases the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution No.
95-0707 of 9 February 1995 required the following senatorial candidates in the 8 May 1995 elections to submit other names
considering that the nicknames or stage names they submitted were not acceptable under the law for purposes of their candidacy:
1. Juan Flavier, who submitted the nickname Lets DOH it, which is a slogan of the Department of Health and not the nickname of
a person;
2. Rodolfo Biazon, who submitted the nickname General, which cannot refer to Rodolfo Biazon only;
3. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who submitted the nickname GMA, which is more associated with Channel 7; and
4. Sergio Osmea III, who submitted the nickname OK Eskapo, which is a title of a recent movie and not a general or popular
nickname of Osmea.
Finally, the HRET invoked Rule 14 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that any vote containing initials
only or which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended shall be considered stray vote. The letters JTV
and its derivatives do not adequately describe the identity of VILLAROSA considering that they are part of the JOE-JTV nickname
of Jose Tapales Villarosa who had been the representative of the district in question for two terms, the last of which ended on 30

June 1998. The letters JTV could not definitely impress upon the voters that the person running for election was indeed petitioner
VILLAROSA.
Her motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied, VILLAROSA filed in G.R. No. 143351 a Supplemental
Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Act on a Pending Prayer and pleaded that this Court issue a temporary restraining order or a
status quo order pending deliberation on, and resolution of, the petition.
On 8 August 2000 this Court required QUINTOS to comment on the Supplemental Manifestation, and set the case for oral argument
on 15 August 2000.
On 11 August 2000 VILLAROSA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 144129, (1) assailing the HRET decision; (2) reiterating the issue of the validity of the JTV votes; and (3)
charging the HRET with grave abuse of discretion in dispensing with the hearings and appreciation of ballots in the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts, thereby depriving her of the right to due process.
QUINTOS filed his Comment on the Supplemental Manifestation in G.R. No. 143351. Later, in his Addendum to Comment he
informed the Court that on 12 August 2000, following the denial by the HRET of VILLAROSAs motion for reconsideration, he took
his oath of office as Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro. He then prayed that the petition in G.R.
No. 14335 be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.
At the oral argument on 15 August 2000, the parties argued on the following issues:
(1) Whether or not due process was observed by the HRET in rendering the decision in question.
(2) Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in not counting in favor of VILLAROSA the votes for JTV or
derivatives thereof.
(3) Whether or not this Court can still sustain the enforcement of the decision of the HRET considering its rules on finality of
judgment and the fact that QUINTOS has taken his oath of office.
By a vote of 7-4, the Court resolved to issue a Status Quo Order allowing VILLAROSA to continue holding her office until 29 August
2000.
On 29 August 2000, by a vote of 7-4, with Davide, Jr., C.J.; Bellosillo; Kapunan; Quisumbing; Purisima; Buena and Santiago, JJ.,
voting in favor of the dismissal of these petitions; and with Puno, Panganiban, Reyes and De Leon, JJ., dissenting, the Court
resolved to dismiss the petitions in these cases, without prejudice to an extended opinion. We also ordered the immediate lifting of
the status quo order issued on 15 August 2000.
This ponencia is an extended opinion.
The first two issues revolve on the ruling of the HRET limiting the issue to the validity of the votes for JTV or derivatives thereof
and in dispensing with the hearings and appreciation of ballots in the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts.
We hold that VILLAROSA was not denied due process in this regard. As to the limitation of the issue, VILLAROSA has herself to
blame. First, she sought no reconsideration of the pronouncement of the HRET in its 7 October 1999 Resolution that [w]ith
Protestants withdrawal of the remaining non-pilot protested precincts, Protestant impliedly limited the issue to whether or not JTV
votes should be counted in favor of protestee Amelita C. Villarosa. Second, at the oral argument before the HRET on 9 December
1999, VILLAROSAs counsel did not object to, but instead concurred with, QUINTOS submission that the case would rise or fall on
how the Tribunal would rule on the JTV votes.
The assailed decision of the HRET quotes the statements of Atty. Felizmea, counsel for QUINTOS, and Atty. Makalintal, counsel
for VILLAROSA, during the oral argument, thus:
Atty. Felizmea: x x x Our case will rise or fall on JTV on whether or not it is valid or not x x x (TSN of December 9, 1999, Part I, p.
10)
xxx
Atty. Felizmea: x x x if this Tribunal will validate JTV ballots, I have no case. (Ibid, ibid, p. 14)
xxx
Atty. Felizmea: x x x as I said earlier, I already withdrew the balance of our protest, Your Honor, and I will only submit for resolution
on the precincts so revised, referring to the pilot precincts of both parties. Now, even in the pilot precincts of the protestee, Your
Honor, there were 865 ballots containing JTV and its derivatives so it will increase even the lead of the protestant should the Hon.
Tribunal rule[ ] that JTV is null and void. However, if the rule is valid, I have no more case (Ibid, Part II, p. 10)
xxx

