The French established its colony in Southeast Asia, French Indochina, in the late 19th

century. The colony was established under a plantation style complex, where a small population
controlled the land and charged rent in exchange for farming rights. There was dissatisfaction
with the French system but little could be done until World War Two.
The Battle of France saw the Nazis defeating the French and the formation of the
collaborationist Vichy government. French Indochina remained nominally under Vichy rule but
Japan, which was also allied with the Germans, actually controlled the area. The fact that the
Japanese controlled Indochina was a significant moment in Vietnamese history. The French
defeat signaled to the Vietnamese nationalists that Europeans were not all powerful and that they
could be defeated militarily. The Japanese were not better masters than the French, pushing the
Vietnamese people even harder to support the war in China. The dissatisfaction with colonization
created several nationalist movements that sought independence for Vietnam.
By the end of the war, the Japanese were being forced out of Vietnam. The Japanese,
wanting to create difficulties for the French, armed Ho Chi Minhs Marxist Nationalists, the Viet
Minh. The nationalists desire to create an independent republic clashed with the French desire to
retain Indochina, as a colony. With British and Indian support, the French attacked Vietnam in an
attempt to regain its colony. The French government observed the anti-colonial sentiment in
Vietnam and created a rival government, the State of Vietnam, to oppose Ho Chi Minh. The Vit
Minh refused to accept French rule and began the First Indochina war in December of 1946.
The Vietnamese fought the French, and later the Americans, to improve their lives.
According to Jeffrey Race, out of the almost forty thousand families in Long An, over threefourths of the province lived and farmed on lands that were rented. Roughly ten percent of the
province lived on lands that were partially rented. Only ten percent of the province lived on land

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they owned completely. Long An was an area considered to be under Viet Cong control in 1966.
Even assuming that the war changed the financial situation of many of the provinces population,
the high number (88.69%) of families that lived on land that was at least partially rented showed
the economical struggle many Vietnamese lived through. Youngs findings match Races, with
Young writing that the overwhelming majority of the farming population owned little or no
land, subsisting as tenants paying rents of 50 percent or better of the estimated yield (56-57).
High rents and poor harvests only served to worsen the struggles many Vietnamese faced.
Financial improvement in a country like Vietnam would only come through
redistribution of land to the peasants. Economic changes on this scale would not occur under the
French, who implemented the plantation system and could only lose from the reforms. The
French only saw the conflict as an attempt to reestablish their colony. Because of this, there was
a morale gap between the two groups.
European strategy was another issue, the French planned to control the roadways and
create defensible outposts. Using these outposts, the French could hunt down the Communists
and return to a fortified location before a counter attack. While this strategy may work in a
standard war; with an insurgency like the Viet Minh, more was needed. The French failed to
establish a viable government to counter Ho Chi Minh. They had Bao Dai but he was seen as too
French to appeal to the Vietnamese. This government failed to explain to the Vietnamese people
why they would remain with the French or remove the inventive to join Ho Chi Minh.
The French strategy in Vietnam flawed. To supplement their forces, they attempted to
create a local army. This strategy may have worked previously, but not Vietnam. In any army
recruitment push, the people most likely to be targeted are the lower class. They would be given
work and a steady wage in the army. In Vietnam, the lower class was anti-French because of the

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colonial policies and Ho Chi Minhs promises of reform. The attempt to create a pro-French
Vietnamese army is puzzling because few Vietnamese supported the French. Those who did
support the French were likely the large landowners who prospered under French rule but the
rich dont join armies.
The French commanders did not seem to understand that the Viet Minh had the initiative.
Strong popular support meant that Viet Minh could easily take advantage of French weakness. In
response, the official French strategy was to create their outposts and hunt down the Viet Minh.
The issue is that, in addition to hunting down the individual cells, the French attempted to
provoke conventional, European-style battle where the two armies would face off and French
firepower would win. But because the Viet Minh had the initiative, there was no way they would
allow for such a battle unless they knew they could win. The French failed in Vietnam because
of their contradictory policies of battle, both looking for a large scale battle and hunting down
individuals, was impossible. Local support for the Viet Minh meant that they could hide in plain
sight. The French wanted to have a repeat of Austerlitz, but Vietnam was not the place for it.
A large part of the peasant population sympathized with the Viet Minh, giving the
communists control over the countryside. In China, Mao Tse-tung forced Chiang Kai-shek out of
power and established a communist state. Communist China and Russia both provided aid to the
Viet Minh. Foreign aid, in the form of loans and captured weaponry, strengthened Ho Chi Minh.
America supported the French war effort because of the threat of a communist Southeast Asia.
Despite anti-colonial policies, America would finance 80% of the French war effort in Vietnam.
American support was not enough to cover the French tactical blunders. Not only did the French
fail to implement proper counter insurgency strategies; Dien Bien Phu, the battle that forced the
French out of Vietnam, was lost due to a series of miscalculations.

