Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC
APO FRUITS CORPORATION
and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 164195

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

versus -

LAND BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
October 12, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petitioners motion for reconsideration addressing our

Resolution of December 4, 2009 whose dispositive portion directs:
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners second motion for
reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and
attorneys fees), and reiterates the decision dated February 6, 2007 and the
resolution dated December 19, 2007 of the Third Division.

For a fuller and clearer presentation and appreciation of this Resolution, we hark
back to the roots of this case.
Factual Antecedents
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI), together also
referred to as petitioners, were registered owners of vast tracks of land; AFC
owned 640.3483 hectares, while HPI owned 805.5308 hectares. On October 12,
1995, they voluntarily offered to sell these landholdings to the
government via Voluntary Offer to Sell applications filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate notices of land
acquisition and valuation of their properties from the DARs Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO). At the assessed valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare,
AFCs land was valued at P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued
at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected these valuations for being very low.
In its follow through action, the DAR requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26,409,549.86 in AFCs bank account
and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts the petitioners then
withdrew. The titles over AFC and HPIs properties were thereafter cancelled, and
new ones were issued on December 9, 1996 in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
On February 14, 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for
determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
When the DARAB failed to act on these petitions for more than three years, AFC
and HPI filed separate complaints for determination and payment of just

compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City, acting as
a Special Agrarian Court. These complaints were subsequently consolidated.
On September 25, 2001, the RTC resolved the consolidated cases, fixing the
just
compensation
for
the
petitioners
1,338.6027
hectares
of
[1]
land at P1,383,179,000.00, with interest on this amount at the prevailing market
interest rates, computed from the taking of the properties on December 9, 1996
until fully paid, minus the amounts the petitioners already received under the initial
valuation. The RTC also awarded attorneys fees.
LBP moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The RTC, in its order of
December 5, 2001, modified its ruling and fixed the interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from the time the complaint was filed until finality of the
decision. The Third Division of this Court, in its Decision of February 6, 2007,
affirmed this RTC decision.
On motion for reconsideration, the Third Division issued its Resolution of
December 19, 2007, modifying its February 6, 2007 Decision by deleting the 12%
interest due on the balance of the awarded just compensation. The Third Division
justified the deletion by the finding that the LBP did not delay the payment of just
compensation as it had deposited the pertinent amounts due to AFC and HPI
within fourteen months after they filed their complaints for just compensation with
the RTC. The Court also considered that AFC had already collected
approximately P149.6
million,
while
HPI
had
already
collected
approximately P262 million from the LBP. The Third Division also deleted the
award of attorneys fees.
All parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling. The Court
uniformly denied all the motions in its April 30, 2008 Resolution. Entry of
Judgment followed on May 16, 2008.
Notwithstanding the Entry of Judgment, AFC and HPI filed the following
motions on May 28, 2008: (1) Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion
for Reconsideration; (2) Second Motion for Reconsideration, with respect to the
denial of the award of legal interest and attorneys fees; and (3) Motion to Refer
the Second Motion for Reconsideration to the Honorable Court En Banc.

The Third Division found the motion to admit the Second Motion for
Reconsideration and the motion to refer this second motion to the Court En
Banc meritorious, and accordingly referred the case to the Court En Banc. On
September 8, 2009, the Court En Banc accepted the referral.
The Court En Banc Resolution
On December 4, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a majority vote, denied the
petitioners second motion for reconsideration based on two considerations.
First, the grant of the second motion for reconsideration runs counter to the
immutability of final decisions. Moreover, the Court saw no reason to recognize
the case as an exception to the immutability principle as the petitioners private
claim for the payment of interest does not qualify as either a substantial or
transcendental matter or an issue of paramount public interest.
Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled to recover interest on
the just compensation and attorneys fees because they caused the delay in the
payment of the just compensation due them; they erroneously filed their
complaints with the DARAB when they should have directly filed these with the
RTC acting as an agrarian court. Furthermore, the Court found it significant that
the LBP deposited the pertinent amounts in the petitioners favor within fourteen
months after the petitions were filed with the RTC. Under these circumstances, the
Court found no unreasonable delay on the part of LBP to warrant the award of 12%
interest.
The Chico-Nazario Dissent
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[2] the ponente of the original December
19, 2007 Resolution (deleting the 12% interest), dissented from the Court En
Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution.
On the issue of immutability of judgment, Justice Chico-Nazario pointed out
that under extraordinary circumstances, this Court has recalled entries of judgment
on the ground of substantial justice. Given the special circumstances involved in