Atty. Felizmea: x x x And finally, Your Honors, there are sufficient ballots containing JTV and its derivatives including Girlie
which will offset the winning margin of the protestee by more than one thousand eight hundred (1,800). And the protestee, in the
remaining non-pilot counter-protested [precincts] will not anymore recover what she had lost here in the pilot precincts because the
pilot precincts are supposedly the precincts where the anomaly is more notorious. So, there is no more chance for the protestee to
recover what she had lost if JTV ballots are considered stray. (Ibid, Part III, p. 23)
xxx
Atty. Felizmea: x x x we already withdrew our remaining non-pilot protested precincts. What is now left for the Tribunal is to decide
whether or not it will continue the revision of the non-pilot counter-protested precincts x x x We submit, Your Honors, that if this
Honorable Tribunal will consider as stray JTV ballots, we will sufficiently overcome the winning margin. And the protestee cannot
overcome our winning margin in the non-pilot counter-protested precincts. So that, therefore, Your Honors, there is no need
anymore to go though [sic] and this case could be decided without anymore revising. That is why we withdrew, as we stated earlier,
our case will rise and fall on JTV. x x x (Ibid, ibid, pp. 24-25)
xxx
Atty. Macalintal: x x x Well, I have nothing more to discuss, Your Honors, because I think the only issue here is whether we could
validate the use[ ] of initials, Your Honors. (Ibid, Part IV, p. 25).[14] (underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Finally, after the HRET promulgated its resolution of 18 May 2000 directing the revision of the ballots in the remaining 75%
precincts, VILLAROSA filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for, inter alia, a categorical ruling that all ballots cast for JTV are valid
votes for her. In its resolution of 8 June 2000 the HRET ruled by a 5-4 vote not to count JTV and its variations as valid votes for
VILLAROSA.
In the 1918 case of Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca[15] this Court held:
As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present, namely; (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject
of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon the lawful
hearing.
The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of ones defense. To be
heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[16]
From the foregoing, it is too plain and obvious that not only was VILLAROSA heard on the issue, she even moved that the HRET
make a categorical ruling that all ballots cast for JTV are valid ballots for her. VILLAROSA cannot now be heard to complain that
she was denied due process.
With the ruling that the only issue left for determination was whether to count in favor of VILLAROSA votes cast for JTV or variations
thereof, it logically follows that a hearing or appreciation of ballots other than those cast for JTV or variations thereof in the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts was unnecessary. All that was to be done was to segregate therefrom ballots bearing
JTV or variations thereof.
Concretely then, the only issue that can justify our taking cognizance of these cases is to determine, pursuant to our duty under
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution, whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring the JTV votes as stray votes. It should not be forgotten that under the Constitution the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.[17] Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in other
words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.[18]
If the HRET had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then the aggrieved party may
come to us for redress by way of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even if by the
HRET Rules of Procedure the assailed judgment has become final and the prevailing party has taken his oath of office or assumed
his position. The HRET rule on finality of its judgment cannot divest the Supreme Court of its power and duty under Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution to determine in a proper case whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of HRET.
Explaining this duty of the courts, then Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion, former Chief Justice, stated:
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
offices. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.[19]

The facts established in this case, strengthened by the admission of the parties at the preliminary conference conducted by the
HRET on 6 August 1998 and during the oral argument before the Court on 15 August 2000, lead us to no other conclusion than that
the use by VILLAROSA of JTV as her nickname or stage name, as indicated in her Certificate of Candidacy, was a clever ruse or
ploy to make a mockery of the election process. Therefore, the HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
JTV votes should not be counted in favor of VILLAROSA. They are stray votes. Here are the facts:
1. The husband of petitioner is Jose Tapales Villarosa.
2. Jose Tapales Villarosa was elected Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the 1992 and 1995
elections, thereby serving two full terms.
3. During the election and campaign periods for the 11 May 1998 elections Jose Tapales Villarosa was the incumbent
Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro.
4. In his certificate of candidacy for the May 1995 elections Jose Tapales Villarosa entered as his nickname JOE-JTV. As stated by
counsel for VILLAROSA during the 15 August 2000 oral argument, JOE and JTV are two nicknames of Jose Tapales Villarosa.
5. Per admission of VILLAROSAs counsel during the oral argument on 15 August 2000, JTV was used by Jose Tapales Villarosa
as his nickname in both the 1992 and 1995 elections, and the public was publicly informed thereof.[20]
6. JTV refers actually to the initials of Jose Tapales Villarosa.
7. Before VILLAROSA filed her certificate of candidacy on 27 March 1998 for the 11 May 1998 elections, VILLAROSA never used
JTV as her nickname or stage name. Her nickname was GIRLIE. In her affidavit dated 16 April 1998 which she filed with the
Provincial Election Supervisor, she requested that she be allowed to insert in her Certificate of Candidacy the name GIRLIE
between her given name Amelita and the initial of her maiden surname C so that her name would read in full as follows: MA.
AMELITA Girlie C. VILLAROSA.
8. In said affidavit of 16 April 1998, VILLAROSA solemnly declared under oath that she was known as GIRLIE Villarosa in every
barangay of the Province of Occidental Mindoro.
9. During the campaign period for the 11 May 1998 elections, VILLAROSAs campaign streamers (e.g., Annex P-1 of Petition in
G.R. No. 144129) and handbills (e.g., Annex P-2, id.) did not at all show that JTV was her nickname. She earlier wanted her real
nickname GIRLIE to be placed between AMELITA and VILLAROSA per the request in her affidavit of 16 April 1998, which request
was not acted upon.
From the foregoing, the following conclusions are beyond dispute:
First, JTV represents either the initials or the nickname of Jose Tapales Villarosa.
Second, VILLAROSA was never generally or popularly known as JTV. She was generally or popularly known as GIRLIE. Clearly
then, since JTV remains to be either the initials or nickname of Jose Tapales Villarosa, who was the incumbent Congressman
during the election and campaign periods for the 11 May 1998 elections, votes entered or written as JTV cannot be considered as
votes for petitioner. The votes JTV or any variations thereof are, therefore, stray votes.
It would be the height of naivety to believe that, indeed, JTV is petitioners nickname, or that she used it for any other purpose than
to ride on the popularity of her husband to mislead the voters, especially the less informed.
The plea that the voters intention must prevail is misplaced. It assumes that those who wrote JTV actually intended to vote for
petitioner. This could be true only if the person who actually owns the nickname or the initials JTV were not (a) VILLAROSAs
husband, (b) the incumbent Representative who had won as such in both the 1992 and 1995 elections, (c) generally and popularly
known as JTV when he ran and campaigned for Representative in both elections in the same legislative district where VILLAROSA
ran in the May 1998 elections. But since these were the immutable facts, the voters who wrote JTV or variations thereof had no
other person in mind except the then incumbent Representative, Jose Tapales Villarosa, or the very person whom they have known
for a long time as JTV.
The foregoing facts distinguish these cases from those relied upon by VILLAROSA and in the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Mme. Justice Gonzaga-Reyes.
Since JTV undoubtedly refers to the initials or nickname of VILLAROSAs husband, Jose Tapales Villarosa, who was, let it be
stressed again, the incumbent Representative of the district in question at the time of the election for his successor, neither reason
nor rhyme can support or justify a claim that JTV votes were intended for petitioner VILLAROSA.
Article 370 of the Civil Code, which VILLAROSA invokes, provides no relief for her. The article enumerates the names which a
married woman may use. One of them is her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
If VILLAROSA had availed herself of this, as she suggested in her petition and during the oral argument, then her name would be
MRS. JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA. If for expediency and convenience she would use the initials of her husband, then her name,
in initials would be MRS. JTV. Yet, on this point, VILLAROSA even attempted to confuse us. During the oral argument on 15
August 2000 she tried to convince us that MRS. JTV is also her nickname, thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE:
And before 1995 can you inform the Court if Mrs. Villarosa the petitioner here had ever used the nickname JTV?
ATTY. DE LIMA BOHOL:
As Mrs. JTV, yes, but not purely as JTV. I am not aware of any instance where she used purely as JTV but as Mrs. JTV.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Do you have evidence to show that before 1995 elections JTV was the nickname of Mrs. Villarosa or the petitioner now?
ATTY. DE LIMA BOHOL:
We dont have evidence, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Can you tell the Court if at any time before the filing of the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner before the May 11, 1998 election
she ever used the nickname JTV?
ATTY. DE LIMA BOHOL:
As Mrs. JTV, yes.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
So, before the filing of the certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1998 election the petitioner here used the nickname Mrs. JTV?
ATTY. DE LIMA BOHOL:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Meaning, I stress Mrs. JTV?
ATTY. DE LIMA BOHOL:
Yes, your Honor.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
This attempt further proves beyond doubt that, indeed, JTV had never been VILLAROSAs nickname.
Even if VILLAROSA decided to use JTV as her nickname for purposes of the 11 May 1998 elections, one must never forget that
she never used it as a nickname before she filed her certificate of candidacy. The nickname which the second paragraph of Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code allows to be included in the certificate of candidacy is that by which [the candidate] is generally or
popularly known. This clearly means the nickname by which one has been generally or popularly known BEFORE the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but NOT what the candidate wants to THEREAFTER use. By her own statement under oath in her affidavit
of 16 April 1998, VILLAROSA solemnly declared that she was generally and popularly known in every barangay in Occidental
Mindoro as GIRLIE BEFORE and AFTER she filed her certificate of candidacy. And, as asserted by her counsel during the oral
argument on 15 August 2000, her other nickname before she filed her certificate of candidacy was MRS. JTV, not JTV.
Rule 13 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot be applied in favor of VILLAROSA. That rule allows the use of (a) a
nickname and appellation of affection and friendship, provided that it is accompanied by the first name or surname of the candidate,
unless the nickname or appellation is used to identify the voter; and (b) a nickname, which is not accompanied by the name or
surname of a candidate, provided that it is the one by which the candidate is generally or popularly known in the locality. In both
instances, the vote cast for the nickname is a valid vote for the candidate concerned. The JTV votes are unaccompanied by her
first name or surname; and JTV is not, to repeat, a nickname by which VILLAROSA was generally and popularly known in the
Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro. The HRET then committed no error in not applying in favor of VILLAROSA Rule 13,
Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Significantly, VILLAROSAs original counsel admitted during the oral argument on 9 December 1999 that JTV are mere initials,
thus:
Atty. Macalintal: xxx Well, I have nothing more to discuss, Your Honors, because I think the very issue here is whether, we could
validate the used [sic] of initials, Your Honors.
The HRET was thus correct in applying Rule 14 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:

