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Linguistic relativity

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The principle of linguistic relativity holds that the structure of a language affects the ways in which
its respective speakers conceptualize their world, i.e. their world view, or otherwise influences
their cognitive processes. Popularly known as the SapirWhorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, the
principle is often defined to include two versions. The strong version says that language determines
thought, and that linguistic categories limit and determine cognitive categories, whereas
the weakversion says only that linguistic categories and usage influence thought and certain kinds of
non-linguistic behaviour.
The term "SapirWhorf hypothesis" is a misnomer, because Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee
Whorf never co-authored anything, and never stated their ideas in terms of a hypothesis. The
distinction between a weak and a strong version of this hypothesis is also a later invention; Sapir
and Whorf never set up such a dichotomy, although often in their writings their views of this relativity
principle are phrased in stronger or weaker terms.[1][2]
The idea was first clearly expressed by 19th-century thinkers, such as Wilhelm von Humboldt, who
saw language as the expression of the spirit of a nation. Members of the early 20th-century school of
American anthropology headed by Franz Boas and Edward Sapir also embraced forms of the idea to
one extent or another, but Sapir in particular wrote more often against than in favor of anything like
linguistic determinism. Sapir's student, Benjamin Lee Whorf, came to be seen as the primary
proponent as a result of his published observations of how he perceived linguistic differences to
have consequences in human cognition and behavior. Harry Hoijer, one of Sapir's students,
introduced the term "SapirWhorf hypothesis",[3] even though the two scholars never formally
advanced any such hypothesis.[4] A strong version of relativist theory was developed from the late
1920s by the German linguist Leo Weisgerber. Whorf's principle of linguistic relativity was
reformulated as a testable hypothesis by Roger Brown and Eric Lenneberg who conducted
experiments designed to find out whether color perception varies between speakers of languages
that classified colors differently. As the study of the universal nature of human language and
cognition came into focus in the 1960s the idea of linguistic relativity fell out of favour among
linguists. A 1969 study by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay demonstrated the existence of universal
semantic constraints in the field of color terminology which were widely seen to discredit the
existence of linguistic relativity in this domain, although this conclusion has been disputed by
relativist researchers.
From the late 1980s a new school of linguistic relativity scholars have examined the effects of
differences in linguistic categorization on cognition, finding broad support for non-deterministic
versions of the hypothesis in experimental contexts.[5][6] Some effects of linguistic relativity have been
shown in several semantic domains, although they are generally weak. Currently, a balanced view of
linguistic relativity is espoused by most linguists holding that language influences certain kinds of
cognitive processes in non-trivial ways, but that other processes are better seen as arising
from connectionist factors. Research is focused on exploring the ways and extent to which language
influences thought.[5] The principle of linguistic relativity and the relation between language and
thought has also received attention in varying academic fields
from philosophy to psychology and anthropology, and it has also inspired and colored works of
fiction and the invention ofconstructed languages.
Contents
[hide]

1 Definitional issues and debates


o 1.1 Linguistic determinism

o 1.2 Relation to debates in science and philosophy


2 History
o 2.1 German Romantic philosophers
o 2.2 Boas and Sapir
o 2.3 Benjamin Lee Whorf
o 2.4 Eric Lenneberg
o 2.5 The universalist period
o 2.6 Fishman's 'Whorfianism of the third kind'
o 2.7 Cognitive linguistics
o 2.8 Present status
3 Empirical research
o 3.1 Color terminology research
4 Outside of science
o 4.1 Therapy and self-development
o 4.2 Artificial languages
o 4.3 Programming languages
5 See also
6 Notes
7 References
8 Further reading
9 External links

Definitional issues and debates[edit]


The concept of linguistic relativity holds that cognitive processes, such as thought and experience,
may be influenced by the categories and patterns of the language a person speaks. Empirical
research into the question has been associated mainly with the names of Benjamin Lee Whorf, who
wrote on the topic in the 1930s, and his mentor Edward Sapir, who did not, himself, write extensively
on the topic. Whorf's writings became the focus of empirical studies in psychology in the mid 20th
century, and this strand of research often referred to the question as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis,
or sometimes the Whorfian hypothesis. This usage has been criticized as a misnomer, since Sapir
and Whorf did not in fact formulate a hypothesis for empirical research, and because it is unclear to
what extent Sapir actually subscribed to the idea of language influencing thought. Currently,
researchers prefer to use Whorf's own terminology, by referring to the principle of linguistic
relativity. This formulation implicitly acknowledges that Sapir and Whorf were not the first or only
scholars to have theorized about relations between language and thought and that other strands of
thinking about the issue also exist.[7]

