THE PATTON REPORT
01112 Pon. J,. ProectionI l..1.0.111,
A Fire Protection Publication
Consulting
THE ANATOMY OF DEATH
AN AMERICAN PROBLEM
Each year, in France, approximately 200 French-
men die in fires. In the United Kingdom, which is
noted for its antiquated heating systems, nearly a
thousand Englishmen are killed by fire each year.
In New Zealand, a primitive country, 33 die. In
Norway, a cold country where the heating systems
must perform much of the year, 85 die. We think
of Japan as a nation consisting of flimsy combusti-
ble residences. In Japan 1300 people succumb to
fire in a year's time. In Belgium, 75 die.
Perhaps in these foreign countries, which are not
so advanced as ours, we should not be surprised
that people die from fire. But how about the United
States, with its 200 National Fire Codes, its
National Electrical Code, its Building Regulations,
with Underwriter's approvals on its furnaces, with
its modern buildings and its advanced technology?
How many people die from fire in the United
States?
The sad and staggering fact is that 12,000 people
die from fire in the United States each year. 12,000
lives in the United States versus 33 in New Zealand.
12,000 lives in the United States versus 200 in
France. 12,000 lives in the United States versus
1300 in Japan.
Why do 10 Americans die for every Japanese fire
death?
Why is it that, on a per capita basis, there are
1 3 Americans killed by fire for every Frenchman?
If we add up all of the annual fire deaths in all of
these countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cana-
da, Denmark, Finland, Japan, France, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States we will find that
16,000 people will die from fire in a year. One
country, the United States, will account for 75%
of these deaths. Think of that for a moment. The
United States produces 75% of the fire deaths that
occur in these 14 countries with a combined popu-
Surveys Research
No. 25
lation of 500,000,000 people. Why?
I have heard this question asked hundreds of times
over the last 20 years. I have yet to hear anyone
give a good answer to it. The National Fire Protec-
tion Association has no answer. The National
Safety Council hasn't produced an answer. The
Federal Government doesn't have the reasons. I
have yet to see any authority on fire protection
give any answer to the question why we kill so
many in fires in the United States. Why is our fire
toll so horribly worse than any other nation on
earth. No one has given us the answer.
Today I will give the answer to that question.
Man has lived with fire many centuries. Over the
years, by and large man has learned to live with
fire safely. He has learned to control fire in the
cave, and in the thatched hut. He has learned how
to build fires in northern igloos without killing
himself with the combustion gases. He has learned
how to handle fires in medieval castles, English
manors, log cabins, teepees, and bamboo structures
with paper thin walls. He learned these things the
hard way, by experience.
However, more than a hundred years ago man took
a new course, a path leading to industrial develop-
ment. A technological society began to emerge,
first in England and Europe, then in the United
States. Soon the United States became the path-
finder in the technological wilderness.
The new technology produced new fire hazards.
And so, of course, one can readily jump to the
conclusion that the problem with fire in the United
States is that we have introduced new fire hazards
to our environment faster than we have introduced
good fire solutions. Basically, this is correct. But
this still leaves the key question, namely: why
haven't we produced the satisfactory technological
solutions to our technological fire problems as we
have advanced? After all, we have had a hundred
years or more to produce the answers.
ENVIRONMENT AFFECTS DEVELOPMENT
By way of answering this question I want to digress
a moment, to give an analogy that will help to ex-
plain what happened.
Not too many years ago we used to think of people
in black and white terms, there were good guys and
bad guys. The criminal was considered incorrigible,
a person who had bad traits by birth, the product
of a "bad seed".
We no longer take such a distorted view of people.
Now we are more cognizant of the part environ-
ment plays in the development of a man or woman.
We can examine a man's past life and we can see
events that brought about changes in his personality
and his attitudes toward society. For example, if a
boy loses his father at a young age, he may not for real fire solutions.
only lose a stabilizing influence, but in addition he
can be subjected to far more severe emotional
pressures brought about by the downgrading of
his economic leitel and his loss of status among his
peers. We can look back and wonder what the man
might have been if, in fact, the event that changed
his life had not occured.
