THE CONTROL OF WAR

By Jeffrey Peter Bradford

As Clauswitz noted in his work, On War, "The conduct of war, in its great features, is therefore policy
itself which takes up the sword in place of the pen" (1) From the time of his writing, war has become
inextricably linked with the political process, the consequence being that political figures have sought
control in the application of the military instrument. This could not be seen more clearly in the
consideration of the debate about the control of nuclear war, where the consequences of failing to
maintain control are most severe.

This paper is concerned with the question of war as a manageable process, and the technical
arrangements for the control and release of the nuclear weaponry used to fight limited war, as well as
the doctrine of 'controlled escalation', in line with Henry Kissinger's two pre-requisites for the conduct
of limited war, "a doctrine and a capability" (2) The key theme which, it could be suggested permeates
the following the following discourse is the issue of what could be described as the 'reality' gap,
between the theorist/policy-maker's plans for controlled employment of nuclear weapons, and the tense
situation in which the decisions would be taken. It is my intention to consider each of these questions
in turn;

IS WAR A MANAGEABLE PROCESS ?

In answering the above question, it is my intention to make a distinction between conventional and
nuclear warfare for the purposes of an initial analysis. A further caveat to the following discussion is
that the question suggests the management of war after the commencement of hostilities, and the
analysis of both conventional and nuclear operations will leave aside the issue of pre-conflict political
considerations outside the context of the escalation process, as portrayed by Herman Kahn.

Conventional war, in the western military mould has lent itself to management, it could be
suggested, allowing for the unavoidable Clauswitzian notion of the 'fog of war'. The effects of drill and
rigid discipline have forged a military culture which can be relied upon to obey orders, to make and
cease war upon command, even when the consequence is the unconditional surrender of the society
they were formed to defend. With the introduction of peacekeeping, this discipline is well shown in the
ability with which soldiers operate in areas of conflict with very concise rules of engagement, only
being able, at best to return fire after being fired upon.

The alliance of technology to this culture has proved profound. In the days of Clauswitz, the
road formed the strategic line of communication (3) Since then technological progress has seen
communication times diminish rapidly, as messages left the era of pen and paper, and entered the
realms of telegraph, telephone, radio, and satellite, approaching rapidly within a century, the capacity
for near instantaneous communications world-wide. To illustrate the increasing importance placed
upon communications, as the key to managing armed conflict, the general staff of Von Moltke in 1870
composed 70 staff officers, responsible for one million men. By the time of the US involvement in
Vietnam, the signals brigade supporting the American command was 5% of the total deployment of
troops or 23,000 (4) The integration of technology in the form of communications, with traditional
methods of exercising command and control of military operations has come to be defined in the
acronym C3, or Communication, Command and Control.

In the context of preparations to fight a limited nuclear war, even if only to reinforce a deterrence
stance, has led to a considerable financial investment. Estimates vary from one and a half billion
dollars per year since 1970 (5) to $40 billion between 1960 and 1980 on strategic nuclear C3
architecture alone (6)

The rationale for strategic C3 resources evolved from the position in the 1950s and 1960s
where they were needed to prevent accidental nuclear war to the position in the early 1970s where C3
would play a key role as "the essential cornerstone of any nuclear warfighting strategy, no matter how
limited" (7) In official terminology, the new systems would act as a force multiplier (8) Improved C3
it was suggested would assist the political and military conduct of a war in exacting superior control
over nuclear assets, whether deployed in the air, at sea, or on land.
 However, the emerging problem with the development of ground based C3 systems was that
if they were assumed to be worth the investment in them, then an enemy would consider them so
important as to be priority targets in time of war, through a decapitation strike, which would have the
effect of also destroying the key government officials, who would be with the systems themselves, thus
gaining the initiative during the post-strike confusion. This concern led to attempts to better shield the
systems, and in the early 1970s newer airborne command posts were procured to ensure that the NCA
would survive a first strike. One such attempt at improving the survivability of the system saw the
creation, as a by-product of the Internet (9)

In summary, the question of war as being a manageable process lends itself to a positive
answer, at least regarding conventional conflict. The Gulf war of 1991 was characterised by the
superior command systems, and innovations such as satellite navigation which enhanced the ability of
coalition forces to synchronise their actions and react rapidly to developments.