14. Any vote containing initials only or which is illegible or which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended
shall be considered as a stray vote but shall not invalidate the whole ballot.
Under this rule three kinds of votes are considered stray: (1) a vote containing initials only, (2) a vote which is illegible, and (3) a
vote which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended. The only error of the HRET is its ruling that if the votes
are in initials only, they are to be considered stray votes if they do not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom the votes are
intended. The first category of stray votes under this rule is not to be qualified by the third category in the sense that votes in initials
only may be counted for a candidate provided that the initials would sufficiently identify the candidate voted for. Such construction of
the rule fails to give meaning to the disjunctive conjunction OR separating the first category from the second, and the second from
the third.
Furthermore, since votes for GIRLIE written in the space for Representative were in fact claimed by VILLAROSA and credited in
her favor, then the HRET correctly ruled that JTV votes or variations thereof, under the idem sonans rule, cannot be counted for
VILLAROSA because only one nickname or stage name is allowed.
From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of VILLAROSA was evident when, in her certificate of candidacy and
campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her husband, the incumbent Representative of the district in
question whom she wanted to succeed in office. She tried to make a mockery of a process whose credibility is essential in
preserving democracy. Nullus commodum potest de injuria sua propia. No one should be allowed to take advantage of his own
wrong.
Howsoever viewed, public respondent HRET did not commit any abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for its
determination was whether JTV votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes
are stray votes.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

NURHUSSEIN A. UTUTALUM,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 84843-44
January 22, 1990
-versusCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ARDEN S. ANNI,
Respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioner Nurhussein A. Ututalum prays for the reversal, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, of the 19 April and 31 August
1988 Resolutions of public respondent Commission on Elections [COMELEC], in Cases Nos. SP 87-469 and 87-497 which declined
to reject the election returns from all the precincts of the Municipality of Siasi, Sulu, in the last 30 May 1987 congressional elections
and to annul respondent Arden S. Anni's proclamation.
The undisputed facts follow:
1. Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in the last 30 May 1987 congressional
elections for the Second District of Sulu. 30 May was the date reset by the COMELEC from the 11 May 1987 elections.cralaw
2. The election returns from Siasi showed that Petitioner Ututalum obtained four hundred and eighty-two [482] votes while
respondent Anni received thirty-five thousand five hundred and eighty-one [35,581] votes out of the thirty-nine thousand eight
hundred and one [39,801] registered voters [pp. 13, 187, Rollo]. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Petitioner Ututalum would
have a lead of 5,301 votes.cralaw
3. On 4 June 1987, during the canvass of votes, Petitioner Ututalum, without availing of verbal objections, filed written objections to
the returns from Siasi on the ground that they "appear to be tampered with or falsified" owing to the "great excess of votes"
appearing in said returns. He, then claimed that multiplying the 42 precincts of Siasi by 300 voters per precinct, there should have
been only 12,600 registered voters and not 36,663 voters who cast their votes, thereby exceeding the actual authorized voters by
23,947 "ghost voters." [In his Petition, however, he admits that an error was committed since "in the May 30,1987 elections, Siasi
had 148 precincts"]. (p. 6, Rollo). He then prayed for the exclusion from the canvass of any election returns from Siasi.cralaw
4. On the same day, 4 June, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu dismissed petitioner's objections because they had been
"filed out of time or only after the Certificate of Canvass had already been canvassed by the Board and because the grounds for the
objection were not one of those enumerated in Section 243 of the Election Code" [See Order, p. 155, Rollo]. Also on the same day,
4 June 1987, petitioner filed with the Board of Canvassers his Notice of Appeal from said Resolution to the COMELEC.cralaw
5. On 5 June 1987, petitioner filed his first petition with the COMELEC seeking a declaration of failure of elections in the Municipality
of Siasi and other mentioned municipalities; that the COMELEC annul the elections in Siasi and conduct another election thereat;
and order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to desist from proclaiming any candidate pending a final determination of the
Petition.cralaw
6. On 8 June 1987, the Provincial Board of Canvassers forwarded Petitioner's appeal as well as its Order dismissing the written
objections to the COMELEC, with the request for authority to proclaim Respondent Anni as the winning candidate.cralaw
7. On 11 June l987, in Case No. SPC 87-180, the COMELEC resolved that there was no failure of elections in the 1st and 2nd
Districts of Sulu except in specified precincts in the 1st District.cralaw
8. On 14 June 1987, the Sulu Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Anni as the winner. He subsequently took his
oath of office and entered upon the discharge of its functions in July 1987.cralaw
9. On 16 June 1987, petitioner filed a second Petition with the COMELEC praying for the annulment of Respondent Anni's
proclamation and for his own proclamation as Congressman for the Second District of Sulu.cralaw
10. While those two petitions were pending, one Lupay Loong, a candidate for Governor of Sulu, filed a verified Petition with the
COMELEC to annul the List of Voters of Siasi, for purposes of the election of local government officials [docketed as SPC Case No.
87-624, p. 9, Rollo]. This Petition was opposed by Respondent Anni. Petitioner Ututalum was not a party to this proceeding.cralaw
On 16 January 1988, the COMELEC issued in said SPC 87-624, a Resolution annulling the Siasi List of Voters "on the ground of
massive irregularities committed in the preparation thereof and being statistically improbable", and ordering a new registration of
voters for the local elections of 15 February 1988 [p. 41 Rollo].cralaw

