KOHA SUMMARY # 95

FRONT PAGE: 15 YEARS AFTER

13 March 1996

EDITORIAL

WARRANT OF THE STATUS-QUO

by VETON SURROI

There are two questions asket in the public opinion, especially among people outside Kosova,
regarding Ibrahim Rugova. First, how did he come to the present position of the undisputable
Albanian leader in Kosova, and second, what are his positions today, is he really undisputable
or not?

For both these questions a much wider elaboration is needed, and most probably there will be
time for this, when we'll collect our individual and collective memoirs. But, anyhow, there is
a simple interpretation for the first question: in the end of eighties Rugova, as chairman of the
Writers' Association was in the focus of the attention with his presentations, it was the time
when people were being isolated, killed in streets, when Serbs celebrated their historical
defeat in hypernationalistic way, etc. The anecdote, which will be published one day, reveals
that Dr. Rugova had suggested to another public personality to give as many interviews as
possible, and give as many statements as possible to the foreign media, because this would be
the best protection from the permanent threats by anti Albanian authorities in Belgrade and
Prishtina. The rest are more or less known: in the moment of formation of democratic
opposition in Kosova, other Albanian important figures were either in prison or would not
accept the position of the Albanian party leader. Then came the period of euphoria and the
projection of Rugova as a rare combination of Mic Sokoli's courage, Rilindja's (the Albanian
renaissance) visions, Gandhi's greatness and the diplomatic capability of Kissinger.

More than five years have passed since appearance of the Rugova phenomenon and the
questions often asked by foreigners about how strong are Rugova's positions do have a
starting point. The level of internal Albanian criticism modestly shows that the Mic Sokoli,
Gandhi and Kissinger like hero can in fact be no more than an ordinary man, and the fear
from the future solution of Kosova issue makes more and more people conclude that fate of
Kosova should not depend on one man only, but (in this case) it depends on a group of "wise
heads". Furthermore, this conclusion is drawn by all those who have had the opportunity to
listen or read statements, many times senseless made by president of Republic (we will
establish relations with this or that, we will be recognised by European Council, etc), or to
briefly asses what has Kosova gone through since the '92 elections. In fact, there is doubt
expressed towards the leader, and this is good; blind adoration leads to blindness.

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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The problem with the second question regarding Rugova is not connected much to him
individually. The question of how strong are Rugova's positions contains in itself not the
question of his individual strength, but the strength of his post as president of Republic of
Kosova. In this direction, there are not few people who would put another question: can the
structure of the Republic be changed with another structure, starting by changing the people.
The answer, it is too much to say, is no, that there is a consensus about the independence of
Kosova, and regardless of changes made, all relevant Albanian figures in Kosova will aim
towards that target.

But, why then the fear, or the question? Because Rugova is in a vicious circle: all are more or
less aware of his limitations as a leader but, within Albanian people, it is known that his
replacement without broad political support would mean the de-institutionalisation of the
Project of the Republic of Kosova. In such a situation, and this has been lasting for several
years, Rugova becomes symbol of status-quo, both for foreigners who deal with him and for
Kosova's citizens who have admitted that status-quo is better than an unknown which is
feared to be worse.

DOSSIER 1981: 15 YEARS AFTER

Counter-revolution and revolution, these were the amplitudes for qualification of Albanian
demonstrations in 1981. 15 years have passed since then and there are still different
interpretations of the events, but one thing is sure: nothing was like before 1981. We asked
for opinions so far not expressed to judge the qualification of events that had their impact on
our lives after 1981. Mustafa Sefedini, former first-man of internal affairs in Kosova, in his
exclusive interview elaborates his concept on parallel legal and illegal actions carried towards
the same target, whereas Mahmut Bakalli, former head of ruling party explains reasons why
he had resigned. Mehmet Hajrizi, former political prisoner, draws attention towards
prospective today: any attempt to repeat 1974 will be faced with a new 1981.

Stories told by them on what happened and interpretations on what led to those events are
interesting.

INTERVIEW

MUSTAFA SEFEDINI, Minister of Internal Affairs of Kosova in 1981

DUALITY OF (IL)LEGAL CHANNELS

Interviewed by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

KOHA: Today, 15 years after demonstrations in 1981 which are considered as the turning
point in our modern history, how would you analyze the events. Were you warned what was
to happen on March 11 and later?

SEFEDINI: I would go a little more back in time to explain continuity of activities which
have contributed to events of 1981. The activity of people who have felt the need for national

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liberation, for the advance of the status of Kosova, consists of two phases: the first phase is
the one from end of WWII when there were armed conflicts aiming to solve the issue of
Kosova and in my opinion this period lasted until the Plenum in Brioni in 1966, to be
followed later by illegal activities. They were people aware of their activities and sufferings
and sacrifice they would face. This period is known for the abuse exercised by Rankovic's
police. Period after 1966, until 1981, was again characterised by similar activities which
developed into two channels. One was the activity of local organs which was operating in de-
masking of Rankovic's police, and to implementing judgements reached in the Plenum in
Brioni, has contributed to fulfilling collective and individual demands in demonstrations in
1968 to have the status of Kosova advanced in the Constitution of former Yugoslav
Federation. In this direction the other, illegal, channel has also contributed to enhancement of
demands and continuation of illegal work towards reaching the final objective for the solution
of status of Kosova and national liberation. I would say then, that the illegal movement was a
national liberation movement. They gave their contribution to the amendments in 1969 and an
important role was also played the demonstrations in 1968...

Legal constitutional and institutional work continued and reached the status of Kosova in the
'74 Constitution. Also, the illegal channel also continued working towards the solution of
Kosova's matter.