It is in this sense that we must examine our present
fire technology. It is not enough to simply say that
our fire technology, our fire solutions if you will,
have gone wrong. We must ask ourselves, why has
this happened? What are the events that have shap-
ed our failures? Where did we make mistakes in
past years? We need answers to these questions so
that we may plan future corrections. In order to
find out why our fire technology has become a
failure we must examine its early development. In
theory, our fire technology should have advanced
as our industrial technology advanced. For each
new hazard that was created, a satisfactory new
fire solution should have evolved. Why didn't this
occur. At what point was the sapling bent in the
wrong direction? This is the key to the problem. ed by the insurer.
We must find out where and why things first went
wrong.
Now as we look back over the years at the evolu-
tion of our so-called modern fire technology, to
its early formulative years during the height of the
19th century industrial revolution: we discover a
startling fact. Back in the 1800's, as industrial
change created new fire hazards, and as the de-
mand for technological solutions for the new fire
solutions intensified, the solutions that were ap-
plied were not real fire solutions. The fire solutions
that evolved first were not fire solutions. Think
about that for a moment. When technology explod-
ed creating demands for new technical solutions to
curb the new fire hazards, in truth, it was not a
technical solution that was first applied. The new
fire problems were not met head on with new and
improved levels of fire safety. No indeed. What
happened was that in place of finding answers to
the problems; a financial plan to create profits out
of fire losses came into being. The first so called
solution that evolved was not a plan to prevent a
a fire loss; rather it was a plan to distribute the loss
over many so that the hardships of the few who
suffer direct loss would be lessened.
The first solution applied to the new fire problems
was insurance. Insurance is not a prevention of loss,
it is a spread of loss. Loss is spread over many to
compensate the few. Note that a good fire insur-
ance program acts to take some of hardship out
of fire. In this sense insurance diminishes the need
Fire insurance makes true fire solutions unneces-
sary, or at least less necessary. Fire insurance, fun-
damentally, is a plan whereby insuring companies
make profits from fire losses.
There are three conditions which are necessary for
fire insurance to be successful.
First, there must be spread of risk. That is, no one
fire should destroy an excessive number of units
in one year.
Secondly, the insured properties must be homoge-
neous. You must not put a General Motors plant
with a group of dwellings because the loss of the
General Motors plant would unbalance the system.
Third, there must be fires. Without fires, insurance
cannot be marketed.
When all things necessary are present insurance
produces guaranteed profits because a percentage
of all monies passing through the system are retain-
When we limit our considerations to small homoge-
neous, properties that fall completely within the
insurance system, fire safety not only becomes non-
essential, fire safety actually can represent a loss
in profits. Here's why. A one dollar fire insurance
rate has more profits in it than a ten cent rate be-
cause it represents ten times the cash flow through
the insuring system. If profits are pegged to the
cash flow, a high rate might produce ten times the
profits of a low fire insurance rate. Further, while
the insurance premium is paid at the inception of
the policy, the average loss occurs six months after
the premiums are paid. Thus, theoretically 50% of
all unearned premiums are available at all times to
earn interest.
So, fundamentally, the insuring system and loss
prevention are competitive systems. One tends to
reduce the need for the other. Under the control of the fire insurance two major
CATASTROPHIC FIRES
There are certain kinds of fires that are destructive Both were related to the catastrophic fire loss
to the insuring system. They are the catastrophic
fires that produce losses so great that the acturial
tables are upset. When losses exceed the premium
income the insuring system fails and the insurance
company is bankrupt.
In the 1800's there were two types of losses that
fell in the catastrophic range.
One was the urban conflegration. When whole
cities, consisting mostly of wood frame buildings,
were destroyed in a single fire many insurance
companies were put out of business.
The second type of catastrophic loss that was ab-
horrent to the insuring system was the industrial
loss. Large factories had so many fire hazards, and
produced such large losses, that insuring systems
frequently were overwhelmed. If one insuring com-
pany suffered two or three major fires in one year
it might be out of business. Putting it in insurance
terminology, factories and large commercial proper-
ties were not sufficiently homogeneous, and the
spread of risk was inadequate.