Linguistic determinism[edit]
Main article: linguistic determinism
A main point of debate in the discussion of linguistic relativity is the correlation between language
and thought. The strongest form of correlation is linguistic determinism, which would hold that
language entirely determines the range of possible cognitive processes of an individual. This view
has sometimes been attributed to Benjamin Lee Whorf, and to Ludwig Wittgenstein, but it is not
currently the consensus that either of these thinkers actually espoused determinist views of the
relation between language and thought. Linguistic determinism is also sometimes described as "the
strong Sapir-Whorf hypothesis", while other forms of correlation are referred to as "the weak
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis". The notion of "weak" and "strong" versions of Whorf's principle of
linguistic relativity is a misunderstanding of Whorf promulgated by Stuart Chase, whom Whorf
considered "utterly incompetent by training and background to handle such a subject."[8]Neither Sapir
nor Whorf ever suggested a distinction between weak or strong versions of their views. The

hypothesis of linguistic determinism is now generally agreed to be false, but weaker forms of
correlation are still being studied by many researchers, often producing positive empirical
evidence for a correlation.[9]

Relation to debates in science and philosophy[edit]


The question bears on many significant philosophical, psychological, linguistic and anthropological
debates.
A major question of debate is of whether human psychological faculties are mostly universal and
innate or whether they are mostly a result of learning, and hence subject to cultural and social
processes that vary between places and times. The universalist view holds that all humans share the
same set of basic faculties, and that variability due to cultural differences is negligible. This position
often sees the human mind as a mostly biological construction, so that all humans sharing the same
neurological configuration can be expected to have similar or identical basic cognitive patterns. The
contrary position can be described as constructivist, stating that human faculties and concepts are
largely influenced by socially constructed and learned categories, that is not subject to many
biological restrictions. Or it can be described as idealist, holding that the human mental capacities
are generally unrestricted by its biological-material basis. And it can be described asessentialist,
holding that there may be essential differences in the ways individuals or groups experience and
conceptualize the world. It may also be described asrelativist, basically a kind of Cultural relativism,
which sees different cultural groups as having different conceptual schemes that are not necessarily
compatible or commensurable, nor more or less in accord with the external reality.[10]
Another question that bears on the debate is about the relation between language and thought.
Some philosophers and psychologists have tended to understand thought as basically a form of
internal speech, suggesting that either this speech must be innate or thought has to be learned while
acquiring language. Others have understood thought as experience and reason, as independent of
and before language.
In the philosophy of language the debate has relevance for the question of the relation between
language, knowledge and the external world, and the concept oftruth. Some philosophers (e.g.
Putnam, Fodor, Davidson, Dennett) see language as representing directly entities that already exist
in the objective world, and that categorization is therefore not generally variable but to some extent
pre-given. Other philosophers (e.g. Wittgenstein, Quine, Searle, Foucault) argue that categorization
and conceptualization is learned and basically arbitrary, and that the objects in the world can be
categorized in multiple ways, giving rise to different ways of describing or understanding the same
phenomena. Philosophers also vary in the question of whether language is basically a tool for
representing and referring to objects in the world, or whether it is a system used to construct mental
representations of the world that can be shared and circulated between people.
Because of the centrality of the question of the relation between thought and language to these
debates, the issue of linguistic relativity has received attention not only from linguists and
psychologists, but from anthropologists, philosophers, literary theorists and political scientists.

History[edit]
The idea that language and thought are intertwined goes back to the classical civilizations.
Famously Plato argued against sophist thinkers such as Gorgias of Leontini, who held the physical
world cannot be experienced except through language; this meant that for Gorgias the question of
truth was dependent on aesthetic preferences or functional consequences. Contrary to this idea
Plato held that the world consisted in pregiven eternal ideas and that language in order to be true
should strive to reflect these ideas as accurately as possible.[11] Following Plato, St. Augustine, for
example, held the view that language was merely labels applied to already existing concepts, and
this view remained prevalent throughout the Middle Ages.[12] Others, such as Roger Bacon, held the
opinion that language was but a veil covering up the eternal truths hiding them from real human

experience. For Immanuel Kant, language was but one of several tools used by humans to
experience the world.

German Romantic philosophers[edit]

Wilhelm von Humboldt

In the late 18th and early 19th century the idea of the existence of different national characters, or
"Volksgeister", of different ethnic groups was the moving force behind the German school of national
romanticism and the beginning ideologies of ethnic nationalism.
In 1820, Wilhelm von Humboldt connected the study of language to the national romanticist program
by proposing the view that language is the very fabric of thought. That is, thoughts are produced as
a kind of internal dialog using the same grammar as the thinker's native language.[13] This view was
part of a larger picture in which the world view of an ethnic nation, their "Weltanschauung", was seen
as being faithfully reflected in the grammar of their language. Von Humboldt argued that languages
with an inflectional morphological type, such as German, English and the other Indo-European
languages were the most perfect languages and that accordingly this explained the dominance of
their speakers over the speakers of less perfect languages. Wilhelm von Humboldt declared in 1820:
The diversity of languages is not a diversity of signs and sounds but a diversity of views of the
world.[13]

Boas and Sapir[edit]

