G.S.R.

Thomas

Maximin Daia's Policy and the Edicts of Toleration

In: L'antiquit classique, Tome 37, fasc. 1, 1968. pp. 172-185.

Rsum
G. S. R. Thomas, Maximin Daia's Policy and the Edicts of Toleration. Aprs la mort de Galre et la publication de l'dit de
Sardique, l'empire romain se trouvait divis en deux : d'une part, Constantin et Licinius allis par les fianailles de Licinius avec
Constantia, et soutenant la tolrance reprsente par l'dit de Sardique ; d'autre part, Maximin et Maxence, unis par un trait
secret. L'alliance entre Constantin et Licinius fut renforce par le mariage de Licinius avec Constantia et par la promulgation d'un
deuxime dit de tolrance, le soi-disant dit de Milan. tant donn que la puissance et l'initiative lgislative taient passes
l'empire d'Occident, la rsistance de Maximin prit une forme quivoque jusqu' ce que Licinius le ft capituler.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Thomas G.S.R. Maximin Daia's Policy and the Edicts of Toleration. In: L'antiquit classique, Tome 37, fasc. 1, 1968. pp. 172185.
doi : 10.3406/antiq.1968.1502
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/antiq_0770-2817_1968_num_37_1_1502

MAXIMIN DAIA'S POLICY

AND THE EDICTS OF TOLERATION *

Henri Grgoire has shown that the Edict of Toleration

by Galerius at Sardica and published at Nicomedia
on 30th April, 311, shortly before his death (probably on 5th
May, 311), was in fact the work of Licinius x. However, he had
been anticipated in this view by Pierre Batiffol, who had further
observed that Galerius often took counsel from Licinius 2. But,
where these two scholars differ is that Batiffol gives part of the
credit to Constantine, who was publishing a pre-view to the Edict
of Milan 3. Eduard Schwartz is another who has departed from
the traditional ascription of the edict to Galerius, and he makes
out a case for Constantine's having been the instigator in forcing
Galerius' hand 4. And in this view he was followed by Hans Lietzmann 5. Guglielmo Ferrero sees Galerius, Licinius and
acting in concert ; thus preserving a careful middle view 6.
* This paper is based on a short paper originally read on 10th February, 1967 to
the First National Conference of the Australian Society for Theological Studies,
held within The University of Sydney.
1 H.Grgoire, La conversin de Constantin, in Revue de V Universit de Bruxelles, 36
(1930-1931), 231-272, esp. p. 247, for the first time that this interpretation was thus
put forward. Cf. more recently idem (avec la collaboration de P. Orgels, J. Moreau
et A. MaricqJ, Les perscutions dans V Empire romain 2 {Mmoires de V Acadmie royale de
Belgique, LVI, 5), Brussels, 1964, p. 86.
2 P. Batiffol, La Paix constantinienne et le Catholicisme, Paris, 1914, p. 181.
3 Ibid., pp. 183-185.
* E. Schwartz, Kaiser Konstantin und die christliche Kirche2, Leipzig and Berlin,
1936, pp. 58-59, conveniently expressing views he had maintained for several
5 H. Lietzmann, A History of the Early Church, E. T., London, 1953, vol. Ill, p.
72, where he also remarks ; 'It is obvious from the wording that his (sc. Galerius')
edict of tolerance was by no means the repentent confession of a remorseful
the tart phraseology plainly reveals that the emperor disliked making the
concession'.
6 G. Ferrero, La ruine de la civilisation antique, Paris, 1921, p. 157.

MAXIMIN DAIA's POLICY

173

But we have no real evidence for Constantine's having played any

part in the issuing of the edict or of its composition. On the whole,
Grgoire's interpretation has been resisted, but not destroyed
by his detractors 7. The edict was promulgated under the names
of Galerius, Licinius and Constantine, and most probably also
under that of Maximin Daia 8. This was, however, but the
formula ; it implied nothing as to who was the driving spirit.
But it is Lactantius who supplies the clue. The only person
present with Galerius was Licinius, and he obtained from the
dying Emperor the guardianship of his wife and son, and hence,
doubtless, a regency 9. But Zosimus explains that there had been
a long-standing friendship between the two and that on that
account, as well as for the coming war with Maxentius, Galerius
had raised Licinius to the position of imperator 10. Licinius then
spent some time in laying his claim to Galerius' former European
possessions u.