the present case, the Court En Banc should have taken a second hard look at the
petitioners positions in their second motion for reconsideration, and acted to
correct the clearly erroneous December 19, 2007 Resolution.
Specifically, Justice Chico-Nazario emphasized the obligation of the State,
in the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain, to pay just compensation
to the owner of the expropriated property. To be just, the compensation must not
only be the correct amount to be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time
from the time the land is taken from the owner. If not, the State must pay the
landowner interest, by way of damages, from the time the property was taken until
just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed a part of just compensation
due, has been established by prevailing jurisprudence to be 12% per annum.
On these premises, Justice Nazario pointed out that the government deprived
the petitioners of their property on December 9, 1996, and paid the balance of the
just compensation due them only on May 9, 2008. The delay of almost twelve
years earned the petitioners interest in the total amount of P1,331,124,223.05.
Despite this finding, Justice Chico-Nazario did not see it fit to declare the
computed interest to be totally due; she found it unconscionable to apply the full
force of the law on the LBP because of the magnitude of the amount due. She thus
reduced the awarded interest to P400,000,000.00, or approximately 30% of
the computed interest.

The Present Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion to reconsider the Court En Bancs December 4, 2009
Resolution (the present Motion for Reconsideration), the petitioners principally
argue that: (a) the principle of immutability of judgment does not apply since the
Entry of Judgment was issued even before the lapse of fifteen days from the
parties receipt of the April 30, 2008 Resolution and the petitioners timely filed
their second motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from their receipt of
this resolution; (b) the April 30, 2008 Resolution cannot be considered immutable
considering the special and compelling circumstances attendant to the present case

which fall within the exceptions to the principle of immutability of judgments; (c)
the legal interest due is at 12% per annum, reckoned from the time of the taking of
the subject properties and this rate is not subject to reduction. The power of the
courts to equitably reduce interest rates applies solely to liquidated damages under
a contract and not to interest set by the Honorable Court itself as due and owing in
just compensation cases; and (d) the Honorable Courts fears that the interest
payments due to the petitioners will produce more harm than good to the system of
agrarian reform are misplaced and are based merely on conjectures.

The Comment of the Land Bank of the Philippines

The LBP commented on the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April
28, 2010. It maintained that: (a) the doctrine of immutability of the decisions of
the Supreme Court clearly applies to the present case; (b) the LBP is not guilty of
undue delay in the payment of just compensation as the petitioners were promptly
paid once the Court had determined the final value of the properties expropriated;
(c) the Supreme Court rulings invoked by the petitioners are inapplicable to the
present case; (d) since the obligation to pay just compensation is not a forbearance
of money, interest should commence only after the amount due becomes
ascertainable or liquidated, and the 12% interest per annum applies only to the
liquidated amount, from the date of finality of judgment; (e) the imposition of 12%
interest on the balance of P971,409,831.68 is unwarranted because there was no
unjustified refusal by LBP to pay just compensation, and no contractual breach is
involved; (f) the deletion of the attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the amount
finally awarded as just compensation is proper; (g) this case does not involve a
violation of substantial justice to justify the alteration of the immutable resolution
dated December 19, 2007 that deleted the award of interest and attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petitioners arguments meritorious and accordingly
GRANT the present motion for reconsideration.
Just compensation a Basic Limitation on
the States

Power of Eminent Domain

At the heart of the present controversy is the Third Divisions December 19,
2007 Resolution which held that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest on
the balance of the just compensation belatedly paid by the LBP. In the presently
assailed December 4, 2009 Resolution, we affirmed the December 19, 2007
Resolutions findings that: (a) the LBP deposited pertinent amounts in favor of
the petitioners within fourteen months after they filed their complaint for
determination of just compensation; and (b) the LBP had already paid the
petitioners P411,769,168.32. We concluded then that these circumstances refuted
the petitioners assertion of unreasonable delay on the part of the LBP.
A re-evaluation of the circumstances of this case and the parties arguments,
viewed in light of the just compensation requirement in the exercise of the States
inherent power of eminent domain, compels us to re-examine our findings and
conclusions.
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public
use. It is an inherent power of State as it is a power necessary for the States
existence; it is a power the State cannot do without.[4] As an inherent power, it does
not need at all to be embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is
solely for purposes of limiting what is otherwise an unlimited power. The
limitation is found in the Bill of Rights[5] that part of the Constitution whose
provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of
governmental powers.
[3]

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads No private

property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.) provides two
essential limitations to the power of eminent domain, namely, that (1) the purpose
of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be given to the
owner of the private property.
It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should be
just as the safeguard is there to ensure a balance property is not to be taken for
public use at the expense of private interests; the public, through the State, must

balance the injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for
what is taken, value for value.
Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor of
the individual and strictly against the government. The protection of the individual
is the reason for the Bill of Rights being; to keep the exercise of the powers of
government within reasonable bounds is what it seeks.[6]
The concept of just compensation is not new to Philippine constitutional
law, but is not original to the Philippines; it is a transplant from the American
Constitution.[8] It found fertile application in this country particularly in the area of
agrarian reform where the taking of private property for distribution to landless
farmers has been equated to the public use that the Constitution
requires. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,[9] a valuation case under our
agrarian reform law, this Court had occasion to state:
[7]

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market

value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair
value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to
sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word
"just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.[10] [Emphasis supplied.]

