5E3
The Business Of Fire
And The American Holocaust
KITTY GENOVESE
Late one evening in March 1964, a
young lady named Kitty Genovese was
returning to her home; and as she neared
the front door to her apartment a figure
appeared out of the darkness and at-
tacked her. "Oh my God, please help
me! ", she screamed as the knife flashed.
Kitty's screams for help awakened the
neighborhood.
The assailant retreated and Kitty lay in
the street alone. Minutes passed, no one
came to her aid, no one called the police.
As she lay bleeding in the street she cried
out repeatedly for help. But her neigh-
oil peered out through closed drapes
and did nothing.
The killer waited, and when it became
clear to him that no one would act, he
emerged from the shadows again. Perhaps
fearing that she could identify him, he
slashed with the knife once again, but
again, her screams drove him away. Still
her neighbors watched, but did not
act.
With blood freely flowing, Kitty
slowly and painfully crawled to the rear
of the apartment, struggled to open the
door, and then collapsed in a heap at the
base of the stairway. Even there, no one
came to help her. Once again the killer
came out from the shadows. This time
her screams were silenced.
Kitty died alone that night, very much
alone indeed, amid the peering eyes of
her cowardly neighbors.
Finally the police were called. Within
two minutes of the call, they arrived at
the scene. But it was 37 long minutes
after the first attack. 38 neighbors had
watched this brutal and prolonged killing,
and failed to act. Why? Their answers
were virtually all the same. "I DIDNT
WANT TO GET INVOLVED."
• THE BUSINESS OF FIRE
Fire is a business. Today, the annual
take from the business of fire lies some-
where in the 50 billion to 100 billion
dollars a year range. In order to maximize
profits from fire, fire in America itself has
been maximized. It all began more than
100 years ago. Here's how it all hap-
pened.
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
PIONEERS
The fire insurance industry was the
pioneer industry to make profits from
fire. Insurance is a tax on the cash flow
from the many (that do not suffer a loss)
to the few (that do suffer the loss). The
greater the number of fires, the greater
the cash flow. The greater the cash flow
the greater the profits. Insurance industry
profits are directly related to the fire
burn rate provided the industry can set
rates to fit its needs (and it does so).
CATASTROPHIC LOSS — AN
ENEMY OF THE SYSTEM
The actuarial tables of the insurers
worked only when there was a very large
number of "small" (by insurance stan-
dards) losses. When "spread of risk" is
adequate, insurance becomes a "no
gamble" business. But, if a vast (or very
excessive and concentrated) loss occurs,
the insuring system can be overpowered.
Back in the 1800s when large sections
of cities, sometimes even an entire city
burned, the actuarial tables were "blown"
(the planned for losses were greatly
exceeded). The insuring systems were
overpowered, and a trail of bankrupt
insurers was left in the wake.
THE PERFECT SOLUTION
In time, the insurers created the
"perfect solution" to the catastrophic
fire. It was called a building code. The
building code subdivided cities and major
size buildings into "insurable size" burn
risks. For example, when row houses in
cities were 100 percent frame con-
structed, an entire block could burn
down. But, when the building code
required a fire wall between each two
houses, then only one house burned at a
time. The fire walls made each home a
separate burn unit. "Spread of risk" was
achieved. When a large building, such as
a hotel or hospital, became subdivided by
the code with fire walls and floors, any
one room or section became a "small"
burn unit within the building.
The fire code was the "perfect solu-
tion" to fire in two ways. First, the
spread of risk increased. Subdivision
multiplied the number of individual risks.
Actuarial tables become extremely ac-
curate when the number of risks is very
high. Secondly, the building code was the
"perfect solution" to fire because it did
not reduce fire frequency, it merely put a
cap on the fire size. The business of fire
insurance survived.
THE MUTUALS
In the 1800s, the industrial revolution
spawned large numbers of factories and
mills. These plants were hazardous, and
burned at an alarming rate. The insurers
learned to operate in this market by
charging very high rates ($1 to $5 per
$100 of value and higher) and by "re-
insuring the risk" with many other
insurers. Each insurer took only a very
small part of the total loss potential.
But the property owners rebelled
against the excessive rates, frequent
inadequate payments, and the continued
destruction of their businesses. Business
men banded together to create mutual
insurance systems (many property owners
combining to self insure their own
properties). Once the property owners
became insurance managers, they learned
they could dramatically reduce the burn
rate.
