CONSTI CASE LIST:

I. INTRODUCTION: THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE

STATE AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
1. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM,
51 SCRA 189
2. Simon vs. Commission on human rights digest, 229 SCRA
117
II. POLICE POWER, DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION
3. MMDA vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION G.R. No. 170656 Aug.
15, 2007
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:
A. PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT
4. Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986]
5. PITC v. Angeles [GR 108461, 21 October 1996]
6. Republic vs. Extelcom [GR 147096, 15 January 2002];
B. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
7. Banco Filipino vs Palanca 37 Phil. 921 March 26, 1918
(Judicial Due Process Requisites)
8. Galvez vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 114046 October 24,
1994
9. STATE PROSECUTORS, vs.JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, 236 scra 505 A.M. No.
RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
10. JUAN C. CARVAJAL, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLID
HOMES, INC., [G.R. No. 98328. October 9, 1997]
11. Hubert Webb, petitioner vs Hon. Raul de Leon G.R. No.
121234, 247 scra 652 August 23, 1995
12. PEOPLE vs CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE,JR.,GR Nos.11120608 Oct.6, 1995
13.People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001]

14. SEE 16 AND 17

15. SUPRA 13
16. Perez v. Estrada, AM No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001
17. Perez v. Estrada [A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. September 13,
2001]
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
18. Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]
19. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, vs. JUDGE
FILOMENO PASCUAL, [A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996]
20. Atty. NapoleonS. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000
21. Lumiqued vs. exevea [G.R. No. 117565. November 18,
1997]
22. Fabella v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110379, 28 November
1997, 282 SCRA 256.
23. Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442, 6 April
2000]
24. Office of the Ombudsman v. Coronel, G.R. No. 164460,
June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 392
25. Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000]
26. Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24,
2002
27. Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19,
2007)
C. ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
28. Guzman v.National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11,
1986, 142 SCRA 699
29. Alcuaz vs. PSBA 161 SCRA 7
30. Non vs. Judge Dames 185 SCRA [GR 89317, 20 May 1990]
31. ADMU VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG 222 SCRA
644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993
32. UP vs. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342 G.R. No. 110280 October
12, 1993

1. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM, 51 SCRA 189

Facts:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a
mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass
demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of
the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the
union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in factan exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right
to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt
the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if
they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that
while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts
should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed.
Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the
PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.

Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the
CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority
"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men
and women by whom we shall be governed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 100150,

January 5, 1994
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and
order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters
complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear
before the CHR. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed
on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were
not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business". On
March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and
supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration
was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991. The Petitioner filed a a
petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and
investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al"
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority
and power of the CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority
and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and
functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part,
all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an
adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision
directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to
issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is
pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The writ prayed for the
petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding
with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

3. MMDA vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION G.R. No. 170656 Aug. 15, 2007
It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the mass transport system.
FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila
the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, Providing for the
Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. As determined
in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been
the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and
commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes.
To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus
terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the
construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more convenient
access to mass transport system to the commuting public.
The project provided for under this E.O. was called Greater Manila
Transport System (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the
implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the governing
board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the
project.
The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation
with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp
Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it
permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of
property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act
which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as
a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers; and that
Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order
the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O.
unconstitutional.
The MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy
in the case for declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was
only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with
the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the
authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179
was a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional

HELD: By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Greater

Manila Transport System, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the
authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires
Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President
Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order
reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated
the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and
regulate networks of transportation and communications.
The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and
administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and
communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to
issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be
necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President
may also exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation
of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for
transportation. Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control
over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws
under the Constitution.
Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of
networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport
system. By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Project,
the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires.
In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA
cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act
(R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including
transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been
recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not
granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies
of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila.

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as
envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by
the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot
validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA,
its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid
police power measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a public,
not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt
need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila
which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of
buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of
existing transport system.
With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O.
seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport
terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their
existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking
areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents
terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic
congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents
bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing
reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of
transference from one site to another.
Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with
the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the
maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally
considered a necessary service by provincial bus operators, hence, the
investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable
terminal sites.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986]

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Taada,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI] sought a writ of mandamus to
compel Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as
Director, Malacaang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity
as Director, Bureau of Printing, to publish, and or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for
the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect. The decision was concurred only by 3 justices.
Tanada, et. al. move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on
various questions. They suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the
Official Gazette. The Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for
advisory opinion. Meanwhile, the February EDSA Revolution took place,
which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on
the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether laws should be published in full and in the Official
Gazette only.
Held: Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Publication is required, even if their
enactment is otherwise provided or effective immediately. The term "laws"
should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do
not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. Publication
requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution;

(3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or

implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a
city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board
circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to (1)
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public; (2) Letters
of Instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies. Further,
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. It should be published in the
Official Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and
come out regularly, this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5. Philippine International Trading Corp. (PITC) v. Angeles [GR 108461,
21 October 1996]

1990 and 1991, under which was specified the commodities to be traded
between them. On August 1989, PITC issued Administrative Order (AO)
SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which, applications to the PITC for importation
from China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export
Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself
or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the
value of the importation from PROC being applied for or 1:1 ratio. Remington
Industrial Sales Corp. and Firestone Ceramics, both domestic corporations,
organized and existing under Philippine-laws, individually applied for
authority to import from PROC with PITC. They were granted such authority.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import
applications were withheld by PITC from Remington and Firestone, such that
the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. On 20 January
1992, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer
for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against PITC in the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Makati Branch 58).
On 4 January 1993, Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles (Presiding Judge) upheld the
petition for prohibition and mandamus of Remington and Firestone (Civil
Case 92-158), and declaring PITC AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its regulations
null, void, and unconstitutional. PITC filed the petition seeking the reversal of
Angeles decision.
Issue: Whether AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 binds Remington and Firestone.

Facts: On 6 August 1973, the Philippine International Trading Corporation

(PITC) was created as a government owned or controlled corporation under
Presidential Decree (PD) 252. On 9 May 1977, PD 1071 revised the
provisions of PD 252, where the purposes and powers of the said
governmental entity were enumerated under Sections 5 and 6 thereof. On 9
August 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of
Instruction (LOI) 444, directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all
commodities) between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other
Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), including the People's
Republic of China (PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed through the PITC.
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on 27 February 1987, then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) 133
reorganizing the DTI empowering the said department to be the "primary
coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for
the country's trade, industry and investment activities." The PITC was made
one of DTI's line agencies. Sometime in April 1988, following the State visit of
President Aquino to the PROC, the Philippines and PROC entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to
make joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade and to
strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value
of their imports and exports during the period. Conformably with the MOU,
the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989,

Held: The PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a

valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. Administrative Order
SOCPEC 89-08-01 is not, however, a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative
power. The original AO issued on 30 August 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of genera circulation. The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context
of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., PD
1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. It was only on 30 March 1992 when
the amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law
Center, and published in the National Administrative Register as required by
the Administrative Code of 1987.The fact that the amendments to AO
SOCPEC 89 08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in
the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the
effectivity of the Administrative Order. Further, the Administrative Order,
without force and effect due to the lack of publication, thus cannot exact any
obligation from Remington and Firestone, specifically, charges for the 0.5%
Counter Export Development Service.