The issue of limited nuclear war management, however, is more problematic, as will become
clear through the paper. The very systems created to enhance the management of such a conflict have
become prime targets for destruction, raising the question, are these measures restoring stability to
nuclear deterrence, or are they actually de stabilising ? American doctrine in the 1980s emphasised
"targeting... the known Soviet obsession with political control" (10) Finally, it could be suggested that
any action involving the use of any nuclear weapons, would be a major escalation, and as such would
involve a high degree of political control, which a conventional conflict would not require, at each and
every subsequent stage.

WHAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE THE AMERICANS MADE FOR CONTROLLING

STRATEGIC EXCHANGES ?
In this part of the paper, it is my intention to examine the key instrument which has provided the
President since the 1960s with an array of nuclear options, known as the Single Integrated Operational
Plan or SIOP.

The evolution of modern American arrangements for employing nuclear weapons can be
traced back to 1961, during President Kennedy's tenure, with the establishment of the SIOP, which had
at its heart the aim of giving the President options other than executing a pre-planned massive
retaliatory strike, or spasm in response to Soviet aggression. For example a plan code named
'Dropshot' created in the United States in 1949 contained three hundred targets in the Soviet Union
which would be attacked with atomic weapons upon execution (11) The SIOP name derives from
Single, indicating a plan which accounted for all the nuclear devices located in the armed services, and
Integrated in that the plan covered all these American weapons, as well as those comprising the British
`independent' nuclear deterrent. In its original incarnation, SIOP-62 which entered into effect in
January 1961 had a mixture of counterforce (military) and countervalue (urban) targets (12) 1961 also
saw the deployment of airborne command posts to maintain communications links with surviving
strategic assets after withstanding a nuclear first strike (13)

In 1962 the Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara delivered a speech at Ann Arbor which
formally declared the counterforce (military targeting) policy. This was followed in August by a
revision of the SIOP, known as the "no cities version" or SIOP-63. This revision introduced four
options from which the President could select, bringing nuclear weapons into the defence policy known
as `flexible response` which aimed to give the United States to respond to any type of threat, with a
proportionate response. These options ranged from the Major Attack Option which was little similar
from previous spasm plans, through Selected and Limited Attack Options, the latter of which targeted
fixed military and industrial targets, down to Regional Attack Options, which utilised tactical nuclear
weapons against small, mobile targets such as for example the leading forces of a conventional attack.

A further development in 1962, was the formation of the World-Wide Military Command and
Control System (WWMCCS), which formed the basis for modern American C3 developments. The
system aimed to "provide the constituted authorities with the information needed for accurate and
timely decisions, and the reliable communications needed to transmit these decisions to the military
forces under all conditions of peace and war" (14) The development of such a system was spurred by
the increasing difficulties faced in maintaining contact with both conventional and strategic forces
deployed around the world. The advantages which these developments gave the United States were, to
a great extent negated by the mid 1960s by increased numbers of Soviet nuclear weapons. This
development led McNamara to move towards a policy of 'assured destruction', that is having enough
weapons to inflict severe damage after withstanding as first strike.

In 1971 President Nixon endorsed this policy with minor modifications as the 'doctrine of
sufficiency', which critics suggested as undermining the rationale behind flexible response (15)
Meanwhile a Department of Defence (DoD) study suggested room for further revision of the SIOP, and
after admissions that Soviet military forces were being targeted once more, which some saw as
provoking the Soviet Union, National Security Division Memorandum (NSDM) 242 was created.

In January 1974 the Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger was authorised by NSDM-242 to
create a document known as NUWEP, or the Nuclear Weapon Employment Programme. The rationale
behind this document was to set out objectives and options to make the policy of flexible response
workable. In effect it led to a new version of the SIOP, SIOP-5 which was available from January
1976. The new SIOP included two new attack options, Launch on Warning and pre-emptive strike, as
well as by now covering over 25,000 targets. A further addition to SIOP-5 was the concept of
'controlled escalation' which Schlesinger described initially as, "a series of measured responses to
aggression which bear some relation to the provocation, have some prospects of terminating hostilities
before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deterrence" (16)
Essentially, it could be suggested the "Schlesinger doctrine" as it was known was little more than a re-
affirmation of the principles of flexible response.