Said Resolution was affirmed by this Court in Anni vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 81398, 26 January 1988 [p. 43, Rollo]. A new Registry
List was subsequently prepared yielding only 12,555 names [p. 228, Rollo].cralaw
11. Immediately after having been notified of the annulment of the previous Siasi List of Voters, Petitioner Ututalum filed a
supplemental pleading with the COMELEC entreating that such annulment be considered and applied by the Commission in
resolving his two Petitions against Respondent Anni [p. 319, Rollo].cralaw
12. On 19 April 1988, in a consolidated Per Curiam Resolution, the COMELEC [First Division] denied Petitioner Ututalum's two
Petitions "for lack of merit, with the advise (sic) that he may file an election contest before the proper forum, if so desired." Declared
the COMELEC, inter alia:
While we believe that there was padding of the registry list of voters in Siasi, yet to annul all the votes in this municipality for
purposes of the May 30, 1987 elections would disenfranchise the good or valid votes. As held in Espaldon vs. Comelec [G. R. No. L78987, August 25, 1987], this Commission is not the proper forum nor is it a proper ground in a pre-proclamation controversy, to wit:
Padded voter's list, massive fraud and terrorism is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy. They are proper grounds for an election protest.
Petitioner Ututalum is now before Us assailing the foregoing Resolution. Petitioner contends that the issue he raised before the
COMELEC actually referred to "obviously manufactured returns," a proper subject matter for a pre-proclamation controversy and,
therefore, cognizable by the COMELEC, in accordance with Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
Sec 243. The following shall be the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion or intimidation or they are obviously manufactured or not
authentic; [Emphasis supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
Further, that the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since its original List of Voters had
already been finally annulled; and, lastly, that there is no need to re-litigate in an election protest the matter of annulment of the
Registry List, this being already a "fait accompli."
It is Our considered view, however, that given the factual setting, it can not justifiably be contended that the Siasi returns, per se,
were "obviously manufactured" and, thereby, a legitimate issue in a pre-proclamation controversy. It is true that in Lagumbay vs.
COMELEC [L-2544, 31 January 1966, 16 SCRA 175], relied upon heavily by Petitioner Ututalum, this Court ruled that the returns
are obviously manufactured where they show a great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast. The Siasi returns
however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is actually a great excess of votes over what could
have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted out of the 39,801 voters. Moreover, the Lagumbay case
dealt with the "manufacture" of returns by those charged with their preparation as shown prima facie on the questioned returns
themselves. Not so in this case which deals with the preparation of the registry list of voters, a matter that is not reflected on the face
of said returns.
Basically, therefore, Petitioner's cause of action is the padding of the Siasi List of Voters, which, indeed, is not a listed ground for a
pre-proclamation controversy.
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy.- The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a
pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain
discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not
authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the
standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
As pointed out in Espaldon vs. COMELEC, L-78987, 25 August 1987:
Padded voters' list, massive fraud, and terrorism are clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy. They are proper grounds for an election protest.
And as held in the case of Bautista vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 78994, March 10, 1988:
The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive. [See also
Sanchez vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. L-78461, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67].
But Petitioner insists that the new Registry List should be considered and applied by the COMELEC as the legal basis in
determining the number of votes which could be legally cast in Siasi. To allow the COMELEC to do so retroactively, however, would
be to empower it to annul a previous election because of the subsequent annulment of a questioned registry in a proceeding where
petitioner himself was not a party. This cannot be done. In the case of Bashier vs. COMELEC [L-33692, 24 February 1972, 43
SCRA 238], this Court categorically ruled:
The subsequent annulment of the voting list in a separate proceeding initiated motu proprio by the Commission and in which the
protagonists here were not parties, cannot retroactively and without due process result in nullifying accepted election returns in a
previous election simply because such returns came from municipalities where the precinct books of voters were ordered annulled
due to irregularities in their preparation.
Besides, the List of Voters used in the 1987 Congressional elections was then a validly existing and still unquestioned permanent
Registry List. Then, it was the only legitimate roster which could be used as basis for voting. There was no prior petition to set it
aside for having been effected with fraud, intimidation, force, or any other similar irregularity in consonance with Section 145 of the

