Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 103

CASE TITLE

RONQUILLO VS. CEZAR

RADJAE VS ALOVERA
BOLIVAR VS SIMBOL
ABRIGAR VS PAZ

STATUTORY BASIS

MORENO VS ARANETA

SORIANO VS DIZON

DEL ROSARIO

DEL ROSARIO

DONTON VS TANSINGCO

CANON 1.01

DULALIA VS CRUZ

DIRECTOR VS BAYOT

LINSANGAN VS TOLENTINO

PACANA VS LOPEZ

KHAN VS SIMBILIO

DACANAY VS MCKENZIE

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS VS BAYOT

TAGORADA

ULEP VS CLINIC

DE ROY VS CA

ABAD VS BLEZA

ABAD VS BLEZA

PLOT

FACTS:

Atty. Homobono t. Cezar entered into a Deed of Assignment for the


price of P1.5M in favor of Marili C. Ronquillo, a Filipino citizen residing in
Cannes, France his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot and
obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell
he executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer

Respondent received P750,000.00 u pon execution of the Deed of


Assignment and was able to encash the first check of P187,500.00

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia


that respondent has not paid in full the price of the townhouse and he also
failed to deliver a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with
Crown Asia.
o Complainant ordered stop payment on the second check of P187,500.00

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his
indebtedness which amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored.
It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is closed.
Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission
recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C.
Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court pursuant
to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the
Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The
Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of
estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Facts:
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on
the grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude,
and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend
himself (treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang
driver, binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril.
Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to
the victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)

The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the fiscal of


the City of Manila, dealing with the case of Felipe del Rosario, has been laid
before the court for consideration and action. It is recommended by the city
fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of
attorney and that he be forever prohibited from taking the bar
examination. An answer to the report has been permitted to be made, in
which the court is asked to disapprove the report and to direct the setting
aside of the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore
ordered by the court.
Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the
second time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar
examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain the required rating.
Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the
revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the
computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this
motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices
dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar
examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken
up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court
and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was
sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion
of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.
The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to
these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity
from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great
deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the
falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.
Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del
Rosario has no legal right to his attorneys certificate. While to admit Felipe
del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a
declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce.
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a

which the court is asked to disapprove the report and to direct the setting
aside of the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore
ordered by the court.
Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the
second time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar
examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain the required rating.
Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the
revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the
computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this
motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices
dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar
examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken
up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court
and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was
sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion
of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.
The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to
these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity
from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great
deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the
falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.
Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del
Rosario has no legal right to his attorneys certificate. While to admit Felipe
del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a
declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce.
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of
its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly
authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex
rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas [1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas.,
886 and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall
[1882], 107 U. S., 265.)
The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe
del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days from receipt of
notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorneys certificate to the clerk
of this court.

declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce.


The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of
its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly
authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex
rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas [1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas.,
886 and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall
[1882], 107 U. S., 265.)
The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe
del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days from receipt of
notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorneys certificate to the clerk
of this court.

Facts: The respondent attorney prepared an Occupancy Agreement


recognizing the ownership of a house and lot of Mr. Duane O. Stier, an
American citizen disqualified to own land in the Philippines, despite the
transfer of title in the name of Peter Donton, a Filipino citizen.

Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in the
Municipal Government to build a high rise building in Bulacan. The permit
was not released due to the opposition of Atty. Cruz who sent aletter to the
Municipal Engineers office, claiming that the building impedes the airspace
of their property which is adjacent to the Dulalias property. Juan Dulalia
(Juan) filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo Cruz (Cruz) for
immoral conduct.
Juan also claimed that Cruzs illicit relationship with a woman while still
married is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Cruz
invokes good faith, claiming to have had the impression that the applicable
provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code, for while Article 256
of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive
application, there is a qualification.