In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the petitioners
landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02,[11] the RTC, acting as a special agrarian
court, determined the actual value of the petitioners landholdings to
be P1,383,179,000.00. This valuation, a finding of fact, has subsequently been
affirmed by this Court, and is now beyond question. In eminent domain terms, this
amount is the real, substantial, full and ample compensation the government
must pay to be just to the landowners.
Significantly, this final judicial valuation is far removed from the initial
valuation made by the DAR; their values differ by P1,131,799,897.00 in itself a

very substantial sum that is roughly four times the original DAR valuation. We
mention these valuations as they indicate to us how undervalued the petitioners
lands had been at the start, particularly at the time the petitioners landholdings
were taken. This reason apparently compelled the petitioners to relentlessly
pursue their valuation claims all they way up to the level of this Court.
While the LBP deposited the total amount of P71,891,256.62 into the
petitioners accounts (P26,409,549.86 for AFC and P45,481,706.76 for HPI) at the
time the landholdings were taken, these amounts were mere partial payments that
only amounted to 5% of the P1,383,179,000.00 actual value of the expropriated
properties. We point this aspect out to show that the initial payments made by the
LBP when the petitioners landholdings were taken, although promptly withdrawn
by the petitioners, could not by any means be considered a fair exchange of values
at the time of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual deposit could not be said to be
substantial even from the original LBP valuation ofP251,379,103.90.
Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the immediate
taking of the landholdings but cannot be claimed as amounts that would excuse the
LBP from the payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the compensation due.
As discussed at length below, they were not enough to compensate the petitioners
for the potential income the landholdings could have earned for them if no
immediate taking had taken place. Under the circumstances, the State acted
oppressively and was far from just in their position to deny the petitioners of the
potential income that the immediate taking of their properties entailed.
Just Compensation from the
Prism of the Element of Taking.
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be
fair and reasonable, compensation, to be just, must also be made without
delay.[12]Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if the
property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate
deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.
This is the principle at the core of the present case where the petitioners
were made to wait for more than a decade after the taking of their property before

they actually received the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due
them.[13] What they have not received to date is the income of their
landholdings corresponding to what they would have received had no
uncompensated taking of these lands been immediately made. This income, in
terms of the interest on the unpaid principal, is the subject of the current
litigation.
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] the need for prompt
payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay
in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this case
that:
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be
the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be
the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation
is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and
the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the
taking occurred.[15] [Emphasis supplied.]

Aside from this ruling, Republic notably overturned the Courts previous
ruling in National Power Corporation v. Angas[16] which held that just
compensation due for expropriated properties is not a loan or forbearance of
money but indemnity for damages for the delay in payment; since the interest
involved is in the nature of damages rather than earnings from loans, then Art.
2209 of the Civil Code, which fixes legal interest at 6%, shall apply.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the
landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping
Lines ruling,[17] the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum,
computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just

compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation
and inflation of the value of the currency over time. In the Courts own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interest[s] on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time
petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in
September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the
value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective
forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over
time.[18] [Emphasis supplied.]

We subsequently upheld Republics 12% per annum interest rate on the

unpaid expropriation compensation in the following cases: Reyes v. National
Housing Authority,[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[20] Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[22] Philippine Ports
Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[24]
These were the established rulings that stood before this Court issued the
currently assailed Resolution of December 4, 2009. These would be the rulings
this Court shall reverse and de-establish if we maintain and affirm our ruling
deleting the 12% interest on the unpaid balance of compensation due for
properties already taken.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we see no compelling reason to
depart from the rule that Republic firmly established. Let it be remembered that
shorn of its eminent domain and social justice aspects, what the agrarian land
reform program involves is the purchase by the government, through the LBP, of
agricultural lands for sale and distribution to farmers. As a purchase, it involves an
exchange of values the landholdings in exchange for the LBPs payment. In
determining the just compensation for this exchange, however, the measure to
be borne in mind is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss[25] since what is
involved is the takeover of private property under the States coercive
power. As mentioned above, in the value-for-value exchange in an eminent
domain situation, the State must ensure that the individual whose property is taken
is not shortchanged and must hence carry the burden of showing that the just
compensation requirement of the Bill of Rights is satisfied.

