BPI vs.

Coscolluela
Facts:
Respondent Margarita Coscolluela and her husband Oscar Coscolluela obtained an agricultural
sugar crop loan from the Far East Bank & Trust Co. Bacolod City Branch for crop years
1997 and 1998. However, in the book of FEBTC, the loan account of the spouses was treated
as a single account,which amounted to P13,592,492.00 as evidenced by 67 Promissory Notes
executed on various dates, from August 29, 1996 to January 23, 1998.
The promissory notes listed under Nos. 1 to 33 bear the maturity date of February 9, 1998, with a
30-day extension of up to March 11, 1998, while those listed under Nos. 34 to 67 bear December
28, 1998 as maturity date.
On 13 June 1997, the spouses executed a REM in favour of FEBTC over the parcel of land located
in Bacolod City as security of loans on credit accommodation obtained by the spouses from
FEBTC and those that may be obtained by mortgagees which was fixed at Php 7 million.
Under the terms and conditions of the real estate mortgage, in the event of failure to pay the
mortgage obligation or any portion thereof when due, the entire principal, interest, penalties and
other charges then outstanding, shall become immediately due; upon such breach or violation of
the terms and conditions thereof, FEBTC may, at its absolute discretion foreclose the same
extrajudicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Act No. 3135, as amended, and for
the purpose appointed FEBTC as its attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to enter the
premises where the mortgaged property is located and to take actual possession and control
thereof without need of any order of any court, nor written permission from the spouses, and with
special power to sell the mortgaged property at a public or private sale at the option of the
mortgagee; and that the spouses expressly waived the term of 30 days or any other terms granted
by law as the period which must elapse before the mortgage agreement may be foreclosed and, in
any case, such period has already lapsed.
The mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod and was annotated in the title
of the land. Oscar died intestate and was survived by his widow, herein respondent.
For failure to settle the outstanding obligation on the maturity dates, FEBTC sent a final demand
letter to respondent demanding payment, within five days from notice, of the principal of the loan
amounting to P13,481,498.68, with past due interests and penalties or in the total amount of
P19,482,168.31 but failed to settle her obligation.
FEBTC filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property, significantly only
for the total amount of P4,687,006.68 exclusive of balance, interest and penalty, covered by
promissory notes from 1 to 33, except nos. 2 and 10
While the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding was pending, petitioner FEBTC filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against respondent for the collection of the
principal amount of P8,794,492.00 plus interest and penalty, or the total amount of
P12,672,000.31, representing the amounts indicated in the rest of the promissory notes.
Petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in its favour. In her answer,
respondent alleged, by way of special and affirmative defense, that the complaint was barred by
litis pendentia, specifically, the pending petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage.
Petitioner presented its loan officer as witness that the spouses were granted an
agricultural sugar loan. Borrowers were allowed to make successive drawdowns against
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the loan as their need arose. The witness also testified that the loan of the spouses was a
single loan account.
After petitioner rested its case, respondent filed a demurrer to evidence contending, among others,
that, with Ganuelas admission, there is only one loan account secured by the real estate
mortgage, that the promissory notes were executed as evidence of the loans. Plaintiff was thus
barred from instituting a personal action for collection of the drawdowns. Respondent insisted that
by filing a complaint for a sum of money, petitioner thereby split its cause of action against her;
hence, the complaint must perforce be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.
Petitioner opposed the demurrer arguing that while the loans were considered as a single
account, each promissory note executed by respondent constituted a separate contract. It
reiterated that its petition for the extrajudicial and foreclosure of the real estate mortgage before the
Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff involves obligations different and separate from those in its action for a
sum of money before the court. Petitioner insists that the promissory notes subject of its
collection suit should be treated separately from the other set of obligations, that is, the 31
promissory notes subject of its extrajudicial foreclosure petition.
The trial court denied the demurrer on the ground that the promissory notes executed by
respondent and her deceased husband contained different amounts, and each note covered a loan
distinct from the others. Thus, petitioner had the option to file a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering 31 of the promissory notes, and, as to the rest, to
file an ordinary action for collection. Petitioner, thus, merely opted to institute an action for
collection of the debt on the 36 promissory notes, and waived its action for the foreclosure of the
security given on these notes.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its February 19,
2002 Order, prompting her to file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 with the CA.
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2003, the parcel of land subject of the aforementioned real estate
mortgage was sold at public auction where petitioner emerged as the highest bidder
The CA rendered its Decision granting the petition, holding, under prevailing jurisprudence,
the remedies either a real action to foreclose the mortgage or a personal action to collect
the debt of a mortgage creditor are alternative and not cumulative. Since respondent
availed of the first one, it was deemed to have waived the second. Further, the filing of both
actions results in a splitting of a single cause of action. Thus, in denying her Demurrer to
Evidence, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion as it overruled settled judicial
pronouncements.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent
in the CA was the proper remedy to assail the January 10, 2002 Order of the trial court
RULING:
We agree with petitioners contention that the general rule is that an order denying a motion to
dismiss or demurrer to evidence is interlocutory and is not appealable. Consequently, defendant
must go to trial and adduce its evidence, and appeal, in due course, from an adverse decision of
the trial court. However, the rule admits of exceptions. Where the denial by the trial court of a
motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the order of
dismissal on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. A wide breadth of
discretion is granted in certiorari proceedings in the interest of substantial justice and to prevent a
substantial wrong. As the Court held in Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[34]