Franz Boas

Edward Sapir

The idea that some languages were naturally superior to others and that the use of primitive
languages maintained their speakers in intellectual poverty was widespread in the early 20th
century. The American linguist William Dwight Whitney, for example, actively strove to eradicate
the Native American languages arguing that their speakers were savages and would be better off
abandoning their languages and learning English and adopting a civilized way of life.[14] The first
anthropologist and linguist to challenge this view was Franz Boas who was educated in Germany in
the late 19th century where he received his doctorate in physics.[15] While undertaking geographical
research in northern Canada he became fascinated with the Inuit people and decided to become
an ethnographer. In contrast to von Humboldt, Boas always stressed the equal worth of all cultures

and languages, and argued that there was no such thing as primitive languages, but that all
languages were capable of expressing the same content albeit by widely differing means. Boas saw
language as an inseparable part of culture and he was among the first to require of ethnographers to
learn the native language of the culture being studied, and to document verbal culture such as myths
and legends in the original language.
According to Franz Boas:
It does not seem likely [...] that there is any direct relation between the culture of a tribe and the
language they speak, except in so far as the form of the language will be moulded by the state of the
culture, but not in so far as a certain state of the culture is conditioned by the morphological traits of
the language."[16]
Boas' student Edward Sapir reached back to the Humboldtian idea that languages contained the key
to understanding the differing world views of peoples. In his writings he espoused the viewpoint that
because of the staggering differences in the grammatical systems of languages no two languages
were ever similar enough to allow for perfect translation between them. Sapir also thought because
language represented reality differently, it followed that the speakers of different languages would
perceive reality differently. According to Edward Sapir:
No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social
reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with
different labels attached.[17]
On the other hand, Sapir explicitly rejected strong linguistic determinism by stating, "It would be
nave to imagine that any analysis of experience is dependent on pattern expressed in language."[18]
Sapir was explicit that the connections between language and culture were neither thoroughgoing
nor particularly deep, if they existed at all:
It is easy to show that language and culture are not intrinsically associated. Totally unrelated
languages share in one culture; closely related languageseven a single languagebelong to
distinct culture spheres. There are many excellent examples in Aboriginal America. The Athabaskan
languages form as clearly unified, as structurally specialized, a group as any that I know of. The
speakers of these languages belong to four distinct culture areas... The cultural adaptability of the
Athabaskan-speaking peoples is in the strangest contrast to the inaccessibility to foreign influences
of the languages themselves.[19]
Sapir offers similar observations about speakers of so-called "world" or "modern" languages, noting
that "possession of a common language is still and will continue to be a smoother of the way to a
mutual understanding between England and America, but it is very clear that other factors, some of
them rapidly cumulative, are working powerfully to counteract this leveling influence. A common
language cannot indefinitely set the seal on a common culture when the geographical, physical, and
economics determinants of the culture are no longer the same throughout the area."[20]
While Sapir never made a point of studying directly how languages affected the thought processes
of their speakers, some notion of (probably "weak") linguistic relativity lay inherent in his basic
understanding of language, and would be taken up by his student Benjamin Lee Whorf.
Drawing on influences such as Humboldt or Friedrich Nietzsche some European thinkers developed
similar ideas to those of Sapir and Whorf, generally working in isolation from one another. Prominent
in Germany from the late 1920s through into the 1960s were the strongly relativist theories of Leo
Weisgerber and his key concept of a 'linguistic inter-world', mediating between external reality and
the forms of a given language, in ways peculiar to that language.[21] Russian psychologistLev
Vygotsky read Sapir's work and experimentally studied the ways in which the development of
concepts in children was influenced by structures given in language. His theories and results were
published in 1934 as "Thought and Language"[22] Vygotsky's ideas have been compared to Whorf's
and taken as mutually supportive evidence of language's influence on cognition.[23] Drawing on

Nietzsche's ideas of perspectivism Alfred Korzybski developed the theory of general


semantics which has been compared to Whorf's notions of linguistic relativity.[24] Though influential in
their own right, these strands of research have not been given much attention in the debate
surrounding linguistic relativity, which has tended to center on the American paradigm exemplified by
Sapir and Whorf.

Benjamin Lee Whorf[edit]


Main article: Benjamin Lee Whorf
More than any other linguist, Benjamin Lee Whorf has become associated with what he called "the
principle of linguistic relativity". Instead of merely assuming that language influences the thought and
behavior of its speakers (after Humboldt and Sapir) he looked at Native American languages and
attempted to account for the ways in which differences in grammatical systems and language use
affected the way their speakers perceived the world. Whorf was also concerned with how a scientific
account of the world differed to such an extent from a religious account, which led him to study the
languages of old religious scripture and to write several anti-evolutionist pamphlets[25] There is not a
lot of agreement about Whorf's opinions regarding the nature of the relation between language and
thought. One tradition of interpretation, exemplified by his critics such as Eric Lenneberg, Max
Black and Steven Pinker, attributes to Whorf a very strong view of linguistic determinism, according
to which commensuration between conceptual schemes and translation between languages are
impossible. Another tradition of interpretation, exemplified in the work of linguists including John A.
Lucy, Michael Silverstein and Stephen C. Levinson, points to the many places in Whorf's writings
where he explicitly rejects determinism, and where he clearly notes that translation and
commensuration between linguistic conceptual schemes is possible. This line of interpretation
suggests that a more sympathetic reading of Whorf would lead to a greater understanding of the
subtleties in Whorf's use of terminology and consequently to resolving some of the apparent
contradictions noted by Whorf's critics.
Whorf has sometimes been dismissed as an 'amateur' because of his lack of an advanced degree in
linguistics. However, his not having a degree in linguistics cannot be taken to mean that he was
linguistically incompetent. The reputation he had during his lifetime belies this idea: his academic
peers at Yale University considered the 'amateur' Whorf to be the best man available to take over
Sapir's graduate seminar in Native American linguistics while Sapir was on sabbatical in 1937
38.[26] He was highly regarded by authorities such as Boas, Sapir, Leonard Bloomfield and Alfred M.
Tozzer. Indeed, John A. Lucy writes: "despite his 'amateur' status, Whorf's work in linguistics was
and still is recognized as being of superb professional quality by linguists".[27]
Still, detractors such as Eric Lenneberg, Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker have criticized him for
not being sufficiently clear in his formulation of how he meant language influences thought, and for
not providing actual proof for his conjectures. Most of his arguments were in the form of examples
that were anecdotal or speculative in nature, and functioned as attempts to show how 'exotic'
grammatical traits were connected to what were apparently equally exotic worlds of thought. In
Whorf's words:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and types that we
isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the
face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscope flux of impressions which has to be
organized by our mindsand this means largely by the linguistic systems of our minds. We cut
nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are
parties to an agreement to organize it in this wayan agreement that holds throughout our speech
community and is codified in the patterns of our language [...] all observers are not led by the same
physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar,
or can in some way be calibrated.[28]