Fire sprinkler systems were developed
to the point where former high risk
properties (virtually uninsurable) became
"no loss" properties (self insurance rates
often fell to the three to five cent range).
The fire sprinkler system created a
property class that was nearly 100
percent free from serious fires. This
movement to "self insurance" with
dramatic reductions in the fire rates was
very disturbing to the stock insurance
companies...
 THE NFPA IS BORN
In 1896 a group of stock (not mutual)
insurance companies met and formed the
National Fire Protection Association.
This new organization was then charged
with the responsibility to standardize and
control the constantly improving fire
sprinkler system. On the surface the
motivation of the founding insurers
appeared to be to encourage the de-
velopment and use of fire sprinklers, and
to promote fire safety nationwide (hu-
manitarianism).
Knowing what we know today, it is
much more likely that these early insurers
recognized the fire sprinkler system for
what it really was — a threat to insurance
industry profits. Fire sprinklers had the
potential to nearly eliminate fire. The
insuring system fed on fire. From that
very day in 1896 when the NFPA took
control of the sprinkler system, tech-
nological evolution and advancement of
this fire safety system stopped, virtually
in its tracks. To this very day, the NFPA
has maintained the fire sprinkler code so
as to bar sprinklers from more than 90
percent of the properties in America.
Today it is the big properties that are
sprinklered, but the great bulk of the
insurance premiums are generated by
smaller non-sprinklered buildings.
THE BIRTH OF THE REGULA-
TORY EMPIRE
Soon the National Fire Protection
Association, and its regulatory partner,
Underwriters Laboratory, were establish-
ing many codes and regulations control-
ling fire safety products, and fire safety
law throughout America. The NFPA
created the legislation. Insurers promoted
its adoption at the local, state, and
federal level. Soon, one private organiza-
tion (NFPA) was creating the laws
mandating the use of those products that
another private organization (Under-
writers Laboratory) "approved". A multi-
billion dollar controlled marketplace was
created.
Those who did not buy that which was
approved and mandated became "law-
breakers". The fire chief who did not
adopt the code that was pushed upon him
was publicly denounced as being "respon-
sible" when the next serious fire occurred
in his jurisdiction. NFPA would investi-
gate the fires, and invariably found that
"failure to comply with NFPA codes"
were primary causes of the disasters. Step
by step, those who make money from
fire, gained absolute control of the fire
marketplace, and the laws of "fire
, safety".
1 1
11 4E NFPA LOBBYISTS
In Wilehington they're called lobbyists.
They must register, and they cannot vote.
In Boston they're called volunteer code-
writers, and they not only vote, they
dominate their pet committees. At one
time the NFPA was a yawn only of the
insurers. Today, a thousand lobbyists
work diligently to prepare the codes and
slice the pie. Behind the humanitarian
facade lies the den of a thousand collu-
sions.
When a Marietta, Ohio nursing home
burned, and 31 died in the flashover fire,
they concealed the flashover and elevated
the carpet. The carpet that would not
burn on the floor, was put upside down
on the ceiling of the fire test tunnel. In
this position it was proven "flammable".
NFPA code 101 was whitewashed, and an
entire new industry, the carpet industry,
was shifted into the fire regulatory
empire. After each major fire, NFPA
investigates, and then reigns over the
division of the spoils.
Having gained the power to "approve"
and "tax" most construction products
years ago, today our volunteer humani-
tarians are, step by step, gaining the
power to regulate and "tax" all com-
bustible products to be entered into
buildings, all for the sake of fire safety.
THE VICTIM BECOMES THE
VILLAIN
One key element behind the fire safety
operation is the fire escape scenario.
NFPA has always promoted complex and
elaborate plans for escaping the fire. Feel
the door, if it is hot don't open it, stuff
wet clothes along the crack to keep the
gases out. Close the door and trap the
fire. And so forth. After the fires occur,
and the bodies are carried out, too often
the failures of the codes are hidden
behind the charges that the victim
panicked, the nurse failed to close the
door, someone did not report the fire
promptly, etc., etc.
Today, they promote the "learn not to
burn" concept, and teach children to
crawl out of fires. They don't explain
that smoke and most toxic gases are
heavier than air, and that in many fires
the floor can be the least safe place. They
don't explain that there is a countdown
to flashover, and that the slow mover
may never make the doorway. The truth
is that there is no such thing as one
"good" escape scenario. Fire is too
variable; but the scenarios are essential to
the concealment of the code faults.
