Land Titles Deed Cases

LTD
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 64818. May 13, 1991.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Respondents.
Pedro M. Surdilla for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; NO PERSON IS ENTITLED TO HAVE LAND REGISTERED UNDER THE
CADASTRAL OR TORRENS SYSTEM UNLESS HE IS THE OWNER IN FEE SIMPLE OF THE SAME. The most basic rule in
land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system
unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented against such
registration by third persons . . . In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have
the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally issued, the burden is upon
him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple."cralaw virtua1aw library
2.
ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY PRIVATE PERSONS WITHOUT ANY GRANT, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, FROM GOVERNMENT; WHEN GRANT CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED BY LAW; FOREGOING RULES BASED ON
DOCTRINE THAT ALL LANDS NOT ACQUIRED FROM THE GOVERNMENT, EITHER BY PURCHASE OR BY GRANT, BELONG
TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a
claim of title since July 26, 1894 or prior thereto. The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that
were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
In a land registration case, does the bare statement of the applicant that the land applied for has been in the
possession of her predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and
"conclusive" evidence required in proceedings of this nature? This is the issue to be resolved in the instant petition for
review.cralawnad
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pangasinan, an application 1 for registration in her favor of a parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more
or less, located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
The Director of Lands, in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition, alleging that neither the
applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other
recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that neither she nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in concept of owner at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines. 2
After trial, the Court of First Instance 3 rendered judgment on December 29, 1976, disposing as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 6236,
the Court hereby confirms the title of the applicants over the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-251940 and hereby
adjudicates the same in the name of the herein applicants, spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, both of legal age,
Filipino citizens and residents of Dagupan City, Philippines, as their conjugal property.
"Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and title issue therefor.
"SO ORDERED." 4
The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), which
however affirmed the lower courts decision in toto on July 29, 1983. 5
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds: 6
"The Intermediate Appellate Court erred:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A.
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIA P. LEE HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE HER FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR IMPERFECT TITLE WHICH ENTITLES HER TO REGISTRATION EITHER UNDER
ACT NO. 496, AS AMENDED (LAND REGISTRATION ACT) OR SECTION 48 (B), C. A. NO. 141, AS AMENDED (PUBLIC
LAND ACT);
"B.
IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY INCOMPETENT, SELF-SERVING AND UNRESPONSIVE
TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT THAT THE SPOUSES URBANO DIAZ AND BERNARDA VINLUAN HAD BEEN IN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS, LEADING TO REGISTRATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING
THE STATE OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;
"C.
IN ORDERING REGISTRATION SIMPLY BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO REBUT
RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE, WHICH, HOWEVER, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOF
WHICH MUST BE CONCLUSIVE REQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION;
"D.
IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS MISERABLY FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE
LAND IS PUBLIC LAND BELONGING TO THE STATE."cralaw virtua1aw library
Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that she was able to prove her title to the land in question through
documentary evidence consisting of Deeds of Sale and tax declarations and receipts as well as her testimony that her
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question for more than 20 years; that said testimony,
which petitioner characterizes as superfluous and uncalled for, deserves weight and credence considering its
spontaneity; that in any event, the attending fiscal should have cross-examined her on that point to test her
credibility; and that, the reason said fiscal failed to do so is that the latter is personally aware of facts showing that
the land being applied for is a private land. 7
We find for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The evidence adduced in the trial court showed that the land in question was owned by the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan, who on August 11, 1960, sold separate half portions thereof to Mrs. Laureana Mataban and Mr.
Sixto Espiritu. On March 18, 1963, and July 30, 1963, respectively, Mrs. Mataban and Mr. Espiritu sold their half
portions to private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private respondent had the property recorded for taxation purposes in her
name and that of her husband Stephen Lee, paying taxes thereon on March 25, 1975 and March 9, 1976 for the same
years.chanrobles law library : red
At the time of the filing of the application for registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent had been in
possession of the subject area for about thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to her possession that of
her predecessors-in-interest in order to comply with the requirement of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library
Private respondents testimony on her predecessors-in-interests possession is contained in a one-page declaration
given before a commissioner on December 22, 1976. It reads in full as follows: 8
"Commissioner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Atty. Surdilla, you can now present your evidence.
"Atty. Surdilla:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I am presenting the applicant, your Honor.
Commissioner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Swearing under oath the applicant.
Atty. Surdilla:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q
Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
"A
Maria P. Lee, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Stephen Lee, proprietor, and resident of Dagupan City.
"Q
Are you the applicant in this case now?
"A
Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.
"Q
From whom did you acquire said property, subject of registration now?
"A
From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban, sir.
"Q
Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours over said property?
"A
Yes, sir.
"Q
Showing to you these documents styled as Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1963 and also Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 30, 1963, what can you say to them?
"A
The deed of sale dated March 18, 1963 is the conveyance to us by Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban over the 1/2
portion of the property and the deed of sale dated July 30, 1963 likewise refers to sale of the 1/2 portion of the
property by Sixto Espiritu to us, sir.
At this juncture, may I pray that said Deeds of Absolute Sale adverted to above be marked as Exhibits "I" and "J",
your Honor.
Please mark them accordingly.
"Q
Do you know from whom did Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana Mataban (your vendors) acquired likewise
the property sought by you to be registered?
"A
Yes, sir. They purchased it from the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan who possessed the same for
more than 20 years.
Q
Showing to you this document styled as Deed of Absolute Sale, dated August 11, 1970, is this the sale
adverted or referred by you?
"A
Yes, sir.

At this juncture, may I pray that said deed be marked as Exhibit "H", your Honor.
Please mark it.
"Q
Who is in possession of the property now? What is the nature thereof?
"A
I and my husband are in possession of the property, which possession tacked to that of our predecessors-ininterest is adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, your Honor.
"Q
Whose name/names is the property declared for taxation purposes?
"A
We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.

At this juncture, may I pray, sir, that Tax Declaration Nos. 22253 and 24128, be marked as Exhibits "K" and "K-1",
respectively.
"Q
Who has been paying taxes over the property?
"A
We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.

At this juncture, may I pray that Official Receipts Nos. H-6048922 and G-9581024, dated March 9, 1976 and March
25, 1975 be marked as Exhibits "L" and "L-1" respectively.
"Q
Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in the bank or private person/persons?
No, sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.
"Thats all, your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library