After 1974, political legal organs were more engaged, on one hand to have the constitutional
principles transferred into legal provisions to regulate of life in all fields on basis of
Constitution that has solved status of Kosova in a very favourable way. On the other hand, I
would say, people who were in legal organs, being faced with the aggressiveness of Serbia,
had difficulties in defending status of Kosova. These Serb manifestations were expressed now
in "white" books and then in "blue" books in which it was insisted to revise the Constitution
of 1974 in favour of Serbia and in disfavour of Kosova and Albanian people... In this context
I would take as an example the transformation of organs of internal affairs from an organ
totally depending on Serbia and totally centralised in the level of Republic into a completely
independent and on the same rank with other Yugoslav units. The other channel of illegal
activity continued its work, most probably not satisfied with achievements made in
Constitution of 1974 because the final tasks was to have Kosova with an advanced federal
status in federation.

KOHA: Did you receive any warning that the activity of this channel, that you call illegal,
would culminate in demonstrations in 1981?

SEFEDINI: We used to have enough data obtained from the field, from materials received
about the illegal work, and full knowledge that something was being prepared in this
direction. In the beginning, especially a couple of years before 1981 there had been operations
which, in my opinion, were oriented towards gaining people in their tasks to achieve. It is
known that there have been leaflets, pamphlets etc. Characteristics of that period was the
masivization of the illegal work to win as much people as possible for the moment needed,
which was expected after Tito's death, to give their contribution for the good of Kosova.
Concretely, I can say that we have had different warnings. I would say that groups that we had
observed used to be independent from each other and they did not have a centralised
organisation from a body. They were rather spontaneous. We had warnings that there would
be different activities. Maybe it is not good to keep it hidden now that there have been
warnings of assassinations too. All these were in service to raise in people the consciousness
that there was need for organisation to participate in growing the movement. I can say that

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this activity had really grown after 1980. We, as a service, more or less, used to be in touch
with what was happening and used to follow up things and keep the political factor informed.
I may say that some of our reports were received with reserve and were not taken as seriously
as we presented them so the whole thing ended in demonstrations, like ones in 1981.

KOHA: What was your forecast for these events then? How did you inform the political top
about them, since there was not a very large scale reaction demonstrations on 11 March,
neither in the media nor the public?

SEFEDINI: I may say that we were surprised by the events of 11 March, not in the sense that
we did not assume that they might happen but because of the form how they happened, as an
incident in the students restaurant. We did not assess that they would develop on what did
happen later. We though that it was an accident that happened spontaneously. Those who
went to streets were not aggressive like they were later and we, as an organ, took the posture
not to undertake any repressive measures, since we did not consider marches to be dangerous.
We considered that the form itself, the number of people who participated and the number
included in the demonstrations could not be dangerous to the level of disturbing the public
order and peace, therefore we applied rather mild measures. Latter we assessed that we should
be careful not to qualify them as hostilities because this would pave ways to various
speculations. So we instructed our organs of internal affairs in this direction. So we tried not
to give those events a big name, without having facts. We considered them as a revolt related
to unsolved social matters, and similar. There were no slogans that would create problems
used in them. The slogan "unity-unity" was heard, but is was interpreted in different ways...
We insisted not to complicate the matter and not to give anyone pretext to undertake drastic
measures or actions, as it was seen to happen latter.

KOHA: On March 25, special unit forces arrived in Prishtina. Who invited them and why?

SEFEDINI: In the meantime, from 11 until 25 March, we had our assessments that
demonstrations of 11 March would not cease because March 26 was planned to be celebration
day for the Youth Estafette in Prishtina and we had some indications that something would be
done to use the situation for a demonstration. So, on March 25, in the afternoon, we got the
information that students were barricaded in their dormitories in Prishtina. We informed the
provincial leadership about this - whether this was taken seriously or not, it would be good to
be judged by somebody else - but we were told that we, as service should work through our
channels and not allow the disturbance of the celebration of Estafette Day. It is true that
without consulting provincial organs, as people responsible in the service, that night we
judged that with forces that we had available would not be able to handle a demonstration or
an activity which was expected, especially when we had to deal with celebration of Estafette
Day which was symbolic. Serbia's security service insisted that they should send in their
forces, just in case, to serve as standby in Kosova. I considered that no forces should be sent
in from Serbia, but it would be good that in agreement with Federal Secretariat a group from
special units would to be sent in, based on the fact that such units consisted of people from all
Yugoslav republics and nations and nationalities. The Constitution provided me this
possibuility. As secretary I had the right to invite or not to invite units from Serbia. There was
a group of 90 people sent in from Federation and I informed political organs keeping the
posture that we would not to use them until the last moment, unless public order is threatened
too seriously. I was warned by the Presidency that if something happened, the responsibility
would fall on me.

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KOHA: It appears that events of 26 March, when Estafette was supposed to arrive in
Prishtina, boosted the student demonstrations. What were reactions, were there offers from
Serbian and Yugoslav police to intervene and how was army brought in?

SEFEDINI: Our judgement was that demonstrations would be aggressive in form, and they
were attended by much larger number of people, although political factors had met with
students and asked them to be debarricade. This made us do our utmost to prevent the
situation which would provide for forces to be sent in from Serbia, as they were already
insisting such a thing. Every half an hour or one hour I was on telephone contact with the
Republican Secretary of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Stanojevic, who constantly insisted on
sending in forces which were on standby waiting in buses in the municipalities neighbouring
Kosova, Kraljevo, Novi-Pazar, Prokuplje etc. I told him that he could not despatch forces
unless we requested for them. This was in our competencies and authorization on basis of the
existing constitution. Later I had understood that they had been under pressure exercised on
them by the political factor in Serbia. I agreed with the provincial leadership in judgements
that there should not be intervention by Serbia and that we had our own forces. They insisted
that Kosova should be defended by Serbia, while we said that Kosova should be defended by
Kosova. If there was a need for help from outside, then it should be intervention from
Yugoslavia and not from Serbia. Such were the relations...