7 Cf. J. Zeiller, apud A. Fliche & V. Martin, Histoire de l'glise, Paris, 1935,
vol. 2, p. 475, n. 3 : . Grgoire fait de Licinius le vritable auteur de l'dit de tolrence. Sa politique dans les annes qui suivent semble justifier cette hypothse, sans
lui confrer cependant plus qu'un assez haut degr de probabilit'. Nevertheless,
most students of ancient history would be satisfied to claim little more at many points
in their labours.
8 Lact., Mort. Pers., 34; Eus., HE, VIII, 17, 3-10. Eusebius, who alone gives
these names, would have deliberately omitted Maximin's name after his rescissio
actorum in 313. Cf. also Lact., Mort. Pers., 36, 3 : communi titulo. For a restoration
of the titulature in Greek, cf. O. Seeck, Die imperatorischen Acclamationen im vierten
Jahrhundert, RhM, 48 (1893), 198-199, and also J. R. Knipfing, The Edict of Galerius
(311 A.D.) re-considered, in Revue beige de Phil, et d'Hist., 1 (1922), 695, n. 1 ; H. J. L.
Lawlor and J. E. L. Oulton, Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History, London, 19271928, vol. II, p. 285, and P. Batiffol, o. c, p. 185, make the alternative suggestion
that Maximin's name may have been deleted because he ignored the edict in his
own dominions (Eus., HE, IX, 1, 1). This depends on a half-truth, at best, and is
really somewhat nave in neglecting to consider the established formulae of the
tetrarchical chancelleries in their explanations.
9 Lact., Mort. Pers., 35, 3. H. Nesselhauf, Das Toleranzgesetz des Licinius,
Jahrbuch. 74 (1954), 50, is too reticent on this point.
10 Zosimus, II, 11, 1. Cf. Lact., Mort. Pers., 20, 3-4; 43, 1 ; Eutrop., X, 4, 1 ;
Aur. Vict., Caes., 40, 8.
11 Lact., Mort. Pers., 36, 1 : Licinio morante. There is, however, no reason to accuse
him of sloth, as does W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church,
Oxford, 1965, p. 533, n. 246, for the delay was occasioned by the time spent in
his scattered troops.

1 74

G. S. R. THOMAS

The Edict of Sardica was known in Nicomedia by 30th April,

311 and the news of Galerius' death also by about the middle of
May 12. Quo nuntio Maximinus audito..., Lactantius continues 13.
Otto Seeck notices that for Lactantius this entails only the news
of the death of Galerius 14, but Eusebius informs us that the Edict
of Sardica had been promulgated broadcast through Asia and
neighbouring provinces 15. Each of our two sources suggests that
Maximin was motivated by the single cause he records. Surely,
it is best to conclude that both pieces of information were sent
to Maximin 16, and they would have been in his hands sometime
between 20th and 30th May 17. I would add that yet another
piece of information was included in the dispatches : and that
was the news of the betrothal of Licinius and Constantia, Constantine's sister, and the formation of a pact between these two
emperors 18. This was a most formidable array, which Maximin
understood as a declaration of hostile policy, and made his bid
for the eastern domains without further delay 19. Grgoire has
12 Lact., Mort. Pers., 35, 4 : idque cognitum Nicomediae <medio> mensis eiusdem,
following the emendation of H. Grgoire, About Licinius' Fiscal and Religious Policy,
Byzantion, 13 (1938), 551.
13 Lact., Mort. Pers., 36, 1.
14 O. Seeck, Regesten der Kaiser und Ppste fr die Jahr 311 bis 476 n. Chr., Stuttgart,
1919, p. 53.
15 Eus., HE, IX, 1, 1.
16 Lawlor and Oulton, Eusebius, II, p. 284 suggest that both had been dispatched
to the Government officials at Nicomedia.
17 H. Grgoire, About Licinius' Fiscal and Religious Policy, Byzantion, 13 (1938),
552.
18 Lact., Mort. Pers., 43, 2 : {Maximinus) tarnen ut audiuit Constantini sororem Licinio
desponsam, existimauit affinitatem Mam duorum imperatorum contra se copulan. The dating
is important in our understanding of the significance of this act. J. Moreau remarks
carefully La date exacte de ces projets matrimoniaux n'est pas connue . (Lactance, II, p. 423). N. H. Baynes dates it to the year 310 {CAH, XII, p. 681). A. H.
M. Jones, Constantine and the Conversion of Europe, London, 1948, p. 74 dates it about
the summer of 312. A. G. McGiffert, Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History (NPNF, 2nd
series, I), p. 365, n. 21 dates it after April, 31 1, as do Lawlor and Oulton, Eusebius,
II, p. 282. The date 310 must be discounted, as there was no motive for an alliance
prior to April-May,.311,when both Constantine and Licinius commenced the
of the Empire in earnest. The date 312 is perhaps rather late, for reasons that
will become obvious below.
18 Lact., Mort. Pers., 36, 2. Maximin set out from Tarsus or Antioch, having heard
the news from Nicomedia, or direct from Sardica, by-passing the Nicomedian
(so Seeck, /. c.) .