6. Republic vs. Extelcom GR 147096, 15 January 2002

Facts: On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now
Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or
Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to install, operate and maintain a digital
Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional
Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on 22 January 1993, the NTC issued
Memorandum Circular 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide or
regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the Commission on or
before 15 February 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed after
said date until further orders. On 6 May 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice
of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantel's original application, Bayantel filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. On 17 May 1993, the notice
of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was published
in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing
were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the
amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its
evidence, the NTC issued an Order dated 19 December 1993 stating that in view of
the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and
GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the
service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may not remain
pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archived without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available.
On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the
availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the
NTC granted BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's application and set the case for
hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the application
was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite
frequency shall become available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom)
filed in NTC Case 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of Bayantel's application; arguing that Bayantel's motion sought the revival
of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago, and thus, the documentary
evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in said application are all outdated and
should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service.
On 3 May 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional
authority to operate CMTS service, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of
Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the Order
reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional
authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and
Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 allocating frequency bands to new public
telecommunication entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain
CMTS. On 13 September 2000, the Court of Appeals granted the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for, annulling and setting aside the NTC orders dated 1
February and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case 92-486, dismissing Bayantel's Amended
Application without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel and
the NTC, the latter being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular 9-

3-2000 be also declared null and void. On 9 February 2001, the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for
lack of merit. Hence, the the present petition, Extelcom contends, among others,
that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the
Office of the National Administrative Register on 3 February 1993. These
Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a
provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion
before the Commission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to
the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in
a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.

Issue: Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure
should govern in the approval of Bayantels application.
Held: The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the
Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the
1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken
effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact
that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February
3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987
which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National
Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is
furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts,
the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may
select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and
mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes,
rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of
these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera.
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that
said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the
1978 Rules that governs.

7. Banco Filipino vs Palanca 37 Phil. 921 March 26, 1918 (Judicial Due
Process Requisites)
FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of
land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property
is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make
his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios
property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died.
Since Engracio is a non resident, El Banco has to notify Engracio about their
intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court
further ordered the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be
sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to
execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of
Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling.
Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never
received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for
judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;
1.) There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and decide the matter before it.
2.) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or
over the property subject of the proceedings.
3.) The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4.) Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
8. Galvez vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent
Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in
three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide fot has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14,
Rule 110, the amendment of the information may also be made even if it may
result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M93 to 3644-M-93. 5 Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and
were subsequently released from detention.
On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L.
Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to
enable him "to review the evidence on record and determine once more the
proper crimes chargeable against the accused," 6 which was granted by
Judge Villajuan in an order dated November 16, 1993. 7Thereafter, pursuant
to Department Order No. 369 of the Department of Justice, respondent
Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial

Prosecutor of Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the

aforesaid criminal cases filed against herein petitioners. 8
By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated November 23,
1993 9 filed by respondent prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered
suspended by Judge Villajuan until after the prosecution's request for change
of venue shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court, and the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the former shall have been
terminated. 10 It appears that on December 2, 1993, private complainants,
through their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III, had filed with the Supreme
Court a Petition for Change of Venue of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to
3644-M-93, purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and their
witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 11
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, respondent prosecutor filed
an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases. 12 This motion
was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases
were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. 13 On the same day,
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners
for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms 14 which were
subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of Branch 10,
Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and were docketed therein as Criminal Cases
Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93. No bail having been recommended for the
crime of murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein
petitioners. 15 On December 23, 1993, said presiding judge issued an order
setting the arraignment of the accused for December 27, 1993. 16
On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment before Judge
Pornillos were reset due to the absence of respondent prosecutor. On even
date, petitioners filed before Judge Villajuan a Motion for Reconsideration of
his order of December 15, 1993 which granted the motion to withdraw the
original informations. 17
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack
of
jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3,
1994. 18 At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January
24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash and,
at the same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners
when the latter refused to enter their plea. 19
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners
before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge
Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, and
setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. 20 On
said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994

issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners' motion to quash filed in

Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 and 4007-M-93. As earlier stated,
respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of
February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
I. On the Main Petition
The main issue in this case involves a determination of the set of
informations under which herein petitioners should be tried, that is, (a) the
first set of informations for homicide and frustrated homicide in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, or (b) the subsequent informations for
murder, frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms in Criminal
Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93. Several corollary but equally important
issues have likewise been addressed to us for resolution, to wit:
1. Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations
is null and void on the ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as
required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b) the
appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the prosecution was
to amend the informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant to
Section 14 of Rule 110;
2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original
informations was immediately final and executory
3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to
quash and thereby acquired jurisdiction over the new informations
considering that (a) the designated public prosecutor allegedly had no
authority to file the second set of informations; and (b) the filing thereof
constituted forum shopping; and
4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 was valid.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
1. It is petitioners' submission that the prosecution's failure to serve
them a copy of the motion to withdraw the original informations and to set
said motion for hearing constitutes a violation of their right to be informed of
the proceedings against them, as well as a violation of Sections 4, 5 and 6,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Hence, so they contend, the ex parte motion
should be considered as a worthless scrap of paper and Judge Villajuan had
no authority to act on it. Ergo, the order granting the same is null and void.
Petitioners advance the theory that respondent prosecutor should have
amended the original informations instead of withdrawing the same and filing
new ones. They postulate that the principle of nolle prosequi does not apply
in this case since the withdrawal or dismissal of an information is addressed
solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court which has the option
to grant or deny it and the prosecution cannot impose its opinion on the
court. It is further stressed that in case there is a need to change the nature
of the offense charged, that is, from homicide to murder, by adding the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the only legal and proper remedy is

