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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds
that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such
illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even
as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right
hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed
to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,

fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and
the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and
May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan
a
and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms.
Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of
this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
b
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions
on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
c
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
[1]
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26." In that complaint, she accused
Alauya of:
1.
"Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith;"
2.

"Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3.

"Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4.

Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a
bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible,
"all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all
her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
[2]
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.
[3]

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not
only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a
[4]
Royal Family **."
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
[5]
tones, Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
[6]
thereon. He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and
that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a
housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who
had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
[7]
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. He declared that there
was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights.
He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate
whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on

the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
[8]
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters
were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest
[9]
mistake.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial,"
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced
[10]
[11]
and injured." He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. He was
induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later
for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know
[12]
where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; He
says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she
did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co.,
Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
[13]
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April
19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed
as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as
"DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
[14]
recommendation.
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges
(against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury
to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1)
Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence;"
2)
Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
3)
Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4)
Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights,
and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
[15]
ofP26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
[16]
public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the
rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
[17]
order, public safety and public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding

judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must
at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of
[18]
the public for the judiciary."
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect
for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a
right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
[19]
good faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language
[20]
which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected
that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should
be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
[21]
Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there
are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The
ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his
use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no
evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of
attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34369 September 30, 1974


ANTONIO VILLASIS, MATERNIDAD V. VILLASIS and SANTIAGO ORENDAIN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEUTERIO VILLASIS and LAURA S. VILLASIS, respondents.
Augusto A. Kimpo for petitioners.
Silvestre Untaran, Jr. for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court in dismissing the petition and affirming the appellate court's dismissal of petitioners-appellants' appeal
for failure to file appellants' brief finds that petitioners have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their
inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for their counsel's utter inaction and gross
indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same.
The case originated in the Antique court of first instance where after due trial judgment was rendered in favor of
respondents-plaintiffs upholding their action for quieting of title with recovery of possession and damages.
Petitioners-defendants appealed the adverse judgment to the Court of Appeals. On June 25, 1970, petitioners as
appellants received notice through their counsel Benjamin M. Valente to submit the appellants' brief within the
reglementary forty-five day period to expire on August 9, 1970.
On August 10, 1970 (the last day of the reglementary period, August 9 being a Sunday), petitioners' counsel, Atty.
Valente, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel due to his having been employed as technical assistant in the
Supreme Court, with a prayer that appellants' newly engaged counsel be given sufficient time to file their brief.
Said new counsel, Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, filed on August 18, 1970 his appearance with the appellate court.
On August 27, 1970, the appellate court received respondents-appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal dated
August 5, 1970 for appellants' failure to file their brief within the reglementary period.
On September 12, 1970, the appellate court required both counsels of appellants, Atty. Valente (whose withdrawal
it held in abeyance until he filed a proper motion in verified form with the signed conformity of the clients as per its
resolution of August 18, 1970) and Atty. Tayco to comment on the dismissal motion.
Withdrawing counsel Valente filed his manifestation dated September 28, 1970 alleging inter alia that he had not
received a copy of the dismissal motion and could not therefore comment thereon and submitting therewith the
signed conformity of his clients to his withdrawal and reiterating his prayer for the court to grant his withdrawal and
to grant appellants sufficient time to file their brief. New counsel Tayco filed no comment whatsoever.
The appellate court granted withdrawing counsel's motion to withdraw per its resolution of October 9, 1970 but
meanwhile issued no resolution on the appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal.
On June 25, 1971 or after the lapse of more than eleven (11 months or to be more exact, 319 days) without
1
appellants having filed their brief at all, the appellate court's special sixth division issued its resolution granting the