The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral
or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented
against such registration by third persons . . . In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be
permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally, issued,
the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple." 9
Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since July
26, 1894 10 or prior thereto. 11
The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As enunciated in the case of Santiago v. de los Santos: 12
". . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural
resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care
applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim
with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless
alienated in accordance with law, It retains its rights over the same as dominus . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more
possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year
period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This
burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses
Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in
private respondents declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.
Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. The
phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner" by which she described her own
possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require factual support
and substantiation.
That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because the burden is
upon her to prove by clear, positive and absolute evidence that her predecessors possession was indeed adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner. Her bare allegation, without more, did not constitute such
preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.cralawnad
Neither does the supposition that the fiscal had knowledge of facts showing that the land applied for is private land
helpful to private Respondent. Suffice it to say that it is not the fiscal, but the court which should be convinced, by
competent proof, of private respondents registerable light over the subject parcel of land.
Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied with the requirements of
the law for confirmation of her title to the land applied for, it was grave error on the part of the lower court to have
granted her application.cralawnad
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 147359 : March 28, 2008]
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF TITLE FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORPORATION,
represented by KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp. (FATCO), through Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr., appeals by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the October 23, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52366,
and the March 7, 2001 Resolution2 denying its reconsideration.
On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union an application for confirmation of
title to parcels of land, described as Lots No. 1505, No. 1234 and No. 47030,3 with an aggregate area of 8,463 square
meters, situated in Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union. The application was docketed as LRA REC. No. N-63835.
FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land which it openly, exclusively and
notoriously possessed and occupied for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of ownership, tacking its
possession with that of its predecessors-in-interest. It allegedly acquired these lots in the following manner:
a) Lot No. 1505 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20304 was acquired by a Deed of Exchange executed by and between
the Brgy. Council of Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, represented by its Brgy. Capt. Honesto Alcid and Brgy. Sec.
Teofilo Descargar, and the applicant, at San Fernando, La Union, on October 19, 1988 appearing as Doc. No. 415,
Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered
with the Registry of Deeds for the Province of La Union on November 16, 1988;
b) Lot No. 1234 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20305 was acquired by a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with the Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by and between Ceferino Bucago, Ildefonso Bucago, Victoria Bucago, Felomina B. Higoy,
Elizabeth B. Espejo, Ernesto B. Dacanay, Maria Bucago, Reinerio P. Dacanay and the applicant at San Fernando, La
Union, on October 19, 1988 appearing as Doc. No. 411, Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial
register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Registry of Deeds for the province of La Union
on November 16, 1988;
c) Lot No. 47030 covered by Tax Declaration No. 21971 was acquired by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and
between Ernesto Adman, Amparo Carino Adman, and the applicant at San Fernando, La Union, on August 27, 1990
appearing as Doc. No. 235, Page No. 47, Book No. II, Series of 1990, in the notarial register of Notary Public Roman
R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Register of Deeds for the Province of La Union on September 25, 1990.4
FATCO, thus, prayed for the registration or confirmation of its title over these parcels of land.
On December 1, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance, as counsel for the Republic of
the Philippines (Republic), and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the case.5
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order setting the application for initial hearing on February 28,
1995.rbl r l l lbrr
The Order was published in the January 23, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette,6 and the February 18-24, 1995 issue of
the Guardian.7 The notice of hearing was, likewise, posted in a conspicuous place in each parcel of land included in
the application, and on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Bacnotan, La Union.8 The Provincial Prosecutor
of La Union was furnished with a copy of notice of hearing on November 18, 1994.9
At the scheduled initial hearing on February 28, 1995, Atty. Marita Balloguing entered her appearance as collaborating
counsel for FATCO, and requested the resetting of the marking of exhibits.10 The RTC granted the request and issued
an Order resetting the hearing to April 19, 1995, viz.:
As prayed for by Atty. Balloguing, who entered her appearance in collaboration with Atty. Ungria as counsel for the
applicant, this case is reset to April 19, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. for the purpose of establishing jurisdictional facts.
SO ORDERED.11
The Republic, through the Provincial Prosecutor, was duly informed of the resetting.12
On March 2, 1995, the OSG again entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic and once more deputized the
Provincial Fiscal of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the case.13 On the same date, the Republic filed its
Opposition to FATCO's application for registration on the following grounds: (1) neither FATCO nor its predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title and tax declarations of the applicant (and its
predecessors-in-interest) do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land
applied for, and do not appear to be genuine; (3) applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) can no longer claim
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant, since they failed to file the appropriate application for
registration within the period of six months from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
892; (4) the parcels of land applied for forms part of the public domain and are not subject to private appropriation;
and (5) the application was belatedly filed as it was filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period set forth under Sec.
2, P.D. No. 1073.14
During the hearing on April 19, 1995, Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan appeared for the Republic. FATCO, through
counsel, offered in evidence the following documents to establish jurisdictional facts:
Exhibit "A" - Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 of Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030
Exhibit "B" - Technical Description
Exhibit "B-1" - Certification in lieu of Lost Surveyor's Certificate
Exhibit "C" - Notice of Initial Hearing from LRA
Exhibit "D" - Affidavit of Publication by publisher of The Guardian
Exhibit "D-1" - Clipping of Publication
Exhibit "E" - Whole issue of The Guardian for February 18 to 24, 1995;
Exhibit "E-1" - Section A of publication of said issue;
Exhibit "F" - Certificate of Publication from the Official Gazette/ National Printing Office;
Exhibit "G" - Certificate of Notification sent to Adjoining Owners (Reserved);
Exhibit "H" - Certificate of Publication from LRA
Exhibit "I" - Sheriff's Certificate of Posting
Exhibit "J" - Certificate of Assessment15
The RTC then issued an Order16 setting the case for the reception of evidence on May 25, 1995 at 8:30 in the
morning.
In the ensuing trial, FATCO offered other documents and testimonial evidence to prove its title to the parcels of land
applied for. The Republic, on the other hand, did not submit evidence to controvert FATCO's assertion.
In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the RTC, upon a finding that FATCO had sufficiently established its ownership of
the lands in question, ordered the registration thereof in its name, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the application and orders that the parcels of
land identified as Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030, Bacnotan Cadastre Pls-1050-D, containing an area of EIGHT
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (8,463) square meters, more or less, located at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La
Union, covered by Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 (Exh. "A"), and more particularly described in the technical
description, Exh. "B" shall be registered in the name of the applicant Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation, with
address at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.
The encumbrance/mortgage of the property to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, San Fernando, La Union Branch
in the amount of Seventeen Million (P17,000,000.00) Pesos, shall accordingly be annotated at the back of the title to
be issued in the name of the applicant.
Once this decision shall become final, let a decree of registration be issued.17
From the aforesaid decision, the Republic went to the CA. It faulted the RTC for giving due course to FATCO's
application arguing that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same in view of the non-publication of the notice of
actual initial hearing. It also claimed that FATCO failed to prove open, continuous and notorious possession of the
subject properties for more than thirty (30) years, as required by law.
On October 23, 2000, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA agreed with the Republic that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over FATCO's application because the publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. The notice
that was published in the Official Gazette and in the Guardian was the hearing set on February 28, 1995, but no
hearing was conducted on the said date. The actual initial hearing was held on April 19, 1995, a date different from
what was stated in the notice, thereby defeating the very purpose of the publication requirement.
The CA disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated February 5, 1996 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.18
FATCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 7, 2001.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by FATCO theorizing that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.19
In its Comment on the petition, the Republic, through the OSG, argues that:
I
No actual hearing was held by the trial court on February 28, 1995 which was THE published date of initial hearing;
II
The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear petitioner's application for registration due to petitioner's failure to
publish the notice of actual hearing set on April 19, 1995 and to post said notice in conspicuous places and to serve
the same to adjoining owners.
III
NO TRACING CLOTH PLAN WAS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE IN THE COURT A QUO.
IV
petitioner failed to prove its open, continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the subject properties in the
concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.20
We will deal first with the jurisdictional issue.
Section 2321 of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, explicitly provides that before the court can act
on the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of
publication, mailing, and posting.
FATCO insists that it complied with all the jurisdictional requirements, specifically the publication of the notice of initial
hearing. It, therefore, faulted the CA for reversing the RTC and, accordingly, dismissing its application for registration.
The Republic, on the other hand, asserts that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over FATCO's application because
the publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. It points out that the initial hearing set on February 28, 1995
was reset to April 19, 1995. The actual initial hearing, therefore, took place on a date different from what was stated
in the published notice of initial hearing. Hence, re-publication of the new notice of hearing was necessary, but FATCO
failed to publish the notice of hearing set on April 19, 1995, thus, preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over
the application.
The Republic is correct that in land registration case, publication of the notice of initial hearing is a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith affects the jurisdiction of the court. The purpose of publication of the