Whorf's illustration of the difference between the English and Shawnee gestalt construction of cleaning a gun with a
ramrod. From the article "Language and Science", originally published in the MIT Technology Review, 1940. Image
copyright of MIT Press.

Among Whorf's best-known examples of linguistic relativity are instances where an indigenous
language has several terms for a concept that is only described with one word in English and other
European languages (Whorf used the acronym SAE "Standard Average European" to allude to the
rather similar grammatical structures of the well-studied European languages in contrast to the
greater diversity of the less-studied languages). One of Whorf's examples of this phenomenon was
the supposedly large number of words for 'snow' in the Inuit language, an example which some have
later contested as a misrepresentation.[29] Another of Whorf's examples are the Hopi language words
for water, one indicating drinking water in a container and another indicating a natural body of water.
These examples of polysemy served the double purpose of showing that indigenous languages
sometimes made more fine grained semantic distinctions than European languages and that direct
translation between two languages, even of seemingly basic concepts like snow or water, is not
always possible.
Another example in which Whorf attempted to show that language use affects behavior came from
his experience in his day job as a chemical engineer working for an insurance company as a fire
inspector.[29] On inspecting a chemical plant he once observed that the plant had two storage rooms
for gasoline barrels, one for the full barrels and one for the empty ones. He further noticed that while
no employees smoked cigarettes in the room for full barrels, no-one minded smoking in the room
with empty barrels, although this was potentially much more dangerous because of the highly
flammable vapors that still existed in the barrels. He concluded that the use of the word empty in
connection to the barrels had led the workers to unconsciously regard them as harmless, although
consciously they were probably aware of the risk of explosion from the vapors. This example was
later criticized by Lenneberg[30] as not actually demonstrating causality between the use of the
word empty and the action of smoking, but instead being an example of circular reasoning. Steven
Pinker in The Language Instinct ridiculed this example, claiming that this was a failing of human
insight rather than language.
Whorf's most elaborate argument for the existence of linguistic relativity regarded what he believed
to be a fundamental difference in the understanding of time as a conceptual category among the
Hopi.[31] He argued that in contrast to English and other SAE languages, the Hopi language does not
treat the flow of time as a sequence of distinct, countable instances, like "three days" or "five years,"
but rather as a single process and that consequentially it does not have nouns referring to units of
time as SAE speakers understand them. He proposed that this view of time was fundamental in all
aspects of Hopi culture and explained certain Hopi behavioral patterns. However, later Malotki

(1983), who researched Hopi, claimed that he found no evidence of Whorf's claims in 1980's era
speakers, nor in historical documents going back to the preconquest era. Malotki used evidence
from archaeological data, calendars, historical documents, modern speech and concluded that there
was no evidence that Hopi conceptualize time the way Whorf suggests. Universalist scholars such
as Steven Pinker often see Malotki's study as a final refutation of Whorf's claim about Hopi, whereas
relativist scholars such as John A Lucy and Penny Lee have criticized Malotki's study for
mischaracterizing Whorf's claims and for forcing Hopi grammar into a pregiven model of analysis
that doesn't fit the data.[32]
Whorf died in 1941 at age 44 and left behind a number of unpublished papers. His line of thought
was continued by linguists and anthropologists such as Harry Hoijer and Dorothy D. Lee who both
continued investigations into the effect of language on habitual thought, and George L. Trager who
prepared a number of Whorf's left-behind papers for publishing. The most important event for the
dissemination of Whorf's ideas to a larger public was the publication in 1956 of his major writings on
the topic of linguistic relativity in a single volume titled Language, Thought and Reality, edited by J.
B. Carroll.