Following a review of nuclear targeting policy in the late 1970s, President Carter issued
directive number fifty-nine (PD-59) in July 1980. PD-59 changed targeting policy within the SIOP,
prioritising military as opposed to industrial targets, also assigning high priority to Soviet military and
political C3 facilities, "most importantly they [in the directive] required US nuclear forces to be able to
endure a nuclear war. The new doctrine was dubbed, grandly, the counter-vailing strategy" (17)

It could be suggested that the new doctrine reflected its political environment. The onset of a
second cold war brought pressure both politically and intellectually to threaten the heart of the Soviet
system, that of the Communist Party structure. For example, President Carter`s National Security
Advisor Brezezinski, Polish by birth complained, "as it was the Russians who were the enemy, there
should be options for destroying them" (18) Academics such as Colin S Gray challenged the basis
behind previous policy, stating that "one of the essential tasks of the American defence community is to
help ensure that in moments of acute crisis the Soviet general staff cannot brief the politburo with a
plausible theory of military victory" (19)

The 1980s saw two revisions of the SIOP. The first, SIOP-6 entered into effect in 1983,
emphasising thoughts on the protracted nature of a possible nuclear war, and as part of the detente
process between the United States and the Soviet Union the number of targets was cut to 14,000. The
final incarnation of the SIOP in the 1980s, was version 6f which emphasised specifically the
destruction of the Soviet leadership through nuclear decapitation, made possible by developments in
the accuracy of modern nuclear weaponry.

In summary the SIOP in its various forms provided the options for nuclear responses since the
Kennedy administration, providing the political executive with greater perceived control over the
nuclear war fighting process. For those observers who see an inability or unpreparedness to fight a
nuclear wear as damaging pre, or intra-war deterrence generally such as Gray, then it could be
suggested that this has proved a significant tool in preserving the American deterrent posture. For
those critics who see Clauswitz`s dictum of war being a continuation of politics, and war-fighting
stratagems as lowering the psychological nuclear conflict threshold, then the arrangements which have
been in place for over thirty years have proved a source of considerable consternation (20)

WHAT ARE THE NUCLEAR RELEASE PROCEDURES FOR THEATRE NUCLEAR

WEAPONS ?
In this section of the paper, it is my intention to look at the military and political problems associated
with the process by which release authority is achieved for the use of 'theatre nuclear' weapons (21)
The focus of the analysis will concentrate upon American procedures in the context of the NATO
alliance, examining the release process, and technical measures, specifically the system of Permissive
Action Links (PALs).
 A problematic issue for the United States during the cold war was how to maintain political
command and control over nuclear weaponry designed for use by the troops on the battlefield, as
opposed to service personnel working in a shirt-sleeves environment, in a silo far removed from the
conflict. The problem, was that of the pressures the theatre military commander, in the European
context SACEUR, would face from his subordinates to obtain release of nuclear weapons early in the
conflict to blunt an overwhelming conventional offensive by the Warsaw Pact, which it was postulated
would rapidly over-take the numerically inferior NATO forces.

Various peacetime exercises sought to simulate the process required to obtain release
authority, REFORGER 1976 demonstrated a NATO turn around time of about twelve hours, half that
projected (22) Other observers suggested that a time frame of sixty hours was more realistic (23)
Figure. 1 on the next page outlines the command process (note the plus/minus signs indicating the flow
of decisions). It is also worthy of note that SACEUR has the authority to not consult NATO allies if
circumstances do not permit, however, it could be suggested that it is doubtful such a major escalation
above one of Herman Kahn's "firebreaks", the third "no nuclear use threshold", would be undertaken
unilaterally, without some form of consultation.