notice is to require all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property applied for, to appear
in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application should not be granted.22
It is not disputed that there was publication, mailing, and posting of the notice of the initial hearing set on February
28, 1995. FATCO, thus, complied with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the
registration proceedings. Accordingly, as of that date, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over FATCO's application.
Even if, at the February 28, 1995 hearing, FATCO's counsel requested a resetting, and the RTC granted said request,
the Republic and all interested parties were already fully apprised of the pendency of the application. When the
hearing was reset to April 19, 1995, interested parties, the Republic included, may be deemed to have been given
notice thereof.23 There was, thus, no need for the re-publication of notice of hearing, for clearly, the avowed purpose
of Section 23 had already been accomplished. We, therefore, find that the application for registration was rightfully
given due course by the RTC. The CA, thus, committed reversible error in holding otherwise.
Be that as it may, we cannot grant FATCO's plea for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision granting its application for
registration or confirmation of its imperfect title.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree explicitly states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to the land, whether personally or through their authorized representatives.
(a) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that: first, he, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, and second, the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.24
To prove its length of possession, FATCO offered the testimonies of Antonio Casugay, its division manager, Emilio Paz,
owner of the adjacent lot, and of Ernesto Adman and Cifirino Bucago, its predecessors-in-interest. It also presented
deeds of conveyance and several tax declarations covering the lands in question.
Unfortunately for FATCO, the testimonies of its witnesses do not serve to prove the validity of its cause. Antonio
Casugay and Emilio Paz merely stated that FATCO acquired the subject lots and had taken possession of the same in
1988 or 1989.25 FATCO's predecessor-in-interest, Ernesto Adman, on the other hand, testified that he acquired
ownership and possession of Lot No. 4703, also described as Lot No. 1504-A, from Victor Dacanay only in 1983 or
1984.26 Similarly, Cifirino Bucago's testimony27 did not establish the period of possession required by law over Lot
No. 1234. His testimony consists merely of general statements with no specifics as to when he began occupying the
land. He did not introduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that he possessed Lot No. 1234 for the
length of time prescribed by law.
Neither do the tax declarations prove FATCO's assertion. The earliest tax declarations presented for Lot No. 1505 and
Lot No. 47030 were issued only in 1948,28 while the earliest tax declaration for Lot No. 1234 was issued in 1970.29
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient
basis for inferring possession.30
Basic is the rule that an applicant in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing the
alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof
of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.31
In this case, FATCO did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and
adverse possession of the subject lots since June 12, 1945. At best, FATCO can only prove possession of Lots No.
1505 and No. 47030 since 1948, and of Lot No. 1234 since 1970. But as the law now stands, a mere showing of
possession for thirty (30) years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown too that possession and occupation had
started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
It is clear that FATCO failed to comply with the prescribed period and occupation not only as required by Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree but also by Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, which states:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, even if FATCO's case is considered as one for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA No.
141), as amended, it would still meet the same fate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for registration of title filed by Fieldman Agricultural Trading
Corporation is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-3637. August 31, 1907. ]
PEDRO P. ROXAS, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ANASTASIO CUEVAS, ET AL., Respondents-Appellants.
Jose Santiago, for Appellants.
Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEAL OF RESPONDENTS IN LAND ADJUDICATION CASES. If it is the opinion of the appellants that the land
awarded to the petitioners does not belong to private individuals but to the Government, it follows that they can have
no interest in such land since they do not represent the Government, being private citizens only. Since the property
belongs to the Government, being private citizens only. Since the property belongs to the Government, although the
lower court has not so held it in its judgment, the prejudiced party would be the Government, not a private individual,
and the right to appeal rests with the Government, not with the respondents nor any other private individual to whom
the representation of the State or Government has not been intrusted.
2. SCOPE OF THE RESPONDENTS APPEAL. In order that an application for registration of the title in the Court of
Land Registration may be objected to, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496, the opposition have been injured the
latter can have no right to appeal from the judgment, whatever it may have been; neither the said act nor any other
law grants to anyone the right to appeal on behalf of another party, and not in his own name and by reason of his
own interest. It is only the legal personal right of the respondent prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court that
can be considered by this court upon appeal. As no claim was made by the respondents in their own name, and as the
decision which they seek from this court is that it be held that the land adjudicated by the judgment appealed from is
the property of the Government, there is no possible way for this court to consider and decide as to a right which has
not been claimed on appeal by the party really prejudiced. In the present case the proper party would be the Insular
Government, represented by the Attorney-General, and the latter has not appealed from the judgment.
3. HOMESTEAD RIGHT SUBORDINATE TO RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. An application for the grant of a
homestead can only be considered when it refers to public lands, not when private property is concerned. Wile it
remained doubtful, in the course of a litigation, whether a portion of land claimed to be private property does or does
not belong to the Government, the applicants for homesteads might be allowed to appear in the suit as coadjuvants,
though it may have been the initial right that induced them to defend the public rights of the Government, although
subordinate to this public interest; but from the moment when such public interest has disappeared, by reason of
proof of private ownership, cooperation in such an action can no longer be insisted upon, nor can the coadjuvant claim
to have better rights than the principal plaintiff himself.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J. :
The judgment appealed from contains the following statements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on the 22d of December, 1904, application was filed with the Court of Land Registration, whereby the applicants
asked for the registration in their name of certain land situated in the Province of La Laguna, known as Hacienda of
Calauang, having an area of 7,813 hectares and 87 ares, valued according to the last assessment at $525,000 in
money of the United States; that the following parties opposed the application: The Government of the Philippine
Islands through the Attorney-General; 367 residents of the town of Calauang, Province of La Laguna, represented by
Jose Santiago; 136 residents of the ancient town of Alaminos, now a barrio of the municipality of San Pablo, Province
of La Laguna, and three residents of Santo Tomas, in the Province of Batangas, represented by Juan Alvarez; and 80
residents of the municipality of San Pablo, Province of La Laguna, represented by Julian Gerona and Gregorio Pineda.
"That the lands in question were originally Crown lands of the Kingdom of Spain, and were conveyed to one Francisco
Xavier Salgado by royal grant dated February 2, 1777, Salgado being already in possession on the 5th day of March,
1776. That after the death of Salgado his estate was taken in administration by the Auditoria de Guerra, and on the
7th day of February, 1829, the Hacienda of Calauang was sold at auction, one Benito Machado becoming the
purchaser for the sum of 16,000 pesos, one-half of which was paid in cash, the purchaser agreeing to pay the balance
in three years, giving a mortgage upon the hacienda to secure the satisfaction of the deferred payment. That the
purchase by said Machado was made with the funds, in the name, and for the use of one Domingo Roxas; that the
latter performed the conditions as to the payment of the remaining one-half of the purchase price and thereupon
became the owner in fee of the hacienda, free and clear of any incumbrance; that by various mesne conveyances and
in regular order of succession the title to the Hacienda of Calauang became vested in the applicants in this case, who
are now the owners of the same in fee, free and clear of all incumbrance, except the lien of a "censo" in favor of "Las
Cajas de Comunidad," dated February 26, 1834, for the sum of twelve thousand pesos, bearing interest at the rate of
6 per cent per annum. That in certain proceedings held in the years 1847, 1848, 1878, and 1880, before the courts of
the Spanish sovereignty, with the assistance of the inspector general de montes in representation of the Government,
various questions disputes concerning the boundaries and limits of the hacienda with adjoining lands and towns were
heard and determined. That pursuant to these proceedings surveys were made by the said inspector general de
montes and a plan was prepared by him showing the true boundaries of the hacienda as established by the decision of
the court and recognized by the Government. The said plan was introduced in evidence and forms part of the record
herein, marked Exhibit U."
In reviewing the case, the court stated the following conclusions of facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1)
That at the time of the entry by respondents upon the lands in question the same were lawfully possessed by
another under a good and sufficient title;
"(2)
That contained and uninterrupted possession has been maintained by the original owner of the lands and his
successors down to the present date; and
"(3)
That both prior and subsequent to the entry aforesaid, by respondents and their predecessors, knowledge of
the title and legal possession of the true owner was repeatedly brought home to them by means of judicial decrees
and official surveys of the land in questions."cralaw virtua1aw library
And further on:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The testimony shows that Francisco Xavier Salgado, the original owner of the lands in question, entered into
immediate possession of the same under his grant from the Spanish Crown in 1777; that he contained in such
possession in during his lifetime and that after his death the possession was continued by his legal successors, and
has been continued by them without interruption down to the present day, for a period of one hundred and thirty
years. This possession was not a purely constructive but a very active one, exercised by Salgado and his successors
by means of actual occupancy, construction of valuable buildings, cultivation, appointment of administrators,
collection of rents, measurements, surveys, placing of boundary monuments, and the employment of persons whose
duty it was to, and who actually did at stated intervals, inspect the said monuments and attend to their proper
maintenance. It further appears that upon two occasions, when infringements upon the rights of the owners were
attempted, the aggressors were met by legal proceedings in the courts, resulting in judgments confirming the ancient
title and possession. In contemplation of law, applicants have never been out of possession.
"Respondents allege in their answers possession by themselves and their predecessors for periods of from thirty to
one hundred years, but their testimony was limited, in most cases, to showing possession by themselves alone. Some
went a little further and introduced testimony tending to show possession by their immediate grantors; but that this
possession was at best a precarious and doubtful one is clear from the testimony, which shows that in most cases the
respondents resided at considerable distances from the lands claimed, having merely made use of the same for
agricultural purposes from time to time, under circumstances from which it is fair to infer that their possession was
nothing more than a permissive one."cralaw virtua1aw library
And, lastly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There is evidence in the record tending strongly to show that many of the persons occupying lands within the limits
of the Hacienda of Calauang were carried upon the books, kept by the administratory of the hacienda, as tenants, and
recognized the title of its proprietors . . .
"For the reason given (so ends the judgment) the oppositions herein must be overruled; and it is ordered that the
