EQUAL PROTECTION

Art. XIII, Sec. 1 and 2 (social justice)

(1) The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.
(2) The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Id., Sec. 3 (protection to labor)
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to
expansion and growth.
Art. XII, Sec. 10 (nationalization of business)
The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the
economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
ID., Sec. 2, par. 2 (reservation of marine resources)
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in
its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Art. II, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts)
The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (legal aid to poor)

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
Art. IX-C, Sec. 10 (protection of candidates)
Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimination.
Art. II, Sec. 26 (public service)
The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
Art. II, Sec. 14 (equality of women and men)
The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men.
Sexual Discrimination
PASEI vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension
of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household
Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination
against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power.
- COURT: Police power consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster
the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," but it does not thereby make
an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is wellsettled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the
preference for female workers rests on substantial
distinctions.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is
germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department
Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female

overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the

midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have
suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their
own good and welfare.
Administration of Justice
People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
Amado V. Hernandez accused of the crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, arsons and robberies.
The prosecution maintained that Hernandez is charged
with rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and
robberies, for which the capital punishment may be
imposed. The defense contends, among other things, that
rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or
robbery. The lower court sentenced Hernandez merely
to life imprisonment. A petition for bail was filed by
Amado Hernandez on 28 December 1953, which was
denied by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated 2
February 1954. A similar petition for bail was filed by
Hernandez on 26 June 1954 and renewed on 22 December
1955
- COURT: Murders, arsons and robberies described therein
are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" for
the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the
crime charged in the amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies. In conformity with
the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant
may be allowed bail
People vs. Isinain, 85 Phil. 648 (1950)
- Theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is
to encourage and protect the development of the coconut
industry as one of the sources of the national economy.
Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision
is unobstructed, coconut groves cannot be efficiently
watched because of the nature of the growth of coconut
trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind
of property, it will be the favorite resort of thieves
Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. 130716, December 9, 1998
Facts: Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former
government official who initiated the prosecution of the
Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated
plunder of the public treasury and the systematic
subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what
impelled him to bring the action were several news
reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in
September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of
billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
share these assets. Chavez, invoking his constitutional
right to information and the correlative duty of the state
to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the
national interest, demands that the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) make public
any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.
He claimed that any compromise on the alleged billions of

ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public

interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the
country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to
the national interest of the Filipino people. PCGG claimed
Chavezs action is premature as he has not asked the
PCGG to disclose the negotiations and agreements and
that the proposed terms of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding. They further aver that the
Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to
the Sandiganbayan for its approval, which the Republic
has opposed as it has not been ratified nor submitted to
the President for approval; and that the Marcos heirs have
failed to comply with the undertakings, particularly the
collation and submission of an inventory of their assets.
On 19 August 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all
surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a Motion for
Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in
Intervention. They aver that they are "among the 10,000
claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family
and/or the Marcos Estate is recognized by the decision in
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation,
Maximo Hilao, et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U .S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis 14796,
June 16, 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme
Court of December 10, 1997"; and as such, they claim to
have personal and direct interest in the subject matter of
the case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcos
properties may adversely affect their legitimate
claims. In a minute Resolution issued on 24 August 1998,
the Court granted their motion to intervene.
Issue: Whether the civil and criminal liabilities of the
Marcoses may be compromised, as embodied in the
General and Supplemental Agreements between the
PCGG and the Marcoses.
Held: In general, the law encourages compromises in civil
cases, except with regard to the following matters:
(1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage
or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation,
(4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6)
future legitime. And like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy or public order. A
compromise is binding and has the force of law between
the parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated
such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the
settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter
instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the
courts. In the absence of an express prohibition, the rule
on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is
applicable to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to the
objectives of Executive Order (EO) 14, particularly the just
and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
so that it may be used to hasten economic recovery.
However, any compromise relating to the civil liability
arising from an offense does not automatically terminate
the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the
criminal liability of the malefactor. While a compromise in
civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is
no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability.
The authority must be specifically conferred. The

power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG

by Section 5 of EO 14, as amended by EO 14-A.
From the wording of the law, however, it can be easily
deduced that the person referred to is a witness in the
proceeding, not the principal respondent, defendant or
accused. Herein, the General and Supplemental
Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs have
serious legal flaws. First, the Agreements do not
conform to the above requirements of EO 14 and 14-A.
Criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted
to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the
spate of ill-gotten wealth cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Second, under Item 2 of the General
Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all
forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos
heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution.
The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in
the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local
legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to
grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its
authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Third,
the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of
all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the
Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct
encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to
criminal jurisdiction. Once a case has been filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its
dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion
and control of the judge, once jurisdiction is acquired by
the trial court. The PCGG, as the government
prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee
the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the
Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not
within its sole power and discretion. Fourth, the
government also waives all claims and counterclaims,
"whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate,"
against the Marcoses. Again, this all-encompassing
stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an
action for future fraud may not be waived. The stipulation
in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope
of future claims against the Marcoses that the
government thereby relinquishes. This is a palpable
violation of
the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses
beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous
precedent for public accountability. It is a virtual warrant
for public officials to amass public funds illegally, since
there is an open option to compromise their liability
in exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth.
Fifth, the Agreements do not provide for a definite or
determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill
their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime
before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total
assets. Sixth, the Agreements do not state with
specificity the standards for determining which assets
shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be
retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental
Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to
25% of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government
recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement

pertains only to the said deposits. No similar splitting

scheme is defined with respect to the other properties.
Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a
statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.
Finally, the absence of then President Ramos' approval of
the principal Agreement, and express condition
therein, renders the compromise incomplete and
unenforceable. Nevertheless, even if such approval were
obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982)
- Assailing Presidential Decree creating sandiganbayan
- The constitution specifically makes mention of the
creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in
response to a problem, i.e. dishonesty in the public
service, the urgency of which cannot be denied. It follows
that those who may thereafter be tried by such court
ought to have been aware as far back as 17 January 1973,
when the present Constitution came into force, that a
different procedure for the accused therein, whether
petitioner is a private citizen or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
- Substantive difference between public officials and
private individuals
Gallardo v. People, G.R. 142030, April 21, 2005
- Public health workers not paid by City
Public Policy
Central Bank Employees Assoc. v. BSP, G.R. No.
148208,
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank
Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the earlier
Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a
petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last
proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which
pertains to establishment of a Human resource
management system and a compensation structure as
part of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees
whose positions fall under SG 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates in the salary standardization
act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not
reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection
clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994
rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other
hand contends that the provision does not violate the
equal protection clause, provided that it is construed
together with other provisions of the same law such as the
fiscal and administrative autonomy of the Bangko
Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The
Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary
defends the provision, that the classification of employees
is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres
to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and
excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and
policies of the government.

Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA

7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence
unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate
on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it
distinguishes between economic class and status with the
higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above
the law than those of mandated by the Salary
Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher
wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the
former are not covered by the salary standardization act
as provided by the proviso.
PNB v. Palma, G.R. 157279, August 9, 2005
This Court has consistently held in those cases that
allowances or fringe benefits, whether or not integrated
into the standardized salaries prescribed by RA 6758,
should continue to be enjoyed by employees who (1) were
incumbents and (2) were receiving those benefits as of
July 1, 1989.
In the present case, the payment of benefits to employees
hired after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because
the law clearly mandated that those benefits should be
reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying
them before its enactment. Withholding them from the
others ensured that the compensation of the incumbents
would not be diminished in the course of the latters
continued employment with the government agency.
Unido vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17 (1981)
- 1973 Constitutional Amendment; television airtime
- Substantial distinction between Head of State and
opposition
- Head of State is subject to accountability; capacity as the
president of the Philippines and as Prime Minister
PJA vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993)
Frank Mail - The SC ruled that there is a violation of the
equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking
privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to
that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys
franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in
contending that the removal of the franking privilege from
the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is
untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut
expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the
judiciary, then they should have removed the franking
privilege all at once from all the other departments.
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700 (1995)
Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the
fact that he issued a permit in favor of the unidentified
Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere
expedient of an executive order, whereas so many
requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be
granted the same permit. Worse, Olivarez failed to show,
in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection,
that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran based vendors'
associations were not similarly situated as to give at least
a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which
said executive order was issued.

Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20,

1999
The EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection clause;
neither is it discriminatory. The fundamental right of equal
protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification.
The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not
unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. It was based,
rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were
germane to the legislative purpose. There are substantial
differences between the big investors who are being lured
to establish and operate their industries in the so-called
"secured area" and the present business operators
outside the area
Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torres, G.R. 132527, July 29, 2005
- Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent
Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary from
allowing other private respondents to continue with the
operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare
Republic Act No. 7227 as unconstitutional on the ground
that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of
raw materials, capital and equipment
- There is a substantial distinctions lying between the
establishments inside and outside the zone. There are
substantial differences in a sense that, investors will be
lured to establish and operate their industries in the socalled secured area and the present business operators
outside the area. There is, then, hardly any reasonable
basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives
accorded in R.A. 7227.
ISAE v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
If an employer accords employees the same position and
rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one employee less than
the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why the others receive more. That would
be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain
why the employee is treated unfairly. Herein, the
International School has failed to discharge this burden.
There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which
they perform under similar working conditions. The School
cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave
their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates
without violating the principle of equal work for equal
pay. The point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreign-hires and localhires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to
foreign-hires contravenes public policy
PHILRECA vs. DILG, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003
- Philippine Rural Electric Cooperative Association Inc.

- There is reasonable classification under the Local

Government Code to justify the different tax treatment
between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as
amended, and electric cooperatives under RA 6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines)
- First, nowhere in PD 269, as amended, does it require
cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital.
Under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation
of a cooperative applying for registration must be
accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers
and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the
subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized
share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of the
total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the
paid-up share capital be less than P2,000.00.
- Second, another principle adhered to by the Cooperative
Code is the principle of subsidiarity.