On the other hand, the other side of the coin should be considered, and we were aware of this:
tanks and armoured vehicles were parked in military barracks in Prishtina, waiting for the
signal to intervene. Such an intervention could have been fatal. We considered that we should
carry our duty without the assistance of the army and from outside so when the danger
reached the peak and demonstrators were approaching the place where the central celebration
was going on, and a serious incident might happen which would lead to very serious
consequences, I ordered the special unit which was located in the premises of Provincial
Secretariat to intervene. It is true that the engagement of special units was an authority abuse,
but we could not keep under control every individual of that unit under the situation of urgent
intervention. Finally events of 26 March were a success of those who organised them but also
of our Service which prevented outcome of larger scale riots which would have fatal
consequences...

KOHA: Immediately after the demonstration, joint police units from all Yugoslavia headed
by minister Herlevic were based in Kosova. What was the outcome of analysis of highest
Yugoslav organs about that event? Later "the headquarters document" was mentioned.

SEFEDINI: I would say it publicly now that after events of 26 March we have felt a lack of
confidence on our service which was said not to be efficient. In the meantime I received a
Decree from Presidency of SFRY in which it was said that some competencies of the Service
in Kosova are to be taken over by Federation Security Service. According to my opinion and
the opinion of my cooperators this was a practical suspension of our Service. Our posture
was, as I said above, that if someone should defend Kosova than it should be Kosova and if it
fails to do this, than any assistance from outside should come from Yugoslavia and not be
restricted to Serbia only. Our political organs had the same posture. Later, brigades of joint
units of security services were formed and they were mainly focused in public security, but
also in civil operations to prevent events which were expected, and that actually happened on
1 and 2 April. Having judged that there was lack of confidence in us, I insisted that I should
resign, since we were not able to operate as an independent organ, equal to other organs of
former Yugoslav federation. I was told by political organs that I should not hasten, that the

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matter would be brought up in the Presidency, but things moved in the direction so other
organs took situation in their hands and that their behaviour were rather harsh. Thus, Federal
Secretary Herlevic had his quarters in Gërmia and coordinated work of units from there
without necessary consultations with us who, as organ, bore the responsibility.

KOHA: Was that interference in competencies, taking into consideration the fact that
according to existing Constitution your organ used to have broad ingerencies?

SEFEDINI: Yes. The competencies of our service diminished, but they were not fully
eliminated. I may state that assessing the events as "counter-revolutionary" was imposed from
outside, especially by Serbian organs. There were individual political cadres here and there
who thought that way, too. Then the flow of events was such that response should be in
conformity with the assessment of counter-revolutionary. Therefore measures were taken that
harmed constitutional position of Kosova.

KOHA: The same was mentioned about "document of the headquarters"...

SEFEDINI: Maybe I am going too deep into details but they can lead us to a certain meaning.
There were materials from different groups delivered to some high leaders in Federation. But,
they did not evaluate those materials in a critical way and with reserves, but took them for
granted. For example one of them was the information that LNÇK (National Liberation
Movement of Kosova) was organised in committees throughout Kosova, Montenegro,
Macedonia and that at a moment needed they would activate them. We, as service, not that
we did no take them as serious, but we considered them as des-information spread by those
who wanted to shake Yugoslavia. As regarding Mojsov's "Document of the Headquarters" I
would say that I talked to many high functionaries in Yugoslavia and told them not to take
things for granted. I always insisted that it was possible that it was written so in the materials
but according to our analysis, they were not true, so they should not be dramatised. Neither
the Federal Secretary nor the organs in Serbia approved my judgement so it was constantly
insisted on that "headquarters of the counter-revolution" should be identified. And we always
insisted that it did not exist. I have the impression that they did not trust us, that they even
suspected that we were hiding something. So there was a conviction then, both with the
political organ and Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs that "the headquarters" existed and
that we were incapable or did not want to discover it. Even Herlevic asked this from us. They
would say that it existed and that we should find it. We would reply, all right, you are
installed here now, help yourselves and find it, if it exists.

KOHA: What were relations of your organ and Yugoslav and Serbian police forces installed
in Kosova?

SEFEDINI: I will bring up an episode that tells much about a total lack of confidence that
existed towards us. In their building of Federal Secretariat in Brezovica, where a Serb cook
was employed, the Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs, Mr. Herljevic, did not want to have
lunch with us after a meeting. I drew his attention telling him that the cook was a Serb lady
and that it is a great insult for an Albanian to turn off his meal offered, because an Albanian
does not commit treason through food and he replied, "never mind, Mujo, I have my own
kitchen in the headquarters in Gërmia!" It was an unexplainable revolt that made me tell our
provincial political organisation that me and my cooperators could not operate in such
conditions any more.

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KOHA: What were direct reasons for you to resign?

SEFEDINI: I resigned because I insisted so but it was also the judgement of Presidency of
SFRY that I was not suitable to carry the duty on my post. Thus, at the same time, it was my
request that was approved in the first meeting of the Assembly. After my resignation, there
were requests to ask for my ideo-political and penal responsibility. A state-political
commission was formed whose duty was to carry out a thorough investigation against me
regarding my responsibility and I was invited twice for interrogation by federal and
republican investigating organs who did their utmost to provide materials to put me to trial. I
know these things for sure. But my competencies as provincial secretary were such and the
existing relations and constitution basis and law would not allow such a thing. They took
ideo-political measures, they dismissed me from the Provincial Committee, from the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia, under public statement that I was guilty for the
counterrevolution because I had not undertaken necessary measures.