During these past 80 years while NFPA
has been "saving the children" with
escape scenarios they have also done two
other things;
1. They remained silent on flashover,
and how it too often reduces escape time
to nearly zero.
2. They have' mtained the thi
sprinkler system as not viable and neces-
sary for nearly all properties where
human life is the main concern.
2
THE FIRST FIVE MINUTES
It's an old saying. The first five
minutes are worth the next five hours.
How can you assure fire control within
the first five minutes? Only with A.
automatic fire suppression system. The
is no other way! There is no really
effective, really practical automatic sup-
pression system, except the water system.
The multi-billion dollar industry of
fire knows this. Tens of billions of dollars
are at stake each and every year. The key to
the profits is to delay the fire response.
Give fire the first five minutes — and the
game is won or lost — depending on your
viewpoint.
THE COST
The cost of the fire safety controls has
been very high. We have a nation filled
with unsafe buildings. Today, probably
eight out of every 10 building fire deaths
are deaths that could have been avoided
with proper codes. They are needless
deaths. Those unnecessarily killed and
injured by fire over the years must by
now number well into the millions.
Children have died, thousands and
thousands of them.
From 10 percent to 50 percent of
building construction costs go into fire
safety products, many of them of mar-
ginal value. Every developer who builds a
building pays a huge tax to the fire
system. The direct fire costs are in
range of six to 10 billion a year. Th.
indirect costs, five to 10 times higher.
Thousands of older buildings have
been condemned and razed for "not
meeting the code". Almost all of these
buildings could have been easily and
inexpensively made safe. Thousands of
businesses have been forced out of
business because they could not afford
the high cost of the codes. Most were
unjustified victims of the codes.
THE AMERICAN HOLOCAUST
There was a German Holocaust. When
it was occurring it was not publicly
acknowledged. Many did know about it.
But few acknowledged it publicly.
For more than 80 years we have had a
continuity of an American Holocaust. It
is far more subtle, and the victims are
selected by chance.
Making money from fire by reducing
fire potential is acceptable. But 'making
codes to maximize profits by suppressing
known solutions to fire is not. Hitler was
a mad man. But shrewd and calculating
business men are behind the American
Holocaust. And more the shame because
of it.
 Recommended: The Formation Of Action Committees .
For Honest Fire Codes And A Fire Safe America
There is a business of fire and they
ave gained the power to make our laws,
they control the keys to the marketplaces
and they mandate what the public shall
buy. Through these powers they have
created wealth beyond reckoning.
But fire is the essential ingredient, and
the thrust for profit has created an
American holocaust to rival the worst of
Hitler.
The system feeds on fire and grinds up
and destroys the solution; but the guilt is
spread so far and wide, and is so diluted
by the scope and complexities of the
committee process, that none acknowl-
edge responsibility.
"Fire safety" as it exists in America
may well be the grandest and most
destructive fraud ever conceived and
executed by the mind of Man.
We propose the formation of "Ac-
tion Committees" or groups. These
could be committees within the fire
services, within the Society of Fire
Protection Engineers, the construction
industry, concerned mothers, or just plain
citizens. They could be homogenous (all
fire service for example), or a mixture
(attorneys, legislators, engineers, fire
it
service, etc.). The makeup is not nearly so
* portant as the motivation.
An action committee could be one
an, or woman, or it could be a hundred.
The important thing is to do something.
Write letters. Write your congressman,
communicate, create new public oriented
standards, do research, etc. These are the
types of action committees I would
propose (You may think of others.)
Incidentally, some of the subject matters
of the recommended committees may
sound like things that some consider they
are already doing. However, here we
propose action that is not just dotting the
"i's" or crossing the "t's" of existing
codes or practices, as is so common
today. Here we propose using the sur-
geon's knife and cutting deeply to the
marrow, finding corruption where it may
exist, and dramatically restructuring
where human life is being wantonly
wasted.
A. INFORMATIONAL COMMITTEES
To a very large degree; the fire journals
permit only that which serves the system.
Write an article on corruption underlying
the codes, and the fire safety magazines
back away. This committee should put
together the side of the story that is
rarely told, and deseminate it to fire
alldefi. legislators, law enforcement agen-
MpRes, the news media, and to the public.
B. REGAIN THE LAWMAKING
COMMITTEES
These committees should study and
plan ways to shift fire code lawmaking
away from private organizations that
make money from fire, to proper legal
authorities at the state and local (not
federal) level.
