FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000]

FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZODADOLE,respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises
of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue
thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank
Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an
Affidavit[1] stating:

1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION

(hereinafter referred to as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes
Street, under the active management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by
the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines without issuing receipt. This is in
violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;
(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the
canned sardines processed by UNIFISH;
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and
buys from UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases;
(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho
delivers to the different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;
(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by
checks drawn payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These
payments are also not receipted (sic);

(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had
withdrawn from the corporation;

3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos

direction is the sale of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of
smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the
Board of Investments, is enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil as one
of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna for export. These tax exemptions
are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the
processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local
customers.
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also
enjoys tax exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these
are to be used as containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never
intended to be sold locally to other food processing companies.
5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING
CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] which
corporation was being controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now
running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was also committing the
same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.
6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both
UNIFISH AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site
at H. Cortes Street, Mandaue City.The particular place or spot where these records
[official receipts, sales invoices, delivery receipts, sales records or sales books, stock
cards, accounting records (such as ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and check
disbursements books)] are kept and may be found is best described in the herein
attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of the
corporation which is made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex A,
7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing
allegations and he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2338.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation
Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu.The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
issued the disputed search warrants. The first[2] is docketed as SEARCH WARRANT

NO. 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253 ("Search Warrant A-1"), and
consists of two pages. A verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,
Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City
x-------------------------/
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic),
Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness
Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation
of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is
good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing
Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control,
the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night
of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession
of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and
bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
The second warrant[3] is similarly docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2,
reproduced below, is almost identical in content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the
portions indicated in bold print. It consisted of only one page.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and
Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City
x-------------------------/
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic],
Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness

Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation
of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is
good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy andUnifish
Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and
control, the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night
of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession
of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and
bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,[4] which was docketed as SEARCH
WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263
(hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for the docket number and the designation of
the crime in the body of the warrant (Section 238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance
of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales
invoices), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of
the Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of
petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the
RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department
of Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants
with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.

The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their

subsequent motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holding
that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:

a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a
copy thereof shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by
a certified true copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the
pleadings and other pertinent documents and papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res.,
dated November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to
Quash, (2) the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the
resolution denying the motion to quash.

In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the
Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation;
the right to post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an
appeal, after judgment on the merits, or after the case shall have been tried. This
brings us to the case of Lai vs. Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement,
thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has
other remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to
the petition for certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided
by Judge Diez, the same should not have been granted. Petitioners were not without
plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law against Judge
Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent
appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional release; 2.
They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If
unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of
Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D.
911); 3. if their petitionfor review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash the
information in the trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of
Court). 4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgment of the court after the c
aseshall have been tried on the merits.
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-Moreover, in the case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, theremedy is not certiorari but t

o go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Moti
on. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the
merits, an appealtherefrom should be the next legal step.
xxx

In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search
Warrants without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument
therefore that the Court committed an error in not describing the persons or things to
be searched; that the Search Warrants did not describe with particularity the things to
be seized/taken; the absence of probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned the
discriminating manner in which the properties were taken, to us, are merely errors in
the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal. [5]
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction was committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant
petition for review.
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings
and documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for
Reconsideration.An examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first
submitted the same in their Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out
petitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground
although, to its credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the
case could have been decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if
the CA deemed them essential to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the
records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case,[6] we held that the submission of a
document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial
compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a
certified true copy of material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition],
and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto along with the petition. So should it
be in this case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a
constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be
defeated.[7]
The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to
question the resolution denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We
note that the case of Lai vs. Intermediate, cited by the appellate court as authority for
its ruling does not appear in 220 SCRA 149. The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the
court, as observed by petitioners,[8] appears to have been taken from the case of Yap
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap, however, is inapplicable

since that case involved a motion to quash acomplaint for qualified theft, not a motion
to quash a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,[9] where we held that the issuing
judges disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes
grave abuse of discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari:

Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule
that certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable
that Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search
warrant. Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit
mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and that no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said
rule renders the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that
where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and
mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an
adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the
warrant. The seizure of her personal property had resulted in the total paralization of
the articles and documents which had been improperly seized. Where the remedy of
appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a
mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs.
Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,[10] which also involved a special
civil action forcertiorari:[11]

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the
constitutional requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of

discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982,
114 SCRA 657, the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the
requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge
violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the
disputed search warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners also alleged that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all
the records and documents of the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its
business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy that would afford
petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.[12]

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the
search warrants.[13] The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for
there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be
construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify under it.[14]
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that
command their nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the
place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of
the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search
warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime, for the same
place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the
existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they
claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects,
according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence. [15]
Inconsistencies
in
the
description of the place to be
searched
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of
Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the
same warrant states the address as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.
Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of petitioner
as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a
particular description of the place to be searched and the persons of things to be
seized.[16] The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended[17] and distinguish it from other places in the community.[18] Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement.[19] Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan,[20] where the search warrant mistakenly
identified the residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the
adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not
of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be
found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in
locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore,

inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that
would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.
Inconsistencies
in
the
description of the persons
named in the two warrants
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search
Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias
Frank Uy. Search Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO
alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing Corporation.
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
In Miller v. Sigler,[21] it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically
derived, does not require the warrant to name the person who occupies the described
premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described
premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or
occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the
warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is
incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of
the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the
officer making the search as to the place to be searched.[22]
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons
owning or occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them,
the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of
the owner or occupants of the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their
names.[23]
Two warrants issued at one
time for one crime and one
place
In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search
Warrant A-2.
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court
for the same crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It
appears, however, that Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the
inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish
Packing Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued. Search Warrant
A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of
the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place to
be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two
warrants authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the
apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1,
the latter should be deemed revoked by the former.

The
alleged
probable cause

absence

of

Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the
subject search warrants.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.[24]
In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court
require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing
and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent
and justification of the application.[25] Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner,
would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. [26]
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal
knowledge. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.[27] Search warrants are not
issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. [28]
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two
witnesses, namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an
old employee of Unifish. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are
hearsay. We agree with this contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who
stated during the examination:
Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?
A. No.
Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead
of the legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.
Q. From where did you get that information?
A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.[29]

The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged
illegal activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was
merely supplied by Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on
hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the search warrants. [30]

The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias
deposition but is supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged
illegal practices was apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his
deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the
payment of taxes, and described the place where the documents supposedly
evidencing these schemes were located:
Q Do you know Frank Uy?
A Yes.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.
Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?
A Hernan Cortes St.
Q What is it being engaged of?
A It is engaged in canning of fish.
Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business
dealings that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q How is it done?
A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making
his authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells
these products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole
Philippines. He makes it appear that it is the company which is selling when actually it is
him selling the goods and he does not issue any invoices.
Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?
A Thru delivery receipts.
Q Is the delivery receipt official?
A No. It is unregistered.
Q For how long has this been going on?
A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.
Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?
A August, 1993, last month.
Q How did you happen to know about this last month?
A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did
not go directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company
for the goods that he sold.
Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?
A White Gold and Gaisano.

Q How did you know this fact?

A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last
three years. I was the Operating Chief.
Q Until now?
A No. I was separated already.
Q When?
A August, 1993.
Q How does he do this manipulation?
A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to his
customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the
company.
Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or
whatever?
A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for the public, not for the
BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and
him. It is not made to be shown to the BIR.
Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?
A Yes.
Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.
Q Based on what?
A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts,
sales records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your affidavit,
which are only for the consumption of the company?
A Yes, not for the BIR.
Q Where are they kept now?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic)
of the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all
the confidential transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers
and notebooks.
Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the
records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the
receipts. The second girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of
all the stocks.

This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people
are stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina
because according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?
A Yes.
Q But how can you enter the bodega?
A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go
straight there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after
opening the door.
Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by
Gina?
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q Where are they now?
A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).
Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me,
especially this one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for
the months of January, February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected
in these xerox copies which appear in the ledger being shown to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it did not appear.
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January,
what does it show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his
customers.
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the
BIR?
A As far as I know, it does not reflect.
Q What are these xerox copies of checks?
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment
of sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?
A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned
tuna for export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I
know, they profit more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil
are sold to another company.
Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but
instead they are selling it locally?

A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt
was the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.
Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling
(sic) it?
A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging
materials. When you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that
advantage of that exemption, they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia
Farms.
Q Do you have proof to that effect?
A No, but we can get it there.
Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since
according to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account
kept by Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still there?
A Yes. I have received information.
COURT: Alright.[31]

Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the
company records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we
reject the contention that this witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to
which he testified. The contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries
made by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We
find such inquiries to be sufficiently probing.
Alleged lack of particularity in
the description of the things
seized
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the
subject warrants and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,[32] Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs.
Ruiz,[33] and Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.[34]
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements
set forth by the Constitution since:

x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized
be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major object: the
elimination of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as
those in Stonehill:

The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner:
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts
and disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received;
certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale;
telex and coded messages; business communications; accounting and business
records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and
records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution,
and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized.
xxx

In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had
occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically
require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit
the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made,
- that abuses may not be committed. That is the correct interpretation of this
constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities.
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the
search warrant issued in this case.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs.
Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of
law - by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure
(idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to
any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation
to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other
than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the
description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least,
the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of
payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of
sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records
of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be
seized, i.e., Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation
receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts
and disbursements and general ledger, etc. was held to be an omnibus description
and, therefore, invalid:

x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records
of petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner
in several motions filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of
TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of
not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured
and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the
general public. And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was
issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of
particularity, especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the
documents sought to be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific
description of these documents from said photocopies instead of merely employing a
generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a general description in a
warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is
unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general
description in a warrant.[35] The use by the issuing judge of the terms multiple sets of
books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books
or records, provisional & official receipts, production record books/inventory lists, stock
cards, sales records, job order, corporate financial records, and bank
statements/cancelled checks is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances
of this case.
As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase &
sales invoices, however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that
the serial markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do
so precisely because they are unregistered.[36] Where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking into
consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.[37] Although it appears that
photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to
the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and every
receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not
render the entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure
of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the
warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly
described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. In United States v.
Cook,[38] the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the following
pronouncement:

x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13
Cal.Rptr. 415 (1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two
particularly described books and myriad other generally described items. On appeal,
the California Supreme Court held that only the books were particularly described in
the warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged that the warrant was flawed,
but rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the defective
portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly
described.

Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a
whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though
proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was
defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are
severable from the authorization relating to the named books x x x. The search for and
seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects
concerning other articles.
xxx

x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the
majority of state courts that have considered this question and hold that in the usual
case the district judge should sever the infirm portion of the search warrant as passes
constitutional muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60
(D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite particularity in the
warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is
hardly consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the
items improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting from its own
wrong and removes the court from considering illegally obtained evidence. Moreover,
suppression of only those items that were not particularly described serves as an
effective deterrent to those in the Government who would be tempted to secure a
warrant without the necessary description. As the leading commentator has observed,
it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause
and which did particularly describe certain items were to be invalidated in toto merely
because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search for
other items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to
petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were
also taken by the enforcing officers:

1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,

2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,
3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,
5. One (1) bound gate pass,

6. Surety Agreement. [39]

In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial
and Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like
those not particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to
comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the
property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no
other property can be taken thereunder.[40] In Tambasen vs. People,[41] it was held:

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police
acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is
to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not
be made and that abuses may not be committed (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541,
547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v.
Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at
preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted
(People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646
[1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been
illegally seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were
doing their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal
seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected right of an individual
(People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176
[1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize,
such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v.
Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in Bagahilog v.
Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), [z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble
the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the
directive in the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other
properties relative to such violation," which in no way can be characterized as a
particular description of the things to be seized.

As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return
in the present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. [42]
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996
and 14 May 1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995,
are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject
Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and
unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of
the articles subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is
hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises and
belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1]

Rollo, p. 264.

[2]

Id., at 80-81.

[3]

Id., at 82.

[4]

Id., at 83.

[5]

Id., at 71-72, 78. Underscoring in the original.

[6]

Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. and Aurelio Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, National Labor
Relations Commission and Josefina Herrero, G.R. No. 138520, September 16, 1999.
[7]

Id., citing Director of Lands vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 495 (1999).

[8]

At note 25, p. 29 of the Petition. (Rollo, p. 55).

[9]

114 SCRA 657 (1982), cited in the Petition at p. 27. (Rollo, p. 53).

[10]
[11]

203 SCRA 140 (1991).

See also the following cases, which the Court took cognizance of, and resolved, without regard to the
question of whether the special civil action (not an appeal) employed was the appropriate
remedy: Benjamin V. Kho andElizabeth Alindogan vs. Hon. Roberto L. Makalintal and National Bureau of
Investigation, 306 SCRA 70 (1999), and Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477 (1976) (certiorari);
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 (1937) (mandamus); Corro vs. Lising, 137
SCRA 541 (1985) (certiorari and mandamus); Tambasen vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995) and Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, et al. vs. Judge Maximiniano C. Asuncion, et al., 307 SCRA 253
(1999) (certiorari and prohibition); Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920) (injunction and prohibition),
Nolasco vs. Pao, 139 SCRA 541 (1985) (certiorari, mandamus and prohibition); Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20
SCRA 383 (1967), Bache & Co.(Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971), Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff,
AFP, 133 SCRA 800 (1984), and Oca vs. Marquez, 14 SCRA 735 (1965) (certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction). See also Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, 54
SCRA 312 (1973), which involved a petition to quash and annul a search warrant.

[12]

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438 (1996).

[13]

Id.

[14]

People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 (1925).

[15]

See Section 3 (2), Article III, Constitution in relation to Section 2, Article III, Constitution.

[16]

Castro vs. Pabalan, supra.

[17]

Prudente vs. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1989).

[18]

Ex Parte Flores, 452 S.W.2d 443 (1970), citing Rhodes v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 553, 116 S.W.2d 395.

[19]

Joyner v. City of Lakeland, Fla., 90 So.2d 118, citing Bonner v. State, Fla., 80 So.2d 683.

[20]

Supra.

[21]

353 F.2d 424 (1965).

[22]

Williams v. State, 240 P.2d 1132 (1952), quoting Cook v. State, 75 Okl.Cr. 402, 132 P.2d 349.

[23]

See Bell v. State, 423 S.W.2d 482 (1968).

[24]

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 (1990); Prudente vs. Dayrit, supra.

[25]

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

[26]

Prudente vs. Dayrit, supra.

[27]

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, supra.

[28]

Quintero vs. National Bureau of Investigation, 162 SCRA 467 (1988).

[29]

TSN, October 1, 1993, p. 2. Rollo, p. 85. Underscoring supplied.

[30]

See Quintero vs. National Bureau of Investigation, supra.

[31]

Rollo, pp. 86-94.

[32]

Supra.

[33]

Supra.

[34]

Supra.

[35]

United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (1981).

[36]

Rollo, p. 155.

[37]

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, supra.

[38]

Supra.

[39]

Rollo, p. 44.

[40]

Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, supra.

[41]

Supra.

[42]

Stonehill vs. Diokno, supra; Nasiad vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 61 SCRA 238 (1974); Lim vs. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 (1975).

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor

FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN,
MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM,
and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:

In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of
the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.[1] Said judgment dismissed the Peoples
petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the order of Judge Caesar A Casanova of Branch
80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9 1996,[2] as well as (ii) that dated May 28,
1996 denying the Peoples motion for reconsideration.[3] Those orders were handed
down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives after the
accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More
particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:

1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge

Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at
Quezon City on December 15, 1995,[4]
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the
warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court
within five (5) days to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful
owner considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search
Warrant."
The antecedents, culled from the records by the Appellate Court, are hereunder
set out.

1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for

search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr.
Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and

explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay

Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068
(95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at
Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent 9to0 Abigail Variety Store resulting in
the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their
personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches,
pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags
including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US
$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The
sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order
of the court on respondents motion or request. Included allegedly are
one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type
and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in
the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4)
gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients
for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a
return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers
and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There
was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the
search.
4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment,
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged; ** and on the same date,
submitted their Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant
and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated January 15,
1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading
(consolidated comment on petition for certiorari **): On January 29,
1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by
respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as
contained in the order dated January 30, 1996** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1
which is adjacent to the Abigails Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the building
as it is correspondingly called only Apartment No. 1, 2, 3, and
4;

3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails Variety

Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from
Abigails Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigails Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its
own respective doors used for ingress and egress.
That there being no objection on the said observation of the
Court, let the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly
granting the motion to quash search warrant **; [5]
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant
motion to dismiss **;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan
filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order
quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the
motion for reconsideration **:
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying
the motion for reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996, private
respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above
referred to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action
of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier
mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on
September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit: [6]

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the
place described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by
the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not
objected to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January
30, 1996. The place searched, in which the accused (herein
petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place
other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit and

adjacent to, Abigails Variety Store, the place stated in the search
warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch submitted to Judge
Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually
depicted the particular place to be searched -- was effectively confuted
by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said SKETCH was not
dated, not signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned
in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead
** directed them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207 ** in
the Order ** dated December 15, 1995 -- this, too, being the address
given in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995
requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team
Leader. The untenability of the claim is made more patent by the
Peoples admission, during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth not attached to the
application for search warrant ** (but) merely attached to the motion for
reconsideration. [7]
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of
Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.:[8]

(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from

the place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason
why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco
Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED,
CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being RAIDERS and
who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to
OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say in TAGALOG with Honorable
Judge who issued the Search Warrant the words KATABI, or
KADIKIT or KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang
papasukin namin or if they happen to be an ENGLISH
speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth
even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS RESIDE or
ADJACENT or BEHIND or NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY
STORE, the place they are going to raid.**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful
occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of
the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the
living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the
law.[9]

4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required
by the warrant itself; (i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from
service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. [10]

5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash

search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco
vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the
Supreme Court in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the
prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one
court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court
or branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search
warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search
warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has
the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence
unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent
Judge, in light of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not
the special civil aciton of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the
Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:

1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of disregarding the

proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latters
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be
searched;
2) sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence ** to
the contrary;
3) ignoring the very issues raised in the petition before it:
4) holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be
diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;
5) hastly applying the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a
substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at
bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule; and

6) depriving petitioner of the opportunity to present evidence to prove

the validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly
resolved without informing petitioner thereof.
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant
was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then
actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been
specifically described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC
for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. It claims tha tone of said officers, infact, had been able to
surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of
four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the
same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had
personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a
sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had
presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but
unfortunately, the place they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate apartment units
(No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Store -- was not what the Judge who issued the
warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search
warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty depiction of
the premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto
appended, they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly
what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: premises located at Abigail Variety
Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan. And the scope of the search was made more particular -- and more
restrictive -- by the Judges admonition in the warrant that the search be limited only to
the premises herein described.
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5)
distinct places in the area involved: the store known as Abigails Variety Store,
and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed
in a single structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting
doors through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the
others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered
only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a
search of all five (5) places, but only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigails
Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical
configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed
to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the
warrant. Even after having received the warrant -- which directs that the search be
limited only to the premises herein described, Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207 -- thus
literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store -- they did not ask the

Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own
definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly indicated, according to them, in the
sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application -was sufficient particularization of the general identification of the place in the search
warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v.
Chief of Staff, AFP,[11] allegedly to the effect that the executing officers prior knowledge
as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity
in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon
perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said
case was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at
No. 19. Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City; and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and
No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City because both search
warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was
error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for
it was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only
one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified
two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, 784 Units C&D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82
(b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the judge intended to be
searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the
ambiguity caused by the obviously typographical error, the officer executing the
warrant could consult the records in the official court file.[12]
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an obvious
typographical erro involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in
Burgos, but thesearch of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity
identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was
immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case,
there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument,
arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between
the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was
to substitute for the place that the judge had written down in the warrant, the premises
that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is
neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in
the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched -- although not that specified in
the warrant -- is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and
had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the
validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had
in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing
the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of the facts of this

case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have been
fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified
by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced
in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to
police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not be that
delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of search process, and
grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be
searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge
Bacallas finding of probable cause, as if he were an appellate court. A perusal of the
record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out
inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant
itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. [13] In
Judge Casanovas view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in
doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the search warrant was
founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable
cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be
conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant -which, of course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof -was not that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the
result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place
other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or
less properly issued as regards Abigails Variety Store, there was none for Apartment
No. 1 -- the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely
the place in which the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing
that:[14]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be serched, and the things to be
seized.,

it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable
cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that
it particularly describe the place to be searched,[15] the manifest intention being that the
search be confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement
that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that
infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that (a)ny
evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[16]
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points
sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch
of the building housing the store and the residential apartment units -- the place to be
searched being plainly marked -- was in fact attached to the application for the search
warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the
place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was
diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals
had improperly refused to receive evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been
denied opportunity to present before the trial court; or (5) the remedy of the special civil
action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The
resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the
search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search
warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness
of their argument that anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had
described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor Generals Office opines that
where a search warrant has been issued by the court other than the one trying the
main criminal case, the proper recourse of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to
assail it before the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving
the subject of the warrant is afterwards filed.[17] In support, it cites the second of five (5)
policy guidelines laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals[18] concerning
possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction)
where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by
another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in
said criminal case. Said second guideline reads:[19]

2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the
main criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the
same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without
prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, other
they shall be deemed waived.

The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one
court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards
commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to
retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a
motion may be filed for the first time for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in
which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not
cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of
the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the
rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guidelines which
indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or

resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same
is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with
different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a
search warrant and a motion to supress evidence are alternative and
not cummulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a
motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus
motion rule, provided however, that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be
raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the
court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper
remedy in the appopriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the
other hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant
was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion
to quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not
otherwise contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such
motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the
Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the
latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which
the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of
September 11, 1996 -- which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9,
1996 and May 28, 1996 in the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the reasons set out
in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 89-96; Annex A, petition

Id., pp. 183-185; Annex AA, petition
[3]
Id., pp. 198-202
[4]
Id., p. 140: Annex K, petition.
[5]
See Footnote No. 2, supra
[6]
Rollo, pp. 92-95.
[7]
Emphasis in original text of Appellate Courts judgment.
[8]
Idem; Rollo, pp. 98, 200-201.
[9]
Sec. 7, Rule 126, Rules of Court, provides that No search of a house, room or any other premise shall
be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. Cited was Quantero v. NBI, G.R, No. L-35148, June 23, 1988.
[10]
Sec. 11, Rule 126 provides that The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
[11]
133 SCRA 800 (1984).
[12]
Citing 68 Am Jur 2d, 729)
[2]

[13]

Rollo, p. 200. The Order of December 15, 1995 mentions only P/Sr. Insp. Roger Brillantes who, in the
th
Application of Search Warrant dated 14 December 95, stated that he had verified the report that
Hussain had possession of weapons and ammunition (i.e., he had no personal knowledge of the
fact). On the other hand, the Search Warrant adverts also to SPO4 Cesar Santiago and SPO1 Prisco
Bello. According to Judge Casanova, if the Order of Dec. 15, 1995 is accurate, then Brillantes had no
personal knowledge of the factual basis for the application for search warrant.
[14]

Emphasis supplied.

[15]

SEE Cruz, I. A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 136-137; Francisco, R.J., Criminal Procedure, 1993
ed., p. 545.
[16]

Sec. 3, ART. III, Constitution

Rollo, pp. 63-65
[18]
232 SCRA 249, 267-268 (1994)
[19]
Underscoring and parenthetical insertion, by the Solicitor Generals Office
[17]

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA

ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our
society, our law enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug
offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees
against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade
the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The
information reads:

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and
five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak placed in a travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.[1]
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello,
Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt.
Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a quo found the following:

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following
day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt.
Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the
afternoon of December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline
station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello,
P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the
other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters
BGO printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at
around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females and a male got

off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team Aling Rosa who
was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling
Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a
plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the
Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accusedappellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt
of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory,
Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a
Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above
technical report, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence
alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accusedappellants constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as
their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court ruling
on the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of
the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the
case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her
version of the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that
immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she
watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her
help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo
arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity
of the woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was
arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the
arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a
Comment and/or Objection to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the

admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable

search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500)
grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article
11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. [2]
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a
warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the
requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched must be
specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied
for by the NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason
that the same would be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the
arrest of accused-appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak
yet the evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law
enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided
in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures as it operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain
import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for
a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless

authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the

fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between
person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power
to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.[4]
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v.
Diokno.[5] This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution, thus:

Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude
indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of
an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against
unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of
the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.[6]
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure
of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A
statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of
arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited
only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an
infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of
full protection and vindication yet often violated.[7]
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2.

Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public

thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause

that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4.

Consented warrantless search;

5.

Customs search;[9]

6.

Stop and Frisk;[10] and

7.

Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law
enforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more
fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential
requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place
to be searched.[12]
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of
evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search
warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought
are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items
will be found in the place to be searched.[13]
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable
cause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be
admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these
cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient
probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,[14] acting on information supplied by informers, police
officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San
Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on
those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening,

the
policemen noticed
a
person carrying
a
red
travelling
bag who
was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but
he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the
bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew
of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their
informant regarding Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted
with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound
is being used by drug traffickers as their business address. More significantly,
Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led
the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant
case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt,[15] the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no
reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect
could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the
officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to
deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a
warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present
case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search
warrant. Second, Arutas identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting
suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally
accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched
while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista,[16] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and
search all vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman having
the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up
north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings
since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a
valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course
of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from
Aruta as this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers
erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,[17] the policemen conducted
a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug
addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in
front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be
trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his
hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court

held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine
if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact
that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the
bases for conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and
circumstances were present which, when taken together with the information,
constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures in
each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause
necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In
the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information
from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for
Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day
carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December
14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag
even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law
enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents;
(4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the
same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6)
Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information
two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on
board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date
of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend
Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be
illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received
confidential information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that
Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at
7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence information regarding the
culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts
could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This
Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19,
series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court
hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating
Encinadas constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant
of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag,
accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which
provides inter alia:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she

about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was
merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and
identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as
the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant
were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accusedappellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This
the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance
of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the
accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being
incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accusedappellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accusedappellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected,
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental
to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered
legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected
based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law.[18]
As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin[19] where, this
Court observed that:

x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other

passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the
search and seizure of accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of
evidence in plain view under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not
immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request
accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as
a search of a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant
case as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the
Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while
inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted
in Posadas v. Court of Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and
his companions were accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was
no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM
agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-appellant. To reiterate, accusedappellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the
abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM
agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication
of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that
accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized
under exigent and emergency circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In
said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being used as
headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team was fired at by a
group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building
refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of
explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and
general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed
that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a
warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and
seizure would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as
to amount to awaiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that
accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to search and inspection citing People v.
Malasugui [23] where this Court ruled:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person
or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello,
thus:
Q

When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what
happened after that?

We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted

her with our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the
bag she was carrying.

What was her reaction?

She gave her bag to me.

So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.[24]

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui
case is inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the
warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search effected immediately
thereafter equally lawful.[25] On the contrary, the most essential element of probable
cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the
warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied
the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized
from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accusedappellant in handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as
voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The
instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,[26] where this Court held:

[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs
containing the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively
waived his right against the warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonias
testimony.
Q:

After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A:

I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q:

Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two
chairs that he carried, what did you do next?

A:

I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two
chairs.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an
otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript
quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of his
belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such
search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted
irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the
presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a
waiver of her constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search. As this Court held in People v. Barros:[27]

x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search

conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to
objectx x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion
Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed to object to
the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of
Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights.[28](Emphasis supplied)

To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish

the right. As clearly illustrated in People v. Omaweng,[29] where prosecution witness
Joseph Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q-

When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A-

When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the
contents.

Q-

And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A-

He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).

Q-

When he said that, what did you do?

A-

We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q-

When you said that, what did he tell you?

A-

He said you can see it.

Q-

And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?

AQA-

When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic)
that was contained in the bag.
And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents
and showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it
was marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)

In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may
be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it as the
protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly gave prior consent to the search
and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is
not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next
argues that the police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search
warrant as it could be secured only if accused-appellants name was known, the
vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the
arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be
seized to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end
that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.[30]
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have
secured one without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor
General. The person intended to be searched has been particularized and the thing to
be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of
December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to
be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact,
the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory
Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents
failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a
search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this
Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.[31] (Emphasis
supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively
participating in the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to
the illegality of the warrantless search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence
obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her
plea of not guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to
the courts jurisdiction.[32] The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the
illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver
simply does not extend this far.

2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes

admissible upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that
accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the
prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,[33] which stated:

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an

invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an
accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified
warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be
waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an

accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the

failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that
waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former--an
argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the
non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a
warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality
for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly
objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4)
kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution. We consider that appellants objection to the admission of such
evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no
intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his
conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis supplied)
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search
warrant considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this
is again an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence illegal and
inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The nonexclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[34]
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be
held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have
realized that the exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based on the justification
made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed.[35]
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.[36]
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss
of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape
than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.[37]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of
evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA
ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

[1]

Decision penned by Judge Alicia L. Santos.

[2]

Decision, Rollo, p. 49.

[3]

222 SCRA 557 [1993].

[4]

Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987, First ed., pp. 85-86.

[5]

20 SCRA 383 [1967].

[6]

Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed.,
pp. 147-148.

[7]

People v. Argawanon, 215 SCRA 652 [1992].

[8]

Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.

[9]

Padilla v. CA and People, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997.

[10]

People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 [1996].

[11]

People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994].

[12]

People v. Encinada, G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997.

[13]

Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995].

[14]

184 SCRA 220 [1990].

[15]

198 SCRA 401 [1991].

[16]

214 SCRA 63 [1992].

[17]

G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997.

[18]

People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 [1996].

[19]

163 SCRA 402 [1988].

[20]

262 SCRA 255 [1996].

[21]

188 SCRA 288 [1990].

[22]

233 SCRA 716 [1994].

[23]

63 Phil. 221 [1936].

[24]

TSN, June 14, 1989, p. 6.

[25]

Supra.

[26]

G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997.

[27]

231 SCRA 557 [1994].

[28]

Supra, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.

[29]

213 SCRA 462 [1992].

[30]

Herrera, Oscar, A Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure and Custodial Investigation, 1994 ed., p.
60.

[31]

People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 [1925].

[32]

People v. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993], People v. De Guia, 227 SCRA 614 [1993], People v. De
Guzman, 231 SCRA 737 [1994], People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998.

[33]

Supra.

[34]

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967].

[35]

Cruz, I. A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., p. 148.

[36]

Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Annotated, 1995 ed.,

Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230 and Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33.

[37]

People v. Aminnudin, supra.

p.

526

citing

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.

vs. RUBEN

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August

22, 1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:

That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality
of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport,
and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are
considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby
causing damage and prejudice to the public interest.
[1]

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of

not guilty from appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte.[2] Trial was
held on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision
of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty of death on
appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.[3]
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at
around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran,
Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both
members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in
Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28
marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks
had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the
arrest of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed
them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom
said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran,
Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the
same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter
alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place. [4]
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He
claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he
traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any
luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier
offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would
return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1
Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite,
he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of
the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's
testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly worked as a
supervisor,[5] although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any document to
prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he
was legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an

objective and exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversible error
in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower
court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be
attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently selfserving in nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on
the basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried
marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of
Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is
supposedly corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon
appellant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, that informant was
a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and
conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II
thereof, as amended, is as follows:

SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
some of the various modes of commission[6] being the sale, administration, delivery,
distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section
4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to
other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Section 4 could
thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified therein, or a combination
thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching
in transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the
transgressive acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he

administered, delivered, and transported marijuana. The governing rule with respect to
an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law is
that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one,
two or more modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in the information of the
various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description of only
one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of
multifariousness.[7] In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly
establishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone
of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that particular section
of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer
should have been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his
presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's
constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him. These
assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising the primacy of
appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in this instance
was justified and cannot be faulted as error.
For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely
corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial
court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they
had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed
with by the prosecution,[8] more so where what he would have corroborated are the
narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing
legal presumption. Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of
the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police.[9] Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses,
and not for the defense to dictate that course.[10] Finally, appellant could very well have
resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear
before the court below,[11] but which remedy was not availed of by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an
unlawful warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact
that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities
had already been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival
from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite
warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the
marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again, the
Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent
which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision.[12] Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable
search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence
for
any
purpose
in
any
proceeding. This

exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus,

(1)
[13]
[14]
customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view;[15](4) consented searches;[16] (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17] and (6)
"stop and frisk" measures[18] have been invariably recognized as the traditional
exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian
informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at
Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June
20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be
beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too
sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search
warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do
not reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the
subject of the warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did
not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the
barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of
the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance
wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or
were being brought by someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for
a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was
still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which
there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for
obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and
ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the
police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry
points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the
"early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside
and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the
place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he would do
so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising
for, as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable
source in past operations. Moreover, experience shows that although information
gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal,
and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional
spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the
apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance
to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the
physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the
placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant
invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the

consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under
that provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the
arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense.[19] On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence
with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).[20] These instances have
been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The
conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination
of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having
reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [21]
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure
for the propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless
arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and
jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or
quantum,[22] and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet,
even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept,
probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the
existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of,[23] or an apparent state of
facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent
and prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime.[24]
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at
least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court
which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to the
fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. [25] It has
the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that
is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a
probable cause exists." [26] It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to
effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney
the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing
to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was
carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was
simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal
effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen,
and requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which

appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag
yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they
brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and
a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime
since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being
illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from
view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow
suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the
drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not
downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and
see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the
point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by
themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and
reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually
committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts,
it is ineluctable that appellant was caught inflagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the
search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the
evidence. To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced
themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, and after
he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the
traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the
fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual
voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be
waived either expressly or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held that the silence of
the accused during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the
search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of the
law,[28] the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously
performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or
intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his
right.[29]
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally,
properly and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated
from (him) were the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in
court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized
from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted that the
prosecution presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence those 28
bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same
were contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper

safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist for
examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs
taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence,
satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and
SPO1 Talingting who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the
contents of the traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith
asked him where he had come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus
confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion can therefore
be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from
Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime,
the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of
appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming
that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities here
could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438 [30] which defines
certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as
the duties of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and providing
corresponding penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower
court will not necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed
anything during his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the
nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him
which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more
importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by
the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the
documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence
in the court below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death
on appellant. As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the
Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or
marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs
carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present
case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be
observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of
Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the court a

quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous
drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall
be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a
conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already
concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code,[31] the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was
also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty
where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second
paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a
minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.[32] While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the liability of the
offender, these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the
law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the
offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that situation, obviously the
rules on the graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's
case, there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence,
the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias,
Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accusedappellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Martinez, JJ, concur.
Melo, and Puno, JJ., join Panganiban J., separate opinion.
Vitug, J., concur but reserve his vote on the discussion on the warrantless search of
appellant as his incidental to a lawful arrest.

[1]

Original Record, 1; Rollo, 3.

Ibid., 19, 21.
[3]
Ibid., 76; per Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
[4]
TSN, October 10, 1994, 1-14; October 19, 1994, 2-9.
[5]
Ibid., February 15, 1995, 4-26; March 2, 1995, 1-4.
[6]
The other modes include violations of Sections 3 (Importation of Prohibited Drugs), 5 (Maintenance of a
Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drugs Users), 6 (Employees and Visitors of Prohibited Drug Den), 7
(Manufacture of Prohibited Drugs), 8 (Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs), 9 (Cultivitation of Plants
which are Sources of Prohibited Drugs), 11 (Unlawful Prescription of Prohibited Drugs), and 12
(Unnecessary Prescription of Prohibited Drugs), all under Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Article III
of the Act provides for similar violations in cases involving regulated drugs, namely, Sections 14, 14- A,
15, 15-A, 16, 17, 18, and 19.
[2]

[7]

Jurado, etcc. vs. Suy Yan, L-30714, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 663.
People vs. Trancca, G.R. No. 110357, August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 435.
[9]
People vs. Gireng G.R. No. 97949, February 21, 1995, 241 SCRA 11.
[10]
People vs. Nicolas, et al., G.R. No. 110116, February 1, 1995, 241 SCRA 67.
[11]
Section 1, Rules of Court.
[12]
People vs. Barros, G.R. No. 90640, Marcch 29, 1994, 231 SCRA 557.
[13]
Chia, et al. vs. Acting Collector of Customs, et al. L-43810, September 26, 1989, 177 SCRA 755;
Papa, etc., et al. vs. Mago, et al., L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857.
[14]
Aniag, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 424;
Valmonte, et al. vs. De Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990, 185 SCRA 665.
[15]
People vs. Leangsiri, G.R. No. 112659, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 213; People vs. Figueroa, G.R.
No. 97143, October 2, 1995, 248 SCRA 679.
[16]
People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 113474, December 13, 1994, 239 SCRA 174; People vs. Tabar, et
al. G.R. No. 101124, May 17, 1993, 222 SCRA 144.
[17]
People vs. Malstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 401.
[18]
Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 889 (1968), adopted in Posadas vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. no. 89139, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 288.
[19]
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
[20]
People vs. Malmstedt, supra, Fn 17; Lo Ho Wing, et al., G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA
122; People vs. Maspil, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 751;
People vs. Tangliben, G.R. No. 63630, April 6, 1990, 184 SCRA 220; People vs. Claudio, L-72564, April
15, 1988, 160 SCRA 646.
[21]
See also People vs. Labarias, G.R. No. 87165, January 25, 1993, 217 SCRA 483; People vs. Tonog,
Jr., etc., at al., G.R. No. 94533, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 772.
[22]
See Salonga vs. Pao, etcc., et al., G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438; Bautista, et al.
vs. Sarmiento, etc., at el., L-45137, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 592. The term denotes evidence
which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a proposition or establish the facts, as to
counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant the conviction of the accused.
[23]
Owens vs. Gratezel, 148 Md. 689, 132 A. 265.
[24]
Brand vs. Hincchman, 68 Micch. 590, 36 N.W. 664, 13 Am. St. Rep. 362.
[25]
Section1, Rule 112.
[26]
Section 4, first and fourth paragraphs., id.
[27]
People vs. Fernandez, supra, Fn 16; People vs. Ramos, G.R. Nos. 101804-07, May 25, 1993, 222
SCRA 557; People vs. Tabar, et al., supra, Fn. 16; People vs. Exala, et al., G.R. No. 76005, April 23,
1993, 221 SCRA 494.
[28]
People vs. Barros, supra, Fn 12.
[29]
People vs. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5, 1997, and cases therein cited.
[30]
Approved on April 27, 1992 and published in the Official Gazette on June 22, 1992, Vol. 88, No. 25,
3880.
[31]
People vs. Gatward, et al., G.R. Nos. 118772-73, February 7, 1997.
[32]
See Section 24 of the Act, which likewise imposes the maximum penalties provided for in Sections 3,
4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 15-A(1), 16, and 19 of
Article III, where those found guilty of any of said offenses are government officials, employees or officers
including members of police agencies and the armed forces.
[8]

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,

G.R. No. 186529

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

JACK RACHO y RAQUERO,

Appellant.