KOHA: After this time distance, who do you think was the real organiser of demonstrations?
Apart from Albanian political prisoners who claimed responsibility, there have been different
speculations regarding organisers - starting from Serbian police up to Albanian SIGURIMI,
including also foreign services such as Russian and American ones. What do you think was
the truth. Who was behind 1981?

SEFEDINI: This is the reason why I elaborated the issue from the very beginning and stated
that there was continuity from armed war to illegal activity and an national liberation
movement to come to the answer to your question. In my opinion, then and now, events of
1981 were the product of an illegal work, of a semi-legal work but also of legal activity of our
forces. I cannot justify nor support, to my knowledge, that events were induced by this or that
state or that they were product of Yugoslav of Serbian Security services in cooperation with
another service, like the one in Albania. Especially, I can say the State Security Service of
Internal Affairs of Kosova had no hand in this matter.

KOHA: What about Serbian security...?

SEFEDINI: I have no arguments and after I left my function I did not have the possibility to
investigate any documents. But, I don't believe that Serb security could organise something of
the kind out side Albanian security service. They could have used the situation created, but
this is another matter. I can tell you another thing, events that preceded 1981, and wide
activity in the aspect of propaganda, distribution of leaflets etc. never have upset Serbia. What
was the reason for lack of upsetedness -I think that this was explained in events to follow. I
can even say that they looked forward to what happened in Kosova and used the events to
apply a brutality shown after 1981, which culminated in suspension of autonomy of Kosova.
So, they were an excuse for Serbia to take actions later.

KOHA: What could you say about other secret services?

SEFEDINI: Yes, we had indications that a certain person from Albanian security organs, in a
point from a western country had given some instructions to some members of illegal
organisations in Kosova how to act. But this is only an episode that, in my opinion, was not
decisive to bring conclusions that there was a cooperation between Albanian security service
and the Serbian one to organise 1981. Of course, we also had indications that somebody from
Albanian organs had a hand in this, but I did not have the possibility to check if these could

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be verified and denied. So I will repeat that if someone has facts, as some are pretending to
claim, then it is time to publish them. According to what I have seen I can say that this was
the result of Albanian national liberation forces and it is not good to devaluate an activity and
sacrifices made which has managed to waken the international opinion on Albanians' rights.
This were things that I know, but to make it clear, although I was the first man in Security
Service, it does not mean that I knew everything. The nature of the work is such that even
Tito in his time did not know everything...

KOHA: What were the real effects of demonstration when they are looked from the angle 15
years after? Could an Albanian revolt be demonstrated about constitutional position of
Kosova without having consequences?

SEFEDINI: This illegal channel, as I called it, was not in cooperation with the legal channel,
but everything that was undertaken in legal and constitutional way has contributed so the
illegal work was more intensive because, in my opinion, something more could have been
achieved in a parallel way, than what would be achieved only by political factor or in illegal
activities. Whether 1981 should have happened the way it did with rather aggressive
demonstrations and serious consequences, even victims, perhaps is not for me to say - history
will show it!

I can honestly and in full consciousness say that those events were hasty. Perhaps conditions
were not ripe for them. Events of 1981 were one of the reasons for the later dissolution of
Yugoslavia, but not the main causes as some try to say. Perhaps it would be good, in my
opinion, if somebody else took the consequences for the situation created which brought to
destruction of Yugoslavia. In fact, not only that Serbia used the situation but other republics
in Yugoslavia used the later situation to secede. Perhaps it would be good for us to wait for
somebody else to take the responsibility for destruction of Yugoslavia and then use it...

KOSOVA 15 YEARS AFTER

THE EVALUATIONS WERE ANTI-ALBANIAN

(Why I resigned?)

by MAHMUT BAKALLI

Mahmut Bakalli, the main actor of events in 1981 did not want to make any appraisal of
events then, under justification that he was preoccupied with the difficult present condition
and solution of future position of Kosova. But, he made the following statement for "KOHA",
after insitingly asked to talk about his resignation:

The events of 1981 proper were serious, but the wrong qualifications and attacks against the
Albanian people and position of Kosova made by the leadership of Serbia and former
Yugoslavia were even more serious and bore heavy consequences for our people. There were
tendencies for the demonstrations to be dramatised to the level that would legalise draconic
measures against Albanian people, instead of having a moderate judgement which could serve
as good lessons. Thus it happened that two parallel evaluations were made: ours, moderate,
and those by a group in Presidency of Yugoslavia, under influence of Serbia, headed by Lazar
Kolisevski. In the end of April, I rounded up and verified our judgement once more in a

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meeting of both Presidencies of Kosova (Party and autonomy), in the presence of our
representatives at the federal level, and there we reached full unity. I attended the meeting of
the two Presidencies of Yugoslavia and in a long speech I presented our evaluations and
opposed the evaluations presented as the posture of the state Presidency where
demonstrations in Kosova were qualified as "counter-revolution". Most of debaters kept to
this qualification. I intervened once more demanding not to approve such a wrong
qualification and warned that if it were to be approved I would resign. I did this because I was
aware and anticipated that such qualification - "counter-revolution" - would be followed by
severe repercussions against Albanian people and bear serious political consequences.

During the pause, some of participants of the meeting approached me trying to convince me
to withdraw my threat to resign, and avoid to be blamed, etc. When the meeting continued, I
said that I was suggested by some participants not to resign because this would allegedly
destabilise Yugoslavia!? I think that it is not my resignation but your wrong qualification that
will destabilise Yugoslavia, I replied. I do not want to implement such evaluations and do not
want to apply them, therefore I keep to my decision to resign. Few days later, I informed
leadership of some municipalities of Kosova and both Presidencies of Kosova about the
qualifications and my decision to resign and asked them not to hinder me in my decision, to
try to understand my motives, because by resigning I aimed to pull behind me the black
political clouds which had covered Kosova then. And thus, on May 5, 1981, I resigned before
Provincial Committee, and my resignation was approved. There were other cadres from
Kosova who expressed their will to resign, but I asked them not to do this because it would
bring to weakening of state and political institutions of autonomy of Kosova then".