C. FIRE CODE EXAMINATION &
REWRITING COMMITTEES
Each committee will be set up to
review and analyze one existing fire code
(Say NFPA-101). They will make a
thorough examination of all regulations
contained therein, solicit backup data,
and then write a new code as considered
necessary. This new code then would be
an advisory code, prepared by a non
biased group (no manufacturers' repre-
sentatives, no fire insurance agents) and
would be made available to all legal
authorities. Note: committee "C" could
tie in with committee "B".
D. FIRE TESTING COMMITTEES
These committees would perform
testing and research to improve the state
of fire safety. For example, one com-
mittee could arrange live fire testing in a
real building, install fire control ap-
paratus, and allow untrained subjects to
attempt to put the fire out using: a)
extinguisher, b) 11/2 inch hose, c) garden
hose.
Comparable control capability could
be tested.
E. LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
These committees would prepare pro-
posed legislation pertinent to fire safety.
F. FIRE SPRINKLER PROMO-
TIONAL COMMITTEES
These committees could work toward
reducing fire sprinkler costs, rewriting or
creating sprinkler codes as necessary, and
working toward 100 percent of all
buildings being sprinklered. Tax write-
offs may be considered.
G. FIRE SPRINKLER WATER
SUPPLY COST COMMITTEES
These committees would study ways
to reduce the cost of feeding a sprinkler
system, reducing main size, liberalizing
pipe types, heading off unnecessary
backflow and tap charges, etc. They
ecadd prepare -legislation regarding the
lon*ng on And Wukccessary"
suppi
( sP iD
H.LEGAL ACTION COMMITTEES
These committees would investigate
fires, and determine whether or not
3
collusion or corruption in the fire codes
were contributory factors, and assist fire
victims in legal recoveries where the codes
are the underlying cause.
I. ANTI-WHITEWASH COM-
MITTEES
These committees would investigate
the fire investigators as well as the fires.
For example, a committee might well
investigate the MGM fire investigators to
see if the reasons and causes for fire
sprinklers not being installed were white-
washed. Were NFPA Codes 13 and 101
deterrants to the use of sprinklers in this
building? Have there been deliberate and
organized efforts made to sabotage the
use of inexpensive life safety type sprin-
kler systems in America? If so, was this a
factor? Was the former State Fire Marshal
of Nevada removed from office because
he nromoted low cost sprinklers for
casinos?
J. INVESTIGATE THE "SPRIN-
KLER SPACING" COMMITTEES
Has there been a conspiracy, on the
part of NFPA, fire insurers, the testing
laboratories, and the sprinkler manu-
facturers to unnecessarily limit sprinkler
head spacing to the result that most
systems sold have been marketed at
possibly more than twice the price
necessary?
In the 1960s Factory Mutual Research
developed a high hazard sprinkler to
cover 320 square feet. This proposed
coverage was more than three times the
code allowed area per sprinkler (1/3 as
many sprinklers needed). The Factory
Mutual system was designed to inject
a "jelling agent" into the riser. The
hardware was patented, and Factory
Mutual projected a $240 million dollar a
year market for this system by 1982 (the
system was never marketed).
Patton, after years of sprinkler re-
search, created the Life Safety System,
and had proven the practicality of 400
square feet and greater spacing of plain
water sprinklers for all hazard ranges.
Patton put his system into the public
domain (available to anyone) and was
gaining recognition and adoption of these
systems and concepts over much of the
nation.
Factory Mutual teamed up with an
array of establishment organizations to
testify against a nationally recognized
solution :Ao the fire problem.-
g
:leen a
r spacing
thereby • dimes double
amountiot 44pe and labor requilielt
protect properties, are those who paid the
extra costs for protection, and those who
died in buildits where protection
was impractical because of cost, entitled
to compensation?
The State Fire Marshal of Nevada was
one of a great many who supported and
approved the Patton Life Safety System,
but he was removed from office, re-
portedly for attempting to require such
protection for a casino he considered
unsafe. Did these events culminate in
the MGM fire? Why did the MGM fire
investigators not delve into these matters?
One or more committees of concerned
citizens should be formed to investigate
these matters.