Facts: Respondent is charged with malpractice for having published an


advertisement in Sunday Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which reads as follows
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance
of delay or publicity avoided if desired and marriage arranged to wishes of
parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything
confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila
Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60

A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan,


Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan
alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial assistance and
expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly
texted and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan
presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried
to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan. Also,
he attached respondents calling card:
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the
printing and circulating of said calling card.

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which


reads: Annulment of Marriage Specialist *contact number+. Espeleta, a
staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo
who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos
provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of
children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published.
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for
investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty.
Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not
appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but
argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the
absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the
public isnt served in any way by the prohibition.

[R]espondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie,


which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked a certain Rosie Clurman
for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979,
denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be
informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie and if not,
what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office. Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint. As admitted by
the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
members of the Philippine bar, practicing under the firm name of Guerrero
& Torres, are members or associates of Baker & McKenzie.

FACTS:The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board


of Isabela, admits that in the last general elections he made use of a card
written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD
MEMBER, Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a
deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can
renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as
any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town
Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and
serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to
a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which
letter reads as follow:
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some
people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in
Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as
lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear
that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my
residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this
information to your barrio people in any of your meeting or social
gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve
with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your
locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in
connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to
handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.

This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist
from issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire
about secret marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It
also says that they are giving free books on Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a
member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements.
On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the
publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but is merely rendering legal support services through
paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed
based on certain US cases decided.

The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and


destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal,
a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court.
First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the
trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987,the last day of the
fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by
the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was
denied in the Resolution because the same was not filed within the grace
period as enscribed in the present jurisprudence .

There are two administrative cases against Judge Ildefonso Bleza here.
Case 1
In 1981, a shooting incident in a cockpit occurred where Gregorio Abad, a
colonel escaped death. In that incident, Abad had an argument with one
Potenciano Ponce and the latters bodyguard, Francisco Sabater Jr. Sabater
shot Abad and due to medical intervention, Abad survived. Abad filed two
separate criminal cases against Ponce and Sabater. Ponce was acquitted
due to insufficiency of evidence (because there were conflicting
testimonies) while Sabater was found guilty of frustrated homicide but with
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to kill.
Abad, not satisfied with Blezas decisions filed an administrative case
against Bleza,
Case 2
Pacifico Ocampo was an employee of the Manila International Airport
Authority. He filed an administrative case against one Ricardo Ortiz.
After that, Ocampo alleged that Crisanto Cruz (perhaps a friend of Ortiz?
not mentioned in the case), tried to persuade Ocampo not to continue with
the administrative case against Ortiz. Ocampo did not accede so allegedly,
Cruz filed a separate administrative complaint against Ocampo. In turn,
Ocampo filed a civil case against Cruz before Judge Bleza. Ocampo alleged
that the administrative case against him was baseless and the same made
him suffer embarrassment, mental shock, anxieties, sleepless nights, and
loss of appetite.
Ocampo won and Bleza ordered Cruz to pay for damages. Cruz filed an
administrative case against Bleza for allegedly knowingly rendering a
wrongful decision as Cruz averred that the administrative case was based
on Ocampos absenteeism, inefficiency and tardiness which were all on
record and same were presented as evidence which were even (allegedly)
uncontroverted.

Pacifico Ocampo was an employee of the Manila International Airport


Authority. He filed an administrative case against one Ricardo Ortiz.
After that, Ocampo alleged that Crisanto Cruz (perhaps a friend of Ortiz?
not mentioned in the case), tried to persuade Ocampo not to continue with
the administrative case against Ortiz. Ocampo did not accede so allegedly,
Cruz filed a separate administrative complaint against Ocampo. In turn,
Ocampo filed a civil case against Cruz before Judge Bleza. Ocampo alleged
that the administrative case against him was baseless and the same made
him suffer embarrassment, mental shock, anxieties, sleepless nights, and
loss of appetite.
Ocampo won and Bleza ordered Cruz to pay for damages. Cruz filed an
administrative case against Bleza for allegedly knowingly rendering a
wrongful decision as Cruz averred that the administrative case was based
on Ocampos absenteeism, inefficiency and tardiness which were all on
record and same were presented as evidence which were even (allegedly)
uncontroverted.