MAXIMIN DAIA'S POLICY

175

shown that Licinius' motive in promulgating the Edict was to

win the powerful Christian support in the eastern provinces 20.
And our sources contain the clue that Maximin was likewise
engaged in a rival quest for popular support at the expence os
Galerius' legislation and policy 21. As well as publishing hif
fiscal laws Maximin had gone as far as to bow to the decision of
Licinius 22, and effect at least the partial publication of the Edict
of Sardica. It is obvious that this was no welcome task, and he
proceeded to issue merely verbal commands ; officials could then
on their own initiative or in response to requests state the
in writing. Eusebius records an example given by Sabinus,
Maximin's Praefectus Praetorio 23. And it would have been this
token publication of the Edict that lulled Licinius into a false
sense of security, and would thus make his delay completely
24.
The rivalry between the two contenders for Galerius' domains
came almost to war, and they were found drawn up on opposite
sides of the Straits. However, war was averted this time by a
peace treaty, the Peace of Chalcedon 25. This was merely a
measure ; both sides could afford to await a more
opportunity.
About the time of the publication of the Edict of Sardica, Maximin concluded a secret treaty with Maxentius 2e. This alliance
20 H. Grgoire, La conversion de Constantin, in Revue de l'Universit de Bruxelles, 36
(1930-1931), 247-248.
21 Maximin reached Bithynia towards the end of August, 311, and there published
his fiscal measures shortly afterwards, about September, 311 (so Lawlor and Oulton, Eusebius, I, p. 290 ; II, p. 301 for discussion). These measures were wild in the
extreme entailing a complete suspension of the census (Lact., Mort. Pers., 36, 1), but
were soon replaced by harsh, repressive ones (cf. ibid. 37, 38 ; Eus., HE, VIII, 14,
10, and H. Grgoire, About Licinius' Fiscal and Religious Policy, Byzantion, 13 (1938),
551-560 for full discussion.
22 Eus., HE, IX, 1, 1. It is noteworthy that Eusebius should refer to Licinius
(and Constantine) as being Maximin's superior. Licinius could claim prior
to the title of Augustus, but Maximin had been a member of the Imperial
for a longer time. Nevertheless, it is certain that political initiative had been
taken in the west. Cf. also H. Nesselhauf, op. cit., pp. 49-51.
23 Eus., HE, IX, 1, 2 ; 1, 7. For the text of this First Letter of Sabinus see ibid.,
IX, 1, 3-4.
24 Cf. n. 11 supra.
26 Lact., Mort. Pers., 32, 2.
26 Ibid., 43, 3 ; Eus., HE, VIII, 14, 7.

176

G. S. R. THOMAS

had the effect of placing Maxentius now in a stronger position

for his war with Constantine. Though his position was
by his conquest of Africa 27, Maxentius was still considered
a usurper 28. And a state of hostility had existed between
and Constantine since the time that Constantine had had
Maximian, Maxentius' father, killed 29. Lactantius informs us
of Maximin's motive for creating this secret alliance with
and that was that he assumed that the Licinius-Constantine Pact was an alliance directed against him 30. Nevertheless,
he shows that it was Maxentius who had most to gain for his
war with Constantine and, indeed, received it as a piece of
felicity 31. Thus we may well wonder whether
is correct on this point. We may well take it that as
was openly engaged in hostilities (with Constantine and
Constantine's ally, L. Domitius Alexander in Africa) 32 and
it with the wonder born of desperation that he was the
most needful partner to the alliance, and on the principle of is
fecit cui prodest, he could well have been the initiator. Likewise
Constantine was the most needful partner in the Licinius-Constantine Pact. The concession Constantine made of his sister to
Licinius was a pledge for the reward that would follow his
33.
27 Aur. Vict., Caes., 40, 17-19 ; Epit., 40, 2 and 6 ; Zosimus, II, 12 and 14.
28 Cf. Eus., HE, VIII, 14, 7-8 ; Anon. Vales., 4, 12.
29 Lact., Mort. Pers., 43, 4. Maximian's death seems to have occurred early in
310. For details cf. ibid., 30 ; Aur. Vict., Epit., 40, 5 ; Caes., 40, 22 ; Eus., HE, VIII,
13, 15 and app. 8. For discussion on the circumstances of the death, cf. Moreau,
Lactance, II, pp. 375-378. It seems quite probable that Constantine had in fact
Maximian's death in some form.
30 Lact., Mort. Pers., 43, 2.
31 Ibid., 43, 4 : Maxentius tamquam diuinum auxilium libenter amplectitur.
32 Cf. P. Bruun, The Battle of the Milvian Bridge : The Date reconsidered, in Hermes,
88 (1960), 367, drawing attention to the evidence of ILS 8936 = CIL VIII 22183 :
Impp. dd. nn. L. Domitio Alexandre et Fl. Constantino Augg.
33 Cf. Zosimus, II, 17 :
, ,
. An alliance of
this nature was a well established Roman custom for cementing a political alliance,
and the recent alliance between Maximian and Constantine against Maxentius had
been sealed in precisely this way, with Maximian giving his daughter, Fausta, to
Constantine in marriage (ibid., II, 10).