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It bears stressing that a writ of certiorari is of the highest utility and importance for curbing
excessive jurisdiction and correcting errors and most essential to the safety of the people and the
public welfare. Its scope has been broadened and extended, and is now one of the recognized
modes for the correction of errors by this Court. The cases in which it will lie cannot be defined.
To do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and limit its usefulness.
The appropriate function of a certiorari writ is to relieve aggrieved parties from the
injustice arising from errors of law committed in proceedings affecting justiciable rights
when no other means for an adequate and speedy relief is open. It is founded upon a sense
of justice, to release against wrongs otherwise irreconcilable, wrongs which go unredressed
because of want of adequate remedy which would be a grave reproach to any system of
jurisprudence.
The aggrieved party is entitled to a writ of certiorari where the trial court commits a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying a motion to
dismiss a complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. An appeal while available eventually is
cumbersome and inadequate for it requires the parties to undergo a useless and time-consuming
and expensive trial. The second case constitutes a rude if not debilitating imposition on the trial
and the docket of the judiciary.
In the present case, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it denied the Demurrer
to Evidence of respondent and, in the process, ignored applicable rulings of this Court.
Although respondent had the right to appeal the decision of the trial court against her after
trial, however, she, as defendant, need not use up funds and undergo the tribulations of a
trial and thereafter appeal from an adverse decision.
Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may not
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action and, if two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as ground for the dismissal of the other or others. A party will
not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits. A party
seeking to enforce a claim must present to the court by the pleadings or proofs or both, all the
grounds upon which he expects a judgment in his favour. He is not at liberty to split up his
demands and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion of the grounds upon
which special relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit if the first
fails. The law does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire or
indivisible demand to divide and split the cause or demand so as to make it the subject of
several actions. The whole cause must be determined in one action.
For the failure of respondent to pay her loan obligation, petitioner had only one cause of action
arising from such non-payment. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the
credit with execution of the security. Petitioner is proscribed from splitting its single cause of
action by filing an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on June 10, 1999 with respect to the
amounts in the 31 promissory notes, and, during the pendency thereof, file a collection case on
June 23, 1999, with respect to the amounts in the remaining 36 promissory notes.
Considering, therefore, that, in the case at bar, petitioner had already instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings of the mortgaged property, it is now barred from availing itself of a
personal action for the collection of the indebtedness.

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PANTRANCO North Express, Inc., and Alexander Buncan, versus

Standard Insurance Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale,
G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005.
NATURE OF THE CASE: The case was elevated to the SC by Pantranco and Buncan by reason of
the ruling of the CA against them and the denial of the appellate court of their motion for
reconsideration. The CA ruled that there was no misjoinder of parties in the complaint filed by
Standard and Gicale against them, and that they are to be held accountable to the money claims of
the respondents.
FACTS:
Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale. Alexander
Buncan, on the other hand, was driving a bus owned by Pantranco North Express Inc. Both drivers
were travelling along the National Highway of Talavera, Nueva Ecija in a rainy afternoon. Buncan
was driving the bus northbound while Cripin was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were
negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, thhe
passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the police and to the insurer of their jeepney, Standard Insurance
Co. The total cost of the repair amounted to P21, 415. Standard only paid P8,000 while Martina
Gicale shouldered the remaining P13,415. Thereafter, Standard and Martina demanded
reimbursements from Pantranco and Buncan, but the bus company and the driver refused. Thus,
Standard and Martina were prompted to file a complaint for sum of money with the RTC of Manila.
Pantranco and Buncan denied the allegations of the complaint and asserted that it is the MeTC
which has jurisdiction over the case.
RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of Standard and Martina, and ordered Pantranco and Buncan to
pay the former reimbursements with interests due thereon plus attorney's fees, and litigation
expenses.
Pantranco and Buncan:
The RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint.
1) Martina Gicale was claiming P13,415, while Standard was claiming P8,000. Their individual
claims are below P20,000. Thus, the case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
2) There was a misjoinder of parties.
CA: The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC.
1) Under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19 of BP 129, it is the sum of the two claims
that determines the jurisdictional amount. At the time this case was heard, cases involving
money claims that amounts to more than P20,000 falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC.
2) Even assuming that there was a misjoinder of parties, it does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint. The claims of Gicale and Standard arose from
the same vehicular accident involving Pantranco's bus and Gicale's jeepney. Thus, there was a
question of fact common to all parties.
Pantranco and Buncan's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Gicale and Standard: There was no misjoinder of parties. Their individual claims arose from the
same vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Thus, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case.
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ISSUE: WON there was a misjoinder of parties in the case.