ISSUE

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Homobono t.


Cezar should be disbared or suspended for
deceit and grossly immoral conduct

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be


disbarred due to the issuance of checks
drawn against a closed account.

Issues:
(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide
considered a crime involving moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant
disbarment?

Is the respondent guilty of malpractice?

Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of


Professional Responsibility

Whether or not Cru: Whether or not the


advertisement is : Whether or not the
advertisement is ethical.

W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising


his services

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 &


Rule3.01.

Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien


law firm, could practice law in the
Philippines.

W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the


practice of law.
W/N the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisements complained of.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals


committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the denied the motion and let the
petitioner be bound by the negligence of
their counsel

Whether or not Bleza should be disciplined.

Whether or not Bleza should be disciplined.

RESOULTION
YES. SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 3 YEARS.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath; (6)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority.
o He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the
subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign
said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment.

Respondents adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the


money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for
10 years, is morally reprehensible.

Respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required by the Code
of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a
member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.
o Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are
dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession

whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of


the Bar; cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of
the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of
moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless
checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law,
or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant
case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment
of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude,
for which he has been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously
committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral
turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long
held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings
v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us.
The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument
is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved
himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.

(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only
because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe
off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly
indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all
justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to
obey the laws of the land. The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years,
unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification
for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.

Yes
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client
in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified
from owning real property. Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted
that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent,
however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainants name. But respondent provided some safeguards by preparing several
documents, including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants
name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the
Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law
against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to
achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, or which he
may be suspended.
In Balinon V. De Leon, respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law
for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit
concubinage. In In re: Santiago, respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the
practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be
single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately
subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of

Cruzs claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3,
1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to
the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it the
obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legalprinciples. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityand is suspended from the practice of
law for one year.

Held: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the
practice of merchantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must
be the outcome of character and conduct.

Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon
3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus,
lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow
lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law
(degrading the profession in the publics estimation).
With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of
gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes
ambulance chasing (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a
measure to protect community from barratry and champertry.
As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyers
best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with
a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away
from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserves no place in the legal profession.

HELD
Yes!
The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is
public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to
public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should
subordinate their primary interest.
Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist he erodes and
undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact
encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the
lawyers name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer
may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer permit his
name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar.

NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
*R+espondents use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a representation
that being associated with the firm they could render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment. This was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was not authorized to
practice law here.

HELD:Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO.
2828, providing The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokets, constitutes malpractice, and to Canon 27
and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by
the Philippines Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is
a profession and not a business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a
ground for disbarment or suspension.
1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.
2. For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is
reprimanded.

Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.


Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a
person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes
the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of
another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice
of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And applying the
criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the practice of law.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have
to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or
skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are

Held: The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time was more
than a year after the expiration of the grace period. Hence, it is no longer within the
coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the
grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said
rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglamentary period.
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and law journals.

: No (in both cases). In the first case, Bleza erred in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to kill in favor of Sabater but such error does not hold
him administratively liable.
In Criminal Law, in cases of frustrated homicide there is inherently an intention to kill for
if otherwise, it would have been a case of physical injuries. Bleza found Sabater guilty of
frustrated homicide hence it is error for him to appreciate lack of intention to kill as a
mitigating circumstance.
But as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts are erroneous. Even on the assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the
appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable for his
judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done
by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. Not every error or
mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a
judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his
position unbearable.
In the second case, the Supreme Court took notice of the fact that it is on appeal before
the Court of Appeals hence it is premature to decide upon it. Only after the appellate
court holds in a final judgment that a trial judges alleged errors were committed
deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be
leveled against him.

appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable for his
judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done
by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. Not every error or
mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a
judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his
position unbearable.
In the second case, the Supreme Court took notice of the fact that it is on appeal before
the Court of Appeals hence it is premature to decide upon it. Only after the appellate
court holds in a final judgment that a trial judges alleged errors were committed
deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be
leveled against him.