Because of these catastrophic fire loss problems the
insurers banded together and created a fire tech-
nology aimed at preventing catastrophic losses.
The insurers created a fire technology for large
properties. They founded the National Fire Protec-
tion Association and the National Board of Fire
Underwriters to write fire protection regulations.
They founded Underwriter's Laboratories and Fac-
tory Mutual Laboratories to test, regulate, and
standardize fire protection equipment .They found-
ed the various State Fire Insurance and Rating
Bureaus to inspect properties, establish rates, and
recommend the application of standardized solu-
tions: They also, as fire experts, played a major
role in writing our building codes and zoning or-
dinances, and setting standards for fire department
operations. And in essence they took over virtually
the full control of our fire prevention technology.
Fire technology fell under the control of a com-
petitive system. As a young lad is often turned in
wrong directions by a hostile environment, so our
infant fire technology of the 19th century was
directed into wrong paths.
TWO FIRE PROTECTION INNOVATIONS OF
THE 19th CENTURY
new concepts of fire protection evolved in the
I 800's.
problem.
The fireproof building became the required build-
ing type in central cities. In less dense areas,
masonry fire walls separated essentially frame
buildings. The typical masonry walled, combustible
interior structure, termed the brick joist building
evolved. These changes in building construction re-
quirements solved the urban conflegration problem.
Note, however, that a building with brick party
walls and wood interior and/or combustible inter-
ior contents might solve the conflegration problem,
because fire would not spread beyond the one unit;
but the internal fire problem remained in existence,
thus insurance continued to be needed.
The other catastrophic fire problem was the fac-
tory. Now note that changing the construction
shell did little to solve the factory fire problem
because a burn-out of the interior produced a
catastrophic loss. The true value of the factory lay
in the machinery, the processes, and the finished
products. The building itself represented but a
small portion of the value. A fireproof building
that was still standing after the interior was gutted
was of little consequence. Thus, to solve the fac-
tory fire problem, it was necessary to develop a
fire protection tool that solved the interior fire
problem, the content fire problem.
Thus, the sprinkler system was invented as a solu-
tion to the interior fire problem.
So, in summary during the 1800's, the two major
innovations in fire safety were on the one hand, an
automatic fire suppression system that would auto-
matically detect and extinguish a fire; and, on the
other hand, a thereotically non-burnable or "Fire-
proof" building.
But now note that these two fire protection de-
velopments, the fireproof building and the sprink-
ler system were profoundly different in results,
and in the way they affected the insuring system.
One represented a limitation on the size of the loss;
the other an elimination of loss. I'll repeat that!
One represented a limitation on the size of the
loss, the other an elimination of loss.
The fireproof building represents a limitation on
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the size of the fire. Combustible materials in any
one fire resistive compartment can burn without
hindrance, but theoretically, only one fireproof
compartment will burn at a time.
The automatic suppression system is, on the other
hand, a true solution to the fire problem. Before
fire can achieve dangerous size it is automatically de-
tected and controlled. Fire loss is held to insignifi-
cant size.
FIRE SUPPRESSION VOW FOR HUMAN
SAFETY APPLICATION
If the sprinkler system had been allowed to de-
velop to its ultimate capability it would have found
application in all buildings, including dwellings,
and fire as a serious threat to human life could all
but have been eliminated.
But this tool also had the capability of very sig-
nificantly reducing fire insurance premiums be-
cause fire insurance rates cannot be divorced from
the degree of the fire risk.
Accordingly, in 1896 the sprinkler system was
standardized by the National Fire Protection As-
sociation, which had been created by the insur-
ance industry. The acknowledged intent of the
sprinkler system standard was to guarantee that
the protection system had a known integrity and
therefore would be worthy of insurance rate
credits. However, this standard also locked the
sprinkler system concept into a large and ugly
piping system primarily intended to protect large
industrial plants. The very large piping require-
ments, plus rigid requirements for huge water
supplies made the infant fire suppression system
an impractical tool for protecting ordinary proper-
ties.