MAXIMIN DAIA's POLICY

177

In the east, Maximin and Licinius maintained an open show

of cordiality and adherence to the Peace of Chalcedon.
and Maximin also officially maintained friendly relations,
taking a joint consulship in 313 and Constantine's mints issuing
currency bearing Maximin's effigy 34. Nevertheless, the fact
that the world was, in effect, divided into two armed
camps 35, with the initiative in hostility coming from the west ;
the conflict between Constantine and Maxentius.
On the evidence of Lactantius, Maximin was certainly aware
of the Licinius-Constantine Pact. In Maxentius' case, we have
no explicit comment. Nevertheless, there are hints in the
actions he took for his war with Constantine that would
suggest that he, too, was aware of the realities of the situation.
As part of his opening manuvres he attempted to drive a wedge
into Rhaetia, between the territories of Constantine and Licinius,
with the hope of aid from a local mutiny and also from Licinius.
He had to abandon this thrust and moved into Africa. This was
clearly an attempt to isolate the two partners to the alliance 36.
It is now instructive to review Maximin's religious policy to
this point. For about a year (May, 305 - April, 306) after
appointment as Caesar in Antioch persecution had been
suspended there 37. During this time Eusebius records that there
was considerable confusion and some danger 38, while
says that, although there were no executions, mutilation
was common 39. Then, about April, 306, the Fourth Edict of
34 Cf. J. Maurice, Numismatique Constantinienne, Paris, 1908-1912, I, pp. 202-205
(the mint at Rome), 282-288 (Ostia) and 309-311 (Aquileia).
35 Cf. Eus., HE, IX, 9, 1, adopting the reading of mss. R (for which no
theory of interpolation could account), which gives a clear reference to the two sides
of the contest at the outset of Gonstantine's war against Maxentius : Gonstantine
and Licinius versus Maxentius and Maximin ; and this is done in terms suggestive
of their religious affiliation.
36 Zosnuus, II, 17, 2. This passage is also significant in that it is suggestive of the
precarious nature of the bond between Constantine and Licinius.
37 Eus., HE, IX, 9a, 2. No act of persecution in Palestine is recorded between the
accession of Maximin and the issuing of the rescript under which Apphianus died on
2nd April, 306 (id., MP, 4, 8-15).
38 Eus., MP, 4, 2.
39 Lagt., Mort. Pers., 36, 6-7, cf. Inst., V, 11, 11. It is probable that Eus., HE,
VIII, 12, 6-10 also refers to this same time, but it is not possible to ascertain accuiately.
12

178

G. S. R. THOMAS

Persecution was published in Caesarea, being marked by the

death of Apphianus. Again there was a pause between the months
of August to October, 309, which was received with agreeable
surprise by Eusebius in Caesarea 40. Grgoire was able to
this by linking it to Lactantius' account from Nicomedia
that war almost broke out between Galerius and Maximin over
the later's demand for the title of Augustus 41. About October,
309, following the pause in the persecution, Maximin ordered
that the old pagan temples be re-built 42, and this was followed
about August, 3 1 2 by the appointment of priests to these temples
(surely a logical development, but seen as persecution by the
Christians) 43. This restoration received its definition in the
'Fifth Edict' of Persecution 44. Eusebius professed that he was
unable to understand what was happening 45, and we may safely
assume that he was accurately reflecting contemporary opinion.
Maximin was playing a double game. And it is against this
background that Maximin's token publication of the Edict of
Sardica should be viewed and also his alliance with Maxentius,
for it is with the creation of this alliance that Eusebius associates
(by retrospection) the outbreak of Maximin's persecution 46.
Maximin's position had long been ambivalent, but force of arms
and the Peace of Chalcedon would have warned him to stay
within the general terms of the Edict of Sardica.
II
Within six months 47 Maximin had begun to abrogate the
Edict of Sardica, by ordering new restrictions to be placed on the
40 Eus., MP, 9, 1.
41 Lagt., Mort. Pers., 32 ; cf. H. Grgoire et al., Les perscutions dans l'Empire
2, pp. 84, 148-150. A. C. McGiffert was probably moving in this same direction
in 1890 when he observed concerning this interruption in persecution : ' It was
in part due to the hostility to Galerius, but chiefly to political considerations'
(o. c, p. 336, n. 1).
42 Eus., HE, VIII, 14, 9 ; MP, 9. 2. N.B. Eusebius expressly calls this persecution.
43 Ibid. ; Lagt., Mort. Pers., 36, 5.
44 For the most convenient summary of the ' Fifth Edict', cf. Lawlor and Oulton,
Eusebius, II, p. 309.
45 Eus., MP, 9, 1 (S) : ' '.
46 Eus., HE, VIII, 14, 7-9, 18.
47 Ibid., IX, 2, 1, i. e. about November, 311.