KOSOVA 15 YEARS LATER

KOSOVA SPRING REVEALED THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

by MEHMET HAJRIZI

The events in 1981 should be looked at in the historical context of movement for
independence of Kosova and Albanians in one side, and circumstances in the international
plan at that time. The political system in the East was passing the years of old age and general
rust. Yugoslavia was also burdened with national problem for decades. Albanians were
undoubtfully in the focus of the national problems in Yugoslavia. Only 10 years later, the
dramatic destruction of the creature called Yugoslavia happened. Kosova's Spring '81
revealed the deep crisis in Yugoslavia and announced its inevitable destruction.

Demonstrations in 1981 are a very important tie in historical chain of national movement in
Kosova in particular and Albanian movement in general.

Incomplete and equivocal solution of status of Kosova in Yugoslav constitution in 1974

inevitably led to the glorious but tragic events of 1981. Constitutional hybrid of status of
Kosova gave possibility and chance for its enhancement or impairment. It was a temporary
and lingering problem of Kosova. The leadership of Kosova of that time had no knowledge,
ability, nor courage to advance this status. In the other hand, the Serbian policy (legal and the
one from underground) drew designs (let's remind us of the Blue Book among others) to
abolish its constitutional status and rights achieved by Albanians in Kosova and in

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Yugoslavia. This danger, after Tito's death, was closer and closer and more and more
touchable. Illusions for Kosova's leadership were disappearing. Albanian people of Kosova,
in a difficult economic, social, political state and insecure of their future went onto streets to
express their political will, to cry out for their legitimate demands to have their fate in their
hands.

The '81 demonstrations are historical because all population of Kosova participated then, as
well as because of their character and content and the brutal reaction by regime then.

As the result of this was international echo and the start of internationalisation of problem of
Kosova. At the same time the international public opinion and the false image of Yugoslavia
as country of national equality and a successful political model of socialism were destroyed.

The resistance of Albanian people in Kosova has not ceased for a single moment since 1981,
but neither has state of emergency proclaimed on 2 April 1981 been abrogated.

Events in 1981 in Kosova, in terms of masses, character, content and form represent the first
plebiscite, sui generis, of people of Kosova, expression of a will that will be repeated, now in
institutionalised form in 1991, in the Referendum for independence of Kosova.

1981 was an outcome of 1974. Any incomplete solution of the problem of Kosova, any '74s
will inevitably lead to new '81s. Only a just and full solution of problem of Kosova can be
called firm and good grounds, not only for peace in the region but also for friendship among
peoples.

ECONOMY

"'TREPÇA' WORKS - BELGRADE GROWS"

by IBRAHIM REXHEPI / Prishtina

Nuri Bashota, among others, in one of his works wrote: "It was actually the wealth of Kosova
to be robbed for years by Belgrade. The revolutionary youth of Kosova had good grounds
when they shouted during their marches in 1968 and 1981, as well as during the resistance
expressed by miners through strikes during February - March 1989: "Trepça" works -
Belgrade grows"! This was the "Trepça limited" whose money Pasic used to make
concessions to England, among others, to educate 160 Serb students per year in English
universities, mainly with Intelligence Service and Royal Institute for Diplomacy. The
resources of this European giant were well-known, therefore Serbia rushed to occupy it as
soon as possible". Whereas, Zeki Bejtullahu supports the other theory that: "It is forgotten
that for 15 years Kosova had its own sovereignty and especially its autonomy in economic
development. This period was from 1968 until 1981... In all serious and non-serious games,
intentionally or unintentionally, US$ 12 billion were spent. The growth of the employment
rate was slow, because a job was very expensive, and the income stagnated, in relation with
investments made. Many things happened. New out-institutional ties which came into the
surface in the marches of 1981 were made. Not merely non-malicious clans. They rather
looked like the Fifth Column". But, Hilmi Troni, senior lecturer, has a different approach to
economic relations in the Former Yugoslavia. "Price control was centralised. Prices of

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electric power and ferrous metals were fully controlled, those of tobacco industry were
controlled up to 94% and the chemical industry was controlled to 74%". Knowing the
structure of industrial production in Kosova, it results that their prices were fully controlled
by Belgrade. Maybe the whole mesh of events is best described by Mustafë Blakaj, who says:
"Serbian and Yugoslav chauvinist decision-making centres, in the economic development
plan, were not led by policy of social efficiency and rentability of investments, but rather by
discriminatory policy: develop Kosova as much as the Slavic element is present, the rest are
to be forced to emigrate. Thus, it was not the model of economic logic to be applied, it was
rather the model of national chauvinistic logic to implement ethnic cleansing. Kosova
stagnated economically, but ethnic cleansing was not achieved because: the majority, the
Albanian people, autochthonous, had no other fatherland..."