August 3, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated May 22, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Joint
Decision[3]dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through

cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported
the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed
of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence
group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the
appellant.[4] The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical
description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed
him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime
of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of
the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the
bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier.
Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a
tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on
suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as
he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom
which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. [5]
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The
confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera
who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and
laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. [6]
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section
11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of
which read:
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in
Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his

possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as Shabu, a regulated drug without any permit
or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in
Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of
shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the
same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler,
Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained
that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As
to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through
their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him
to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the
police station for investigation. [9]
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment [10] convicting appellant
of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of
the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision. [11]
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,[12] appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity
of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen
immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first
time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless

search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that
it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual
findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the case.[13]
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and
seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It
is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed
by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the
evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not
ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those
not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of
the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in
keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed
innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. [14]
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will
be discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of
his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue.
Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case,
we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to

question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended
his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of
his acquittal. [15]
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us
to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful.[16]
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[17] Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

Search of evidence in plain view;
Search of a moving vehicle;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and Frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances. [18]

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure

is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. [19]
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring
that he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to
commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler,
Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.[20] Consequently, the warrantless
search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the
arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.

Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede

the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.[21] Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether
the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause
eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged. [22]
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates
a reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of
the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase
of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00
a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red
and white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus
arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent
pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as
he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants
pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small
sachet containing the suspected drug. [23] The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the
presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of
the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a
warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora carryingshabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question:
whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone
is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that

the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. [24] We find no cogent
reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar
Tudtud,[26] and People v. Nuevas. [27]

to People

v.

Aruta,[25] People

v.

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a
certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a
large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and
deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building
where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team
members the woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying a traveling bag.
Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about
the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon
inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves.[28]
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril
Police Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the
neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the
Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1,
1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato
and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00
p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds
arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry
a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see
the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves. [29]
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain
male person, more or less 54 in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on
the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a
delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description,

carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and informed him that they
were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the
bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid
to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would
make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later
identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them,
introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were
carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana
leaves.[30]
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely
because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some
overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had
just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not
acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to
commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant
would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and
consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable
information sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,[31] People v. Bagista,[32] People v. Balingan,[33] People v.
Lising,[34] People v. Montilla,[35] People v. Valdez,[36] and People v. Gonzales.[37] In
these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would
indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to
commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except
in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches.[38]

Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow
them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1
Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the tipped
information on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only
the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain
that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that
he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant. [39]
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree,
hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained
based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the
waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a
plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. [40]
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas, [41]
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have
no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full
protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to
gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the
alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were
obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of
justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the
peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.
Truly, the end never justifies the means. [42]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated

May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and
to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement,
within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTES TATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico
and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-17.
[2]
Branch 96, Baler, Aurora.
[3]
Penned by Judge Corazon D. Soluren; records, pp. 152-157.
[4]
Transcript of Stenographic Notes, July 31, 2003, pp. 4-6.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[6]
Id. at 5-6.
[7]
Records (Criminal Case No. 3054), p. 1
[8]
Records (Criminal Case No. 3038), p. 1.
[9]
Rollo, p. 6.
[10]
Supra note 3.

[11]

Supra note 1.
CA rollo, pp. 56-69.
[13]
Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611; People v. Chua, G.R. Nos.
136066-67, February 4, 2003, 396 SCRA 657, 664.
[14]
People v. Chua, supra.
[15]
Valdez v. People, supra at 622.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Section 2 and 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
[18]
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 475-476 citing People v. Tudtud,
458 Phil. 752, 771 (2003).
[19]
People v. Nuevas, id. at 476.
[20]
Records, p. 156.
[21]
People v. Nuevas, supra at 477; People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752 (2003).
[22]
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998).
[23]
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[24]
People v. Nuevas, supra; People v. Tudtud, supra.
[25]
Supra note 22.
[26]
Supra.
[27]
Supra.
[28]
People v. Aruta, supra at 875.
[29]
People v. Tudtud, supra at 765-766.
[30]
People v. Nuevas, supra at 468-469.
[31]
G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 751.
[32]
G.R. No. 86218, September 12, 1992, 214 SCRA 63.
[33]
311 Phil. 290 (1995).
[34]
341 Phil. 801 (1997).
[35]
349 Phil. 640 (1998).
[36]
363 Phil. 481 (1999).
[37]
417 Phil. 342 (2001).
[38]
People v. Tudtud, supra at 776.
[39]
People v. Tudtud, supra at 782; People v. Aruta, supra at 894.
[40]
People v. Nuevas, supra at 483-484; People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729, 748 (2003).
[41]
Supra.
[42]
People v. Nuevas, supra at 484-485.
[12]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding
the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without
being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the
purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document
and testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of
suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25,
1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic container; "B-1a"another plastic container; "C"Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings:
Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of
accused with Pat. Daniel Obia and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"
Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H"
Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V.
Galindo;"H-1"date of of the request; "L"Certificate of Field Test dated July 22,
1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses
of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obio, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco,
Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of
1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task
Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana
submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a
marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. Aft er her
examination, she prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981
(Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three eliminations; microscopic examination,
the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of thin layer
chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo
Santiago, a representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.
The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married,
policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia

testified that he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He
was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job then
was among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover st olen items and
apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTINARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in
Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:3 0
o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His
family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second
seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same
bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the
back of the seat of Obia. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven
buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting
her bag behind Pat. Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic)
nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to
go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of
the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain
camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the
ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that
there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached
Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline
Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina
intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her
he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana
inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at
home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right
hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the
police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the
presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leonc io
Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana
weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before
the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the
CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs
were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with
Pat. Obia and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified
photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness
was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs.
"B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused and
pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and
time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled already. The
marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was
confiscated from the accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented
the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs.
"F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because
as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.

On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981

and underwent treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for
medical treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to
Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never knew the
accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same
Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic
bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside
her seat. Witness Obia became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when
they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus
stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers
inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on
direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to
settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had
to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine
that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside
the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the
bag. He Identified his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981
which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981,
he was inside the Investigation Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty
Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Pat.
Daniel Obia arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obia reported to him that he apprehended Anita
Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dr ied leaves. The
marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote
tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic
wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white. Witness
Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings of Pat. Obia
which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date
which was placed by Pat. Obia after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected
marijuana.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he
interviewed apprehending officer Obia and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl.
Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obia (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed
accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated on
a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused
whether she was willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused.
Hence, no statements were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the
investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified
by Pat. Obia, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat.
Obia and the accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in
the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East
Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was
stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he
was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22,
1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more th an a
kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted

a field test on this marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a
request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a
Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test
indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can
be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag
of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago,
the Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married,
residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo
City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to
the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty
was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City
along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at
the said place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obia h e approached
him and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obia told him he apprehended a
certain woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus.
Pat. Obia then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with
her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while
Pat. Obia sat behind the driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle
to police station. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police Station and
he was there when Pat. Obia reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the
woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the
Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed the
taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of Cpl.
Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang
Identified the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana
when it was brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not
well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and
bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri
bag of the accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obia,
(Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to
Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He,
however, did not linger long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana
and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery
of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature,
stands for Daniel Obia. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution
rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I

CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE

OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II
CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF
THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS
WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT
CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep.
Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs.The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs.
Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only
delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of
probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuan a, thus the lower court did not
err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is
unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of
marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259,
267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and
seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except
the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a
warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delict o. The warrantless search being
an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having
had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence
against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only
planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's
findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records
why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Bag uio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused
herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De
La Cruz,supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested,
tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was
high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a
motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against
the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25,
1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to
him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of
what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she
conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC

headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator
hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have
been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock
room of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of
his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not
even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the trua nt fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for hi s
release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a
third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the

coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days
before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of
Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo

with marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was
coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act
of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search
of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you
do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averment s of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant
as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtaine d a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red -handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high - handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused -appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana
leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel."
The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime.
(Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected
without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the
marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I
vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana
leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarkin g from the vessel."
The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime.
(Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected
without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the
marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I
vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting ma rijuana.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 29.
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3 Original Records, p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 20.
5 "Exh. 1," Original Records, p. 204.
6 Original Records, p. 26.
7 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.
8 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 29.
9 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, pp. 6-7.
10 TSN, Sept. 5, 1984, pp. 8-10.
11 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, p. 3.
12 Ibid., pp. 8-9; 19-20.

13 Id., pp. 10 & 13.

14 Brief for the Appellant, p. 22.
15 Rollo, p. 28.
16 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, pp. 17-18; 22-24.
17 Ibid., p. 29.
18 Id., p. 4.
19 Rollo, p. 28.
20 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.
21 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 19.
22 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 12.
23 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, pp. 31-33.
24 65 SCRA 336.
25 People v. Rubio, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Madarang, 147 SCRA 123; People v.
Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252; People v. Cerelegia; 147 SCRA 538; People v.
Fernando, G.R. No. L-68409, December 1, 1987.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant -appellant.

PADILLA, J.:p
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to
as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual
background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of
the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bu s stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a
late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country,
scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and
Plate number AVC 902. 1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province,
for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs. 2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set
up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that
they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspectio n from the
front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the
same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which
did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue
of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed
that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and o ther papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to
accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his
lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish
in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Ar t. II of RA 6425, as
amended. 3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional
Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under
Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant
may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case. 9

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee. 12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, 13 the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against
persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers.
Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and
searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to pre sent his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken togethe r
as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed
inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to
act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:

The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion even by the king, has not
only found its niche in all our charters, from 1935 to the present; it has also received unvarying
recognition and acceptance in our case law. 1 The present Constitution 2 declares that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right, among others, "shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." 3
The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other government authority to a search
of his body, or his personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a legitimate arrest. 4 An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue
of a warrant of arrest. Even without a warrant, an arrest may also be lawfully made by a peace officer or a
private person: 5

(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; an d
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant." 6 And it has been held that the search may extend to the area "within his immediate

control," i.e., the area from which said person arrested might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. 7

Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also been held to be proper in
cases of "search of a moving vehicle, 8 and "seizure of evidence in plain view." 9 This was the
pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention to Moreno
v. Ago Chi; 10 Alvero v. Dizon, 11 Papa v. Mago, 12and an American precedent, Harris v. U.S. 13

If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those
justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is
engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it
is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit
of the poisonous tree. 14 In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 15 But the right against an unreasonable search and
seizure may be waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly decided not
to invoke it. 16

There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing validity of these
established principles. However, the Court is divided as regards the ultimate conclusions which may
properly be derived from the proven facts and consequently, the manner in which the p rinciples just
cited should apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at odds. What is certain,
however, is that the soldiers had no warrant of arrest when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's
person and the things in his possession at the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the
soldiers could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or arrest nor a search warrant everytime
they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and) no judge would issue t hem one considering that
searching questions have to be asked before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to
the search, a warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in accordance with the
norms of the law. For Malmstedt had not committed, nor was he actually committing or attempting to
commit a crime, in the soldiers' presence, nor did said soldiers have personal and competent
knowledge that Malmstedt had in fact just committed a crime. All they had was a suspicion that
Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags; all they had was, in the words of
the Trial Court, "the hope of intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the Office of
the Solicitor General asserts, "information that most of the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera)
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6, 1988 also by the First
Division. 17 There, Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was disembarking from
an inter-island vessel. The officers were waiting for him because he was, according to an informer's
report, then transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin's bag confirmed the informer's report; the
bag indeed contained marijuana. The Court nevertheless held that since the PC officers had failed to
procure a search warrant although they had sufficient time (two days) to do so and therefore, the case
presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search of Aminnudin's person and bag,
the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal; and the marijuana was inadmissible
in evidence in the criminal action subsequently instituted against Aminnudin for violating the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in which apparently different
conclusions were reached. It is needful to devote a few words to them so that the relevant
constitutional and legal propositions are not misunderstood.

In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988), 18 the accused boarded a "Victory
Liner" passenger bus going to Olongapo from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was carrying at
the back of the seat then occupied by Obia, an INP member "on Detached Service with the AntiNarcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obia's suspicion, and at the first opportunity, and without
Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously looked into the plastic bag and noted that it contained camote
tops as well as a package, and that there emanated from the package the smell of marijuana with which
he had become familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at Sta. Rita, and Claudio
alighted, Obia accosted her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a policeman, and announced his
intention to search her bag which he said contained marijuana because of the distinctive odor detected by
him. Ignoring her plea "Please go with me, let us settle this at home" he brought her to the police
headquarters., where examination of the package in Claudio's bag confirmed his suspicion that it indeed
contained marijuana. The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the
search justified, and the evidence thus discovered admiss ible in evidence against the accused.

In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990), 19 two police officers and a barangay
tanod were conducting a "surveillance mission" at the Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there) but
also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by
informers; . . . they noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag . . who was acting suspiciously;" they
asked him to open the bag; the person did so only after they identified themselves as peace officers;
found in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing one kilogram, more or less; the
person was then taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, where he was
investigated; and an information was thereafter filed against that person, Tangliben, charging him with a
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as amended. Upon these fac ts it was
ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a valid warrantless arrest and a proper warrantless search
incident thereto.

The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In
contrast" toAminnudin where the Court perceived no urgency as to preclude the application for and
obtention of a search warrant, it was declared that the Tangliben case
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an informer who
pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana . . . Faced with such on-thespot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to
secure a search warrant . . . To require search warrants during on -the-spot
apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors,
smugglers of contraband goods, robber, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on hand to enable
the PC officers to secure a search warrant, had there been time. But because there was
actually no time to get the warrant, and there were "on-the-spot" indications that Tangliben
was then actually committing a crime, the search of his person and his effects was
considered valid.
Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al.,
decided on August 2, 1990, 20 and People v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990. 21
In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two members of the INP, Davao
Metrodiscom, and when he was accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police officers,
he suddenly fled. He was pursued, overtaken and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody.
The buri bag Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a revolver, for which he could produce
no license or authority to possess, four rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas grenade. He was

prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and convicted after trial. This Court
affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a search
without warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he
had with him at the time. The Court cited with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court
in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio, 22 a 1968 case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify the
search.

In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit
of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles
on the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by
informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of
marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As
expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the
checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw
that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When op ened, the sacks
and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon
placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific
examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus
conducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, 23 and declared that, as in Tangliben,
supra, Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs at the time
of their arrest. Again, the Court took occasion to distinguish the case fromAminnudin 24 in which, as
aforestated, it appeared that the police officers were aware of Aminnudin's identity, his projected criminal
enterprise and the vessel on which he would be arriving, and, equally as importantly, had sufficient time
and opportunity to obtain a search warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the Court found that the
officers concerned had no exact description of the vehicle the former would be using to transport
marijuana, and no inkling of the definite time of the suspects' arrival, and pointed out that a jeepney on
the road is not the same as a passenger boat on the high seas whose route and time of arrival are more
or less certain, and which ordinarily cannot deviate from or otherwise alter its course, or select another
destination. 25

The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure appears to be People v. Lo Ho
Wing; et al., G.R. No. 88017, decided on January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an
undercover or "deep penetration" agent, Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into a group of
suspected drug smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim Ching Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo
to Guangzhou, China, where he saw him and other per son empty the contents of six (6) tins of tea
and replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with the cans of substituted "tea," they
were met at the airport by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were
intercepted by officers and operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), who had earlier been
tipped off by Tia, and placed under arrest. As search of the luggage brought in by Tia and Peter Lo,
loaded on the group's vehicles, quickly disclosed the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of
white crystalline powder which, upon analysis, was identified as metamphetamine . Tia, Lo and Lim
were indicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was discharged as state witness.
Lo and Lim were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the questions
raised by them in this Court on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their vehicles and
personal effects was legal. The Court, citingManipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267
(1986), 26 held legal the search of the appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure therefrom of the
dangerous drug, considering that there was intelligence information, including clandestine reports by a
planted spy actually participating in the activity, that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country; that the requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one pl ace to
another with impunity," and "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 27

In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing, facts existed which were
found by the Court as justifying warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly
ascertained that the woman he was arresting was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had
personally seen that her bag contained not only vegetables but also a package emitting the odor of
marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, and had been
positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused were about to board
passenger buses, making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and decisive
action. In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, too, and when
accosted had attempted to flee from the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was
definite information of the precise identity of the persons engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at
a particular time and place.
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the case at bar ma ke out a
legitimate instance of a warrantless search and seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable
divergence of views among the members of the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant should be absolved
on reasonable doubt. There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by
an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably
persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the offense for
which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch and
the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. It matters not that the search
disclosed that the bags contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and
suspicion. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless
arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was
being or about to be committed, or adjust been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional
waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore illegal,
since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body
and his belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first
undertaken, and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An
arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident of such an
unlawful arrest, also unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic Command at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Malmstedt had, it is said, willingly admitted that there were was hashish inside the "teddy
bears" in the luggage found in his possession an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory
examination does not help the cause of the prosecution one bit. Nothing in the record even
remotely suggests that Malmstedt was accorded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all
persons under custodial investigation. 28 He was not informed, prior to being interrogated, that he had
the "right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice,"
and that if he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one; not does it appear
at all that he waived those rights "in writing and in the presence of counsel." The soldiers and the police
officers simply went ahead with the investigation of Malmstedt, without counsel. The admissions elicited
from Malmstedt under these circumstances, as the Constitution clearly states, are "inadmissible in
evidence against him. 29

The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having been taken in violation of
the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are inadmissible against him
"for any purpose in any proceeding." Also pronounced as incompete nt evidence against him are the
admissions supposedly made by him without his first being accorded the constitutional rights of
persons under custodial investigation. Without such object evidence and admissions, nothing
remains of the case against Malmstedt.

It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence presented by Malmstedt in his
defense is feeble, unworthy of credence. This is beside the point; for conformably to the familiar
axiom, the State must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
The unfortunate fact is that although the existence of the hashish is an objective physical reality that
cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate with any degree of persuasion,
much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was engaged in a criminal activity. This is the
paradox created by the disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is
that the hashish in question has been correctly confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn from
private use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a disparagement of the
efforts of the police and military authorities to deter and detect offenses, whether they be possession
of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or some other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and
commendation of the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen. But those efforts must take
account of the basic rights granted by the Constitution and the law to person s who may fall under
suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be justified by the objective
of ferreting out and punishing crime, no matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective
might be. Disregard of those rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of
the guilty, and all because the "constable has blundered," rendering the evidence inadmissible even
if truthful or otherwise credible. 30
I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989 and to acquit the appellant
on reasonable doubt.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe represents the correct application
to the facts of this case of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and
seizures. It is consistent with my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with
Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a unanimous decision of the Court en banc, and my
dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311, Valmonte v. De Villa (on
checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181 SCRA 623.
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made during the deliberation on this
case that some members of the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of extending its
protection to society, which deserves our higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong
priorities, criminals are being imprudently let free, to violate our laws again; and it is all our fault.
Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I do not consider a
person a criminal, until he is convicted by final judgment after a fair trial by a competent a nd impartial
court. Until then, the Constitution bids us to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak
crudely or sport tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our own standards of propriety and
decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he may look like a criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also so wrong.
On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal search
and seizure as long as the suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited article That
fact will retroactively validate the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize,

the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession, not the fact of illegal
search and seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1,
which was discredited in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejec ted by
an express provision in the 1973 Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the present
Constitution, again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally obtained "shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of criminal justice. In the
case at bar, the search was made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that the
route was being used by marijuana dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at his
waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that probable cause? The ponencia notes that the
military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the Sagada with prohibited
drugs in his possession. This is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless
search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily accept
it.
The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subs equent
discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's
suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the
probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree
that washed clean the tree itself.
In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years ago:
. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available
evidence should be used. It is also desirable that the government should not itself
foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to
be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see wh y it
may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no
importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and
announces that in the future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my
part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part.
If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am "coddling criminals," I welcome
the accusation and take pride in it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with
outlawed evidence than exalt order at the price of liberty.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:

Footnotes

* The case was referred to the Court En Banc by the First Division (to which it had
originally been assigned). Thereafter the Court En Banc resolved to accept and itself
decide the case.
1 Brief for Defendant-appellant, Rollo, pp. 43-44.
2 Brief for Plaintiff-appellee, Rollo, p. 89.
3 Decision of the RTC of La Trinidad, Branch 10, dated 12 October 1989, Rollo, pp.
14-20.
4 Rollo, pp. 16-17.
5 Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution.
6 Sec. 5, Rule 1 13 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
7 People vs. Maspil, G.R. No. 885177, 20 August 1990; People vs. Tangliben, G.R.
No. 63630, 6 April 1990, 184 SCRA 220; People vs. Claudio G.R. No. 72564, 15
April 1988,160 SCRA 646.
8 Quintero vs. NBI, G.R. No. 35149, 23 June 1988, 162 SCRA 467.
9 Valmonte vs. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, 29 September 1989, 178 SCRA 211.
10 People vs. Claudio, supra.
11 People vs. Tangliben, supra.
12 Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83139, 2 August 1990.
13 Supra.
NARVASA, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:
1 SEE People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986); Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
(1986); Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987); Guazon v. de Villa, G.R. No. 80508,
Jan. 30, 1990.
2 Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution; to the same effect: ART. IV, Sec. 3, 1973
Constitution, and ART. IV, Sec. 3, 1935 Constitution.
3 ART. III, Sec. 3 (2).
4 Peo. v. de la Cruz, G.R. No. 83260, April 18, 1990.
5 Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court; SEE Cruz, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., pp.
141-142, citingAdams v. Williams, 47 U.S. 143 and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.
6 Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court.

7 SEE Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), cited in the monograph of Mr.
Justice Mendoza, V.V. entitled Reflections on the Constitutional Law of Arrest,
Search and Seizure, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. LXIII, Third Quarter, September,
1988, p. 241.
8 As pointed out in Cruz, op. cit. p. 142, in the U.S., "searches without warrant may
also be made of automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or "constructive
borders" like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State," but "the mere
mobility of these vehicles does not justify their indiscriminate searches without
warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable
cause (Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 37 L. ed. 2d 596; Carrol v. U.S. 267 U.SS. 132).
9 SEE footnote 13, infra.
10 12 Phil. 439, to the effect that, "An officer making an arrest may take from the
person arrested any money or property found upon his persons which was used in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime of which might furnish the
prisoner with the means of committing violence of escaping, or which may be used in
evidence in the trial of the case."
11 76 Phil. 637 to the effect that, "The most important exception to the necessity for a
search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A
lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its
commission. The right to search includes in both instances that of searching the
person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed (Agnello vs. United
States, 269 U.S., 20).
12 22 SCRA 857 that the "Tariff and Customs Code does not require any search
warrant issued by a competent court before police authorities can effect the seizure.
But the Code requires it in the search of a dwelling house."
13 390 U.S. 243, holding that "prohibited articles within plain view "open to eye and"
hand of the law-enforcement officer who comes upon them "inadvertently," may also
be seized by him even without warrant (SEE Cruz, op. cit. p. 143).
14 SEE U.S. v. Hachaw, 21 Phil. 514 (1912); U.S. v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853 (1917),
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Enrile, Oct. 21, 1985, cited in Gupit, Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 1986 ed., pp. 179182; Peo. v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402
(1988); Guazon v. de Villa, G.R. No. 80508, Jan. 30, 1990; cf., Peo. v. Cruz, 165
SCRA 135 (1988).
15 Nolasco v. Ernani Cruz-Pao, 147 SCRA 509 (1987); SEE, also, People v.
Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986) where the petitioner, while plowing his field, was
arrested and his premises searched on the basis of information that he was in
possession of unlicensed firearms, and thereafter, on discovery by the au thorities of
a gun and subversive documents, had admitted ownership thereof upon which
facts, this Court ruled the gun and documents to be inadmissible in evidence
because their seizure was not an incident of a lawful arrest, and his acknowledgment
of ownership thereof equally incompetent because obtained in violation of the
Miranda doctrine.

16 SEE Cruz, op. cit. p. 142, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, and Magoncia v. Palacio, 80
Phil. 770, and pointing out, on the authority of Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377
and Bagcal v. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525, that the posting by the accused of a bail
bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest and estops him from
questioning its validity.
17 163 SCRA 402, per Cruz, J., Grio-Aquino, J., dissenting; SEE footnote 6 at page
2 supra.
18 160 SCRA 646, Third Division, per Gutierrez, Jr., J.
19 184 SCRA 22, Third Division, per Gutierrez, Jr., J.
20 G.R. No. 83139, First Division, per Gancayco, J.
21 G.R. No. 85177, Third Division, per Gutierrez, Jr., J:
22 392 US 1, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S Ct 1868.
23 Sec. 12, Rule 126 in relation to Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
24 SEE footnote 20, supra.
25 Attention may be drawn, in this connection, to the Resolution of May 24, 1990 in
G.R. No. 83988 (Valmonte v. de Villa, [Sept. 29, 1989], 178 SCRA 211) where the
Court cited with approval a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court that "Automobiles,
because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying
a warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160,
93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed
543, 45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 (1952). The cases so holding have, however, always
insisted that the officers conducting the search have "reasonale or probable cause"
to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a
crime before they begin their warrantless search. . . . (Dyke v. Taylor, 391 US 216,
20 L Ed 538, 88 S Ct 1472)."
26 SEEFootnotes 9 and 13, supra.
27 Citing Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
28 ART. III, Sec. 12 (1).
29 Id., Sec. 12 (3); Peo. v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 62805, Jan. 22, 1990; Peo. v.
Camalog, G.R. No. 77116, Jan. 31, 1989; Peo. v. Lagahan, G.R. No. 78692, Dec. 8,
1988; Peo. v. Newman, G.R. No. 45354, July 26, 1988.
30 Peo. v. Hizon, G.R. No. 71273, July 29, 1988, per Cruz, J.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro ,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter referred to
as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, jo urnals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that

issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the pe tition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stoc k or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear
that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not
been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of

the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
1wph1.
t

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of

Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, le dgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should
not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal r emedies as may be provided by other
laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing t he
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided

by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Wer e it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state
or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an
essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty pr omise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law

enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and se izures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committ ed By agents
of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but,
understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army -Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of
the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and othe r papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being
best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures

therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issue d, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of
the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section
1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against
the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adver ted to above, the opinion written
by the Chief Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and
leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at t his time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches
and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably

outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of
the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and t he
intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that
"legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably r egarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manage r" of the particular corporation.
The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or u nder the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant
was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be
it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate
the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing
factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we
either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interest s have
been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except
to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises
searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC,
USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in
which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them
standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what
it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee",
"licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in

fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman

vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the pre mises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under
against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones
vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary
rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude
that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a sufficient interest in
the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like
in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books
and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . ( Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment;
the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including
himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel andVillano considered also the fact that the
search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at
682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitut ion a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against s aid person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers
turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of
certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the
court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored,
he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying
on Jones vs. U.S.,supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d
631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; andSchwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: " United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers
v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S.
Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers)
were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show
that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects
of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things arepersonal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do
not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in or igin or nature.
Footnotes
1

Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity
as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon,
Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of
Manila.
2

Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman
Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez,
Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3

Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.

Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far
East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business
Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil
Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass

Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation,

The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate
Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
6

Inter alia.

"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be rendered in
the case, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against the use of the
papers, documents and things from the following premises: (1) The office of the U.S.
Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St., Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita,
Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts., Port Area, Manila; (4)
527 Rosario St., Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development Corp., Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San Vicente St.,
Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between
Muelle de San Francisco & Boston, Port Area, Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston;
(11) IBMC, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila;
(14) Room 91, Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15) Warehouse Railroad St. between 17
& 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila, South Blvd.; (17)
Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.; Dewey
Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey
Blvd.; (21) Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp .,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (23) IBMC, 2nd Floor, Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24)
IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis, Manila; (25) United Housing Corp., Trinity
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27)
1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San
Luis, Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases
Nos. R-953 and 955 against petitioners, before the Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. The
preliminary injunction shall continue as to the papers, documents and things found in the
other premises namely: in those of the residences of petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra
Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2) 15 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8
Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village, Makati, Rizal."
8

Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.

10

In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 60 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287 F.
69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F. Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.
11

U.S. vs. Gass 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.

12

On March 22, 1962.

13

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

14

Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

15

. . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)
16

People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.

17

Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

18

Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.

19

Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; emphasis
supplied.
20

Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed, 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs.
United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 US
25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669,
80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio (1961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed. 2d. 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.
21

Even if remote.

22

Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 49: U.S. vs.
Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93: Villano vs, U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Fed. 2d
650.
CASTRO, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:
*

Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32409 February 27, 1971
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR
DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, et al, respondents.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman,
pray this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2 -M-70 issued by respondent Judge on
February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the
documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax
assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been made on the basis of the
said documents, papers and effects, and to order the return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due
course to the petition but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant
against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to
all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness,
respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the
following papers: respondent Veras aforesaid letter -request; an application for search warrant
already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio
subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already
accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished
but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his
Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the
session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes;
and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if
his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leons application for search warrant and respondent
Logronios deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and
accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search
warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
Petitioners lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which
yielded six boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the
search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of
injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be
ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorneys fees. On March 18, 1970,
the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court,
presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an or der dismissing the petition for
dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly,
if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court are:

(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaina nt and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him. (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1,
par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be
conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The phrase which shall be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by Delegat e Francisco as an
amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following discussion in the
Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III,
pp. 755-757) is enlightening:
SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compaero los piropos y vamos al grano.
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la
justicia mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Seoria que
causaria cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria frustrar
los fines de la justicia o si Su Seoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin de
compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo e n su persona, bienes etcetera,
etcetera.
SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Seoria pregunta por la
siguiente razon: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese
escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o
peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo denunciante o
alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos cas os
consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra solamente a sea peticion sino que
el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin examiner a los testigos.
SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Seoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito
siempre requeriria algun tiempo?.
SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo
posible las vejaciones injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo
que entre dos males debemos escoger. el menor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. LAUREL.. . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are
incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, b efore a judge could
issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the
complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may produce . . .

The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Ru le 126, is more emphatic and
candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . .
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him
to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3,
of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the
issuance of warrants except upon probable cause. The determination of whether or not a probable
cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be
allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the
complainants application for search warrant and the witness prin ted-form deposition were
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was
probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little
significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even
taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic n otes
(pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court
below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy
Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes
thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case.
After respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer
Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judges chamber and
informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the
stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as
follows:
A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed
them, requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be
false and without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr.
Logronio whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the affidavit executed before
Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
Q And thereafter?
A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
Q Who is this he?
A The Honorable Judge.
Q The deposition or the affidavit?
A The affidavit, Your Honor.
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a
few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk
of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge.
It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make
it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the
question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the
Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the

stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that mann er respondent Judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and
follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to
conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of
whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue
Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209.
The question is: Was the said search warrant issued in connection with one specific offense, as
required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code
referred to above. Thus we find the following:
Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and
fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the
information required under the Tax Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any
article subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets
in the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to
specific tax . . ., and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association, the
official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output
removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code.
The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which
are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The
third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the
violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output
actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above -mentioned
provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income
Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., L -19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383),
is not applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for violation of Central Bank Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code; whereas, here Search Warrant No 2 -M-70 was
issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more
apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred
sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Cou rt amended
the former rule by inserting therein the phrase in connection with one specific offense, and adding
the sentence No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense, in what is now Sec.
3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court
that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.'

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2 -M70 in this manner:
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and
securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.
While the term all business transactions does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2 -M-70, the said
warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable
records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly ren der its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, to wit:
. . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made, that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct
interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities.
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to
any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove

the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant
should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding
the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of
sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign
remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judges order of July 29, 197 0. The contention is without merit. In the
first place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely
raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court
before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., et al. vs. Ago,
et al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied
without considering the circumstances. (Matutina vs. Buslon, et al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar
time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate
and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 26 SCRA 768.)
Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivatio n of petitioners fundamental right
to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but
also with nullity. (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against
unreasonable search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which
is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in
the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such
corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled t o
immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is,
after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body.
Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process
of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . . (Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule
applied to a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers.
But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the
same result might have been achieved in a lawful way. (Silverthorne Lumber Company, et al. v.
United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation
to object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each
of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled
that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and pre mises of

the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not
be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity . . .
In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers
and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to
whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a
petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from the
corporations in Stonehill.
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely as claimed by
petitioners at least partly as in effect admitted by respondents based on the documents seized by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some
one and one-half months after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication
that the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments. Those assessments should
therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued
by respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from
enforcing the said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered
to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their
representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex G
of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects
seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any
criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
READ CASE DIGEST HERE.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur.
I agree with the ruling that the search warrants in question violates the specific injunction of Section
3, Rule 126 that No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. There is no
question in my mind that, as very clearly pointed out by Mr. Justice Villamor, the phrase for violation
of Section 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions
thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209 refers to more than one specific offense,
considering that the violation of Section 53 which refers to withholding of income taxes at the
sources, Section 208 which punishes pursuit of business or occupation without payment of the
corresponding specific or privilege taxes, and Section 209 which penalizes failure to make a return
of receipts sales, business or gross value output actually removed or to pay the taxes thereon in
connection with Title V on Privilege Taxes on Business and Occupation can hardly be absorbed in a
charge of alleged violation of Section 46(a), which merely requires the filing of income tax returns by
corporations, so as to constitute with it a single offense. I perceive here the danger that the result of
the search applied for may be used as basis not only for a charge of violating Section 46(a) but also
and separately of Section 53, 208 and 209. Of course, it is to be admitted that Sections 72 and 73,
also mentioned in the application, are really directly related to Section 4 6(a) because Section 72
provides for surcharges for failure to render, returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns
and Section 73 refers to the penalty for failure to file returns or to pay the corresponding tax. Taken

together, they constitute one single offense penalized under Section 73. I am not and cannot be in
favor of any scheme which amounts to an indirect means of achieving that which not allowed to be
done directly. By merely saying that a party is being charged with violation of one se ction of the code
in relation to a number of other sections thereof which in truth have no clear or direct bearing with
the first is to me condemnable because it is no less than a shotgun device which trenches on the
basic liberties intended to be protected by the unequivocal limitations imposed by the Constitution
and the Rules of Court on the privilege to secure a search warrant with the aggravating
circumstance of being coupled with an attempt to mislead the judge before whom the application for
its issuance is presented.
I cannot close this brief concurrence without expressing my vehement disapproval of the action
taken by respondent internal revenue authorities in using the documents and papers secured during
the search, the legality of which was pending resolution by the court, as basis of an assessment, no
matter how highly motivated such action might have been. This smacks of lack of respect, if not
contempt for the court and is certainly intolerable. At the very least, it appears as an attempt to
render the court proceedings moot and academic, and dealing as this case does with constitutionally
protected rights which are part and parcel of the basic concepts of individual liberty and democracy,
the government agents should have been the first ones to refrain from trying to make a farce of
these court proceedings. Indeed, it is to be regretted that the government agents and the court have
acted irregularly, for it is highly doubtful if it would be consistent with the sacredness of the rights
herein found to have been violated to permit the filing of another application which complies with the
constitutional requirements above discussed and the making of another search upon the return of
the papers and documents now in their illegal possession. This could be an instance wherein taxes
properly due the State will probably remain unassessed and unpaid only because the ones in charge
of the execution of the laws did not know how to respect basic constitutional rights and liberties.

A.M. No. L-207-J April 22, 1977

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE PIO MARCOS District Judge, Second Judicial District, CFI of Benguet and
Baguio City, Branch I, stationed at the City of Baguio respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
The administrative complaint for gross inefficiency filed by Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos
against the then respondent Judge Pio Marcos of the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio
City, now retired after having reached the age of seventy, 1 arose from the issuance of a search
warrant past 12:00 midnight of April 4, 1971, and thereafter served and executed approximately two
hours later, long before dawn. The grounds alleged were that the search warrant was not limited to one
offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations;
that it did not particularly describe the property to be seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath

the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that thereafter the return and
the inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to
respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April
19.