Since that day in 1896 when the automatic fire
suppression concept was locked into a standard
directed toward protecting large industrial plants,
the use of this tool to protect human life in a
practical and reliable manner has been most drasti-
cally curbed. It is interesting to note that while
the sprinkler system standards permit the fire sup-
pression concept to be applied to large industrial
plants, which represents an insurance industry prob-
lem, on the other hand these regulations are a
formidable barrier to the installation of a practical
fire suppression system in small properties. Small
properties, of course, can be fully covered by the
insuring systems which are based on the law
of averages.
The fireproof building represented quite a different
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situation. Although the building itself can with-
stand a fire, there is nothing to prevent the con-
tents from burning. When the fireproof building is
compartmented so that only one compartment can
burn at a time, the catastrophic fire loss is prevent-
ed, but the potential to have a fire within any
compartment is not reduced. Note that this is solv-
ing the catastrophic fire problem without neces-
sarily reducing the probability of the small fire
occurring. Full insurance coverage with relatively
high rates continues to be needed, but a loss that
would harm the insuring company is prevented.
The compartmented fireproof building was advanta-
geous to the early fire insurance companies be-
cause it solved the catastrophic fire problem with-
out reducing the need for insurance, but the sprink-
ler system had the potential to dramatically reduce
fire insurance premiums. And thus, during the
formulative years of fire technology, economic
pressures suppressed the fire sprinkler system con-
cept and permitted it to exist only as a protection
tool for large industrial properties. With barriers
established that prevented the sprinkler system
from growing into an economically practical and
highly efficient method of protecting human life,
the sole remaining avenue for life safety was in the
field of structural regulation. The theory that the
construction shell was the key to fire safety
blossomed.
THE FIREPROOF BUILDING AS A FALSE
SOLUTION TO FIRE SAFETY
For the past 70 years we have been trying to
eliminate fire as a hazard to human life by defining
the basic construction of the building.
Gradually fire safety became what might be termed
as a race for life. Each major building contain-
ing many people was, by code requirement, com-
partmented into fire zones. Then, so called protect-
ed pathways to the exterior were installed. We call
them exits. Then once fire occurred, the race be-
gan. The humans must find their way to the pro-
tected pathways and to the outside before fire
breaks out of the compartment in which it origi-
nates. Over the years there have been many who
have lost the race.
Unfortunately, there are many factors that give
fire an edge in this life or death race. Just to name
a few of them, I'll give you the following:
1. In many properties, such as hospitals and nurs-
ing homes, the occupants are nonmobile and
therefore cannot readily flee.
2. There is no real guarantee that fire will not
spread so rapidly as to close off the exitways
before the occupants know there is a fire.
3. Fires often occur while occupants are asleep.
4. Children and babies are not capable of escape.
5. In the building that represents the No. I fire
problem from a human life standpoint, the
single family dwelling, a fire solution which
requires a compartmented fireproof structure
with protected exitways is not economically
practical.
So, you see, the comparttnented fireproof build-
ing which has been promoted as the number one
way to protect human life leaves much to be de-
sired. However, with the fire suppression system
virtually destroyed as a weapon for protecting
hutnan life, there is no alternative but to promote
structural regulations - regulations that protected
the structure - as being the answer to life safety.
The "fireproof" building began to be considered a
"fire safe" building. When people said "fireproof",
they meant "fire safe". Our fire experts actually
began to believe that they could protect people by
protecting the building steel. The fire experts sold
the public into believing that they were safe from
fire when they were in a fireproof building.
So, throughout all of the 20th century, unti' even
today, our foremost fire experts have pu -suf d the
vision of the inherently safe structure — the struc-
ture in which fire will not occur. As Ponci de Leon
pursued the fountain of youth, so our fire experts
have pursued the inherently firesafe building. They
have pursued this dream for 72 years of this cen-
tury, and unless rational thinking can some how
prevail, our fire experts give every indication they
can pursue this vision for at least another hundred
years or so, adding new increments to the cost of
construction every step of the way.
Now what is the real truth about the fireproof
building, the inherently firesafe building.