The slogan used in all Albanian marches "'Trepça' works - Belgrade grows" was not shouted
by accident and without firm reasons. Approaches made to interpret it, either scientific or
quasi-scientific, or political or quasi-political, could not leave aside the conclusion that
Kosova was exploited, mainly through investments for development of an economic structure
which responded only to the interest of the state existing then. In other words, it was to back
up aliens' interests, whereas the Albanian population was forced to live without jobs and in
poverty. One comparison only will illustrate the whole game: in the first years of WW II
Kosova would reach half the level of economic development of Yugoslavia, and in 1989 it
could hardly reach the quarter of that development. Hence statements about a quick
development of Kosova were nothing else but a political propaganda. Ali Jakupi wrote:
"According to the annual average realised in the post-war period until 1980 and the national
income realised by the Former Yugoslavia and other republics individually, in 1980 Kosova
would reach the level of former Yugoslavia in 2003, Slovenia - 2016, Croatia -2007,
Vojvodina - 2016, Serbia - 2003, Macedonia - 1996 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003".
This means that Kosova was stagnating behind the other for about a quarter of a century.

Then what happened with large "capital" investments, which, according to Serb propaganda
reached to "more than one million US dollars per day"? How could this period be
characterised as failed from the economic aspect if it is known that it was the time of surface
exploitation of coal with additional capacities, of two electric power plants working in full
capacity, of "Ferronikel" plant, of modern capacities in "Trepça" and a large number of other
factories raised from the Federation Funds, or as they would be called then: premises from
joint labour and means? Was it because former Yugoslavia, after the events of 1981,
approached the economic development of Kosova in more serious way? If such a theory was
to be accepted then, the most moderate qualification for it would be - deceit. Bejtullahu stated
that during all periods of development, Kosova got US$ 12 million, mainly as aid from
Republics of the former common state. He even stated that this was the minimum. But the
way the aid was utilised in a completely different matter. There were too many failures. It was
because of our failures, and of others also. But, in any ways, it should not be forgotten that
Kosova was always treated as a reservation of raw materials, as a colony. But interest for any
investment there would be for someone else not for Albanians.

1981 begun with rather big cracks in the field of economy as well. We are not talking only of
repression which increased from year to year, but also of a new strategy, which was mainly
prepared by circles out of Kosova, and was strictly applied. Although not in direct way, an
alien, destructive and exploiting hand was felt in all segments of production and
development. Kosova did not have its own potential to act independently, in centralised
relations, since a large part of social product which could have been invested in living

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conditions and development, was allocated to state treasury of Serbia and Yugoslavia.
Discussions of how to utilise means from the Fund of Federation, which in almost all designs
accounted for by 70% begun in the same year. Theory that almost half of these funds were to
be utilised through joint investments and the remaining part to be "cash" was adopted. In
essence, there was nothing new, apart from that means should be held as far away as possible
from investors - in this case the ones from Kosova. With means, which in essence should be
only refunding of the part that the others took from Kosova, Yugoslav republics and
Vojvodina started to keep their liquidity, and even to invest on their own development. This
means that this possibility, which was quite efficient before eighties now was cut to half. The
more years passed, the inflow of means was slower, and it almost stagnated totally. They
were more and more controlled up in Belgrade. But, products from Kosova, the ones of
strategic interest, did not change their direction of flow. Products of "Trepça", such as lead
and zinc, were of state interest and in most of cases they were in the lists of inter-state
arrangements, when interest was gained by somebody else and not workers of "Trepça".
Capacity of electric power generated in Kosova was so large that Kosova would not be able to
consume not even half of it. If it is known that prices were controlled from above and were
too low, then who could have profited but large consumers such as large steel plants
throughout Yugoslavia and other manufacturers. "Trepça" and Electric Company of Kosova
participated with more that one third of the total industrial production. The rest consisted of
products which were not very much competitive. It was not by chance why there was a rather
liberal policy in the branches out of ferrous metals and electric power production. There are
no qualifications on who gained and who lost under such relations, apart from a statement
made by Hilmi Troni that "Kosova gave nine dinars and gained one, and that if rate of
migration of labour force, turnover of goods and customs duty are considered, it will come
out that Kosova gave 16 dinars and received one".

When it was noticed that a part of funds from Federation Fund was allocated to Albanian
settlements after 1985 a new policy begun, the policy of developing local communities with
Serb population, with the allegedly intention to prevent their emigration. State organs in
Kosova then assisted in defining these settlements, and then forced some enterprises of
Kosova to set up their facilities in such settlements. There was a strategy to have a plant in
each Serb settlement. And this was partly realised. Serbia took under their supervision
economic development of Leposavic, Strpce, Fushë-Kosove, Obiliq, Novo-Brdo, Zubin
Potok, etc. It is interesting that other republics, such as Croatia started to reallocate an amount
of means towards Letnica and Janjeva (inhabited by Croats). None cared about Albanians any
more. The situation came when 69,6% of 237.119 employees in 1989 were Albanians, and
82% out of 198 000 persons recorded as unemployed were Albanians.

But after mass protests of workers in 1988 Albanians were mostly neglected from leadership
plans. According to "recipes" written above, Albanians were incapable to be directors,
therefore there was need to send "capable" personnel. Every enterprise prepared lists of staff-
needs, but almost none of them responded. Requests were made to build up apartments and
settlements, to grant credits with favourable conditions, and many more things. Although only
a little was realised then, they were preparations to colonise Kosova. A perfidious strategy
was used: economic facilities of interest for Serbia were built up, Albanians were declared as
incapable (latter to be differentiated and dismissed), personnel from Serbia was requested,
flats were built up for them.

The economy of Kosova in the nineties looks as follows: the larger part of enterprises does
not function and statistic data on the increase of production has no firm grounds. Although

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attempts are made, "Trepça" does not function. The electric power system of Kosova is
working for the power system of Serbia, from whom consumers from Kosova buy electricity.
More that 125 000 workers have been fired. Industrial production in 1994 was 69 % lower
that in 1988. 336 enterprises and institutions were put under forced management. All these
enterprises have been transformed and gone under ownership of Serbia.