There was a lengthy and detailed answer submitted by respondent Judge, the essence of which was
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the
procedure followed by him conforming to the practice he found quite conducive to fruitful results in
the campaign against smuggling, resulting in intensified tax collection. He asserted that he is legally
and morally convinced of his innocence of the charge of gross inefficiency, his actuations being
guided by the prescriptions of the Constitution and the rules or the spirit thereof as well as the best
interest of the State. He then alleged that the application for the search warrant was filed by the
Chief of Police of Baguio City, Colonel Victorino S. Calano duly supported by the affidavit of one
Romeo Amansec, who was subjected to intensive examination and interrogation, the other witness,
one Sergeant Victorino de Vera of the Philippine Constabulary, also being thus examined and
interrogated, all three of them describing with particularity and in detail the p lace to be searched and
the things to be seized; that the applicant and his witnesses arrived at his place at about 10:30 p.m.
and the warrant issued at 11:45, the promptness with which he acted being due to the urgency of the
matter; that there was only one specific offense therein covered, namely robbery in band with the
use of a firearm then in the possession of the alleged leader Rogelio Roxas, who had allegedly
taken by force a treasure in the form of a golden Buddha; that after the interrogation, he was
convinced that the offense of robbery in band was committed and that the Buddha had to be seized
before dawn as it would be taken out of Baguio and smuggled out of the country; that the delay in
the delivery to the court could be explained by the conclusion reached by him that from the angle of
security and safety, the articles seized should be kept and guarded by the CIS agents at Camp
Holmes, only a few kilometers from Baguio, under tight security and personal responsibility of
Colonel Calano and that as to those things taken or seized not covered by the warrant, the persons
aggrieved could file a motion for their return, his duty to act on the matter starting to commence only
when it is submitted judicially Respondent Judge prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit.
The Complaint and the answer were then referred for investigation, report and recommendation to
the then Associate, now Acting Presiding, Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan of the Court of Appeals, He
conducted a thorough investigation arid thereafter submitted an exhaustive and comprehensive
report on May 31, 1974. The grounds alleged in the complaint to show inefficiency he classified in
the following: The first, the failure to follow the legal Procedure by respondent Judge when he i ssued
tile warrant,; the second, the defects manifest on the face thereof as two offenses were included and
the description of the premises to be searched and the object to be seized being too general; the
third, the absence of the probable cause; and the fourth, the article seized having included objects
not mentioned in the warrant and the delay in the delivery thereof to respond judge.
As to the first ground, the failure to follow the legal Procedure by respondent Judge when he issued
the warrant, Justice Gatamaitan stated the following in his Report: "There can be no question that
from a reading of the application for search warrant by Col. Calano and the affidavit by witness
Romeo Amansec is well as the search warrant itself, it can be decuded that the deposition in
writing of Sgt. De Vera had not been taken to contrary to 4 of Rule 126; but Investigator must agree
with defense that Respondent did examine under oath, Col. Calano and witnesses, Romeo
Amansec and Sgt. De Vera for Investigator notes that complainant Secretary of Justice himself
presented as his sole witness, Clerk of Court. Fernando R. Romero, and this witness declared that,
'Q.' Would you be able to tell us more or less what sorts of questions were propounded by Judge
Marcos by way of interrogating these witnesses A I cannot repeat the words because it was a long
time ago, but if I may be permitted to make a gist I may be able to relate. Q. Please do so. A. After
administering the oath individually to Col. Calano Amansec and de Vera after giving their names and

other personal circumstances, he dealt on the questions "What were those articles that were the
subject of the application? And they described the articles, what I heard are a golden Buddha, a rifle
with some ammunitions ' This being the case, Investigator is bound to accept this testimony and
must hold that outside of the literal defect in that Respondent had not taken the written disposition of
Sgt. de Vera, the proceedings he had adopted were not fatally wrong, in fact, it might as well be
added that there is something very probable and thereof credible, in the testimony of this witness
that time was of the extreme essence, the urgency of the situation could no longer permit further
going back to the Office of the Clerk of Court for renewed typing of application and affidavits and
warrant, at any rate, since it was complainant Secretary of Justice himself who presented Clerk of
Court Romero, he should be bound by latter's testimony. ... " 2 As to the second ground consisting of
the warrant Being defective because it was issued for two offenses and tile description of the premises to
be searched and the objects to be seized being too general, Justice Gatmaitan discussed the matter thus:
"Since the warrant really stated that it as issued for, 'Illegal Possession of firearms and Violation of
Central Bank Rules and Regulations,' and the body recited that, 'Accused Rogelio Roxas illegally
possess[es] firearms and ammunition without license or permit to possess the same and a golden
Buddha which he is keeping and concealing at his premises at No. 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City in
violation of Central Bank Rules and Regulations; Investigator must concur with complainant that this
warrant violated See. 3 of Rule 126 which provides that, 'No Search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense.' Investigation must even add that the particular Central Bank circular or regulation is not
determined: as to the attack on the description of the premises to be searched and the objects to he
seized, what Investigator understands is that the test of a good description for purposes of sufficiency of
the warrant 'is that it be one that would not permit seizure of the wrong property, indeed the very cited by
Complainant where the search warrant described the objects as, 'books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money lender charging a usurious rate
of interest in violation of the law,' this description was held to be good enough the Supreme Court
reasoning, 'Taking into consideration to nature of "he articles so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof, The description so made substantially complies with the legal
provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which he did,' ... so that here, since certainly, no one
would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image is well known, and even the firearms and
ammunition because these were those without permit to possess, and all located at No. 47 Ledesma St.,
Baguio City, so far as description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have
suffered fatal defects. 3 As to the third charge that the search warrant was issued without probable cause,
Justice Gatmaitan started with the affidavit of Amansec showing that " 'on or about 6:30 a. m. of March
31, 1971, I went to Baguio City and while I passed by a house at No. 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio City I
was attracted by several persons inside the house; That I peeped from outside the house and when the
curtain was moved I saw a Buddha that was inside the house; That I observed what was going on inside
the house and I heard someone say that the golden Buddha was actually for sale and when I observed
them closer I overheard that it was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos; That I peeped again and I
actually saw for myself again the Buddha and I heard one of the persons inside whom I later found out to
be Mr. Rogelio Roxas that it was a golden Buddha but that a down payment was needed; That I am
executing this affidavit because I actually saw the Buddha and that I also saw a firearms and some bullets
inside the house.' which can easily sustain, contrary to complainant's position, that Amansecs knowledge
was not hearsay at all; as to Sgt. De Vera, it will be seen that according to his t estimony, 'Q. Upon arrival
in Baguio, did you seek the coordination of the Police Force in Baguio? A. Not upon our arrival, but late in
the evening, sir. Q. What else did you do between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. that same day, April 4, 1971,
when you went to see Col. Calano A. We conducted a survey and tried to find out and I found out that the
Buddha is really existing in the house of Rogelio Roxas, at No. 47 Ledesma Street. Q. Were you able to
pinpoint where the Buddha is? A. Yes, sir. We went to the place at No. 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio City to
determine that. Q. What did you find out? A. That it was really existing.' ... from which investigator
concludes that Sgt. de Vera's knowledge neither was hearsay either; now complainant point[ed] out
certain alleged discrepancies between the affidavit of Amansec and his interrogation, ... but perhaps,
neither should it be overlooked that all these if they existed at all were directed to the conscience of
examining Judge, who was the one called upon to grade their c redibility, to act with precision; the point is

that while at this beginning the knowledge of witnesses had come thru their information from their
undercover men, the fact also was that they were able to confirm the same with their own eyes, the
existence of the suspected articles within the premises, and that was what they certified under
interrogation, from respondent, as declared no less by complainant's own witness, the Clerk of
Court, Fernando R. Romero who was present threat. 4 As to the fourth accusation of gross inefficiency,
based on the delay in the return as well as the delivery of the objects seized, Justice Gatmaitan did
concur "with complainant that the return was quite delayed; for in the words of See. 11, Rule 126, the
searching officer should forthwith deliver the seized articles, yet, while search had been made on the
night of 5 April, or better stated, early morning of 6 April, 1971, the return was made only on 13 April,
1971. As to the Buddha, it was stated in the return that it was, 'under the control and custody of
Government Security Agents for safekeeping and will be turned over to this Honorable Court when
directed to do so.' ... Now if it be remembered that Police chief Calano kept the Buddha in his residence in
Camp Holmes, ... for several days, that provided the most fertile ground for suspicion of possible
substitution; however, Investigator will concede that the duty to make immediate return devolved upon the
searching party, perhaps a Judge cannot, considering that he has other duties, be expected to
immediately act and require immediate return; perhaps, if there might and probably could be, danger of
substitution, the attention of the Judge should be immediately called to that, here it was not ever, at least,
there is nothing in the evidence to that effect; ... However, the searching officer's duty is to immediately
return to the Court with the seized articles; here the raiding party returned 7 days later, but without the
Buddha, although Investigator sees that on that date, 13 April, 1971, when the return was made without
the Buddha, respondent issued the order reading, "In the 1st Indorsement dated April 5, 1971 signed by
the Acting Chief of Police of Baguio, the following articles were seized by virtue of Search Warrant No.
296 issued by the undersigned, to wit: One (1) Buddha allegedly golden about 28 inches in height more
or less; ... . All these articles were delivered to this Court, except the first item which is , one (1) Buddha
allegedly golden about 28 inches in height more or less.' To complete the record of search warrant No.
296, the Acting Chief of Police is hereby ordered to deliver to this Office the 'one (1) Buddha allegedly
golden about 28 inches in height more or less. It is so ordered]. City of Baguio, Philippi nes, this 13th day
of April, 1971. ... Although not mentioned in the memorandum but mentioned in the complaint, is the fact
that article not mentioned in the warrant, i.e., '1 old saber with scabbard, and 14 pieces of brassbars,
appearance similar to gold bars were seized ... as to this, respondent's answer that Fiscal had the right
to take action, as well as aggrieved person to file corresponding pleading in court, ... this is correct.
Therefore, as to the delay in the return and the seizure of other articles not mentioned in the search
warrant, Investigator must conclude that he can find no way to blame respondent's. 5

The conclusions reached by Justice Gatmaitan follow: "From foregoing, Investigator come to the
conclusions that Respondent: 1st Issued subject search warranty after examining the witnesses
as well as complainant thereof under oath, that the examination sufficiently complied with the
requirement as to the description of the place to be searched and the object to be seized and that
the knowledge of the witnesses was not hearsay but on their own knowledge; however, insofar as
the fact that the written deposition of witness Sgt. De Vera was not taken down and the same
attached to the record, Respondent violated Sec. 4 of Rule 126; 2nd There was probable cause
to issue the warrant; but the warrant itself suffered of the defect that it was for two (2) offenses and
one of these was not even specified by stating with precision what Central Bank circular or
regulation had been infringed contrary to Rule 126, See. 3; 3rd As to the delay in the return, and
as to the seizure of brass bars and a saber not mentioned in the warrant, Therein Investigator has
not seen that Respondent should be made liable. 6
Then came his recommendation: "In view whereof, while Investigator believes that aforecited defects
in the search warrant might perhaps have justified setting it aside on certiorari, this being however
an administrative case, maybe something more should have been shown to justify punishment, for
otherwise, all Judges whose orders are assailed and annulled under the extraordinary legal
remedies must be visited with definite sanctions, something more should have been shown, some
partiality, bias, prejudice, wrongful motive, but which Complainant has not shown nor even
attempted to show, and Investigator after some reflection having come to believe that in the extreme

urgency in which Respondendt had found himself, even other judges, even investigator himself,
would have fallen into the same mistake, therefore, he respectfully desist from recommending a
specific severe or even less than severe punishments, this subject of course to his Highest
Court's other wiser criterion. 7
What immediately attracts attention in the above sentence of Justice Gatma itans recommendation is
the extreme care he took to indicate that he is not to be understood as intruding in and way with the
full discretion that appropriately belongs to his court. It reflects his high sense of delicadeza.
Nonetheless, it would appear obvious, considering the exhaustive report and the 'language
employed after his painstaking appraisal of the evidence of record, that there is not sufficient warrant
for any disciplinary action against respondent, As he correctly pointed out, a certiorari pr oceeding
could have been availed of for correctly purposes. Moreover, it must have been Justice Gatmaitans
sense of realism fortified by long years of service as a trial judge and possibly excessive modesty
that did lead him to say that he could have fallen into the same mistake. As ".'as categorically
affirmed by retired Chief Justice Makalintal Dizon v. De Borja: 8 "To hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable. 9 Nonetheless, it is not
inappropriate to place on record that a trial judge in the position of respondent ought to have abided with
the settled juristic norm that a warrant should not be issued for more than one offense and that the
deposition of the witness should be made in writing and thereafter attuned to the record.

One last word. It is to be recalled that, as noted at the outset, respondent judge retired on July 11,
1975. The writer of this opinion is of the view, following Diamalon v. Quintilla, 10 that as an
administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the government, the
resignation or retirement calls for its dismissal. Nonetheless, in Perez v. Abiera, 11 this Court, in an opinion
by Justice Muoz Palma, ruled: "In short, the cessation from office of a respondent Judge either because
of resignation, retirement or some other similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an
administrative complaint which was filed against him while still in the service. Each case is to be resolved
in the context of the circumstances present thereat." 12

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for gross inefficiency against Judge Pio Marcos is
dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be placed on his record.
Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., took no part.
Barredo, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The facts as found in the resolution sufficiently justify the complaint for gross inefficiency filed by the
complainant Secretary of Justice against respondent Judge, arising from the latter's issuance at
around midnight of April 4, 1971 of a constitutionally prescribe d general search warrant that

unlawfully covered more than one offense and failed to particularly describe the property to be
seized. The record also does not show that respondent Judge complied with the prescribed
prerequisites for the issuance of a search warrant of personally examining the complainant and
witnesses, taking their depositions in writing and attaching them to the record. Furthermore, contrary
to standing instructions that such warrants except for compelling urgent reasons should be served i n
the daytime, the warrant was served and executed within two hours of its issuance long before dawn
(allegedly because the golden Buddha subject thereof would be taken out of Baguio and smuggled
out of the country, notwithstanding that the house where it was kept was under close surveillance of
the police and constabulary); no receipt for the properties seized appears to have been issued and
the return of the warrant and delivery of the properties seized and the return of the warrant and
delivery of the properties seized with an inventory thereof were made to respondent judge not
forthwith but only about two weeks later on April 19, 1971.
It seems quite clear that Rule 126 on search and seizure was thus violated in five principal sections
thereof, viz, sections 3, 4, 5, 10 and 11 thereof, which provide as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by
the judge or justice of the peace after examinations under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The judge or justice of the peace
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing,
and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
SEC. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge or justice of the peace
is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based,
or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant,
which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these rules.
The form prescribed by the Rules of Court as referred to in section 5 is Form 26 thereof, which
reads:
FORM 26. SEARCH WARRANT. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
Criminal Case No. -versus - for A.B., Accused (State nature of the
offense)

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

Greetings:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath (name
of applicant) and his witnesses (name of witness) that there is probable cause to
believe that (describe the act charged) has been committed or is about to be
committed and that there are good and sufficient reason to believe that (name of

person or persons to be searched) has in his Possession Or Control in (describe

premises in (name of street), district Of , (name property subject of
the offense- or stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or
used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense) which should be
seized and brought to the undersigned. (Cancel description not applicable.)
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day (or
night) of the premises above described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the following personal Property, to wit: (give a complete and detailed description of
the property to be seized) and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with
as the law directs.
Witness my hand this day of , 19 .
, Judge
SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose
possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at
least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court. The officer
must forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the peace or judge of the
municipal court, or of the Court of First Instance which issued the warrant, together
with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath. (Emphasis supplied.)
The non-observance and breach of the cited vital provisions for the issuance of search and seizure
warrants which are grounded on the constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 1 and with
which provisions all members of the bench and bar are rightly expected to be familiar, make out a case of
gross inefficiency, as charged by the complainant Secretary of Justice. The doctrine of Dizon vs. de
Borja 2 that a judge should not be held admiistratively liable "for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders" is not applicable here, for the elements of partiality, bias, prejudice or wrongful motive do not
enter into consideration in a charge of gross inefficiency or concretely as in this case a charge of breach
and violation of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and of the basic and well known implementing rules.

In the leading case of Stonehill vs. Diokno, 3 the Court through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
stressed two points in connection with the constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in Said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized."

There as in this case, the implementing rule that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense" was disregarded and violated and the warrants that were issued were general
warrants that did not refer to any specific offense or determinative provision of law alleged to have
been violated (as stated by the Investigator, the particular Central Bank circular or regulation is not
even determined) and did not particularly describe the properties to be Seized. The Court, in
emphasizing that such general warrants are outlawed and therefore may not be issued by judges to
whom the responsibility was at the time exclusively entrusted by the Constitution (so that the
determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant may be properly le ft
to "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime 4 held that "(T)o uphold the validity of the warrants in

question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the so-called general
warrants." In unanimously adopting the exclusionary rule, the Court recognized its salutary purpose to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way, by removing the
incentive to disregard it since otherwise "the ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest." 5

The Court reaffirmed in Asian Surety & Ins. Co. Inc. vs. Herrera 6 in declaring void an outlawed
general warrant that was wrongfully served in "the wee hours of the morning", that "(O)f all the rights of a
citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the
inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare,
still it must be exercise and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government." The Court once again stressed that the evident purpose and intent of the constitutional
mandate requiring a particular description in the search warrant of the place to be searched and of the
things to be seized is "to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures' may not be made."

In line with the foregoing, judges of inferior courts who have been entrusted with this great
responsibility must be placed on notice that they will be held administratively liable for disregard and
breached of the Constitutional guaranty of immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures and
of the cited implementing rules of court.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The facts as found in the resolution sufficiently justify the complaint for gross inefficiency filed by the
complainant Secretary of Justice against respondent Judge, arising from the latter's issuance at
around midnight of April 4, 1971 of a constitutionally prescribed ge neral search warrant that
unlawfully covered more than one offense and failed to particularly describe the property to be
seized. The record also does not show that respondent Judge complied with the prescribed
prerequisites for the issuance of a search warrant of personally examining the complainant and
witnesses, taking their depositions in writing and attaching them to the record. Furthermore, contrary
to standing instructions that such warrants except for compelling urgent reasons should be served in
the daytime, the warrant was served and executed within two hours of its issuance long before dawn
(allegedly because the golden Buddha subject thereof would be taken out of Baguio and smuggled
out of the country, notwithstanding that the house where it was kept was under close surveillance of
the police and constabulary); no receipt for the properties seized appears to have been issued and
the return of the warrant and delivery of the properties seized and the return of the warrant and
delivery of the properties seized with an inventory thereof were made to respondent judge not
forthwith but only about two weeks later on April 19, 1971.
It seems quite clear that Rule 126 on search and seizure was thus violated in five principal sections
thereof, viz, sections 3, 4, 5, 10 and 11 thereof, which provide as follows:

SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by
the judge or justice of the peace after examinations under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The judge or justice of the peace
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing,
and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
SEC. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge or justice of the peace
is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based,
or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant,
which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these rules.
The form prescribed by the Rules of Court as referred to in section 5 is Form 26 thereof, which
reads:
FORM 26. SEARCH WARRANT. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
Criminal Case No. -versus - for A.B., Accused (State nature of the
offense)

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

Greetings:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath (name
of applicant) and his witnesses (name of witness) that there is probable cause to
believe that (describe the act charged) has been committed or is about to be
committed and that there are good and sufficient reason to believe that (name of
person or persons to be searched) has in his Possession Or Control in (describe
premises in (name of street), district Of , (name property subject of
the offense- or stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or
used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense) which should be
seized and brought to the undersigned. (Cancel description not applicable.)
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day (or
night) of the premises above described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the following personal Property, to wit: (give a complete and detailed description of
the property to be seized) and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with
as the law directs.
Witness my hand this day of , 19 .
, Judge

SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose
possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at
least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court. The officer
must forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the peace or judge of the
municipal court, or of the Court of First Instance which issued the warrant, together
with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath. (Emphasis supplied.)
The non-observance and breach of the cited vital provisions for the issuance of search and seizure
warrants which are grounded on the constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 1 and with
which provisions all members of the bench and bar are rightly expected to be familiar, make out a case of
gross inefficiency, as charged by the complainant Secretary of Justice. The doctrine of Dizon vs. de
Borja 2 that a judge should not be held admiistratively liable "for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders" is not applicable here, for the elements of partiality, bias, prejudice or wrongful motive do not
enter into consideration in a charge of gross inefficiency or concretely as in this case a charge of breach
and violation of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and of the basic and well known implementing rules.

In the leading case of Stonehill vs. Diokno, 3 the Court through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
stressed two points in connection with the constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in Said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized."

There as in this case, the implementing rule that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense" was disregarded and violated and the warrants that were issued were general
warrants that did not refer to any specific offense or determinative provision of law alleged to have
been violated (as stated by the Investigator, the particular Central Bank circular or regulation is not
even determined) and did not particularly describe the properties to be Seized. The Court, in
emphasizing that such general warrants are outlawed and therefore may not be issued by judges to
whom the responsibility was at the time exclusively entrusted by the Constitution (so that the
determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant may be properly left
to "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime 4 held that "(T)o uphold the validity of the warrants in
question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the so-called general
warrants." In unanimously adopting the exclusionary rule, the Court recognized its salutary purpose to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way, by removing the
incentive to disregard it since otherwise "the ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest." 5

The Court reaffirmed in Asian Surety & Ins. Co. Inc. vs. Herrera 6 in declaring void an outlawed
general warrant that was wrongfully served in "the wee hours of the morning", that "(O)f all the rights of a
citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the
inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare,
still it must be exercise and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government." The Court once again stressed that the evident purpose and intent of the constitutional
mandate requiring a particular description in the search warrant of the place to be searched and of the

things to be seized is "to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures' may not be made."

In line with the foregoing, judges of inferior courts who have been entrusted with this great
responsibility must be placed on notice that they will be held administratively liable for disregard and
breached of the Constitutional guaranty of immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures and
of the cited implementing rules of court.
Footnotes
1 He reached the compulsory retirement age of seventy on July 11, 1975. As he was
appointed under the 1935 Constitution, the present retirement age of sixty did not
apply as to him.
2 Report, 7-8.
3 Ibid, 8-9.
4 Ibid, 10-11.
5 Ibid, 11-14.
6 Ibid, 14-15.
7 Ibid, 15.
8 Adm. Case No. 163-J, January 28, 1971, 37 SCRA 46.
9 Ibid 52, Cf. Santiago Santos, Adm. Case No. 772-CJ, April 18, 1975, 63 SCRA
392, per Aquino, J and De Nacional v. Zosa, Adm. Case No July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA,
32, per Martin J.
10 Adm. Case No. 116, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 347.
11 Adm. CaseNo. 223-J, June 11, 1975, 64 SCRA 302.
12 Ibid, 308. The writer of this opinion did not take part in Perez v. Abiera. However,
as he is speaking for the Court, he is bound by such a doctrine.
Teehankee, J.:
1 Art. III, sec. 1, par. 3, 1935 Constitution provides that: "(3) The rights of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papaers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examinatio n under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Art. IV, sec. 3, 1973 Consituttion substantially reproduces the text of the 1935
Constitution emphasizing the people's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures "of whatever nature and for any purpose" although adding that the warrant

may also be issued by " such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law."
The text reads: "SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
2 37 SCRA 46, cited in the Resolution at page 8 thereof.
3 20 SCRA 383, 391 (1967).
4 Johnson vs. U.S. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947).
5 Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
6 54 SCRA 312, 316 (1973) per Esguerra, J., citing People va. Elias, 147 NE 472.
See Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) to same effect,

G.R. No. L-28642 April 30, 1976

MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, and SGT.
ERNESTO LUMANG, respondents.
Marcelino B. Florentino for petitioners.
Jose L Yumang for respondent Sgt. Ernesto Lumang. Hon. Javier Pabalan for and in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:
This Court is confronted anew in this certiorari proceeding with the claim that a search warrant
issued without complying with the requisites of the Constitution 1 and the Rules of Court 2 should have
been nullified, but was not in the challenged order of respondent Judge Javier Pabalan. 3 More
specifically, it was the failure of the application for the search warrant as well as the search warrant itself
to specify the specific offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of
respondent Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized,
that were singled out to justify the assertion of illegality. When required to answer, respondent Judge did
not bother to refute specifically the allegations of the petition for certiorari, but merely contented himself
with inviting attention to the challenged order as well as the resolutions denying the motion for

reconsideration and with the statement that he "has no particular prayer to ask the Supreme Court," an
assertion thereafter repeated in the second paragraph of his two-paragraph answer that he "has no
request to make in this particular case leaving the issues entirely to the discretion of the Supreme
Court." 4 The tone of diffidence, almost of apology, is easy to understand. It is difficult to resist the thought
that respondent Judge failed to pay heed to authoritative decisions of this Court. The most cursory
perusal of the application for search warrant 5 by respondent Lumang and the search warrant
itself, 6 yields no other conclusion. Respondent Judge ignored what the Constitution requires on two
points, the existence of a probable cause and the particular description of the things to be seized. The
limitation as to the specific offense as mandated by the Rules of Court was not observed either. Even on
the assumption then that he could not

relevant According to the former: "A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. No search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." Section 4 provides: "The municipal or city
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." be held chargeable with knowledge of the
leading Stonehill decision, 7 announced barely twenty days before the search warrant in question was
issued, still from Alverez v. Court of First Instance 8 the first to be decided under the 1935 Constitution,
promulgated in 1937, to Oca v. Marquez, 9 that came out in 1965, this Court had adhered firmly to the
view that for a search warrant to escape the imputation of being unreasonable, there should be strict
conformity with the requirements of the Constitution and the applicable procedural rules. The finding then
should have been against the validity of the search warrant. Nonetheless, insofar as such order limited
itself to requiring the return solely of the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and
five bottles of Streptomycin, all of which may be considered as personal effects of petitioners, with the
rest of the goods taken falling under the category of things forbidden by law and therefore need not be
restored, 10 it can be sustained. So we rule.

In the opening paragraph of the application for search warrant, respondent Ernesto I. Lumang
admitted that "he has been informed" and therefore was of the belief that petitioners Maria Castro
and Co Ling, whose place of residence was not even indicated, although subsequently mention was
made of their being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession narcotics and other
contraband." 11 There is a claim that he had verified the report and that therefore he had "reasons to
believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned to take possession" of such
narcotics and other contraband. 12 The application was accompanied by the joint affidavit of a Sergeant
Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary. 13 Again, mention
was merely made of their information about narcotics and other contraband being kept by petitioners.
They did allege therein that they conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could come out with is that
petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for almost ten years conducting such traffic and that after
verification, he was not registered in the Immigration Office. 14 Then, on the very same day, July 10, 1967,
the search warrant was issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. 15 Again, there was reference
to the possession by petitioners of such forbidden goods. As to the complete and detailed description of
the properties to be seized, the search warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and
contraband inside the warehouse and premises of petitioners. 16 In the resolution upholding the validity of
the search warrant, respondent Judge did state the following: "On July 10, 1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of
the PC, with a long service behind, appeared in chamber before the Presiding Judge of B ranch I of this
Court. With him were Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Apilado both of the PC Command of La Union. The three
submitted to the Presiding Judge in chamber an application for search warrant which is Exhibit I in this
case and a joint affidavit supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt. Lumang said, testifying regarding
this incident, those appearing were asked, although not in writing and not recorded, some questions by
the Presiding Judge regarding their request of the search warrant on the knowledge of Molina and
Apilado on the facts stated on the application and on the joint affidavit. The inquiry was brief. The barrio to
be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But this

correction was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina are adjoining barrios. After
the routine taking of their oath and examination questions and answers, the Presiding Judge of this
Branch signed the application for search warrant, the joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search
warrant which is Exhibit C." 17

As set forth at the outset, failure to abide by both the Constitution and the procedural law in terms of
the existence of a probable cause, a particular description of the property to be seized and the
requirement that there be only one specific offense, is quite manifest.
1. This excerpt from the epochal opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v.
Diokno 18 is highly relevant: "Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had
committed a 'violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code.' In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed
by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a 'violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,' as
alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
or codes." 19 That same approach is reflected in the two subsequent cases of Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v.
Ruiz 20 and Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera. 21 It bears repeating, as was emphasized in
Stonehill v. Diokno, that the averments as to the alleged commission of the offenses imputed to petitioner
were abstract. As admitted in the challenged order, the inquiry was brief. Subsequently, reference was
made to "the routine taking of [their oath] and examination questions and answers ..." 22 Nor can such
perfunctory manner in which respondent Judge conducted the required "examination under oath" be
justified merely because respondent Lumang was "a Sergeant of the PC, with a long service behind
[him]." 23 Moreover, contrary to the Rules of Court, he did not even bother to take the depositions of the
witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record. 24 There was thus a manifest and palpable violation of
the constitutional standard as to the quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause, as so
clearly enunciated in Stonehill.

2. Then again, the Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 25 As was admitted
by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners,
which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria
Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to
the premises to be searched, it may be admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to
call for its invalidation. Nonetheless, and again in line with Stonehill v. Diokno, the Constitution is quite
explicit that there be a particular description of the things to be seized. That requisite was not complied
with in this case. That would explain why the searching party felt it had a free hand and did take
possession of various kinds of goods, including personal effects, which respondent Judge himself would
have them return. What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of this constitutional provision, the
elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that this Court is
resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional provis ion is of a mandatory character and
therefore must be strictly complied with. 26 To quote from the landmark American decision of Boyd v.
United States: 27 "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principis." 28

3. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search
warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific o ffense." 29 Here
reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term
covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes. Necessarily
then, more than one offense could arise from the activity designated as illegal traffic of narcotics and
contraband. As a matter of fact, in the challenged order, reference was made to at least three charges
having been filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal Revenue Code, its Section 1039 on tax
evasion, as well as illegal possession of opium. It would seem that once again what was correctly pointed
out by Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diok no as unjustified and unwarranted finds application.
Nor can there be any plausibility to the possible excuse, to repeat what was said before, that the Stonehill
opinion having been rendered only twenty days previous to the issuance of the search warrant,
respondent Judge could not be held chargeable with a knowledge thereof, considering that as far back as
July 30, 1965, two years earlier, in Oca v. Marquez, 30 this Court, through the then Justice J. P. Bengzon,
enunciated: "The decision herein has applied the provisions of th Old Rules of Court since this case arose
under said Rules. Attention of the Bench and Bar is however called to the fact that effective January 1,
1964 the issuance of search warrants is governed by Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
which among other things requires that a search warrant must be in connection with one specific
offense." 31

4. As was made clear at the outset, though, the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the
return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited by law. This is the established
doctrine in this jurisdiction. As far back as Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 32 a 1920 decision, it was held: "That
although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements
of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium. and its
paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be
exonerated because of such omission of the judge." 33 Among the authorities cited is Cooley: "'Searchwarrants have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been
smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for
lottery tickets or Prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for
sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the
public safety.'" 34 So, also, in Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda, 35 handed down in 1940, Justice Laurel, speaking
for this Court, stated: "If it be true, furthermore, without, however, deciding the point, that as alleged by
the respondents the articles in question constitute the corpus delicti of the Usury Law, their return to the
petitioners cannot be ordered." 36 Magoncia v. Palacios, 37 promulgated in 1948, reiterated such a
doctrine. Thus: "En el asunto de Uy Kheytin contra Villareal (42 Jur. Fil. 935), los recurrentes pidieron la
devolucion del opio de que se incautaron los constabularies al registrar su casa armados con un
mandamiento de registro expedido sin cumplir las disposiciones de los articulos 96 y 98 de la Orden
General No. 58; sostenian que los requisites exigidos por dichos articulos no se habian cumplido, y por
tanto, el mandamiento de registro era ilegal, como si no existiera; que al registro se ha hecho sin
mandamiento de registro debidamente expedido. Este Tribunal denego la peticion, declarando que la
irregularidad de la expedicion del mandamiento de registro ne era suficiente causa para ordenar la
devolucion del opio. El Hon. Juez recurrido no abuso de su discrecion al denegar la devolucion al
acusado del paltik , 42 municiones y una granada de mano, tampoco abuso de su sana discrecion al
denegar la peticion del acusado de que se prohiba al Fiscal Provincial y al Jefe de Policia de Asingan,
Pangasinan a presentar tales efectos como prueba en la vista." 38

5. This decision leaves open the question of the legality of any possible use that may be made by
the prosecuting authorities of the articles seized under an invalid search warrant. Here, again, the
Yee Sue Koy opinion of Justice Laurel is illuminating, especially in view of the inadmissibility of
evidence illegally seized under the present Constitution 39 At this stage, the question does not have to
be faced. The words of Justice Laurel follow: "While we reiterate the rule that the seizure of books and
documents by means of a search warrant ' for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
against the person in whose possession they were found is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion
of an accused to testify against himself ..., the said rule has no applicable force in the present case. ... In

the application for the issuance of the search warrant in question, it was alleged that the articles seized
were 'being used by it (Sam Sing & Co.) in connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate
of interest in violation of the Usury Law,' and it is now suggested (memoranda of respondents) that the
only object of the agents of the Anti-Usury Board in keeping the articles is to prevent the petitioners from
employing them as a means of further violations of the Usury Law. In this state of the record, without
deciding the question whether the petitioners will in fact use the articles in question, if returned, for illegal
purposes, we are not prepared to order the return prayed for by the petitioners. (Cf. People v. Rubio, 57
Phil. 384, 394-395.)" 40

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of September 12, 1967 denying the
motion of petitioners to annul the search warrant as well as the resolutions of October 26, 1967 and
January 29, 1968 denying the motions for reconsiderations are reversed, the decision of this Court
being that the search warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being violative both of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court. It is likewise the decision of this Court that notwithstanding the
illegality of such search warrant, the challenged order of respondent Judge can be sustained only
insofar as it would limit the return of the articles seized to the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the
bottle of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such search warrant. No costs.
Barred, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 The search warrant was issued on July 10, 1967 at a time when the 1935
Constitution was still in force. As set forth in Art. III, Sec. 1, par. (3): "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Under the present Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 3, the provision remains
unaltered except for the vesting of the competence on any other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law to issue a search warrant or a warrant of arrest where
formerly only a judge may do so.
2 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court defines with particularity how a search warrant may
be issued. Sections 3 and 4 are particularly
3 Ernesto Lumang, a Philippine Constabulary Sergeant who applied for the search
warrant, was included likewise as a respondent.
4 Answer of Respondent Judge Pabalan dated February 28, l968.
5 Petition, Annex A.
6 Ibid, Annex B.
7 Stonehill v. Diokno, L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383.
8 64 Phil. 33.

9 L-20749, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 735.

10 Cf. Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920); Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil
770(1948).
11 Petition, Annex A.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, Annex B.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid, Annex C.
16 Ibid.
17 Resolution dated September 12,1967, Ibid, Annex H.
18 L-19550, June 19, 1967 20 SCRA 383.
19 Ibid, 391-392.
20 L-32409, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 823.
21 L-25232, December 20, 1973, 54 SCRA 312.
22 Resolution, Annex H.
23 Ibid.
24 Cf. Rule 126, Section 3.
25 Art. 111, Sec. 1, par. 3 of the 1935 Constitution.
26 Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33 (1937).
27 116 US 616 (1886).
28 Ibid, 630.
29 Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court bears repeating in full: "A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination gander
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." What
cannot escape attention is that the Rules of Court twice spoke of such basic
limitation of "one specific offense."

30 L-20749, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 735.

31 Ibid, 738.
32 42 Phil. 886.
33 Ibid, 899-900.
34 Ibid, 892. The citation came from Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed.,
432 (1909).
35 70 Phil. 141.
36 Ibid, 148.
37 80 Phil. 770.
38 Ibid, 774-775.
39 According to Art. IV, See. 4, par. (2) of the present Constitution: "Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for an y
purpose in any proceeding."
40 70 Phil. 141, 147-148.

G.R. No. L-25232 December 20, 1973

ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J. ZOLETA, JR. and
MANUEL CUARESMA, respondents.
Astraquillo, Laquio, Brillantes and Associates, Taada, Carmon and Taada and Alidio, Elegir,
Anchete and Catipon petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for respondent
Celso J. Zoleta, Jr.
Antonio Barredo for respondent Manuel Cuaresma.

ESGUERRA, J.:

Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City
Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers,
receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso
Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in
connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax
evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg.,
Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is couched in the following language:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath NBI
Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel Cuaresma that there are good and
sufficient reasons to believe that Mr. William Li Yao or his employees has/have in
his/their control in premises No. 2nd Floor Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal
Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----- of
the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Repo rt
including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts,
including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check vouchers,
income tax returns, and other papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to
1964 to be dealt with as the law directs.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI
entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon
Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman
of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2)
carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the
explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the
1935 Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sect ions 3, 5, 8 and 10 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of reference, viz:
Sec. 3 The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnessed he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person s, or
things to be seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution)
Sec. 3 Requisites for issuing search warrant A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by
the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126,
Rules of Court)
Sec. 5 Issuance and form of search warrant If the judge or justice of the peace
is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based,
or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant in
the form prescribed by these rules. (Sec. 5, Rule 126)
Sec. 8 Time of making search The warrant must direct that it be served in the
day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the per son or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the night or day. (Sec. 8, Rule 126)
Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose
possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at
least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
(Sec. 10, Rule 126) .
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and
happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. 1 While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government (People v. Elias, 147 N.E. 472)."

I.
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1)
estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit
command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense." The aforequoted provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the
same section, is something new. "There is no precedent on this amendment prohibition against
the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense either in the American books
on Criminal procedure or in American decisions." 2 It was applied in the celebrated case of Harry S.
Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice 3 where this Court said:

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at
the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision abovequoted to outlaw the
so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in times of
keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend section 3 of Rule
122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised
Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the court

added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense.
II.
Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the
search and seizures of personal properties so vaguely described and not particularized, thereby
infringing the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the place to be se arched and
the persons or things to be seized. It also assails the noncompliance with the above -requirement as
likewise openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which provides:
SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the follo wing
personal property:
(a) Property subject of the offense;
(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the offense, stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents
that by not cancelling the description of one or two of the classes of property contained in the form
when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the respondent judge intended the search
to apply to all the three classes of property. This is a patent impossibility because the description of
the property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report,
including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash
receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been
committed by the corporation to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it
impossible for Us to see how the above-described property can simultaneously be contraband
goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain
and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property
he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of
personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2
of the Rules. The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus
description of the personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing description which
includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized (as it was really seized in
the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its business, 4 petitioner in several motions, filed for early
resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their
business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its
numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the
general public. 5 And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued, We have
before Us the infamous general warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 896,
cited with approval in the Bache case, supra, We had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement
that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:

"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically
require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to
limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what

articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may
not be made. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is
borne out by American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
III.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule
126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts
(Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one
bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders
described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various sizes,
etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents contained in the folders of which there
were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and
other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away private papers of the pe titioner, in
violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the
broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport.
IV.
The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126. 6 Annex "A" of the
Petition which is the search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual
search was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the
morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities 7 are of
the view that where a search is to be made during the night time, the authority for executing the same at
that time should appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.

In their Memorandum 8 respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v. Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1),
argued:

Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the illegality
thereof would not render the incriminating documents inadmissible in evidence.
This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling (Stonehill case, supra).
Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the United
States declared: 9
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in eviden ce
against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his right to be secured against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praise-worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted
in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.

Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by the Court
or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition filed by petitioner
dated October 24, 1972, for early resolution of this case.
V.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and the
application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the application is so far
remote in time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective.
Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say
on this point:
From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the following
general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants:
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and
definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit and
issuance of the search warrant.
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the
offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit is made or the search warrant
issued, but, generally speaking, a lapse of time of more than three weeks will be held
not to invalidate the search warrant while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so .
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the
affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the affidavit is
thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the observation of the offense is
alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of
probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is
nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents,
papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernandez * and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., concurs in the result.