through the filing of the corresponding amended information; and that the
withdrawal of an information is allowed only where the new information
involves a different offense which does not include or is not included in the
offense originally charged. Normally, an accused would not object to the
dismissal of an information against him because it is to his best interest not
to oppose the same. Contrarily, if the accused should deem such conditional
or provisional dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him, he could object to
such dismissal and insist that the case be heard and decided on the
merits. 21 However, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of
the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex
parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be
arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof.
In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the
original three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of
which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had
these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no
cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the
supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and
granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress
us as a candid presentation of their real position.
Petitioners' contention that the dismissal of the original informations
and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to
bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the
fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the
capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right
to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners
could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent
ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is
charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of
discretion under either an amended or a new information.
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the absence of notice and
hearing does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the
motion. It has been held that The order of the court granting the motion to
dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is
merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court
of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the
merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is
either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the
court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal and
notcertiorari. 22
Besides, when petitioners were given by Judge Villajuan the
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, even assuming the alleged
procedural infirmity in his issuance of the order of dismissal, the same was
thereby deemed cured. This is especially so in this case since, on his order,
the original informations were reinstated in Branch 14 of the trial court. The
rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in

court any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the

conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion
of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in court, he
cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the
prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been
brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter
should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. 23 The
only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be
conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court
must be secured. And, if after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a
cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of
the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 25
It is not denied that in the present case, the court granted the motion of
respondent prosecutor for the suspension of the proceedings until the reinvestigation thereof shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the prosecutor
arrived at a finding that petitioners should have been charged with murder,
frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms. This prompted him to
file an ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide. Although the motion did not state the reasons for the
withdrawal of the informations, nevertheless, the court in the exercise of its
discretion granted the same, as a consequence of which a new set of
informations was thereafter filed and raffled to another branch of the court.
Petitioners now question the propriety of the procedure adopted by the
prosecution, insisting that an amendment, not a new information, was
required under the circumstances. It must here be emphasized that
respondent prosecutor sought, and was subsequently granted, permission by
the court to dismiss the original informations. It cannot therefore be validly
claimed that the prosecutor exceeded his authority in withdrawing those
informations because the same bore the imprimatur of the court. The issue is
thus focused on whether or not under the given situation the court acted
correctly in dismissing the original informations rather than ordering the
amendment thereof.
It has been observed that while the Rules of Court gives the accused
the right to move for the quashal of the information, it is silent with respect to
the right of the prosecutor to ask for a dismissal or withdrawal thereof. 26 A
perusal of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure will show that there are
only two provisions concerning the dismissal of an information other than on
motion of the accused, namely, Section 14 of Rule 110 and Section 11 of
Rule 119. But then, it may be contended that these rules speak of a dismissal
by the court when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, but

make no mention of a dismissal made upon application of the prosecution.

That is not necessarily so.
It is true that Section 11, Rule 119 is virtually a restatement of
Section 14, Rule 110, providing as it does that:
Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense. When it becomes manifest at any time
before judgment, that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of
the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily
included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if
there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case,
the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper
offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the
proper information. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rule 119 is the rule specifically governing the trial stage where
evidence is necessarily being presented, hence the trial court is now in a
better position to conclude that manifestly the accused cannot be convicted
of the offense charged or of one that it necessarily includes. It would primarily
be the function of the court to motu proprioorder the dismissal of the case
and direct the filing of the appropriate information. We do not discount the
possibility of either the prosecution or the defense initiating such dismissal
and substitution at that stage, although, from a realistic point of view, that
would be a rare situation. This provision, therefore, is more directly and
principally directed to the trial court to invest it with the requisite authority to
direct by itself the dismissal and refiling of the informations therein
contemplated.
Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for
the prosecution of offenses. Section 14 thereof, quoted infra, provides in its
second paragraph the procedure and requisites for the substitution of a
defective information by the correct one. Although, just like Section 11 of
Rule 119 the permissible stage for effecting that substitution is "at any time
before judgment," unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that "it appears . . .
that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, . . . ." The
situation under said Section 14 contemplates a longer time span, inclusive of
the period from the filing of the information up to and before trial. Since no
evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be
discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of
course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again,
realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same.
That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that
such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into
account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should
institute remedial measures for the dismissal of the original information and
the refiling of the correct one, otherwise he would be recreant to his duties.
It is interesting to note that in the American jurisdiction, such right is
specifically recognized under Rule 48 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure which provides that the entry of a nolle prosequi by the

Government is a permissible right, although requiring in all cases the
approval of the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. 27 As a matter of
fact, the prosecuting attorney is given the broad power, sole authority and
discretion to enter a nolle prosequi provided he does not act arbitrarily 28 and
subject to the discretion of the court.
In several cases, we have also impliedly recognized the propriety of such a
procedure particularly in those instances where the prosecution is allowed to
dismiss or withdraw an information on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. We have even gone further by imposing upon the fiscal, as he was
then called, the duty to move for the dismissal of the information if he is
convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish, at least prima facie,
the guilt of the accused. 29
In this case now before us, what is involved is a dismissal effected at
the instance of the prosecutor by reason of a mistake in charging the proper
offense, in order that new informations can be filed. The problem that may be
posited, and should now be resolved, is when the fiscal may be allowed to
move to dismiss an information and when he should merely move to amend
it.
Section 14 of Rule 110, which is invoked by petitioners, reads as follows:`
Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form,
by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would
not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the
information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the
substitution of the information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the
court can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense,
provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and
that could only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily include or is
not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information.
It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110, the amendment of the information may also be made even if it may
result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused. Hence, in the case of Dimalibot vs.
Salcedo, 30 the accused therein were originally charged with homicide and
were released on bail. However, the then provincial fiscal, after a review of
the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution, discovered that the killing
complained of was perpetrated with the qualifying circumstances of

treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and employing means to

weaken the defense of the victim. Consequently, an amended information for
murder was filed against the accused who were ordered re-arrested without
the amount of bail being fixed, the new charge being a capital offense.
The Court ruled therein that the amendment was proper, pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 106 of the 1940 Rules of Court (now Section 14, Rule 110
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), thus:
Here these rules properly apply, since it is undisputed that the herein
accused were not yet arraigned before the competent court when the
complaint for homicide was amended so as to charge the crime of murder.
Upon the authority of said rules, the amendment could therefore be made
even as to substance in order that the proper charge may be made. The
claim that such amendment can only refer to matters of specification
affecting the elements constituting the crime is not correct, for there is
nothing in the rule to show that the nature of the amendment should only be
limited to matters of specification. The change may also be made even if it
may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
Be that as it may, it is quite plausible under Section 14 of Rule 110 that,
instead of an amendment, an information for homicide may also be
dismissed before the accused pleads, to give way to the filing of a new
information for murder. This may be deduced from the pronouncement of the
Court in the aforecited case of Dimalibot, to wit:
This clearly appears from the second part of Section 13 of Rule 106
which says that, if it appears before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original information
and order the filing of a new one provided the defendant may not be placed
in double jeopardy. If a new information may be ordered at any time before
judgment no reason is seen why the court may not order the amendment of
the information if its purpose is to make it conformable to the true nature of
the crime committed. . . .
In the subsequent case of Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, et al., 31 however,
Section 14 of Rule 110 was clarified to mean as follows:
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution
of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but
they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes,
while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original
charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without
leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as
the original information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for
another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused;
in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and
the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the