record of the above-mentioned documents in the registry of property of the Province of La Laguna be canceled."cralaw
virtua1aw library
And the findings in said judgment are of this tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The court finds that the appellants have legally acquired title to and are the owners in fee of the lands hereinafter
described, and that they are entitled to a decree of registration for the same as provided by law.
"The court surveyor will prepare a new plan in accordance with this decision, showing therein the following described
land, title to which is hereby confirmed to and ordered registered in the name of the applicants in the manner in which
the interest of such of the applicants is set forth in the petition."cralaw virtua1aw library
This judgment was rendered on the 17th of February, 1906. On the 26th of the same month the respondents residing
in the town of Calauang, by their attorney, Jose Santiago, duly excepted to said judgment, and announced their
intention to present a bill of exceptions. On the same date they also filed an application for a new trial to be held on
March 1, alleging as reason "that the exceptions submitted to this court the appellants state that "on the first instant
(March, 1906) the new trial was denied."cralaw virtua1aw library
The record does not show that the motion was considered or that the petition for new trial was denied, nor that
exception was taken in consequence of such denial.
In accordance with paragraph 3 of section 497 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, if the excepting partly filed a
motion in the Court of First Instance for a new trial, and the judge overruled the motion, and due exception was
taken, the Supreme Court may "review the evidence and make such findings upon the facts, and render such final
judgment, as justice and equity require."cralaw virtua1aw library
Therefore, in this case, there is no basis provided for a review of the evidence, and the findings upon the facts, as set
down by the trial court in its decision, must stand.
Under the bill of exceptions presented, this court, in accordance with the said section 497, can only decide the
questions of law therein contained.
The questions of law presented in the statements of errors, in which, according to the appellants, the trial court has
incurred, are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. For having admitted "Exhibits C" and "D" as evidence from the applicants, the first of which is the instrument
whereby the Hacienda of Calauang was acquired by Benito Machado, at public auction, in February, 1829, and the
second a statement made by the same party interested in the hacienda, which does not invalidate the deed of sale in
favor of Machado. (I and II.)
2. For having admitted from the applicants, as counter- proofs and additional evidence, the exhibits stated above,
which do not justify the right or dominion of the petitioners on the Hacienda of Calauang, and for having accepted as
sufficient proof of dominion the documents offered by the petitioners when the same are not deeds of successive
conveyances from the first holder to the petitioners. (III, IV, V, and VI.)
3. For not having considered that the land in question belongs to the Government when, as a matter of fact, the
exclusion of a parcel thereof, as such Government land, had been ordered; for having included in the judgment land
the title to which is recorded in the Court of Land Registration in favor of persons other than the petitioners, said title
having been issued by the Government; in view of the fact that the chief of the Bureau of Public Lands had approved
several applications for homesteads; according to "Exhibits 1" to "10" of the respondents; since one of the very same
petitioners had himself applied for a permit to cut timber within the land in question. (VII, VIII and IX.)
4. For not having considered that the petitioner have exhibited only a title by mere possession, a right which was
forfeited for having failed to possess the property during more than eight years; and for having failed to consider the
preferential rights of the respondents to the land occupied by them, when the evidence of the latter had not been
objected to by the petitioners, in accordance with the agreement entered into by both parties on page 8 of the bill of
exceptions. (X and XI.)
This last point touched by the appellants, and by the appellees as well, is extremely important on account of its
significance and decisiveness. In fact, it has been agreed between the parties herein that the contents of the answers
filed by the respondents may be taken as confirmed.
And it is because the respondents of Calauang have maintained in all their pleadings "that the land claimed and a
portion thereof is occupied by the respondents." (Bill of exceptions, 6.) And in the brief filed before this court they
maintain "that the Roxas people have alleged, as applicants, that they were the owners of the land in question, and
that the respondents residing in the town of Calauang said that the land belonged to the Government . . ." And they
reproduce the essential parts of their answer in opposition, wherein the first thing that they state is that the land in
question is the property of the Government. And when referring to the documents offered by them as evidence, they
said "that the same clearly established that the land in question is owned by the Government and not by private
individuals." This statement is repeated in several parts of the brief.
If it is the opinion of the appellant that the land awarded by the judgment to the petitioners does not belong to private
individuals but to the Government, it follows that the appellants, as respondents residing in Calauang, can have no
interest in said land, as they are not the Government but mere citizens.
Since the land belongs to the State, and since the lower court has not so held it in its judgment, the aggrieved party
would be the State and not a mere citizen, and it is the State that would have been entitled to appeal from the
judgment and not the respondents of Calauang or any other private individual to whom the representation of the
State or the Insular Government has not been entrusted.
The Insular Government, duly represented at the trial by the Attorney-General, has not appealed before us, nor have
we to decide any question connected with the rights of the State or of the Insular Government.
In order that an application for registration of the title of ownership in the Court of Land Registration may be objected
to, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496, the opposition must be based on the right of dominion or some other
real right opposed to the adjudication or recognition of the ownership of the petitioner, whether it be limited or
absolute; and if none such rights of the respondent have been injured by the judgment, he can not have, on his part,
the right to appeal from the said judgment, whatever it may be, as neither the said act nor any other law on this
matter grants any one the right to appeal on behalf of another party and not in his own name and by reason of his
own interest.
It is only the legal personal right of the respondent, prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court, that can be
considered by this court upon appeal. No right of their own being claimed by the respondent, and inasmuch as the
decision they seek from this court is one declaring that the land adjudicated by the lower court is the property of the
Government, there is no way for his court to consider and decide as to a right which has not been claimed in the
appeal by the party prejudiced, which in the present case would be the Insular Government, represented by the
Attorney-General, who has not appealed from the said judgment.
Therefore the assignment of errors filed by the appellants is overruled as being absolutely contrary to law and
worthless, and the appeal filed by the respondents of Calauang, from the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, of
the Court of Land Registration, is dismissed, with the cost of this instance.
But there is yet another judgment by the same court in this same action, bearing date of the 20th of July, 1906,
rendered upon the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. On account of the opposition to the application in question, filed by the Attorney-General, with regard to a certain
tract of land in the Hacienda of Calauang, the Court of Land Registration, in its judgment above referred to, of
February 17, 1906, made also this statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That portion of the application which refers to lands not included in the above description is hereby denied, reserving,
nevertheless, the right of the petitioners to file an amended application asking for the registration of the land thus
excluded, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Act and in the manner therein provided."cralaw virtua1aw
library
2. Although the applicants excepted to this part of the decision, they, however, subsequently availed themselves of
the benefits of the said act, and the action was reopened in view of the amended application.
3. In his opposition the Attorney-General asked that certain persons who had applied for homesteads be notified in
order that their rights might be protected; these persons appeared with Santiago and ratified their former answers in
this case. (Minutes of proceedings.)
The court rendered its aforementioned judgment of the 20th of July, 1906, whereby, with the exception of about 213
hectares held to be public forest, it adjudged to the applicants the remainder of the lands which had been excluded by
the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, announced his appeal.
On the same date a petition for new trial was filed on the ground that the decision was contrary to law, and on the
28th of September of the same year he stated who were the respondents to the amended application, on account of
their respective homesteads, to wit: Jose Antillon, Maria Salvador, Mariano Marfori, Gabino Quincaco, Juan Palejon,
Domingo Ramos, Brigido Pascual, Leopoldo Atienza, Regino Martinez, Vicenta Jazmin, Magdalena Avapo, Mariano
Medel, and Catalino Marfori, on whose behalf the defense excepted to the decision rendered in connection with the
amended application. (Petition on p. 188, part 12.)
In the aforesaid petition, as well as in their previous one, the petitioner asked that the last proofs produced by both
parties in support of and against the amended application, in connection with the tract of land excluded by the first
decision, be included in the bill of exceptions. And upon this basis the appeal was heard together with the former one.
Out of the 1,000 hectares, more or less, excluded from the adjudication, under the judgment of the 17th of February,
1906, the court in its last decision, rendered on the 20th of July of the same year, finally excluded but 213 hectares,
and adjudicated to the petitioners the remaining 787 hectares, more or less.
If the land claimed by the respondents of Calauang is included within the 213 hectares which have been excluded, and
are not adjudged to the petitioners, their is no object in the appeal and the same should be dismissed. If, on the other
hand, the same is included in the 787 hectares, more or less, transferred by the judgment of the 20th of July, 1906,
the appeal can not prosper because in the last decision the court found as a fact that the petitioners, and not the
respondents, have been and are not in possession of the 787 hectares. The thirteen respondents are not, therefore,
entitled to the homestead for the reason that they have not been, nor are they at the present time, in possession of
the land included therein.
Be that as it may, the fact is that in connection with the judgment of the 20th of July, 1906, although the aforesaid
thirteen respondents excepted thereto, the bill of exceptions announced by them at the time has not been brought
before us. Consequently the evidence expressly stated as forming part of the bill of exception can not be reviewed, for
the reason that the bill has not been submitted with or without the evidence.
And even if submitted, they could not have been reviewed by this court, in view of the fact that the motion for a new
trial was made on the ground that the judgment was contrary to the law, a basis which does not authorize the
reviewing of evidence taken before a lower court. The motion for a new trial was neither heard nor denied, and no
exception was taken as to any ruling denying the same.
The jurisdiction of this court being thus limited to deciding mere question of law, none of which, except those already
set forth in the bill of exceptions to the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, have been offered in connection with
the judgment of the 20th of July following, yet, and in order to avoid confusion, the foregoing remarks are made on
points of law that might have arisen on the second appeal.
For the reasons above set forth, the judgments of the 17th of February and 20th of July, 1906, appealed from, are
affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 162322 : March 14, 2012]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction of
municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of San Juan, Batangas[2] in LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point
Development Corporations (Corporation) application for original registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions
of law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before
filing this Petition for Review.cralaw
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an assessed value of
P4,330, P1,920 and P8,670, or a total assessed value of P14,920 for the entire property, more particularly described
as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 square meters, located at
Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. [3]
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.[4] On 7 August
1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.[5]
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still