Footnotes
1 In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. 241; Interstate Commerce Comm. v.
Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Boyd v. U.S. 29 Law. ed. 746; Car rol v. U.S. 69 Law.
ed., 543, 549.
2 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1963 ed. p. 890.
3 Harry S. Stonehill v. Sec. of Justice, L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA, 392.

4 Bache & Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, L-32409, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 835.
5 See Rollo p. 94, 182.
6 "Sec. 8. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the
affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of
the day or night."
7 People v. de Jesus, 73 PRR (1952); People v. Negron, 72 PRR 825; State v.
Conwell, 96 Me 172, 51 A 873 as cited in Varon's Searches, Seizures and
Immunities, 1961 p. 394.
8 See p. 144 of Rollo.
9 Weeks v. U.S. 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S Ct. 341, cited in Stonehill
case, supra, p. 394.
* In lieu of Justice Teehankee, disqualified.

G.R. No. L-34038 June 18, 1976

Customhouse, Pasay City, petitioner,
vs.
District, stationed at Pasig, Rizal, and CESAR T. MAKAPUGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34243 June 18, 1976
NICANOR MARCELO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District
stationed at Pasig, Rizal, and SALVADOR T. MASCARDO, as Collector of Customs stationed
at the MIA Airport Customhouse, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36376 June 18, 1976
CALIXTO D. ENRIQUEZ, REYNALDO REYES AND LUCILA ENRIQUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, GREGORIO CONDE AND ANASTACIA TORILLO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-38688 June 18, 1976

FRANCISCO P. FELIX, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ and FELIX C. HALMAO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39525 June 18, 1976
PEDRO E. NIEVA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th
Judicial District, JOSE ARELLANO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40031 June 18, 1976
PEDRO E. NIEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th
Judicial District, JOSE ARELLANO and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:p
G.R. No. L-34038
On July 1, 1971, petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter complaint w ith respondent
Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of: (a) Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4713, (b) Central Bank Circular No. 265, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as The Central Ba nk Act, and (c)
Section 3601 and 3602 of Republic Act No. 1937, in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act, claiming that Ce sar T.
Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally, willfully and feloniously brought in to the country FORTY (40)
cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the necessary
permit from the proper authorities. The respondent submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry wh ich did not declare the said articles. The
Customs Examiner assigned further asked him if he has something more to declare but the answer was in the negative. And in ut ter
disregard of existing Central Bank Circulars particularly C.B. Circular 265, as amen ded, the respondent brought into the country various
Philippine Money in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P2,280.00) Pesos cleverly hidden in one of the pieces of b aggage
examined by the assigned customs examiner, without any prior permit fro m the Central Bank authorities. ... " (p. 11, rec.).

Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation,
and on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering
the return to private respondent the amount of P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag -2456 FA - No.
B103813, and one (1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only, as well as the forfeiture of forty (40)
cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey"
(p. 13, rec.).
Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles
so stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of
seizure proceedings thereon." The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for
"Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay
City.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, see king to annul and set aside the order
dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal complaints directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with
prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, and is without
authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities.

In due time, respondents filed their respective answers to the petition and su bsequently both parties
submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
G. R. No. L-34243
On June 22, 1971, respondent Collector of Customs filed a letter - complaint with respondent Judge
against petitioner Nicanor Marcelo for an alleged violation of Section 3602 in relation to Section 2505
of Republic Act 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code, supposed to have been
committed in the following manner:
... Mr. Marcelo who is an arriving passenger from Hongkong on board a Philippi ne Air
Lines plane, Flight 307, on June 22, 1971, criminally, feloniously, and with intention
to defraud the government did not declare the contents of his pieces of baggage in
the Baggage declaration Entry nor with the assigned Customs Examiner. ... When
his pieces of baggage were examined, instead of personal effects as declared in the
Baggage Declaration Entry, what were found were various assorted Watches, Bags,
Montagut shirts and Dress materials which are highly taxable.
The act of passenger Marcelo in intentionally refusing to declare the said articles in
the Baggage Declaration Entry, and before the Customs Examiner despite inquiries
made, constitute a criminal offense within the meaning of Section 3602 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines. ... (p. 19, rec.).
The criminal complaint having been docketed as Case No. CCC-VII-854-P.C., the respondent Judge
assumed jurisdiction over the objection of petitioners counsel, conducted the preliminary
examination and investigation, simultaneously in the manner provided for by Section 13, Rule 112 of
the New Rules of Court, and thereafter on October 6, 1971 issued the following order:
WHEREFORE, there being a preliminary investigation and examination conducted
by the Court and considering that the respondent was given a chance to defend
himself let a Warrant of Arrest be issued for his apprehension. The respondent is
hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 for his provisional release.
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13,
Rule 113 thereto, the City Fiscal of Pasay is hereby ordered to file the corresponding
information against the respondent before this court of competent jurisdiction within
FORTY EIGHT (48) HOURS from receipt hereof (p. 23, rec.)
Petitioner Nicanor Marcelo filed this action for certiorari with preliminary injunction, impugning the
validity of the order of respondent Judge dated October 6, 1971, on the same ground as the petition
in G.R. No. L-34038.
On October 20, 1971, the Supreme Court adopted resolution requiring respondents to rile an answer
and likewise issued a writ of preliminary injunction, "restraining respondent Judge, his
representatives, assigns or persons acting upon his orders, place or stead, from executing, enforcing
and implementing his order of October 6, 1971 ... "(p. 32, rec.)
In compliance therewith, respondent Judge filed a petition for admission of answer on November 29,
1971 (pp. 43-44, rec.), which was granted by this Court in its December 13, 1971 r esolution (p. 62,
rec.).

On the other hand, respondent Collector of Customs, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation on February 1, 1972, adopting as his answer to the petition, the legal grounds averred
in the original petition in G.R. No. , Collector of Customs, etc. versus Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, etc., et
al (p. 72, rec.).
On June 13, 1972, the Supreme Court by resolution resolved to consider the case submitted for
decision after noting the failure of petitioner to file his memorandum (p. 9 4, rec.).
G. R. No. L-36376
On February 22, 1973, private respondents Gregorio Conde and Anastacia Torillo, filed a complaint
directly with the Circuit Criminal Court, indicting petitioners with violations of the Anti -Graft Law.
The complaint was ultimately docketed and on the same day (February 22, 1973), respondent Judge
forthwith issued an order of the following tenor:
Considering that the complaint filed ... sufficient in form and substance, the same
having been filed in accordance with Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court,
and pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of "Mateo
vs. Villaluz," let the preliminary investigation of this case be set on February 24, 1973
at 8:00 o'clock in the morning (p. 22, rec.).
On the day set, petitioners appeared at the sala of respondent Judge who proceeded to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the case. The same was reset on February 26, 1973.
Immediately before the hearing of February 26, 1973, petitioners, through counsel, fil ed an "Urgent
Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" contesting the power of the respondent Judge to
conduct the preliminary examination and investigation (p. 23, rec.), which was denied by respondent
Judge in his order dated February 27, 1973 (p. 31, rec.). Counsel for petitioners then asked for time
to raise the issue before this Court, which respondent Judge granted by giving petitioners a period of
just one (1) day to seek relief from this Tribunal.
Accordingly, herein petitioners filed this petition.
On March 2, 1973, this Court required respondents to answer the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order "enjoining respondent Judge from ... causing and effecting the arrest of petitioners
herein" (p. 39, rec.).
In his answer filed on March 14, 1973, respondent Judge, invoking the same arguments in G.R. No.
L-34243, held on to the view that the Circuit Criminal Courts are vested with the power and authority
to conduct preliminary investigations.
G. R. No. L-38688
On May 23, 1974, private respondent Felix Halimao filed a criminal complaint directly with the Circuit
Criminal Court presided over by respondent Judge charging herein petitioner with alleged violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. Prel. Inv. 116-Rizal.

At the hearing of May 27, 1974, petitioner, through counsel, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend
Preliminary Investigation" (p. 9, rec.) based on the ground that respondent Judge h as no authority to
conduct the same.
After arguments by counsels for both parties, the respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion. An
oral motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (pp. 14-15, rec.).
Hence, this petition.
On May 31, 1974, this Court by resolution gave due course to the petition and issued a restraining
order, "enjoining respondent Judge, his agents, representatives, and/or any person or persons
acting upon his orders or in his place or stead from proceeding further with the preliminar y
investigation ... " (p. 24, rec.)
On June 17, 1974, it appearing that the case involved in the petition is criminal in nature, the Court
required herein petitioner to IMPLEAD the People of the Philippines as party -respondent (p. 26,
rec.). In conformity thereto, petitioner through counsel, filed on June 28, 1974 an amended petition
impleading The People (pp. 49-50, rec.).
Except for the Solicitor General who appeared for The People of the Philippines, respondents in
answer, frontally met the averments of petitioner.
G. R. No. L-39625
On October 24, 1974, petitioner filed this instant petition seeking to annul "any preliminary
investigation conducted by respondent Judge in Preliminary Inv. No. 72 -Rizal, Circuit Criminal Court,
7th Judicial District, as well as the warrant, if any, that may be issued for the arrest and
imprisonment of petitioner" and to enjoin permanently respondent Judge from conducting preliminary
investigations and from ordering petitioner's arrest.
On October 30, 1974, the Court required the respondents to file their answer within ten (10) days
from notice thereof and issued, effective immediately, a temporary restraining order against
respondent Judge (p. 64, rec.).
On November 13, 1974, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation request ing to be excused from
filing an answer considering that in three other cases (The Collector of Customs v. Hon. Onofre A.
Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34038; Nicanor Marcelo v. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34243; and
Francisco Felix v. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-38688) which involve the same legal issue, his
office maintains that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of
criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act No. 5179 (p. 81, rec.).
On November 20, 1974, private respondent filed his answer (pp. 87-104, rec.).
Petitioner, on January 22, 1975, filed a motion praying that the instant case be consolidated and
decided jointly with G.R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243, L-36376 and L-38688 as they involve the same
issue; and that the memoranda filed for petitioners in said four cases be reproduced and adopted as
the memorandum for petitioner in this case, which should be deemed submitted for decision together
with the aforementioned cases (pp. 122-124, rec.). Said motion was granted in the resolution of
February 10, 1975 (p. 129, rec.).

In his pleading dated February 5, 1975, private respondent (pp. 130 -132, rec.) stated that he joins
the petitioner in his plea for the consolidation of the instant case with cases Nos. L-34038, L-36376
and L-38688 and prayed that the memorandum filed by respondent in L -38688 be considered
reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for private respondent in this case, in addition to the
affirmative defenses and arguments contained in private respondent's answer to the petition, and
that this case be submitted for decision together with the aforementioned cases (p. 137, rec.).
The records disclosed the following antecedent facts.
On January 11, 1974, herein private respondent Jose Arellano filed a complaint against Pedro E.
Nieva, Jr., herein petitioner, together with his wife Pacita and daughter Patricia N. with the Circuit
Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA No. 3019) in connection with the P230,000.00 industrial loan obtained by the
Areson Woodtech Manufacturing Company headed by the complainant, Jose Arellano, from the
Development Bank of the Philippines, where herein petitioner holds the Position of Au ditor. The cm
was docketed therein as Criminal Case Prel. Inv. CCC-VII-72 Rizal (pp. 1-2, 90-91, pp. 14-16 [Annex
"A"] rec.).
On the same day the aforesaid complaint was filed in court, respondent Judge issued an order that
reads:
Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court in relation to the doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court in the mu of "Mateo versus Villaluz", Assistant City
Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos is hereby ordered to conduct the preliminary investigation
of the above-entitled case within five (5) days from receipt hereof and to file the
necessary information in a court of competent jurisdiction if the evidence so warrants.
... (pp. 2, 91 [Annex "B"], pp. 21-22, rec.).
On May 22, 1974, investigating Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos endorsed the records of the case back to
respondent Judge, because
... (T)he facts and circumstances which has (sic) been the basis of this instant suit is
the same set of first and circumstances and involving the same parties in a case of
ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION now pending preliminary investigation and also
before this Honorable Court. Hence, this endorsement in order to avoid duplication of
effort and time in' the resolution and disposition of the same incident.
In an urgent ex-parte motion dated May 24, 1974 filed with the Circuit Criminal Court pursuant to
paragraph 1 of the Joint Circular of the Department of Justice and the Department of National
Defense dated April 29, 1974, herein private respondent prayed that the endorsement of Fiscal
Santos be given due course and that the preliminary investigation be conducted by the respondent
Judge (pp. 3, 92, 104 [Annex "I"], rec.).
Herein petitioner opposed the same in a pleading dated June 1, 1974 (p. 3, pp. 40 -49 [Annex "F"],
rec.), which was amplified in another pleading dated September 24, 1974 (pp. 3, 50-59 [Annex "G"],
rec.).
Under date of June 18, 1974, private respondent filed a motion to strike out herein petitioner's
opposition to complainant's ex parte urgent motion for preliminary investigation in view o f the failure
of herein petitioner's counsel to comply with the order of the Court to furnish a copy of his opposition
to complainant Jose Arellano (pp. 93, 105-106 [Annex "2"], rec.).

On September 24, 1974, herein petitioner filed his opposition to the mo tion to strike out herein
respondent's opposition (pp. 7, 55-59 [Annex "G"], rec.). On the same day, a hearing was conducted
by the respondent Judge on the urgent motion for preliminary investigation and immediately
thereafter, he denied said opposition of herein petitioner (Annex "H", p. 62, pp. 3, 93, rec.).
Hence, this petition.
G. R. No. L-40031
On November 2, 1973, Jose Arellano, private respondent herein, filed with the Circuit Criminal Court
at Pasig, Rizal, a complaint charging herein petitioner with estafa, allegedly committed under the
circumstances provided for in paragraph 4 1(b) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (p. 12, rec.).
Said complaint was subsequently docketed as CCC Case No. Prel. Inv. -65-Rizal. Thereupon,
respondent Judge proceeded to conduct the preliminary investigation in question. After the
termination of the proceedings, respondent Judge issued on May 31, 1974 the challenged resolution
which reads:
Wherefore, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, Assistant
City Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos is hereby ordered to file the necessary information for
the crime of Estafa against respondent Pacita Nieva, in a court of competent
jurisdiction, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof.
Let a warrant of arrest be issued for the immediate apprehension of respondent Mrs.
Pacita Nieva, and for her provisional liberty, she is hereby ordered to post a bond in
the amount of P20,000.00. (p. 24, rec.).
On July 26, 1974, petitioner's counsel filed an urgent motion to declar e the preliminary investigation
proceedings null and void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. to conduct the
same, re-echoing the arguments invoked by petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243, L-36376
and L-38688 (p. 14, rec.).
In an order dated August 8, 1974, respondent Judge denied the same (p. 22, rec.).
On January 28, 1975, this Court by resolution required respondents to file an answer to the petition
and not to move for the dismissal of the same. The Court further' resolved to consolidate the case
with Cases Nos. L-38688, L-34038, L-34243, and L-36376 (p. 26, rec.).
In a manifestation filed on February 10, 1975, the Solicitor General requested that he be excused
from filing an answer on the ground that in three cases (G.R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243 and L-38688),
which involve the same legal issue, the counsel for the People has taken the position that
respondent Judge has no authority or jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal
cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act No. 5179.
Private respondent, on the other hand, through the Citizens Legal Assistance Office of the
Department of Justice, filed his answer on February 20, 1975, maintaining that respondent Judge
has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation invoking particularly Section 13, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sections 1, 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. 5179.
The one common legal issue posed by these six cases is whether a Circuit Criminal Court
possesses the power to conduct preliminary investigations. Neither the explanatory note to House
Bill No. 9801 (now R.A. No. 5179,) nor the available Congressional debates intimate that Circuit

Criminal Courts are clothed with the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations
(Congressional Records of House, March 28, 1967, pp. 41-45; May 15, 1967).
WE therefore examine the law.
Petitioners, in maintaining that respondent Judge has no such power, rest their claim on Section I of
Republic Act No. 5179, which provides:
In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as presently
constituted, there is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction,
concurrent with the regular Court of First Instance, to try and decide the
following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
latter:
a. Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and crimes. against
property as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, wh ether simple or
complex with other crimes;
b. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, ... ;
c. Violations of Sections 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
Sections 174, 175 and 345 of the National Internal Revenue Code. (emphasis
supplied).
Petitioners argue that said courts, having been conferred limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise such
power of preliminary investigation, the same not being embraced and contemplated within its gi ven
function to "try and decide" specific criminal cases.
What is limited by Republic Act No. 5179 is the scope of the cases that may be tried by Circuit
Criminal Courts.
Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction, only because they cannot try and decide all criminal
cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as courts of general jurisdiction.
They can only take cognizance of cages expressly specified in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 126. Nevertheless, they have the same powers and
functions as those conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance necessary to effectively exercise
such special and limited jurisdiction. This is plain and evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organ ic
law, Republic Act No. 5179:
Section 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of
the Courts of First Instance and the trial, and disposition and appeal of criminal cases
therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases cognizable by them
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. ... Unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the Circuit Criminal
Courts shall have the same powers as those conferred by the Judiciary Act and the
Rules of Court upon regular Courts of First Instance, insofar as may be necessary to
carry their jurisdiction into effect.

Judges of the regular Courts of First Instance are expressly conferred the authority to conduct
preliminary examination and investigation by Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Court:
Section 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of
First Instance. Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance,
without previous preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the fiscal,
the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to the justice of the peace referred
to in the second paragraph of Section 2, hereof - for preliminary examination and
investigation, or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation
simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding sections, and should he find
reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged,
he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for
the filing of the corresponding information. (emphasis supplied).
Section 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by
state attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance. Except where an
investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, justice of the peace or
other officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections no
information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by
the provincial or city fiscal, or state attorney, without first giving the accused a chance
to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant by
issuing a corresponding subpoena. ...
The power of preliminary examination and investigation, which may be exercised by judges of the
Circuit Criminal Courts, is without doubt, "not inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No.
5179," and likewise, "necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect."
Moreover, Congress further confirmed that the Court of First Instance has the power to conduct
preliminary investigation by approving on September 8, 1967 Republic Act No. 5180, prescribing a
uniform system of preliminary investigation by all government prosecutors, which provides:
Sec. 1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except when an
investigation has been conducted by a Judge of First Instance, city or municipal
judge or other officer in accordance with law and the Rules of Court of the
Philippines, no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance
shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal or any of his assistants, or by a state
attorney or his assistants, without first giving the amused a chance to be heard in a
preliminary investigation conducted by him by issuing a corresponding subpoena. ...
Sec. 2. The provisions of Section fifteen, Rule 112, of the New Rules of Court Of the
Philippines, shall be observed in the investigations of persons in custody.
From the abovequoted Provisions, Republic Act No. 5180 likewise continues the procedure
prescribed in the Revised Rules of court of 1964, Particularly Rule 112 thereof.
The aforequoted portion of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5180 was not modified by the amendatory
Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 issued respectively on December 6, 1972 and March 23,
1976.
More decisively, the 1935 as well as 1973 Constitution vests this essential power in all courts to first
determineprobable cause before ordering the arrest of those charged with a criminal offense

(Section 1[3], Art. III, 1935 Constitution; See. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). The determination of
"Probable cause" is the sole object of preliminary examinations. Surely, congress could not have
possibly intended to deny the Circuit Criminal Courts such constitutional prerogative, which is part of
the basic constitutional right of an individual whose person cannot be legally seized without prior
preliminary examination by a judge.
WE enunciated that the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts is for the purpose of alleviating the
burden of the regular Courts of first Instance and to accelarate the disposition of criminal cases
pending to be filed therein(People vs. Gutierrez, etc., et al., 36 SCRA 172; Osmea vs. Sec. of
Justice, G.R. No. L-32033, Sept 30, 1971, 199) or to contribute to the speedy resolution of criminal
cases and help curb the progress of criminality in the country (Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 13s). As
opined by Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in the Gutierrez case, supra, "... Circuit
Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their
respective districts ..." , which he reiterated in his concurring opinion in the Osmea case, thus:
My principal reason for my vote in favor of the judgment in this case is that I cannot
find any justification for allowing the Secretary of Justice to have any part at all in the
distribution or assignment of cases among the different branches of any Court of
First Instance, of which the corresponding Circuit Criminal Court is one. I took this
view in my concurring opinion in the case of People v. Gutierrez, cited in the main
opinion of Justice Villamor, and I cannot see why I must opine differently now. ... (41
SCRA 211).
If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal Courts are to alleviate the burden of the regular
Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of the cases therein as well as stem the
tide of criminality, it is only logical that such authority vested in the judges of the Courts of First
Instance is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. Otherwise, the Courts of First Instance
would still be carrying the burden of conducting preliminary. investigations in those cases where
Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and consequently delaying the trial and disposition of
criminal cases pending before such Courts of First Instance.
That Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 5179 clearly intended, by Sections 3 and 6 thereof, to
clothe the Circuit Criminal Court with all the powers vested in regular Courts of First Instance
including the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations, is confirmed by the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 44, Section 39 of which confers on Circuit Criminal Courts, Courts of First
Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent original ju risdiction over all
offenses punishable thereunder and expressly directs that the "preliminary investigation of cases
filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date -of their filing."
Before the amendment, the law required only seven (7) days from the date of the commencement of
the preliminary investigation. Section 39, as amended, reads:
Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court and
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction
over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act: Provided, that in cities or
provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts
shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under sixteen
years of age.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.

Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and a prima

facie case is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within
twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary
investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist, the
corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecuting officer within forty eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.
Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not lat er than
ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases
shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of
the case.
It is patent that the aforequoted provision of Section 39 of Rep ublic Act No. 6425 affirms the power
of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary examination and investigation in all the cases
falling under their jurisdiction and additionally fixes the period for preliminary investigation, the filing
of the information and the rendition of decisions in all offenses penalized by the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.
Under the amendment, the Circuit Criminal Court no longer has exclusive, but still retains
concurrent, jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Its authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation
granted under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 5179, remains intact and undiminished; because the
amendatory decree expressly directs that "If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge
and a prima facie case is found to exist, the corresponding information should be filed by the proper
prosecuting officer ... " There is nothing in the amendatory decree from which it can be reasonably
inferred that since the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court over violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is no longer exclusive, Circuit Criminal Court Judges no longer possess the authority to
conduct preliminary examination and investigation.
Recognizing the constitutional power of the courts, including the Courts of First Instance, to conduct
preliminary examination, other special laws specifically vest such authority exclusively in the Court of
First Instance in case of violation of the Revised Election Code (Sec. 187, 1947 Revised Election
Code, as amended; Sec. 234, 1971 Rev. Election Code) and of the Anti-subversion Act when the
penalty imposable for the offense is prision mayor to death (Sec. 16, Rep. Act No. 1700).
It is urged that the word "judge" in the above-quoted section of Presidential Decree No. 44 (and also
in the. 1935 and 1973 Constitutions) contemplates not the Court of First Instance Judge nor the
Circuit Criminal Court Judge but the municipal judge. As heretofor e stated, it is an elementary
precept in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, WE should not distinguish
(Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Gimenez, L-14787, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 267). The Statute
cannot give a restricted meaning to the generic term "judge", used in the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Furthermore, in People versus Manantan (L-14129, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 684), a justice of the
peace, accuse of violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that the law refers merely to a justice, judge, or fiscal and that being a
justice of the peace, he is beyond the coverage of the said Code. The Supreme Court in denying
such contention, held that there was no need of including justices of the peace in the enumeration in
said section because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic term "judge". The term
"judge", not modified by any word or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, including
justices of the peace.

The cases of People versus Paderna (22 SCRA 273) and Paraguya versus Tiro (41 SCRA 137)
involved not the power of the Circuit Criminal Court to conduct preliminary investigation, but its
jurisdiction to try and decide certain They do not at all reveal an iota of any further restriction on the
limited jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court other than those delineated in existing laws.
Thus, in the Paderna case, supra, involving a violation of Section 174 of the Tax Code, Mr. Chief
Justice Castro, then Associate Justice, speaking for the Supreme Court in ruling that the Circuit
Criminal Court was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, stated:
... [T]he charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed "blue seal cigarettes" of an
appraised value of less than P500.00 ... and the penalty provided under Republic Act
4713 is a fine of not less than P50.00 nor more than P200.00 and imprisonment of
not less than 5 nor more than 30 days because the value of the cigarettes does not
exceed P500.00, this case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city
court. ...
... Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, which took effect on September 8, 1967, provides
in part that circuit criminal courts shall have limited jurisdiction concurrent with the
regular court of first instance, to try and decide the following criminal cases falling
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter.
xxx xxx xxx
The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on the type of
cases but also on the penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case at
bar falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the City Court, it cannot, even
if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken cognizance of by
circuit criminal courts, the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first
instance where the latter's jurisdiction is original and exclusive.
The same ruling was substantially reiterated in the more recent Tiro case, supra, involving indirect
bribery committed by a public officer. In passing upon the issue of the Circuit Criminal Court's limited
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, held:
... The law (R.A. 5179) confined the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts (which is
even made concurrent with the courts of first instance) to crimes committed by public
officers; ... only where they are falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the court of first instance. In short, circuit criminal courts' jurisdiction was limited
merely to cases involving crimes specifically enumerated in Section 1 of Republic Act
5179, for which the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for more than 3 year
(or 6 years in proper cases), or fine of more than 3 years (or 6 years in proper
cases), or fine of more than P3,00.00 (or P6,000.00 as the case may be), or both
such fine and imprisonment (sec. 44[f] in relation to Sec. 87[c], Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25922, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596; Mangila vs.
Lantin, L-24735, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 81; People vs. Tapayan , L-36885,
November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 529; Andico vs. Roan, L-26563, April 16, 1968, 23
SCRA 93).
Since indirect bribery is penalized under the Revised Penal Code with imprisonment
for a period not exceeding six months, suspension and public censure (Art. 211,
RPC), the case is clearly removed from the competence of the circuit criminal court
to pass upon. It is not denied that the crime of indirect bribery is essentially one

committed by public officers. Jurisdiction of the court, however, is determined not

only by nature of the offense charged in the information, but also by the penalty
imposable thereto. ... (emphasis supplied).
In these two cases, it was made clear that for the Circuit Criminal Court to acquire jurisdiction, the
offense must not only be one of those enumerated under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179; it
should also be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the regular Courts of First Instance. In
the aforesaid cases, the Circuit Criminal Court was clearly without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
offenses involved, by command of the specific provisions of its charter, the Judiciary Act and t he
Revised Penal code; and not by a directive of the Supreme Court, which merely applied in said cited
cases the statutory prescriptions. The Supreme Court cannot legally define additional restrictions,
which is the sole prerogative of the law-making authority.
The contrary view appears to entertain the mistaken notion that Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court, being a rule of procedure, the same should be rendered inoperative by reason of the
fact that the Supreme Court cannot, by promulgating a rule of procedure, arrogate jurisdiction unto
itself or grant any to the lower courts.
It is of course basic that only the Constitution and the law can confer jurisdiction to hear and decide
certain cases. But equally true is the fact that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly
delegated to the Supreme Court the rule-making authority the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure and to amend the existing laws thereon. The law or rule of
preliminary investigation is undoubtedly a rule of procedure.
The 1935 Constitution states:
The Supreme court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be inform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase
or modify, substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines (Sec. 13, Art. VIII, 1935
Constitution).
The 1973 Constitution similarly authorizes the Supreme Court to
Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may
be repeated, altered, or supplemented by the National Assembly. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade. and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights (Sec. 5[5], Art, X, 1973 Constitution).
Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court merely implement Section 3 of Article
Ill of the 1935 Constitution (now Section 3 of Article IV of the 197 3 Constitution). Section 13 of Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court was not an innovation as it merely restated Section 13 of General
Order No. 58, Section 37 of Act No. 1627, and Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of
Court, in obedience to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1935

Constitution. Rule 112 does not modify substantive rights but continues the procedure already
operative prior to the 1935 Constitution.
WE have ruled that Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court, which is the predecessor of Rule 112 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court, is an adjective or procedural rule (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
While admitting that Court of First Instance were previously clothed with the power of preliminary
investigation by virtue of Section 37 of Act 1627, nevertheless, it is argued that this same section
was amended when the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted since under Section 99 of said Judiciary
Act, "All laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act' were repealed. the inconsistency,
it is claimed, lies in the fact that while the authority of municipal courts and city courts to conduct
preliminary investigation was reiterated in said Judiciary Act, there was no mention therein whether
Courts of First Instance Judges are still possessed of such authority.
If such repeal was intended, it is unconstitutional; because the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 vest
in the Judge the power to issue a warrant of arrest or search warrant after conducting a preliminar y
investigation or examination. Congress could not divest the court of such authority as the
Constitution does not permit it, for the constitutional guarantee on arrest or search warrant is not
qualified by some such phrase as "unless otherwise provided by law." For a clearer appreciation, the
Constitutional guarantee on arrest and search warrant reads:
(3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized (Art. III, 1935 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated,and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized (Art. IV,
1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution that until now only the judg e can
determine the existence of probable cause and can issue the warrant of arrest. No law or
presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular
"responsible officer." Hence, the 1973 Constitution, which was ratified and took effect on January 17,
1973, should govern the last four cases, namely, Nos. L-36376, L-38688, L-39525 and L-40031,
which arose after January 17, 1973.
But even under the 1935 Constitution, the term seizures or seized comprehends arrest. Thus, in
Vivo versus Montesa (July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155), reiterating the doctrines in the cases of Qua
Chee Gan, et al. vs. Deportation Board (L-20280, Sept. 30, 1963) and Morano vs. Vivo (L-22196,
June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 162), WE ruled unanimously through Mr . Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final

order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill
of Rights) of our Constitution, providing:
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
andparticularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, 1773 Constitution,
emphasis supplied).
It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is
limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively, unlike in previous organic
laws and the Federal Constitution of the United States that left undetermined which
public officials could determine the existence of probable cause. And in Qua Chee
Gan, et al. vs. Deportation Board, L-20280, promulgated on September 30, 1963,
this Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 69, of July 29, 1947, issued by
President Roxas, in prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens, only required
the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation, but did not authorize his arrest.
Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the issuance of
administrative warrants of arrest, this Court said in the same case:
xxx xxx xxx
Under the express terms of our Constitution it is, therefore, even
doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine
the existence of probable cause, leading to an administrative
investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants
in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative
proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is
entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a
judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative
nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of
arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an
executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the
purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution
which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would
be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to
effect compliance of an order of contempt.
The(n) contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a
foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is
valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the president
obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But,
certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien
be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of
President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance

of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the

executive order of President Roxas.
Following the same trend of thought, this Court, in Morano vs. Vivo (L-22196, 30
June 1967, 20 SCRA, 562; Phil. 1967-B, page 741), distinguished between
administrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation order and arrest as
preliminary to further administrative proceedings. The Court remarked in said case:
Section 1 (3), Article Ill of the Constitution, we perceive, does not
require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of
deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial
power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent
official, such as a legal order of deportation issued Commissioner of
Immigration, in circumstance of legislation (L-24576, pp. 161-1621).
The foregoing doctrine was last reiterate in Ang, et al. versus Galang, etc. (L-21426, Oct. 22, 1975).
Under the American Constitution, the aforesaid terms include not only arrest but also invitations for
police interview or interrogation as well as stop-and-frisk measures. In the 1968 case of Terry versus
Ohio, the United States Supreme Court enunciated:
... It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which
do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime "arrests"
in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer
accounts an individual and restrain his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person (392 U.S. 1, 16 88 S.C.T. 1868, 20 L.E.D. 2d 889; 903 [1968].)
That the aforesaid terms seizures and seized signify arrest was deliberately intended by the
founding fathers of the 1935 Constitution, which words are likewise employed in the 1973
Constitution, Delegate Miguel Cuaderno categorically recounted:
An amendment affecting the issuance of an order of arrest and search warrant, to the
effect that in each case the order must be supported by the testimony of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, made before the judge, and also an
amendment providing that prisoners charged with capital offenses shall be bailable
before conviction unless the evidence of guilt is strong, were approved upon the
initiative of Delegates Francisco. It was the prevailing opinion among many delegate
that one courts had been rather easy in the issuance of order of arrest or search
warrants,and charged with capital offenses (Cuaderno, the Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p. 65, Emphasis supplied).
Delegate Jose Aruego added:
During the debates on the draft, Delegate Francisco proposed an amendment being
the insertion of the words, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The Idea
in the Francisco amendment was not new in the Philippines; for it was provided for in
the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Philippines. The signification of the Idea into a
constitutional provision was zealously insisted upon, in order to make the principle

more sacred to the judges and to prosecuting pointed out in the debates, causes by
the issuance of search warrants, which were generally found afterwards to be false
(Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p.160).
The term "judge" employed in both Constitutions cannot be so limited to "municipal judge" as to
exclude the judge of the Court of First Instance and Circuit Cr iminal Court (People vs. Manantan, 5
SCRA 684, 690-695). WE are not justified to create a distinction where the Constitution does not
make any.
In general, "judge" is a term employed to designate a public officer selected to preside and to
administer the law in a court of justice (Ark. School Dist. No. 18 vs. Grubbs Special School Dist.,
43 S.W. 2d 765, 766, 184 Ark. 863, 48 CJS 946).
According to intent or context, the term "judge" may include an assistant judge (N.H. City Bank v.
Young, 43 N.H. 457); a country or court justice (Mo. State v. O'Gorman, 75 Mo. 370); a justice of the
peace (N.Y. People v. Mann 97 N.Y. 530, 49 Am. R.556).
The term "a judge", in Gen. St. C. 47, Art. 1 & 22, providing that "a judge" may cause any house or
building to be searched for the protection of gambling tables, etc., is equivalent to "any judge"
and comprehends an entire class, and cannot, without disturbing its meaning, be restricted in its
applications to judges of county, city and police courts and therefore the judge of the Louisville Law
and equity court has authority to issue a warrant for such a research (Com. v. Watzel, 2 S.W. 123,
125, 84 KY 537).
Admittedly, Section 99 of the Judiciary Act contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws and
rulesinconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed." The question may now be
asked: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to Identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed (Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, [1934], Vol. 1, p. 467). Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing
and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against
strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex propio vigore, for repeals and amendments by
implication are not favored (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, L-23894, Jan. 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261, 265-6;
Villegas vs. Subido, L-31711, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190; Quimseng vs. Lachica, 2 SCRA 182).
Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws; so that, if a repeal is intended, the
proper step is to so express it with specificity (Continental Insurance Co. vs. Simpson, 8 F[2d] 439;
Webb vs. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P[2d] 832; State vs. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876).
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing
law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist between the terms of the new and of the old statutes (Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377). Here, there is no such inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different persons and
different methods applicable under different circumstances. Thus, while Section 87 of the Judiciary
Act provides that municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct preliminary
investigation for arty offense alleged to have been committed within their respective municipalities
and cities ... ; Section 37 of Act 1627 reads in part that such power of "every justice of the peace
including the justice of Manila, ... shall not exclude the proper judge of the Court of First Instance ...
from exercising such jurisdiction."
WE should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal
expression of the will of Congress, which is not manifest from the language of Section 99 of the

Judiciary Act, apart from the fact that Congress by itself alone had no power to amend the
Constitution.
The opposite view likewise denies that the jurisdiction of our courts to conduct preliminary
investigation could be traced to the Constitution, adding that the Charter of Manila and other cities
confer upon the respective fiscals of said cities the power to conduct preliminary investigations.
The organic acts prior to the 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the conferment of such a power to
conduct preliminary examination or investigation on quasi-judicial officers like the city fiscals of
chartered cities (see the instructions of President McKinley to First Philippine Commission, the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Jones Law of 1916, and the Revised Administrative Code of 1917).
But the power thus granted to the Manila City Fiscals (and later to City Fiscals and City Attorneys of
other chartered cities) to conduct preliminary investigations did not and does not include the
authority to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants, which warrants the courts alone can issue
then as now. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
1935 Constitution provides that only a judge can issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest after he
has by himself personally determined the existence of probable cause upon his examination under
oath of the complainant and his witnesses; although as ruled in one ca se, he may rely on the
investigation conducted by the fiscal or prosecutor (Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, 741 -42).
It is patent that under the 1935 Constitution, only the "judge" is directed to conduct a preliminary
examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by express constitutional conferment.
But the 1973 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to grant the power to issue search
warrants or warrants of arrest after conducting the necessary preliminary examination to "other
responsible officer." Until such a law is enacted by the National Assembly, only the judge can validly
conduct a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search warrant.
Even when the fiscal or prosecutor conducts the preliminary investigation, only the judge can validly
issue the warrant of arrest. This is confirmed by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, which directs the judge to issue the warrant of arrest when he is "satisfied from the
preliminary. examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer (referring to the fiscal or the
municipal mayor under Sec. 5) that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, ... ."
Thus, the power of the city prosecutors to conduct preliminary examination and investigation (minus
the authority to issue warrants of arrest or search warrant) is purely statutory. On the other hand, the
judge derives his authority not only from the Rules of Court, but also and originally from the
fundamental law to which all other laws are subordinate. If an objection must be raised, it should be
against the authority of the fiscal to exercise such power of preliminary investigation, which, as has
been stated, is merely statutory. No less than the Constitution confers upon the judge the power to
conduct such examination and investigation.
The case of Albano versus Alvarez (December 22, 1965, 15 SCRA 518) is authority for the
proposition that Sec. 13 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court contains an innovation,
which requires that, when the Court of First Instance itself conducts the preliminary investigation, it
must not only conduct the preliminary examination proper but the preliminary investigation as well
since Section 13 commands the Court of First Instance to conduct both the preliminary examination
and investigation simultaneously (523-524). Said Albano case does not negate but recognizes the
authority of the judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct such preliminary investigation.