MAXIMIN DAIA's POLICY

179

freedom of Christian worship. Thus ceremonies in cemeteries were

forbidden 48. Then, too, while still in Nicomedia, Maximin
deputations and petitions from the Nicomedians against
the Christians, but, for the time being, rejected them 49. There
were several martyrdoms at this time : three men of the city of
Emessa in northern Phoenicia were executed in the arena, among
them their bishop, Siluanus 50. Peter, Bishop of Alexandria, was
executed on 26th November, 311 51. Then, on 7th January, 312,
Lucan, a presbyter of Antioch, was martyred at Nicomedia in
the presence of Maximin 52. Nor were these the only ones who
paid the penalty during this period.
At length Maximin set out for Antioch about March 53.
From April, 312, a zealous official, Theotecnus, the of
Antioch, caused a flood of petitions to pour in to Maximin from
different cities 54. He wished to prohibit Christians within the
cities. Many petitions 55 followed over what must have been a
considerable time, and Maximin's answers were now favourable
and based upon a single norm 56, which would suggest that this
was some well planned device. Eusebius gives us as a specimen
the rescript to the Tyrians 57 ; for which we have epigraphic
corroboration from the inscription of Arykanda in Lycaonia 58.
From June, 312 these rescripts were inscribed on stelae in the
towns 59. Nevertheless, the imperial decisions were never
by order for their implementation.

48 Ibid., IX, 2, 2.
49 Ibid., IX, 9a, 4-5. A. H. M. Jones, o. c, p. 72, wrongly states that Maximin
acceeded to this request.
50 Eus., HE, IX, 6, 1 ; VIII, 13, 3.
51 Ibid., IX. 6. 2 ; VIII3 13, 7. Gf. Lawlor and Oulton, Eusebius, II, p. 264. He
is dated in the Syriac Breuarium to 24th November.
52 Eus., HE, IX, 6, 3 ; VIII, 13, 2 ; Chrysostom, Horn, in S. Luciam 2 (Migne, PG
50, col. 519).
63 Cf. Lawlor and Oulton, Eusebius, II, p. 287 for discussion.
64 Eus., HE, IX, 2, 2.
55 Ibid., IX, 4, 2.
56 Ibid., IX, 7, 1. Eusebius refers to rescripts (plural) but considers it sufficient
to record only one. Nevertheless, we must allow for local variation in detail.
57 Ibid., IX, 7, 3-14.
58 ILCVl, 1, 1 = CIL III, 12132.
69 Eus., HE, IX, 7, 1 ; 10, 12.