dismissal motion and dismissing the appeal on the ground stated by appellees in their motion that appellants had
failed to file their brief within the reglementary 45-day period.
It was only then that new counsel Tayco apparently stirred from almost a year of inaction and filed a motion dated
July 13, 1971 for reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that he as new counsel had not
received the notice to file brief. The appellate court per its resolution of August 17, 1971 denied the motion for
reconsideration, pointing out that "Attorney Tayco's appearance was entered [on August 18, 1970] after the period
2
for filing brief had already expired [on August 10, 1970]."
New counsel Tayco filed a second motion for reconsideration on September 10, 1971 still without having filed
3
appellants, brief, which the appellate court denied per its resolution of October 6, 1971.
Hence, the present appeal by certiorari wherein petitioners are represented by their third counsel, Atty. Augusto A.
Kimpo vice Atty. Tayco.
The appeal is patently without merit.
New counsel Tayco's claim in his motion for reconsideration that he had not received the notice to file brief borders
on the frivolous. Such notice to file brief had been received by his predecessor-counsel Atty. Valente and is
binding on him as the successor. A new counsel who accepts a case in midstream is presumed and obliged to
acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired in the record prior to his
takeover. It is noteworthy that Atty. Tayco makes no claim that he was unaware that notice to file brief had been
duly served on Atty. Valente and that the period would expire on August 10, 1970 and that Atty. Valente had asked
in his two withdrawal motions that he (Tayco) as new counsel be granted "sufficient time" to file the brief.
Here the notice to file the brief had been received on June 25, 1970 to expire on August 10, 1970. The appellate
court did not dismiss the appeal at appellees' instance for failure of appellants to file brief until one year later as
per its resolution of June 25, 1971 or until almost eleven months after the expiration of the reglementary period on
August 10, 1970.
The appellate court gave appellants all the time and opportunity to duly prosecute their appeal by filing their brief in
the interval to no avail. It asked both counsels per its resolution of September 12, 1970 (which in effect granted
appellants the sufficient time asked by Atty. Valente in his withdrawal motion to file their brief) to comment on the
dismissal motion but withdrawing counsel Valente claimed he could not file any comment as he had not received
the motion while new counsel Tayco ignored the court's resolution and filed no comment and filed no brief!
Even going by new counsel Tayco's mistaken notion that he was entitled to a new notice to file brief, the appellate
court's resolution of September 12, 1970 requiring his comment on the motion to dismiss appeal for failure to file
appellant's brief was tantamount to such notice and he should then have prepared and filed the brief within fortyfive days thereafter. But as already pointed out, he never filed the appellants' brief during the interval of almost 11
months that the appellate court took before it finally dismissed the appeal per its resolution of June 25, 1971.
During all this period and even during the three months that followed when he filed two motions for
reconsideration, he presented no earnest of prosecuting the appeal by at least filing the brief even at that late date
but contented himself with a perfunctory prayer in his motion that "appellants be allowed to file their brief."!
The appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no
valid and justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for their
counsel's utter inaction and grow indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief for a year since receipt of
due notice to file the same. They could not even claim ignorance of the appellate court's notice to file brief since it
had required withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their written conformity before granting his withdrawal as
counsel, and certainly they must have ascertained from him as well as new counsel the status of their appeal
which accounts for Atty. Valente's repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal for the granting of sufficient
time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost a year thereafter to make sure that their new counsel did
attend to their appeal and did file the brief.
4

The case of Alonso vs. Rosario cited by petitioners is clearly inapplicable. There, appellants had filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss their appeal (filed by appellee just five days after the notice to file brief was

served) asking that they be allowed to file the brief after notice of denial of the motion, and when the appellate
court denied both the dismissal and the extension, they moved for reconsideration and for at least 15 days to file
their brief, but the court therein both denied reconsideration and dismissed the appeal as well for failure to file brief
within the reglementary period. Within five (5) days of such dismissal, appellants nevertheless filed their brief. This
Court in reinstating the appeal held that "the period consumed during the pendency of the motion to dismiss
should be excluded from the period given to petitioners to submit their brief, and if this is done, the brief submitted
by them on April 17, 1957 may be deemed presented in due time."
It is manifest that there are two basic differences in this case: here, the motion to dismiss the appeal was filed
precisely on the ground of failure to file the brief after the expiration of the 45-day reglementary period and no
question of suspension of the period arises, whereas there, the appellee questioned appellants' right to appeal
5
when only 5 days of their 45-day period had elapsed such that the rule that a motion to dismiss "interrupts the
time to plea" was applied by this Court by analogy; and here, petitioners-appellants never filed their brief while
there appellants immediately filed their brief within 5 days of notice of dismissal of their appeal.
It may parenthetically be noted that aside from petitioners' bare assertion of merit in their appeal, the Court has not
been shown that to reinstate the appeal would serve any purpose and not just be a futile waste of time, since
petitioners have never submitted their brief nor their proposed assignment of errors against the trial court's verdict.
To cap it all, petitioners in praying for a reversal of the appellate court's dismissal of their appeal, pray that they be
given an extension of fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision within which to file the appellants' brief (at last!).
Such laches and lassitude on their part serve but to confirm the correctness of the appellate court's dismissal of
their appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition at bar is dismissed with costs against petitioners.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

[Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]

ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.