K. INVESTIGATE THE NFPA
FIRE INVESTIGATIONS COM-
MITTEES
These committees would look into the
ethics of the NFPA fire investigations and
reports. NFPA sells fire codes. When
NFPA investigates fires, does it slant the
conclusions to increase the sale of and
influence of its own codes? Does it cover
up the role its own codes may have
played in the fire? Does it use its investi-
gatory powers as a weapon against a local
authority that does not adopt the NFPA
codes? Do federal agencies finance and
"rubber stamp" the NFPA fire investiga-
0.LEGISLATIVE WATCHDOG
COMMITTEES
These committees would keep an eye
on fire legislation promoted by special
interests that may not be in the public's
interest. For example, the California
State Fire Marshal has prepared a code
that would allow plastic pipe fire sprin-
kler systems under certain conditions.
Some special interest groups are at-
tempting to outlaw the use of all plastic
pipe, including its use in fire protection
systems. Most legislation slips through
because no one watches or shows
concern.
P. BUILDING CONSTRUCTION
COST COMMITTEES
These committees would attempt to
curb the increasing cost of constructing
buildings due to the increasing regulations
mandating fire protection products. It
would propose methods to streamline and
modernize the building codes, and take
the "superfluous" and useless out of the
codes while making buildings safer.
There are a thousand other
pertinent subjects.
yourself that you, yourself, are doing all
you can to save a life. There's no doubt in
my mind that 90 percent, or more, who
are "fire safety experts" by way
memorizing the codes can rationalib
the codes into being in the public
interest. It's easy that way.
But, somewhere out there are some
people who know the truth, and find
it hard to hide it from themselves. They
are the ones we're looking for. They are
the people who find that it is not easy to
shut out the screams, as did the neighbors
of Kitty Genovese.
THE FIRST STEP — BREAKING
THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE
The business of fire has nurtured
itself for more than a century, and has
written the rules to consolidate its
own powers. There will be no sudden,
dramatic, changing of the system. No
one will wave a magic wand and make
things wonderful. But, the day that
free and open discussion begins regarding
the manner by which the codes guarantee
fire continuity, then and there, on that
day a turn around will begin.

tions? If so, why?
L. THE INSURANCE — SPRIN-
KLER CONNECTION COM-
MITTEES
These committees would look into the
role the fire insurer plays in controlling
sprinkler technology. Is there a conflict
of interest? Are low cost sprinklers a
threat to insurance profits? Is this in-
dustry obstructing the development of
better systems for small buildings?
M. CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL
SPRINKLER CODE COMMITTEES
These committees would examine, and
if found satisfactory, promote the Cali-
fornia residential sprinkler code as a
means to inexpensively protect homes
and dwellings nationally.
N. NFPA-13D INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEES
These committees would investigate
the strange role the NFPA and others
have played regarding residential sprin-
klers. Were fire tests "rigged" to de-
liberately prove conventional sprinklers
unsatisfactory in the home? Did the
so-called "fast" sprinklers fail the very
same test criteria? Was there any col-
lusion between the testing laboratories,
NFPA, a federal agency and equipment
manufacturers to push one product off
the market and open the door for a more
expensive product? Unbiased committees
should begin gathering and evaluating all
pertinent data.
•
IT WON'T BE EASY
Above are a few of the things that
could be done. We would like to see a
very active group in each major city, and
in every county, taking on special studies
or activities and sink their teeth into the
subject, write for data, explore past fire
reports, examine anything and every-
thing, and begin a grand scale revolution
and rewriting of the technology of fire. RICHARD M. PATTON FPE.-PE
I'd like to see the committees cooperate President
— share the information — but for each to PATTON FIRE SUPPRESSION
be unique and inquisitive. SYSTEMS INC.
4740 Myrtle Ave.,
For the vast majority of people in Sacramento, CA 95841
fire safety, who have been brought up Telephone (916) 338-0943
to use "made in Boston" fire codes as
a substitute for thinking and for local
law, rethinking will not come easy.
Tearing the NFPA — U.L. security
blanket away from the fire services
would be equally as traumatic as tearing
the Kremlin away from Siberia. Having all
the answers handed to you in a set of
books is an awfully tempting way to
become an "expert". Having a label on a
product is apple pie easy security, and
who cares if the cost is twice as high?
Turn a sprinkler code over to in-
surance men, who are in the business
of making money from fire, then make
believe that they make a code that
serves the public. Rationalize that there is
no correlation at all between the sprinkler
system code controls and the burned
children in the home next door. It's easy!
It's easy to close your eyes to the back-
ground causes, figure the codes are the
other guy's business, and convince OCTOBER 1982
4