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G. S. R. THOMAS

Theotecnus next devised a strategy similar to that of Tagis for

Diocletian 60, which would have been well known in the east.
He constructed a statue of Jupiter Philius, the tutulary deity of
Antioch, and obtained from it an oracle to expel the Christians 61.
And to further an atmosphere hostile to the Christians, the civic
authorities distributed the spurious Acta Pilati, aimed at
the person of Jesus Christ. These became school text
books 62. As well as that, the alleged evidence of some prostitutes
referring to sexual orgies at Christian meeting was published 63 ;
but these old accusations would hardly have been credited in
the fourth century.
In November, 312 Maximin waged war with the Christian
Kingdom of Armenia 64. Eusebius' language would suggest that
Armenia had taunted Maximin into this war on his border, but
whether this taunting was overt or not we do not know. Perhaps
its very existence was cause enough in Maximin's eyes.
One thing from all this is clear, Maximin was at war with
Christianity, but it was a contained war. Maximin was thus able
to avoid a collision with the power of Licinius and even, indeed,
to lull Licinius into a false sense of security. It was the
position in the east that maintained peace there.
But in the west conflict had broken out between the western
Emperors. By the spring of 312 Constantine, who had
dealt with the Francs, could turn his attention to the war
with Maxentius 65, who had also returned from a successful
in Africa. Constantine gathered his troops and, leaving
the Rhine garrisoned, entered Italy by way of the Alps and
marched to meet Maxentius' superior forces e6. His march on
60 Lact., Mort. Pers., 10, 3-5.
61 Eus., HE, IX, 3.
62 Ibid., IX, 5, 1.
63 Ibid., IX, 5, 2.
* Ibid., IX, 8, 2.
65 Lact., Mort. Pers., 43, 4 and Zosimus, II, 14, 1, make Maxentius the initiator
of the war, but Pan. Lat., IX, 2, 3 claims this for Gonstantine (primus inuaderes). These
views can be reconciled by making Gonstantine the initiator of the second phase of
the hostilities.
66 Zosimus, II, 15 ; Pan. Lat., IX, 5, 1 ; Lact., Mort. Pers., 44, 2. On the exact
figures cf. the discussion in Moreau, Lactance, II, pp. 429-430. This remarkable state
of affairs was perhaps made possible for Constantine by the knowledge that he could

MAXIMIN DAIA's POLICY

181

Rome was a triumphal one and capped with the Vision of the
Cross 67 and the Victory of the Milvian Bridge 68.
Constantine entered Rome in triumph on 29th October, 312 69,
amid the rejoicing of Senate and People 70. As part of his
of the city he exacted penalties from a few of those
most intimate with Maxentius 71, and abolished his acta 72. Here
he found evidence of the secret treaty that had existed between
Maxentius and Maximin 73.
Now, there was at this stage a shift in the balance of power in
the west. Constantine had achieved his goal ; his religious
had been strengthened by a successful battle fought under
the new talisman of the labarum. His position was, therefore,
stronger than when the alliance with Licinius was first created ;
and as events were to prove, Licinius had little grounds for
trusting Constantine too far once in full power.
Herbert Nesselhauf 74 has drawn attention to the proximity that
Eusebius gives to Constantine's drawing up of the
concerning the Christians and his entry into Rome 75,
showing that the legislative initiative had now passed to
and suggests that Eusebius means us to understand that
Licinius acqiesced while Maximin did not. He rightly observes
that the law was intended against Maximin ; but it is worth
the strangeness of this, for Constantine and Maximin were
not openly engaged in hostilities. Indeed, Maximin was still
the legitimate ruler of the East, and the fiction of official friendtrust Licinius to remain neutral or even come to his aid under the terms of their
alliance.
67 It is not my present purpose to enter into discussion on this question. Cf. the
discussion in Moreau, Lac tance, II, pp. 433-436, to which add A. H. M. Jones, o. c,
pp. 94-97, who takes it quite literally, explaining it as an example of 'halo
(repeated in LRE, I, p. 80).
68 On the locality of this battle, cf. Moreau, Lactance, II, p. 432.
Pan. Lat., IX, 16, 2. Gf. also Moreau, Lactance, II, pp. 432-433. For an attempt
at dating the year to 31 1, cf. P. Bruun, o. c.
70 Aur. Vict., Caes., 40, 24 ; Eus., VC, 1, 39 ; HE, IX, 9, 9 ; Pan. Lat., IX, 19 ;
Lact., Mort. Pers., 44, 10-11 ; Zonaras, XIII, 1, 13.
71 Zosimus, II, 17.
72 Cod. Theod., XV, 14, 3 (6th January, 313) and 4 (13th January, 313).
73 Lagt., Mort. Pers., 44, 10 ; cf. Eus., HE, VIII, 14, 7.
74 H. Nesselhauf, o. c, pp. 51-53.
75 Eus., HE, IX, 9, 12 ; Lact., Mort. Pers., 37, 1.

