Staying

in
Power

Sacking, Shuffling, Shrinking, and

Shoring Up

Corporate World
Interchangeables

(Nominal Selectorate): All Stock Holders

Influentials (Real Selectorate): Large Individual and Institutional Share
Holders
Essentials (Winning Coalition): Majority of Board of Directors & some
Senior Management (10 to 15 people)
!

The Size of the Winning Coalition

It

might be very few individuals

But they might control a relatively large proportion of shares
Thus, despite being few in number, they prefer public goods to private goods.
What are public goods in this case?
What are private goods in this case?

Few Individuals
Many Shares

Is there a political analogy?

The Perils of Meritocracy

It is good to have qualified people. Sort of . . .

Qualified

at keeping the leader in power

LOYALTY
Appoint trusted members of ones own tribe
Kill potential rivals
Keep the winning coalition small
Keep the selectorate large
Not necessarily qualified at providing good governance
It is better to have loyal incompetents than competent rivals

Ethnicity and Leader Survival:

some data from Africa

Ethnic

divisions play an important role in African

politics
Group sizes differ widely

Some constitute a majority of the population

Others represent 5% or less

Ethnic

identities matter for politics:

Government jobs
Top political & military positions
Taxation & redistribution

Leaders

often favor individuals of their own

ethnicity

Ethnicity and Staying in Power

!

Which

is better? Belonging to a large ethnic group

or a small one?
!

(RNG!)

The Pros and Cons of Group Size

Large

group

More people (but they might apathetically not turn out)

You have to distribute payoffs among more people
Members of the WC stand a better chance of being in the
next WC even if you are eliminated

Small

group

Fewer people whose support you need to buy

Still plenty of interchangeables to ensure loyalty
Group may lose privileges if there is turmoil/leader is
removed (Members of the WC dont stand a good chance of
being in the next WC even if you are eliminated)

So which African rulers survive?

Large-n

study (n = 836)

24 African countries 1962-1987

DV: whether the leader leaves power in a given year
IV: size of the leaders ethnic group (as proportion of the
population, or relative to other groups)

What African rulers survive more

time?

Keep Essentials Off Balance

Rigged elections help show politicians that they

are replaceable
!

Pay

for loyalty but keep reminding members of the

winning coalition that they can and will be replaced
Lenin,

got it
Hitler, got it
Gorbachev, didnt get it
Mugabe, got it

Its all fun and games until somebody

throws a Molotov cocktail
In

good times, essentials typically stay loyal

As soon as the resistance looks serious, members of
the WC are encouraged to think about who will be
the essentials for the next leader
If your ministers believe a popular uprising will
succeed, they have incentives to defect.
After

them.

all, the leader wont be around tomorrow to punish

Think Like a Pirate!

To

decrease the probability that attempted mutinies

will succeed, make it clear that there will be no
lifeboats for deserters.
But if the mutiny succeeds, you cant prevent those
who deserted you from reaching the lifeboats
They

might become part of the new WC

Even if they arent an Essential for the next captain, they may be
allowed to go into exile (lifeboats)
!

What to do? Tie supporters to the masthead before the

rumors of a mutiny even begin to spread!

Whats a masthead?
Which knot should I use?
Select

supporters with a very small chance of being

in a future coalition and even with a very small
chance of being offered exile:
Fifth-grade

buddies
Family members
People who dirtied their hands for you
Members of your own ethnicity

How can democratic leaders capitalize

on these rules?

How can democratic leaders capitalize

on these rules?
Restrict the franchise
Buy votes
Use violence and intimidation to prevent access to
polling places
Miscount or destroy ballots
Bloc Voting (poor choice of terminology)
Clientelism

Vote

for dominant party to encourage them to spend in your

constituency

How can clever democratic leaders

capitalize on these rules?
Redraw Districts

Voters

like it
Incumbents really like it
All major parties like it
Challengers, not so much

Encourage more competitors to enter!

Dominant

parties fund opposition

Create set aside seats for minorities (meaning you

dont need them to win the majority of seats)

Mixed-Member
Electoral Systems

Two Electoral Tiers

Plurality

Tier
Usually single-member districts
Often provides a majority of total members
Proportional Tier
Often used to determine party seat shares
MMM v. MMP
Often provides a minority of total members
top up seats to provide proportionality
!

Rationale

for choosing such a system?

Legislative Election Results

September 2010
PSUV

MUD

PPT

CIRCUMSCRIPTION MEMBERS!
===========================================================!

NATIONAL SUMMARY OF VOTES AND SEATS!

===========================================================!
Party
Votes
%
Seats!
-----------------------------------------------------------!
Coalition for Dem Unity (MUD)
5,294,304 47.2
38!
Fatherland for All (PPT)
356,127 03.2
1!
United Socialist Party (PSUV)
5,451,989 48.6
71!
Others
125,229 01.1
-!
-----------------------------------------------------------!
Total
11,227,649
110!
-----------------------------------------------------------

1%

40%

59%

LIST MEMBERS!
=====================================================================!

NATIONAL SUMMARY!
=====================================================================!
Party
Votes
%
Seats!
---------------------------------------------------------------------!
Coalition for Democratic Unity (MUD)
5,334,309 47.2
26!
Fatherland for All (PPT)
354,677 03.1
1!
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
5,451,419 48.3
25!
Others
155,429 01.4
-!
---------------------------------------------------------------------!
Total
11,295,834
52!
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Seats

What are the determinants of

proportionality (and therefore N)?
2%

3%

49%

48%

50%

Votes
!

PSUV

Seats
MUD

PPT

LIST MEMBERS!
=====================================================================!

NATIONAL SUMMARY!
=====================================================================!
Party
Votes
%
Seats!
---------------------------------------------------------------------!
Coalition for Democratic Unity (MUD)
5,334,309 47.2
26!
Fatherland for All (PPT)
354,677 03.1
1!
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
5,451,419 48.3
25!
Others
155,429 01.4
-!
---------------------------------------------------------------------!
Total
11,295,834
52!
---------------------------------------------------------------------

48%

How do you make this

happen?
1%

3%

35%
49%

48%

65%

Votes
PSUV

Seats
MUD

PPT

CIRCUMSCRIPTION MEMBERS!
===========================================================!

NATIONAL SUMMARY OF VOTES AND SEATS!

===========================================================!
Party
Votes
%
Seats!
-----------------------------------------------------------!
Coalition for Dem Unity (MUD)
5,294,304 47.2
38!
Fatherland for All (PPT)
356,127 03.2
1!
United Socialist Party (PSUV)
5,451,989 48.6
71!
Others
125,229 01.1
-!
-----------------------------------------------------------!
Total
11,227,649
110!
-----------------------------------------------------------

Electoral Reform in Venezuela

Redrew the plurality districts grouping together supporters of

the government.
Made some of the plurality districts multimember increasing
disproportionality.
Moved from a 50-50 split between plurality and proportional tier to
70-30.
Changed from compensatory to parallel again, increasing
disproportionality
!

Delegated decree authority to the president after obtaining the

super-majority required by expelling a rebel member.

Curtailed the meeting of congress.

Survival Rates by Regime Type

Further Reading

Londregan, John, Henry Bienen, and Nicolas van de Walle.

Ethnicity and Leadership Succession in Africa. International Studies
Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1995): 125.