Omnibus Election Code. [1] That List must then be considered conclusive evidence of persons who could exercise the right of
suffrage in a particular election [Abendante vs. Relato, 94 Phil. 8; Medenilla vs. Kayanan, L-28448-49, 30 July 1971, 40 SCRA 154].
Moreover, the preparation of a voter's list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is
limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors [Sanchez vs. COMELEC, ante],
and such challenges should relate to specified election returns against which petitioner should have made specific verbal objections.
[Sec. 245, Omnibus Election Code; Pausing vs. Yorac, et al., G. R. No. 82700, 4 August 1988, Endique vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
82020-21, 22 November 1988] but did not.cralaw
That the padding of the List of Voters may constitute fraud, or that the Board of Election Inspectors may have fraudulently conspired
in its preparation, would not be a valid basis for a pre-proclamation controversy either. For, whenever irregularities, such as fraud,
are asserted, the proper course of action is an election protest.cralaw
Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper grounds in an election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to
declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a
relative few. Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers
will always cry fraud and terrorism [GAD vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665].cralaw
Petitioner Ututalum's other submission is that the Siasi returns should be excluded since the List of Voters on which it was based
has been conclusively annulled. He thus asks for the application of the rule on res judicata. This is neither possible. Aside from the
fact that the indispensable requisites of res judicata, namely, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action are not all
present, the ruling desired would, as the COMELEC had opined, disenfranchise the good and valid votes in the congressional
elections of 30 May 1987.cralaw
Finally, this Petition has to fail if only on the basis of the equally important doctrine enunciated in Padilla vs. COMELEC [L-68351-52,
9 July 1985, 137 SCRA 424] reiterated in Baldo vs. COMELEC [G. R. No. 83205,14 July 1988] that:
Where the respondent had already been proclaimed as the elected representative of the contested congressional district and has
long assumed office and has been exercising the powers, functions, and duties appurtenant to said office, the remedy of the
petitioner lies with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The pre-proclamation controversy becomes moot and
academic.
and in the more recent case of Antonino vs. COMELEC [G. R. No. 84678, 29 March 1989]:
Where the winning candidates have been proclaimed, the pre-proclamation controversies cease. A pre-proclamation controversy is
no longer viable at this point in time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy thereafter is an election protest before the proper
forum. Recourse to such remedy would settle the matter in controversy conclusively and once and for all.
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusions, a discussion of the other peripheral issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed and the assailed Resolutions are affirmed. No costs.cralaw

DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT and DATU JABERAEL SINSUAT,

Petitioners,

- versus -

The HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the SPECIAL MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SOUTH UPI,
MAGUINDANAO, as Public Respondents, ANTONIO GUNSI, SR. & JOVITO MARTIN, ABDULLAH CAMPONG, ROLAND
MOENDEG, RICARTE
G.R. No. 169106
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
BETITA & ARISTON CATALINO, and ELINDA ERESE, MARIA SARGAN, LYDIA ARON, BIENVENIDO YAP, SR., RODRIGO
TORIALES, WARLITO PINUELA, VICENTE BETITA, JAIME USMAN, all as Private Respondents,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

June 23, 2006

x --------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
prohibitory injunction or status quo order assails the Order[1] dated August 16, 2005 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
SPC No. 04-247. The COMELEC denied petitioners motions to suspend the reconvening of the Special Board of Canvassers
(SBOC) and the proclamation of winning candidates for South Upi, Maguindanao.
The facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Datu Israel C. Sinsuat (Israel) was a mayoralty candidate in the May 2004 Local Elections in South Upi,
Maguindanao, while petitioner Datu Jaberael R. Sinsuat (Jaberael), a vice mayoralty candidate. Before the elections, Israel filed a
complaint docketed as SPA No. 04-202 for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy for mayor of Antonio B. Gunsi, Sr. (Gunsi).

Upon canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed as winners, on different dates, three candidates for
mayor, two candidates for vice-mayor and different sets of members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Atty. Clarita Callar, Regional Election Director, Region XII, Cotabato City, filed a report on the multiple proclamations in South
Upi. In a Resolution[2] dated June 29, 2004, the COMELEC First Division, finding that all proclamations were based on incomplete
canvass, annulled the proclamations. The COMELEC en banc, in a Resolution[3] dated September 8, 2004, denied Israels motion
for reconsideration[4] and ordered the appointment of the SBOC. The SBOC was directed to convene and re-canvass all election
returns from all 35 precincts of South Upi, and proclaim the winners for mayor, vice-mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
However, the SBOC was unable to canvass votes from four of the 35 precincts. Thus, in a resolution dated March 8, 2005, the
SBOC was also directed to act as Special Board of Election Inspectors for Precincts Nos. 3A,[5] 10A, 15A and 17A, count the
ballots therein, and proceed with the canvassing.
Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 04-202, disqualified Gunsi to run for mayor for not being a registered
resident of South Upi.[6] On June 9, 2005, the COMELEC en banc denied Gunsis motion for reconsideration.[7]
The SBOC, on the other hand, submitted its report[8] dated May 16, 2005 with the following results:
[For Mayor]
Antonio B. Gunsi
1,954
Jovito B. Martin
1,617
Israel C. Sinsuat
1,643
For Vice-Mayor
Catalino M. Ariston
Ricardo F. Betita
Abdullah A. Campong
Roland B. Moendeg
Jaberael R. Sinsuat

387
872
1,352
1,296
1,229

For Councilors
Jose N. Alvarez
1,307
Doming L. Angit
653
Lencio A. Arig
859
Lydia B. Aron
1,652
Armando S. Babas
214
Antonio B. Batitao
623
Rene T. Batitao
447
Vicente F. Betita
1,384
Manuel L. Compleza
839
Abogado K. Dida
1,105
Mohamad D. Diocolano
761
Francilino B. Dizon
508
Alimudin S. Edzil
1,166
Linda L. Erese
2,061
Florentino M. Fantingan
19
Leo T. Galangan
1,002
Manuel B. Gunsi
1,026
Joselito C. Insoy
968
Amil B. Kamid
308
Adnan K. Karim
1,290
Gems S. Kudteg
902
Ronnie K. Omar
1,284
Sanny M. Piang
1,155
Warlito D. Pinuela
1,477
Raymundo L. Quinlat, Jr.
1,356
Calbeno P. Rawadin
1,041
Maria A. Sargan
1,868
Manuel B. Gunsi
1,026
Alfredo A. Tenorio
1,046
Rodrigo S. Toriales
1,481
Zainal S. Tumambiling 23
Armando B. Untal
747
Jaime T. Usman
1,364
Bienvenido W. Yap, Sr.
1,609[9]
Jaberael questioned 95 ballots from Precincts Nos. 15A and 17A which would affect the results of the election. It appeared
that in 48 ballots from Precinct No. 15A and 47 ballots from Precinct No. 17A, the name Jay or Sinsuat written on the space for
vice-mayor was erased by a single line and beside it was the name Campong or Beds which is the nickname of respondent
Abdullah Campong (Campong). In view of this, the SBOC suggested that the commission check these ballots which it counted in
favor of Campong. It wanted the commission to ascertain whether or not the Boards determination of the integrity and validity of
the ballots from said precincts must be reversed and set aside.[10]