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Dien Bien Phu was the site of a French base surrounded by mountains, too remote for
quick resupply by air. Worse, the French general underestimated the Viet Minhs capabilities.
Navarre thought the mountains would provide cover from enemy artillery; instead, the Viet Minh
were able to sneak weapons through the passes and pound the French base. Young writes that in
preparation for the battle, 200,000 peasants hacked trails and moved supplies as far as 500 miles
to the battlefront. They laid hundreds of miles of roads, (31). The Viet Minhs ability to gather
support for its cause is what won the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The mobilization of the peasant
population allowed the Viet Minh to gain the upper hand and defeat the French forces. The
terrain may have been impossible to navigate for the 13,000 French troops or even the Viet Minh
but Navarre did not count on the local population aiding the Viet Minh. Dien Bien Phu was
revolutionary because of how it was fought. Young writes that [o]n the basis of a nationalist
appeal that was at the same time revolutionary, the government of Vietnam had organized and
inspired a poor, untrained, ill-equipped population to fight and ultimately win against a far better
equipped and trained army, (35). It was this nationalist appeal that won Dien Bien Phu and it is
the inability of the French or the Americans to create their own appeal that lost them the war.
American involvement from 1946 to until the French defeat was largely hands off. As
mentioned previously, Vietnam was seen as a domino, a country whose fall to Communism
would affect the rest of the area. Because of this, America lent money to French efforts to
reclaim the area. Despite the American dislike of colonies and imperialism, a French Indochina
was seen as the better alternative to a Communist Indochina. But despite American fears of
Communism, the Truman administration did not send troops to the area, likely because the
country was worn out from World War Two and Korea. When the French military situation

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turned bleak, the Eisenhower administration would offer to send troops, with some hawks
advocating the use of atomic weaponry.
After the Geneva Accords and the partition of Vietnam, the American government
expanded its influence in South Vietnam. The Americans understood from their time in the
Philippines that a strong leader would be necessary in Vietnam to keep American interests safe,
(meaning to keep South Vietnam anti-communist). The Americans relied on Ramon Magsaysay,
a charismatic politician attuned to the skillful public relations advice offered by the US,
(Young 43). Magsaysay put American money to good use and enacted reforms to gain public
support. The Emperor was not that person because he was too French, preferring to remain in
Cannes, and reminded the Vietnamese of colonization. Vietnams Magsaysay, the Americans
decided would be the prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem.
To aid Diem, entire parishes of Catholics were carried south in American ships and
encouraged by Catholic hierarchy, (Young 45). These one million Catholics would serve as
an imported political resource for Diem, a substantial and dependent bloc of loyal supporters
(Young 45). The imported resource that Young writes about would prove unnecessary in the
governmental election. Despite the Americans advising against outright fraud, Diem still was
given many positive suggestions (Young 53). Diem had an overwhelming victory with 98.2
percent of the vote. In Saigon, out of a total of 450,000 registered voters, an astonishing 605.025
voted for Diem, (Young 53). Ho Chi Minh was not on the ballot.
Despite Americas democratic ideals, the Eisenhower administration supported Diem.
While Diem did come to power via undemocratic means, Diem was crucial to American policy
because of his anti-Communism. The Americans needed someone in power who would be
against Ho Chi Minh and the North. South Vietnam was so important to the Americans because

Hoss 6

it was supposed to be a defense against Communism. According to American policy makers, if