with the RTC.[6]
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan,
because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than P100,000.[7]
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default[8] and commenced with the reception of evidence.[9]
Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax Declarations,[10] a Deed of
Absolute Sale in its favor,[11] and a Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the
alienable and disposable zone.[12] Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.[13]
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.[15] The CA further found that respondent
Corporation had sufficiently established the latters registrable title over the subject property after having proven
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its
predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.[16]
Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following
arguments in support of its appeal:
I.
THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
II.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.[17]
The Courts Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings in order to
determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
I
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court,
even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.[18] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
only by the Constitution or the law.[19] It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.[20] Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable
even if raised for the first time on appeal.[21]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has
actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the
event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppel
by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the
party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years
thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant
question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v.
People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the
most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic
filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the RTC.[25] At that point,
petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with
that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative
relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the
exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it.[27] In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that
would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's
jurisdiction.
II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the period for
setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because the RTC set the
date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property Registration Decree.[28]
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue
an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than
ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a day after the
filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997,
which was 96 days from the Order.[30] While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in
Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[31]
petitioner Republic therein contended that there was failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original
registration, because there were 125 days between the Order setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial
hearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and
the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:
x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has
no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene
in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on
matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has
neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.[32]
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its application for
registration on account of events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997,[33]
within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect was still not cured,
as the second Order was issued more than five days from the filing of the application, again contrary to the prescribed
period under the Property Registration Decree.[34]
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the filing of
the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its
jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that period
did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory
would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law.[35] It cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that the law
deliberately meant the provision to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.[36] However, the
records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the case for
initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for registration,[37] except that it had to issue a second Order
because the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale annexed to
respondents application for original registration was P160,000,[39] the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,[40] the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try
cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which should not exceed ?100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or
land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of
which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of
the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of
the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first, where there is
no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent Corporations application
for registration on 8 January 1998.[41]
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case does not
exceed P100,000.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling price.
Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to be registered
may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective
claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.[42]
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the records are bereft of
any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the
second method, because this method finds application only where there are multiple claimants who agree on and
make a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations
submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From the records, we find that the
assessed value of the property is P4,330, P1,920 and P8,670, or a total assessed value of P14,920 for the entire
property.[43] Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question does not
exceed P100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower court erred in
granting respondent Corporations application for original registration in the absence of sufficient proof that the
property in question was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State.[44] The applicant for land
registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through
incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the
government.[45] We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered.[46] The applicant must also show sufficient
proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and
disposable.[47]
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO[48] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.[49]
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its application.[50] Clearly, this falls
short of the requirements for original registration.
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the property in
question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If respondent Bantigue Point
Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary,
the application for original registration should be granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question
is alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the government, the application should be denied.cralaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the property sought to be
registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85515. June 6, 1991.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner. J. Renato V. Leviste for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529); VIEW OF
RESPONDENT COURT THAT SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 26 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IMPLIEDLY AMENDED BY SAID
DECREE, TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There
is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend
said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D.
No. 1529 reading as follows: ". . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court." Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied
amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF SAID VIEW. The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the
principal purposes of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens
System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and
irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out
in few copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday
painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had caused their
registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLICATION IF NOTICE IS PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by
mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient
compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published "once in
the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the
latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. That such proviso was never meant
to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section
23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of
mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties, and occupants of the land.
4.
REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; FUNCTION; LAPSES ON THE PART OF COURTS OR THEIR PERSONNEL, NOT A
REASON OR JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF LAWS. The belabored argument of respondent Court of
Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of
service of notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost
is unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous
proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the
required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately,
and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to
comply with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here
that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-observance of
laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey the laws.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29 August 1988 1 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October 1988 3 which, respectively, affirmed
the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region, of 17 June 1987 4
granting the petition of private respondent for the reconstitution of the original and the owners duplicate copies of a
transfer certificate of title despite lack of service of notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land,
and denied petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the Decision. 5
The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land are mandatory
and jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution of certificates of title.
On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a
parcel of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a
petition for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the
basis of the owners duplicate copy. 6 She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of the
petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.
In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in the Official
Gazette, which was done. Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, were
given.
Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondents evidence was made by the OIC-Branch Clerk
of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987, the trial court handed down an Order 7 which made the following findings of
facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain parcel of land
situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, embraced in and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered in the name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. "B") as evidenced by a
document of sale executed by the registered owner (Exh. "I"). The original copy of said title which was usually kept in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the
entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12,1977 (Exh. "C"). It appears further that there are no coowners, mortgagees, lessees duplicate copy of said certificate of title which had been previously issued by the
Register of Deeds of this province; that the petitioner is in actual possession of the area of 16,647 square meters
which was sold to her and that she is benefitting from the produce of the improvements existing on the area
belonging to her."cralaw virtua1aw library
and disquisition:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no opposition to its approval, same is
hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of this province is hereby directed to reconstitute the original and the owners
duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the name of the registered owners (sic) thirty days after
receipt of this Order by the Register of Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the Land Registration
Commission, on the basis of the existing owners duplicate copy thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals and
made the following assignment of errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE OWNERS DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT THE
REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION." 8
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.