The owners loss, of course, is not only his property but also its incomegenerating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value
must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the
potential income lost. The just compensation is made available to the property
owner so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner
that he would have derived income from his expropriated property. If full
compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State must make up for the
shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the
absence of replacement property from which income can be derived; interest on the
unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate
on eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness.
In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners landholdings
without the corresponding full payment, it became liable to the petitioners for the
income the landholdings would have earned had they not immediately been taken
from the petitioners. What is interesting in this interplay, under the developments
of this case, is that the LBP, by taking landholdings without full payment while
holding on at the same time to the interest that it should have paid, effectively
used or retained funds that should go to the landowners and thereby took
advantage of these funds for its own account.
From this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution deleting the
award of 12% interest is not only patently and legally wrong, but is also morally
unconscionable for being grossly unfair and unjust. If the interest on the just
compensation due in reality the equivalent of the fruits or income of the
landholdings would have yielded had these lands not been taken would be
denied, the result is effectively a confiscatory action by this Court in favor of the
LBP. We would be allowing the LBP, for twelve long years, to have free use of the
interest that should have gone to the landowners. Otherwise stated, if we continue
to deny the petitioners present motion for reconsideration, we would
illogically and without much thought to the fairness that the situation
demands uphold the interests of the LBP, not only at the expense of the
landowners but also that of substantial justice as well.
Lest this Court be a party to this monumental unfairness in a social program
aimed at fostering balance in our society, we now have to ring the bell that we have

muted in the past, and formally declare that the LBPs position is legally and
morally wrong. To do less than this is to leave the demands of the constitutional
just compensation standard (in terms of law) and of our own conscience (in terms
of morality) wanting and unsatisfied.
The Delay in Payment Issue
Separately from the demandability of interest because of the failure to fully
pay for property already taken, a recurring issue in the case is the attribution of the
delay.
That delay in payment occurred is not and cannot at all be disputed. While
the LBP claimed that it made initial payments of P411,769,168.32 (out of the
principal sum due of P1,383,179,000.00), the undisputed fact is that the
petitioners were deprived of their lands on December 9, 1996 (when titles to
their landholdings were cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines), and received full payment of the principal amount due them only
on May 9, 2008.
In the interim, they received no income from their landholdings because
these landholdings had been taken. Nor did they receive adequate income from
what should replace the income potential of their landholdings because the LBP
refused to pay interest while withholding the full amount of the principal of the just
compensation due by claiming a grossly low valuation. This sad state continued
for more than a decade. In any language and by any measure, a lengthy delay in
payment occurred.
An important starting point in considering attribution for the delay is that
the petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their landholdings to the
governments land reform program; they themselves submitted their Voluntary
Offer to Sell applications to the DAR, and they fully cooperated with the
governments program. The present case therefore is not one where substantial
conflict arose on the issue of whether expropriation is proper; the petitioners
voluntarily submitted to expropriation and surrendered their landholdings, although
they contested the valuation that the government made.

Presumably, had the landholdings been properly valued, the petitioners

would have accepted the payment of just compensation and there would have been
no need for them to go to the extent of filing a valuation case. But, as borne by the
records, the petitioners lands were grossly undervalued by the DAR, leaving the
petitioners with no choice but to file actions to secure what is justly due them.
The DARs initial gross undervaluation started the cycle of court actions that
followed, where the LBP eventually claimed that it could not be faulted for seeking
judicial recourse to defend the governments and its own interests in light of the
petitioners valuation claims. This LBP claim, of course, conveniently forgets that
at the root of all these valuation claims and counterclaims was the initial gross
undervaluation by DAR that the LBP stoutly defended. At the end, this
undervaluation was proven incorrect by no less than this Court; the petitioners
were proven correct in their claim, and the correct valuation more than five-fold
the initial DAR valuation was decreed and became final.
All these developments cannot now be disregarded and reduced to
insignificance. In blunter terms, the government and the LBP cannot now be heard
to claim that they were simply protecting their interests when they stubbornly
defended their undervalued positions before the courts. The more apt and accurate
statement is that they adopted a grossly unreasonable position and the adverse
developments that followed, particularly the concomitant delay, should be directly
chargeable to them.
To be sure, the petitioners were not completely correct in the legal steps they
took in their valuation claims. They initially filed their valuation claim before the
DARAB instead of immediately seeking judicial intervention. The DARAB,
however, contributed its share to the petitioners error when it failed or refused to
act on the valuation petitions for more than three (3) years. Thus, on top of the
DAR undervaluation was the DARAB inaction after the petitioners landholdings
had been taken. This Courts Decision of February 6, 2007 duly noted this and
observed:
It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October 1995,
when AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. In view
of the failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of the properties, the
Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DARAB