HELD: No. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the following requirements for a
permissive joinder of parties: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c)
such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the rear
side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are
negligent.
There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they
have the same cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which
is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same
evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action.
Thus, the filing by
both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids
multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
There is NO MISJOINDER OF PARTIES if the money sought to be claimed is in favor of the same
plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s.
On the issue of lumping together the claims of Gicale and Standard, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the
same Rules provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Further, the Court reiterates the Totality rule exemplified by Sec. 33 (1) of BP 129: where there are
several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
Hence, PETITION IS DENIED.

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Spouses Decena vs. Spouses Piquero [G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005]

Facts: On September 7, 1997, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero for the sale of their titled property in
Paranaque, costing P6,900,000.00, for the price of P940,250.00 only, payable in six (6)
installments via postdated checks. The MOA stipulated that the that the petitioners obliged
themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the
condition that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter
would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners. The vendees forthwith took
possession of the property.
The first two checks issued by the respondents were dishonored by the drawee bank and were not
replaced with cash despite demands by the petitioners who on May 17, 1999 filed a complaint,
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan where they reside, against the respondents for the annulment
of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages, alleging that they did not transfer the
property to and in the names of the respondents as a result of the dishonored checks.
The petitioners declared in their complaint that the property subject of the complaint was valued at
P6,900,000.00. They appended copies of the MOA and TCT No. 134391 to their complaint. The
case was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of improper
venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action.
On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of the petitioners for the
rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action and not a
personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC of Paraaque City, where the
property subject matter of the action was located, and not in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where
the petitioners resided. The respondents posited that the said court had no jurisdiction over the
property subject matter of the action because it was located in Paraaque City.
In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and attorneys fees is a personal
action and not a real action; hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside. They
averred that while their second cause of action for the recovery of the possession of the property is
a real action, the same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of action for
damages, conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
By way of reply, the respondents averred that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court applies
only when one or more of multiple causes of action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first
level courts, and the other or others are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, and the venue
lies therein.
On February 9, 2000, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit. It found
merit in the petitioners contention that Section 5(c), Rule 2 was applicable.
Meanwhile, the case was re-raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. In a Motion[8]
dated December 20, 2000, the respondents prayed for the reconsideration of the trial courts
February 9, 2000 Order. On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order[9] granting the motion
and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It ruled that the principal action of the petitioners was
a real action and should have been filed in the RTC of Paraaque City where the property subject
matter of the complaint was located. However, since the case was filed in the RTC of Bulacan
where the petitioners reside, which court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, it
must be dismissed.

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Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Malolos Bulacan gained jurisdiction over the case and should be
the venue of litigation. The resolution of this issue is, in turn, anchored on whether Section 5, Rule
2 of the Rules of Court invoked by the petitioners is applicable in this case.
Held: Justice Jose Y. Feria declared:
(c) Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action should be filed
in the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action have different venues, they may be joined in
any of the courts of proper venue. Hence, a real action and a personal action may be joined either
in the Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located or where the parties
reside.[10]
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other which
causes the latter injury. The essential elements of a cause of action are the following: (1) the
existence of a legal right of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect
ones right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs right.[11] A
cause of action should not be confused with the remedies or reliefs prayed for. A cause of action is
to be found in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer for relief. It is the substance
and not the form that is controlling.[12] A party may have two or more causes of action against
another party.
A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of action in a complaint.
The question of the joinder of causes of action involves in particular cases a preliminary inquiry as
to whether two or more causes of action are alleged.[13] In declaring whether more than one
cause of action is alleged, the main thrust is whether more than one primary right or subject of
controversy is present. Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on the
other, whether the same evidence would support the other different counts and whether separate
actions could be maintained for separate relief;[14] or whether more than one distinct primary right
or subject of controversy is alleged for enforcement or adjudication.[15]
A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies. The mere fact
that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has stated more than one cause
of action. The prayer may be an aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or not
more than one cause of action is pleaded.[16] If the allegations of the complaint show one primary
right and one wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are incidentally
involved, and although different acts, methods, elements of injury, items of claims or theories of
recovery are set forth.[17] Where two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder
of causes of action.
After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules
of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only
one cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latters
refusal to pay the first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to
the petitioners the possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon
occupied by the respondents. The claim for damages for reasonable compensation for the
respondents use and occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as moral and exemplary
damages suffered by the petitioners on account of the aforestated breach of contract of the
respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not independent or
separate causes of action.[18]
The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of the respondents breach
thereof and the latters failure to return the premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and
the respondents eviction therefrom is a real action.