In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 is not
only mandatory but jurisdictional as held in MWSS v. Sison, Et Al., 124 SCRA 394.
In its Decision of 29 August 1988 9 respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of petitioner and held
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1)
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners and actual
occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to have been "at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529"
because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which provides that in original registration cases publication
of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Section 110 of said
Decree provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 110.
Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title. Original copies of certificates of title lost
or destroyed in offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such titles shall be
reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent
with this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
2)
The MWSS v. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the original and the
owners duplicate copies of the certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant case where the
duplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the custody of the Register of Deeds was
destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been lost were later found intact in the names of other persons;
and, more importantly, the Petition was not published in the Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in
the instant case.
3)
The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is imposed upon the court, not the party
filing the petition for reconstitution (herein private respondent); any lapse in regard thereto should not prejudice or
injure the latter.
4)
Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the loss of the original copy of the
transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason of the burning of the Capitol Building; she should not, therefore, be
put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.
Petitioners motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 18
October 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging therein that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a.
The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it did not consider that the trial court
is without jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution of the original owners (sic) duplicate copies of TCT
No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the
land as required by Section 13 of R.A. No. 26;
b.
The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in granting the petition for reconstitution of
the original and duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Our resolution of 16 January 1989, 10 We required the respondents to comment on the petition. Private respondent
filed her comment on 10 February 1989. 11 She practically copied therein the questioned decision of respondent Court
of Appeals.
In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda, which petitioner complied with on 3 July 1989 12 and private respondent
on 10 June 1989. 13
The petition is impressed with merit.
The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals, as
well as the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June 1987, must be set aside.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended. Since the requirement therein of service of
notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not complied with in this
case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Order of the
trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been "at least impliedly amended" by Section
23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 14 We ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of
R.A. No. 26 reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 12.
Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (e)
and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or
any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following:
(a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners mortgagees
or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the
location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any,
which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners
of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of
the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting
the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has rot been
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of
the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall
be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title
covering the same property.
SEC. 13.
The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petition, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of
the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered
mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or
destroyed certificates of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or person in
possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area
and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file
their claim or objection to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting
and service of the notice as directed by the court."cralaw virtua1aw library
are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly null and void. We
reiterated this rule in Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. 15 where, in respect particularly to the
required notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as
claimant or person having interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as
well as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality (sic) on
which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition
and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court."cralaw virtua1aw library
In MWSS v. Sison Et. Al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing doctrine:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, the service of the notice of hearing to
the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land, as well as the posting of the notices in the main entrance of
the provincial and municipal buildings where the property lies at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing, as
prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are mandatory and jurisdictional requisites."cralaw virtua1aw library
This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted logic to support a sophistic distinction
between said case and the instant case and an implausible interpretation of the law.
We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 "appears to
have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529
which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals
either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied amendment of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.chanrobles law library
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter alia,
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication;
(2) mailing; and (3) posting."cralaw virtua1aw library
As regards publication, it specifically provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall
cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply
means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the
Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord
primacy to the official publication.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain mandatory and
jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have
stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of
the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is clearly
expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling
of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings
for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to
or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of
the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both
unregistered and registered lands may someday painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land
because scheming parties had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold
the property to third parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent
the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the original
copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or
exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court
that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced if
it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of
notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the
principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees
to faithfully observe. We should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a
reason or a justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to
obey the laws.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition and SETTING ASIDE
the Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in
Petition No. 11,456.
Costs against private Respondent.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-35787. April 11, 1980.]
FAUSTA FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO F. SANTOS and RAMONA FRANCISCO
(Substituted by: JOSE SAN DIEGO; CELSO GARROVILLAS, HONORIO GARROVILLAS, EDILBERTO GARROVILLAS,
AMALIA GARROVILLAS; VIRGINIA GARROVILAS, PACITA GARROVILLAS and LOPE GARROVILLAS), Respondents.
Sumulong Law Office for Petitioner.
Candido G. del Rosario & Associates for Private Respondents.
DECISION
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the judgment rendered by a vote of 3 to 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 37818-R,
entitled Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, applicants-respondents, v. Fausta Francisco, petitioner-appellee,
reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Land Registration Case No. N-4383, L.R.C. Record No.
N-25140, wherein said trial court granted the petition for review of the decree of registration earlier issued by it, after
a virtually ex parte hearing and judgment, and ordered said previous decision and decree set aside and the land in
question registered instead in the name of now herein petitioner Fausta Francisco.
As recounted in the original decision of the Court of Appeals, on May 23, 1964, the aforementioned trial court
rendered a decision ordering the registration of the land in dispute situated in Barrio Singalong, Antipolo, Rizal, in the
names of herein private respondents Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, which decision became final and
executory, and on June 27, 1964 the order was issued to the Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree, which it did, No. N- 99323 on July 13, 1964, followed by the issuance of Original Certificate of
Title No. 4064 in their names.
According to the Record on Appeal, on July 31, 1964, herein petitioner Fausta Francisco, filed a petition for review
alleging under oath inter alia that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2.
She is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for in this case, which is situated in Barrio
Singalong. Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and covered by Plan Psu-1992781 and now embraced in Original
Certificate of Title No. 4064 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
"3.
She and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, open, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession of the land in dispute since time in memorial.