original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to
the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the
objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn,
the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution
requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense
which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge,
hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment
under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of
information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the
second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an
amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that
initially charged, a substitution is in order.
In any event, we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the
withdrawal of the original informations, there having been no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in granting the motion and, more
importantly, in consideration of the fact that the motion to withdraw was filed
and granted before herein petitioners were arraigned, hence before they
were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a substitution was made at such
stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the
evil sought to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple
reason that no first jeopardy had as yet attached. Consequently, we hold that
although the offenses charged under the three new informations necessarily
include those charged under the original informations, the substitution of
informations was not a fatal error. A contrary ruling, to paraphrase from our
former pronouncements, would sacrifice substantial justice for formal
nuances on the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore, petitioner's
right to speedy trial was never violated since the new informations were filed
immediately after the motion to withdraw the original informations was
granted.
2. The controversy over the jurisdiction of Judge Pornillos to
entertain and act upon the new informations for murder, frustrated murder
and illegal possession of firearms, is grounded on three points of
disagreement.
Firstly, it is argued that the new informations were prematurely filed
considering that the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations
had not yet become final and executory and that, as a matter of fact, the
same was subsequently reconsidered and the case reinstated by Judge
Villajuan. Therefore, so petitioners postulate, Judge Pornillos could not
acquire jurisdiction over the same offense involving the same incident and
the same accused.

Secondly, petitioners contend that the dismissal of the original

informations and the filing of new ones which were raffled to another branch
of the court constituted forum shopping, and was tainted with malice
considering the indecent haste with which the motion to withdraw the
informations was filed, the order granting the same was issued, and the new
informations were filed, all of which took place on the same day. Pursuant to
the doctrinal ruling that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other
courts, it is theorized that the cognizance of the case taken by Judge
Villajuan barred Judge Pornillos from assuming jurisdiction thereover.
Finally, the designation of respondent Prosecutor Dennis VillaIgnacio (who was then First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Rizal)
as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan was arbitrary and without any
justifiable reason. It follows, therefore, so petitioners vigorously argue, that in
the absence of such authority, the informations should be considered null
and void by reason of which Judge Pornillos did not acquire jurisdiction over
the same.
On the other hand, respondents question the propriety of petitioners' filing of
a petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals
against the order of the lower court denying petitioners' motion to quash,
claiming that the proper remedy was to proceed to trial on the merits and
thereafter raise on appeal, as special defenses, the grounds invoked in the
motion to quash.
It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before
the accused is placed on trial and before he is called on to plead is not
equivalent to an acquittal, 32 and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense. 33 It is not a final disposition of the case. 34 Rather, it
partakes of the nature of a nonsuit or discontinuance in a civil suit and leaves
the matter in the same condition in which it was before the commencement
of the prosecution. 35
A dismissal is different from an acquittal. An order of dismissal which
is actually an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
reconsidered. 36 Furthermore, an acquittal is always based on the merits, that
is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but a dismissal does not
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals
terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance. 37 For dismissal to
be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have the effect of acquittal.
All these go to show, therefore, that the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 did not amount to an acquittal of herein
petitioners. Consequently, the same did not immediately become final, hence
petitioners could still file a motion for the reconsideration thereof. Moreover,
such dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy. 38 Since jeopardy had not yet attached, herein petitioners were not

prejudiced by the filing of the new informations even though the order of
dismissal in the prior case had not yet become final. Neither did it affect the
jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case.
In American legal practice, where a motion for an order of nolle
prosequi is made, the only power to deny the motion would be based on
failure of the district attorney to judiciously exercise his discretion. 39 In most
cases, the motion will be readily granted and should not be refused unless
the court has some knowledge that it is based on an improper reason or a
corrupt motive. But such a motion to dismiss will not also be approved unless
the court is satisfied that the administration of justice requires that the
prosecution be ended, or if there appears to be a clear violation of the
law. 40Whatever may be the reason therefor, a denial of the motion to
withdraw should not be construed as a denigration of the authority of the
special prosecutor to control and direct the prosecution of the case, 41 since
the disposition of the case already rests in the sound discretion of the court.
This brings us to the question as to whether or not an order of
dismissal may be subsequently set aside and the information reinstated.
Again, in American jurisprudence, the authorities differ somewhat as to
whether a nolle prosequi may be set aside and the cause reinstated. 42 Some
cases hold that the nolle prosequi may be recalled and that the accused may
be tried on the same information, 43 but before it can be retraced, set aside,
cancelled, or struck off, the permission or assent of the court must be had
and obtained, and such cancellation or retraction must be duly entered.
According to other authorities, however, the entry of an unconditional nolle
prosequi, not on the ground that the information is insufficient on its face, is
an end to the prosecution of that information, and such nolle prosequi cannot
afterward be vacated and further proceedings had in that case. 44
Still in some cases, it has been held that a nolle prosequi may be set aside
by leave of court, so as to reinstate proceedings on the information, or unless
it was entered by mistake. 45 In our jurisdiction, we follow the rule which
allows an order of dismissal to be set aside by leave of court. In one case, it
was held that in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, the
court may, in the interest of justice, dismiss a criminal case provisionally, that
is, without prejudice to reinstating it before the order becomes final or to the
subsequent filing of a new information for the offense. 46
The rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction the court first
acquiring jurisdiction will retain it to the end to the exclusion of other
tribunals, is not to be given unyielding effect in all cases and it does not apply
where the jurisdiction of the first court has come to an end in any legal way,
such as by nolle prosequi. 47 The rule on exclusions is intended to prevent
confusion and conflicts in jurisdiction and to prevent a person from being
twice tried for the same offense, but no accused has a vested right to be tried
in any particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and when one court of
concurrent jurisdiction voluntarily relinquishes it by a nolle prosequi or
dismissal of the case, there can be no legal or logical reason for preventing
the other court from proceeding. 48 With much more reason will this rule apply