Figure 1: Request procedure for theatre nuclear weapons (24)

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES (USA)

Military and defence planning committee (NATO)

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

Armed Forces Central Europe (AFCENT)

(Central Army group (CENTAG))

Corps Headquarters

Divisional headquarters

Divisional Artillery

Delivery unit

Individual delivery system

KEY: BOLD = Decision-making level

(BOLD) = Decision making applies to tactical usage of weapons
UNDERLINED = American officer commanding
= Flow of release request
= Flow of nuclear release authority once approved

It could be suggested that figure 1 illustrates the key problem with the use of theatre nuclear weaponry.
If the battlefield commander is expected to wait until his conventional forces are at breaking point, it is
likely that he will be over-run at best, or at worst be annihilated by the time permission is granted for
nuclear release. In time of crisis this may result in commanders requesting authority very early on, so
that they can disperse their weapons for security, ready to use, and with the vulnerability of fixed
command and control sites, this may appear to be a sound military judgement. A further problem
concerns that of distortion/proportion. The commander on the ground may request more weapons than
necessary due to his perception of events, out of all proportion to the threat, in turn risking an even
greater escalation by the adversary.
 The political problem which this creates, essentially is one where the executive upon giving
early release authority delegates control of nuclear weapons, and then becomes hostage to military
developments, and possible anarchy, realising Herman Kahn's fear of an uncontrollable, nuclear spasm.
Fortunately, this dilemma has never had to be resolved decisively, with the official American position
being that, "a presidential decision will be obtained in time to meet the requirements stated by the MCA
in his request." (25) There was however, an alternate means of maintaining political control, through
the technical system of Permissive Action Links.

In the 1960s Defence Secretary McNamara, sought to allay fears about accidental war,
through the introduction of a system to prevent both accidental, and unauthorised launches of nuclear
weapons. The PAL system is defined as,

"A device attached to or included in a nuclear weapon that prevents the unauthorised arming or firing
of the weapon without the insertion of a prescribed code or combination. This may include equipment
and external cabling to the weapon or weapon system to activate components within it which can
destroy it if unauthorised arming or firing is attempted" (26)

The aim of PAL systems could be seen as removing control of the weapon, from its mere possession.
In congressional testimony, Admiral Miller spoke of PAL systems as being "a highly secure system
which permits the using unit to obtain the proper numerical code only after the PAL unlock has been
authorised" (27)

The Americans then removed any weapons which did not have, or could be fitted with PAL
architecture, thus improving the security of nuclear weapons against theft. However, the same problem
can be observed, as with the release process. If the codes are withheld in time of crisis, and a
decapitation strike is launched, most of the weapons will not be able to be armed. One solution to this
has been to disperse the launch codes to several nodes in the C3 system. This however, brings us back
to the situation of the threat of accidental launch, and the President losing control of events.

In summary, in this section I have outlined the process for obtaining permission to obtain
nuclear weaponry, and the problems associated with the system, As well as the PAL system, and its
contribution to improving security, and maintaining control of the both varied and vast nuclear arsenal.

DOES THE IDEA OF CONTROLLED ESCALATION MAKE SENSE ?

The objective of the final part of this paper, is to consider the theory behind, and policy of controlled
escalation. Following an explanation of the major features of the policy, the paper will discuss the
strengths and weaknesses associated with it.

Escalation control in name, had its roots in the defence reviews of the early 1970s, which
cumulated in the issue of NSDM-242. Its intellectual heritage could be traced back to that of flexible
response. The concept built upon the foundations laid by McNamara's policy of flexible response in
the previous decade, but it was differentiated from previous efforts by two differences. Firstly
American attitudes had changes with regard to the distinction between nuclear weapons stationed at
home and abroad, and secondly a greater resolve had developed towards the use of nuclear weapons in
a limited fashion after the commencement of hostilities.

Escalation control itself had two objectives, the first was that of stopping the immediate
aggression, creating a 'pause' which could be used to give diplomatic efforts an opportunity to stop
further actions. The second objective aimed to change the perceptions of the enemy leadership about
the prospects for a quick, cheap victory. As discussed earlier this evolution of doctrine required a
redesign of nuclear options within the context of the SIOP, which aimed to support escalation control
in the following four ways;

1 - To prevent the enemy achieving their military objectives.