"4.
Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco obtained a Decree of Registration No. N-99332 for the parcel of
land in question through fraud. In their application dated October 29, 1963, they claimed to be the owners of this
parcel of land by possession. This is not true. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco have never been in
possession of the parcel of land in question.
"5.
Petitioner and her five (5) brothers and sisters namely, Anastacia, Leoncio, Paula, Perfecta, all surnamed
Francisco, with residence in Morong, Rizal and Venancia Francisco Nepomuceno, residing in Calumpang, Marikina,
Rizal, who are the adjacent registered owners of the land in question, were not notified of any alleged survey of this
land nor of the present application for registration.
"6.
Neither petitioner nor her tenant was notified of the alleged survey nor of the present application for
registration as actual occupant and possession of the land in question.
"7.
Notice of this land registration proceedings was published in The Official Gazette but herein petitioner does not
read it.
"8.
The land in question was never actually surveyed by or for the applicants for reason among others that when
petitioner caused the recent survey of the same there were no monuments found on this land."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Herein private respondents opposed the above petition for review maintaining principally that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4.
That in her petition for review, petitioner claims to be the owner of the land covered by the decree of
registration but failed to state in said petition how she became the owner thereof and under what color of title does
she claim to be owner of the land; neither did petitioner attached any instrument supporting her claim other than a
supposed affidavit of merit signed by her alone containing allegations amounting to the existence of intrinsic fraud
only; that assuming without admitting that there was indeed intrinsic fraud, nevertheless said allegations even if true
is not sufficient ground for reopening and review of the corresponding decree of registration;
"5.
That petitioners petition is not sufficient in form and substance and therefore should be dismissed by the
Honorable Court. In support of this contention, we most respectfully quote the following doctrine:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
The essential requisite for a valid petition for the reopening and review of a decree under Sec. 38 of Act 496 is that it
be made only by a person who has been deprived of land or of any interest therein by virtue of the decree sought to
be reconsidered. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient and the petition of any person whose interest in the land
is short of absolute ownership, lacks the essential requisite, and for that reason should not be considered. Thus in the
case of Broce v. Apurado, 26 Phil. 581, 586, the Supreme Court clearly and unequivocably said: "In order to obtain
the benefits of section 38 the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show fraud in
the procurement of the decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title
obtained under the Land Registration Act. "Philippine Land Registration Law, Vargas, Maalac & Maalac, p. 284)."
(Rec. on Appeal, pp. 20-22.)
It may be noted at this point that because the Bureau of Lands withdrew its opposition to herein respondents
application, Judge Guillermo Torres, the trial judge, commissioned the clerk of court to receive their evidence and
subsequently rendered his original favorable decision. In contrast, when Judge Torres gave due course to herein
petitioners petition for review, he held a trial and heard the evidence of the parties himself, with private respondent
Alejandro F. Santos and his former witnesses Lauro Cruz and Eugenio Francisco as well as petitioners and her
witnesses testifying in open court. After such trial, on April 5, 1966, the same judge, the Honorable Guillermo Torres,
rendered the new decision now in dispute reversing that of May 23, 1964, thus setting aside the latter, the decree of
registration and original certificate of title of private respondents issued pursuant thereto and ordering instead that
the land under litigation be registered in the name of petitioner. When Justice Mateo Canonoy prepared the first draft
of the decision, the other two members of the Division, Justices Antonio Lucero and Eulogio Serrano disagreed with
him. Justices Juan F. Enriquez and Manuel P. Barcelona were designated to join to form the division of five required by
law, and on March 17, 1972, with Justice Canonoy as ponente and Justices Enriquez and Barcelona concurring, the
decision favorable to herein private respondents was promulgated. Justice Serrano dissented in an extended opinion
pointing out the existence of actual fraud committed by private respondents in securing the judgment in their favor
and sustaining, with a careful analysis of the relevant and material evidence, the contention of petitioner that she, by
herself and thru her predecessor in interest has been the one, instead of respondents, in continuous, open, adverse
possession of the land in issue, under a claim of title. In due time, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied with the same votation.
In reversing himself in the light of the evidence he himself had subsequently heard, instead of his clerk of court,
unlike in the original proceeding, Judge Torres reasoned out and made his findings thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Petitioner alleges in her petition for review that applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco obtained
through fraud Decree No. N-99332; that she is the absolute owner in fee simple of that parcel of land in question
situated in Barrio Singalong, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, described in Plan Psu-1992791 and embraced
in Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal; that she has been in
possession of said land, together with her father who is her predecessor in interest, openly, peacefully, adversely and
continuously since time immemorial. On the other hand, applicants-respondents contend in their application for
registration that the land in question was owned by applicant Alejandro Santos father, Toribio Santos, and that upon
the latters death in 1922, he inherited the said parcel of land. However in the presentation of his evidence in this
petition for review, Alejandro F. Santos testified that this land had no previous owner; that he merely occupied this
land sometime in 1920 and had been in possession of the same for more than thirty years.
"The main issues in this case are: (a) Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332 and (b)
Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.
"It appears clearly from the evidence that since 1918, Diego Francisco, father of petitioner, had occupied the parcel of
land in question; that this land is a portion of a bigger parcel of land with an area of fifty hectares which was occupied
and possessed by Diego Francisco since 1918. Comprising this fifty-hectare parcel of land are the land in question
described in Plan Psu-199278, Exhibit A, the land described in Plan Psu-199277, Exhibit B, and the land described in
plan H-114240, Exhibit C, embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, formerly the homestead
patent of Diego Francisco. The whole area of fifty hectares is fenced with barbed wire and planted with mango trees, a
portion planted to palay and a bigger portion devoted to pasturing of carabaos. All these improvements were
introduced by petitioners father, Diego Francisco, during his lifetime. In 1940, Diego Francisco, was able to obtain a
title on a portion of this big parcel of land, now embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, in the
names of petitioner Fausta Francisco and her sister and brother, Anastacia, Leoncio, Venancia, Perfecta and Paula, all
surnamed Francisco.
"The petitioners father, Diego Francisco, died in the year 1941 and after his death, petitioner continued to possess
the land in question which was not embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, and her possession
over said portion of the land is open, public, peaceful continuous, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept
of an owner. In 1964, petitioner had the land in question surveyed by a private land surveyor, Jose de Guzman, who,
upon inquiry from the Bureau of Lands, discovered that there was already a survey plan in the name of the applicant
in this case, Alejandro F. Santos. Petitioner likewise discovered that this land is already titled in the name of the said
Alejandro F. Santos.
"It was clearly established that petitioner, as adjacent owner of the land in question was not notified of the alleged
survey. The Surveyors Certificate, Exhibit 6, with respect to notices of adjoining owners cannot be given any
credence. It could be seen from Exhibit 6 that Jose P. Cruz, who is no longer the adjoining owner of the land in
litigation and who is admittedly dead was notified on October 29, 1962 and that said Jose P. Cruz appeared on the
date of the survey, although being dead, it was, impossible for him to appear on the date of the survey. The Santol
Creek was also allegedly notified but that it did not appear. This is ridiculous. The Santol Creeks is not a person or
entity, and the one notified should have been the proper government official or office. Similarly, it was made to
appear by applicants-respondents that Diego Francisco, petitioners father, an adjoining owner, was notified of the
survey. Diego Francisco has been long dead, since 1941, and neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters
received the purported notice. By thus avoiding the sending of actual notices to the petitioner and other interested
parties, applicants were able to have the land in question surveyed, Plan Psu-1992791. It is likewise admitted that
neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters as adjacent owners were notified of the registration proceedings in
this case. It was established thru the testimony of the petitioner that she does not read the Official Gazette, the
publication where the notice of initial hearing was published. By thus avoiding the sending of actual notice of initial
hearing to petitioner as adjoining owner and as actual owner and possessor of the land in question, the applicants
were able to obtain the decision dated May 23, 1964 in their favor. Furthermore, the Court is convinced by the
evidence that it is petitioner and her father before her, who have actually possessed and occupied the land in
question, and not the applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco. It was shown thru the testimony of
Quiterio San Jose, former Mayor of Teresa, Rizal, who is an adjacent owner across the Santol Creek, that Alejandro F.
Santos was never in possession of this land in question and that it was Diego Francisco who was the one in possession
of this parcel of land during his lifetime and after his death, his heirs. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open
possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner of
this parcel of land." (Pp. 26-31, Record on Appeal.)
To the foregoing, We only need to add by adoption the following well taken discussion by distinguished counsel of
petitioner in his memorandum of December 13, 1973:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The true adjoining owners at the
time of the filing of application.