where only branches of the same court, and not different courts, are involved
in the jurisdictional conflict.
There was no forum shopping in the lower court with respect to the case
involved. While the procedure adopted by the prosecution was somewhat
cumbersome, it was not in bad faith and, accordingly, it did not affect the
legality of the proceedings. There is no showing, and petitioners failed to
prove otherwise, that the assignment by raffle of the new informations to
another branch of the same court was intended to prejudice herein
petitioners, or to place them under less favorable circumstances, or to find a
court which would act favorably on the prosecution's case.
The authority of the special prosecutor appointed by the Secretary of
Justice to sign and file informations has long been recognized in this
jurisdiction and it has been held that such information cannot be quashed on
that account. There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints,
holding of investigations, and conducting prosecutions that only an officer
appointed by the President or one expressly empowered by law be permitted
to assume these functions. 49 And any irregularity in the appointment does
not necessarily invalidate the same if he may be considered a de
facto officer. 50
Of course, where the person who signed the information was
disqualified from appointment to such position, the information is invalid and
the court does not acquire jurisdiction to try the accused thereon. 51 Such is
not, however, the situation obtaining in the case at bar. It will be noted that
respondent prosecutor was designated by the Secretary of Justice to handle
the re-investigation and prosecution of the case against petitioners pursuant
to Department Order No. 369. Petitioners failed to show any irregularity in the
issuance of said directive.
At any rate, the power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of
Justice under Presidential Decree No. 1275 had been broadened beyond the
confines of the old law, that is, Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative
Code, wherein the power of the Secretary was then limited only to certain
instances. Pertinently, in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., 52 we said:
The Court notes, however; that Department of Justice Order No. 85
was issued pursuant to, among others, P.D. No. 1275 issued on 11 April 1978
which provides:
Sec. 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision
and Control of the Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and
established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control
of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the
Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State
Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are
hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation
and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.
The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of
Justice includes the authority to act directly on any matter within the

jurisdiction of the Prosecution Staff, the Regional State Prosecution Office or

the Office of the Provincial or City Fiscal and to review, modify or revoke any
decision or action of the Chief of said staff or office.
The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of
Justice under P.D. No. 1275 had thus been broadened beyond the confines
of the old law, i.e., Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
where the power of the Secretary of Justice to designate acting fiscals or
prosecutors to handle a particular case was limited to instances "when a
provincial fiscal shall be disqualified by personal interest to act in a particular
case or when for any reason he shall be unable, or shall fail to discharge any
of the duties of his position." Indeed, the limitation upon which petitioners rely
no longer subsisted under P.D. No. 1275.
Having been duly designated in accordance with law, the panel of
prosecutors had complete control of the investigation and prosecution of the
case. . . .
3. Petitioners similarly dispute the legality of their arraignment on
January 24, 1994, when Judge Pornillos entered a plea of not guilty for them
after they refused to plead, without furnishing them copies of the information
with the list of witnesses, after merely reading the informations against them
and asking whether they understood the same, which were allegedly in
palpable violation of Section 1, Rule 116. Petitioners aver that they were
requesting for the suspension of the arraignment as they wanted to have a
final copy of the order of January 24, 1994 which was merely read in open
court, and to take the necessary steps to question the same by way of a
motion for reconsideration or an appeal.
In criminal cases, it is the duty of the accused, in addition to the other pleas
authorized by law, to plead whether he is guilty or not of the crime charged.
In that way and in that way only can an issue be created upon which the trial
shall proceed. 53 Section 1 (c) of Rule 116 is quite explicit that where the
accused refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
Hence, under such mandatory language, if the accused refuses to plead, the
court must enter a plea of not guilty. The words are so plain and
unambiguous that no construction is necessary. It actually calls for a literal
application thereof. Any explanation or defense which petitioners would want
to invoke can be properly raised during the trial, but they cannot refuse to
enter their plea. Nonetheless, the alleged defect in their arraignment on
January 24, 1994 is deemed to have been cured when they were again
arraigned on February 18, 1994 with the assistance of counsel de oficio, and
the information was read to them in the vernacular.
In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial court handling
Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction
over the new informations which we have likewise declared valid, petitioners
may be prosecuted thereunder.

II. On the Petition for Habeas corpus

This petition is predicated mainly on petitioners' asseveration that the
court which issued the warrant for their arrest had no jurisdiction over the
case, hence their detention should be deemed illegal.
We have earlier declared that Branch 10 of the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the new set of informations. Consequently, the warrant of
arrest issued on the bases of said informations filed therein and the
subsequent detention of herein petitioners pursuant thereto are valid. What
instead has to be resolved is the corollary issue of whether the petition
for habeas corpus was properly filed together with their present petition
for certiorari andmandamus.
The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each
other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher
courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional
matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the
body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ
of certiorari for the purpose of review. 54 However, habeas corpus does not lie
where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not
be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the
purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a
court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. 55
Neither can we grant the writ at this stage since a writ of habeas
corpus is not intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial court. In the
absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be
invoked. Habeas corpus is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to
determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. 56 It has to be an
exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused
before trial. 57 In the absence of special circumstances requiring immediate
action, a court will not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner in advance of
a determination of his case in court. 58 In the case under consideration,
petitioners have dismally failed to adduce any justification or exceptional
circumstance which would warrant the grant of the writ, hence their petition
therefor has to be denied.
In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle
for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial. In the case of Enrile vs.
Salazar, etc., et al., 59 we held that:
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the
normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent.
The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming
a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by

the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have
been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the
Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available
there.
III. On the Motion to Cite for Contempt
The records show that on February 24, 1994, this Court issued a
temporary restraining order, pursuant to its resolution in Administrative Matter
No. 94-1-13-RTC which is a petition for change of venue filed by the
Vinculados, requiring Judges Felipe N. Villajuan and Victoria VillalonPornillos to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases involving herein
petitioners which were pending before them. 60
Subsequently, another resolution was issued in said cases, dated
March 1, 1994, with the following directive:
ACCORDINGLY, without prejudice to the final determination as to
which of the two (2) sets of information will be upheld or prevail, the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby
directed to transfer all the aforementioned criminal cases filed against Mayor
Honorato Galvez, et al. now in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle as one
(1) single case among its branches and for the branch concerned, after raffle,
to proceed with all deliberate dispatch after the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP
No. 33261 have been resolved with finality. 61
As a consequence, the seven informations which were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-94-55481 to Q-94-55487 were assigned to and are now
pending trial on the merits before Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, presided over by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. Petitioners now
assert that Judge Salazar and Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio proceeded with the
trial of the cases despite the aforestated directives in the above cited
resolutions. We find no merit in the motion to cite them for contempt.
The records reveal that there was a manifestation dated May 31,
1994 62 filed by the Solicitor General wherein the latter manifested his
conformity to the agreement made between the prosecution and the defense
before Judge Salazar, the pertinent part of which agreement is as follows:
1. During the hearing on May 26, 1994, the prosecution, through
Senior State Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio, the defense through Justice
Alfredo Lazaro, and this Honorable Court agreed that the trial in these cases
shall proceed on condition that: (a) the defense shall not be deemed to have
waived any issue or objection it has raised before the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 114046; and (b) that the trial shall also be without prejudice to whatever
decision and resolution the Supreme Court may render in the case before it.
Counsel for petitioners, retired Justice Alfredo Lazaro, takes issue
with said agreement on the pretension that the same is not the true
agreement of the parties, but he failed to state what they actually agreed
upon. Withal, the resolutions of this Court in the petition for change of venue,