The truth of the matter is that the fireproof
building is, at face value, a patent absurdity. It is,
in fact, such a patent absurdity that it is very hard
to believe that anyone can be so dense to really
believe that it is possible to build a building
in which fire cannot occur.
If you can sell a man a fireproof building, you can
sell him the Brooklyn Bridge. The Brooklyn Bridge
ha's been sold over and over again, and most of our
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fire experts still continue to sell the fireproof
building.
Let us look at this so-called fireproof building for
just a moment. No matter how you build a build-
ing, the building is not of very much use until you
fill it with furnishings and contents. But most of
the furnishings and contents that are brought into
buildings are combustible, and any fool should
realize that when you burn the furnishings you
burn the people.
For 70 years we have pursued the fireproof build-
ing. We have passed ten thousand regulations that
have increased the cost of new construction and
the net result is that we have constructed high
priced furnaces. Just as fuel burns within the fur-
nace, combustible interior contents burn within
the structure. The fire proof building is, in its
ultimate form, nothing more than an excellent
furnace. The fireproof building as a defender of
human lives is an absurdity because the humans
are inside of the building and are directly exposed
to the content fire. In essence, the people are in-
side of the furnace.
Now if we protect the steel so that the structure
can withstand an internal two-hour fire - we must
be expecting an internal two-hour fire - otherwise
the cost of fireproofing the steel cannot be justi-
fied. But -the people who are inside of the building
with the fire are more susceptible to the flames
and the toxic gases. We fireproof the steel - but
there's no way to fireproof the people - but our
experts are claiming that the people are safe when
the structure is safe. The claim n that the fireproof
building is a firesafe building is one terrible,
gigantic, lie.
WHY THEY DIE
Now let's look once more at those fire deaths that
occur each year in the United States. Since the U.S.
is the wealthiest nation on earth it means that we
have the greatest capacity to load our building
with machinery, electrical equipment, combustible
materials, and fire hazards. While the fire regula-
tions are directed toward the structure, it is the
contents that cause most of the problems.
A fire control approach is needed, directed toward
the contents fire problems. But our fire technology
is oriented toward the structure.
I believe this is why so many people die from fire
in the U. S. Our industrial technology has moved
forward creating new fire problems; and the fire
safety technology that should be following close
behind has been directed up a blind canyon.
Now note carefully that I do not condenm fire
resistive construction in order that the building
may remain standing after the fire has burned
itself out, or been extinguished. Also, I do not
condemn the compartmentation of structures to
limit the extent of any one fire loss.
What I do condemn is our fire protection experts
who have sold the fire resistive building to the
public as a panacea for the human fire life safety
problem. I feel that the National Fire Protection
Association, and its many committees, has failed
in its public commitment to human fire safety.
The NFPA has promoted its very narrowly orient-
ed sprinkler standard, NFPA-13 as the one and only
way to install the sprinkler system, and this has
prevented the normal evolution of the fire sup-
pression concept as a way to protect all building
and life as well. The sprinkler standard has at all
times been under the control of the insurance
industry.
The NFPA has also published its Life Safety Code,
NFPA-101, which promotes the concept that con-
crete and steel construction, the fireproof building,
is the primary way to save lives. By voiding the fire
suppression concept as a valid concept for human
protection, and by promoting elaborate and costly
regulations applicable to the structure as the solu-
tion to human life safety, NFPA has set the stage
for high priced buildings that serve as fire traps.
I firmly believe that the regulations that were ap-
plied to the sprinkler system in 1896, and which
exist today, represent the number one barrier to
improved human fire safety. I believe that these
restrictions, are directly or indirectly responsible
for more than 200,000 fire deaths in the U. S. over
the years, in billions of dollars in fire loss, and even
more billions in excessive building construction
costs.
THE NEW ERA BEGINS
We now have began to correct the faults that have
occurred so many years ago. We have started to
build a new fire technology with primary emphasis
placed on the content fire and systems to control
it. When we accomplish this we will finally see the
dramatic reduction in fire deaths that we have
waited for so many years.