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G. S. R. THOMAS

ship was still retained. Nesselhauf thinks that Constantine's

action is entirely explicable in terms of Constantine's use of his
new position as Senior Augustus. But it is much more likely to
have been the result of the discovery of the Secret Treaty between
Maximin and Maxentius. Constantine had known Licinius'
mind on this point since 311.
This law of Constantine was sent to Maximin accompanied
by news of the defeat of Maxentius and the capture of the city
of Rome 76, and Maximin probably guessed that the evidence
of his pact with Maxentius would have been discovered as well.
Lactantius notes Maximin's sorrow quam si ipse uictus esset 77.
Constantine's tributes given him by the Senate, viz., the
cognomen of Maximus, was also aimed at Maximin :
received from legtitimate authority the very title and
position that Maximin had arrogated to himself. That this
shot went home is seen in Maximin's violent reaction, and in his
endeavouring to counter the value of the honour of Maximus in
particular 78. This all took place before the Milan Summit
Meeting, while Constantine was still in Rome 79.
Constantine then left for Milan 80. For the moment he had
proved successful, and there was danger for Licinius that their
alliance could now be terminated. So Licinius hurried to Milan
to meet Constantine 81, to receive his reward and to assure the
alliance between them. This time a further pact was made
the two emperors and cemented by Licinius' marriage
to Constantia. Constantine now persuaded Licinius to extend
76 Lact., Mort. Pers., 44, 11-12.
" Ibid., 44, 11.
78 Ibid., 44, 12. The primi nominis titulum was doubtless that of the Senior Augustus,
with the right to place his name first on imperial laws. Maximin seems to have
this honour from Galerius. Constantine immediately used this honour (CIL
V, 8060, 8963, VI, 507). The use of such titles was a most important thing to Maximin, cf. his et.-lier behaviour (ibid. XXXII, 1-3). Constantine knew how to strike
home a telling blow.
79 Constantine was still in Rome on 18th January, 313 according to the date of
the law Cod. lust., XI, 57, 1 = Cod. Theod., XIII. 10, 1. Lawlor and Oulton,
Eusebius, II, pp. 288, 299-300 place Constantine's law after the Milan meeting, but
Nesselhauf, o.e., pp. 52-53, n. 12 shows that both Constantine's letter (which
does not record) and Maximin's to Sabinus must belong to the year 312.
80 Lact., Mort. Pers., 45, 1.
81 Ibid., 45, 1 ; Anon. Vales., 5, 13 ; Auk. Vict., Epit., 41, 4 ; Zosimus, II, 17, 2.

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183

his dominions to the east, to which his inclinations had been

leading him since 311 82. Here, one of the principal topics that
came up for discussion was that of toleration of Christianity 83.
Licinius was, of course, already predisposed towards Christianity.
Maximin now repeated his earlier trick for dealing with
decrees from the west, and conveyed a garbled report to
Sabinus of Constantine's law M. This letter is a most
document 85. Eusebius says that he was forced into
it, and gave the command unwillingly. He adds that
Maximin was generally known to be unstable and deceitful, and
so the Christians ignored it 8e. Indeed, the very ambiguousness
of this document seems to be the key to its interpretation. For
Maximin's position was, at that time, also a very ambiguous one.
It was the news of the marriage of Licinius to Constantia that
finally spurred on Maximin to attack Licinius' provinces 87.
Lactantius' language would seem to rule out the religious
for it was simply a matter of attacking while the wedding
celebrations were proceeding 88. Actually, no religious question
has been recorded as yet : Maximin, on Lactantius' showing,
must have been acting under the terms of his treaty with the now
deceased Maxentius. However, in Lactantius' understanding
of the conflict the question of power politics and religion were not
sharply divided. Perhaps, too, Maximin was hoping for a
between Constantine and Licinius, as Maxentius had done
before him. If so, the news of the alliance at Milan would have
dashed his hopes. And the two emperors were united on the
religious question. Lactantius, who has said practically nothing
82 Aur. Vict., Epit., 41, 7.
83 Eus., HE, X, 5, 4 ; Lact., Mort. Pers., 48, 2.
84 Eus., HE, IX, 9a, 1-9.
85 Cf. A. J. Mason, The Persecution of Diocletian, Cambridge, 1876, pp. 334-335 :
' In this curious letter Maximin contradicts himself often enough to make his
subjects dizzy. First he justifies bloody persecution, then plumes himself upon
having stopped it, next apologises for having set it again on foot, then denies that it
was going on, and lastly orders it to cease. We cannot wonder at what Eusebius
that the people whose wrongs the letter applauded and forbad, neither built
Church nor held meeting in public on the strength of it ; they did not know where
to have it'.
86 Eus., HE, IX, 9a, 10-11 ; cf. Lact., Mort. Pers., 37, 1.
87 Lact., Mort. Pers., 45, 2.
88 Cf. Moreau, Lactance, II, pp. 446-447.