Eric Lenneberg[edit]
In 1953 psychologist Eric Lenneberg published a detailed criticism of the line of thought that had
been fundamental for Sapir and Whorf. He criticized Whorf's examples from an objectivist view of
language holding that languages are principally meant to represent events in the real world and that
even though different languages express these ideas in different ways, the meanings of such
expressions and therefore the thoughts of the speaker are equivalent. He argued that when Whorf
was describing in English how a Hopi speaker's view of time was different, he was in fact translating
the Hopi concept into English and therefore disproving the existence of linguistic relativity. He did not
address the fact that Whorf was not principally concerned with translatability, but rather with how the
habitual use of language influences habitual behavior. Whorf's point was that while English speakers
may be able to understand how a Hopi speaker thinks, they are not actually able to think in that
way.[33]
Lenneberg's main criticism of Whorf's works was that he had never actually shown the causality
between a linguistic phenomenon and a phenomenon in the realm of thought or behavior, but merely
assumed it to be there. Together with his colleague, Roger Brown, Lenneberg proposed that in order
to prove such a causality one would have to be able to directly correlate linguistic phenomena with
behavior. They took up the task of proving or disproving the existence of linguistic relativity
experimentally and published their findings in 1954.
Since neither Sapir nor Whorf had ever stated an actual hypothesis, Brown and Lenneberg
formulated one based on a condensation of the different expressions of the notion of linguistic
relativity in their works. They identified the two tenets of the Whorf thesis as (i) "the world is
differently experienced and conceived in different linguistic communities" and (ii) "language causes a
particular cognitive structure".[34] These two tenets were later developed by Roger Brown into the socalled "weak" and "strong" formulation respectively:
1. Structural differences between language systems will, in general, be paralleled by nonlinguistic
cognitive differences, of an unspecified sort, in the native speakers of the language.
2. The structure of anyone's native language strongly influences or fully determines the worldview he
will acquire as he learns the language.[35]
It is these two formulations of Roger Brown's which have become widely known and attributed to
Whorf and Sapir while in fact the second formulation, verging on linguistic determinism, was never
advanced by either of them.
Since Brown and Lenneberg believed that the objective reality denoted by language was the same
for speakers of all languages, they decided to test how different languages codified the same
message differently and whether differences in codification could be proven to affect behavior.

They designed a number of experiments involving the codification of colors. In their first experiment,
they investigated whether it was easier for speakers of English to remember color shades for which
they had a specific name than to remember colors that were not as easily definable by words. This
allowed them to correlate the linguistic categorization directly to a non-linguistic task, that of
recognizing and remembering colors. In a later experiment, speakers of two languages that
categorize colors differently (English and Zuni) were asked to perform tasks of color recognition. In
this way, it could be determined whether the differing color categories of the two speakers would
determine their ability to recognize nuances within color categories. Brown and Lenneberg in fact
found that Zui speakers who classify green and blue together as a single category did have trouble
recognizing and remembering nuances within the green/blue category.[36] Brown and Lenneberg's
study became the beginning of a tradition of investigation of the linguistic relativity through color
terminology (see below).

The universalist period[edit]


Main article: Universalism and relativism of color terminology
Lenneberg was also one of the first cognitive scientists to begin development of the Universalist
theory of language which was finally formulated by Noam Chomskyin the form of Universal
Grammar, effectively arguing that all languages share the same underlying structure. The
Chomskyan school also holds the belief that linguistic structures are largely innate and that what are
perceived as differences between specific languages the knowledge acquired by learning a
language are merely surface phenomena and do not affect cognitive processes that are universal
to all human beings. This theory became the dominant paradigm in American linguistics from the
1960s through the 1980s and the notion of linguistic relativity fell out of favor and became even the
object of ridicule.[37]
An example of the influence of universalist theory in the 1960s is the studies by Brent
Berlin and Paul Kay who continued Lenneberg's research in color terminology. Berlin and Kay
studied color terminology formation in languages and showed clear universal trends in color naming.
For example, they found that even though languages have different color terminologies, they
generally recognize certain hues as more focal than others. They showed that in languages with few
color terms, it is predictable from the number of terms which hues are chosen as focal colors, for
example, languages with only three color terms always have the focal colors black, white and
red.[38] The fact that what had been believed to be random differences between color naming in
different languages could be shown to follow universal patterns was seen as a powerful argument
against linguistic relativity.[39] Berlin and Kay's research has since been criticized by relativists such
as John A. Lucy, who has argued that Berlin and Kay's conclusions were skewed by their insistence
that color terms should encode only color information.[40] This, Lucy argues, made them blind to the
instances in which color terms provided other information that might be considered examples of
linguistic relativity.
Other universalist researchers dedicated themselves to dispelling other notions of linguistic relativity,
often attacking specific points and examples given by Whorf. For example, Ekkehart Malotki's
monumental study of time expressions in Hopi presented many examples that challenged Whorf's
interpretation of Hopi language and culture as being "timeless".[41]
Today many followers of the universalist school of thought still oppose the idea of linguistic relativity.
For example, Steven Pinker argues in his book The Language Instinct that thought is independent of
language, that language is itself meaningless in any fundamental way to human thought, and that
human beings do not even think in "natural" language, i.e. any language that we actually
communicate in; rather, we think in a meta-language, preceding any natural language, called
"mentalese." Pinker attacks what he calls "Whorf's radical position," declaring, "the more you
examine Whorf's arguments, the less sense they make."[42]
Pinker and other universalist opponents of the linguistic relativity hypothesis have been accused by
relativists of misrepresenting Whorf's views and arguing againststrawmen put up by themselves.[43]