2 - To convince the enemy that such a limited attack was indeed a limited attack.
3 - To gain both control and the initiative over the future conduct of the war.
4 - To close opportunities for future, low-risk initiatives by the enemy (28)

Escalation control, it could be suggested, is not without its detractions. The first objective assumed that
the enemy would be both willing and able to stop any advance after the attack, to consider their
options, and await new instructions. This objective ignored the possibility of degraded enemy C3
facilities, which a nuclear attack could degrade due to the effects of the Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP).
Further to this was the assumption that the enemy would both co-operate with this strategy, and the
assumption that American assumptions about rationality, and the costs of continuing the conflict, could
be easily transposed to the enemy.

A further problem with the first objective of creating a 'pause' through the limited use of
nuclear weapons, is that of targeting the leading edge of a conventional attack, as by definition it would
probably be in close contact with friendly American or NATO forces, or could be close to a built-up
area. The effects of nuclear explosions, it could be suggested, do not discriminate between friend or
foe. A nuclear attack on enemy forces, ostensibly referring to the Soviet Union, fails to take into
account recent Soviet history. The Soviet armed forces were firstly numerically larger, than those of
NATO, and thus able to absorb more casualties, but further the Soviet experience in the Second World
War showed the cultural capacity to deal with large casualties in wartime, which was something it
could be suggested, American theorists overlooked in their assessments.

The final problem with the objective of creating a 'pause' is conspicuous by its omission. It
could be suggested that very little emphasis was laid upon how to use the pause, which the limited
nuclear attack would bring. This is consistent with criticisms of Herman Kahn's ladder of escalation, in
that it ignores the problems of de-escalating conflict, Kahn himself in a chapter on warfighting, devoted
a scant 116 words to the problem of war termination (29)

The second objective, deals once more with the psychological realm, in an attempt to change
enemy perceptions in the long term about the costs of aggression, which limited nuclear war would
pose. The enemy may see an attack as a first-use of nuclear weapons by an enemy, and as such, it
would give them an excuse to counter-attack, or escalate further, into an attack on the enemy's
homeland. A further possibility is that controlled escalation send a signal to the enemy, that a limited
conventional attack can be successful, in that it leaves the United States with the choice of using
nuclear weapons, and risking escalation, or backing down.

In summary the doctrine of escalation control placed to a large extent, American values
particularly concerning the nature of rationality onto Soviet decision-makers, whilst assuming, like
with Herman Kahn's ladder, that both sides would choose to play the same game, with the same respect
and similar understanding of each rung on the ladder. President Carter's 'counter-vailing' policy was
essentially quite similar to controlled escalation, and led to a vigorous debate. Walter Slocombe made
several points, discussing what the counter-vailing strategy was not, and I have included the key points
here, as it could be suggested that they are equally applicable to the discussion of controlled escalation,
and are thus relevant to an analysis of the theory;

1 - It does not assume that the US can win. It does seek to ensure and convince the USSR cannot win.
2 - It does not assume nuclear war will be long, but takes into account that the USSR believes it will.
3 - The policy does not assume that a nuclear exchange will remain limited.
4 - It does not substitute military for civilian targets.
5 - It is not inconsistent with future progress in arms control.
6 - It is not a first-strike strategy. It is a response to an attack.
7 - Does not create incentives for the USSR to strike first with nuclear weaponry.
8 - Does not undermine deterrence, allowing the USSR to predict responses to aggression. (30)

Critics of the doctrines advocated more aggressive war-fighting stratagems, involving targeting those
things that they perceived mattered most to the Soviet Union, its leadership and party facilities, which
would therefore be more effective in checking their expansionist tendencies, and thus reinforce the
American strategic deterrent. The central flaw they felt, with escalation control and its predecessor was
summed up by Gray, is perceiving the doctrines as failing to "relate military assets to political purpose"
(31)

In conclusion the policy of escalation control attempted to bring increased flexibility to the
problem of handling nuclear operations short of all out war. The theory underlying the policy however,
was open to sufficient criticism that it provided political capital to those who felt the doctrine rewarded
aggression, and this ultimately led to more a aggressive warfighting doctrine emerging from President
Carter's PD-59 through the first term of the Reagan administration.
CONCLUSIONS
In concluding an examination of limited nuclear warfare and its technical requirements, it could be
suggested that an analysis of the preparations for limited nuclear war, and the intentions of how it
should be conducted raise three issues.