DECISION
PUNO, J.:
[1]

This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City, against Atty. Elpidio D.
Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City) found Atty. Unto
guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law or, at the
[2]
very least, a severe reprimand against him.
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a demand-letter from
the respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian. The full text of respondents
[3]
letter reads:
Dear Mr. Ong:
This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you for your
only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which Miss Garganian
is demanding from you. It is now about two months that you have abandoned your legal and moral
obligations to support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and up to this moment you have
not given said financial support.
I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that you will
not be dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and moral obligations to
your son with Miss Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to her house
her television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence and without her knowledge
and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office will be constrained to file the proper
action in court against you.
I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at the above
address or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the preliminary
matters in connection with all the claims of Miss Garganian against you.
I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your intentional
failure or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be construed as your absolute
refusal really.
Expecting you then.
Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO


Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN
A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the
complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian
against the complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the complainant should
the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son. The relevant portion of the
[4]
respondents second letter reads:
These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):
1.
P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of P1,500.00
should be up to the completion of Mr. Ongs son in the elementary course and this is subject to adjustment when
the son is already in the secondary course or up to his college course).
2.
P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her planned
business venture to give her a source of her living since she cannot anymore be a teacher in any government
position because of her status, having a child without being lawfully wedded. x x x.
3.
The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian, without the
presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x x.
4.
The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow before noon in my
Law Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.
Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr. Alex Ong will be
withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise agreements.
Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and that the
complainant merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue
them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.
[5]

Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutors Office)
of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the
Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela
Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the Bureau of
Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor

[6]

General. According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the
aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. Essentially, the complainant
alleged that the respondent manufactured the criminal and administrative cases against him to blackmail him or
extort money from him. He claimed that the respondent solicited for any information that could be used against
him in the aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of whatever
amounts they could get from him. The complainant branded the respondents tactics as highly immoral,
unprofessional and unethical, constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the afore-quoted letters
of the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2) Nemesia Garganians affidavit where she
denied any knowledge regarding the demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit
allegedly prepared by the respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms.
Ganganians son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for alleged violation of
the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor
of the complainant who claimed that a representative of the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit
allegedly prepared by the respondent, with an offer to give any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any amount
he can get from Mr. Alex Ong. To further bolster the disbarment case against the respondent, the complainant
[7]
also included a Supplemental Affidavit, citing several cases previously filed against the respondent by other
[8]
parties.
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint lodged against
[9]
him. He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial Fiscal Jacinto
Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for postponement. After denying the
respondents third request for postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with the reception of the complainants
evidence. The respondent was duly notified of the on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it
was the respondents turn to present evidence, notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to his home
address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon
City. The return cards showed that he could not be located, although his wife received some of the notices sent to
his home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with some of them inhibiting
nd
from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2 Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili
deemed the respondents absence as waiver of his right to present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainants
cause, the investigator recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one month, or, at
the very least, be severely reprimanded.
[10]

The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General. Thereafter, the OSG
transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines inManila, for proper disposition, conformably with
[11]
adopted policies and procedures. The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinilis report and
[12]
recommendationin toto.
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the importance of the
[13]
legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in Noriega vs. Sison. We then held:
In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability attached
to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious
study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his
family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the
social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact
that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of
the United States Court when he said:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other
hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the
bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised
with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is
rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be
competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
[14]

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It mandates
lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any
case or proceeding.
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith required of a
lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the
complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the
complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative
cases against the complainant. We find the respondents action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against
the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the
respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any
information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. His tactic is
unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
[15]
[16]
proceeding and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. In the case of Choa vs.
[17]
Chiongson, we held:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do
so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of his clients case with the end view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the
Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same; Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common
sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a
course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
(emphases ours)
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,
[18]
whether in his professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in
[19]
such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by
the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the
proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect
towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his
[20]
[21]
conduct. The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath he took before this Court when he sought
admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims
to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court.
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1) month suspension
or reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis--vis the misconduct of the respondent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Untos personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a
copy thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

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