as well as the cease and desist order issued therein, are clearly directed
against the two aforenamed regional trial judges in Malolos, Bulacan. By no
stretch of the imagination can we interpret the same to include Judge Jaime
N. Salazar, Jr. of Quezon City.
For that matter, the issues involved in this petition for certiorari do not
necessarily require a suspension of the proceedings before the present trial
court considering that the main petition hinges only on a determination of
which set of informations shall constitute the indictments against petitioners
and for which charges they shall stand trial. Whichever set of informations
prevails, the evidence of the prosecution and defense will more or less be the
same and can be utilized for the charges therein. Hence, no cogent reason
exists for the suspension of the proceedings before the court below.
As a final word, while it may well be that both sets of information
validly exist for the nonce, to allow both of them to subsist will only serve to
confuse and complicate the proceedings in the cases therein. Brushing aside
procedural technicalities, therefore, it becomes exigent to now consider and
declare the four informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal
possession of firearms as having amended and superseded the original three
informations for homicide and frustrated homicide, there being no substantial
rights of herein petitioners which may be affected thereby. Correspondingly,
the three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide should be
ordered withdrawn from the Quezon City trial court's docket.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
petition for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas
corpus; DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to cite respondent judge and
prosecutor for contempt and to annul proceedings; and ORDERING the
withdrawal and invalidation of the three informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide against petitioners from the docket of Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
9. STATE PROSECUTORS, vs.JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 54, Manila, 236 scra 505 A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September
19, 1994
PER CURIAM:
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a
magistrate, legal authorities place a premium on how he has complied with
his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential to the
judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the
weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of
traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning
of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1

Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the

public and to the legal profession, to know the very law he is supposed to
apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants
will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be
accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For,
service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law
from beginning to end. 2
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge
Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was
charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno
V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order
dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to
92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors
(members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal
provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of
newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by
the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign
exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board
as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive
Department on the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers
which are reputable and of national circulation had the effect of repealing
Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court
decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and,
therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned
"for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has
no more jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the
basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of
date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his
Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement
made by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign
exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent
haste, as he had no way of determining the full intent of the new CB Circular
or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception,
as in the case of persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts
for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously issued
on the matter;

5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking

judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper
account that the President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange
restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular,
erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice
thereof even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text
published as required by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in
utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which the People
is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby
tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can the
Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet come
into force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been
published and ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The Honorable
Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in
the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constituting Grave Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of
requiring first the comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid
Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases
before dismissing the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to
due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to
dismiss the cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action
was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in
the order of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its
evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21,
& 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen
disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its
right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the
case without even waiting for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for
accused has even placed his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent
judge filed his comment, 4 contending,inter alia, that there was no need to
await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law
on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general
circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without
qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the
basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the
erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign exchange rules
rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which
was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on
August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of
dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised by his
advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment

by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose

to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent judge
who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which
had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular
No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving
violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed
involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused
cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she
was charged; that assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the order
of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an appeal therefrom but
definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake
committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the
law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show
ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or
modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later
reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the
prosecution had nothing to explain because, as he theorized, "What
explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through
his hat' (to use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should
wait for the publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then nonexistent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not
affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause
does not refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed
cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial notice of
the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129;
that the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent
haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper account is
contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President
announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention
to be effected in the future, because of the use of the present perfect tense
or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange
controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are
officers of the Department of Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first
instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published
in the newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him;
and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and
pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court
for speedy disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the
saving clause under Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific
reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of Circular
No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the
new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether

under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving
violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof.
Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases,
without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion to quash or
a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R.
Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality
and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate of
the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint
to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report and
recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator
Ernani Cruz-Pao.
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to
the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these
cases; apparently the other accused in some of these cases, Roberto S.
Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on
August 10, 1992 that the government has lifted all foreign exchange
restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia
said that the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same
date). The Court has to give full confidence and credit to the reported
announcement of the Executive Department, specially from the highest
official of that department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, without introduction of proof, the
announcement published in at least the two newspapers cited above which
are reputable and of national circulation.
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs.
Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor,
77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it
was held that the repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the
right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old law and if
the law repealing the prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which
constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the
repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to
its repeal. Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws
and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as
the Import Control Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the

accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law because

violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to the provision of
Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes violations of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions
and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of
jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a
forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this Court to charges of
trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed
with the Court of Appeals, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel
T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private
respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave
due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed
despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ
of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992,
and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate court held
that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to
dismiss filed by counsel for the accused, without giving an opportunity for the
prosecution to be heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper reports
announcing that the President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order
that the enactment can become effective and binding. Laws take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise
provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular
1353, series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange
Regulation" was published in the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila
Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the
CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect on September
2....
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the
official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously
on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is
charged, was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily
shown that the repeal of the regulations on non-trade foreign exchange
transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision that with respect to
violations of former regulations that are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations existing at the time
the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction
over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a

motion to dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution
to comment/oppose the same, his resolution would have been the result of
deliberation, not speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of
the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial
notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another
way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice,
may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a
mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay
evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign
exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of
common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an
administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of
dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be
taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law
which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one
of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was

definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No.
1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order
of dismissal was issued.
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1,
1992, further liberalized the foreign exchange regulations on receipts and
disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions.
Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions
in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent
with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force
and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign
exchange transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by
this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending
actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such
pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the
cause of action accrued shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the
provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven criminal cases he
dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists,
Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the
former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more
basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant a
dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353
explicitly provides that "any regulation on non-trade foreign transactions
which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of
which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be
considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are
concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, theregulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued
shall govern." The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave
no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven
cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of
violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial
when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is
supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of
Circular No. 1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more
carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he would have readily perceived
and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving
clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former
provides:

Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365,

960 and 1028, including amendments thereto, with the exception of the
second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing
Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent
with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall be considered
repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it
being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the
regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although
Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the former specifically excepted
from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which were then
pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any
reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects
Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no
suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a judge
should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so
in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and
impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency
in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is
more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not
enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient
that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should
moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be
pure but beyond suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of
controverted cases, judges should show their full understanding of the case,
avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their
intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the
law. 22 A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general
law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men,
and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if
he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a
particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding
on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the
immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the
law.23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the
task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly
considered in the present case.