on 14 February 1997. Despite the lapse of more than three years from the filing
of the complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the
land. Meantime, the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had already been
cancelled and in their place a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December 1996. A period of
almost 10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this case has
truly languished for a long period of time, the delay being mainly attributable to
both official inaction and indecision, particularly on the determination of the
amount of just compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date,
have yet to be fully compensated for the properties which are already in the hands
of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of time, may have already
converted or sold the land awarded to them.
Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it
not for LBPs counsel causing unnecessary delay. At the inception of this case,
DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine
just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC
and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. We underscore the pronouncement of the
RTC that the delay by DARAB in the determination of just compensation
could only mean the reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform and
the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation by
corporate landowners.
To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them emptyhanded while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly
oppressive. [Emphasis supplied.]

These statements cannot but be true today as they were when we originally
decided the case and awarded 12% interest on the balance of the just compensation
due. While the petitioners were undisputedly mistaken in initially seeking recourse
through the DAR, this agency itself hence, the government committed a graver
transgression when it failed to act at all on the petitioners complaints for
determination of just compensation.
In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of this
case, delay should be laid at the doorsteps of the government, not at the
petitioners. We conclude, too, that the government should not be allowed to
exculpate itself from this delay and should suffer all the consequences the delay
caused.
The LBPs arguments on the applicability
of cases imposing

12% interest
The LBP claims in its Comment that our rulings in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[26] Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[27] and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Imperial,[28] cannot be applied to the present case.
According to the LBP, Republic is inapplicable because, first, the
landowners in Republic remained unpaid, notwithstanding the fact that the award
for just compensation had already been fixed by final judgment; in the present
case, the Court already acknowledged that pertinent amounts were deposited in
favor of the landowners within 14 months from the filing of their
complaint. Second, while Republic involved an ordinary expropriation case, the
present case involves expropriation for agrarian reform. Finally, the just
compensation in Republic remained unpaid notwithstanding the finality of
judgment, while the just compensation in the present case was immediately paid in
full after LBP received a copy of the Courts resolution
We find no merit in these assertions.
As we discussed above, the pertinent amounts allegedly deposited by LBP
were mere partial payments that amounted to a measly 5% of the actual value of
the properties expropriated. They could be the basis for the immediate taking of the
expropriated property but by no stretch of the imagination can these nominal
amounts be considered pertinent enough to satisfy the full requirement of just
compensation i.e., the full and fair equivalent of the expropriated property, taking
into account its income potential and the foregone income lost because of the
immediate taking.
We likewise find no basis to support the LBPs theory that Republic and the
present case have to be treated differently because the first involves a regular
expropriation case, while the present case involves expropriation pursuant to the
countrys agrarian reform program. In both cases, the power of eminent domain
was used and private property was taken for public use. Why one should be
different from the other, so that the just compensation ruling in one should not
apply to the other, truly escapes us. If there is to be a difference, the treatment of

agrarian reform expropriations should be stricter and on a higher plane because of

the governments societal concerns and objectives. To be sure, the government
cannot attempt to remedy the ills of one sector of society by sacrificing the
interests of others within the same society.
Finally, we note that the finality of the decision (that fixed the value of just
compensation) in Republic was not a material consideration for the Court in
awarding the landowners 12% interest. The Court, in Republic, simply affirmed the
RTC ruling imposing legal interest on the amount of just compensation due. In the
process, the Court determined that the legal interest should be 12% after
recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a forbearance on the
part of the government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical factor,
then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time the RTC decision
fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed
from the time that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took
the property.
The LBP additionally asserts that the petitioners erroneously relied on the
ruling in Reyes v. National Housing Authority. The LBP claims that we cannot
apply Reyesbecause it involved just compensation that remained unpaid despite the
finality of the expropriation decision. LBPs point of distinction is that just
compensation was immediately paid in the present case upon the Courts
determination of the actual value of the expropriated properties. LBP claims, too,
that in Reyes, the Court established that the refusal of the NHA to pay just
compensation was unfounded and unjustified, whereas the LBP in the present case
clearly demonstrated its willingness to pay just compensation. Lastly, in Reyes, the
records showed that there was an outstanding balance that ought to be paid, while
the element of an outstanding balance is absent in the present case.
Contrary to the LBPs opinion, the imposition of the 12% interest
in Reyes did not depend on either the finality of the decision of the expropriation
court, or on the finding that the NHAs refusal to pay just compensation was
unfounded and unjustified. Quite clearly, the Court imposed 12% interest based on
the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals that x x x if property is taken for
public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over
the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be

computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before
the taking occurred.[29] This is the same legal principle applicable to the present
case, as discussed above.
While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just
compensation due to the petitioners after this Court had fixed the value of the
expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact from the time that the
State took the petitioners properties until the time that the petitioners were fully
paid, almost 12 long years passed. This is the rationale for imposing the 12%
interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have
made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the
taking.
Finally, the LBP insists that the petitioners quoted our ruling in Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Imperial out of context. According to the LBP, the Court
imposed legal interest of 12% per annum only after December 31, 2006, the date
when the decision on just compensation became final.
The LBP is again mistaken. The Imperial case involved land that was
expropriated pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27,[30] and fell under the coverage
of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 13.[31] This AO provided for the payment
of a 6% annual interest if there is any delay in payment of just compensation.
However, Imperial was decided in 2007 and AO No. 13 was only effective up to
December 2006. Thus, the Court, relying on our ruling in the Republic case,
applied the prevailing 12% interest ruling to the period when the just compensation
remained unpaid after December 2006. It is for this reason that December 31, 2006
was important, not because it was the date of finality of the decision on just
compensation.
The 12% Interest Rate and
the Chico-Nazario Dissent

To fully reflect the concerns raised in this Courts deliberations on the

present case, we feel it appropriate to discuss the Justice Minita Chico-Nazarios
dissent from the Courts December 4, 2009 Resolution.
While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were entitled to
the 12% interest, she saw it appropriate to equitably reduce the interest charges
fromP1,331,124,223.05 to P400,000,000.00. In support of this proposal, she
enumerated various cases where the Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil
Code,[32] equitably reduced interest charges.
We differ with our esteemed colleagues views on the application of equity.
While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in
numerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was essentially
consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements between the
contracting parties. In contrast, the interest involved in the present case runs as
a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner
to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of
taking.[33]
Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments made by the LBP to the
petitioners cannot be a proper premise in denying the landowners the interest due
them under the law and established jurisprudence. If the just compensation for
the landholdings is considerable, this compensation is not undue because the
landholdings the owners gave up in exchange are also similarly considerable
AFC gave up an aggregate landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave
up 805.5308 hectares. When the petitioners surrendered these sizeable
landholdings to the government, the incomes they gave up were likewise sizeable
and cannot in any way be considered miniscule. The incomes due from these
properties, expressed as interest, are what the government should return to the
petitioners after the government took over their lands without full payment of just
compensation. In other words, the value of the landholdings themselves should be
equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due; interest is due and
should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after
taking has been completed. This is the compensation arrangement that should

prevail if such compensation is to satisfy the constitutional standard of being

just.
Neither can LBPs payment of the full compensation due before the finality
of the judgment of this Court justify the reduction of the interest due them. To rule
otherwise would be to forget that the petitioners had to wait twelve years from the
time they gave up their lands before the government fully paid the principal of the
just compensation due them. These were twelve years when they had no income
from their landholdings because these landholdings have immediately been taken;
no income, or inadequate income, accrued to them from the proceeds of
compensation payment due them because full payment has been withheld by
government.
If the full payment of the principal sum of the just compensation is legally
significant at all under the circumstances of this case, the significance is only in
putting a stop to the running of the interest due because the principal of the just
compensation due has been paid. To close our eyes to these realities is to condone
what is effectively a confiscatory action in favor of the LBP.
That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to be
paid is not per se an inequitable or unconscionable situation, considering the length
of time the interest has remained unpaid almost twelve long years. From the
perspective of interest income, twelve years would have been sufficient for the
petitioners to double the principal, even if invested conservatively, had they been
promptly paid the principal of the just compensation due them. Moreover, the
interest, however enormous it may be,cannot be inequitable and unconscionable
because it resulted directly from the application of law and jurisprudence
standards that have taken into account fairness and equity in setting the interest
rates due for the use or forebearance of money.
If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has itself to
blame, as this interest piled up because it unreasonably acted in its valuation of the
landholdings and consequently failed to promptly pay the petitioners. To be sure,
the consequences of this failure i.e., the enormity of the total interest due and the
alleged financial hemorrhage the LBP may suffer should not be the very reason
that would excuse it from full compliance. To so rule is to use extremely flawed

logic. To so rule is to disregard the question of how the LBP, a government

financial institution that now professes difficulty in paying interest at 12% per
annum, managed the funds that it failed to pay the petitioners for twelve long
years.
It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this Court should tread
lightly in imposing liabilities on the LBP because this bank represents the
government and, ultimately, the public interest. Suffice it to say that public interest
refers to what will benefit the public, not necessarily the government and its
agencies whose task is to contribute to the benefit of the public. Greater public
benefit will result if government agencies like the LBP are conscientious in
undertaking its tasks in order to avoid the situation facing it in this case. Greater
public interest would be served if it can contribute to the credibility of the
governments land reform program through the conscientious handling of its
part of this program.
As our last point, equity and equitable principles only come into full play
when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.[34] As we have shown above,
established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the present
case. There is thus no occasion for the equitable consideration that Justice ChicoNazario suggested.