Fishman's 'Whorfianism of the third kind'[edit]


Joshua Fishman argued that Whorf's true position was for a long time largely overlooked by most
linguists. In 1978, he suggested that Whorf was a 'neo-Herderianchampion'[44] and in 1982, he
proposed his 'Whorfianism of the third kind' in an attempt to refocus linguists' attention on what he
claimed was Whorf's real interest, namely the intrinsic value of 'little peoples' and 'little
languages'.[45] Whorf had expressed the sentiment thus:
But to restrict thinking to the patterns merely of English [] is to lose a power of thought which, once
lost, can never be regained. It is the 'plainest' English which contains the greatest number of
unconscious assumptions about nature. [] We handle even our plain English with much greater
effect if we direct it from the vantage point of a multilingual awareness.[46]
Where Brown's weak version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis proposes that
language influences thought and the strong version that language determinesthought, Fishman's
'Whorfianism of the third kind' proposes that language is a key to culture.

Cognitive linguistics[edit]
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, advances in cognitive psychology and cognitive
linguistics renewed interest in the SapirWhorf hypothesis.[47] One of those who adopted a more
Whorfian approach was George Lakoff. He argued that language is often used metaphorically and
that languages use different cultural metaphors that reveal something about how speakers of that
language think. For example, English employs metaphors likening time with money, whereas other
languages may not talk about time in that fashion. Other linguistic metaphors may be common to
most languages because they are based on general human experience, for example, metaphors
likening up with good and bad with down. Lakoff also argues that metaphor plays an important part
in political debates where it matters whether one is arguing in favor of the "right to life" or against the
"right to choose"; whether one is discussing "illegal aliens" or "undocumented workers".
In his book Women, Fire and Dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind,[33] Lakoff
reappraised the hypothesis of linguistic relativity and especially Whorf's views about how linguistic
categorization reflects and/or influences mental categories. He concluded that the debate on
linguistic relativity had been confused and resultingly fruitless. He identified four parameters on
which researchers differed in their opinions about what constitutes linguistic relativity. One
parameter is the degree and depth of linguistic relativity. Some scholars believe that a few examples
of superficial differences in language and associated behavior are enough to demonstrate the
existence of linguistic relativity, while others contend that only deep differences that permeate the
linguistic and cultural system suffice as proof. A second parameter is whether conceptual systems
are to be seen as absolute or whether they can be expanded or exchanged during the lifetime of a
human being. A third parameter is whether translatability is accepted as a proof of similarity or
difference between concept systems or whether it is rather the actual habitual use of linguistic
expressions that is to be examined. A fourth parameter is whether to view the locus of linguistic
relativity as being in the language or in the mind. Lakoff concluded that since many of Whorf's critics
had criticized him using definitions of linguistic relativity that Whorf did not himself use, their
criticisms were often ineffective.
The publication of the 1996 anthology Rethinking linguistic relativity edited by sociolinguist John J.
Gumperz and psycholinguist Stephen C. Levinson marked the entrance to a new period of linguistic
relativity studies and a new way of defining the concept that focused on cognitive as well as social
aspects of linguistic relativity. The book included studies by cognitive linguists sympathetic to the
hypothesis as well as some working in the opposing universalist tradition. In this volume, cognitive
and social scientists laid out a new paradigm for investigations in linguistic relativity. Levinson
presented research results documenting rather significant linguistic relativity effects in the linguistic
conceptualization of spatial categories between languages. Two separate studies by Melissa
Bowerman and Dan I. Slobin treated the role of language in cognitive processes. Bowerman showed

that certain cognitive processes did not use language to any significant extent and therefore could
not be subject to effects of linguistic relativity. Slobin described another kind of cognitive process that
he named "thinking for speaking" the kind of processes in which perceptional data and other kinds
of prelinguistic cognition are translated into linguistic terms for the purpose of communicating them
to others. These, Slobin argues, are the kinds of cognitive process that are at the root of linguistic
relativity.

Present status[edit]
Current researchers such as Lera Boroditsky, John A. Lucy and Stephen C. Levinson believe that
language influences thought, but in more limited ways than the broadest early claims. Exploring
these parameters has sparked novel research that increases both scope and precision of prior
examinations. Current studies of linguistic relativity are neither marked by the naive approach to
exotic linguistic structures and their often merely presumed effect on thought that marked the early
period, nor are they ridiculed and discouraged as in the universalist period. Instead of proving or
disproving a theory, researchers in linguistic relativity now examine the interface between thought (or
cognition), language and culture, and describe the degree and kind of interrelatedness or influence.
Following the tradition of Lenneberg, they use experimental data to back up their
conclusions.[48][49] Paul Kay, co-author of the seminal work about color naming, ultimately reached the
conclusion that "[the] Whorf hypothesis is supported in the right visual field but not the left".[50] His
findings show that taking in account brain lateralization allows another perspective on the debate.
Psycholinguistic studies have gone far beyond color perception (although that is still studied), having
explored motion perception, emotion perception, object representation, and memory.[51][52][53][54] The
gold standard of psycholinguistic studies on linguistic relativity is now finding cognitive differences in
speakers of different language when no language is involved in an experimental task (thus rendering
inapplicable Pinker's claim that linguistic relativity is "circular").
Recent work with bilingual speakers attempts to tease apart the effects of language from the effects
of culture on aspects of bilingual cognition including perceptions of time, space, motion, colors, and
emotion.[55] Researchers have described differences between bilinguals and monolinguals in
perception of color,[56]representations of time,[57] or other elements of cognition.