In addition, 340 500 people have emigrated to Europe. There are 18 000 newly created
enterprises in Kosova, mainly owned by Albanians, with about 20 000 employees. There are
50 000 families whose survival is supported by humanitarian organisations. There are a little
more than 30 000 Albanians not dismissed, and in records of employment agencies there are
488 000 persons seeking job, all Albanians.

So from the slogan "'Trepça works - Belgrade grows" we came to times when "Trepça" does
not work and Albanians continue getting poor. Perhaps it is better to preserve resources of
this giant for the day when Albanians will defeat poverty?

SERBIA

SOCIALIST SURREALISM

by RADIVOJ CVETICANIN \ AIM \ Belgrade

After Dayton, when Milosevic announced his party congress, the only promise that he made
was that number of socialists would reach one million until their highest level meeting.
Efforts made in this direction cannot be denied, but only half of what was promised was
achieved. On Saturday, when the third Congress of Socialist Party of Serbia was held, none
remembered the promise.It was covered with new promises.

It was stated that the whole congress was turned towards its circle, ie. the society. Towards
what was designed to be not their, but our future. They wanted to play the role of a populist
party and to identify Serbia and Serbian people with themselves. They knew that there were
also some things that are not liked, especially if one does not look far behind in the past with
widely open eyes. Milosevic presented this history in few sentences. He presented the whole
failure of the design for a national state which was promoted by SPS during difficult years of
Yugoslav state and war crisis, as a kind of natural disaster and humanitarian problem. Serbs
in a disaster were assisted, and that was all.

This determination is presented much better in concrete activities, such as staff policy, than it
is done with words. The purge applied after Dayton to eliminate a number of people from the
top was completed in the congress. Warship lobby - Jovic, Markovic, Vucelic, Pankov - was
taken off the scene. Now they were joined by another corpus attached to former secretary
general Minic. He was pushed downhill, whereas TANJUG's director Slobodan Jovanovic
and Federal Minister of Information Dragutin Brcin had to leave their posts. They are
interesting because they were fierce fighters in the famous Eighth Session.

So Milosevic discharged the old staff, his comrades from the Eighth Session, the old luggage,
aiming thus to secure his new possible political challenges. Short commentaries to what
Milosevic said in the Congress which had nothing to do with "steps into the new century", are

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given here to show how the noise in official media preceding the congress, the glamour and
pompousness shown in the Congress, the socialist surrealism were in fact an inner need of the
party in order to maintain and exercises power. The glamour was not intended to cheat the
ones outside the party, but rather the ones inside it. This is why Milosevic spoke of one
million members because he needed a lever for new victories when elections are due. He also
spoke of the mobilisation immediately after the congress, on Saturday, when he called the
first meeting of Central Council of the Party.

It seems that socialists are determined to work on their own in the future. In whole
Yugoslavia. For example, Dragan Tomic, Speaker of the Parlaiment, told Momir Bulatovic
that it was time for a clear determination of functions in the federation and to build
Yugoslavia as a strong and modern European federation. The meaning was not quite clear,
but Montenegrins could have taken this as a threat. As regarding Serbia, Milosevic sent a
faint offer to other political forces. There ware no traces of the previous slogan for
government of National Unity. The Congress was attended by the last partner in coalition,
Dusan Mihajlovic, but he was not given the chance to speak whereas ties with Government of
Marjanovic and the Assembly of Serbia were not even mentioned. In fact, according to what
is known and said, the only combination and the only alliance in which is counted is the one
with "left forces".

This can be clearly supported by the fact that leaders of last coalition partners of Nova
Demokratija sat together with "others" whereas the chairman of JUL, Ljubisa Ristic, sat in the
first row. Mira Markovic, spiritual leader of JUL was not present. It is difficult to draw
serious conclusions if this had any deeper meaning. After the endo of the Congress, Ristic
stated that he was happy because due to what he heard SPS turned form "a party of left
orientation" into a "left party." (In the end "The International" was performed). Gorica
Gajevic, a new star of the party and new secretary, said that in the left front no quarrel was
allowed, but only cooperation. Speaker Tomic emphasised the need for cooperation, first of
all with Balkan countries, which is Markovic's preferable subject. But he did not go any
further. Taking into consideration speculations that appeared after Dayton and when the
socialist Congress was called, it might happen that the two parties could merge in "a wide
movement". It is clear that the brake was pulled somewhere. Where, this is difficult to say.

MACEDONIA

ONE RESIGNATION, TWO INTERVIEWS

by ISO RUSI \ Shkup

The continuation of the Parliament session (after the adoption of Ando's

resignation and the election of the new "speaker" Tito Petkovski, last vice
president of Parliament, from the Social Democratic League) might indicate
what is to happen in the future in the Parliament of Republic of Macedonia. In
most of cases, Liberals did not attend meetings, the remaining part of
parliamentarians from the new coalition showed monotony, and there was no
quorum in the meeting room so the new president of Parliament was forced to
postpone the session for several days. A perfect confirmation of the thesis that
after election, the "kitchen" is out of Parliament, "that there are some groups

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within some political circles which formulate laws presented to Parliament,
and approved by the government, and in this continuation nothing changes"
(Arbën Xhaferi in his interview given to "Fokus", which will be treated later
here under reserve of the accuracy of translations Albanian-Macedonian-
Serb/Croatian-Albanian-English!). Let's take one at a time.

After premier Branko Cervenkovski's and his Social Democratic League

decision to clear up (for five years undefined) relations with Liberal Party
(second in importance in the so called League for Macedonia pulled by the
Gligorov "engine", president of Republic), it was clear that one member of
"trilling" who was first to identify Macedonia in the last period as pluralist,
president of Parliament Stojan Andov, leaves that position. Simply there was
no other solution for him as president of the party which was expelled from the
coalition in power. He could not remain in the place of the first man in the
Parliament because his ministers in Government ran out of jobs, and survival
in one of the three most important functions in the state was uncertain because
of real possibility that the Social-Democratic League of Macedonia could
change him any time they wanted. And second - he could be voted non-
confidence by the party he was leading.