The Amount Due the Petitioners

Compensation

as Just

As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is only on the difference
between the price of the expropriated lands (determined with finality to
be P1,383,179,000.00) and the amount of P411,769,168.32 already paid to the
petitioners. The difference between these figures amounts to the remaining balance
of P971,409,831.68 that was only paid on May 9, 2008.
As above discussed, this amount should bear interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from the time the petitioners properties were taken on December
9, 1996 up to the time of payment. At this rate, the LBP now owes the petitioners

the total amount of One Billion Three Hundred Thirty-One Million One Hundred
Twenty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Three and 05/100 Pesos
(P1,331,124,223.05), computed as follows:
Just Compensation

P971,409,831.68

Legal Interest from 12/09/1996

To 05/09/2008 @ 12%/annum
12/09/1996 to 12/31/1996
01/01/1997 to 12/31/2007
01/01/2008 to 05/09/2008

23 days
11 years
130 days

7,345,455.17
1,282,260,977.82
41,517,790.07
P1,331,124,223.05[35]

The Immutability of Judgment Issue

As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified,

even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court,
be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.[36] In the past, however, we have
recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries
in the interest of substantial justice and where special and compelling reasons
called for such actions.
Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[37] Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[38] Philippine Consumers Foundation v.
National Telecommunications Commission,[39] and Republic v. de los
Angeles,[40] we reversed our judgment on the second motion for reconsideration,
while in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[41] we did so on a third motion for reconsideration. In Cathay
Pacific v. Romillo[42] and Cosio v. de Rama,[43] we modified or amended our ruling
on the second motion for reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v.
Court of Appeals,[44] Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico,[45]Manotok IV v.
Barque,[46] and Barnes v. Padilla,[47] we recalled entries of judgment after finding
that doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:

x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be

attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this
principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be
final.[48] [Emphasis supplied.]

That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not
hard to discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed
under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can
compensation in an eminent domain be just when the payment for the
compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably delayed? To
claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this
case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary
actor. It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or
standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these
standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss this case as a private interest
matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leave
uncorrected.
As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first
impression in our jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the payment of just
compensation have been settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled
jurisprudence on the issue alone accords this case primary importance as a contrary
ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of grounds, all the rulings we have
established in the past.

More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of

transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved
agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has unceasingly sought to
achieve in the past half century. This reform program and its objectives would
suffer a major setback if the government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly
or unwittingly, through lack of good faith in implementing the needed
reforms. Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the national agenda that the
Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership and
abuse, to the idea of revolution.[49] This linkage, to our mind, remains valid even if
the landowner, not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of
the agrarian reform program.
As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not
override, substantial justice.[50] As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:[51]
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court
reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice.[52] [Emphasis supplied.]

Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[53] we had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines
in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always
been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of
Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation.[54] [Emphasis
supplied.]

We made the same recognition in Barnes,[55] on the underlying premise that

a courts primordial and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the
duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to re-examine even a final and
executory judgment.
Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and
erroneous conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find
that we are duty-bound to re-examine and overturn the assailed Resolution. We
shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our duty as defenders of justice if,
given the chance to make the rectification, we shall let the opportunity pass.
Attorneys Fees
We are fully aware that the RTC has awarded the petitioners attorneys fees
when it fixed the just compensation due and decreed that interest of 12% should be
paid on the balance outstanding after the taking of the petitioners landholdings
took place. The petitioners, however, have not raised the award of attorneys fees
as an issue in the present motion for reconsideration. For this reason, we shall not
touch on this issue at all in this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petitioners motion
for reconsideration. The Court En Bancs Resolution dated December 4, 2009, as
well as the Third Divisions Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and December 19,
2007, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ORDERED to pay
petitioners Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest at the rate of
12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from
the date the Government took the properties on December 9, 1996, until the
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines paid on May 9, 2008 the balance on the
principal amount.
Unless the parties agree to a shorter payment period, payment shall be in
monthly installments at the rate of P60,000,000.00 per month until the whole
amount owing, including interest on the outstanding balance, is fully paid.

Costs against the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

(on wellness leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CONCHITA
MORALES
Associate Justice

CARPIO

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

(on leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

(on wellness leave)

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief
Justice

On wellness leave.
On leave.