Vietnam became communist, it was thought that the rest of Indochina would become communist
as well. Communist Indochina would be allied with the Soviet Union and would threaten US
interests in South Korea, Japan and the Pacific. As Young notes, for the US, Vietnam was a
domino whose fall would turn the Pacific into a Soviet lake, denying raw materials to the
United States and its allies, (29).
Diems power base within South Vietnam were the Catholics (including those who were
moved south after partition), the wealthy landowners (who could lose everything in a Communist
dominated society), and his family. One brother, Ngo Dinh Can was the governor of Hue, Ngo
Dinh Thuc became a Catholic archbishop and Ngo Dinh Nhu became cofounder of the Can lao
party. While Thucs archbishopric was important, it meant that Diem would always have
someone loyal in power among the Catholics, Nhus appointment was perhaps the most
important. As Young notes, Nhu was Diems principal adviser (47). The Can Lao party that
the two brothers founded allowed Diem to exercise control over the police, the officer corps of
the army, and the civil bureaucracy, (Young 47-48).
Diems religiosity would cause problems from the beginning of his rule. Devout
Catholics, Diem and Nhu would repress the majority Buddhist population of South Vietnam. The
reason for the repression may have been religious differences or because Diem did not want the
Buddhists to oppose him. Regardless of the reason, Diems religious policies would have a major
impact on his rule. His treatment of the Buddhists would cause unrest to grow until June 1963. A
monk, Thich Quang Duc, self-immolated in a public square. Madame Nhu, the wife of Diems
younger brother, called the event a barbeque, (Young 96). The monks suicide and Nhus
disregard for the situation demonstrated to the US government that the Nhus had to be removed

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from power and Diem needed to stop the persecution to gain the support of the population. Diem
failed to do this. Despite this failure, the US government was reluctant to remove him because he
was the American-backed strongman in the area. American reluctance to remove Diem vanished
when Diem signaled he was willing to negotiate with the North Vietnamese. Diem had
inadvertently signed his own execution order. As Young notes, the one condition that had made
Diem so attractive-that he was a Vietnamese nationalist who could be counted on to never cut a
deal with Hanoi, was forfeit, (97). Diems willingness to negotiate was likely a ploy to show the
population that he was not an American puppet, as his enemies alleged. Diem would not
negotiate with Hanoi because Hanois terms were that American troops withdrew and
negotiations were followed by a freely elected government in the South, (Young 97). If Diem
was serious about negotiations, he would be removing himself from power. Keeping himself in
power and American aid flowing was the entire purpose of his government. This makes it
unlikely that Diem was sincere about negotiations. But for whatever reason, Diem gave America
the wrong signal and was assassinated by the South Vietnamese military in a CIA backed coup.
The American role between the French defeat and Diems death was an expanded version
of its role. The American government provided Diem with money and advisors to stabilize his
rule. But Diems and the Kennedy administrations view on stability differed. Kennedy wanted
South Vietnam to create a modern reformist government, something Diem could not do. Diems
inability stems from the fact that he came into power through electoral fraud and held onto his
power through the use of a secret police. In any sense of the word, Diem was a dictator. If Diem
acquiesced to the American desire for a reformist state that allowed fair elections, Diem would
be forcing himself out of office and would likely turn South Vietnam over to Ho Chi Minh.
Diem had a different idea for government than the Americans. He came into power

Hoss 8

through authoritarian means and wished to stay in power. Staying in power entailed the use of
secret police and repressing those who spoke out against the government but this was only how
he stayed in power, not why. Diems strategy both in the war and his government was to do
anything to keep the Americans in the area and to keep American money flowing. The
contradictory aims of the Americans and Diem only complicated the war.
The complications and contradictions between the Americans and South Vietnamese
were seen at the battle of Ap Bac. A group of American soldiers went to the village of Ap Bac
because of radio intelligence showed that members of the National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam, a South Vietnamese resistance group that supported by the North Vietnamese
and fought against the South Vietnamese government. The number of NLF or Viet Cong soldiers
in the village was believed to be small and a force of Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops
was sent to put an end to the threat. Once there, the ARVN troops could not break the NLF
defenses. ARVN reinforcements were brought in with American helicopters, but the ARVN
troops and American airmen were quickly pinned down. The American advisors had pleased
with their ARVN collegues to persue a more offensive strategy but the ARVN refused, (Young
90). The fighting continued until the NLF pulled out at nightfall. Not only had the NLF won a
victory against the ARVN, the reluctance of ARVN leaders to follow American orders made it
clear to American advisors that the ARVN could not be counted on to fight.
President Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963 and Lyndon Johnson became
president. Kennedy had been a member of the American Friends of Vietnam, which wanted to
build bonds between America and Vietnam and was responsible for bring Diem to Americas
attention, before becoming president. Johnson had a different focus. Johnsons interest in
Vietnam was similar to Diems, a holding action instead of pushing for victory. Johnson was

