Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Control
Craig T. Borowiak
Introduction
Craig T. Borowiak
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778256.003.0000
Introduction
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books are opened and debts and credits are tabulated. Here, the balance
sheet serves (figuratively if not actually) as the central accounting device. On
its face, calculations are made visible, debts and credits are revealed, and
performance is exposed for scrutiny and judgment according to objective
criteria with the aim of correcting imbalances. Alternatively, one can give
an account in the sense of narrating or justifying a series of events and
behavior. The telling of reasons, albeit often harboring a calculation of its
own, nonetheless suggests something at least potentially more dialogical
in nature. Its metaphors are as much aural and oral as they are visual. The
emphasis is upon answerability and moral reasoning over and above the
totalizing equivalencies implied in numerical calculation. These connotations
in turn receive different shadings within different democratic traditions.
In contemporary democratic theory they are, for example, manifest in
the differing approaches of aggregative (p. 7 ) and deliberative models of
democracy. Whereas the former focuses on the calculation of prefigured
individual preferences and the counting of votes as a way to measure
the gap between an officers performance and the public interest, the
latter centers on dialogue, reason giving, public justification, and social
transformation. As will become clear in the following chapters, I believe the
calculating connotation has become overweighted in contemporary discourse
with the result that accountability is too often seen as a tool for discipline
and efficient management rather than as a way to encourage receptivity,
dialogue, and mutual understanding.
All forms of accountability also rely on a combination of visibility and
punishment. Accountability requires visibility in an epistemic sense; it
requires information and understanding. In order to hold people accountable
for their behavior one must first be able to identify that behavior; one
must first have a line of sight. Accountability discourse is correspondingly
populated by references to transparency, monitoring, whistle-blowing, backroom deals, imperfect and asymmetrical information, disclosure, opaque
supply chains, and so forth. Visibility in this epistemic sense can take the
form of external monitoring. It can also result from discursive processes of
explanation and justification. Some of the most intractable accountability
problems emerge when the effects of power are visible, but the sources
of such effects are diffuse, systemic, or otherwise unidentifiable, such as
we may find with financial crises involving opaque financial instruments,
with sweatshops and the elaborate subcontracting relations in international
commodity chains, or with global warming and other human-caused changes
to the environment.
Page 5 of 27
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Introduction
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Democratic Accountability
To qualify as democratic, the right actors need to be accountable to the
right people for the right reasons and in the right way. Thus, for example, a
bureaucratic organization might have a very elaborate system of supervisory
accountability internal to its operation, but this alone does not mean it
is democratically accountable. Similarly, just because the majority of a
population wishes to remove a corrupt official from office does not mean that
the intervention of a foreign government to depose that official constitutes
democratic accountability: the wrong actors are involved.
It is relatively easy to generate examples such as these of what democratic
accountability is not. It is considerably more difficult to generate precise
criteria for what democratic accountability is. Answers to the questions Who
should be accountable to whom, for what, and how? vary across historical
contexts, democratic paradigms, and political cultures. Because part of
my task in this book is to reconceptualize democratic accountability for
Page 7 of 27
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Introduction
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criterion for inclusion. What matters most for my argument is that the
boundaries of citizenship remain contested and open for interrogation and
renegotiation. As will become clear, I believe the dynamic between citizen
insiders and noncitizen outsiders is centrally important for democratic
accountability. Initiatives undertaken from outside established channels
of citizenship can introduce new accountability actors and relationships,
new roles, and new standards that challenge existing membership criteria.
Democratic accountability can both interrupt status quos and constitute new
bases for defining what does and does not qualify as a legitimate basis for
inclusion.
Working with these definitions, I make four broad sets of arguments in this
book. Three address democratic accountabilitys functions. I argue that
democratic accountability functions as a means of control, as a means of
solidarity and political community, and as a means of disruption and critique.
My fourth argument is more fundamental. I contend that, as a source of
political legitimacy, democratic accountability needs to be rethought in
ways that break from modern notions of popular sovereignty. Rather than
construing democratic accountability as an expression of a sovereign public,
I argue it should be re-conceived as part of a post-sovereignty politics that
resists all claims to final authority, including claims made by democratic
publics themselves. I will elaborate on each of these arguments.