The Model Codes Group, and this includes those
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organizations behind the Basic Building Code, the
Uniform Building Code, and the Southern Stand-
ard Building Code, and also the National Bureau of
Standards, are now moving toward recognizing an
inexpensive and highly reliable fire suppression
system called the Life Safety System. This new
system picks up where the industrial sprinkler
system left off 70 years ago. This new system
promises not only a new period of improved
human fire safety, but new ways to build buildings,
and new ways to make older buildings fire safe.The
roadblock of the NITA sprinkler standard is being
bypassed and soon humans will be able to obtain
fire safety even in their own homes.
This new concept of fire safety could be summariz-
ed by saying that we should protect the people in-
side the building by preventing an internal fire
from reaching a dangerous level. When we protect
the people by controlling the content fire, we also
protect the structure itself. This in turn will make
many of the very costly regulations applicable to
building construction unnecessary.
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE NEW
TECHNOLOGY
This new era of fire safety promises much for our
future cities. Here are some of the benefits that
will result.
1. We will have an inexpensive method of making
older buildings fire safe and therefore, it will
not be necessary to destroy many fine old
structures that have historic significance.
2. It is not unrealistic to foresee at least a 20%
reduction in building construction costs. Often,
the savings will be greater. The net weight of
high rise building will be reduced because of
reduced fireproofing requirements.
3. Our homes and apartments will become fire
safe.
4. Restrictions on materials that can be used in
building constructions will be reduced.
5. A new architectural freedom will result be-
cause the structure will no longer be the pri-
mary fire safety system. No matter what form
or shape the building takes it will be possible
to protect it from fire through the systems
approach.
6. Open plan facilities with completely flexible
interior partitioning systems will become prac-
 tical because fire safety will be achieved by
independent systems.
7. When urban centers become predominently
sprinklered the costs of municipal fire protec-
tion will be reduced. Major fires will become a
rarity. There will be a shift from heavy fire
apparatus using large hose to small mobile units
using small hoses to back up sprinklers.
8. Reductions in the annual cost of fire protec-
tion for large corporations will be possible with-
out sacrifice in safety.
9. Insurance costs will be reduced.
10.People will no longer have to flee the building
in event of fire, fire will be controlled auto-
matically, and the people will be safe where
they are.
And now there's one final point I would like to
make, and it is that the pattern that was set for
fire technology was set many years ago.
Today there is a different philosophy among the
insurers. Insurers are no longer thinking in narrow
terms, such as fire insurance, casualty insurance,
etc. It is now possible for a property owner to
place all his coverages with a single multi-peril
insurer.
,
This fact changes the old conflicts betwee i fire
technology and fire insurance.
In a multi-peril package the fire insurance can be
a very small portion of the total package. Fire
insurance premiums are not the most important
consideration of the multi-peril insurer.
Gordon C. Graham Memorial Lecture
Delivered to the National Safety Congress & Exposition
Chicago, Illinois — October 30, 1972
by Richard M. Patton
When a major fire occurs where a great number of
people are killed, the insurance company can end
up paying many millions of dollars for wrongful
deaths under the liability portion of the cover.
Insurers no longer pay only the property damage
and walk away; they now become involved with
the multimillion dollar law suits under the lia-
bility covers.
The net results is that any fire - even rather small
ones from the property loss viewpoint - can be-
come a catastrophic loss from the human injury
viewpoint.
Multi-peril insurers now have an interest in elim-
inating all fires.
I am pleased to report that many insurers are now
helping us to convert the old fire sprinkler system
into a modern system for protecting human life.
The tragic distortions to our fire technology took
place during a period 50 to 100 years ago, and to
blame the modern insurer for these events is like
blaming modern medical practitioners for the
unsanitary medical practices of the past century.
It is also well to keep in mind that when today's
fire protection engineer continues to recommend
illogical fire solutions, quotes obsolete regulations,
or just plain sound confused - it is only because
he is a victim of his own background.
But it is now high time that we all turn our backs
to the ridiculous concept if the inherently safe
structure, and turn our attention to the internal
fire problem and to those who are on the inside
of the furnace.
— Dated October 1972