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more interested in implementing his social program, the Great Society, instead of the conflict in
Vietnam. The only thing that kept him from pulling out of Vietnam was the Republican Party.
Ever since Mao Tse-tungs rise to power in China, and the Republican attacks on Truman for this
event, Democrats have feared being seen as weak on foreign policy. The fear of Republican
attacks was very real. Republicans watched Kennedys negotiations on Laos carefully, ready to
pounce should the Democrats lose Southeast Asia as they had lost China, (Young 78).
Effectively, Johnson was stuck. If he committed the entire military, China and Russia would
intervene in Vietnam. China had an army that was capable of taking on the entire NATO force in
Korea and Russia had nuclear weapons. If he pulled out, Republicans would attack him for
losing Vietnam. Johnson could not go all in or pull out, forcing him to take the middle road.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident changed the political reality in America. On August 2, the USS
Maddox engaged came under fire in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam. At the
end of the battle, the Maddox and one aircraft suffered slight damage, there were no American
casualties. Two days later, the Maddox and USS Turner Joy came under attack in the same area.
Shortly after, the Maddoxs captain informed Washington that the second attack may not have
occurred, that the two ships were firing at ghosts on their radar. James Stockdale recalls there
were no boat wakes, no ricochets off boats (Young 118). Despite this, two attacks were
reported to Congress, which passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The resolution gave Johnson
the ability to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
United States and would only expire when the president had determined that peace and
security had returned to the area, (Young 119) The open ended wording of the resolution
expanded Johnsons powers, authorizing him to send troops to Vietnam without declaring war.
The first American troops arrived in March 1965. At the end of 1964, 23,000 Americans

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were in South Vietnam and the surrounding area; patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin and the South
China Sea, piloting helicopters, and serving as military advisors to the South Vietnamese. Even
without the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, American troops would have been sent to South
Vietnam. Ap Bac had proven that the ARVN could not be trusted to fight and the US had already
given so much money to the South Vietnamese and had so much to lose if Vietnam became
communist. By sending troops into Vietnam, Johnson had subscribed to the fallacy of sunken
costs; money was already invested in Vietnam, which made him reluctant to pull out. Instead, he
escalated the American involvement, hoping to get a return for his money.
The military that arrived in Vietnam had been preparing for battle with the USSR. Since
VJ Day, military training largely focused on tank and artillery style warfare. Korea fit the mold
and reinforced the focus on a conventional style war. But the US government had failed to learn
from the French failure in Vietnam. The French also tried to force large scale battle and were
unprepared for the guerilla warfare used by the Viet Minh. To defeat the North Vietnamese,
America would have to prevent the PAVN from entering South Vietnam, kill every Viet Cong
and PAVN soldier and bomb Hanoi, much like America did Japan. The American military
adapted new technology to its concept of war, creating the airmobile concept. Soldiers would go
into suspected NLF areas, hoping to provoke a fight. Once the enemy was drawn out into the
open, bombers and artillery would open fire. Once the area was clear, the troops would load into
a helicopter and fly to the next area, repeating the process.
The Battle of Ia Drang demonstrated the effectiveness of this strategy. After landing
troops at LZ X-Ray, American troops were under fire. The Americans held out for two days,
supported by bombers, close air support and artillery. After two days at landing zone X-Ray, the
North Vietnamese pull back and the Americans moved to landing zone Albany. There they were

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ambushed by the PAVN. Again, the Americans had air support but the close combat made
napalm drops dangerous. The battle ended on November 18th, four days after the landing at XRay. Despite heavy casualties, the PAVN had learned an important lesson. Bombs and Napalm
could not be dropped if the Americans were engaged in close combat. At Ia Drang, the American
military believed it had codified its battle tactics. American military leaders sought to conduct a
battle of attrition against Hanoi, killing enough men so that the political will to fight would
disappear. To do this, American forces would need to maintain a favorable kill ratio while
engaging the NLF and PAVN in combat; because the ARVN lost the Americans confidence at
Ap Bac, the ARVN would focus on counterinsurgency, finding and capturing NLF fighters while
the Americans focused on the larger war.
The problem with the war of attrition was the lopsided political nature of the combatants.
American was fighting in Vietnam but also focusing on containing Communism elsewhere in the
world. This meant that not all troops and political resources could be brought to Vietnam or other
interests would suffer. President Johnson knew that American will to fight would collapse if the
war disrupted the American way of life. To that end he refused to call up the reserves. The NLF
and PAVN would not lose their will to fight because the fight was for their very existence as a
unified state. Living in a democracy, Johnson had to worry about the political consequences of
his actions; Ho Chi Minh did not.
Another part of the political consequences of Vietnam was Americas standing globally.
Because America was at war with Communism, to appear weak would drive unaligned countries
to the Soviets. Looking at Vietnam as a reflection of American resolve, the outcome becomes
unimportant. But if America was defeated in Vietnam, this would affect its global credibility and
its military strength. It would look like even the American military could be defeated by any

