War!

Guess what?

What

Its

all about political survival.

War Fighting Philosophy: Small Coalition

Strike
Even

quickly
if your capabilities arent as great as your adversaries

Resources
Dont

dedicated to the fight should be limited

endanger your ability to pay off your coalition

War

should involve private benefits for the fighters

Pillage

and the go home

(Sun Tzu)

War Fighting Philosophy: Large Coalition

Make

sure the interest is vital

a public good

Go all in
Clear objectives political and military
Reassess
Public and congressional support
Your

Its

winning coalition is big

still a last resort

(Casper Weinberger)

Incentives to Try Hard

Democrats
Losing,

and sometimes even winning, means you will get unseated

Autocrats
If

try hard

are hoping for a quick payoff

they cant get loot for cronies, call it off

Democrats

spend more per soldier

War

deaths are unpopular with members of the coalition

Mogadishu v. Battle of Afabet

Autocrat

may fear domestic opponents more than

foreign ones
Invest

more in (personal) security forces

Keep those forces close
(see Six Day War detailed example)

Large Coalition Math: Israel

Military

budget was $381 million in 1967

Assume

a large coalition government can spend 10% of its budget

on private goods = $38 million for private payoffs
!

Say

the WC was 25% of the population (it was

probably larger), that is 650,000 people
!

($381

million X 10%)/650,000 = $58.62 each

Do

you want $60 or do you want to spend 10%

more on the military?

Small Coalition Math: Egypt

Military

budget was $500 million in 1967

Assume

a large coalition government can spend 30% of its budget

on private goods = $150 million for private payoffs
!

Say

the WC was 1,000 key officials (it was probably

much smaller)
!

($500

million X 30%)/1,000 = $150,000 each

Do

you want $150,000 or do you want to spend

30% more on the military?

Who tried hardest during WWI?

The Democratic Peace

Democrats

only fight if they are sure they can win.

Two Democrats cant both believe this and be right.
If

the other democracy is weak enough, threatening attack might

make sense.
Knowing its weakness, the other democracy will negotiate/
capitulate
Democracies that start wars win about 93% of the time, Autocrats
only 60%

Democrats arent angels

They

are just looking out for their WC, it just

happens to be big
!

They

are happy to pick on smaller/weaker

adversaries (even democracies)
!

When

the war is over, they are happy to set up a

puppet autocrat rather than establish a democracy
Might

encourage democratization if it assumes the vanquished

state will share its interests

The military and political survival

If

everything else remained equal, as a leader would

you prefer a strong military or a weak military?

Why do economists always say,

all else equal. . . .?
All

else equal, a strong military is better

Protection

against foreign intervention (remember Saddam?)

Protection against mass uprisings > the (weak) Tunisian
military refused to repress anti-government protesters
!

But

everything else is never equal

strong military increases the risk of a coup

Do you feel threatened?

The

less you care about threats from outside your

coalition, the less interested you will be in
strengthening your military.
True

if you think the most likely threat is domestic

Or if you think it is foreign
!

When

threats from outside are real, you will

strengthen the military even if that means increased
risk of a coup

Whats the Militarys Purpose?

The

U.S. and Israeli militaries are designed to fight

and win (conventional) wars
!

The

militaries of many authoritarian regimes are

designed to prevent coups
!

The

3d Armored Division [] came to be known

as the regular armys anti-coup division. It was
positioned close to the capital with a leadership
uniquely attached to President Asad. (Quinlivan
1999:147)

Coup-proofing
Coup-proofing

is the art of ensuring that the military

is unable to stage a successful coup
!

Five

principles of coup-proofing:

Exploitation

of family, ethnic and religious loyalties

Creation of a parallel military with strong ties to the regime > these
are the units to station close to the capital
Remember monopsony? > multiplicity of security agencies that spy
on the military (and each other) and report directly to the leader
Encouragement of professionalization and (narrow) technical
expertise among regular forces
Keeping the military happy > distribution of rents through oil,
export licenses, corruption in arms deals

Redundancy

Civil/Military Relations
Three

patterns of military government-military

relations
Political

guns

control: the people with guns obey the people without

Developed

world, some dictatorships (Mexico, China)

Brinkmanship: the threat of military intervention is always in the
air, but does not materialize frequently
South America before 1985
Military tutelage: the government is completely subordinate to the
military
Central America (El Salvador, Cuba before Castro)

The military is political

Like other political players, soldiers have policy

preferences

Over the defense budget, relationships with other countries,

and acceptable hairstyles among young men

Unlike other players, they can impose their

preferences with guns

Coup attempts are potentially disastrous

But overt military interventions are costly

Coups can fail

Successful coups can divide the military: purges of officers
opposed to the coup, preeminence of politics over
professional competence
!

Thus, both the military and the government are

better off if a coup is avoided

The military wants to obtain concessions by threatening to

intervene, but without actually intervening
The government wants to offer concessions to prevent a coup

I really mean it this time!

But

neither side has incentives to be sincere:

If

the government is going to satisfy any concession, the military

have incentives to exaggerate their demands
The government knows that the military might be exaggerating
> it offers less than demanded, calculating that the military
will not stage a coup after all
Coups occur when one side miscalculates:
the military demands more than the government is willing to
give,
or the government offers less than the military will actually
accept

Its all about your credibility rating

The

credibility of the threat to intervene plays a key

role in the process
Political

control > military threats are never credible, so the

government never offers concessions
!

Brinkmanship

> military threats are partially credible, so the

government runs the risk of offering less than requested, hoping
there will not be a coup after all
!

Military

tutelage > military threats are fully credible, so the

government always complies

Inequality and coups

The argument implies that the probability of

coups should be nonlinearly related to inequality:

Low inequality > no revolutionary threats > weak

military > coups threats not credible > political control
& no coups
Medium inequality > military might be needed >
moderately strong army > coup threats partially credible
> brinkmanship & coups
High inequality > fear of mass revolt > military is
indispensable > coup threats completely credible >
tutelage & no coups

Inequality and coups

Further Reading
Quinlivan,

James T. Coup-Proofing: Its Practice

and Consequences in the Middle East.
International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 13165.
!

Svolik,

Milan W. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
!

Svolik,

Milan W. Contracting on Violence The

Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and
Military Intervention in Politics. Journal of
Conflict Resolution 57, no. 5 (2013): 76594.