In an Order[11] dated July 26, 2005, the COMELEC en banc ordered the SBOC to reconvene and proclaim Campong for
vice-mayor, and Erlinda L. Erese, Maria A. Sargan, Lydia B. Aron, Bienvenido W. Yap, Sr., Rodrigo S. Toriales, Warlito D. Pinuela,
Vicente B. Betita and Jaime T. Usman, for councilors. It also held that no candidate shall be proclaimed mayor due to the
disqualification of Gunsi, the winning candidate for mayor. Instead, it referred the matter to the Department of Interior and Local
Government ARMM for the implementation of the rules on succession.
Consequently, petitioners filed the following: (1) Motion to suspend implementation of order promulgated on July 26, 2005;
(2) Very urgent motion to suspend reconvening of the SBOC; and (3) Very urgent motion to recall notice to reconvene issued by the
SBOC. On August 2, 2005, the COMELEC suspended the reconvening of the SBOC and required the other parties to comment.
In its assailed order dated August 16, 2005, the COMELEC denied the cited motions holding that they were actually motions
for reconsideration of an en banc resolution which is not allowed in special cases under Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. It added that the SBOC had already considered the contested ballots from Precincts Nos. 15A and 17A as
valid, and counted them in favor of Campong. It ratiocinated that the case before it was not an election protest where election
documents may be examined and evidence aliunde may be presented to prove that the contested ballots were written by two
persons.
Hence, this petition where petitioners raise the following issues:
1.
WHETHER OR NOT THE NINETY-FIVE (95) VOTES ORIGINALLY AND OBVIOUSLY CAST FOR DATU JABERAEL
SINSUAT, VICE MAYORALTY CANDIDATE, BUT WAS ILLEGALLY ERASED AND TAMPERED IN FAVOR OF ABDULLAH
BEDS CAMPONG SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR OF DATU JABERAEL SINSUAT;
2.
WHETHER OR NOT DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT, MAYORALTY CANDIDATE, AS THE CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVED THE
NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, [SHOULD] BE PROCLAIMED AS THE DULY ELECTED MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SOUTH
UPI, MAGUINDANAO CONSIDERING THAT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF THE CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVED THE HIGHEST
NUMBER OF VOTES, ANTONIO GUNSI, SR., BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY PRIOR TO THE PROCLAMATION OF ANY
WINNING CANDIDATE;
3.
THE PRIMORDIAL CONSIDERATION IS WHETHER OR NOT THE AUGUST 16, 200[5] ORDER IS PROPER OR
REVERSIBLE.[12]
Simply, the issues in this case are: (1) Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it did not count the contested
ballots in favor of Jaberael? (2) Should petitioner Israel be proclaimed mayor?
On the first issue, petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it did not consider the contested
ballots as votes for Jaberael despite the SBOCs recommendation. They aver that had the 95 contested ballots been counted in
favor of Jaberael, the latter would have won the elections with 1,324 votes since Campong would only have 1,257 votes. They also
maintain that the COMELEC should have inspected and examined the contested ballots and made a definite ruling thereon. On the
second issue, petitioners claim that the COMELEC should have proclaimed Israel as the duly elected mayor since Gunsis votes
should have been considered stray votes. They also aver that Gunsis disqualification became final and executory before the
proclamation of any winning candidate.
Respondent Campong claims that the case is now moot and academic as the order sought to be annulled had become final
and executory. Further, he argues that he already took his oath as vice-mayor and assumed his office on August 25, 2005.
Thereafter, he succeeded as mayor in view of Gunsis disqualification.
He also contends that petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping considering Jaberael also filed an election protest, docketed as
Case No. 2005-19, now pending in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, Branch XIV.[13] He argues that the appreciation of
the contested ballots and election documents is best left to the trial court hearing the election protest.
Considering the circumstances in this case, we find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent
COMELEC.
Note that this petition stemmed from a pre-proclamation controversy where the proclamations of Israel and Jaberael were
annulled due to an incomplete canvass.[14] A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns.[15] The
proceedings are summary in nature in that there is no room for the presentation of evidence aliunde, the inspection of voluminous
documents, and for meticulous technical examinations which take up considerable time.[16]
In this case, Jaberael challenged, not the election returns, but the 95 ballots reflected in the returns of Precincts Nos. 15A and
17A. Well-settled is the rule that issues relative to the appreciation of ballots cannot be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy.[17] Appreciation of ballots is the task of the board of election inspectors, not the board of canvassers, and questions
related thereto are proper only in election protests.[18] In a regular election protest, the parties may litigate all the legal and factual
issues raised by them in as much detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.[19]
Moreover, the COMELEC en bancs decision directing the proclamation of the winning candidates becomes final and
executory after five days from promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.[20] Since this Court did not issue a restraining
order, the winning candidates must be proclaimed. Upon such proclamation, the action ceases to be a pre-proclamation
controversy. But the losing party may still file an election contest within ten (10) days following the date of proclamation.[21]

As a rule, the filing of an election protest (1) precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or (2) amounts
to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the
protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this rule is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of
an election protest, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding to prevent
confusion and conflict of authority.[22]
While this rule admits exceptions, circumstances of this case do not warrant their application. Records reveal that, indeed,
Jaberael filed an election protest[23] with the trial court assailing the results in all 35 precincts of South Upi including the 95
contested ballots from Precincts Nos. 15A and 17A. Hence, such election protest amounts to his abandonment of the preproclamation controversy.
On the second issue, should petitioner Israel be proclaimed mayor?
It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number
of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified.[24] This rule admits an exception. But this exception is
predicated on the concurrence of two requisites, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and
(2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[25] The facts warranting the exception do not
obtain in this case.
The complaint for disqualification of Gunsi was filed before the elections but the COMELEC en banc disqualified him
subsequent to the election. Thus, when the electorate voted Gunsi for mayor on May 10, 2004, it was under the belief that he was
qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Gunsis
disqualification. The Court cannot adhere to petitioner Israels contention that the votes cast in favor of Gunsi are stray votes. The
subsequent finding of the COMELEC en banc that Gunsi is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as to invalidate the
votes cast for him.[26] At the time, he was not notoriously known by the public to be ineligible to run for mayor.[27]
Conformably then, the rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, thus,
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. . . .
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated
to discharge the functions of his office.
x x x x[28] (Emphasis added)
Considering Gunsi failed to qualify as mayor of South Upi, the proclaimed vice-mayor shall then succeed him as mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, without prejudice to the election protest filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City, Branch XIV. The order dated August 16, 2005 of the Commission on Elections in SPC No. 04-247 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 195649