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Uniwide Holdings vs Cruz

Facts:
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. with principal office in Paranaque City, entered into a Franchise
Agreement1 that granted the respondent, Alexander M. Cruz (Cruz), a five-year franchise to adopt
and use the "Uniwide Family Store System" where one will be established along Marcos Highway,
Sta. Cruz, Cogeo, Marikina City.
Article 10.22 of the agreement stated that Cruz must pay UHI a monthly service fee of 50, 000
pesos or three percent of its GROSS MONTHLY purchases (whichever is higer) within five days
after end of the month. In case of delay, Cruz will pay a surcharge of 3 percent for every month. It
appears that Cruz had purchased goods from UHIs affiliated companies First Paragon Corporation
(FPC) and Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).
In August 2002, FPC and USWCI executed Deeds of Assignment in favor of UHI assigning all
their rights and interests over Cruzs accounts payable to them.
In the same month, Cruz had obligations to UHI in the amount of P1.3 million which prompted UHI
to sent him a letter of notice regarding payment within the five day stipulated period. Although he
received the letter, the account remained unpaid.
UHI then filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0278 against Cruz on the following causes of action:
First Cause of Action
10. Being entitled to the payment of monthly service fee pursuant to the FA, which defendant failed
to pay despite demand, plaintiff suffered actual damages in the amount of Phil. Peso: One Million
Three Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Nine & 83/100 (P1,327,669.83),
computed as of 05 April 2004, for which defendant should be held liable together with legal interest
thereon from the date of filing of this Complaint, until fully paid.
Second Cause of Action
11. Being the assignee of the receivable of FPC, which receivable defendant failed to pay despite
demand, plaintiff suffered actual damages in the amount of Phil. Peso: Sixty Four Thousand One
Hundred Sixty Five & 96/100 (P64,165.96) for which defendant should be held liable together with
the legal interest thereon computed from date of receipt of plaintiffs demand letter, or on August
16, 2002 to be exact, until fully paid.
Third Cause of Action
12. Being the assignee of the receivable of USWCI, which receivable defendant failed to pay
despite demand, plaintiff suffered actual damages in the total amount of Phil. Peso: One Million
Five Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Sixty One & 36/100 (P1,579,061.36), computed as of 05
April 2004, inclusive of the two and a half percent (2.5%) monthly interest, as and by way of
penalty, and the three (3%) annual interest on the unpaid amount, for which defendant should be
held liable, with legal interest thereon from the date of filing of this Complaint, until fully paid.
Fourth Cause of Action
13. By reason of defendants obstinate refusal or failure to pay his indebtedness, plaintiff was
constrained to file this Complaint and in the process incur expenses by way of attorneys fees,
which could be reasonably estimated to reach at least Phil. Peso: Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
Page 8 of 9

(P250,000.00) and for which defendant should be held answerable for.6 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Cruz filed an MOTION TO DISMISS on the ground of IMPROPER VENUE invoking article 27.5:
The Franchisee consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Quezon City, the Franchisee
waiving any other venue.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: WHETHER A CASE BASED ON SEVERAL CAUSES OF ACTION IS DISMISSIBLE ON
THE GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE WHERE ONLY ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION
ARISES FROM A CONTRACT WITH EXCLUSIVE VENUE STIPULATION.
RULING:
The general rule on venue of personal actions, as in petitioners complaint for collection of sum of
money, is embodied in Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 4 qualifies Section 2, which allows parties before the filing of the action, to validly agree in
writing on an exclusive venue. The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an
action does not, however, preclude parties from bringing a case to other venues.
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise
out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the one at
bar, may be brought before other venues provided that such other cause of action falls within the
jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.
Based on the allegations, the second and third causes of action are based on the deeds of
assignment between FPC and USWCI. The deeds bear no exclusive venue stipulation with respect
to the causes of action thereunder therefore the complaint may be filed in the place where the
plaintiff or defendant resides.
The causes of action are separate and distinct and is not based on breach of agreement between
Cruz and UHI thus, any action arising from the deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to the
exclusive venue stipulation embodied in the agreement

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