"When the applicants, the spouses Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco, filed their application for registration on
October 29, 1963, they did not state the true adjoining owners at the North, East, and West, of the land in question.
"At the North, they stated that the adjoining owner was Diego Francisco, when in truth and in fact, as they knew full
well, Diego Francisco died in 1942 and his homestead patent title over the land at the North bad been cancelled and
transferred to his children-heirs, namely Fausta (petitioner herein), Anastacia, Paula, Perfecta, Venancia, and Leoncio,
all surnamed Francisco (see TCT No. 23434 issued to the latter and marked as Exh. `J).
"At the East, they stated that the adjoining owner was Jose P. Cruz, when in truth and in fact, as they knew full well,
Jose P. Cruz died in 1952 and his homestead patent title over the land at the East had been cancelled and transferred
to Estela Angeles to whom his children (Lauro Cruz and two others sold on January 1, 1954 (see TCT No. 32697
issued to Estela Angeles marked as Exh. `L-2). On November 7, 1957, Estela Angeles sold the land to Vicente
Antonio who issued TCT No. 32697 (Exh. `L-3). On August 31, 1959, Vicente Antonio sold the land in favor of Antonio
Astudillo (TCT No. 96527 (Exh. `L-4). who in turn sold the land to Arturo Rojas (TCT No. 100145 (Exh. `L-5) who on
May 22, 1962 sold the land to Pilar V. Romack who was issued TCT No. 100146 on June 7, 1962.
"At the West, they stated that the adjoining owner was Eugenio Francisco, when in truth and in fact, as they knew full
well, at the time of the filing of their application, Paula Francisco (sister of petitioner Fausta Francisco) was the actual
occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land. The application for registration of the said land filed by Eugenio
Francisco in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was opposed by Paula Francisco and is to be noted that Eugenio
Francisco was not even present during the hearing and did not continue presenting evidence. After Paula Francisco
had presented her evidence, the Court of First Instance decided that the said land at the West should be registered
and decreed in the name of Paula Francisco, which decision became final as Eugenio Francisco did not appeal
therefrom, resulting in the issuance of decree and OCT No. 6945 to Paula Francisco (see the said decision of the CFI
Rizal attached to our motion for reconsideration dated August 26, 1966 filed with the respondent Court of Appeals,
Annex `B of Petition).
"Motive of the Applicants in not
stating the true adjoining owners.
"The intent and motive of applicants in not stating that the true adjoining co-owners at the North were Fausta
Francisco and her sisters and brother, was because they knew that Fausta was the one occupying the land in question
or at least that Fausta was claiming the land in question to be hers, so if notice of their application for registration
were sent to her as an adjoining co-owner at the North, she would surely oppose their application for registration.
"The intent and motive of the applicants in making it appear that the adjoining owner at the East was still Jose P.
Cruz, when in truth it was already Estela Angeles, was because they were intending to utilize Lauro Cruz (son of Jose
P. Cruz) as their witness to testify, as he did testify, before the Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner
at the East and as such knew that applicant Alejandro Santos had been in possession of the land in question since
1929 when the latters father died.
"The intent and motive of the applicants in not stating the true fact that both Eugenio Francisco and Paula Francisco
were claiming to be the owners of the land at the West, was because they knew that Paula was the sister of petitioner
Fausta Francisco, so if notice of their application for registration were sent to Paula as one of the claimants to the land
at the West, Paula would surely tell her sister Fausta about it, and the latter would surely oppose their application for
registration. Moreover, applicants were intending to utilize Eugenio Francisco as their witness to testify, as he did
testify, before the Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner at the West and as such knew that the
applicant Alejandro Santos had been in possession of the land in question since 1929 when the latters father died.
"It will thus be seen that the applicants did not state the true adjoining owners with the deliberate intention of
preventing notices of their application for registration to be sent to petitioner Fausta Francisco and to her sister Paula
Francisco, and in that way prevent petitioner from appearing in the land registration case and file an opposition to
their application for registration." (Pp. 198-201, Record.)
Indeed, how could two dead persons and a creek be legally upheld as having been separately properly notified of the
application here under discussion? It is high time, the Court made it patently clear and emphasized that it is the
inescapable duty of surveyors to find out by themselves who are the occupants and boundary owners of any land
being surveyed by them for purposes of registration. Beyond doubt, had the surveyors of respondents complied with
this simple and logical obligation imposed by the very nature of their professional undertaking, the obvious anomalies
extant in the instant case would not have happened. No dead persons nor a creek could have been certified as duly
notified by the Land Registration Office of the application!
Besides, as pointed out in the above-quoted portions of petitioners memorandum, the boundary owner at the north in
1963 when the application of respondents was filed could not have been Diego Francisco, for the simple reason that
said person had died twenty-one years before or in 1942. Factually, under ordinary circumstances, if respondents
were indeed in possession of the land in dispute, it stands to reason they would have known of their neighbors long
demise. More, legally speaking, Diego Francisco had a Torrens Title which was duly transferred subsequently in TCT
23434 (Exh. J) to the name of his children. Registration under the Torrens System constitutes, at the very least,
constructive notice to any boundary owner of who is his neighbor.
The same observations may be made insofar as Jose P. Cruz, the alleged former boundary owner in the east. He had
died in 1952, eleven years before the application, and the title he had acquired over his land had been transferred
several times in the Office of the Register of Deeds to Estela Angeles, TCT 32697, Exh. L-2; to Vicente Antonio, TCT
No. 32697 (sic) Exh. L-3; to Antonio Astudillo, TCT 96527, Exh. L-4; to Arturo Rojas, TCT 100145, Exh. L-5; to Pilar
V. Romack, TCT 100146 on June 7, 1962. (See Petitioners memo pp. 1-2.) These facts have never been denied in any
pleading of respondents.
Again, respondents knew or ought to have known that the boundary owner in the west could not have been Eugenio
Francisco, because it is judicial record that OCT No. 6945 was actually issued to Paula Francisco who had opposed
Eugenios attempt to have the land registered in his name. (See Annex B of the petition.)
In addition, it is admitted that petitioner was never notified of the application, let alone her not having had any chance
to read or perhaps even know the Official Gazette.
In the light of the foregoing. the matters that require Our resolution in the instant case may be said to be one of
mixed fact and law, but apparently more legal than factual. Did respondents commit fraud of the nature contemplated
in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, (Act 496) that would warrant the cancellation of the decree of registration
and Torrens Title already issued to them? The pole star jurisprudential pronouncements in this respect are found, as
every student of Land Registration knows, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, by Justice Trent. Therein, it was
declared definitely that a land registration proceeding is one in rem and notice thereof by publication binds the whole
world, inclusive of those who may be adversely affected thereby, innocent factually as they might have been of such
publication. Understandably, such a rule could be the only way to give meaning to the finality and indisputability of
the Torrens title to be issued. It may be said that to a certain degree such a strict rule could result in actual injustice,
considering not only the rather irregular publication of the Official Gazette and other publications, and, of course, the
illiteracy, not to speak, of the inaccessability to those concerned of such publications.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Thus, Grey Alba should not be read, as the majority in the Court of Appeals decision under review, did as entirely
depriving victims of obvious fraudulent intent of the remedy of having a decree reopened. This is clear in that decision
itself. As the present Chief Justice, Hon. Enrique M. Fernando, pointed out in Minlay v. Sandoval, 53 SCRA 1, "all that
is required is a showing according to this leading Grey Alba decision" of intention to deprive another of (his) just
rights, which constitutes the essential characteristic of actual fraud." And in this connection, the Chief Justice went on
thus: "It is to be stressed likewise that the Land Registration Act commands that the applicant shall also state the
name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all
adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. (Section 21 of
Act No. 496 [1902].) What can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court was not sufficiently mindful of what the
law ordains when it refused to hear petitioner on his claim that appellee Sandoval was guilty of fraud in including in
his application the disputed lot." The pertinent statutory provision reads thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 21.
The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person duly
authorized in his behalf. All oaths required by this Act may be administered by any officer authorized to administer
oaths in the Philippine Islands. If there is more than one applicant, the application shall be signed and sworn to by
and in behalf of each. It shall contain a description of the land and shall state whether the applicant is married; and, if
married, the name of the wife or husband; and, if unmarried, whether he or she has been married, and, if so, when
and how the married relation terminated. If by divorce, when, where, and by what court the divorce was granted. It
shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addressee of all occupants
of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find
them. It may be in form as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
"To the Honorable Judge of the Court of Land Registration:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I (or we) the undersigned, hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the
Land Registration Act, and to have my (or our) title therein registered and confirmed. And I (or we) declare: (1) That
I am (or we are) the owner (or owners) in fee simple (or by possessory information title) of a certain parcel of land
with the buildings (if any, if not, strike out the words `with the buildings), situated in (here insert accurate
description). (2) That said land at the last assessment for taxation was assessed at _____ dollars. (3) That I (or we)
do not know of any mortgage or encumbrance affecting said land, or that any other person has any estate or interest
therein, legal or equitable in possession, remainder reversion, or expectancy (if any, add `other than as follows, and
set forth each clearly). (4) That I (or we) obtained title (if by deed, state name of grantor, date and place of record,
and file the deed or state reason for not filing If any other way, state it). (5) That said land is ______ occupied (if
occupied, state name in full and place of residence and post office address of occupant and the nature of this
occupancy. If unoccupied, insert `not). (6) That the names and addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the
owners of all lands adjoining the above land are as follows (same directions as above.) (7) That I am (or we are)
married. (Follows literally the directions given in the prior portions of this section.) (8) That my (or our) full name (or
names), residence, and post office address is (or are) as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Dated this ____ day of _____ in the year nineteen hundred and _____
(Signature) _______
"(SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS)
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
"Province (or city) of ________ (date)
"There personally appeared the above-named ______ known to me to be the signer (or signers) of the foregoing
application, and made oath that the statements therein, so far as made of his (or their) own knowledge, are true, and
so far as made upon information and belief, that he (or they) believe them to be true. The residence certificate _____
of the applicant (or applicants, or representative) was exhibited (or applicants, or representative) was exhibited to
me, being No. _______ issued at ____ dated _____, 19 ____
BEFORE ME:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(Notary Public or other
official authorized to
administer oaths)"
As maybe readily noted, No. (6) of the suggested sufficient form says: "That the names and addresses so far as
known to me (or us) of the owners of all lands adjoining the above land are as follows (same directions as above)."
But more importantly, it should be borne in mind, the text of the law requires not mere statement of the lack of
knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners by also "what search has been made to find them." As
earlier indicated, respondents could not have escaped, if they had "search(es)" as the law definitely mandates, the
names of their "colindantes", it being a fact that the latters lands were duly registered. Surely, they would have
known, as it can be presumed they did, that Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz, whom they would name as boundary
owners in their application is 1963 had already been long dead and buried. In Grey Alba, the reason found by the
Court for the failure of the applicant to notify the acknowledged occupant of the land applied for was because, from
the circumstances known to them, it was evident that they were no more than their lessees and could have had no
registerable interest at all in the property, which is far from what happened in the instant case. Here, We cannot bring
Ourselves to believe that the naming of Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz, two persons long dead, as boundary owners
in their application, not to speak of the "creek", (who was also "proven" to have been notified) does not constitute
actual fraud. Petitioners evidence of her own occupancy, considering it is contradicted by respondents evidence, need
not be mentioned anymore. Anyway, the unrebuttable proof alone is to Us sufficient, by and large, to uphold not only
the dissenters in the Court of Appeals but also the trial judge who had heard the respondent Alejandro Santos and his
witness Lauro Cruz somehow deviate substantially and materially from their testimonies given before the clerk of
court in the original proceeding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In Grey Alba itself, We find the following significant pronouncements at p. 50, (Vol. 17, Phil.) "By fraud is meant
actual fraud, dishonesty of some sort. This meaning should be given to the word fraud in section 38 of the Land
Registration Act. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a
case and modify its decree. Specific acts intended to deceive and deprive another of his right, or to in some manner
injure him, must be alleged and prove."cralaw virtua1aw library
We hold that as above discussed, the majority decision of the Court of Appeals under review, cannot be reconciled
even with Grey Alba. The emphasis given in that decision to the in rem character of land registration proceedings and
the broad legal significance of such kind of proceeding could not have by any degree minimized the paramouncy of
truth and justice itself in any actual case before the court. As Our Chief Justice quoted from Justice Torres "The
registration of (land) cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith" (p. 12, 53 SCRA), just as it is
reiterated therein what We said in Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498, "it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon
which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person." (taken from Nicolas v. Director of Lands, 9 SCRA 934, at
p. 938.) Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion that in law, the better view is that of the distinguished dissenters in
the Court of Appeals, and We find no alternative but to uphold the same. Incidentally, the binding force of a finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals, assuming the instant case were in any degree factual in nature, diminishes
correspondingly according to the number and content of the dissent, when there is or are any. In the case at bar, it is
Our conclusion that the majoritys bases, much more its reliance in their purely literal understanding of Grey Alba do
not conform with the dictates of truth and justice.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed, and the second decision of Judge
Guillermo Torres of April 5, 1966 is affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court complying with the
additional requirements for the issuance of the corresponding title in favor of petitioner. Costs against private
respondents.

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Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

Are you the applicant in this case now?

Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.

From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban, sir.

Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours over said property?

"Atty. Surdilla:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Who is in possession of the property now? What is the nature thereof?

Whose name/names is the property declared for taxation purposes?

We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.

"Atty. Surdilla:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Who has been paying taxes over the property?

We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.

"Atty. Surdilla:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in the bank or private person/persons?

No, sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.

"Thats all, your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library

The judgment appealed from contains the following statements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION." 8

The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.

time of the filing of application.

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