It is true that this COURT held expressly and impliedly that under the charters of the cities of Manila,
Bacolod and Cebu, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is exclusively lodged in the city
prosecutor (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859, 868-869, May 12, 1948; Espiritu vs. De la Rosa,
45 OG 196; Montelibano vs. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228, June 23, 1955; and Balite vs. People, 18 SCRA
280, 285-286, Sept. 30, 1966). But the charters of the cities of Manila, Baco lod and Cebu do not
contain any provision making such grant of power to city prosecutors exclusive of the courts
(Kapunan, Criminal Procedure, 3rd Edition, 1960), which cannot be deprived of such authority to
conduct preliminary examination because said prerogative of the courts emanates from the
Constitution itself. Unless the Constitution is amended, the judge cannot be divested of such a
power, which is an essential element of the cardinal right of an individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures. If the present city charters conferred on city fiscals or city prosecutors the
power to issue warrants of arrest it would be an unconstitutional grant of power under the 1935
Constitution. As heretofore intimated, the present practice or rule of court au thorizing the judge to
issue warrants of arrest based on the preliminary investigation conducted by the city fiscal, seems to
violate the 1935 Constitution, which requires the judge himself to conduct the preliminary
examination. Neither the judge nor the law can delegate such an authority to another public officer
without trenching upon this constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The theory that Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts Judges cannot exercise the
power of preliminary examination and investigation, and that as a necessary consequence, they
cannot also issue warrants of arrest, obviously collides with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Moreover, the theory tolerates an unthinkable because anomalous situation wherein the Court
of First Instance and the Circuit Criminal Court must wait for prosecutors and courts inferior to them
to conduct the preliminary examination and/or to issue the needed warrants of arrest before they
could effectively exercise their power to try and decide the cases falling under their respective
jurisdiction. This situation would make the Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts totally
dependent upon state prosecutors and municipal courts, which are inferior to them, for their proper
functioning. The possibility that the administration of criminal justice might stand still will not be very
remote.
The two-fold purpose for which the Circuit Criminal Courts were created was to alleviate the burden
of the regular Courts of First Instance and accelerate the disposition of criminal cases filed therein
(Osmea vs. Secretary of Justice, supra; People vs. Gutierrez, supra). Such being the admitted
purpose, the power to conduct preliminary examination must necessarily attach to the duties of a
Circuit Criminal Court Judge; for aside from being one of the instruments by which a case may be
accelerated and disposed of, it is a duty which trully lies within the scope of the office, essential to
the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was created (Sec. 3, Art III, 1935
Constitution; Sec 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution), even if regarded as incidental and collateral, is
germane to and serves to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose (Lo Cham vs.
Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635).
WE RULE that both Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution provide the source of the power
of all Judges, including Judges of the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, and other
courts of equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine probable cause before the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent
Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or
other government prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information.
II
It may be well to trace briefly the historical background of our law on criminal procedure.

During the Spanish regime, the rules of criminal procedure were found in the Provisio nal Law on
Criminal Procedure which accompanied the Spanish Penal Code. The two laws were published in
the Official Gazette in Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887 and became effective four (4) months
thereafter(U.S. vs. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 32-33; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1969, ed., p. 8).
While the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure provided or governadorcillo, it did not require any
preliminary examination or investigation before trial. The sumario was abolished by General Order
No. 58 (U.S. vs. Tamparong, supra; Navarro, Criminal Procedure, 1960 ed., pp. 171, 174; Revilla,
Vol. 2. Philippine Penal Code and Procedure, 1930 ed., pp. 1134 -35).
When the Philippine came under American sovereignty General Order No. 58 was promulgated by
the U.S. Military Governor in the exercise of his legislative powers as commander -in-chief of the
occupation army and took effect on April 13, 1900. General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No.
194 of August 10, 1901, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903 , Act No. 1627 of
July 1, 1907, the Jones Law of 1916, Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Act
No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, and Act No. 4178 of December 5, 1934.
General Order No. 58 amended (Sec.1) the Criminal Code of Procedure enforc ed during the
Spanish regime and vested in the magistrate "the authority to conduct preliminary investigation (Sec.
13) for the issuance of the warrant of arrest" and authorized "a judge or a justice of the peace" to
issue a search warrant upon his determination of the existence of probable cause therefor
"particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized" (Secs. 95 and
97). The term "magistrate" comprehended the court of First Instance (Temporosa vs. Yatco, 79 Phil.
225, 226 [1947]; Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104-107 [1939]; People vs. Red, 55 Phil. 706, 710
[1931]; People vs. Solon, 47 Phil. 443 441 [1925]; Navarro Criminal Procedure, 960 ed., 1973;
Padilla, Criminal Procedure, 1965 ed., p. 270).
A "magistrate" is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person
charged with a public offense. People vs. Swain, 90 P. 720, 722 5 Cal. App. 421
citing Pen. Code, S807.
A "magistrate" is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a pers on
charged with the commission of a crime. The arrest of a person charge with the
commission of a crime. The following persons are magistrates:
(1) the justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) the judges of the Circuit Court;
(3) the county judges and justices of the peace;
(4) all municipal officers authorized to exercise the power and perform the duties of a
justice of the peace. Wallowa County v. Oakes, 78 P. 892, 46 Or. 33 (26 Words and
Phrases, pp. 44, 45).
Act No. 194 of August 10, 1901 amended General Order No. 58 by empowering "every justice of the
peace ... to make preliminary investigation of any crime allege to have been committed within his
municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the
Courts of First Instance" (emphasis supplied).

The obvious inference from the aforequoted provision of Act No. 194 is that before its passage, the
justice of the peace had no power to conduct preliminary investigation of any offense triable by the
Court of First Instance, which alone can conduct such preliminary investigation of a crime under its
original jurisdiction pursuant to General Order No. 58. But its enactment did not divest the Court of
First Instance of such authority.
In the 1939 case of Marcos, et al. versus Cruz, the Supreme Court, through Justice Imperial,
sustained the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations under
Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. 58 (68 Phil. 96, 106 -107), which was impliedly followed in
the 1947 case of Temporosa versus Yatco, et al., supra.
While General Order No. 58 vested the authority in a magistrate, a generic term which includes
judges of the Courts of First Instance and justices of the peace; Section 1 of Act No. 194 is less
categorical by employing the clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested
in the judges of the Courts of First Instance."
The Philippine Bill of 1902 in a similar ambiguous vein contained such authority when it merely
provided that the "Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said Go vernment
to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall possess
and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters
to such alteration and amendment as maybe hereafter enacted by law; ... " (Sec. 9, emphasis
supplied).
Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903 further amended Act No. 194 by extending the power to conduct
preliminary investigation to the justice of the peace of the provincial capital or of the town wherein
the provincial jail is situated of crimes committed anywhere within the province but again utilized the
equivocal clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the Court's of First
Instance; ... (Sec. 7, Act 590, emphasis supplied).
Act No. 1627 of July 1 1907 had the virtue of greater clarity when if authorized expressly every
justice of the peace, including the justice of the peace of Manila, to "conduct preliminary investigation
of all crimes and offenses alleged to have been comitted within his municipality and cognizable by
Court of First Instance, but this shall not exclude the proper judge of the Court of First Instance of a
municipal court from or of a municipality in which the provincial jail is located, when directed by an
order from the judge of First Instance, shall have jurisdiction to conduct investigation at the expense
of the municipality wherein the crime or offense was committed although alleged to have been
committed anywhere within the province, to issue orders of arrest, ... (Sec. 37, Act No. 1627,
emphasis supplied).
The Jones Law of 1916, like the Philippine Bill of 1902, merely provides "that the Supreme Court and
the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisidiction as
heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law" (Sec.
26, Jones Law).
Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 re-affirms the power of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to conduct preliminary examination
Sec. 2474. Persons arrested to be promptly brought before a court.
Preliminary examination in municipal court and Court of First Instance. Every
person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be brought before the municipal

court, or the Court of First Instance for preliminary hearing,release on bail, or trial. In
cases triable in the municipal court the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a
preliminary examination, except a summary one to enable the court to fix the bail, in
any case where the prosecution announces itself and is ready for trial within three
days, not including Sundays, after the request for an examination is presented. In
cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as
of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city, after a
due investigating of the facts, shall have presented an information against him in
proper form. But the Court of Firs Instance may make such summary investigation
into the case as it may necessary to enable it to fix the bail or to determine whether
the offense is bailable. (emphasis supplied).
It is clear that both the Manila Court of First Instance and municipal court can conduct a preliminary
hearing or examination. Section 2474 aforequoted, adds, however, that the City Fiscal impliedly may
conduct such preliminary examination; because it provides that in "cases triable only in the Court of
First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminar y examination in any case
where the fiscal of the city, after a due investigation of the facts, shall have presented an information
against him in proper form. It will be noted, however, that it is only after the City Fiscal has
conducted a preliminary examination that the accused ceases to "be entitled as of right" to a
preliminary examination by the Judge of the Court of Firs Instance who, however, retains inferentially
the discretion to conduct another preliminary investigation because the Court of First Instance Judge
is not foreclosed by the preliminary examination conducted by the City Fiscal. But, when the City
Fiscal has not conducted any preliminary examination, the Court of First Instance Judge himself
certainly can proceed with such preliminary examination, which the defendant can demand as a
matter of right.
Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, while amending Section 13 of General Order No. 58, re -states the
power of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest.
Act No. 4178 of December 5, 1934 further amended Section 13 of General Order No. 58 but still
retained the authority of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination. As herefofore stated,
Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. 58, as amended, were applied by the Supreme Court in
Marcos, et al. versus Cruz (68 Phil. 96, 106-107).
Under the jurisprudence then or prior to the 1935 Constitution, the preliminary investigation before
the justice of the peace or muncipal court consisted of two stages, namely, preliminary examination
for the issuance of the warrant of arrest where only the complainant and his witnesses are heard by
the justice of the peace; and the second stage where the accused and his witnesses are heard. The
Judge of the Court of First Instance conducts only the first stage, that is, preliminary examination for
purposes of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, to be followed by the actual trial (Marcos, vs.
Cruz, supra; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555 [1946]).
The basic source of the power of the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary examination or
investigation from May 14, 1935 to January 17, 1973, is paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III of the
1935 Constitution, which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against
unreasonable ... seizures ... and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after an examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing ... the persons ... to be seized." Construing the foregoing
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court, through then
Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, pronounced that the determination of the exis tence of "probable cause
must depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge ... issuing the warrant. ... His conclusion

as to whether "probable cause" existed or not is final and conclusive. If he is satisfied that "probable
cause" exists from the facts stated in the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting
attorney, then his conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue a warrant of arrest. He may, however,
if he is not satisfied, call such witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. ...
There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion that "probable cause" exists from
the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone, or any other person whose statement or affidavit is
entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge ... The preliminary investigation conducted by the
petitioner (Provincial Fiscal) under Republic Act No. 732 ... does not, as correctly contended by the
respondent Judge, dispense with the latter's duty to exercise his judicial power of dete rmining,
before issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists therefor.
The Constitution vests such power in the respondent judge who, however, may rely on the facts
stated in the prosecuting attorney" (Amarga vs. Abbas, March 28, 195l, 98 Phil. 739, 741-742).
While the power to conduct preliminary examination may be delegated by law to government
prosecutors, only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest under the 1935 Constitution and prior
thereto (Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, et al. 80 Phil. 859; Lino vs. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 933; Hashim vs.
Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).
The valid seizure of a person can only be executed through a lawful warrant of arrest. Arrest without
a warrant can only be legally effected by a police officer or private individual a) when the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) when an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transfer red from one confinement to
another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1964 Revised Rules of Court).
In all other cases, there must be a valid warrant of arrest. When the seizure of a person is made
without a warrant of arrest or with a warrant of arrest which is not base d on a determination by the
judge of the existence of probable cause, the arrest becomes unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional.
Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court expressly confer on the municipal or city
judge, the City Final and the Judge of the Court of First Instance the power to conduct preliminary
examination or investigation.
On June 20, 1957, Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, was
approved. The proviso of Section 5 thereof expressly provides that the preliminary investigation of
offenses defined and penalized therein by prision mayor to death shall be conducted by the proper
Court of First Instance. This grant obviously is exclusive of the provincial or city fiscal or other
government prosecutors whose power to conduct preliminary investigation in all other cases is
affirmed in the first clause of Section 5 thereof.
Sections 13 and 14 of the 196.4 Revised Rules of Court re-state Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the
1940 Rules of Court.
As aforestated, aside from the challenged Sections 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. 5179 creating the
Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act 5180 was approved on September 8, 1967, which affirms the
prerogative of the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary inve stigation of offenses
punishable by said courts.

Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 promulgated respectively on December 6, 1972 and March
23, 1976. amending Republic Act No. 5180, did not modify the opening clause of Section 1 of said
Republic Act 5180 affirming the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary
investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court.
Section 234 of the 1971 Revised Election Code, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6388, vests in
the Court of First Instance "exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations, issue
warrants of arrest and try and decide any criminal case or proceeding for violation of" the Election
Law. This provision was a reiteration of the previous election laws (Act No . 1582 of 1907; Com. Act
No. 357 of 1938; and Republic Act No. 180 of 1947, as amended).
After the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973, the source of the authority of the
judge to conduct preliminary examination for purposes of issuin g a warrant of arrest, is still the
Constitution, this time the 1973 Constitution, which likewise guarantees "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose
... and no search warrant or warrant of arrestshall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may pro duce, and
particularly describing ... the persons ... to be seized" (Sec. 3 of Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). The 1973
Constitution, instead of employing the generic term warrants to comprehend both search warrants
and warrants of arrest, as did the 1935 Constitution, expressly specifies "search warrants or
warrants of arrest." The purpose of such specification was apparently to clarify the doubt raised by
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor in the Amarrga case, supra, that the 1935
Constitution merely guarantees against unreasonable searches but not against unreasonable
arrests, despite the fact that the constitutional guarantee expressly affirms "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures ... and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the persons ... to be seized" (Par. 3, See. 1, Art. III, 1935
Constitution).
In passing, the dissent of Justice Montemayor in the Amarga case seems to deny equal, if not
greater, importance to individual freedom from illegal arrest or arbitrary detention vis-a-vis property
rights and right against self-incrimination. It will also likewise be noted that the 1973 Constitution also
authorizes the law-making authority to empower other responsible officers to conduct such
preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of a warrant of arrest. As enunciated in the
Amarga case and in U.S. versus Ocampo (18 Phil. 1, 41-42), the government prosecutors may be
authorized to conduct such preliminary examination and their determination of the existence of
probable cause may be relied upon by the , 23 SCRA judge, who may, as a consequence, issue the
warrant of arrest; although the judge himself is not precluded from conducting his own preliminary
examination despite the conclusion of the prosecuting attorney as to the existence or non -existence
of probable cause.
III
1. The challenged order of July 6, 1971 issued by the respondent Judge in G.R. No. L -34038
(Collector of Customs, etc. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.) dismissed the criminal complaint filed by
petitioners therein against private respondent with prejudice, obviously meaning that the case may
not be refiled without exposing the accused to double jeopardy. The respondent Judge seriously
erred in so issuing said order, contravening as it does a basic legal principle on double jeopardy, and
committing thereby a grave abuse of discretion. The constitutional right against double jeopardy
exists, not after the first preliminary examination or investigation, but only after the first trial which
results either in conviction or acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of the case without the
express consent of the accused by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or

information and after the accused had pleaded to the charge (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of
Court; Taladua vs. Ochotorena, et al. L-25595, February 15, 1974; Republic vs. Agoncillo, L-27257,
August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 579; People vs. Obsania, L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249;
People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, petitioner's counsel, "dismissal at preliminary
investigation is never with prejudice. Re-filing of the same is allowed if evidence has become
sufficient to warrant conviction of private respondent." There has been no deviation from such
established jurisprudence exemplified in People vs. Bagsican (6 SCRA 400), Wherein the Court held
that "the finding in the preliminary investigation that no prima facie case existe d against the accused
does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction. Such finding is not final acquittal as would
preclude further proceedings" (Emphasis supplied).
2. Aggravating his grave mistake and misapprehension of the law, respondent Judge al so directed
through the same order the return of the articles allegedly seized from the person of respondent
Makapugay. This portion of the question order is fraught with undesirable consequences.
As stated heretofore, the dismissal of a case, even with pr ejudice, during the stage of preliminary
investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction if the evidence warrants the re filing of the same becomes next to impossible. For the enforcement of such order would virtually
deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs of the evidence indispensable to a successful
prosecution of the case against the private respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of
seizure of the customs official.
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are
actually in the possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for
the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals
and to final review by the Supreme Court (Section 2205 and 2303, Tariff and Customs Code; Papa,
et al. vs. Mago, et al., Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857; Virata, et al. vs. Aquino, et al. Sept 30, 1973, 53
SCRA, 24; see also Vierneza vs. Commissioner, July 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 394; Farm Implement &
Machinery vs. Commissioner, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 905; Lazatin vs. Commissioner, et al., July
30, 1969, SCRA 1016; Asaali, et al. vs. Commissioner, December 16, 1968, 26 SCRA 382; Sare
Enterprises vs. Commissioner, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 112; Geotina, etc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
et al., August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362; Commissioner vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., January 31,
1972; Lopez vs. Commissioner, et al., January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 327; Geotina vs. Broadway, etc.,
et al., January 30, 1971, 37, SCRA 410; Auyong Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., September
12, 1974, 59 SCRA 110; and Pacis, et al., vs. Pamaran, etc., et al., March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 16).
Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court
from assuming cognizance of the subject matter (Enrile, et al. vs. Venuya, et al., January 30, 1971,
37 SCRA 381) and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure
and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code (Diosamito, et al. vs.
Balanque, et al., July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 836; Seares vs. Frias, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 533);
because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since
they do not result in the conviction of wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty (Lazatin
vs. Commissioner, et al., July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1016).
Respondent Judge claims that the pendency of a seizure proceeding was never brought to his
attention (p. 038, rec.) and that he could not have foreseen the possibility that petitioner would be
instituting seizure proceedings ... and besides, it is understood that the order of the court

commanding the release of the subject articles was on a premise that herein petitioner was not
holding or withholding the same for some other lawful reason (p.39, rec.).
The questioned order of respondent Judge is unqualified and contains no intimation that the "release
... was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for some other
lawful reason." On the contrary, the tenor of the order is so absolute and so emphatic that it really
leaves no alternative for petitioner Collector of Customs except to return the articles.
The records of the case, moreover, reveal that a report of seizure (p. 14, rec.) and warrant of seizure
and detention (p. 15, rec.) were made by petitioner Collector of Customs on June 30, 1971 and on
July 9, 1971 respectively. It is patent that respondent Judge knew actually of the existence at least of
the report of seizure of June 30, 1971, which is six days prior to his order of dismissal dated July 6,
1971. He should have anticipated that a warrant of seizure and detention will logically be issued as
in fact it was issued on July 9, 1971, because it was the petitioner Collector of Cust oms who filed the
criminal complaint directly with him on July 1, 1971. Respondent Judge chose to ignore the
presence of the report of seizure dated June 30, 1971, six days before his order of dismissal and the
filing of the criminal complaint on July 1, 1971. Prudence should have counselled him, so as not to
frustrate the petitioner Collector of Customs in enforcing the tariff and customs laws, against
ordering the release of the seized articles without first ascertaining from the petitioner Collector of
Customs whether the latter intended to institute or had instituted seizure proceedings.
As aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Barredo in his Concurring Opinion in People vs. Gutierrez, supra,
"It is not enough that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as ca pable of acting in good faith, it is
equally important that no circumstance attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of trust
worthiness." We have enjoined judges to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and not
to dispose of a case according to their personal views (Albert vs. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA
948).
IV
In G.R. No. L-36376 (Enriquez, et al. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.), the arbitrary denials displayed
by respondent Judge of motions presented before him likewise invite some cautionary reminders
from this Court.
In this case, petitioners were given an unreasonable period of one (1) day within which to elevate the
matter before this Tribunal. But considering the novelty of the issue, a grant of twenty -four hours to
prepare a petition for certiorari is a virtual denial of the motion. And petitioners' motion for an
extension of at least one (1) day was peremptorily brushed aside by respondent Judge with one
single word DENIED.
The fact that petitioners succeeded in bringing the matter before the Supreme Court within the
constricted period of time granted them is beside the point. More important is the consideration by
this Court of the dangers posed by respondent Judge's peremptory denial of a reasonable time.
Indeed, it is commendable to see judges hasten the disposition of cases pending before them. But
more commendable would be for judges to contribute their share in maintaining the unswerving faith
of litigants in the courts of justice. WE once again stress that "One important judicial norm is that a
judge's official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety" (Luque vs. Kayanan, 29
SCRA 165).
V

But while w sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal to conduct preliminary examination (p. 36),
pursuant to OUR constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts (Sec. 6, Art. X,
1973 Constitution) as a matter of policy, WE enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal
Court Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts (see
Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29, March 31, 1973). The primary purpose of the creation of the
Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts of First Instance, as above intimated, is to
mitigate the case load of the Courts of First Instance as well as to expedite the disposition of criminal
cases involving serious offenses specified in Section I of Republic Act 5179, as amended. Circuit
Criminal Judges therefore, should not encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints, which they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or
city fiscal, who in turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary
examination and investigation. Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court can directly request the
Secretary of Justice to assign a state prosecutor for the same purpose (See. 3, Republic Act No.
5184).
Moreover, it seems that respondent Judge does not have adequate time to hear and dispos e of the
34 criminal cases with detention prisoners pending in his sala, aside from the 479 pending cases of
voluntary submission by drug addicts, as of January 31, 1975 (A.M. No. 230 -CCC, Item 42, Agenda
of March 13, 1975), as revealed by his letter dated February 26, 1975, wherein he requested the
Supreme Court to renew the detail in his sala of Municipal Judge Hermenegildo C. Cruz of
Mandaluyong, Rizal, to assist him. This significant fact should further dissuade him from actively
conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal cases directly filed with him.
Furthermore, Judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts whose dockets permit, may be assigned by the
Supreme Court for a period not exceeding 6 months, unless with their consent, to assist Judges of
regular Courts of First Instance with clogged dockets (Sec. 5[3], Art. X, 1973 Constitution).
WHEREFORE, IN G.R. NOS. L-34243, 36376, 38688 AND 39525, THE PETITIONS ARE HEREBY
DISMISSED AND THE WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR RESTRAINING ORDERS
ISSUED THEREIN ARE HEREBY LIFTED; IN G.R. No. L-40031, THE PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED; AND IN G.R. NO. L-34038, THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JULY 6,
1971 IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS THE SAME DISMISSED THE
CRIMINAL CASE WITH PREJUDICE AND INSOFAR AS THE SAME DIRECTED THE RETURN TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THEREIN OF THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM HIM WHICH ARE NOW
SUBJECT OF SEIZURE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES, AND THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCT ION ISSUED THEREIN IS HEREBY MADE PERMANENT. NO
COSTS.
Castro, C.J., Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring

The opinion of the Court, both thorough and comprehensive, penned by Justice Makasiar, is
impressive for its analytical skill and scholarly attributes. On the whole then, especially so where
reference is made to our previous decisions, there is no impediment to full concurrence. This is
particularly true where it concerns the ruling announced by this Court, i.e., "that both Section 1(3),
Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution and Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provide the
source of the power of all Judges, including Judges of the Court of First Instance, th e Circuit
Criminal Courts, and other courts of equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine
probable cause before the issuance of the warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings
conducted by respondent Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of
the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding
information." 1 At that, there is still need, it seems to me, for a few words not only to set forth the extent of
my agreement with my brethren but also to indicate what for me are the precise limits of our holding. The
full and exhaustive treatment of the specific issue dealing with the power of the circuit criminal courts to
conduct preliminary examination, with historical and textual allusions to the previous judicial
pronouncements and comparable statutory provisions, certainly a virtue to be commended, may for those
not sufficiently discerning, yield implications which, for me, go further than is intended by us. It is my
understanding then that the decision reached is at most an affirmation that the present Constitution, as
did the 1935 Constitution, confers the power to conduct preliminary examination preparatory to issuing a
warrant of arrest, to a circuit criminal court judge. Even then, however, he should for sound policy reasons
curb any eagerness . s or propensity to make use of such competence.

1. To repeat, it is solely the first stage in the criminal process that may lead to the apprehension of
the accused that has been passed upon by this Court. It has not considered the second stage, that
of preliminary investigation proper, one of equal significance. As far back as 1910, its importance
was stressed in United States v. Grant and Kennedy. 2 Thus: "The object or purpose of a preliminary
investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon trial, is to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an
open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect the State from useless and expensive trials." 3 It is of the essence then that the accused should be
heard. There are overtones in the opinion of the Court susceptible to being misinterpreted in this regard, if
it be assumed that upon the termination of the preliminary examination the arraignment and trial could
then proceed. I would dissociate myself from such a view. I am gratified therefore that it is made explicit
therein that our ruling is limited to the power of a judge under the Circuit Criminal Court Act 4 to conduct a
preliminary examination. As to his competence regarding a preliminary investigation, it is my
understanding that the question has been left open.

2. Respondent Judge was likewise admonished "to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal
cases filed before their courts (see Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28 -29, March 31, 1973." 5 That is
as it should be. It is well that it is so. The occasion for its exercise should be minimized. That is the
teaching of Mateo v. Villaluz, the same respondent Judge in these petitions. The facts could be
differentiated, but the principle announced holds true. The load to be shouldered by a trial judge is heavy
enough for him to attend to matters which could be looked after by municipal judges. So this excerpt from
Mateo would indicate: "To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges are well advised to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave to others the role of notarizing
declarations. The less an occupant of the bench fritters away his time and energy in tasks [that could be
left to other hands], the. less the danger of his being a participant in any event that might lend its elf to the
interpretation that his impartiality has been compromised. There is much to be said for displaying zeal
and eagerness in stamping out criminality, but that role is hardly fit for a judge who must bide his time
until the case is before him. He must ever he on guard lest what' s done by him, even from the best of
motives, may be thought of as eroding that objectivity and sobriety which are the hallmarks of judicial
conduct. Thus should he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that is his." 6 For me, the fact that a
judge had listened to testimony damaging to a prospective accused, without his being given the
opportunity to refute the same, may lead to a subsconcious prejudice difficult to erase at the stage of trial.

BARREDO, J, concurring:
I concur in the result of the judgment in these cases, for although the main opinion sustains the
authority of Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary investigations, it strictly ordains, however,
that "as a matter of policy (sic) We enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court
Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts." With such an
imperious mandate, I am satisfied that Circuit Criminal Courts will not anymore do what I am fully
convinced they are not legally permitted to do. I and certain no Criminal Court Judge will dare
deviate from the policy announced in the main opinion, which, of course, I say is the policy of
Republic Act 5179 itself. Indeed, my uncompromising position is that it is the policy of the law itself,
rather than that of this Court alone as the main opinion would seem to imply, that Circuit Criminal
Courts should strictly confine themselves to merely trying and deciding the cases assigned to them,
and I have always insisted that it should be on the basis of that very policy of the law itself informed
in public interest that this Court should construe the statutory provision here in issue, Section 1 of
Republic Act 5179 which provides as follows:
In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as presently
constituted, there is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction,
concurrent with the regular Court of First Instance, to try and decide the following
criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter:
a. Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and
crimes against property as defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
b. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, ...
c. Violations of Section 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and Sections 174, 175 and 345 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Thus, the judgment of the Court in these cases will after all effectively effectuate what I maintain is
the spirit of the Act, notwithstanding the considerations predicating the main opinion which, with due
respect to my learned brethren in majority, I find it impossible to agree with. And so, I can give my
assent to the judgment in these cases without my having to sacrifice my conviction herein involved,
which I am explaining in this separate opinion. Frankly, I will never be able to comprehend why the
majority can give the above provision a construction contrary to what plainly appears to be policy
that underlies it, only for them to just the same "enjoin" all Circuit Criminal Courts "as matter of
policy" (of the Court) that they should not conduct preliminary in vestigations, which I say the statute,
as matter of policy, never intended to allow them to do anyway.
Not withstanding the scholarly and extended main opinion, I am not persuaded that the legislature
ever intended to confer upon Circuit Criminal Courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations.
Not only the specific words of the above provision, but the development of the law on preliminary
investigations and the circumstances obtaining at the time Republic Act 5179 was enacted point
unmistakably, in my considered opinion, to this conclusion.
There are already two earlier cases in which this Court had to dwell on the extent of the jurisdiction
of the circuit criminal courts. In both of them, the approach was restrictive. Way back in 1968, in the
case of People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273, the Court was confronted with the question of whether or
not the mere fact that under Section 1 (c) of Republic Act 5179, the organic act of the circuit criminal

courts, mentions violations of Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code to be among the
cases under the jurisdiction of said courts, is enough justification for disregarding the penalty
provided in the Revenue Code of fine of not less than P50 nor more than P200 and imprisonment of
not less than 5 nor more than 30 days when the value of the cigarettes involved does not exceed
P500, which ordinarily would make such violation fall within the original jurisdiction of the City Court
of La Carlota City and considering such violations to be within the jurisdict ion of the corresponding
Circuit Criminal Court. The Court, thru Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, resolved the problem this wise:
The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent. not only on the type of
cases but also on the penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case at
bar falls within the exclusive and 'original jurisdiction of the city court, it cannot, even
if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken cognizance of by the
circuit criminal courts the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first
instance in criminal cases where the latter's jurisdiction is original and exclusive (Atp
279.)
Almost four years later, in Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 137, the issue was whether or not a case of
indirect bribery, a crime committed by a public officer included in Section 1(a) of the Act, but
punishable under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor, suspension and public
censure, penalties which are imposable by the city of municipal courts concurrently with the courts of
first instance, may be considered as within the jurisdiction of the, Circuit Criminal Courts. We held
that the fact alone that the crime involved was one committed by a public officer did not suffice to
place the case within the jurisdiction of said courts. Reiterating the predicate of adherence to the
letter of the statute adopted in Parenda supra, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, emphasized the reason therefor
thus:
In fact, the intention of the legislature to bestow unto these special criminal courts
limited jurisdiction is clear not only from the provision of the law itself; it was so stated
that this limited jurisdiction of the circuit courts would enable them to act with
dispatch on the cases cognizable by said tribunals. And, this is precisely the purpose
for which the circuit criminal courts were createdto contribute to the speedy
resolution of criminal and help curd the progression of criminality in the country
(Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 388, which became Republic Act No. 5179) (At
142.)
In the cases at bar, it is admitted in the main opinion that because "the primary purpose of the
creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts of First instance, as above
intimated, is to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving serious offenses specified in
Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, ... Circuit Criminal Judges, therefore, should not encumber
themselves with attending to the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal compla ints,
which they should refer to the Provincial or City Fiscals, who, in turn can utilize the assistance of the
state prosecutor for the same purpose." What is more, as if to predicate such observations on
actuality and project them in the context of what is happening in the very court of respondent judge,
the main opinion invites attention to the number of pending cases and matters therein which
compelled respondent judge, according to the opinion, to seek from this Court the detail of a
municipal judge to assist him. It further points out that under Section 5(3) Article X of the
Constitution, Criminal Court Judges may be temporarily assigned by the Supreme Court to other
stations, provided that, without the consent of the judges concerned, such assignment may not last
longer than six months. 1 And to these very apt observations, it may be added that unlike in the regular
courts of first instance, in circuit criminal courts "the trial of cases ... once commenced, shall be
continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within thirty days from the time the case
is submitted for decision. (Sec- 6, R.A. 5179).

To my mind, all these considerations were precisely what the Congress had in mind when it enacted
the law creating the circuit criminal courts. As may be seen, all of these considerations point to the
necessity of freeing the said courts from all functions other than "to try and decide" the cases
enumerated in the Act. It is inconceivable that with said considerations in view, Congress could have
meant by omitting mention of preliminary investigations in the statute that it should nevertheless be
construed in the sense of encumbering to borrow the language of the main opinion, the circuit
criminal courts with the burden of "attending to preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints", which the main opinion emphasizes and the legislature must be presumed to have
known can be better performed by the multitudinous other offices in the prosecution staff of the
government already referred to above.
It is important to note that the conferment in the Judiciary Act of jurisdiction upon the regular courts
of first instance is worded thus:
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction.
(a) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation;
(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of
forcible entry into and detainer on lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is
conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts;
(c) In all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of property in
controversy, amounts to more than ten thousand pesos; (RA Nos. 2613 & 3828.)
(d) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, irrespective of the value of the
property in controversy or the amount of the demand;
(e) In all matters of probate, both of testate and intestate estates, appointment of
guardians, (See also Section 90, and note thereof trustees and receivers, and in all
actions for annulment of marriage, and in all such special cases and proceedings as
are not otherwise provided for;
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more
than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos;
(g) Over all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippines, on
board a ship or watercraft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippines in
accordance with the laws thereof. The jurisdiction herein conferred may be exercised
by the Court of First Instance in any province into which the ship or watercraft upon
which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the commission thereof:
Provided, That the court first lawfully taking cognizance thereof shall have jurisdiction
of the same to the exclusion of all other courts in the Philippines, and
(h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue writ of
injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in
their respective provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the Rules of Court.

Significantly, unlike Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, this provision does not say that the Courts of
First Instance shall "try and decide" the cases therein enumerated. Rather, it simply says they shall
have original jurisdiction "in" and "over" the respective cases mentioned. In other words, Section 1 of
Republic Act 5179 does not grant the circuit criminal courts jurisdiction "in" or "over" the cases listed,
but, as may be plainly seen in the above- quoted tenor of its pertinent provision, only "the limited
jurisdiction . . . to try and decide" them. To my mind, this difference in phraseology must have been
intentional in order to emphasize the restricted and limited prerogatives of Circuit Criminal Courts,
not only as to the nature of the cases that can be filed with them but also as to the extent of their
functions and powers relative to said cases.
I maintain that consonant with the need to make of the Circuit Criminal Courts the courts of special
and limited jurisdiction designed to attend with utmost expeditiousness to the cases assigned to
them, as undoubtedly the law intends them to be, Section 1 of the Act should be construed, even in
case of doubt in the sense not only that the jurisdiction of said courts is limite d to the cases which
they may take cognizance of, but also in that any other work not strictly part of the functions to "try
and decide" said cases, is not contemplated to be performed by them.
It is a familiar rule that the jurisdiction of a court, may not be deemed granted by mere implication,
unless perhaps in instances when this is indubitably clear. Whenever there is reason to doubt, as in
the case before Us, precisely because of the considerations expounded in the main opinion as to
why, as a matter of this Court's policy, at least, the circuit criminal courts should refrain from holding
preliminary investigations, the rule, as I know it, is to deny the existence of power. In this connection,
it should he borne in mind that the power to conduct preliminary investigations has never been
deemed as a mere incidental prerogative of any court. It exist only when duly granted.
It should be noted from the provisions of Section 44 of the Judiciary Act aforequoted that even the
authority of the regular courts of first instance to grant writs of injuction, mandamus certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto andhabeas corpus, which by their nature could reasonably be deemed
inferable from the grant of general jurisdiction, had still to be granted expressly to said court s, and
only within their respective provinces and districts. And this Court has been very restrictive in
construing this particular grant of jurisdiction. (See Director of forestry vs. Ruiz, L -24882, April
30,1971, 38 SCRA 559, and cases therein cited.) To repeat, such authority would seem to be implicit
from the grant of general jurisdiction, and yet We always insist that it should be specifically
conferred. Now, is there anything in the conduct of preliminary investigations that makes it more
inherent or inseparable from the expressed power "to try and decide" that necessarily, We must
consider the same as included in said power or as something that must indispensably be added
thereto, such that the authority therefor need not be spelled out in black and white? Withal, if in the
case of inferior courts, which everyone knows have always conducted preliminary investigations
since the enactment of Act 194 in 1901, the Judiciary Act had to expressly provide for the grant of
such authority to them, what special reason is there why the conferment upon circuit criminal courts
of the faculty to "try and decide" certain types of criminal cases should be deemed as necessarily
including the authority to conduct preliminary investigations related thereto, when according to what
the main opinion emphasizes, such function can be better performed by the prosecution staff of the
government?
The main opinion holds that it "is plain and evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic act,
Republic Act 5179" that circuit criminal courts "have the same powers and functions as those
conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance necessary to effectively exercise (their) special and
limited jurisdiction." But I am afraid this reasoning ignores that "the powers and functions (of) th e
regular Courts of First Instance" conferred upon the circuit criminal courts are only those "necessary
(for them) to effectively exercise (their) special and limited jurisdiction", and the issue precisely is
what is the extent of that special and limited jurisdiction. As I have already pointed out, that "special
and limited jurisdiction" is "to try and decide" the cases enumerated, and this power does not have to

be accompanied, whether by logical implication or by the reasons behind the organization of t he

courts, by the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. I dare say, in connection with the
provisions of Section 3 of the Act, that the provisions of laws and Rules of Court, if any, granting
jurisdiction to regular courts of first instance to conduct preliminary investigations are inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act, considering that these latter provisions contemplate circuit criminal
courts which should not undertake the functions of conducting preliminary investigations, as found
factually by the main opinion, albeit surprisingly the majority would give weight to such factual finding
only to serve as basis for a policy only of the Court, instead of utilizing the same as premise for the
proper construction of the Act in order that such policy may be legally effectuated, since it is indeed
the policy underlying the law itself. And besides, a careful reading of Section 3 should make it clear
to everyone that its phraseology studiously refers not to all the powers of the judges of the Court s of
First Instance, but only to "the provisions of the laws and the Rules of Court relative to the Judges of
the Courts of First Instance", meaning their qualifications, salaries, transfer etc. and to their powers
and prerogatives in "the trial, and disposition and appeal of criminal cases" in the circuit criminal
courts, which is plainly consistent with the scope of the power granted to them under Section 1 "to
try and decide."
The main opinion quotes from my concurring opinion in People vs. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172,
apparently to show that in my view, "circuit criminal courts are nothing but additional branches of the
regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts". But the portion quoted from my opinion
is not complete. What I said was this:
I take it that under Republic Act 5179, Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but
additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts
with the limited concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of, try and decide only
those cases (enumerated in Section I of the Act. This is readily implied from Section
3 of the Act which says:
SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to
the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and
appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit
judge and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, I adhered closely to the language of the statute and referred to the jurisdiction of the
criminal courts as comprising of the power "to take cognizance of, try and decide" only the cases
therein enumerated. I did not concede that the authority was broadly "over" those cases, as in
Section 44 of Judiciary. Act, but strictly "to take cognizance of, try and decide" them.
There is another point which is more transcendental. The main opinion assumes the correctness of
the generally prevailing impression that courts of first instance continue to possess the jurisd iction to
conduct preliminary investigations. It cites the Rules of Court as the source of such authority. For my
part, I am not sure, to put it mildly, that the Supreme Court can arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or
grant any to the lower courts by merely promulgating a rule to such effect. I believe it is safer to hold
that jurisdiction to act on any given matter may be granted only by statute or legislative enactment,
for the simple reason that jurisdiction is substantive and not adjective in nature. And so, the question
in my mind is simply this, assuming arguendo that circuit criminal courts have all the powers of the
regular courts of first instance, which I dispute, is it clear that the latter courts continued to possess,
after the Judiciary Act of 1948 went into effect, the power to conduct preliminary investigations? In

other words, are the provisions of the Rules of Court invoked in the main opinion, Section 13 of Rule
112, predicated on any law or statute?
According to former Chief Justice Moran, this section was "taken, with amendments, from Section 4
of former Rule 108, which was a substantial re-statement of the ruling of the Supreme Court in one
case", citing People vs. Solon, supra. (See 4 Moran, Rules of Court, p. 117, 1970 ed.) But Sec. 4 of
Rule 108 was part of the Rules of Court of 1940, when Act 1627 was still in force. Apparently, when
Rule 108 was revised in the 1964 Rules, it was overlooked that under Section 99 of the Judiciary
Act, "all laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act" was repealed thereby wiping
away Section 37 of Act 1627.
No matter how many times one may read the provisions of the whole Judiciary Act of 1948 anti
particularly those that refer to the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, one will ne ver find any
word therein that directly or indirectly confers upon said courts the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. In pointing out this patent omission, I am of course assuming that the jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigations, while sometimes given to courts in spite of its being basically an
executive function per Orendain, 2 is not inherent in every court. For instance, in the Judiciary Act itself.
It can be clearly seen that as in the case of Act 194, seventy-five years ago, by Section 87 of the
Act, the legislature had to expressly vest upon inferior courts the power to conduct such preliminary
investigations. Thus, Section 87 provides in unmistakable terms:
xxx xxx xxx
Said municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct preliminary
investigation for any offense alleged to have been committed within their respective
municipalities and cities which are cognizable by Courts of First Instance and the
information filed with their courts without regard to the limits of punishment, and may
release, or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his
appearance before the proper court.
xxx xxx xxx
If, as the majority maintain, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in all our courts
by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, of what need is there for the provision just quoted? Upon the
other hand, if such conferment is merely confirmatory of an existing constitutionally based authority, I
see no reason at all why there should be such an express confirmation of the power of inferior courts
alone and none at all of that of the Courts of First Instance.
My position is that the silence of the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter, taken
together with the fact that Section 99 of the Act repeals all laws and rules inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, indicates an unmistakable legislative intention to remove from the Courts of
First Instance the prerogative under discussion.
It is argued that to thus argue is to rely on repeal by implication which is not favored. I contend,
however, that such pose overlooks the fact that the Judiciary Act of 1948 is indisputably in the nature
of a codification of all laws existing at tile time of its passage related to the judiciary, the judges, the
courts and their respective jurisdictions. Such being the case, the applicable rule of statutory
construction is that to the effect that when scattered statutes and provisions relative to the same
subject matter ire embodied subsequently in a single comprehensive legislation, any particular
provision not incorporated therein and germane to the main subject matter is deemed to be

repealed. (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, Sec. 2019, pp. 480 -481.) Which is but logical,
as otherwise, of what use is the integration?
The main opinion points to certain legislations subsequent to 1948 which it contends constitute
recognition on the part of Congress of the continued authority of Courts of First Instance to conduct
preliminary investigations, such as, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or Republic Act 6425, and
Republic Act 5180 governing preliminary investigations by fiscals.
As regards Republic Act 5180, the main opinion claims that because Section 1 thereof makes
mention of "investigation . . . conducted by a Court of -First Instance . . . in accordance with law,"
said provision is proof of a legislative assumption that said courts can exercise such power. To start
with, I have never denied that there are instances when by specific provision of the pertinent laws,
preliminary investigations in prosecutions under said laws have to be done by the Courts of First
Instance, such as, in violations of the Election Law, the Anti-Subversion Act, Republic Act 1700 and
the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 44.
But as I see it, if Republic Act 5180 is of any materiality in this discussion, it is in that it makes more
patent that the policy of the law on preliminary investigations is to make them as expeditious as
possible but without depriving the accused of the opportunity to be heard, which is likely to happen in
a preliminary investigation in a Court of First Instance, following Solon 3 and Marcos, 4 unless, of
course, the procedure provided for in Section 13, Rule 112 is followed pursuant to Albano vs. Arranz 5 It
sounds to me rather anachronistic for a law to emphasize the right of an accused to be heard before he is
arrested, while it perpetuates in the same breadth as a general rule a procedure which denies that right.
Besides, why did not Republic Act 5180 which was approved on the same day as Republic Act 5179,
mention preliminary investigations by Circuit Criminal Courts, just as the other later law, Republic Act
6425, cited in the main opinion expressly treated and referred to said courts separately from the Courts of
First Instance and Domestic Relations Courts, if really Congress intended to confer the power in issue on
them?