The first issue which the paper has attempted to illustrate is the gulf that existed between the
theory and the reality of the preparations for limited nuclear war. The exercises taken in peacetime,
and simple escalatory diagrams of how to respond to each aggression, it could be suggested are not a
reflection of the confused, chaotic environment in which such decisions would be made in the midst of
war, an illustration of this is the idea that SACEUR could authorise the use of nuclear weapons without
recourse to the European allies of NATO. It could be suggested that this alone reflects the ignorance of
the intellectuals to the reality of such a situation, as for example who could imagine nuclear weapons
being used in West Germany without the knowledge of the West German government ? As the paper
has tried to show, the theory underlining controlled escalation does little to reflect reality at its best, and
at its worst attempt to provide the illusion that a nuclear exchange can be limited, and that controlled
escalation is a manageable form of "politics by other means"

The second issue, is that of the international environment today. The INF Treaty of 1987 set
in train the destruction of all American and Soviet theatre range nuclear weapons (32) which has now
been completed. Battlefield nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from service, and it is projected in
the case of Britain that its stockpile will no longer be functional by 2010. However, whilst the threat of
traditional theatre nuclear operations may have receded in the European context, it could be suggested
that the doctrine employing nuclear weapons in a warfighting mode does not preclude the future
emergence of a power that will be prepared to employ nuclear weapons as part of a national security
strategy.

Third and finally, the escalation control doctrine in the context of the cold war would see
Western Europe as the battleground, due to NATO plans, and the concept of "forward defence",
coupled with the fundamental notion of NATO as a defensive alliance. The inability of the Americans
to consider the issue in creating the doctrine, it could be suggested is a reflection of the strategic culture
from which it emerged. Gray (1988) saw a distinct parallel between limited nuclear war thinking and
British maritime strategy, which enabled Britain, an island nation, to choose when, where and how to
fight, as opposed to a continental European power, for example Austria which followed Clauswitzian
logic out of necessity.

In closing Gray noted that, "The concept of controllable escalation and de-escalation has roots in the
political and strategic culture of an insular power" (33)
Appendice A: Abbreviations
AFCENT Allied Forces Central
C3 Communication, Command and Control facilities
C3I Communication, Command, Control and Intelligence
CENTAG Central Army Group (NATO operational area, commanded by an American)
DoD Department of Defence (Unites States)
EMP Electro-Magnetic Pulse
MCA Military Command Authority
NCA National Command Authorities
NUWEP Nuclear Weapon Employment Plan
NSDM National Security Division Memorandum
PAL Permissive Action Links
PD Presidential Directive
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe (traditionally an American Commander)
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
US United States (of America)
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWMCCS World-Wide Military Command and Control System