April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October
201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc
dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is
solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of
the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in
his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of
the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among
others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will
obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and
national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USAAmerican."10To further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and
again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado,
Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the
following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes
and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of
Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing
in his familys ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a
bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in
2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo
P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan
since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Baluas contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States
was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division
still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnados act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
xxxx

Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship
and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnados unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly
divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C.
Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take
effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to
justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit
of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his
Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his
Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Divisions treatment of the
petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten days
from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest
number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado
opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that
as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission
"shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose
qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the
petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010,
the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnados Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he
never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen
again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The
First Divisions reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be
its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport,
the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he
was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondents submission of a
certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16,
2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be
undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the
grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle,
once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this
assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring
his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence
of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of
citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The latters
continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the aforementioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents
submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after
his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the
mayoralty post cure the latters failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not
validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was
adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people
who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued
use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a
Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc
that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions disqualification of Arnado,
Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC
committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions
hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First
Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling
contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is
disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and
/ or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear
from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling
has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and
therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before
this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the
decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining
finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed
by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his
foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution
of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At
the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation,
thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship,
the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his
US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question
to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used
his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of
both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day.
It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation
and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted
his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively

reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39
Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges
of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April
2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to
attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under
R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an
elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as
a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen
and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation
does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from
June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used
his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship
and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not
undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the
state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are
required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding
the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a
second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness
once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The
petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes,
and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second
time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the
four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination
of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers
actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct
the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality
that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness
of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be
that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is
not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to
who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances
of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast
to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction
being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared
that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912"
where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The
Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in
those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said
order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be
entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere
pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it
is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and
ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest
number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even
have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself
out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When
the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to
serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If
a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing
all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and
Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the
candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidates certificate of candidacy. We said that while
provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election
laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give
effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization
that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and
the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidates
eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or
deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious,
candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may
have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing
every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the
election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule
of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only
the electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral
anarchy to set in.1wphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of

votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any
legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to
participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to
the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of
a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate.
The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC
but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the
petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already
proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify
the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American
citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position." The
prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the
winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections,
reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011
is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 193314

June 25, 2013

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUPAG and RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA. Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 8 March 2013, filed by Edwin Elim Tumpag and Rodolfo Y.
Estrellada (private respondents) and the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013, filed by Svetlana P. Jalosjos (petitioner)
in connection with the Decision of the Court promulgated on 26 February 2013.
Private respondents come before this Court on the sole issue of who between the vice-mayor and the second placer shall assume
office pursuant to the final determination of petitioner's ineligibility to run for office and the lifting of the 07 September 20 1 0 Status
Quo Order.
Petitioner, on the other hand, questions the Decision, by raising the following arguments:
1. This Court erred in concluding that there are inconsistencies in the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses presented by petitioner.
2. Petitioners stay in Brgy. Punta Miray should be considered in determining the one-year residency requirement in the same
municipality.
3. Petitioners registration as a voter presupposes she has stayed in the municipality at least six months prior to the registration.
4. Petitioners certificate of candidacy (COC) should not be cancelled, absent any finding of a deliberate attempt to deceive the
electorate.
5. COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction to decide on the question of the qualification of petitioner after she was proclaimed as
winner.
We deny the motion of petitioner and grant the partial motion for reconsideration of private respondents.
The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2008 is contradicted by the statements that petitioner was staying in
Mrs. Lourdes Yaps house while her residential unit was being constructed; and that by December 2009, the construction was still
ongoing.
Petitioner questions the inconsistencies noted by the court in the affidavit of her witnesses who, while claiming that they personally
know her to have been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008, declared in the same affidavit that while her
house was being constructed, she used to stay at the residence of Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Mrs. Yap) in Brgy. Punta Miray.
The declaration of petitioners witnesses that they know petitioner to be "an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008"
contradicts their statements that (1) they have "started the construction of the residential house of the owner and other
infrastructures of the resort since January 2009"; (2) "until the present (meaning until December 2009 when they executed their
affidavit), the construction and development projects are still on-going"; and (3) "at times when Ms. Jalosjos is in Baliangao, she
used to stay in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap at Sitio Balas Diut, Brgy. Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, while her
residential house was still being constructed."
Petitioner asserts that there are no inconsistencies in the statements of her witnesses, and that the statements are in fact consistent
with her claim that she had been residing in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
She argues as follows:

x x x the fact that some of these witnesses knew that petitioner lived in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap in a different barangay,
particularly Brgy. Punta Miray, is not at all inconsistent or contradictory with petitioners assertion and the witnesses statements that
petitioner resides in Brgy. Tugas, because petitioner obviously needed a place to stay while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being
constructed. This does not negate the fact that petitioner was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008,
or at the very latest during the first few months (sic) of January 2009.1
Her assertion that she "was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008, or at the very latest during the
first few months [sic] of January 2009" shows that she herself cannot pinpoint the particular date when she established her legal
residence in Brgy. Tugas. This fact is contradictory to the declaration of the witnesses that "we have personal knowledge that Ms.
Svetlana P. Jalosjos has been an actual and physical resident of Sunrise Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, after she bought
the properties thereat from the Heirs of Agapita Yap, Jr. on 9 December 2008."
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and
regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential
structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet
established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her witnesses that she has been an actual
and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.
Petitioner wants this Court to believe that the ongoing construction referred to by her witnesses in their joint affidavit does not refer
to the residential structure, but to the other structures in the resort that petitioner was then establishing. She does not assert,
however, that her residential unit had already been completed by that time. In fact, she has failed to present any proof as to when
her claimed residential unit was completed, or when she transferred to the unit.
It must be pointed out that the second statement in paragraph 1 of the Joint Affidavit states: "We have started the construction of the
residential house of the owner and the other infrastructures of the resort since January, 2009." This was immediately followed by
paragraph 2 which reads:
2. Until the present, the construction and development projects are still ongoing. To establish the fact of the on-going construction
work, we are attaching herewith as part hereof, pictures we have taken on December 20 and 29, 2009 marked Annexes "1", "2", "3",
"4", "5", and "6" hereof, respectively.2
Without any qualification as to what is being referred to by the construction and development projects in paragraph 2, it follows that
it refers to the "construction of the residential house of the owner and the other infrastructures of the resort" found in the prior
statement.
In the affidavit, there is no mention whatsoever of completion of the residential house as of 30 December 2009. Neither has any
occupancy permit been presented by petitioner to definitely establish the date she started occupying what she claims to be her
residential unit in the resort.
Petitioner takes pains to present photographs of other structures in the resort, but fails to present any photograph of a completed
residential structure, which is more relevant in proving her claimed residence in Brgy. Tugas. If the residential unit was already
completed by December 2009, her witnesses could have easily testified to that fact and presented photographs of the structure.
This absence of any photograph proving the alleged residence of petitioner in the resort bolsters the courts conclusion that at the
time the witnesses signed their affidavits in December 2009, or six months prior to the May 2010 elections, her residential unit had
not yet been built.
A temporary stay in a strangers house cannot amount to residence.
Petitioner wants this Court to credit her stay in Mrs. Yaps house as proof that she had been a resident of the Municipality of
Baliangao for more than one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. In her words:
7. More importantly, if this Honorable Court would consider the circumstance that petitioner was staying in Brgy. Punta Miray as true
so as to render the statements of her witnesses inconsistent, then such a consideration should not have led this Honorable Court to
the conclusion that petitioner was not a resident of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental since Brgy. Punta Miray is located in the
municipality of Baliangao like Brgy. Tugas. In other words, the fact that petitioner was staying in a house in Brgy. Punta Miray while
her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed during the early part of 2009 would STILL LEAD to the conclusion that
petitioner has been residing in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one (1) year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections since Brgy.
Punta Miray is a part of Baliangao.3 (Emphasis in the original and underscoring omitted)
Petitioner relies on Mitra v. COMELEC4 and Sabili v. COMELEC5 in claiming that "the series of events whereby petitioner first had
her residence constructed ... after she purchased in 2008 the property where her residence was eventually established, and while
she lived in another barangay of the same municipality, and then eventually moved in to her residence in Brgy. Tugas amounted to
an incremental process of transferring residence."
Petitioners case must be differentiated from Mitra in that petitioner therein presented not only the notarized lease contract over the
property where he claimed to be residing, but also "a residence certificate ... and an identification card of the House of
Representatives showing Aborlan as his residence."6

In Sabili, the Court declared that "the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by petitioners common-law wife, with whom he
has been living for over two decades, makes plausible petitioners allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area."7
Petitioners stay in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was only a temporary and intermittent stay that
does not amount to residence. It was never the intention of petitioner to reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times
when she was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed.8 Her temporary stay in Brgy. Punta Miray cannot be counted as
residence in Baliangao.
Petitioner failed to show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yaps house. Except for the declarations of her witnesses that she stayed
there while her residential unit in the resort was being built, she presented no other evidence to show any basis of her right to stay in
that particular house as a resident.
Approval of voter registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place prior to registration.
It appears on record that petitioner, in filing her application for registration as a voter on 7 May 2009, claimed "that she has been a
resident of Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for six (6) months prior to the filing of the said registration."9 For her claim to
be true, she must have resided in Brgy. Tugas on or before 8 November 2008. The records, however, show that she purchased
property in Brgy. Tugas only on December 2008. Thus, her claim that she had been a resident of Brgy. Tugas for at least six (6)
months prior to her application for registration as a voter on 7 May 2009 is an utter falsity.
The approval of the registration of petitioner as a voter does not and cannot carry with it an affirmation of the falsehood and
misrepresentation as to the period of her residence in Brgy. Tugas. At best, the approval of her registration as a voter carries a
presumption that the registrant will be able to meet the six-month residency requirement for the elections in which the registrant
intends to vote.10 It does not prove that the registrant has resided in the locality for more than one year prior to the elections.
Representation that one is qualified to run for public office when proven false constitutes a deliberate attempt to deceive the
electorate.
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in upholding the cancellation of her COC despite the glaring absence of any finding made
by the respondent COMELEC in its assailed Resolution that petitioner committed a false material representation in said COC.
The finding of the COMELEC that petitioner lacks the one year residency requirement to run for local elective position in the
municipality of Baliangao directly contradicts her sworn declaration that she is eligible to run for public office. The fact that petitioner
failed to prove that she has been a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the elections reveals the falsity of her
assertion in her COC that she is qualified to run for a local elective position. This false material representation justifies the
cancellation of her COC.
When the candidates claim of eligibility is proven false, as when the candidate failed to substantiate meeting the required residency
in the locality, the representation of eligibility in the COC constitutes a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide the fact"11
of ineligibility.
COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction to decide a petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy after the winner is
proclaimed.
The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated 19 August 2010, citing Aquino v. COMELEC,12 has amply discussed this matter, thus:
Petitioners contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral
exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of
qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to
Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates. Section 6 states:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue after the election (and
does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or
termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is
strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving
disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.1wphi1 The procedure hereinabove provided
shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.13
The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate who has assumed office renders the officer a de facto
officer.

This Court has ruled in Aratea v. COMELEC14 and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC15 that the cancellation of the COC based on an
ineligibility that existed at the time of its filing means that the candidate was never a valid candidate from the very beginning.16
On the question of who should assume the post vacated by the ineligible candidate, this Court amply explained in Jalosjos, Jr. that:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared
ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first placer was valid at the time of filing but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing
of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of
candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled
on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be
stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning.17 x x x. (Citations omitted)
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the highest number of votes must assume the
office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code18 cannot apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted
from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in
the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal
right to assume the position.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 08 March 2013 is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013 is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. AGNE V. YAP, SR. is hereby
declared the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental in the 10 May 2010 elections. This resolution
is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.