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group, much less the Russians.

Even though the ARVN was responsible for counterinsurgency, the American
government still had theories on how it should be conducted. Americas theories showed its lack
of understanding of the political situation in Vietnam. Counterinsurgency was two-pronged, to
deal with the population supporting the NLF and to deal with the NLF. By either changing the
mind of the South Vietnamese peasants or separating them from the NLF, the NLF would be out
in the open. The South Vietnamese government implemented the strategic hamlet program in
1961 to bring the population into areas controlled by the government. This would drain the sea
and make the NLF easy to find. Once relocated to the hamlets, modernization would provide
sanitation and education services to the population. The failure of this strategy is that the NLF
was not some foreign force but made up of regular Vietnamese peasants. There was no way of
knowing if the peasants moved to the hamlet were NLF or not. Counterinsurgency agents could
look for certain suspicious items like black clothing, because the dark color was no good for
working in the sun and therefore only worn by NLF, (Young 174). They could also rely on
intelligence but this was often used for intimidation or vendettas, . The improvements that the
government was supposed to provide were not an incentive for government support either. The
new schools or wells would exist remain under Communist control but the land reform promised
by the Communists would not occur unless the government and the US were defeated. Because
of this, the ARVN embarked on a campaign of terror, to frighten the population from supporting
the NLF. Young details how American and ARVN troops committed atrocities like My Lai,
where a platoon of soldiers cold-bloodedly killed virtually the entire population of a village in
retaliation for Tet, (243). The massacre may have been a result of the stresses of war and the
disillusionment of the troops towards the war, but My Lai was commonplace, (Young 243).

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The random death and destruction only served to push the peasants towards the NLF. As Young
notes, the increase in bombings only increased the peoples will to defeat America.
The policy towards the NLF shared the same flaws as the policy towards the peasants.
Because the NLF was made of ordinary people, they were difficult to hunt down. The support
they enjoyed with the peasant population meant that they could slip in and out without the
government being notified. The American government did help with this through its combat
operations and its attempt to keep a favorable body count in the war of attrition but, as mentioned
before, the Americans war effort could not reach full strength without political ramifications.
The US did not try to send men into North Vietnam to assassinate Ho Chi Minh, but this may not
have mattered. When Ho died, years later, the movement did not fall apart. Hos death at
American hands likely would not have ended the war; in fact it could have made it worse by
making Ho a political martyr.
The counterinsurgency policies were failures by Washington and Saigon. The US
government looked at all parts of the Vietnam War through eyes searching for Communism.
Instead of realizing that the issue in Vietnam was the economy and land reform, American policy
makers thought that the issue was Communist influence. President Johnson was insistent that
Communist governments were financing the student protests, failing to understand that the
protests were purely homegrown, (Young 153). Seeing everything as Cold War related meant
that the American government applied the wrong strategy to the war. Since Communism offered
the Vietnamese a better life, they supported Communism. Reeducation would not be successful
if supporting the Saigon government meant a return to the miserable way of life.
The Saigon government could not enact the land reform the peasants wanted because the
displaced landowners were its political base. The solution would be to create a new government,