The reference to Republic Act 6425 is even more revealing of the insistence of the majority to c ling
to any drifting straw in their effort to prove their point . Republic Act 6425 originally granted to the
Circuit Criminal Courts exclusively jurisdiction over cases for violation thereof. Of course, it also
contained provisions about preliminary investigations, but these did not in any manner indicate
whether expressly or impliedly that the same courts would have authority to conduct such
investigations. Here is the pertinent provision, before it was amended by Presidential Decree No. 44:
SEC. 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Cirminal Court. The Circuit Criminal Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under
this Act.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall he resolved within a
period of seven (7) days from the date of termination of the preliminary investigation.
Where a prima facie case is established, the corresponding information shall be filed
in court within twenty-four (24) hours. Decision on said cases shall be rendered
within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case.
It is to be noted that there is here a requirement that the corresponding information should be filed in
court within 24 hours. Does not this show that the preliminary investigation is not to be conducted by
the court itself? But, as if to make it more patent that it is better that the investigation is undertaken
by another authority, Presidential Decree 44 amended the above provision as follows:

SEC. 39. Jurisdiction. Circuit Criminal Court, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive
cognizance of cases where the offenders are under
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.
Where the preliminary' investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and
a prima facie case is establish, the corresponding information shall be file in court
within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the
preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to
exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecuting officer
within forthy-eigth (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.
Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not later than
ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases
shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of
the case.
That the foregoing provision does not vest any preliminary investigation authority in any of the courts
mentioned is best proven by the fact that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts have never
conducted any preliminary investigation whether under its original charter or under this provision. I
am not aware that any Court of First Instance has ever done so. The mention of "the preliminary
investigation (being) conducted by a judge" in the above provision contemplates, to my mind, not the
judges of the courts specified therein, but the proper municipal judges, bearing in mind the
considerations already discussed above relative to the tendency of the every new law to remove
from superior courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations, Indeed, in this connection, it is
to me a mystery how easily my brethren have forgotten that when in another ease the very same
respondent judge here did nothing more than act as the officer before whom the accused swore a
confession which the said accused later on repudiated as having been secured thru violence and
intimidation, We disqualified respondent from trying the case for fear that he might not be able to
maintain "the cold nuetrality of an impartial judge". Quite inconsistently, they now hold that the law in
question allows a judge to conduct the preliminary examination of the witnesses of the prosecution
to issue a warrant of arrest and to subsequently try the main case on the merits, even if the
language of said law in issue is not really clear and the existence of the preten ded power is just
being gathered from inference of doubtful logic, while, on the other hand, there is a multitude of
reasons strongly justifying the contrary construction.
In what I consider, with the pardon I hope of my learned colleagues, to be a despera te but vain effort
to provide substantive law basis for Section 13 of Rule 112, the main opinion falls back on of all
things the provision of the Bill of Rights of the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 enjoining that no
warrant (of arrest) "may issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge 6 after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." It is posited
that this constitutional mandate is the ultimate source of the authority of the Courts of First Instance,
assuming the absence of any statutory basis, to conduct preliminary investigation. As I understand it, the
theory is that under the Constitution, warrants of arrests may be issued only by judges (under the 1935
Constitution), and since before doing so, they must examine the complainant and his witnesses under
oath, ergo, judges, and I presume that would mean all judges, are constitutionally vested with jurisdiction
to conduct preliminary examinations, if not investigations. But as I will demonstrate anon I sense some
kind of non sequitur here. At this point , however, I will just make the observation that if it were true that all
judges may conduct preliminary examinations by virtue of the above provision of the Bill of Rights, why

did the majority have to go thru all the trouble of a lengthy and laborious if scholarly, desertation of why
Circuit Criminal Courts have all the powers of the Courts of First Instance to prove that they can like the
latter courts conduct preliminary examinations, when all they had to say is that Circuit Criminal Court
Judges are among the judges the Constitution contemplates. Moreover, if the theory of the majority is to
be pursued to its logical conclusion, then the jurisdiction of judges in the matter in issue cannot but be
exclusive, for the Constitution mentions no other officer who may issue warrants of arrest. But then the
question would arise, from where did our municipal mayors derive their authority under existing rules to
perform such function?

I have carefully perused with deep interest the elaborate statement in the main opinion of the
"historical background of our law on criminal procedure." I regret to state, however, that even after
such a very refreshing intellectual excursion, I still cannot see that such historical background traced
by my scholarly brethren necessarily leads to the conclusion that the power of our courts to conduct
preliminary investigation springs from the Constitution or that after the Judiciary Act of 1948 repealed
all laws and ruled inconsistent with its provisions, the statutory authority of Courts of First Instance to
conduct preliminary examinations and investigations still continued to exist. Quite to the contrary, my
reading of the history of the law on preliminary investigations in this jurisdiction indicates that this
Court has been consistently holding that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional
right, at least in so far as the so-called second stage thereof is concerned. In Marcos vs. Cruz, 68
Phil. 96, this Court unanimously held: "In this jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation in
criminal cases is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory and the right thereto can be
invoked when so established and granted by law." (at p. 104) According to the same decision, it is
only when there is a statute granting such right and still it is denied to the accused in spite of his
demand therefor that there is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. More
authoritatively, in my opinion, in Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216, no less than Justice Laurel took
occasion to say: "Viewed in the light of fundamental principles, the right to preliminary investigation
is statutory, not constitutional." (at p. 225.)
Of course, I am not overlooking the fact that seemingly what the main opinion contends to be
constitutionally based is the power of judges to issue warrants of arrest, which corresponds power of
judges to issue warrants of arrest, which corresponds only to the first stage of the pr osecution known
as preliminary examination, and for this reason, it is maintained the purported ruling can stand
together with the Marcos and Hashim doctrines which relate to the second stage known as the
preliminary investigation. I do not see it that way.
My understanding of the Bill of Rights provision pertinent to this discussion, which reads thus:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. IV,
1973 Constitution.)
is that is a prohibition against any judge issuing a warrant of arrest witho ut complying with the
requirements set forth therein. In fact, an arrest may even be made without a warrant, and it is only
when a warrant is needed that the judge who is issue the same is constitutionally bound to adhere to
the conditions therein laid down. Literally, the provision does not refer to all judges, but only to "the
judge" who will issue the warrant and that to me is presumably only the judge who by statute is
authorized to act in the premises. In fine, the Constitution does not vest upon just any judge, much
less upon all judges, jurisdiction to issue warrants of arrests; it merely limits and lays down

conditions before any judge authorized law to issue warrants may do so. In like manner, it cannot be
argued that because Section 4 (1) of the Bill of Rights provides that privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, just any court in the
Philippines, even a municipal court can grant such authority or that because the liberty of abode and
of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, according to Section 5, also of
the Bill, it follows that all courts in the Philippines may act in the premises, regardless of the
definition and allocation of jurisdiction by the National Assembly or the legislature, who, after all is
constitutionally endowed with authority to precisely make such allocation. (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973
Constitution.) Indeed, this provision which reads thus:
SECTION 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law. The National Assembly shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section five hereof.
readily connotes that except in the case of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is not the
Constitution but the statutes that are the sources of the jurisdiction of all the various courts of the
country.
Moreover, to my mind, the development of the law on preliminary investigations in this jurisdiction
evinces a clear tendency not only to give the accused in all such investigations the opportunity to be
present, to cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution and to present his own evidence, until
lately when the right to cross-examine was eliminated by Presidential Decree 77 as amended by
Presidential Decree 911, but also (2) to transfer the function of conducting preliminary investigations,
sans the power to issue warrants of arrest, to prosecuting officers belonging to the Executive
Department to which the retrogative to prosecute or not to prosecute properly belongs in the
exercise of the President's duty to see to it that the laws are properly executed (Estrella vs.
Orendain, 37 SCRA 640.) Of course, in special cases wherein it is required by what in the
legislature's judgment is the public interest, the particular statute concerned expressly provides that
the preliminary investigation be conducted by the Court of First Instance, such as, in cases of
violation of Election Code and cases of violations of the Anti-Subversion Law (Act 1700). Indeed,
with the broad control given to the Secretary of Justice over crime prosecution by Presidential
Decree 911, not to mention Our own ruling in Estrella recognizing his power of supervision and
control over fiscals, as long as the case has not passed to the jurisdiction of the court, it does not
sound realistic and in keeping with the trend of recent developments in the pe rtinent laws to further
allow prosecutions to be initiated in the Courts of First Instance. 7
At this juncture, I would like to address myself to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Fernando, whose specialization in matters of constitutional law has won recognition not only for him
but also for our country from no less than the organizers of the constitutional aspect of the
bicentennial celebration of the American. I do not mind saying that whenever I want to be
comprehensive in my study of constitutional issues, I always find his views illuminating. But on the
point now in controversy, I find it difficult to see his point. Thus, he particularly underlines his
conformity to the ruling in the main opinion that the 1935 as well as the 1973 Constitut ion "provide
the source of the power of all Judges, including Judges of the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, and other courts of equivalent rank to determine probable cause before the
issuance of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to
the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government
prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information," not without hastening to clarify, however,
that "it is (his) understanding ... that the decision reached is at most an affirmation that the present
Constitution, as did the 1935 Constitution, confers the power to conduct (the) preliminary
examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest, to a circuit criminal court judge" and that "it is

only the first stage in the criminal process that may lead to the apprehension of the accused that has
been passed upon by the Court", such that as to the judges' competence regarding a preliminary
investigation," or "the second stage, (the) preliminary investigation proper," "that question has been
left open."
Of course, that such specifically was what the members of the Court were made to understand
during the deliberations by the distinguished writer of the main opinion is clear and distinct in my
recollection. As a matter of fact, for a moment I entertained earnestly the thought that I could
probably join my brethren in the formulation of such a ruling. I had in mind then Mr. Justice
Fernando's pose in his book on the Bill of Rights (1970 Edition) that the significance of entrusting the
responsibility of determining the existence of probable cause exclusively to judiciary (under the 1935
Constitution) in the defense of freedom cannot be overestimated. (p. 177 ) But after trying very hard
to see it his very I have to confess, I have arrived at the conclusion that such a proposition cannot
stand close scrutiny, if only because even if none but judges may issue warrants of arrest, it is not
indispensable that all judges be vested with such power so it is really up to the legislature to
determine which court or judge should be endowed with it.
My knowledge, if limited, of the origin of the competence of judges to issue warrants of arrest is to
the effect that it is a prerogative that antedates both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. It was in
fact recognized by the American military occupation authorities from the very inception of their rule
over the Philippine Islands in 1901, as evidenced by General Orders No. 5 8, our first code of
criminal procedure of American Surely, such military order cannot in any sense be deemed to be a
mandate of constitutional stature. No doubt, Section 13 of Rule 112 appears to be a mere reiteration
if with substantial modifications, of similar provision of General Orders No. 58 and Section 37 of Act
1627, but I regret I cannot accept the hypothesis emphasized in the main opinion that because said
provision of the rules is supposed to be an implementations of the Bill of Rights provision against
unreasonable searches and seizures, We must perforce conclude that the Bill of Rights is the source
of the jurisdiction of the judges to act in the manner provided in said rule. There can be no dispute
about the imperative need to make the safeguards against unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures as air tight as possible, but it is equally undeniable that giving the power to determine the
existence of probable cause exclusively to judges is not the only guarantee that can ensure that
same as being conducive to a more efficient system of prosecution of offenses. (See Hashim vs.
Boncan, supra.) What is more, the 1973 Constitution has given the practice explicit constitutional
basis by providing that probable cause may also be determined by "such other responsible officer
(not necessarily a judge) as may be authorized by law."
More than ever before, I now hold that the Bill of Rights provision under discussion has not been
designed to confer the power to determine probable cause to every judge in t he courts of the
Philippines; rather said provision lays down the conditions and limitations which the particular judges
authorized by law to perform such functions must observe. I feel I am supported in this view by the
following excerpts from the records of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 containing the apt
observation of no less than Senator Vicente J. Francisco and Justice Jose P. Laurel.
EL PRESIDENTE. Tiene la palabra el Delgado por Cavite.
EL SR. FRANCISCO RAZONA SU EN MIENDA
SR FRANCISCO. Seor Presidente y Caballeros de la Convencion: bajo el proyecto
del Comite de 7, se puede expedir mandamientos de registro, con tal de que la
peticion vaya acompaada de un affidavit en el que aparezcan hechos y
circunstancias que demuestren causas probales. Bajo mi en mienda, un juez puede
expedir un mandamiento de registro sino solo despues de haber examinado al

denunciate y a sus testigos bajo juranmento. Parace serque la diferencia es grande.

El texto en ingles del projecto dice.
... and no warrants shall issue by upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.'
Esta expresion ha sido interpretada por los tribunales de America en el sentido de
que el juez tiene dos medios: o puede tomar en cuenta para la expedicion de un
mandamiento de registro un affidaviten el que consten hechos y demuestren la
causa probable, o mediante examen del denuciante. Someto a la consideration de
esta Asamblea que es completamente. peligroso permiter que un juez expida
mandamiento de registro, atendiendose excluevanmente a lo que consta en
un affidavit. Esta Idea de que se puede expedir mandamiento de registro meiante
affidavit, o sea, solamante mediante un documento jurado en el que aparezcan
hechos probables, no ha sido aceptada por la orden genera Num.58. Esta
disposicion que aparece en el proyecto de Comite de 7 que es una reproduccion o
copia de precepto que aparece en el bill de Filipinas y luego en la Ley Jones,
aparece reproducida, como ya he dicho, en la Orden General Num. 58, como
articulo 27. Este articulo 27, dice lo siguiente: "No se expedirapeticion apoyada por
juramento." Como ya he dicho, "peticion apoyada por jurament" puede ser testimonio
del testigo o affidavit. Considerandose, sin embargo, que estos es verdaderamente
peligroso para el derecho que tiene un individuo a la seguridad de sus bienes y
papeles, nuestro mismo Codigo de Procedimiento Civil inserta en su Articulo 28 una
disposicion que exige como requisito "sine quanon" el que el Juez no pueda expedir
mandamiento de registro sino mediante el examen de testigos, especialmente del
denunciatne. Este articulo viene a ser el Articulo 28 del Codigo de Procedimiento
Civil que dice lo siguiente: "ElJuez de Primera Instancia o el Juez de paz debera,
antes de expedir el mandamiento, examinara bajo juramento al denunciante o al
testigo presente, consignando dus declaraciones por escrito." De modo que mi
enmienda es a tenor o en consonancia con esta disposicion legal. Como y a he
dicho, si mantuvieramos el precepto del proyecto de constitucion, esta disposicoin
de la Orden General Num. 58 podra en cierto modo ser contradictoria al procepto del
proyecto de constitucion en la forma como esta el precepto, cuya enmienda pido, y
si encontrara una discrepancia susstancial entre dicho precepto y el si encontrara
una discrepancia sustancial entre dicho precepto y el Codigo de Procedimiento Civil,
creo queo este ultimo tendria que guedarse derogado, o al menos no puede
mantenerse este precepto por anti-consitutcional. Pero yo creo que ninguno de los
miembros de esta Asamblea ver que mi enmienda no responde a una razon
fundamental y a una necesidad que se ha sentido en la practica. Los abogados que
estamos en el ejercicio de la profesion hemos visto muchas veces casos en que
agentes secretos consiguen mandamientos de registro solamente mediante la
presentacion de un affidavit que reune los requisitos de la ley. Pero que expedido el
registro e impugnados despues los terminos del affidavit se descubre que los behcos
que aparecen en el mismo son completamente falsos. De ahi que si queremos
salvaguardar en todo lo posible el derecho de del individuo a la seguridad de sus
bienes o papeles este rodeado de todas las garantias que puedan impedir o que
impidan la expedicion de registros inmotivados o imnfaundados que pueden dar
lugar a molestias o vejaciones enjustas a irreparables, creo que debemos hacer que
en nuestra constitucion se consigne el precepto tal como yo propongo que se
enmienda. (Pp. 750-752, Vol. III.)
EL PRESIDENTE. El Delegado por Batanga (Seor Laurel) acepta la enmienda?

SR. LAUREL. No seno Presidente, y quisiera decir dos palbras.

MR. LAUREL. Mr President and Gentlemen of the Convention: The anomalies
pointed out by the Honorable gentleman from Cavite, Mr. Francisco, if they ever
occur at the present time, it si because of the irregularities committed by some
justices. The amendment introduced by the distinguished Delegate from Cavite is
already covered by existing legislation, and if those irregularities pointed out by him
really occured, it is because some justices have not enforec and adhered to the
specific provision of the General Order. the General Order, or the Code of Criminal
Procedure, now provides that the judge, before issuing a search warrant, must
exsamine the complainant and his witnesses and that he must take their depositions
in writing. The reasons why we are in favor o fthis amendment is because we are
incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental ch aracter. Now, before
a judge could issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine
personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness, the withnesses that
he may produce. It is not necessary for me to recall here one of the grievances of the
early settlers in America which was one of the causes of the revolution against the
mother country, England; the issuing of the so-called general search warrant. It is,
therefore, quite important that we impose this obligation upon the ju dge, so that he
will not be issuing search warrant in blank, or simply accompanied by affidavitsm, but
that he must consider the sanctity of the home. It is necessary thta we surrond that
power with the necessary constitutional guaranty. You might say that as this
amendment is already in the general legislation, what is the necessity of
incorporating this in the constitution. The necessity consist in that the constitution is
something permanent for the protection of the rather than general legislation in th is
constitution that we shall adopt. For this reason, the committee accepts and
approves of the amendment as suggested by Delegate Francisco. (Pp 757 -785, Vol
III.)
And so, since there is neither any constitutional provision nor statute that presently conf ers on
Judges of the Courts of First Instance the power to conduct preliminary examinations, and the trend
of our laws is to leave such function to other responsible officers, except the very act of issuing the
warrant of arrest, I have no alternative by to deny to Circuit Criminal Courts such power.
I cannot close this separate opinion without inviting attention to certain specific points of procedure
which the main opinion seems not to have bothered to pass upon, notwithstanding what I consider to
be their importance . In G.R. No. L34038, I notice that respondent judge conducted a preliminary
investigation on the basis of nothing more than a letter -complaint of the petitioner Collector of
Customs. It is not stated whether or not it was in due form or under oath. Whil as Mr. Justice
Fernando stresses, this decision recognizes only the power of respondent judge to conduct the first
stage or the preliminary examination, in G.R. No. L-34038, L-34243, L-39525 and L-40031, what are
actually involved are preliminary investigations, both the first and second stages. It is only in G.R.
Nos. L-36376 and L-38688 that respondent judge has not been able to conduct even the dispositive
portion of Our judgment is to be understood, Court, as attested to by Mr. Justice Ferna ndo, reaches
only preliminary examinatins and not preliminary investigations, in order precisely to avoid having to
overrule Hashim vs. Boncan and Marcos vs. Cruz, which I understand some members of the Court
are not ready to do.
Regarding G.R. No. L-34038, I agree that respondent judge executed his authority in providing that
his order of dismissal is with predice and in ordering the return of the article seized by the customs
authorities to his co-respondent Makapugay. Of coused anyway , in legal contemplation the
qualification "with prejudice" thus made by respondent judge means nothing. In no way can it have
the effect of jeopardy, since what was conducted by him was only a preliminary investigation, which

in my opinion is unauthorized and void. And assuming it to be valid there would be no need of
setting aside the order of dismissal itself; it is enough to say that it is a dismissal before arraignment
and jeopardy has not thereby attached, the express qualification therein of "with prejudice"
notwithstanding.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to grant the petitions in G.R. No. L -34038 insofar as the
respondent judge's impugned order of July 6, 1971 orders the return of the articles seized to his co respondent Makapugay and insofar as G.R. Nos. L-34243, L-36376, L-39525, L-38688 and L-40021
are concerned, I am giving my concurrence to the judgment therein subject to the qualifications I
have discussed in this separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring

The opinion of the Court, both thorough and comprehensive, penned by Justice Makasiar, is
impressive for its analytical skill and scholarly attributes. On the whole then, especially so where
reference is made to our previous decisions, there is no impediment to full concurrence. This i s
particularly true where it concerns the ruling announced by this Court, i.e., "that both Section 1(3),
Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution and Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provide the
source of the power of all Judges, including Judges of the Court of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, and other courts of equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine
probable cause before the issuance of the warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings
conducted by respondent Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of
the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding
information." 1 At that, there is still need, it seems to me, for a few words not only to set forth the extent of
my agreement with my brethren but also to indicate what for me are the precise limits of our holding. The
full and exhaustive treatment of the specific issue dealing with the power of the circuit criminal courts to
conduct preliminary examination, with historical and textual allusions to the previous judicial
pronouncements and comparable statutory provisions, certainly a virtue to be commended, may for those
not sufficiently discerning, yield implications which, for me, go further than is intended by us. It is my
understanding then that the decision reached is at most an affirmation that the present Constitution, as
did the 1935 Constitution, confers the power to conduct preliminary examination preparatory to issuing a
warrant of arrest, to a circuit criminal court judge. Even then, however, he should for sound policy reasons
curb any eagerness . s or propensity to make use of such competence.

1. To repeat, it is solely the first stage in the criminal process that may lead to th e apprehension of
the accused that has been passed upon by this Court. It has not considered the second stage, that
of preliminary investigation proper, one of equal significance. As far back as 1910, its importance
was stressed in United States v. Grant and Kennedy. 2 Thus: "The object or purpose of a preliminary
investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon trial, is to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect hi m from an
open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect the State from useless and expensive trials." 3 It is of the essence then that the accused should be
heard. There are overtones in the opinion of the Court susceptible to being misinterpreted in this regard, if
it be assumed that upon the termination of the preliminary examination the arraignment and trial could
then proceed. I would dissociate myself from such a view. I am gratified therefore that it is made explicit
therein that our ruling is limited to the power of a judge under the Circuit Criminal Court Act 4 to conduct a

preliminary examination. As to his competence regarding a preliminary investigation, it is my

understanding that the question has been left open.

2. Respondent Judge was likewise admonished "to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal
cases filed before their courts (see Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28 -29, March 31, 1973." 5 That is
as it should be. It is well that it is so. The occasion for its exercise should be minimized. That is the
teaching of Mateo v. Villaluz, the same respondent Judge in these petitions. The facts could be
differentiated, but the principle announced holds true. The load to be shouldered by a trial judge is heavy
enough for him to attend to matters which could be looked after by municipal judges. So this excerpt from
Mateo would indicate: "To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges are well advised to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave to others the role of notarizing
declarations. The less an occupant of the bench fritters away his time and energy in tasks [that could be
left to other hands], the. less the danger of his being a participant in any event that might lend itself to the
interpretation that his impartiality has been compromised. There is much to be said for displaying zeal
and eagerness in stamping out criminality, but that role is hardly fit for a judge who must bide his time
until the case is before him. He must ever he on guard lest what' s done by him, even from the best of
motives, may be thought of as eroding that objectivity and sobriety which are the hallmarks of judicial
conduct. Thus should he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that is his." 6 For me, the fact that a
judge had listened to testimony damaging to a prospective accused, without his being given the
opportunity to refute the same, may lead to a subsconcious prejudice difficult to erase at the stage of trial.

BARREDO, J, concurring:
I concur in the result of the judgment in these cases, for although the main opinion sustains the
authority of Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary investigations, it strictly ordains, however,
that "as a matter of policy (sic) We enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court
Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts." With such an
imperious mandate, I am satisfied that Circuit Criminal Courts will not a nymore do what I am fully
convinced they are not legally permitted to do. I and certain no Criminal Court Judge will dare
deviate from the policy announced in the main opinion, which, of course, I say is the policy of
Republic Act 5179 itself. Indeed, my uncompromising position is that it is the policy of the law itself,
rather than that of this Court alone as the main opinion would seem to imply, that Circuit Criminal
Courts should strictly confine themselves to merely trying and deciding the cases assigne d to them,
and I have always insisted that it should be on the basis of that very policy of the law itself informed
in public interest that this Court should construe the statutory provision here in issue, Section 1 of
Republic Act 5179 which provides as follows:
In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as presently
constituted, there is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction,
concurrent with the regular Court of First Instance, to try and decide t he following
criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter:
a. Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and
crimes against property as defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
b. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, ...
c. Violations of Section 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and Sections 174, 175 and 345 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.

Thus, the judgment of the Court in these cases will after all effectively effectuate what I maintain is
the spirit of the Act, notwithstanding the considerations predicating the main opinion which, with due
respect to my learned brethren in majority, I find it impossible to agree with. And so, I can give my
assent to the judgment in these cases without my having to sacrifice my conviction herein involved,
which I am explaining in this separate opinion. Frankly, I will never be ab le to comprehend why the
majority can give the above provision a construction contrary to what plainly appears to be policy
that underlies it, only for them to just the same "enjoin" all Circuit Criminal Courts "as matter of
policy" (of the Court) that they should not conduct preliminary investigations, which I say the statute,
as matter of policy, never intended to allow them to do anyway.
Not withstanding the scholarly and extended main opinion, I am not persuaded that the legislature
ever intended to confer upon Circuit Criminal Courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations.
Not only the specific words of the above provision, but the development of the law on preliminary
investigations and the circumstances obtaining at the time Republic Act 5179 was enacted point
unmistakably, in my considered opinion, to this conclusion.
There are already two earlier cases in which this Court had to dwell on the extent of the jurisdiction
of the circuit criminal courts. In both of them, the approach was restrict ive. Way back in 1968, in the
case of People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273, the Court was confronted with the question of whether or
not the mere fact that under Section 1 (c) of Republic Act 5179, the organic act of the circuit criminal
courts, mentions violations of Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code to be among the
cases under the jurisdiction of said courts, is enough justification for disregarding the penalty
provided in the Revenue Code of fine of not less than P50 nor more than P200 and imp risonment of
not less than 5 nor more than 30 days when the value of the cigarettes involved does not exceed
P500, which ordinarily would make such violation fall within the original jurisdiction of the City Court
of La Carlota City and considering such violations to be within the jurisdiction of the corresponding
Circuit Criminal Court. The Court, thru Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, resolved the problem this wise:
The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent. not only on the type of
cases but also on the penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case at
bar falls within the exclusive and 'original jurisdiction of the city court, it cannot, even
if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken cognizance of by the
circuit criminal courts the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first
instance in criminal cases where the latter's jurisdiction is original and exclusive (Atp
279.)
Almost four years later, in Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 137, the issue was whether or not a case of
indirect bribery, a crime committed by a public officer included in Section 1(a) of the Act, but
punishable under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor, suspension and public
censure, penalties which are imposable by the city of municipal courts concurrently with the courts of
first instance, may be considered as within the jurisdiction of the, Circuit Criminal Courts. We held
that the fact alone that the crime involved was one committed by a public office r did not suffice to
place the case within the jurisdiction of said courts. Reiterating the predicate of adherence to the
letter of the statute adopted in Parenda supra, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, emphasized the reason therefor
thus:
In fact, the intention of the legislature to bestow unto these special criminal courts
limited jurisdiction is clear not only from the provision of the law itself; it was so stated
that this limited jurisdiction of the circuit courts would enable them to act with
dispatch on the cases cognizable by said tribunals. And, this is precisely the purpose
for which the circuit criminal courts were created to contribute to the speedy
resolution of criminal and help curd the progression of criminality in the country

(Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 388, which became Republic Act No. 5179) (At
142.)
In the cases at bar, it is admitted in the main opinion that because "the primary purpose of the
creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts of First instance, as above
intimated, is to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving serious offenses specified in
Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, ... Circuit Criminal Judges, therefore, should not encumber
themselves with attending to the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints,
which they should refer to the Provincial or City Fiscals, who, in turn can utilize the assistance of the
state prosecutor for the same purpose." What is more, as if to predicate such observations on
actuality and project them in the context of what is happening in the very court of respondent judge,
the main opinion invites attention to the number of pending cases and matters therein which
compelled respondent judge, according to the opinion, to seek from this Court the detail of a
municipal judge to assist him. It further points out that under Section 5(3) Article X of the
Constitution, Criminal Court Judges may be temporarily assigned by the Supreme Court to other
stations, provided that, without the consent of the judges concerned, such assignment may not last
longer than six months. 1 And to these very apt observations, it may be added that unlike in the regular
courts of first instance, in circuit criminal courts "the trial of cases ... once commenced, shall be
continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within thirty days from the time the case
is submitted for decision. (Sec- 6, R.A. 5179).

To my mind, all these considerations were precisely what the Congress had in mind when it enacted
the law creating the circuit criminal courts. As may be seen, all of these considerations point to the
necessity of freeing the said courts from all functions other than "to try and decide" the cases
enumerated in the Act. It is inconceivable that with said considerations in view, Congress could have
meant by omitting mention of preliminary investigations in the statute that it should nevertheless be
construed in the sense of encumbering to borrow the language of the main opinion, the circuit
criminal courts with the burden of "attending to preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints", which the main opinion emphasizes and the legislature must be presumed to have
known can be better performed by the multitudinous other offices in the prosecuti on staff of the
government already referred to above.
It is important to note that the conferment in the Judiciary Act of jurisdiction upon the regular courts
of first instance is worded thus:
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction.
(a) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation;
(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of
forcible entry into and detainer on lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is
conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts;
(c) In all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of property in
controversy, amounts to more than ten thousand pesos; (RA Nos. 2613 & 3828.)
(d) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, irrespective of the value of the
property in controversy or the amount of the demand;

(e) In all matters of probate, both of testate and intestate estates, appointment of
guardians, (See also Section 90, and note thereof trustees and receivers, and in all
actions for annulment of marriage, and in all such special cases and proceedings as
are not otherwise provided for;
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more
than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos;
(g) Over all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippines, on
board a ship or watercraft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippines in
accordance with the laws thereof. The jurisdiction herein conferred may be exercised
by the Court of First Instance in any province into which the ship or watercraft upon
which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the commission thereof:
Provided, That the court first lawfully taking cognizance thereof shall have jurisdiction
of the same to the exclusion of all other courts in the Philippines, and
(h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue writ of
injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in
their respective provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the Rules of Court.
Significantly, unlike Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, this provision does not say that the Courts of
First Instance shall "try and decide" the cases therein enumerated. Rather, it simply says they shall
have original jurisdiction "in" and "over" the respective cases mentioned. In other words, Section 1 of
Republic Act 5179 does not grant the circuit criminal courts jurisdiction "in" or "over" the cases listed,
but, as may be plainly seen in the above- quoted tenor of its pertinent provision, only "the limited
jurisdiction . . . to try and decide" them. To my mind, this difference in phraseology must have been
intentional in order to emphasize the restricted and limited prerogatives of Circ uit Criminal Courts,
not only as to the nature of the cases that can be filed with them but also as to the extent of their
functions and powers relative to said cases.
I maintain that consonant with the need to make of the Circuit Criminal Courts the court s of special
and limited jurisdiction designed to attend with utmost expeditiousness to the cases assigned to
them, as undoubtedly the law intends them to be, Section 1 of the Act should be construed, even in
case of doubt in the sense not only that the jurisdiction of said courts is limited to the cases which
they may take cognizance of, but also in that any other work not strictly part of the functions to "try
and decide" said cases, is not contemplated to be performed by them.
It is a familiar rule that the jurisdiction of a court, may not be deemed granted by mere implication,
unless perhaps in instances when this is indubitably clear. Whenever there is reason to doubt, as in
the case before Us, precisely because of the considerations expounded in the ma in opinion as to
why, as a matter of this Court's policy, at least, the circuit criminal courts should refrain from holding
preliminary investigations, the rule, as I know it, is to deny the existence of power. In this connection,
it should he borne in mind that the power to conduct preliminary investigations has never been
deemed as a mere incidental prerogative of any court. It exist only when duly granted.
It should be noted from the provisions of Section 44 of the Judiciary Act aforequoted that even the
authority of the regular courts of first instance to grant writs of injuction, mandamus certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus, which by their nature could reasonably be deemed
inferable from the grant of general jurisdiction, had still to be granted expressly to said courts, and
only within their respective provinces and districts. And this Court has been very restrictive in
construing this particular grant of jurisdiction. (See Director of forestry vs. Ruiz, L -24882, April