Empirical research[edit]
John Lucy has identified three main strands of research into linguistic relativity.[58] The first is what he
calls the "structure centered" approach. This approach starts with observing a structural peculiarity in
a language and goes on to examine its possible ramifications for thought and behavior. The first
example of this kind of research is Whorf's observation of discrepancies between the grammar of
time expressions in Hopi and English. More recent research in this vein is the research made by
John Lucy describing how usage of the categories of grammatical number and of numeral classifiers
in the Mayan language Yucatec result in Mayan speakers classifying objects according to material
rather than to shape as preferred by speakers of English.[59]
The second strand of research is the "domain centered" approach, in which a semantic domain is
chosen and compared across linguistic and cultural groups for correlations between linguistic
encoding and behavior. The main strand of domain centered research has been the research on
color terminology, although this domain according to Lucy and admitted by color terminology
researchers such as Paul Kay, is not optimal for studying linguistic relativity, because color
perception, unlike other semantic domains, is known to be hard wired into the neural system and as
such subject to more universal restrictions than other semantic domains. Since the tradition of
research on color terminology is by far the largest area of research into linguistic relativity it is
described below in its own section. Another semantic domain which has proven fruitful for studies of
linguistic relativity is the domain of space.[60] Spatial categories vary greatly between languages and
recent research has shown that speakers rely on the linguistic conceptualization of space in

performing many quotidian tasks. Research carried out by Stephen C. Levinson and other cognitive
scientists from the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics has reported three basic kinds of
spatial categorization and while many languages use combinations of them some languages exhibit
only one kind of spatial categorization and corresponding differences in behavior. For example the
Australian language Guugu Yimithirr only uses absolute directions when describing spatial
relations the position of everything is described by using the cardinal directions. A speaker of
Guugu yimithirr will define a person as being "north of the house", while a speaker of English may
say that he is "in front of the house" or "to the left of the house" depending on the speaker's point of
view. This difference makes Guugu yimithirr speakers better at performing some kinds of tasks, such
as finding and describing locations in open terrain, whereas English speakers perform better in tasks
regarding the positioning of objects relative to the speaker (for example telling someone to set a
round table putting forks to the right of the plate and knives to the left would be extremely difficult in
Guugu yimithirr).[61]
The third strand of research is the "behavior centered" approach which starts by observing different
behavior between linguistic groups and then proceeds to search for possible causes for that
behavior in the linguistic system. This kind of approach was used by Whorf when he attributed the
occurrence of fires at a chemical plant to the workers' use of the word 'empty' to describe the barrels
containing only explosive vapors. One study in this line of research has been conducted by Bloom
who noticed that speakers of Chinese had unexpected difficulties answering counter-factual
questions posed to them in a questionnaire. After a study, he concluded that this was related to the
way in which counter-factuality is marked grammatically in the Chinese language. However, other
researchers have attributed this result to flawed translations that Bloom used.[62] Another line of study
by Frode Strmnes examined why Finnish factories had a higher occurrence of work related
accidents than similar Swedish ones. He concluded that cognitive differences between the
grammatical usage of Swedish prepositions and Finnish cases could have caused Swedish factories
to pay more attention to the work process where Finnish factory organizers paid more attention to
the individual worker.[63]
Another widely publicized project with relevance to linguistic relativity is Daniel Everett's work on
the Pirah language of the Brazilian Amazon.[64] Everett observed several peculiarities in Pirah
culture that he interpreted as corresponding to linguistically rare features, such as a lack of numbers
and color terms in the way those are normally defined, and a lack of certain types of clauses.
Everett's conclusions about the exceptional status of the Pirah have been met with skepticism from
universalists, who disagree with his conclusions.[65] That is, these critics argue, the lack of need for
numbers and color discrimination explains both the lack of counting ability and the lack of color
vocabulary.[66]
Recent research with non-linguistic experiments in languages with different grammatical properties
(e.g., languages with and without numeral classifiers or with different gender grammar systems)
showed that there areto a certain degreedifferences in human categorization due to such
differences.[67] But there is also experimental research suggesting, that this linguistic influence on
thought is not of long continuance, but diminishes rapidly over time, when speakers of one language
are immersed by another.[68]

Color terminology research[edit]