Introduction
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Page 11 of 27
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Introduction
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The grounds for making that determination invariably stand outside the
accountability dynamic itself: accountable governance is anchored in
unaccountable assertions of authority. With a twist on the classic question,
Who should guard the guardians? we might thus ask, Who is going to hold
the accountability-makers accountable? It is not possible to fully overcome
the problems of infinite regress that asking such a question invites, but it is
possible to approach this reflexivity in different ways. Democratic discourse
often makes it sound like democracy provides accountable government. To
the form of illegitimacy that stems from the unaccountability of tyranny and
oligarchy, democracy is presented as the solution. Democracy, however,
doesnt so much solve the problem of unaccountability as it does shift
its location. It would replace the unaccountability of the tyrant with the
unaccountability of the demos. If governance without accountability is
tyranny, then democracy harbors its own tyrannical shadow insofar as the
boundaries of the demos are not themselves opened to scrutiny. Modern
notions of popular sovereignty have reinforced this.
The principle of popular sovereignty, developed in eighteenth-century
Europe as a way to divest other sovereignties of their normative and political
authority, is meant to ground the legitimacy of political power. Nevertheless,
as Hobbes and other early theorists of sovereignty observed long ago, the
sovereigns authority is defined by its unaccountability. This applies as
much to popular sovereigns as it does to monarchical ones. Subjects may
be accountable to the sovereign, but the sovereign is accountable to no
one.7 Insofar as political communities ground themselves in totalizing claims
to final authority, they define their authority against rather than through
accountability. Because their authority is considered final, the people are not
accountable for their decisions: if they were subjected to anothers authority,
their authority would cease to be final. The people, however, is not an
unproblematic category. Ironically, if the accountability of political authority
is a sine qua non of political legitimacy, then popular sovereignty stands in
the way of a more legitimate politics.
The desire for a final sovereign democratic subject most often takes as its
referent the bounded communities of city, region, or nation, and determining
who counts and who does not is left to those already included. With nations
rendered as clubs, decisions about membership in political communities
would be the privilege of members. Citizens alone would have the authority
to decide who else should be included and how accountability relations
should be comprised. History has shown, however, that that authority has
as often been a source of abuse as a source of freedom. Large segments
Page 15 of 27
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This is not to reject citizenship or the idea of a demos per se. It is not the
existence of a demos that poses the challenge for accountable governance.
Rather, it is the notion that the demoss authority is final. A reconceived,
post-sovereign notion of democratic accountability would still require
democratic publics, but the structures and decisions of these publics would
no longer be located outside the field of contestation and answerability.
Introduction
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escape their control. Today, the decisions made in one country often (p.
18 ) have governance effects that reach well beyond national borders, and
many sources of governance end up neither authorized by nor accountable
to the people governed or affected by them. Consequently, even though
democratic accountability is normatively indispensable for legitimate
governance, at the national level its conditions of possibility appear to be
slipping away, to the extent that they were ever in place to begin with.
It is important to avoid exaggeration. The early exuberance for globalization
has given way to more tempered reflections about the nationally embedded
nature of global flows,13 about the continuing relevance of state regulation,14
about the historical continuities of globalization,15 and about the ways
the vision of state sovereignty that serves as a foil for globalization hype
is based largely on a fiction: the Westphalian order of sovereign nationstates was never so seamless.16 Moreover, in some ways nation-states
are acquiring more, not less, power and authority as a result of outside
pressures: The threat of transnational terrorism has resulted in heightened
state monitoring and regulation of social life; global environmental pressures
have generated new environmental bureaucracies; global financial crises
have given rise to new forms of economic regulation. Such qualifications
notwithstanding, I believe the basic globalization thesis remains compelling.
The capacity and authority of states to regulate affairs within what has
been considered their territorial and citizenship-defined sovereign space is
being significantly altered by the transformations mentioned earlier. With
more integrated economies and more porous social and political boundaries,
the notion of a bounded and authoritative national citizenry exerting
self-governance has, thus, grown disjointed from the actual exercise of
governing power. This has bearing on the possibility of realizing democratic
accountability.
Insofar as globalization can be characterized in terms of insides that are
being shaped or affected by outsides, it clashes with the desire for an
autonomous, democratically regulated interior. The republican principle
that locates ultimate political authority in the people (the citizenry; the
demos) is sidestepped when transnational bodies and systems exert political
influence over state decisions without being compelled to account, finally,
to the members of the political community. The presence of alternative
sources of influence and authority interrupts the accountability dynamics
that are seemingly indispensable for democratic politics. Quite simply, the
accountability extracted from governments by bodies outside the citizenry
itself and unauthorized by it marks a deviation from forms of democratic
Page 17 of 27
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Chapter Outline
I have divided the book into three parts, loosely organized around the books
core themes. In part I, I focus on the role of democratic accountability as a
source of popular control and on how different institutional configurations
can enhance or thwart accountabilitys controlling effects. I begin in chapter
1 by using the eighteenth-century U.S. ratification debates between the
Federalists and Anti-Federalists to reflect upon competing accountability
tendencies inherent in republican institutions. Both sets of authors conceived
of accountability mechanisms as part of a politics of control designed to
manage the (p. 22 ) various gaps separating representatives from citizens.