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G. S. R. THOMAS

of Licinius' Christianophile policy since representing him as

initiator of the Edict of Sardica, now makes Maximin declare
war on Licinius as a Christian 89.
Maximin, repeating his attack of 3 1 1 , made a campaign hieme
[quam] cum maxime saeuiente and mansionibus geminatis and brought
his troops from Syria to Bithynia, crossed the Thracian Bosphorus, took Byzantium and Heraclea and beseiged Perinthus. It
was three weeks before Licinius could move against him, having
been delayed in assembling his army 90. Again the explanation
for Licinius' unreadiness is to be found in the ambivalence of
Maximin's policy.
The war that followed between Licinius and Maximin was
seen as a religious war. On 30th April, 313 the two armies met
at Campus Ergenus 91, some miles from Adrianople. Maximin
vowed to Jupiter that he would annihilate all Christians 92.
Licinius counter-moved the following night with a visitation
of an angel, who taught him the prayer to the Summus Deus, that
he was to recite followed by all the centurians and that was to
be repeated by the soldiers on the battle-field. The ceremony
was thrice repeated in full view of Maximin's army with
ostentation, and proved an immediate morale-booster 93.
While the morale of Licinius' men was high, Maximin's army
was panic-stricked 94. Maximin fled and, after half his army was
killed, the rest surrendered 95. Then, while Maximin was trying
to rally a new army in Cappadocia 96, Licinius crossed the Bos89 Lact., Mort. Pers., 46, 2 : turn Maximinus eins modi Ioui uouit, ut si uictoriam cepisset,
christianorum nomen extingueret funditusque deleret. It is obvious to whom Maximin is
alluding as he is facing the army of Licinius.
90 Ibid., 45, 2-8.
91 Ibid., 46, 9, following the emendation of H. Grgoire, Deux champs de bataille,
in Byzantion, 13 (1938), 585.
92 Cf. n. 89 supra.
93 Ibid., 46, 3-11.
94 Ibid., 46, 1-3.
96 Ibid., 46, 4-6. H. Grgoire, in calling attention to this desertion en masse of
Maximin's troops as a consequence of the Prayer, remarks that that was in sum the
strategy that was used in World War I (1914-1918), when the Russians had their
advance troops sing Czech and Polish hymns to decoy deserters {La conversion
de Constantin,'m Revue de Univ. de Bruxelles,^ (1930-1931), 260 ; repeated in Les
dans V Empire romain*, p. 87).
96 Lact., Mort. Pers., 47, 6.

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185

phorus and entered Nicomedia 97. There, on 13th June, 313

he issued his version of the Edict of Toleration, propounded by
Constan tine, and seconded by himself at Milan 98. For Lactantius
it was a victory edict.
Then there followed throughout the summer a running battle
between the two. Maximin was forced back through the passes
of Mount Taurus and settled in Tarsus ". In the autumn Maximin issued his Edict of Toleration 10. Lactantius does not
record this ; but then Eusebius does not record Licinius'
in Nicomedia, reserving it for his appendix of laws 101.
Each seems to have been content to record one law on behalf
of the Christians issued in the eastern part of the Empire,
that to be the real end of the affair. The reason behind
the promulgation of Maximin's edict is conjectural. In his
position and probably contemplating suicide 102, desire
for a come-back can be ruled out 103. Hence, it is best considered
as a formal act of capitulation, and possibly with the hope of
securing favourable terms for himself and /or his family, on the
pattern of Diocletian's capitulation to Galerius 104.
43, rue de la Concorde, Bruxelles 5.

G. S. R. THOMAS.

97 Ibid., 48, 1.
98 Ibid., 48, 2-12. O. Seeck first showed the impropriety of speaking of an 'Edict
of Milan' {Das sogenannte Edikt von Mailndern Zeitschrift fr Kirkengeschichte, 12 (1891),
381-386) . I have followed the reconstruction of events as put forth by H. Nesselhauf,
o. c.
99 Lact., Mort. Pers., 49, 1-2 ; Zosimus, II, 17 ; cf. Eus., HE, IX, 10, 6.
100 Eus., HE, IX, 10, 7-11.
101 Ibid., X, 5, 1-14.
102 Lact., Mort. Pers., 49, 2-7 is the only source to suggest that Maximin died by
suicide. Aur. Vict., Epit., 40, 8 makes it death by natural causes (morte simplici).
Others sources merely note the death and Eus., HE, IX, 10, 13-15 ; VC, 1, 58 give
further details.
103 The view of A. C. McGiffert, o. c, p. 366, n. 8. A. J. Mason, o. c, p. 236 views
it as a measure to placate the east in Maximin's favour. However, Zosimus, II, 17,
3 says he hoped to be able to get away from Tarsus to Egypt, and the frenzied picture
that we have of Maximin during these last days would suggest that he knew that
time had run out for him.
104 Maximin has made his last edict explicitely straight-forward as Eusebius
recognized {HE, IX, 10, 6). He had realized that the days when ambivalence was
a useful ploy were over. Nevertheless, to the very end he tried to capitalize on the
ambivalence of his earlier statements (Lact., Mort. Pers., 49, 6).