Main article: Linguistic relativity and the color naming debate
The tradition of using the semantic domain of color names as an object for investigation of linguistic
relativity began with Lenneberg and Roberts' 1953 study of Zuni color terms and color memory, and
Brown and Lenneberg's 1954 study of English color terms and color memory. The studies showed a
correlation between the availability of color terms for specific colors and the ease with which those
colors were remembered in both speakers of Zuni and English. Researchers concluded that this had
to do with properties of the focal colors having higher codability than less focal colors, and not with
linguistic relativity effects. Berlin and Kay's 1969 study of color terms across languages concluded

that there are universal typological principles of color naming that are determined by biological
factors with little or no room for relativity related effects.[69] This study sparked a long tradition of
studies into the typological universals of color terminology. Some researchers such as John A
Lucy,[70] Barbara Saunders[71] and Stephen C Levinson[72] have argued that Berlin and Kay's study
does not in fact show that linguistic relativity in color naming is impossible, because of a number of
basic unsupported assumptions in their study (such as whether all cultures in fact have a category of
"color" that can be unproblematically defined and equated with the one found in Indo-European
languages) and because of problems with their data stemming from those basic assumptions. Other
researchers such as Robert E. Maclaury have continued investigation into the evolution of color
names in specific languages, refining the possibilities of basic color term inventories. Like Berlin and
Kay, Maclaury found no significant room for linguistic relativity in this domain, but rather concluded
as did Berlin and Kay that the domain is governed mostly by physical-biological universals of human
color perception.[73][74]

Outside of science[edit]
The hypothesis of linguistic relativity has inspired many to think about how it might be possible to
influence thought by consciously manipulating language.

Therapy and self-development[edit]


Main articles: General semantics and Neurolinguistic Programming
Already as Sapir and Whorf were formulating the ideas of linguistic relativity, Polish-American
engineer Alfred Korzybski was independently developing his theory ofGeneral Semantics which was
aimed at using language's influence on thinking to maximize human cognitive abilities. Korzybski's
thinking was influenced by logical philosophy such as Russel and Whitehead's Principia
Mathematica and Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus."[75] Although Korzybski was not
aware of Sapir and Whorf's writings when he developed his thinking, the movement was followed by
Whorf's admirer Stuart Chase, who fused Whorf's interest in cultural-linguistic variation with
Korzybski's programme in his popular work "The Tyranny of Words". Another follower and
popularizer of Korzybski's work was S. I. Hayakawa, who wrote Language in Thought and Action.
The General Semantics movement in turn influenced the development of Neurolinguistic
programming, another therapeutic technique that seeks to use awareness of language use to
influence cognitive patterns.[76]
Independently of Whorf and Sapir, Korzybski described the basic principle of his theory in a way that
is a "strong" version of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity.[77]
We do not realize what tremendous power the structure of an habitual language has. It is not an
exaggeration to say that it enslaves us through the mechanism of s[emantic] r[eactions] and that the
structure which a language exhibits, and impresses upon us unconsciously, is automatically
projected upon the world around us.
Korzybski (1930) in Science & Sanity p. 90[78]

Artificial languages[edit]
Main articles: Constructed languages and Experimental languages
In their fiction, authors such as Ayn Rand and George Orwell have explored how linguistic relativity
might be exploited for political purposes. In Rand's work a fictivecommunist society have removed
the possibility of individualism by removing the word "I" from the language of their community, and in
Orwell's 1984 the authoritarian state has created the language "Newspeak" to make it impossible for
people to think critically about the government.
Others have been fascinated by the possibilities of creating new languages that could enable new,
and perhaps better, ways of thinking. Examples of such languages designed to explore the human

mind include Loglan, explicitly designed by its inventor James Cooke Brown to test the hypothesis of
linguistic relativity, by experimenting whether it would make its speakers think more logically.
Speakers of Lojban, a development of Loglan, report that they feel speaking the language enhances
their ability for logical thinking. Suzette Haden Elgin, who also was involved in the early development
of neurolinguistic programming, invented the language Ladan, specifically devised to explore
linguistic relativity, by making it easier to express what Elgin considered the female worldview, as
opposed toStandard Average European languages which she considers to convey a "male centered"
world view.[79] Also the language Ithkuil developed by John Quijada, has been designed with linguistic
relativity in mind, exploring the limits of how many cognitive categories a language can make use of,
and keep its speakers aware of at a single time.[80]

Programming languages[edit]
Kenneth E. Iverson, the originator of the APL programming language, believed that the SapirWhorf
hypothesis applied to computer languages (without actually mentioning the hypothesis by name).
His Turing award lecture, "Notation as a tool of thought", was devoted to this theme, arguing that
more powerful notations aided thinking about computer algorithms.[81]
The essays of Paul Graham explore similar themes, such as a conceptual hierarchy of computer
languages, with more expressive and succinct languages at the top. Thus, the socalled blub paradox (after a hypothetical programming language of average complexity called Blub)
says that anyone preferentially using some particular programming language will know that it is more
powerful than some, but not that it is less powerful than others. The reason is that writing in some
language means thinking in that language. Hence the paradox, because typically programmers are
"satisfied with whatever language they happen to use, because it dictates the way they think about
programs".[82]
In a 2003 presentation at an open source convention, Yukihiro Matsumoto, creator of
the programming language Ruby, said that one of his inspirations for developing the language was
the science fiction novel Babel-17, based on the SapirWhorf Hypothesis.[83]

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