For a long time it was thought that Andov had "a hidden joker under his coat"
during the three months agony of coalition in power called League for
Macedonia. It was supposed that him and Gligorov, each for his own reasons,
would protect the election coalition. When their activities, public and those
non-public, remained without effects, it was expected that Andov would at
least communicate something to the opinion. It seemed that Andov prevented
the situation to be "over the events". What he did was that he avoided to
appear in public while reconstruction of the government was staggering,
chaired meetings of Parliament where the new Government was elected and
then announced his resignation and the "pioneering" work to constitute the
opposition in the Parliament. It was expected that the announcement of his
resignation in the Parliament would be a good opportunity for former partners
to tell him openly what they thought of him, but this did not happen.

Andov sent a written statement whose motto was "I withdraw because the
League is dead", by which he played the card that elections were won by
coalition of three parties, that after election triumph of Gligorov's League each
one was elected in key functions in the state, as part of it, and not as party
representative, not failing to mention one thing known by everyone that
premier ruined the League and formed a new one and that this brought to
breach of relations regulated in Constitution between the government and the
Parliament. Again the other "loser", president Gligorov was involved: Andov
is worried by breach of relations regulated in Constitution between premier
and president of Republic and premier and the Parliament, and the principle of
responsibility in the Parliament was abandoned and Parliament was brought to
the subordinated role in relation with the Government. The last conclusion
sends us back to the quotation from the interview of Albanian "radicalist"
Xhaferi given to weekly "tabloid" with largest number of copies issued, after
puzzle and riddle magazine "Kotelec", "Fokus".

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There is an estimation of quality of actual government in the mentioned
interview, which is interesting not only because of Xhaferi's explications about
relations between two largest populations in Macedonia, "When someone
wants to be exclusive he is declared sick... the fact that Macedonia is hurt,
sick, can be swallowed by neighbours but an exclusive development is needed
to do this" said leader of PPDSH Xhaferi for "Fokus" to draw attention that
"with such system of methods Macedonia is ruined from inside, and the
opposition, creative resources, institutions fall down... all are included in a
political idea and in the end we will have an atrophied Macedonia which has
entered European structures as an alien body. And none will profit anything
from such Macedonia. There will be the rank of rich people who, in a twinkle
of an eye, occupied economic and political spaces. Finally, an ordinary
Macedonian will ask himself what has he gained from all this". Xhaferi reverts
to the support that Macedonia enjoys from the west. "Macedonia is targeting to
enter western structures. But they cannot be entered carrying Balkanian
luggage, not with our paranoia, neither Albanian nor Macedonian. Because of
this, Macedonia should be redesigned, among others, pointing that Macedonia
has been avoiding western expertise and is led by the illusion "we know
everything, you should give us money and we will become a happy and
modern state."

In the same interview, Xhaferi supported the idea for early elections: "We
consider that this regime has lost its legitimacy in the time of elections, and we
knew that they were 'adjusted'. It was a naive way to deceit the electorate so
the one who should win would win... Second, we consider that election laws
are not all right and that a complete re-designing of democracy in Macedonia
is needed". Xhaferi further adds that "Macedonians themselves become
victims of self-dribbling", that opposition concludes that there are no
differences between us (Albanians) and them (Macedonians) because they are
deceived, because a repressive thing is bound to destroy itself". Seven days
ago the same magazine published the interview with former president of the
reformed communists, now president of Democratic Party, Petar Gosev. In the
interview it can be easily seen that there is an identity of attitudes in "general"
matters between him and Xhaferi (although according to Gosev, in relation
with Albanians, does not have any other posture than the one the "position"
has).

The leader of the Democratic Party, which abandoned last elections together
with VMRO-DPMNE in the second round because of forgeries, considers that
breach of League for Macedonia (synonym for "election falsification") is a
harsh fight between clans of the oligarchic top in the Macedonian government.
According to him, it was proved that the League was only a trick, dust
dedicated to voters which shows that crisis is much deeper than what it was
supposed to be, that there is transparent irresponsible ruling, that none of
economic achievements was made, that policy is disastrous for economy, that
money from state treasury is abused, that bribe and corruption dominate in the
top of the state, that life is becoming more and more insecure...

Gosev is pessimistic in terms of development of events in the future: "There

will come the period of further suffocation of democratic processes.

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Authoritarian and despotic forms of rule will strengthen. Dimension of human
rights will be developed further more on criterial basis: first, economic power
(economic census), second party-political persuasion and third loyal service to
self-proclaimed representatives of invisible and visible high state interests".

Gosev and his party, as well as Xhaferi and his party, have almost identical
postures as regarding last elections, suggestions for new elections, system of
early elections (proportional instead of majority...)

Early elections are the card used by all the dissatisfied (starting from expelled
Liberals to extra-parliamentary opposition). The losers of the now rump
League for Macedonia at the moment are Andov and president Gligorov.
Premier Cervenkovski together with his team undertook the responsibility of
further development of events. Most of them think that he is working against
himself and that temporary experienced losers count on time factor when the
premier will "slip down" whereas the experienced ones will triumph. But now
this is "a stage" play.

Identity, or better to say similarity, of predictions of what will happen in

Macedonia can be interpreted as general revolt in behaviour of actual
authorities - ranging from "thrown" Gligorov, expelled Andov and ending with
opposition - Macedonians out of parliament and Albanians partly present in
Parliament. Common name for all of them is dissatisfaction with what is
happening.

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