30,1971, 38 SCRA 559, and cases therein cited.) To repeat, such authority would seem to be implicit
from the grant of general jurisdiction, and yet We always insist that it should be specifically
conferred. Now, is there anything in the conduct of preliminary investigat ions that makes it more
inherent or inseparable from the expressed power "to try and decide" that necessarily, We must
consider the same as included in said power or as something that must indispensably be added
thereto, such that the authority therefor need not be spelled out in black and white? Withal, if in the
case of inferior courts, which everyone knows have always conducted preliminary investigations
since the enactment of Act 194 in 1901, the Judiciary Act had to expressly provide for the grant of
such authority to them, what special reason is there why the conferment upon circuit criminal courts
of the faculty to "try and decide" certain types of criminal cases should be deemed as necessarily
including the authority to conduct preliminary investigations related thereto, when according to what
the main opinion emphasizes, such function can be better performed by the prosecution staff of the
government?
The main opinion holds that it "is plain and evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic act,
Republic Act 5179" that circuit criminal courts "have the same powers and functions as those
conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance necessary to effectively exercise (their) special and
limited jurisdiction." But I am afraid this reasoning ignores that "the powers and functions (of) the
regular Courts of First Instance" conferred upon the circuit criminal courts are only those "necessary
(for them) to effectively exercise (their) special and limited jurisdiction", and the issue precisely is
what is the extent of that special and limited jurisdiction. As I have already pointed out, that "special
and limited jurisdiction" is "to try and decide" the cases enumerated, and this power does not have to
be accompanied, whether by logical implication or by the reasons behind the organization of the
courts, by the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. I dare say, in connection with the
provisions of Section 3 of the Act, that the provisions of laws and Rules of Court, if any, granting
jurisdiction to regular courts of first instance to conduct preliminary investigations are inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act, considering that these latter provisions contemplate circuit criminal
courts which should not undertake the functions of conducting preliminary investigations, as found
factually by the main opinion, albeit surprisingly the majority would give weight to such factual finding
only to serve as basis for a policy only of the Court, instead of utilizing the same as premise for the
proper construction of the Act in order that such policy may be legally effectuated, since it is indeed
the policy underlying the law itself. And besides, a careful reading of Section 3 should make it clear
to everyone that its phraseology studiously refers not to all the powers of the judges of the Courts of
First Instance, but only to "the provisions of the laws and the Rules of Court relative to the Judges of
the Courts of First Instance", meaning their qualifications, salaries, transfer etc. and to their powers
and prerogatives in "the trial, and disposition and appeal of criminal cases" in the circuit criminal
courts, which is plainly consistent with the scope of the power granted to them under Section 1 "to
try and decide."
The main opinion quotes from my concurring opinion in People vs. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172,
apparently to show that in my view, "circuit criminal courts are nothing but additional branches of the
regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts". But the portion quoted from my opinion
is not complete. What I said was this:
I take it that under Republic Act 5179, Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but
additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts
with the limited concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of, try and decide only
those cases (enumerated in Section I of the Act. This is readily implied from Section
3 of the Act which says:
SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to
the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and
appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit

judge and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, I adhered closely to the language of the statute and referred to the jurisdiction of the
criminal courts as comprising of the power "to take cognizance of, try and decide" only the cases
therein enumerated. I did not concede that the authority was broadly "over" those cas es, as in
Section 44 of Judiciary. Act, but strictly "to take cognizance of, try and decide" them.
There is another point which is more transcendental. The main opinion assumes the correctness of
the generally prevailing impression that courts of first instance continue to possess the jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigations. It cites the Rules of Court as the source of such authority. For my
part, I am not sure, to put it mildly, that the Supreme Court can arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or
grant any to the lower courts by merely promulgating a rule to such effect. I believe it is safer to hold
that jurisdiction to act on any given matter may be granted only by statute or legislative enactment,
for the simple reason that jurisdiction is substantive and not adjective in nature. And so, the question
in my mind is simply this, assuming arguendo that circuit criminal courts have all the powers of the
regular courts of first instance, which I dispute, is it clear that the latter courts continued to po ssess,
after the Judiciary Act of 1948 went into effect, the power to conduct preliminary investigations? In
other words, are the provisions of the Rules of Court invoked in the main opinion, Section 13 of Rule
112, predicated on any law or statute?
According to former Chief Justice Moran, this section was "taken, with amendments, from Section 4
of former Rule 108, which was a substantial re-statement of the ruling of the Supreme Court in one
case", citing People vs. Solon, supra. (See 4 Moran, Rules of Court, p. 117, 1970 ed.) But Sec. 4 of
Rule 108 was part of the Rules of Court of 1940, when Act 1627 was still in force. Apparently, when
Rule 108 was revised in the 1964 Rules, it was overlooked that under Section 99 of the Judiciary
Act, "all laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act" was repealed thereby wiping
away Section 37 of Act 1627.
No matter how many times one may read the provisions of the whole Judiciary Act of 1948 anti
particularly those that refer to the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, one will never find any
word therein that directly or indirectly confers upon said courts the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. In pointing out this patent omission, I am of course assuming that the jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigations, while sometimes given to courts in spite of its being basically an
executive function per Orendain, 2 is not inherent in every court. For instance, in the Judiciary Act itself,
it can be clearly seen that as in the case of Act 194, seventy-five years ago, by Section 87 of the Act, the
legislature had to expressly vest upon inferior courts the power to conduct such preliminary
investigations. Thus, Section 87 provides in unmistakable terms:

xxx xxx xxx

Said municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct preliminary
investigation for any offense alleged to have been committed within their respective
municipalities and cities which are cognizable by Courts of First Instance and the
information filed with their courts without regard to the limits of punishment, and may
release, or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his
appearance before the proper court.
xxx xxx xxx

If, as the majority maintain, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in all our courts
by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, of what need is there for the provision just quoted? Upon the
other hand, if such conferment is merely confirmatory of an existing constitutionally based authority, I
see no reason at all why there should be such an express confirmation of the power of inferior courts
alone and none at all of that of the Courts of First Instance.
My position is that the silence of the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter, take n
together with the fact that Section 99 of the Act repeals all laws and rules inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, indicates an unmistakable legislative intention to remove from the Courts of
First Instance the prerogative under discussion.
It is argued that to thus argue is to rely on repeal by implication which is not favored. I contend,
however, that such pose overlooks the fact that the Judiciary Act of 1948 is indisputably in the nature
of a codification of all laws existing at tile time of its passage related to the judiciary, the judges, the
courts and their respective jurisdictions. Such being the case, the applicable rule of statutory
construction is that to the effect that when scattered statutes and provisions relative to the same
subject matter ire embodied subsequently in a single comprehensive legislation, any particular
provision not incorporated therein and germane to the main subject matter is deemed to be
repealed. (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, Sec. 2019, pp. 480 -481.) Which is but logical,
as otherwise, of what use is the integration?
The main opinion points to certain legislations subsequent to 1948 which it contends constitute
recognition on the part of Congress of the continued authority of Courts of First Instance to conduct
preliminary investigations, such as, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or Republic Act 6425, and
Republic Act 5180 governing preliminary investigations by fiscals.
As regards Republic Act 5180, the main opinion claims that because Section 1 there of makes
mention of "investigation ... conducted by a Court of -First Instance . . . in accordance with law," said
provision is proof of a legislative assumption that said courts can exercise such power. To start with,
I have never denied that there are instances when by specific provision of the pertinent laws,
preliminary investigations in prosecutions under said laws have to be done by the Courts of First
Instance, such as, in violations of the Election Law, the Anti-Subversion Act, Republic Act 1700 and
the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 44.
But as I see it, if Republic Act 5180 is of any materiality in this discussion, it is in that it makes more
patent that the policy of the law on preliminary investigations is to make them as expeditious as
possible but without depriving the accused of the opportunity to be heard, which is likely to happen in
a preliminary investigation in a Court of First Instance, following Solon 3 and Marcos, 4 unless, of
course, the procedure provided for in Section 13, Rule 112 is followed pursuant to Albano vs. Arranz 5 It
sounds to me rather anachronistic for a law to emphasize the right of an accused to be heard before he is
arrested, while it perpetuates in the same breadth as a general rule a procedure which denies that right.
Besides, why did not Republic Act 5180 which was approved on the same day as Republic Act 5179,
mention preliminary investigations by Circuit Criminal Courts, just as the other later law, Republic Act
6425, cited in the main opinion expressly treated and referred to said courts separately from the Courts of
First Instance and Domestic Relations Courts, if really Congress intended to confer the power in issue on
them?

The reference to Republic Act 6425 is even more revealing of the insistence of the majority to cling
to any drifting straw in their effort to prove their point . Republic Act 6425 originally granted to the
Circuit Criminal Courts exclusively jurisdiction over cases for violation thereof. Of course, it also
contained provisions about preliminary investigations, but these did not in any manner indicate
whether expressly or impliedly that the same courts would have authority to conduct such
investigations. Here is the pertinent provision, before it was amended by Preside ntial Decree No. 44:

SEC. 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Cirminal Court. The Circuit Criminal Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under
this Act.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall he resolved within a
period of seven (7) days from the date of termination of the preliminary investigation.
Where a prima facie case is established, the corresponding information shall be filed
in court within twenty-four (24) hours. Decision on said cases shall be rendered
within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case.
It is to be noted that there is here a requirement that the corresponding information should be filed in
court within 24 hours. Does not this show that the preliminary investigation is not to be conducted by
the court itself? But, as if to make it more patent that it is better that the investigation is undertaken
by another authority, Presidential Decree 44 amended the above provision as follows:
SEC. 39. Jurisdiction. Circuit Criminal Court, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive
cognizance of cases where the offenders are under
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.
Where the preliminary' investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and
a prima facie case is establish, the corresponding information shall be file in court
within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the
preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to
exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecuting officer
within forthy-eigth (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.
Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not later than
ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases
shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submissio n of
the case.
That the foregoing provision does not vest any preliminary investigation authority in any of the courts
mentioned is best proven by the fact that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts have never
conducted any preliminary investigation whether under its original charter or under this provision. I
am not aware that any Court of First Instance has ever done so. The mention of "the preliminary
investigation (being) conducted by a judge" in the above provision contemplates, to my mind, not th e
judges of the courts specified therein, but the proper municipal judges, bearing in mind the
considerations already discussed above relative to the tendency of the every new law to remove
from superior courts the power to conduct preliminary investigatio ns, Indeed, in this connection, it is
to me a mystery how easily my brethren have forgotten that when in another ease the very same
respondent judge here did nothing more than act as the officer before whom the accused swore a
confession which the said accused later on repudiated as having been secured thru violence and
intimidation, We disqualified respondent from trying the case for fear that he might not be able to
maintain "the cold nuetrality of an impartial judge". Quite inconsistently, they now hold that the law in
question allows a judge to conduct the preliminary examination of the witnesses of the prosecution
to issue a warrant of arrest and to subsequently try the main case on the merits, even if the
language of said law in issue is not really clear and the existence of the pretended power is just

being gathered from inference of doubtful logic, while, on the other hand, there is a multitude of
reasons strongly justifying the contrary construction.
In what I consider, with the pardon I hope of my learned colleagues, to be a desperate but vain effort
to provide substantive law basis for Section 13 of Rule 112, the main opinion falls back on of all
things the provision of the Bill of Rights of the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 enjoining that no
warrant (of arrest) "may issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge 6 after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." It is posited
that this constitutional mandate is the ultimate source of the authority of the Courts of First Instance,
assuming the absence of any statutory basis, to conduct preliminary investigation. As I understand it, the
theory is that under the Constitution, warrants of arrests may be issued only by judges (under the 1935
Constitution), and since before doing so, they must examine the complainant and his witnesses under
oath, ergo, judges, and I presume that would mean all judges, are constitutionally vested with jurisdiction
to conduct preliminary examinations, if not investigations. But as I will demonstrate anon I sense some
kind of non sequitur here. At this point , however, I will just make the observation that if it were true that all
judges may conduct preliminary examinations by virtue of the above provision of the B ill of Rights, why
did the majority have to go thru all the trouble of a lengthy and laborious if scholarly, desertation of why
Circuit Criminal Courts have all the powers of the Courts of First Instance to prove that they can like the
latter courts conduct preliminary examinations, when all they had to say is that Circuit Criminal Court
Judges are among the judges the Constitution contemplates. Moreover, if the theory of the majority is to
be pursued to its logical conclusion, then the jurisdiction of judges in the matter in issue cannot but be
exclusive, for the Constitution mentions no other officer who may issue warrants of arrest. But then the
question would arise, from where did our municipal mayors derive their authority under existing rules to
perform such function?

I have carefully perused with deep interest the elaborate statement in the main opinion of the
"historical background of our law on criminal procedure." I regret to state, however, that even after
such a very refreshing intellectual excursion, I still cannot see that such historical background traced
by my scholarly brethren necessarily leads to the conclusion that the power of our courts to conduct
preliminary investigation springs from the Constitution or that after the Judiciary Act of 1 948 repealed
all laws and ruled inconsistent with its provisions, the statutory authority of Courts of First Instance to
conduct preliminary examinations and investigations still continued to exist. Quite to the contrary, my
reading of the history of the law on preliminary investigations in this jurisdiction indicates that this
Court has been consistently holding that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional
right, at least in so far as the so-called second stage thereof is concerned. In Marcos vs. Cruz, 68
Phil. 96, this Court unanimously held: "In this jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation in
criminal cases is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory and the right thereto can be
invoked when so established and granted by law." (at p. 104) According to the same decision, it is
only when there is a statute granting such right and still it is denied to the accused in spite of his
demand therefor that there is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitu tion. More
authoritatively, in my opinion, in Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216, no less than Justice Laurel took
occasion to say: "Viewed in the light of fundamental principles, the right to preliminary investigation
is statutory, not constitutional." (at p. 225.)
Of course, I am not overlooking the fact that seemingly what the main opinion contends to be
constitutionally based is the power of judges to issue warrants of arrest, which corresponds power of
judges to issue warrants of arrest, which corresponds only to the first stage of the prosecution known
as preliminary examination, and for this reason, it is maintained the purported ruling can stand
together with the Marcos and Hashim doctrines which relate to the second stage known as the
preliminary investigation. I do not see it that way.
My understanding of the Bill of Rights provision pertinent to this discussion, which reads thus:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. IV,
1973 Constitution.)
is that is a prohibition against any judge issuing a warrant of arrest without complying with the
requirements set forth therein. In fact, an arrest may even be made without a warrant, and it is only
when a warrant is needed that the judge who is issue the same is constitutionally bound to adhere to
the conditions therein laid down. Literally, the provision does not refer to all judges, but only to "the
judge" who will issue the warrant and that to me is presumably only the judge who by statute is
authorized to act in the premises. In fine, the Constitution does not vest upon just any judge, much
less upon all judges, jurisdiction to issue warrants of arrests; it merely limits and lays down
conditions before any judge authorized law to issue warrants may do so. In like manner, it cannot be
argued that because Section 4 (1) of the Bill of Rights provides that privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, just any court in the
Philippines, even a municipal court can grant such authority or that b ecause the liberty of abode and
of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, according to Section 5, also of
the Bill, it follows that all courts in the Philippines may act in the premises, regardless of the
definition and allocation of jurisdiction by the National Assembly or the legislature, who, after all is
constitutionally endowed with authority to precisely make such allocation. (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973
Constitution.) Indeed, this provision which reads thus:
SECTION 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law. The National Assembly shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section five hereof.
readily connotes that except in the case of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is not the
Constitution but the statutes that are the sources of the jurisdiction of all the vario us courts of the
country.
Moreover, to my mind, the development of the law on preliminary investigations in this jurisdiction
evinces a clear tendency not only to give the accused in all such investigations the opportunity to be
present, to cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution and to present his own evidence, until
lately when the right to cross-examine was eliminated by Presidential Decree 77 as amended by
Presidential Decree 911, but also (2) to transfer the function of conducting preliminary in vestigations,
sans the power to issue warrants of arrest, to prosecuting officers belonging to the Executive
Department to which the retrogative to prosecute or not to prosecute properly belongs in the
exercise of the President's duty to see to it that the laws are properly executed (Estrella vs.
Orendain, 37 SCRA 640.) Of course, in special cases wherein it is required by what in the
legislature's judgment is the public interest, the particular statute concerned expressly provides that
the preliminary investigation be conducted by the Court of First Instance, such as, in cases of
violation of Election Code and cases of violations of the Anti-Subversion Law (Act 1700). Indeed,
with the broad control given to the Secretary of Justice over crime prosecution by Presidential
Decree 911, not to mention Our own ruling in Estrella recognizing his power of supervision and
control over fiscals, as long as the case has not passed to the jurisdiction of the court, it does not
sound realistic and in keeping with the trend of recent developments in the pertinent laws to further
allow prosecutions to be initiated in the Courts of First Instance. 7

At this juncture, I would like to address myself to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Fernando, whose specialization in matters of constitutional law has won recognition not only for him
but also for our country from no less than the organizers of the constitutional aspect of the
bicentennial celebration of the American. I do not mind saying that whenever I want to be
comprehensive in my study of constitutional issues, I always find his views illuminating. But on the
point now in controversy, I find it difficult to see his point. Thus, he particularly underlines his
conformity to the ruling in the main opinion that the 1935 as well as the 1973 Constitution "provide
the source of the power of all Judges, including Judges of the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, and other courts of equivalent rank to determine probable cause before the
issuance of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to
the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government
prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information," not withou t hastening to clarify, however,
that "it is (his) understanding. . . that the decision reached is at most an affirmation that the present
Constitution, as did the 1935 Constitution, confers the power to conduct (the) preliminary
examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest, to a circuit criminal court judge" and that "it is
only the first stage in the criminal process that may lead to the apprehension of the accused that has
been passed upon by the Court", such that as to the judges' competence r egarding a preliminary
investigation," or "the second stage, (the) preliminary investigation proper," "that question has been
left open."
Of course, that such specifically was what the members of the Court were made to understand
during the deliberations by the distinguished writer of the main opinion is clear and distinct in my
recollection. As a matter of fact, for a moment I entertained earnestly the thought that I could
probably join my brethren in the formulation of such a ruling. I had in mind then Mr . Justice
Fernando's pose in his book on the Bill of Rights (1970 Edition) that the significance of entrusting the
responsibility of determining the existence of probable cause exclusively to judiciary (under the 1935
Constitution) in the defense of freedom cannot be overestimated. (p. 177 ) But after trying very hard
to see it his very I have to confess, I have arrived at the conclusion that such a proposition cannot
stand close scrutiny, if only because even if none but judges may issue warrants of arrest , it is not
indispensable that all judges be vested with such power so it is really up to the legislature to
determine which court or judge should be endowed with it.
My knowledge, if limited, of the origin of the competence of judges to issue warrants of arrest is to
the effect that it is a prerogative that antedates both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. It was in
fact recognized by the American military occupation authorities from the very inception of their rule
over the Philippine Islands in 1901, as evidenced by General Orders No. 58, our first code of
criminal procedure of American Surely, such military order cannot in any sense be deemed to be a
mandate of constitutional stature. No doubt, Section 13 of Rule 112 appears to be a mere reiteration
if with substantial modifications, of similar provision of General Orders No. 58 and Section 37 of Act
1627, but I regret I cannot accept the hypothesis emphasized in the main opinion that because said
provision of the rules is supposed to be an implementations of the Bill of Rights provision against
unreasonable searches and seizures, We must perforce conclude that the Bill of Rights is the source
of the jurisdiction of the judges to act in the manner provided in said rule. There can be no dispute
about the imperative need to make the safeguards against unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures as air tight as possible, but it is equally undeniable that giving the power to determine the
existence of probable cause exclusively to judges is not the only guara ntee that can ensure that
same as being conducive to a more efficient system of prosecution of offenses. (See Hashim vs.
Boncan, supra.) What is more, the 1973 Constitution has given the practice explicit constitutional
basis by providing that probable cause may also be determined by "such other responsible officer
(not necessarily a judge) as may be authorized by law."
More than ever before, I now hold that the Bill of Rights provision under discussion has not been
designed to confer the power to determine probable cause to every judge in the courts of the

Philippines; rather said provision lays down the conditions and limitations which the particular judges
authorized by law to perform such functions must observe. I feel I am supported in this view by the
following excerpts from the records of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 containing the apt
observation of no less than Senator Vicente J. Francisco and Justice Jose P. Laurel.
EL PRESIDENTE. Tiene la palabra el Delgado por Cavite.
EL SR. FRANCISCO RAZONA SU EN MIENDA
SR FRANCISCO. Seor Presidente y Caballeros de la Convencion: bajo el proyecto
del Comite de 7, se puede expedir mandamientos de registro, con tal de que la
peticion vaya acompaada de un affidavit en el que aparezcan hechos y
circunstancias que demuestren causas probales. Bajo mi en mienda, un juez puede
expedir un mandamiento de registro sino solo despues de haber examinado al
denunciate y a sus testigos bajo juranmento. Parace serque la diferencia es grande.
El texto en ingles del projecto dice.
... and no warrants shall issue by upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.'
Esta expresion ha sido interpretada por los tribunales de America en el sentido de
que el juez tiene dos medios: o puede tomar en cuenta para la expedicion de un
mandamiento de registro un affidaviten el que consten hechos y demuestren la
causa probable, o mediante examen del denuciante. Someto a la consideration de
esta Asamblea que es completamente. peligroso permiter que un juez expida
mandamiento de registro, atendiendose excluevanmente a lo que consta en
un affidavit. Esta Idea de que se puede expedir mandamiento de registro meiante
affidavit, o sea, solamante mediante un documento jurado en el que aparezcan
hechos probables, no ha sido aceptada por la orden genera Num. 58. Esta
disposicion que aparece en el proyecto de Comite de 7 que es una reproduccion o
copia de precepto que aparece en el bill de Filipinas y luego en la Ley Jones,
aparece reproducida, como ya he dicho, en la Orden General Num. 58, como
articulo 27. Este articulo 27, dice lo siguiente: "No se expedirapeticion apoyada por
juramento." Como ya he dicho, "peticion apoyada por jurament" puede ser testi monio
del testigo o affidavit. Considerandose, sin embargo, que estos es verdaderamente
peligroso para el derecho que tiene un individuo a la seguridad de sus bienes y
papeles, nuestro mismo Codigo de Procedimiento Civil inserta en su Articulo 28 una
disposicion que exige como requisito "sine quanon" el que el Juez no pueda expedir
mandamiento de registro sino mediante el examen de testigos, especialmente del
denunciatne. Este articulo viene a ser el Articulo 28 del Codigo de Procedimiento
Civil que dice lo siguiente: "ElJuez de Primera Instancia o el Juez de paz debera,
antes de expedir el mandamiento, examinara bajo juramento al denunciante o al
testigo presente, consignando dus declaraciones por escrito." De modo que mi
enmienda es a tenor o en consonancia con esta disposicion legal. Como ya he
dicho, si mantuvieramos el precepto del proyecto de constitucion, esta disposicoin
de la Orden General Num. 58 podra en cierto modo ser contradictoria al procepto del
proyecto de constitucion en la forma como esta el precepto, cuya enmienda pido, y
si encontrara una discrepancia susstancial entre dicho precepto y el si encontrara
una discrepancia sustancial entre dicho precepto y el Codigo de Procedimiento Civil,
creo queo este ultimo tendria que guedarse derogado, o al menos no puede
mantenerse este precepto por anti-consitutcional. Pero yo creo que ninguno de los

miembros de esta Asamblea ver que mi enmienda no responde a una razon

fundamental y a una necesidad que se ha sentido en la practica. Los abogados que
estamos en el ejercicio de la profesion hemos visto muchas veces casos en que
agentes secretos consiguen mandamientos de registro solamente mediante la
presentacion de un affidavit que reune los requisitos de la ley. Pero que expedido el
registro e impugnados despues los terminos del affidavit se descubre que los behcos
que aparecen en el mismo son completamente falsos. De ahi que si queremos
salvaguardar en todo lo posible el derecho de del individuo a la seguridad de sus
bienes o papeles este rodeado de todas las garantias que puedan impedir o que
impidan la expedicion de registros inmotivados o imnfaundados que pueden dar
lugar a molestias o vejaciones enjustas a irreparables, creo que debemos hacer que
en nuestra constitucion se consigne el precepto tal como yo propongo que se
enmienda. (Pp. 750-752, Vol. III.)
EL PRESIDENTE. El Delegado por Batanga (Seor Laurel) acepta la enmienda?
SR. LAUREL. No seno Presidente, y quisiera decir dos palbras.
MR. LAUREL. Mr President and Gentlemen of the Convention: The ano malies
pointed out by the Honorable gentleman from Cavite, Mr. Francisco, if they ever
occur at the present time, it si because of the irregularities committed by some
justices. The amendment introduced by the distinguished Delegate from Cavite is
already covered by existing legislation, and if those irregularities pointed out by him
really occured, it is because some justices have not enforec and adhered to the
specific provision of the General Order. the General Order, or the Code of Criminal
Procedure, now provides that the judge, before issuing a search warrant, must
exsamine the complainant and his witnesses and that he must take their depositions
in writing. The reasons why we are in favor o fthis amendment is because we are
incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before
a judge could issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine
personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness, the withnesses that
he may produce. It is not necessary for me to recall here one of the grievances of the
early settlers in America which was one of the causes of the revolution against the
mother country, England; the issuing of the so-called general search warrant. It is,
therefore, quite important that we impose this obligation upon the judge, so that he
will not be issuing search warrant in blank, or simply accompanied by affidavitsm, but
that he must consider the sanctity of the home. It is necessary thta we surrond that
power with the necessary constitutional guaranty. You might say that as this
amendment is already in the general legislation, what is the necessity of
incorporating this in the constitution. The necessity consist in that the constitution is
something permanent for the protection of the rather than general legislation in this
constitution that we shall adopt. For this reason, the committee accepts and
approves of the amendment as suggested by Delegate Francisco. (Pp 757 -785, Vol
III.)
And so, since there is neither any constitutional provision nor statute that presently confers on
Judges of the Courts of First Instance the power to conduct preliminary examinations, and the trend
of our laws is to leave such function to other responsible officers, except the very act of issuing the
warrant of arrest, I have no alternative by to deny to Circuit Criminal Courts such power.
I cannot close this separate opinion without inviting attention to certain specific points of procedure
which the main opinion seems not to have bothered to pass upon, notwit hstanding what I consider to

be their importance . In G.R. No. L34038, I notice that respondent judge conducted a preliminary
investigation on the basis of nothing more than a letter -complaint of the petitioner Collector of
Customs. It is not stated whether or not it was in due form or under oath. Whil as Mr. Justice
Fernando stresses, this decision recognizes only the power of respondent judge to conduct the first
stage or the preliminary examination, in G.R. No. L-34038, L-34243, L-39525 and L-40031, what are
actually involved are preliminary investigations, both the first and second stages. It is only in G.R.
Nos. L-36376 and L-38688 that respondent judge has not been able to conduct even the dispositive
portion of Our judgment is to be understood, Court, as attested to by Mr. Justice Fernando, reaches
only preliminary examinatins and not preliminary investigations, in order precisely to avoid having to
overrule Hashim vs. Boncan and Marcos vs. Cruz, which I understand some members of the Court
are not ready to do.
Regarding G.R. No. L-34038, I agree that respondent judge executed his authority in providing that
his order of dismissal is with predice and in ordering the return of the article seized by the customs
authorities to his co-respondent Makapugay. Of coused anyway , in legal contemplation the
qualification "with prejudice" thus made by respondent judge means nothing. In no way can it have
the effect of jeopardy, since what was conducted by him was only a preliminary investigation, which
in my opinion is unauthorized and void. And assuming it to be valid there would be no need of
setting aside the order of dismissal itself; it is enough to say that it is a dismissal before arraignment
and jeopardy has not thereby attached, the express qualification th erein of "with prejudice"
notwithstanding.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to grant the petitions in G.R. No. L -34038 insofar as the
respondent judge's impugned order of July 6, 1971 orders the return of the articles seized to his co respondent Makapugay and insofar as G.R. Nos. L-34243, L-36376, L-39525, L-38688 and L-40021
are concerned, I am giving my concurrence to the judgment therein subject to the qualifications I
have discussed in this separate opinion.
Footnotes

Fernando , J., concurring:

1 Opinion, 1(36).
2 18 Phil. 122.
3 Ibid, 147. The United States v. ' Grant decision was cited with approval in United
States v. Laban 21 Phil. 297 (1912); United States v. Carlos, 21 Phil: 553 (1911);
United States v. Go Chanco, 23 Phil. 641 (1912); United States v. Ipil, 27 Phil. 530
(1914); United States v. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918); United States v. Alabot, 38
Phil. 698 (1918); Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920); People v. Solon, 47
Phil. 443 (1925); People v. Villegas, 55 Phil. 567 (1931); Peo ple v. Carigan,'61 Phil.
416 (1935); People v. Castillo 76 Phil. 72 (1946); People v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 265
(1946); People v. Zapanta, 79 Phil. 308 (1947); Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 80
Phil. 859 (1948); Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640 (1948); Lozada v. Hernandez, 92
Phil. 1051 (1953); Rodriguez v. Arellano, 96 Phil. 954 (1955); Santos, Jr. v. Flores,
L18251, Aug. 31,1962,5 SCRA 1136; Molinyawe v. Flores, I,18256, Aug. 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 1137; People v. Figueroa, L- 24273, April 30, 1969, 27 SCRA 1239; Sausi v.
Querubin, L- 24122, Jan. 29, 1975, 62 SCRA 154.
4 Republic Act No. 5179 (1967).

5 Opinion, V.
6 L-34756-59, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29.
Barredo, J., concurring:
1 Under Section 7 of Republic Act 5179, itself the Secretary of Justice, (now t he
Supreme Court) could make Circuit Criminal Court Judges hold sessions and try
cases pertaining to other districts for a period of not more than three months.
2 Estrella v. Orendain, G.R. No. L-19611, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 640.
3 People vs. Solon, 47 Phil. 443.
4 Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96.
5 15 SCRA 518.
6 In the 1973 Constitution includes "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law." (Sec. 3. Article IV).
7 In Albano vs. Arranz, supra, the Supreme Court held, withour delving into the
question of whether or not the power of Courts of First Instance to conduct
preliminary investigation has been eliminated in the Judiciary Act of 1948, that under
Section 13 of Rule 112, the Courts of First Instance have to give the accused a
chance to be heard before issuing a warrant of arrest. Even then, the question of the
repeal of Act 1627 was not raised in this case.

G.R. No. L-29218 October 29, 1976

JOSE T. VIDUYA, as collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BERDIAGO alias EDUARDO BERTIAGO; and HON. ANDRES REYES, as Presiding
Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, respondents.
Solicitor, General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

An order of the lower court quashing a search warrant issued at the instance of petitioner Jose T.
Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila, to gain custody of a seized vehicle pursuant to a
warrant of seizure and detention against private respondent Eduardo Berdiago 1 was assailed in this
certiorari and mandamus proceeding with a prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction. 2 The
invocation by the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of this Court, Antonio P. Barredo, of
the controlling force of Papa v. Mago 3 and the persuasive character attached to the ruling of an
American leading decision, Carroll v. United States, 4 clearly indicative of the tenuous nature of the
claim of private respondent that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, 5 led to a resolution by the Court of July 12, 1968, requiring that
respondents answer the petition and issuing the preliminary mandatory injunction sought requiring
respondent Berdiago "to deliver the custody and possession of said car to respondent court; and
furthermore requiring respondent court to take possession and custody of the said Rolls Royce car
from respondent Berdiago or from whomsoever has possession and custody thereof and let
petitioner to take delivery and custody thereof; ... ." 6 The stress, and quite understandably, in the
extensively-researched answer filed on behalf of respondents by their able counsel, former
Ambassador Amelito R. Mutuc, was on the primacy of the immunity the Constitution guarantees
against an unreasonable search and seizure. More specifically, it was contended with vigor and
plausibility that respondent Judge quashed the search warrant on showing of lack of probable cause,
a requirement not only of the Constitution but of the Rules of Court 7 and the Tariff and Customs
Code. 8 While no objection could validly be raised against such a proposition, it cannot apply to this
controversy. It is undoubted that prior to the issuance of a search warrant, there was a previous
discovery of the failure to pay the correct amount of customs duties. That was probable cause
enough. It let to the institution of a seizure and forefeiture proceeding. Moreover, the law has always
looked with disfavor on attempts at nonpayment or underpayment of customs duties. It is essential
that no undue obstacle be placed on intensive efforts to assure the collection of what is properly due
the government. The Mago decision was thus merely a reflection of what has long been the settled
doctrine on the matter in the Philippines. It is futile to assert then, considering the circumstances to
be more specifically referred to, that the requirement of lack of probable cause was not met. We find
for petitioner.
The petition includes as one of its Annexes the warrant of seizure and detention. 9 It was issued on
the basis of reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by respondent Berdiago in
securing the release from the Bureau of Customs of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966, 2 door, Hardto p
with Motor No. CRX 1379, which arrived in the Port of Manila on January 8, 1968 on board the
vessel, Jose Abad Santos, it being made to appear that such car was a 1961 model instead of a
1966 one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much lower customs duty in the amount of P3,255.00,
when the correct amount due was P219,783.00. 10 There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the
payment of the sum to cover the deficiency, respondent manifesting his willingness to do so but
failing to live up to his promise contained in a letter of April 24, 1968, leading to Seizure Identification
Case No. 10941 against the car. 11 As it was kept in a dwelling house at the Yabut Compound,
Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, two officials of the Customs Police Service as duly
authorized agents of petitioner, applied to respondent Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling
house and to seize the Rolls Royce car found therein, pursuant to Section 2209 of the Tariff and
Customs Code; he issued the search warrant on May 30, 1968. 12 Thereafter, on June 3, 1968,
there was an urgent motion to quash the same by respondent Berdiago. 13 Then, on June 6, 1968,
an opposition to said motion to quash was filed by petitioner, based on the allegation of a violation of
Section 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 14 It was moreover pointed out that respondent
Berdiago could not rely on the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure because
it was not shown that he owned the dwelling house which was searched. 15 Nonetheless,
respondent Judge in the challenged order quashed such search warrant. 16 Hence this petition.
To repeat, the plea of petitioner must be heeded. A case of a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge when he quashed the search warrant had been shown. What lessens the gravity

of such lapse from controlling doctrines was the commendable attitude displayed in stressing the
worth of a constitutional right. Where attempts at evasion of payment of customs duties are
concerned, however, this Court has not been indisposed to he as receptive to claims of its violation,
especially where they rest on no substantial basis.
1. In the leading case of Papa v. Mago, 17 with Justice Zaldivar as ponente, there is this
pronouncement, which he aptly noted by the then Solicitor-General Barredo, calls for application:
"The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and
collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in question
were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry." As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port
of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties,
taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. The record shows, ... that the duties, taxes and other
charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been
assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the
"compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory, shows that
the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. ...
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture .... And this
Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to
forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture." 18
2. Nor did Mago announce a novel doctrine. It is merely a recognition of the state power to assure
that fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers would be doomed to failure. That same year in
1968, in Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs, 19 the opinion stressed in rather emphatic language
why it must be thus: "The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if
not to do away entirely, with the evil and corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would be
frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by respondent Commissioner of Customs in this case,
as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside and this appeal from the decision of
the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the controlling principles of law do not call for a contrary
conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the legitimate authority vested in the government were not to be
reduced to futility and impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times has
assumed epidemic proportions." 20 Moreover, as far back as 1920, in Uy Kheytin v.
Villareal, 21 there was the explicit affirmation of the principle that "dutiable articles on which the
duties have not been paid" belong to a different category from the search and seizure "of a man's
private papers" as they "rightfully belong to the custody of the law." 22
3. There is this clarification of the matter in the opinion of Justice Zaldivar in Mago "Petitioner Martin
Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant
issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the
instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft
and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibit ed article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said 'dwelling house may
be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace ... .' It is our
considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search

warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. " 23 There is justification then for the insistence on the
part of private respondent that probable cause be shown. 24 So respondent Judge found in issuing
the search warrant. Apparently he was persuaded to quash it when he noted that the warrant for
seizure and detention came later than its issuance. In thus acting, respondent Judge apparently
overlooked that long before the search warrant was applied for, to be specific on April 15, 1968, the
misdeclaration and underpayment was already noted and that thereafter on April 24, 1968, private
respondent himself agreed to make good the further amount due but not in the sum
demanded. 25 As the car was kept in a dwelling house in Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police Service 26 applied for and was
able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move on the part of petitioner, the duties
expressly enjoined on him by law noted in the Mago opinion namely t o assess and collect all lawful
revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds, and to enforce tariff and customs
law would not have been performed. While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure
and detention came later, on July 5, 1968 to be exact, than the search warrant, which was issued on
May 30, 1968, there were indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for its issuance. Certainly
there was probable cause as defined in United States v. Addison, 27 Identifying it with "such
reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his
action, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper." 28 There was evidently
need for the issuance of a search warrant. It ought not to have been thereafter quashed.
4. That is about all, except for a reference in the petition to an excerpt from Carroll v. United
States, 29 tracing such an approach to the landmark Boyd decision cited in Uy Kheytin. It was
emphasized therein in the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that what was said by Justice Bradley in
Boyd stated the doctrine that had gained approval and acceptance. It was summarized thus: "The
seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of go ods forfeited for a
breach of the revenue laws or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized
by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our
own revenue acts from the commencement of the government." 30 It is not for this Court to do less
than it can to implement and enforce the mandates of the customs and revenues laws. The evils
associated with tax evasion must be stamped out without any disregard, it is to be affirmed, of
any constitutional right. The facts, appreciated in their true light, fail to show that the issuance of the
search warrant contravened the immunity against unreasonable search and seizure. Its being
quashed then amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of June 20, 1968 of respondent Judge
denying the petition for custody of the car by petitioner and quashing the search warrant nullified and
set aside. The writ of preliminary mandatory injuction issued by this Court is maintained in full force
and effect, the custody and possession of the Rolls Royce car, model 1966, 2 door Hardtop with
Motor No. CRX 1379 to remain in the custody of the Customs authorities until the termination
according to law of the seizure and forfeiture proceeding. Costs against private respondent.
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 The caption of the petition stated that such a name is an alias for Eduardo
Bertiago. The other respondent is the then Judge Andres Reyes of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

2 Pars. II, IV, IX, Annex K.

3 L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857.
4 267 US 132 (1925).
5 According to Article III, section 1, par. 3 of the 1935 Constitution then enforced:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not he violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." Under the present Constitution, Article IV, section 3, this provision has been
expressly modified to include a warrant of arrest. Also, now for the issuance of
warrant, not only a judge but also "such other responsible officer may be authorized
by law."
6 Petition, 15.
7 Rule 126, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: "Requisites for issuing search
warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
thingss to be seized. No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
8 Section 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code, Rep. Act No. 1937 reads: "Search of
Dwelling House. A dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace, upon sworn application showing
probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and person or
thing to he seized."
9 Petition, Annex C of the Petition reads: "[Greetings:] [Whereas], the above described article is subject to forfeiture for having been imported in violation of
2530(m) 3, 4 and 5 of the Tariff and Customs Code. [Whereas,] the said articles are
at present in the custody of Eduardo Berdiago alias Eduardo Bertiago, with given
address at 70 Estrella St., Bel-Aire Village, Makati, Rizal. [Wherefore] by virtue of the
authority vested in me by law, and in compliance with Finance Department Ordr No.
96-67 as published in Customs Memorandum Circular No. 133-67 dated July 25,
1967, you are hereby ordered to forthwith seize the aformentioned articles and detain
them under your custody pending termination of the seizure proceedings thereof
and/or until further orders. [So Order.]"
10 Ibid, par. II.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, par. III.
13 Ibid, par. IV.

14 Ibid, par. VI.

15 Ibid. par. VII.
16 Ibid, Annex K.
17 L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857.
18 Ibid, 865-867. In support of the view that seizure and forfeiture proceedings lie:
Pascual v. Commissioner of Customs, 105 Phil. 1039 (1959) and De Joya v. Lantin,
L- 24037, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 893.
19 L-24170, December 16, 1968, 26 SCRA 382.
20 Ibid, 385.
21 42 Phil. 886.
22 Ibid, 899 citing Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886).
23 22 SCRA 857, 871-872.
24 Cf. Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33 (1937); People v. Sy Juco, 64
Phil. 667 (1937); Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil, 230 (1937); Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 (1938); Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda 70 Phil. 141 (1940); Cruz v.
Dinglasan, 83 Phil. 333 (1949); People v. De la Pea, 97 Phil. 669 (1955); Oca v.
Marquez, L-20749, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 735; Stonehill v. Diokno, L-19550, June
19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383; Bache and Co. v. Ruiz, L-32409, Feb. 27, 1971, 37 SCRA
823; Asian Surety & Insurance Co. v. Herrera, L-25232, Dec. 20, 1973, 54 SCRA
312; Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, L-25434, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 336; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, L-22554, Aug. 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299; Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, L27968, Dec. 3, 1975, 68 SCRA 320.
25 Petition, par II and Answer II, 2nd paragraph.
26 Major Enricus Figueroa and Lieutenant Colonel Osmundo Victoriano.
27 28 Phil.566(1914).
28 Ibid, 570.
29 267 US 132 (1925). Board, as previously noted, was an 1886 American Supreme
court decision reported in 116 US 616.
30 Ibid, 149-150.

