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Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ
of mandamuscommanding respondents LTFRB
and DOTC torequire PUVs touse compressed
natural gas (CNG) asalternative fuel.Asserting
their right to clean air, petitionerscontend that
thebases for their petition for a writ
of mandamus to order theLTFRB to require PUVs
to useCNG as an alternative fuel, lie inSection
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling
in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,and Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8749otherwise known asthe
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
NO. Petitioners invoke the provisions of
theConstitutionand the Clean Air Act in their
prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus
commanding therespondents to require PUVs
touse CNG as an alternativefuel. Although both
are generalmandates that do notspecifically
enjoin the use of any kind of fuel,
particularlythe use of CNG, there is an executive
order implementing a program on the use of
CNG by public vehicles.ExecutiveOrder No. 290,

entitled Implementing the NaturalGasVehicle

Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT),
took effect onFebruary 24, 2004. A thorough
reading of theexecutive order assures us that
implementation for a cleaner environment
isbeing addressed. To a certain extent,
theinstant petition hadbeen mooted by the
issuance of E.O. No. 290.Regrettably, however, a
writ of mandamus is unavailing.Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an
actspecifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here,
there is no lawthat mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC toorder owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG. Further,mandamus
will not generally lie from one branch
of government to a coordinate branch, for the
obvious reasonthat neither is inferior to the
other. The need for futurechanges in
both legislation and its implementation
cannot be preempted by orders from this Court,
especially whenwhat is prayed for is
procedurally infirm. Besides, comitywith and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we
givesufficient time and leeway for the coequal
branches toaddress by themselves the
environmental problems raisedin this petition.In
the same manner that we have associated
thefundamental right to a balanced and
healthful ecology withthe twin concepts
of "inter-generational responsibility" and"intergenerational justice" in Oposa, where we
upheld theright of future Filipinos to prevent
the destruction of therainforests, so do we

recognize, in this petition, the right

of petitioners and the future generation to
clean air. In Oposawe said that if the right to a
balanced and healthful ecologyis now explicitly
found in the Constitution even if the rightis
"assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers [of theConstitution] that
unless the rights to a balanced andhealthful
ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state asolemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect andadvance the
second, the day would not be too far when
allelse would be lost not only for the present
generation, butalso for those to come."It is the
firm belief of this Court that in this case, it
istimely to reaffirm the premium we have placed
on the protection of the environment in the
landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the
statistics are on air pollution,with the present
fuels deemed toxic as they are to
theenvironment, as fatal as these pollutants are
to the health of the citizens, and urgently
requiring resort to drasticmeasures to reduce
air pollutants emitted bymotor vehicles, we
must admit in particular that petitionersare
unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an
indubitablelegal duty on respondents that will
justify a grant of thewrit of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for publicutility
vehicles. It appears to us that more properly,

thelegislature should provide first the specific

statutoryremedy to the complex environmental
problems bared byherein petitioners before any
judicial recourse bymandamus is taken

MMDA vs Jancom
Posted on October 14, 2008 by danabatnag
MMDA v. Jancom
Date: Jan 30, 2002
Petitioner: MMDA
Respondent: Jancom
Ponente: Melo, J.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Facts of the case: After bidding for a waste
management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a
contract for the MMDAs San Mateo waste
management project. A BOT contract for the waste to
energy project was signed on Dec 19, 1997, between
Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by
the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste
Management through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos,
CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA chair
Prospero Oreta.
The contract, however, was never signed by President
Ramos as it was too close to the end of his term. He
endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused

to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or

the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo
residents for the closure of the dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals
for solid waste management projects for Metro Manila,
Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC asking the
court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater
Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee disregarding the BOT contract with Jancom,
and the call for bids for a new waste management
On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of
Jancom. Instead of appealing, the MMDA filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and a TRO.
When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA went to
the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with
Jancom was not binding because it was not signed by
the President, the conditions precedent to the contract
were not complied with, and there was no valid notice
of award.
The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed
a motion for appeal instead of for certiorari, because a
certiorari would only apply in cases where there was
grave abuse of jurisdiction, something which the
petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained
only by an appeal from the final decision. Since the
decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become
final and gone beyond the reach of any court to
modify in any substantive aspect.
Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the
substantive issues, the court took it up just the same,
if only to put the petitioners mind to rest.

The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305,

1315 and 1319 of the Civil Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding
contract, MMDA can only allege that there was no valid
notice of award; the contract does not bear the
signature of the President; the conditions precedent
specified in the contract were not complied with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the
governments fault; though the President did not sign,
his alter-ego did; and anyway his signature was only
necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its
perfection; and that the two-month period within which
Jancom should comply with the conditions had not yet
started to run because the contract had not yet taken
effect, precisely because of the absence of the
Presidents signature.
HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err when it
declared the existence of a valid and perfected
contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the
same without the consent of the other. Although the
contract is a perfected one, it is still ineffective or
unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the
Voting: vitug, panganiban, Sandoval Gutierrez concur.
Carpio j: No part, I was former counsel to a foreign
partner of Jancom Environmental Corporation.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who

actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in

the case and voted thereon.
Does this mean that all administrative decisions and
penalties may be rendered only by the Supreme Court
en banc?
On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular
No. 2-89 which says: A decision or resolution of a
Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority
of its members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at
least three such Members, is a decision or resolution of
the Supreme Court (Sec 4 (3), Article VIII, 1987