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with the peasants as its political base. But if the hypothetical government answered to the people
and the majority of the people favored reunification with the North, the US would have created a
government that lost it the war. That failure would have tremendous consequences on American
standing globally. Because of this, Americas only option in Vietnam was to fight the war out.
The Tet Offensive changed the war. The offensive occurred during a cease-fire for the
Vietnamese lunar New Year, Tet. On January 30, NLF and PAVN troops launched attacks
against over a hundred towns and cities. American and ARVN troops thought that the cease-fire
would be honored and were caught off-guard. Enemy troops were able to get deep into provincial
capitals, and were even able to enter the American embassy in Saigon before being repelled.
The American counter attack decimated the NLF and regained control of the contested
cities. Despite failing to overthrow the government or provoke an uprising, Tet did have
important ramifications for the war. Young writes that the Chinese section of Saigon, the
heavily fortified American embassy, the imperial city of Hue, places that should have been
secure, were engulfed in battle, (217). The images not only showed the American people the
full extent of the war but it also showed that America was not as in control as Washington said.
Even though the attacks were defeated, the American people grew more disillusioned with what
the government was saying about the war. Despite massive losses that knocked the NLF out of
the war, Tet succeeded in turning the conflict over to the North Vietnamese.
The final stage in the American conflict was Vietnamization. Under President Nixon and
General Abrams, the ARVN began taking over the war while American forces pulled out. The
defeat of the NLF during Tet removed it from the conflict. This meant that only the PAVN
remained and the PAVN was a conventional military. The ARVNs success rate increased,
largely because the ARVN was trained to fight a conventional war by the US. This new phase of

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the war also saw incursions into Laos and Cambodia to destroy NLF and PAVN hideouts.
Vietnamization gave America the opening it needed to leave Vietnam. By 1972, troop
levels were at pre-Tonkin levels. These decreases were matched by increases in bombing in
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The bombing campaigns were meant to convince North Vietnam
to come to the peace table on Americas terms. The gesture worked, with a treaty signed and
American troops out of Vietnam on March 29, 1973.
Constraints on American policy makers changed from 1945 to 1975. The basic issue, do
not provoke China or Russia was constant. That was one the reason nuclear bombs were not used
to stop the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu. The Soviets had created their own nuclear weapons in
1949 and if America was not careful, a nuclear war would break out. Chinas large army was
originally a factor in American policy but after the breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations, North
Vietnam stayed with Russia. The American people were another constraint. Eisenhower did not
want to send troops to Vietnam because the population was still absorbing the shock of Korean
War dead and the inconclusiveness of the outcome, (Young 34). As Johnson and Nixon would
come to realize, the American people did not care about wars abroad unless it affected America.
When Johnson sent troops into Vietnam, he had to weigh his options. Young details Johnsons
dilemma, the remaining questions where no longer whether to send troops, but how many? So
many that the reserve would have to be called up? Congress asked for new taxes? (158). The
quickest way to turn the American people against a war is to have it impact their lives. Johnson
knew this and if he forced hardships on the American people, they would turn against him and
cost him his reelection. Tonkin changed the situation and the war had a high level of support in
1965 and 1966, but support began dropping immediately, never reaching over 50% after 1967.
Negative publicity from Tet and university protests like Kent State only lowered the approval.

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As Young notes, in 1967, Vietnam was costing $20 billion per year, and in August a 10 percent
surchase on individual and corporate taxes ended the illusion that the economy could painlessly
supply both guns and butter. The tax increase was immediately reflected in Gallup and Harris
Poll results, (210-211). As soon as the American people began being impacted, the polls
changed. At the same time, American demands to Hanoi changed from insisting all infiltration
stop before a bombing halt to saying America was willing to stop all bombardment of North
Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion (Young 211). The shift to a
softer stance with room for interpretation shows the effect of public opinion on Washington.
With the withdrawal of American troops, the South Vietnamese government was left with
no backing. The Saigon government had relied on American aid to survive, as far back as Diem.
Without the aid and employment by the military, the government faced 40 percent
unemployment and food shortages, (Young 290). The Saigon government lacked the support of
the people and when the government collapsed after the North Vietnamese attack. Without aid,
the country could not have survived.
Despite a successful treaty, America failed in its goals in Vietnam. American
involvement in Vietnam was meant to stop a Communist takeover of the area. By 1975, Saigon
had fallen and Vietnam became fully Communist. In addition, Laos and Cambodia also had
Communist governments. As to whether America kept its global standing after the war, that is
debatable. In the aftermath of Vietnam, America would not go to war unilaterally again until
Iraq. The student protests and the governments heavy handed response to them weakened the
image of the presidency in America. Worse, America spent years, millions of dollars and lost
thousands of lives to bring no change to Vietnam. This fact makes America seem just as weak as
the government feared.