They, nevertheless, had different understandings of what such a politics
should entail, and their respective republican appeals to accountability
served conflicting agendas. I draw attention to several pitfalls of institutional
design and to the need to balance the effects accountability institutions
have on government with the effects they have on citizens and democratic
culture.
In chapter 2, I argue that contemporary social-scientific discourse has
become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability
typified by the widespread use of the principalagent framework. Within
this model, accountability is treated as involving citizen principals holding
representative agents to account in order to compel the agent to uphold
the principals interests. Despite its considerable utility in selected contexts,
the principalagent framework fails as a general model of democratic
accountability. The model has the benefit of illuminating how conflicting
interests and informational constraints can confound the effects of electoral
accountability. Nonetheless, when it comes to gaining a full picture of what
democratic accountability entails, this approach has several shortcomings.
It is too bound to institutional hierarchies at the expense of horizontal forms
of accountability. It is too focused on disciplining officials according to the
principals preferences, at the expense of accountabilitys role in generating
preferences and new forms of solidarity. It also reflects a conservative bias
that favors formal institutions and that discounts accountability initiatives
coming from outside established institutional structures.
Part II shifts attention away from discipline and control and, instead,
addresses democratic accountability as a source of communal solidarity
and mutual understanding. It also shifts attention away from representative
government and toward deliberative and direct models of democratic
accountability in which reciprocity is given greater priority. Chapter 3
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Notes:
(1) . The Old French is derived from the late Latin accomptare, which
combines the shortened version of computare meaning to calculate with
the preposition ac or ad meaning to or toward. There was also clearly
variation in the spelling. The OED lists the following variations: acont, acunt,
acunte, acounte, aconpte, accompte, accompt, acownte. Although the
specific word accountability appears to have originated in eighteenth-century
America in the context of debates over political representation, Mel Dubnick
claims that Middle English terms related to accountability can be traced to
the fourteenth century and to Old French equivalents for comptes rendres.
He goes on to describe accountability as an Anglican concept that is tied
to the political history of modern England. See Melvin J. Dubnick, Clarifying
Accountability: An Ethical Theory Framework, in Public Sector Ethics: Finding
and Implementing Values, ed. Charles Sampford, Noel Preston, and C-A Bois
(New York: Routledge, 1999), 6881.
(2) . See Richard McKeon, The Development and the Significance of the
Concept of Responsibility, in Freedom and History and Other Essays: An
Introduction to the Thought of Richard McKeon, ed. Zahava K. McKeon
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 69.
(3) . See, for example, Catalina Smulovitz and Enrique Peruzzotti, Societal
and Horizontal Controls: Two Cases of a Fruitful Relationship, in Democratic
Accountability in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30932; Guillermo ODonnell,
Horizontal Accountability and New Polyarchies, in The Self-Restraining
State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, ed. Andreas Schedler,
Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 29
52.
(4) . See Gerry Stoker, Governance as Theory: Five Propositions,
International Social Science Journal 155 (1998): 1728; James N. Rosenau,
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(9) . Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work
of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York:
Routledge, 1994).
(10) . Even if one maintains that the ends of accountability should be
determined not by democratic publics but by reference to abstract principles,
as liberal theorists generally do with their appeal to rights, the determination
of those principles also presumes an unaccountable authoritative claim: Who
has the authority to
determine which principles are universal and which rights are to be actively
protected? Reason does not speak on its own, and rights have long been
shown to be heavily contested.
(11) . See, for example, David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and
Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
(12) . See Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., The Emergence
of Private Authority in Global Governance (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
(13) . Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
(14) . Michael Mann, Has Globalization Ended the Rise and the Rise of the
Nation-State? Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1997):
47296; Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and National Politics: Collision
Course or Virtuous Circle? International Organization 52, no. 4, (1998); 787
824.
(15) . Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson. Globalization in Question: The
International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, 2nd ed. (Malden,
MA: Polity Press; 1999).
(16) . Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999).
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