FOOTNOTES
(1) Carl Von Clauswitz On War (1968 Penguin) pp 401
(2) Henry Kissinger Nuclear weapons and foreign policy (1957 Oxford UP) Ch. 5 pp 145
(3) Carl Von Clauswitz On war (1976 Princeton Press) Ch. 16 pp 345. Clauswitz saw roads as
providing lines of communication, advance and retreat, and were thus of great importance.
(4) Martin Van Creveld Command in war (1985 Harvard UP) Ch. 1 pp 4
(5) Desmond Ball Can nuclear war be controlled (1981 IISS Adelphi Paper No 169) pp 1
(6) See "The evolution of military technology and deterrence strategy" in SIPRI world armaments and
disarmament yearbook 1981 Ch. 2 pp 29
(7) Op. Cit. Ball (1981) pp 5. Ball denotes C3 as a force multiplier "in the sense that proper and timely
command decisions, together with capabilities for immediate retargeting, better force positioning, and
improved location accuracies, have the practical effect of multiplying the strength of a given number of
weapons."
(8) A force multiplier is defined in David Robertson A dictionary of modern defence and strategy
(1987 Europa)
pp 136 as "Any piece of technology which allows a smaller body of soldiers... or whatever to defeat a
larger force of similar type.. The development of the Phalanx formation by Greek spearmen, which
allowed them to overcome much larger formations of less well-coordinated enemies, is an early
example."
(9) See John Browning "That damned explosive Internet" in The Economist: the world in 1995 (1994)
pp 142.
"It was originally conceived by America's defence department, way back in the 1960s, as a prototype of
a network that could withstand a nuclear strike, this meant that the internet has no central authority...
which could be wiped out by pre-emptive strike."
(10) See Colin S Gray "Targeting problems for central war" in Naval war college review Vol 33 No 1
(Jan/Feb 1980) pp 11
(11) See Raymond Garthoff "Soviet perceptions of Western strategic thought and doctrine" in Gregory
Flynn (ed.) Soviet military doctrine and western policy (1989 Routledge) pp 221
(12) Notes on the various versions of SIOP from Desmond Ball and Robert C Toth "Revising the SIOP:
taking warfighting to dangerous extremes" in International Security Vol 14 No 4 (Spring 1990) pp 67
(13) February 1961 saw EC-135 Looking Glass C3 aircraft placed on 24 hour alert, providing
continuous coverage until the end of the cold war.
(14) Op. Cit. Ball (1981) pp 3
(15) Lynn Etheridge Davis Limited nuclear options, deterrence and the new American doctrine (1976
IISS Adelphi Paper No 121) pp 1
(16) ibid. pp 1
(17) Peter Pringle and Wiliiam Arkin SIOP (1983 Sphere Books) pp 141
(18) ibid. pp 148
(19) See Colin S Gray "Nuclear strategy: the case for a theory of victory" in International Security Vol
4 No 1 (Summer 1979) pp 56
(20) John Keegan A history of warfare (1993 Hutchinson) pp 48 - 49
(21) A definition of theatre nuclear is supplied in John M Collins U.S.-Soviet military balance 1980-
1985 (1985 Pergamon-Brassey's) pp 66. Theatre nuclear refers to "the mission and location of nuclear
forces which, in conjunction with conventional ground and air forces, are designed and generally
intended to deter, attack, retaliate, and/or defend in regions outside the United States and Soviet Union
under conditions that never directly threaten superpower survival. Theatre nuclear warfare may include
strike between a contested region and U.S. or Soviet sovereign territory but, by U.S. definition,
excludes a homeland to homeland exchange."
(22) See Bruce G Blair "Alerting in Crisis and conventional war" in Carter, Steinbruner, Zraket (ed.)
Managing nuclear operations (1987 Brookings) pp 109
(23) See Catherine McArdle Kelleher "Managing NATO's tactical nuclear operations" in Survival Vol
30 No 1 (Jan/Feb 1988) pp 65
(24) Op. Cit. Blair in Carter, Steinbruner, Zraket (1987) pp 110. This table originated from Army
Operations FM 100-5 (July 1976 US Government Publications Office) pp 10-9
(25) Op. Cit. Blair in Carter, Steinbruner, Zraket (1987) Ch. 2 pp 111
(26) H J Neuman Nuclear forces in Europe (1984 IISS) pp 49
(27) Op. Cit. Ball (1981) pp 5
(28) Op. Cit. Lynn Etheridge Davis (1976) pp 7
(29) Herman Kahn (1965) On escalation Ch. 10 "Some comments on warfighting" pp 202
(30) See Walter Slocombe "The counter-vailing strategy" in International Security Vol 5 No 4 (Spring
1981) pp 24-27
(31) Op. Cit. Gray (1980) pp 1
(32) H J Neuman Nuclear forces in Europe (1982 International Institute for Strategic Studies) pp 58.
Theatre nuclear weapons are defined as; Intermediate Range (2,700 - 5,500 Km), Long range (1,000 -
2,700 Km), Medium range (200 - 1,000 Km), Battlefield (0 - 200 km). Atomic Demolition Munitions
(ADMs) are defined as Defensive weapons, and maritime theatre nuclear weapons encompass depth
charges and cruise missiles, but SLBMs are excluded.
(33) See Colin S Gray "Strategic de-escalation" in Stephen J Cimbala and Joseph D Douglas (ed.)
Ending a nuclear war (1988 Pergamon-Brassey's) Ch. 5 pp 62

BIBLIOGRAPHY
D Ball (1981) Adelphi Paper No 169: Can nuclear war be controlled ? (IISS)
D Ball and R Toth "Revising the SIOP: taking warfighting to dangerous extremes" in International
Security Vol 14 No 4 (Spring 1990) pp 65 - 92
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