On wellness leave.
[1]
While the petitioners owned a total of 1,454.8791 hectares based on the landholdings stated in this Courts
February 6, 2007 Decision, the RTC, in its decision, fixed just compensation for 1,388.6027 hectares of land.
[2]
Retired from the Court on December 5, 2009.
[3]
See Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 391, citing Visayan Refining Co. v.
Camus, 40 Phil. 550, 558-559 (1919).
[4]
See Manapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 110478, 116176 and 116491-503, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 32.
[5]
See Heirs of Alberto Saguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 137.
[6]
Id., citing City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
[7]
The authority to exercise the power of eminent domain was expressly conferred to the Philippine Government
through Section 63 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, which states:

That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, subject to the limitations and
conditions prescribed in this Act, to acquire, require, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and
personal property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right of
eminent domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.)
Section 74 of the same law, which deals with the authority of the Philippine Government to grant franchises and
concessions, provides:
That the Government of the Philippine Islands may grant franchises, privileges, and concessions,
including the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain for the construction and
operation of works of public utility and service x x x: Provided, That no private property shall
be taken for any purpose under this section without just compensation paid or tendered
therefor x x x.
More specifically, Section 3 of the Jones Act (of 1916) provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
See Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, supra note 3.
[8]
We derived the concept of just compensation from the last clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which reads: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from taking its citizens' property; rather, it merely
prohibits the government from taking property without paying just compensation. (26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain 3, citing Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. U.S., 168 F.3d 1209 [10th Cir. 1999].) It is designed to secure
compensation, not to limit governmental interference with property rights. (Id., citing Preseault v. I.C.C.,
494 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 914, 108 L. Ed. 2d 1 [1990].) It prevents the legislature (and other government actors) from
depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a "public use" and upon payment of "just

compensation." (Id., citing Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1522, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229
[1994].)
[9]
G.R. No. 157206, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 102, 116-117.
[10]
Id.
[11]
P86,900,925.88 for the land of AFC and P164,478,178.14 for HPI.
[12]
Land Bank v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 148892, May 6, 2010.
[13]
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, supra note 9, at 117.
[14]
G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 611.
[15]
Id. at 622-623.
[16]
G. R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 542.
[17]
In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78), we said:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of
6% per annum.No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except
when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only
from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may
be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate
of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
[18]
Supra note 12.
[19]
G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 494.
[20]
G.R. No. 140160, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 67.
[21]
G.R. No. 147245, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 516.
[22]
G.R. No. 157753, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 449.
[23]
G.R. No. 173392, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 198.
[24]
G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214.
[25]
Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, No. L21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, No. L-35861, October 18,
1979, 93 SCRA 503;Manotok v. National Housing Authority, No. L-55166, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 89.
[26]
Supra note 14.
[27]
Supra note 19.
[28]
Supra note 22.
[29]
Supra note 14.
[30]
Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the
Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanisms Therefor.

[31]

Rules and Regulations Governing the Grant of Increment of Six Percent (6%) Yearly Interest Compounded
Annually on Lands Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (Effective October 21,
1994). Amended by DAR AO No. 02, series of 2004 (Issued on November 4, 2004).
[32]
Article 1229 states: The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly
or irregularly complied with by the debtor.
[33]
Republic v. Juan, G.R. No. L-24740, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 26; citing 30 CJS 230.
[34]

See Parent-Teachers Association of St. Mathew Christian Academy v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R.
No. 176518, March 2, 2010, citing Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.), G.R. No.
169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 625, 626.
[35]
Rollo, p. 1337.
[36]
Equitable Banking Corp. v. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 380, 416-417.
[37]
G.R. No. 82467, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 510.
[38]
G.R. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
[39]
G.R. No. L-63318, August 18, 1984, 131 SCRA 200.
[40]
G.R. No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.
[41]
G.R. No. L-58011, November 18, 1983, 125 SCRA 577.
[42]
G.R No. L-64276, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 396.
[43]
G.R. No. L-18452, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 207.
[44]
G.R. No. 125451, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 741.
[45]
434 Phil. 753 (2002).
[46]
G.R. No. 162335, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468.
[47]
482 Phil. 903 (2004).
[48]
Id. at 915.
[49]
Oral arguments at the Supreme Court, Hacienda Luisita case, G.R. No. 171101, August 26, 2010.
[50]
Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72 SCRA 121; Mc Entee v. Manotoc, G.R. No.
L-14968, October 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 279; Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-40098, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA
441.
[51]
G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998, 292 SCRA 38.
[52]
Id. at 51-52.
[53]
326 Phil. 182 (1996).
[54]
Id. at 191.
[55]
Supra note 47.