The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await

publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement
made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting
foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and
immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the
elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect.
It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether different
and illogical interpretation of an established and well-entrenched rule if only
to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible
action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of
catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He
having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put
to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous
interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether
dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a
written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad
faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the
cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and
discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a
deprivation of the
prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law. 26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which
respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a
hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened
him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless
of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and
legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact
remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or
prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he
thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due
process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was
not sure of the effects and implications of the President's announcement, as
by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the
cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution
to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can
but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the
President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I
should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The

pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal
scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the
patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present
his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance
and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is
inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very
least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the
outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation
highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge
could have seriously and substantially affected the rights of the prosecution
had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that
the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said
accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay
in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals
that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the absence of
jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as
acaveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate
what we have heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal
cases is denied due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation
of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . .
which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never
submitted either her comment on or an answer to the petition for certiorari as
required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in her
defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal
was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the
accused is a prominent public figure with a record of influence and power, it
is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal
order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the
entire judiciary.

VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order

through inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is
entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically
and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious
violation of the legal precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by
respondent judge reveals that no substantial argument has been advanced in
plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or
even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The
explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious
submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further
depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent
unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic
illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I
issued the Order dismissing the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the
letter complaint without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank
Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of
"all foreign exchange controls" was announced by the President of the
Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe,
August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign exchange controls,"
and in the words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The
government yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only
the President made the announcement but also the Central Bank Governor
Jose Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board
arrived at the decision after noting how the "partial liberalization" initiated
early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions, there was no need to await the publication of
the repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring
publication of laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to inform
the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs and how they will conform to
the laws or the rules. In this particular case, with the total lifting of the
controls, there is no need to await publication. It would have been different if
the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under
which the accused was charged in the cases dismissed by me, had provided
for penalties and/or modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.

The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force
when I dismissed the cases but it should be noted that in the report of the
two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting
of controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense
(Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted; the announcement did
not say that the government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions
but instead says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange
controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The government
yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions". The lifting of the last remaining exchange regulations
effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the
lifting of all foreign exchange regulations. The President has within his control
directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of
Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the
policies of the Central Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's
announcement of August 10, published the following day, nor made an
announcement that the lifting of the controls do not apply to cases already
pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after my Order, and the third day
after report of said order was published) and after the President said on
August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the
"new foreign exchange rules have nullified government cases against Imelda
R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the widow of former
President Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of new
ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note,
parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to be drafted").
The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours later, presidential
spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'."
"He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia
and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board Regulation
excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court and such a
position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10
announcement (published in August 11, 1992, newspapers) and in the
August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on the
Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the
President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal
advisers, because no one bothered to advise the President to correct his
announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President
had made another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos
having been rendered moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to
do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It
therefore behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice,
and brief him on matters of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as

the lifting of foreign exchange controls, designed, among others to

encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief
Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the
latter's announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the
consequence of their failing to me, who only acted on the basis of
announcements of their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect
that respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary credentials and
qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of
Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the
nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would
want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency
thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted
thereto.
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for
acquitting the accused of a violation of CB Circular No. 960 despite the fact
that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a
plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove
criminal intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further
ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the
mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from
seizure. Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the
government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly
rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused
charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation
of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the
case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one
"who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and
administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox,
even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies,
exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law,
applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias
and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed
by this Court for gross ignorance of the law after she ordered, in a probate
proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other
interested parties. 36

Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service
was dismissed after he acquitted all the accused in four criminal cases for
illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of
malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The
Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment
being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect
and unjust judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the
Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with
it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately
from rendering any judgment or order, or continuing any judicial action or
proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10. JUAN C. CARVAJAL, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLID HOMES,
INC., [G.R. No. 98328. October 9, 1997]
Is there denial of due process if an applicant for land registration is
unable to testify? May a land registration court, after it is convinced that the
property subject of an application for registration under the torrens system is
already covered by an existing certificate, dismiss such application and thus
ignore petitioners insistence on submitting further evidence of his alleged
title? What constitutes sufficient evidence to show identity of the land applied
for with the land already titled in favor of private respondent?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this petition for review assailing
the November 29, 1990 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals [2] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 18318, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this petition be, as it is hereby
DISMISSED.[3]
This petition also impugns the April 25, 1991 Court of Appeals
Resolution[4] which denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts found by public respondent are as follows: [5]
Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case filed with
Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in
Antipolo, Rizal. Sought to be brought by petitioner under the operation of the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is a 96,470 square meter lot

denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and 6846-D. Copies of the