Dizon v Castro

G.R. No. L-23051

October 20, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose
Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252
of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to four months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor,
with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errors assigned by counsel for the accused as
appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the
illegality of the John Doe search warrant.
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the
House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more
than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad,
had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo
of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge
Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a
little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises
closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a
telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke
in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of
them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed
him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and
not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso
was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils,
Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was
consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on
searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.

At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso on ly
to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another
part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of
Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper,
of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again
refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for
the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three
policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.
1awph! l. net

In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling.
All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole
exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reache d the
appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )
The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the Honorable
Vicente Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these findings, except
that he stresses certain points as more favorable to the case of his client. The defense, as previously
indicated, is planted squarely on the contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the
search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist
the police by force. The nature of this defense makes it advisable to set forth further facts, relating
particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.
There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and
the search warrant. The application reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.
APPLICATION FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

(G)

Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduo, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.

Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47
Revellin, detective.
Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W. C.,
City of Manila? A. Yes. sir.
Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? A. I do not know. According to the
best of my information the house is occupied by John Doe.

Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? A. It has been
reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that in said premises there
are instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips,
lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It has been
reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are or there will
be gambling conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premises are known as
gambling house. I have watched the foregoing premises and believed it to be a
gambling house and a place where instruments and devices used in gambling
games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in
prohibited games are kept.
I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing
questions and answers and that I find the same to correct and true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.)

L. GARDUO

Judge, Municipal Court

The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search warrant
alone. This document reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DOE, Defendant.
SEARCH WARRANT

(G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the

Police Force of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he h as
good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the
building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building numbered
124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in
violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs
and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly known as monte and that the
said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects with the illegal and criminal
intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten
(10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the
house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest of the
above described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part thereof, you are
commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.
Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.)
L. GARDUO
Judge, Municipal Court
Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and the
person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the right to be secured against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that no warrant shall i ssue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although
naturally entering more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a search warrant
shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to b e seized." (Section 97.) After the
judge or justice shall have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce,
and shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98), and after the judge or justice is
satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable
cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant which must be substantially in the
following form:
. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of
............................, or in the house situated ...................................... (describing it or any other
place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the case may be) for the following
property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with a crime may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the crime. (Section 105).
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constit utional and statutory
provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for
there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to
the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however,
going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to b e invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.;
Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72
Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.)
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are
material differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe
search warrants we propose to take into consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant,
thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of
the issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.

In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the d efense quoted from Wharton's
Criminal Procedure. In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is
found the following:
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .
xxx

xxx

xx x

Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and
where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will
enable the officer to identify him when found.
xxx

xxx

xx x

Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be
apprehended is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as
will enable the officer to identify the accused.
xxx

xxx

xx x

John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the
essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about
blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is
unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in
unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended,
and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in
addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or
persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the
proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his
personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any
other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other
hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such
circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.
The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States
Supreme Court, is the case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there
appeared that one Peaslee had made a complaint to the police court Lee, charging that "John Doe
or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown," had committed an
assault and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was issued against "John Doe or
Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown, named in the foregoing
complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or means of
identification of the person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant
was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:
We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one of
the defendant at the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not contain
the name of the defendant, nor any description or designation by which he could be known
and identified as the person against whom it was issued. It was in effect a general warrant,
upon which any other individual might as well have been arrested, as being included in the
description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to elementary principles,

and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of
Rights, article 14, which declares that every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that all warrants, therefore, are
contrary to this right, if the order in the warrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more
suspected persons or to seize their property be not accompan ied with a special designation
of the persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure. This is in fact only a declaration of an
ancient common law right. It was always necessary to express the name or give some
description of a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in
blank, and without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C.
577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312. 7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow.,
332, and cases cited.)
This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party
whose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be
arrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is
to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place
of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can be identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law,
39, 40.)
The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person
on whom he attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The
defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to resist by force, using no more than was
necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . . .
The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in
question, if they were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an
unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be
convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law, constitutional
and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly"
describe the person to be seized. A failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the
search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process must be legal. Illegal official action may be
forcibly resisted.
For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney -General, and as the
law was summarized by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection brings
forth certain points of paramount force and exercising a decisive influence. We will now make
mention of them by correlating the facts and the law.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the
building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands."
This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing
rule that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. (Steele vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme
Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officers were accordingly
authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the so -called
Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged
in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been
held that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime,
or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or

which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi
[1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search
warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be
seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his
possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building
numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used
in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic
Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus,
and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by
the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party
is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the
officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper
person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had
gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 12 4 Calle Arzobispo,
City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club
purposes. It was not the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully
protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged
club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but intended for nefarious
practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would commonly be varying
occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to the
police.
It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his
dwelling, a man has a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, an d much less
so in a club or public place, the person sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no more
force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the officers. To authorize resistance to the agents
of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a
proper case for protest. There was no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of
a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42
Phil., 230; 3 Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently
identified therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or
information, permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the
true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the argument that the police were authorized to arrest
without a warrant since a crime was being committed. We find it unnecessary to comment on this
contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it
is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult
enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far
fetched judicial interference.

We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the
search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.
The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member
of the House of Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the
facts as an aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We do ubt,
however, that advantage was taken by the offender of his public position when he resisted the
officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his office as a
means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted
the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls
within the medium of that provided by the Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with t he findings of facts as made by the
trial judge, and concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results
that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the
defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and one day imprisonment, arresto
mayor, with the costs of this instance against him. Let the corresponding order to carry this judgment
into effect issue.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Villa-Real, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
1

Promulgated October 17, 1924, not reported.

G.R. No. 141176

May 27, 2004

ELI LUI and LEO ROJAS, petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES EULOGIO and PAULINA MATILLANO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44768 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del
Sur, Branch 21.2
The Antecedents

Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt, his fathers
older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao del Sur. On May 2,
1988, Lariosawas employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a
monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao and was located
at the corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to close the
store during lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself opened the store in the
mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another store owned by Kiaos son, Eli
Lui, who also happened to be Bens nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and Kiao employed Maximo
Pagsa and Rene Malang.
Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his employer every morning
before going to work and in the afternoon, in exchange for free meals and lodging. There were
occasions when Lariosa stayed in the house of Pagsa and Malang and left some of his things with
them. Lariosa deposited his savings with the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan.
On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the
house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Ban salan City, where he
rested until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on October
19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for
the month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the Department of Labor.
Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his things from Kiaos house.
On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his backwages from
Ben in the amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the Mindanao Savings Bank in
Bansalan City and on November 1, 1988, applied for a job at his cousins place, at Quimpo
Boulevard, Davao City. He bought a radio cassette for P2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses
for P900.00.
On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at New Matina, Davao City,
but returned to Bansalan on the same day. On November 4, 1988, he returned to Nancys house
and stayed there until the next day, November 5, 1988.
That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben
reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein
he alleged that after Lariosas employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that
he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a
former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.
At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to
retrieve his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, and when Lariosa agreed,
they borrowed Luis Ford Fierra for their transportation. The vehicle stopp ed at the Almendras Hall
where Pagsa alighted on the pretext that he was going to buy fish. Lariosa, Rene, and his wife
remained in the Fierra. Pagsa contacted Lui and informed the latter that Lariosa was with him.
After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle. With him were Pagsa and two others, Alan
Mendoza and Henry Tan. Lui told Lariosa that he wanted to talk, and asked the latter to go with him.
Pagsa urged Lariosa to go along with Lui. Lariosa agreed and boarded Luis vehicle. The car
stopped in front of Luis house, where the latter alighted and went inside, while his companions and
Lariosa remained in the car. When Lui returned, he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked
Lariosa with the weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be killed. The group
went to Bens house to get the keys to the store. Ben joined them as they drove towards the store.

Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Bens money. Lariosa
refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face into
the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to
anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Dava o City.
Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF -A-004-88 dated
November 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City from
12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m." Rojas was directed to coordinate with the n earest PNP headquarters and/or
stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station on
board a police car and proceeded to the corner of Magsaysay and Gempesaw Streets.
In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of them
handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of the keys. As
Lariosa opened the lock as ordered, one of Luis companions took his picture. Another picture was
taken as Lariosa held the door knob to open the door. Lariosa was then boarded in the police car
and brought to the corner of Magsaysay and Gemphesaw Streets where he was transferred to the
police car driven by Rojas. He was brought to the Metrodiscom headquarters. Lui once more mauled
Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to confess that he stole P45,000.00 from his uncle and to reveal
what he did with the money. When a policeman asked him where he slept the night before, Lariosa
replied that he spent the night in the house of his girlfriends parents at New Matina, Davao City. The
policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Nancy if Lariosa had left anything while he slept
thereat. Nancy replied that Lariosa had left a radio cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The policemen
took these and brought Lariosa back to the Metrodiscom headquarters where Lui and his two
companions were waiting.
Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied that he used to
stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan.
Rojas and Lui then brought Lariosa, with his hands still handcuffed, to a car. Luis companions, Alan
Mendoza and Henry Tan boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence.
Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian clothes, Lui, Tan and
Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed
Lariosa in tow. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the
house. They then proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosas aunt, Paulina Matillano. In the
adjacent room were Julieta, Lariosas sister, Paulinas daughter -in-law, Virginia, the latters sister,
Erlinda, and a seven-month-old baby. Paulina was shocked. Rojas told Paulina, "Mrs., we are
authorities. We are here to get something." Paulina remonstrated, "Why are you meddling
(manghilabot)?"
Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because somethin g might happen.
He then said, "All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something." Paulina told Lui
to wait for her husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they were in a hurry.
Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and Tan, to the second
floor where her aparador was located. Rojas and the handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui
and his two companions then took two mats and two pairs of ladies shoes belonging to Paulina and
Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which belonged to the
latters children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui and his
companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins. Lu i and his two
companions then went down to the ground floor. When Julieta went out of the room, one of Luis
companions recognized her as Lariosas sister. Lui and his companions brought her along with them
as they left the house.

Paulina was so unnerved by the incident. Her vision blurred, her stomach ached and she was on the
verge of losing consciousness. Concerned, Erlinda massaged Paulinas stomach. However, Erlinda
had to leave because she was worried about her mother. Paulina then went to the kitchen, prepared
hot water and put a soothing ointment on her stomach to relieve the pain.
In the meantime, Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police Station and caused an
entry in the police blotter at 3:20 p.m. that he had recovered the following items from the Matillano
residence -- one pair of colored blue pants valued at P89.00; one floor mat costing P290.00; a pair of
black ladies shoes worth P126.00; and another pair of ladies shoes worth P69.00.
At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons identifying themselves as
policemen had gained entry into their house and took the following: two polo shirts; two t -shirts; two
pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; one Bulova wristwatch; one necklace; one
ring; and old coins.3
At 7:35 p.m., Eulogio Matillano made an entry in the Bansalan police blotter that earlier that day, at
4:00 p.m., Rojas took the following from his house: two polo shirts; two t -shirts; 2 pairs of pants; two
floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; 1 Bulova wristwatch; 1 necklace; one ring; and, old coins,
without his and his wifes consent and without a search warrant. 4 In the meantime, Doroteo Barawan,
officer-in-charge of the Office of the Barangay Captain, filed a complaint against Kim Kiao, et al.,
based on the complaint of Paulina, docketed as Barangay Case No. 168. 5
On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated that he
stole P40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao United Products, and that he u sed part of the
money to buy appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies shoes, a Seiko
wristwatch, two pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats. 6
On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging
Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
17,136,88.7 The trial court rendered judgment on June 14, 1989, acquitting Lariosa of the crime
charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured Lariosas confession through
force and intimidation, in connivance with police authorities. 8 The trial court, likewise, found that Lui
had an ulterior motive for charging Lariosa of robbery:
What would have been the possible motive of complainant in putting the burden of this
charged against the accused despite want of any appreciable evidence, can be gathered in
the record, as indicating the fear of complainant, that the accused will file a complaint against
him in the Department of Labor for illegally dismissing him in his employment, without any
sufficient legal grounds and basis. This unfounded complaint was intended to support
complainants ground against any possible complaint, the accused might file against him with
the Department of Labor by way of anticipation. 9
On motion of Lariosa, the trial court ordered the return of the following exhibits:
Accordingly and conformably with the judgment of this court dated June 14, 1989, one
Eulogio Matillano, accuseds uncle, is hereby allowed to get or to retrieve exhibits "H," "I,"
"J," "K," "L," and "M," consisting of Sony Cassette with serial no. W3658; Rayban
sunglasses; two (2) bundles of floor mat; two (2) pairs of pants; two (2) pairs of ladies shoes;
and Seiko Actus wristwatch. 10
Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, Peter Doe, John Doe
and Alan Mendoza. An Information was, thereafter, filed against them in the Municipal Circuit Trial

Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 880-B. On
December 13, 1988, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused therein. Upon
reinvestigation, however, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated March 31, 1989,
recommending that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but that the charges be
forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals Office for possible administrative sanctions against
Rojas.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
the respondents Eli Lui be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Considering that Pat. Leo Rojas is
a member of the Integrated National Police, this office is without jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint against him pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850. Therefore, let the complaint against
Pat. Leo Rojas, together with its annexes, including a copy of the resolution of the undersigned, be
forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals Office at Camp Catitipan, Davao City, for whatever
action it may take. 11
The complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 92-0020. The National Police Commission,
thereafter, rendered a decision exonerating Rojas of administrative liability for the complainants
failure to substantiate the charges. 12 The Commission held that Rojas was merely complying with the
mission order issued to him when he accompanied Lui and the latters two companions to the
Matillano residence.
In a Resolution dated August 25, 1989, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III dismissed the
petition for review of the Provincial Prosecutors resolution filed by Paulina Matillano. The Secretary
of Justice, likewise, denied a motion for reconsideration thereon.
In a parallel development, Lariosas parents, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for
robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et
al., with the Commission of Human Rights docketed as CHR Case No. RFO No. 88 -0207-DS. In a
Resolution dated December 4, 1989, the Regional Office of the Commission recommended, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are recommending that there is sufficient prima
facie evidence:
1. to indict Eli Lui for unlawful arrest as defined under Art. 369 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended; and
2. to indict both Eli Lui and Pat. Leo Rojas liable for Violation of Domicile, as defined
under Art. 128 of the same code. 13
The Proceedings in the Trial Court
On January 11, 1990, the spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil complaint for damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur against Eli Lui, Leo Rojas, Alan Mendoza and Henry
Tan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. G-XXI-47(90). The plaintiffs therein alleged the
following:
3. That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in Bansalan, Davao
del Sur, for several years now. They are law-abiding and peaceful citizens in the community;
4. That at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while plaintiff husband
was away from his residential house at Lily St., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and plaintiff wife

was there tending the house, defendants, without any lawful search warrant, arrived and thru
intimidation succeeded in searching the house owned by the plaintiff after which they brought
with them two floor mats, two pairs of ladies shoes, two pairs of pants, two polo shirts, two T shirts, one Relova wrist watch, one necklace (sinubong), one ring (sinubon g) and several old
coins, without the consent of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt for the items
taken;
5. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by one Elinito Lariosa but
defendants thru the use of naked power and brute force, illegally searched the house of the
herein plaintiffs in gross violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights;
6. That what defendants did in conspiring and confederating to illegally search the house of
plaintiffs and then taking with them the items mentioned above without even the benefit of
any receipt is not only violative of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code but also
of Article 32 of the Civil Code;
7. That because of what defendants did, plaintiffs suffered mental a nguishes, wounded
feelings, deprivation of the properties taken, besmirched reputation, and fright for which
reason defendants should be made to jointly and severally pay moral damages in the
amount of P500,000.00;
8. That in order to deter others similarly bent and minded and by way of example or
correction for the public good, defendants should be made to pay jointly and severally
exemplary damages in the amount ofP300,000.00;
9. That in the protection of their rights, plaintiffs engaged the services of c ounsel for an
agreed attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total award plus per diem of P1,000.00 per
court appearance;
10. That plaintiffs are bound to incur litigation expenses in an amount not less
than P10,000.00;14
They prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment issue ordering the
defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs:
1. P500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Litigation expenses of P10,000.00;
4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total award;
5. Per diems to be proved during the trial of this case.
Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs consistent with equity. 15
In their Answer to the complaint, the defendants therein alleged, inter alia, that they did not conduct
a search in the house of the plaintiffs and that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter the

house and even brought out pairs of pants. They added that the other items were brought out by
Lariosas sister and that they took only one (1) floor mat, two (2) pairs of ladies shoes, and one (1)
pair of blue pants. 16
The defendants adduced evidence that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter their house,
and with Lariosas sister, voluntarily turned over the items declared in the complaint. They testified
that no violence, threats or intimidation were even committed by them against Paulina Matillano.
Defendant Rojas further testified that he was merely complying with the Mission Order issued to him
when he entered the house of the plaintiffs in the company of the other defendants, and that he
remained in the ground floor while the other defendants retrieved the goods from plaintiff Matillano in
the second floor of the house.
On August 18, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment, ordering the dismissal of the complaint for
plaintiffs failure to prove their claims. The trial court also dismissed the defendants counterclaims.
The trial court gave credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina
Matillano voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the
subject items to them. The trial court took into account the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor, the
Secretary of Justice, the National Police Commission, as well as the order of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Bansalan, dismissing Criminal Case No. 880-B.
The Case on Appeal
The decision of the trial court was elevated to the Court of Appeals where the appellan ts contended,
thus:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT PAULINA MATILLANO
VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED APPELLEES TO ENTER THE HOUSE BECAUSE OF THE
PRESENCE OF HER NEPHEW ELINITO LARIOSA WHO WAS HANDCUFFED;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MRS. PAULINA MATILLANO WAS
THE ONE WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO THE BANSALAN POLICE STATION.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE CLEAR
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS APPELLEES.17
On April 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering defendants-appellees jointly and severally:
1. To pay plaintiffs-appellants the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages and Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages;
and
2. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), as attorneys fees; and
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.18

The appellate court denied the appellees motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The
appellees Mendoza and Tan no longer appealed the decision.
Petitioners Eli Lui and Leo Rojas now assail the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE TIME-HONORED
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT FINDINGS OF TRIAL
COURT ARE BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE AND DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF
RESPECT, WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT TRIED THE CASE;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED IN MRS. MATILLANOS RESIDENCE, IN
DISREGARD OF THE EXCULPATORY FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT MRS.
MATILLANO HAD VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED PETITIONERS ENTRY INTO HER HOUSE. 19
The Issues
The issues in this case may be synthesized, thus: (a) whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano
consented to the petitioners entry into her house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and
pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family; (b) whether or not the petitioners are liable for
damages to the respondents; and, (c) if so, the extent of the petitioners liability to the re spondents.
Considering that the assignments of errors are interrelated, this Court shall delve into and resolve
them simultaneously.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Admittedly, the issues in the case at bar are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule
admits of some exceptions, such as a case where the findings of facts of the trial court are
substantially different from those of the appellate court, and the resolution of such issues are
determinative of the outcome of the petition. 20
The petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in discarding the factual
findings of the trial court. Contrary to the disquisitions of the appellate court, the petitioners assert
that the inconsistencies between the testimonies of Rojas and Lui are peripheral. Lui did not conduct
any search in the second floor of the respondents house and even if he did so, respondent Paulin a
Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search when she allowed the petitioners to enter.
According to the petitioners, the respondents failed to prove that they forced their way into the house
of the respondents, and that the facts and circumstances which the appellate court found the trial
court to have overlooked are not, in fact, substantial enough to warrant a reversal of the factual
findings of the court a quo. According to the petitioners, the appellate court failed to discern that the
action filed by the respondents with the trial court was merely a leverage to the charge of robbery
against Lariosa, the respondents nephew.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave credence and full probative weight to the evidence of
the respondents. It stated in its decision that the trial court erred in giving credence and probative
weight to the testimonies of the petitioners (the appellants therein). Moreover, the appellate court

found that the trial court had overlooked facts and circumstances of su bstance, which, if considered,
would have altered the courts decision. The appellate court gave weight to the findings of the trial
court in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88. 21
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn and with
the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the
respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her
vehement protests, and because of petitioner Luis warning that she might be harmed, respondent
Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of their
house. The foregoing was testified to by respondent Paulina Matillano, thus:
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q Mrs. Matillano, do you know the person of Eli Lui?
A I know him.
Q Why do you know Eli Lui?
A Because he is from Bansalan.
Q On November 6, 1988, where were you, Mrs. Matillano?
A I was in our house.
Q At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, did you notice any unusual
incident that took place in your house?
A There was.
Q What incident was that, Mrs. Matillano?
A There were five (5) persons who suddenly went inside our house.
Q Where did they enter?
A They entered through the kitchen.
Q Now, where were you when they entered suddenly in your house?
A I was in our sala.
Q Now, what did you do when you saw these five (5) persons entered (sic) your house?
A I was afraid.
Q Aside from fear, what did you do?

A One of them suddenly said, "Mrs., we are authorities."

ATTY. TAN:
Not responsive to the question, Your Honor.
ATTY. SUARIO:
She is responding the question because my question is, "Aside from fear, what did you do?"
and according to this witness, she was not able to do anything because one of those who
entered(not continued)
COURT:
I think the answer is not responsive. Just reform the question.
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q What did these persons do when they entered your house?
A One of them said, "Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something from your
house."
Q Do you know who this person was, this person who was talking that they were persons in
authority?
A That person when he first went to our house, I do not know him yet, but I know (sic) him
later to be Leo Rojas.
Q Why do you know him later to be Leo Rojas?
A When the case was already being tried, he introduced himself as Leo Rojas.
Q What was Leo Rojas wearing at that time?
A He was in civilian clothes.
Q Aside from Leo Rojas, who were the other persons who entered your house?
A Aside from the two (2) persons whom I do not know, my nephew was also with them in the
name of Elinito Lariosa.
Q Who else, Mrs. Matillano?
A Eli Lui.

ATTY. SUARIO:

At least, may we ask, Your Honor, that the word "manghilabot" be incorporated.
COURT:
So, the word is "interfering" or "meddling." You record the word "manghilabot."
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q When you said "manghilabot," what do you mean, Mrs. Matillano?
A Yes, because they said that they are taking some of our things and I said why are they
doing that (manghilabot)?
Q When you said those remarks, what else happened?
A It was Eli Lui who answered, "Mrs., do not answer anymore because something might
happen." (Basig madisgrasya).
ATTY. SUARIO:
"Madisgrasya," Your Honor, is more than something.
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q When you heard those words from Eli Lui, what else transpired?
A He said, "All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something." And I even
told him that we should wait for my husband but they did not agree because they said they
are in a hurry.
Q And after that, what else happened?
A I accompanied him upstairs.
Q You accompanied him upstairs, who are you referring to that you accompanied upstairs.
A Eli Lui and his other two (2) companions.
Q These two (2) companions whom you said you do not know their names?
A Yes, sir.22

ATTY. TAN:
Q Now, you said on November 6, 1988, five (5) men suddenly entered your house. When
you said suddenly, will you please describe how did they enter the house?
A They passed through the kitchen and suddenly appeared inside the house.

Q You mean to say that they did not knock at the door?
A They did not.
Q Who first entered the house among the five (5)?
A What I first saw was that they immediately converged in the sala and whom I recognized
was Eli Lui and my nephew who was in handcuffs.
Q Was your door opened at that time?
A It was closed but it was not locked. It can be kicked open.
Q But you can open it without kicking the door?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that you were afraid, why were you afraid?
A Why would you not be afraid when they were armed?
Q Who were armed among the five (5)?
A All of them except the one who was in handcuffs.
Q You are very sure of that?
A I am very sure.23
Respondent Paulina Matillano, likewise, testified that petitioner Lui and his cohorts took her personal
things, and those of her familys, from the second floor of the house:
Q Now, while you and Eli Lui with two (2) other companions were upstairs, what happened
upstairs?
A Upon reaching upstairs, they immediately rolled the two (2) floor mats, the pair of leather
shoes, 2 pairs of pants, two (2) polo-shirts. They also let me open the chest and when it was
already open they rummaged through it and they got my old Bulova wat ch, my necklace, my
ring and a coinsita, old gold coins.
Q When you said "coinsita," what is "coinsita"?
A Old coins.
Q After taking all of these things, what else happened?
A They went downstairs. 24

Q Now, you mentioned in this affidavit that several properties were taken from your house,
do you confirm that there were two (2) polo-shirts that were taken?
A Yes.
Q And there were also two (2) floor mats?
A Yes, that is true.
Q One (1) Bulova wristwatch?
A Yes.
Q One (1) necklace?
A Yes.
Q Two (2) pairs of lady (sic) shoes?
A Yes.
Q Two (2) pairs of pants?
A Yes.
Q One (1) ring?
A Yes.
Q Who owns these two (2) pairs of ladys (sic) shoes?
A That was mine.
Q What were the color of the shoes?
A Black and dirty white (referring to the color of the rostrum).
Q Where did you buy that shoes?
A In Davao City.
Q What store in Davao City?
A NCCC.
Q What particular date when you bought that shoes?
A I think it was in the month of November.

Q 1988?
A 1988.
Q And who owns these two (2) polo-shirts?
A My children.
Q What are the names of your children?
A Allan and Danilo.
Q Where is Allan residing?
A During the incident, Allan was still schooling in Tacloban.
Q So, you mean to say, on November 6, 1988, he was no longer residing in Bansalan?
A No more.
Q How about Danilo, where was he residing in November 6, 1988?
A He was living in Sta. Cruz.
Q He has a family of his own at Sta. Cruz?
A He was still single then.
Q But he was residing in Sta. Cruz?
A Yes.
Q How about these two (2) pairs of pants, who owns these pants?
A My children also.
Q You are referring to Allan and Danilo?
A No, because I still have so many children.
Q So, who owns these two (2) pants?
A Also my children, Eulogio, Jr. and Allan.
Q Now, Eulogio, Jr. where is (sic) he residing on November 6, 1988?
A In our house.
Q How about these two (2) t-shirts?

A Also owned by my children.

Q Are you referring to Allan and Danilo?
A They used to wear that.
Q How come that Allan has a polo-shirt in your house when you said he was then residing in
Tacloban?
ATTY. SUARIO:
May we manifest, Your Honor, that he was schooling in Tacloban.
COURT:
All right.
A They used to have a vacation during December and March and usually they left some of
their clothes inside our aparador.
Q These polo shirts were still new?
A Already used.
Q How about the pants?
A The other one is already used and the other one is new.
Q How about the floor mats?
A That is mine.
Q Now, you claimed that these clothes were taken from the cabinet or aparador, is that
correct?
A Yes, that is true.
Q Inside your aparador, how many pieces of clothes were stored therein?
A Many.
Q Could you say one (1) dozen?
A It cannot be counted.
Q Could you say three (3) dozens?
A It is really full of dress.
Q Would you say it is more than three (3) dozens?

A More.
Q And these more than three (3) dozens consists of polo shirts, t-shirts and pants?
A Yes.
Q And inspite (sic) the fact that there were more than three (3) dozens of clothes, pants, polo
shirts and t-shirts only these two (2) pants, two (2) polo shirts and two (2) t-shirts w ere
taken?
A Only those things because they only selected the ones which were still usable the good
ones.
Q Now, you mentioned also in your affidavit that the group also searched your trunk?
A I was ordered to open the trunk.
Q Who particularly ordered you to open the trunk?
A Eli Lui.25
The respondents immediately reported the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain 26 and filed a
complaint against petitioner Lui and his cohorts. 27
The petitioners claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and their cohorts inside the
house and voluntarily gave their personal belongings is belied by the unshaken testimony of
respondent Paulina Matillano, corroborated by Erlinda Clarin.
The petitioners attempt to project themselves to have acted with civility and courtesy to respondent
Paulina Matillano is implausible, taking into account petitioner Luis state of mind before he and
petitioner Rojas and their cohorts left the Metrodiscom Headquarters in Davao City, and proceeded
to the house of the respondents in Bansalan. Before they left Davao City, Lui sadistically mauled
Lariosa with the acquiescence of the police authorities, and forced him to give an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession. This was the finding of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88:
Despite being mauled by Eli Lui and drowned in a toilet bowl, accused denied having
anything to do with the lost money of the complainant. Later, he was turned over to the police
for investigation and there without affording accused with his right to counsel, he was
interrogated orally and was forced to admit that out of the money he stole, he bought items
which the police later recovered at Bansalan. They also returned the accused to the
complainants establishment and forced to do re-enactment of the act of robbery, without
accused again afforded the right to counsel. Pictures were taken during the re -enactment
while accused was handcuffed, as shown in the pictures taken by the police.
Finally, the accused was forced to admit and sign his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit A), no
longer able to bear the pain of the mauling to him by Eli Lui, who has the temerity of
maltreating the accused even in the presence of the guards in the jail and ser iously
threatening accused to admit ownership of the recovered items at Bansalan and at New
Matina, SIR, Davao City, otherwise he will be salvaged, along with the serious threatening
words of accuseds companion in the jail, that if he will refuse to sign his alleged confession,
he will be salvaged as directed by Eli Lui with the police.

Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui seems to have an
open hand in the prosecution of accused. He was the one who called the police to arrest
him, even without a warrant of arrest. Before his statement was obtained, policeman relied
on him in the investigation and the filing of proper charges against accused. They rode in a
car of Eli Lui, in taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the establishment of complainant
during the re-enactment in going to Bansalan, to recover the items allegedly bought by
accused out of the money allegedly stolen; all of these incidents shows (sic) [that] the police
despite justification, that they do not have enough facilities (sic), [had] gone astray in
conducting an impartial investigation, by submitting to any possible indiscretion of Eli Lui of
making the scale of justice bend in his favor, by manifesting control over the police power of
investigation highly and seriously pre-judicial to the rights, and interests of the accused. 28
If petitioner Lui was so brazen as to have mauled Lariosa in the presence of police authorities, he
would not have cared a whit in barging into the respondents house with petiti oner Rojas, a
policeman of Davao City, and his cohorts, and divesting the respondents of their belongings. The
petitioners and their cohorts wanted to insure that their caper would succeed. Hence, they did not
coordinate with the Bansalan Police Station when they went to the respondents house with their
intention to divest them of their belongings.
Petitioner Rojas reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by Sergeant Alberto
Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely tasked in the said order to
"follow up a theft case within the area of responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City." The
petitioner was not authorized, under the said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a crime,
such as violation of domicile as defined in Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
ART. 128. Violation of domicile The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial
order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other
effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having surreptitiously
entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.
If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a
crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the second floor of the
respondents house and himself conduct a search therein, he allowed them to search the premises
without a warrant. The petitioners and their cohorts were not authorized to conduct a search in the
house of the respondents, much less divest the latter of their personal belongings. As a police
officer, it was petitioner Rojas duty to prevent the commission of crimes in his presence, and to
arrest the persons committing such crimes.
The trial court rejected the testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano on the following grounds: (a)
she had known petitioner Lui for ten years as a businessman doing business in Bansalan; (b) the
occupants of the respondents house when the petitioners and their cohorts arrived were all women;
(c) the respondents failed to report the incident to the Bansalan police authorities; and, (d) the
provincial prosecutors resolution recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 880 -B for
robbery against the petitioners, which was sustained by the Secretary of Justice, and the ruling of
the National Police Commission exonerating petitioner Rojas from any liability.
We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in overruling the trial co urt.

First. Respondent Paulina Matillano testified that petitioner Lui did not stay permanently in Bansalan.
He went there only to collect money from a certain Matura and other businessmen. 29 She also
testified that there were many cases against the petitioner, one of which was for arson. The case
was dismissed, but one of her neighbors was rendered missing. 30 If the petitioner, a businessman for
ten years or so, had no qualms in torturing Lariosa under the very noses of police officers, he would,
likewise, have no qualms about intimidating respondent Paulina Matillano and divesting her of her
personal belongings. It must be stressed that petitioner Lui was in the company of petitioner Rojas, a
police officer from Davao City.
Second. The petitioners and their cohorts had no foreknowledge that the occupants of the
respondents house were all women. They must have believed that there were male occupants;
hence, barged into the house with drawn guns.
Third. As shown clearly in respondent Paulina Matillanos swor n statement before the Bansalan
Police Station, she declared that the petitioners were armed with guns. They threatened her life and,
without any search warrant therefor, divested her and her family of their personal belongings against
their will.31
Fourth. In her complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain, respondent Paulina Matillano
declared that the petitioners entered their house, that petitioner Lui pointed a gun at her, and that the
petitioners and their cohorts searched the house and carted away their personal belongings. 32 That
the report made before the Barangay Captain and petitioner Paulina Matillanos sworn statement are
not as complete as her testimony before the trial court is understandable. Affidavits are usually taken
ex parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate, but they do not detract from the
credibility of the witness. 33 An entry in the police blotter is usually incomplete and inaccurate for want
of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the victim may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory, and for
his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. 34 The same principle applies to entries in
the barangay blotter.
Fifth. As correctly held by the trial court, the findings of administrative and quasi-administrative
agencies are not binding on the courts. In the present case, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
as affirmed by the Secretary of Justice, 35 found no probable cause for robbery against the petitioners
because they had no intent to rob, but merely to recover the properties from the house of the
respondents which petitioner Lui perceived to have been acquired by Lariosa with money stolen
from his uncle, Ben.36 The decision of the National Police Commission absolving petitioner Rojas of
grave misconduct was anchored on its finding that the petitioner was merely performing his duty as
ordered by his superior officer. 37 It was inevitable for the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint for
violation of domicile filed against petitioner Rojas in I.S. No. 91 -1488 because the crime of violation
of domicile was committed in Bansalan and not in Davao City. 38 In contrast, the Commission on
Human Rights recommended the indictment of petitioner Lui for unlawful arrest and of petitioner
Rojas for violation of domicile. 39
Sixth. Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, the dismissal of the
complaint against the petitioners by the Provincial and City Prosecutors, the Municipal Trial Court
and the National Police Commission are of no relevance to the civil complaint for damages filed by
the respondents against the petitioners. The action of the respondents against the petitioners may
still proceed despite the dismissal of the criminal and administrative actions against them.
The petitioners contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable
search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable

searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable." This provision
protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty, who must
nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 40 The general rule is that a search
and seizure must be carried through or with judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure
becomes unconstitutional within the context of the constitutional provision 41because a warrantless
search is in derogation of a constitutional right. Peace officers who effect a warrantless search
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. 42
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. 43 There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a
constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 44 The waiver must be made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges every reasonable presumption agai nst any waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights. 45 The fact that the aggrieved person did not object to the entry into
her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. 46 A
peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. 47
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent
Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto,
either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening
of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure to obj ect or
resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search and seizure. The
petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her. Respondent
Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted
the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.
Furthermore, the petitioners claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily handed over the
articles to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is no evidence that there was foreknowledge on the part
of the petitioners of the articles they wanted to retrieve from the respondents house. Even if
respondent Paulina Matillano did hand over the articles to the petitioner, it was onl y because the
petitioner and his cohorts had earlier threatened and intimidated her into doing so.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are liable to the respondents for
moral and exemplary damages in the amounts respectively awarded by it. Petitioner Rojas, a
policeman of Davao City, conspired with petitioner Lui and, with drawn guns, gained entry into the
respondents house, and threatened and intimidated respondent Paulina Matillano. Although
petitioner Rojas did not himself conduct the search, he assented thereto by allowing petitioner Lui
and his cohorts to go up to the second floor and divest the respondents of their belongings. The
petitioners even left together after the incident.
In MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,48 we had the occasion to state:
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:
"ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.

"x x x
"(9) the rights to be secure in ones persons, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
"x x x
"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged."
"ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
"x x x
"(6) Illegal search;
"(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
"Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or
employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded."
xxx
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials
in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in t he
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official
abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort."
(emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons
indirectly responsible, viz:
"[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks
of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for th e violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx
"While it would certainly be too nave to expect that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well
as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
xxx

[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated directly should be held
liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted
damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Fir stly, they instigated the raid
pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of
all illegal sources of scouting supplies. As correctly observed by respondent court:
"Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees
(respondents) merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against
appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner)
corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it
was upon appellant (petitioner) corporations instance that the PC soldiers conducted the
raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial courts
query posed in its decision now under consideration as to why the PC soldiers
immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation."
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by and apparently assenting
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner
corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreason able seized by the PC raiding
team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its
complaint for unfair competition. 49
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno*, Quisumbing **, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*

On official leave.

**

Acting Chairman.

Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia and Teodoro P. Regino, concurring.
2

Penned by Judge Rodolfo A. Escovilla.

Exhibit "A."

Exhibit "3."

Exhibit "B."

Exhibit "1."

Exhibit "E."

Exhibit "K."

Exhibit "K-25."

10

Exhibit "L."

11

Exhibit "10."

12

Exhibit "18."

13

Exhibit "N."

14

Records, pp. 1-3.

15

Id. at 3.

16

Id. at 12-13.

17

CA Rollo, p. 20.

18

Rollo, p. 30.

19

Id. at 5.

20

Heirs of Tan Eng Kee vs. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 740 (2000).

21

Rollo, pp. 24-27.

22

TSN, 23 September 1991, pp. 5-10.

23

Id. at 20-21.

24

Id. at 10-11.

25

TSN, 3 December 1991, pp. 9-12.

26

Exibit "A."

27

Exhibit "B."

28

Exhibit "K."

29

TSN, 23 September 1991, p. 16.

30

Id. at 20.

31

Exhibit "4."

32

Exhibit "B."

33

People vs. Padilla, 213 SCRA 631 (1992).

34

People vs. Tabao, 240 SCRA 758 (1995).

35

Exhibit "13."

36

Exhibit "10."

37

Exhibit "18."

38

Exhibit "20."

39

Exhibit "H."

40

MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 227 (1994)

41

People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).

42

People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., 360 SCRA 690 (2001).

43

Ibid.

44

Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 89 (1938).

45

People vs. Compacion, 361 SCRA 540 (2001).

46

Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770 (1948).

47

Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, supra; People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., supra.

48

Supra.

49

Id. at 234-236.