application were ordered by respondent Court to be furnished (to) the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) which
on March 18, 1987 submitted a report recommending that applicant be
order[ed] to amend his petition by including the names and complete postal
addresses of the adjoining owners and correcting the discrepancy regarding
the boundary lot number along line 2-3 of Lot 6846-D on plan Csd-04005516-D. On order of respondent Court [trial court], the petition was
accordingly amended.
After the NLTDRA was notified that the case is [sic] initially set for hearing on
December 7, 1987, the Acting Chief, Docket Division of the NLRDRA [sic]
submitted another report recommending that petitioner be ordered to refer to
the Bureau of Lands for corrections of the discrepancy existing in the
directional bearing and area of Lot 6846-D, Csd-04-005516-D. The technical
descriptions as corrected by the Bureau of Lands was [sic] submitted and the
application was initially set for hearing on April 26, 1988. The Notice of Initial
Hearing stating that the application was set forbe [sic] heard on April 26,
1988 was thereafter issued by the NLTDRA.
On June 1, 1988, an order of general default was issued by
respondent Court. Exempted from the order was one Annie Jimenez who
filed an opposition to the application. On June 22, 1988, private respondent
Solid Homes, Inc. filed its opposition stating that a land registered in its name
under the Torrens System and covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is almost
identical to the property subject of the application by petitioner. The
opposition was not admitted considering that no motion to set aside the order
of general default was filed by private respondent.
On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to lift the order
of general default and to admit its opposition on the ground that its right
would be adversely affected by the application. Acting on the motion and in
order to avoid duplicity, the NLTDRA was directed to make the plotting of the
relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and embraced
in TCT No. N-7873 and to submit its plotting to the Court for its guidance. In
the same order dated July 1, 1988, respondent Court in the interest of justice
set aside the order of general default in so far as private respondent was
concerned and admitted private respondents opposition.
On January 10, 1989, petitioner filed a motion praying that the
opposition of private respondent be dismissed for the reason that the order
issued by respondent court directing the NLRTDA [sic] to make a plotting of
the land in question on the basis of the title submitted by the Registry of
Deeds of Marikina Branch Manila released the private respondent from the
duty and obligation of presenting evidence to prove that the land applied for
is private and that there is apparent lack of interest on the part of private
respondent to pursue its claim on account of its non-appearance despite the
lapse of more than six months or to introduce evidence that will show that the
land in question is covered by the alleged torrens certificate of title.

During the hearings conducted on September 13, 1988, September

27, 1988, October 4, 1988, October 11, 1988, October 18, 1988, November
22, 1988, December 6, 1988, petitioner presented his evidence on the
question as to whether or not he had a registrable right over the land in
question.
Pursuant to the court order dated July 1, 1988 directing the NLTDRA
to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC
Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N-7873, the Land Registration
Authority submitted a report dated December 22, 1986 [should be 1988]
recommending that, after due hearing, the application for registration of
petitioner be dismissed. The application was thus dismissed by respondent
court in an order dated January 2, 1989. Considering, however, that the
recommendation is [sic] for dismissal after due hearing, respondent judge
issued an order dated January 10, 1989 setting for hearing on January 24,
1989 the Report submitted by the Land Registration Authority. The hearing
proceeded on February 8, 1989 with Engr. Silverio G. Perez, Chief,
Department on Registration, Land Registration Authority being presented in
connection with his Report recommending the dismissal of the application
after due hearing. On February 28, 1989, the petitioner's application for
registration was dismissed.
On March 13, 1989, petitioner filed his motion to reconsider the
February 28, 1989 dismissal of the application for registration to which
private respondent filed an opposition dated March 20, 1989. The motion for
reconsideration was denied in an order dated March 4, 1989.
On May 2, 1989 petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider the
dismissal of his petition. On May 8, 1989, respondent judge issued an order
requiring the parties as well as the engineers from the Land Registration
Commission and the DENR to appear before respondent Court on June 5,
1989. The engineer from the Land Registration Commission was likewise
directed to inform the court whether the property applied for by petitioner is
indeed inside the titled property of private respondent.
After the Land Registration Authority submitted a report showing that
there was indeed an overlapping of the four (4) parcels of land applied for by
petitioner and the properties of Solid Homes under TCT 7873 and
considering that the properties applied for are [sic] within the titled property
and could not be the subject of an application for registration, the second
motion to reconsider the dismissal of the application for registration was
denied in an order dated July 5, 1989.
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the
application for registration, and denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues:[6]
1. Whether or not an actual ground verification survey is required to
establish the identity of the two parcels of land or whether TCT No. 7873
under Plan FP-1540 of Solid Homes Inc., situated in Barangay Mayamot,
Antipolo, Rizal is identical or similar to Lots 6846-A to 6846-D inclusive Cad.
585, Lungsod Silangan, Cadastre, situated in Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal
applied for under LRC Case No. 414 (-A), LRC Record No. N-60084;
2. Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the
opportunity to be heard or allowed to fully introduce his evidence in the
(proceeding) for Land Registration and (to) rest (his) case;
3. Whether the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals is
reversible.
Petitioner alleges that the table survey made by the Land
Registration Authority and the geodetic engineer of the Land Management
Bureau cannot serve as basis for identifying his land. On the other hand,
petitioner was able to establish the identity of the land he applied for by
actual ground survey which was approved by the Director of Lands and
reprocessed by the Land Registration Authority. He claims that if said land
is covered by private respondents title, the Director of Lands and/or
Regional Director will no(t) approve the survey. Petitioner also argues that
the land in question is situated in Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal while that of
private respondent is in Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal. Survey Plan FP1540, which served as basis of private respondents certificate of title,
cannot be found; hence, according to petitioner, the table survey was
anomalous. Petitioner adds that the matter entirely wanting in this case
(is) the identity or similarity of the realties. [7] Petitioner concludes that the
trial court should have ordered actual ocular inspection and ground
verification survey of the properties involved.
Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process when
he, as an applicant in a land registration case, was not able to take the
witness stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel hardly participated
in the proceeding except to propound clarificatory questions during the
examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the Land Registration Authority.[8]
Public respondent justified its dismissal of the appeal in this wise: [9]
Land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration proceeding
cannot again be subject of adjudication or settlement in a subsequent
conducted proceeding (Land Titles and Deeds by Noblejas, 1968 Revised
Edition, page 96). The Report submitted by the Land Registration Authority
(Annex B) and the Survey Division of the DENR (Annex RR) both indicate
an overlapping of the lot applied for by petitioner and the lot covered by TCT
N-7873 owned by private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. Even if petitioner
were allowed to continue with the presentation of his evidence, the end result
would still be the dismissal of his application for registration. Respondent
Judge was therefore justified in cutting short the proceeding as the time to be

spent in hearing petitioners application could be used disposing the other

cases pending with respondent court.
Anent the allegation that private respondent Solid Homes did not actively
participate in the trials conducted to hear his evidence, suffice it to state that
it is counsels prerogative to determine how he intends to pursue his case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Identity of the Property Applied For
We are not persuaded that the land petitioner applied for was not
identical to private respondents land which was already covered by a torrens
certificate of title. The two reports prepared by the Land Registration
Authority and the DENR Survey Division clearly showed that there was an
overlapping between the two properties. Because the futility of petitioners
application was apparent, the trial court deemed it unnecessary to hear
further evidence. We agree.
At the outset, we stress that there was nothing irregular in the order
given by the trial court to the Land Registration Authority and the Survey
Division of the DENR to submit reports on the location of the land covered by
petitioners application and private respondents certificate of title. The
authority of the land registration court to require the filing of additional papers
to aid it in its determination of the propriety of the application was based on
Section 21 of PD 1529:[10]
SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. -The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those
prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the
filing of any additional papers. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if
necessary.
From the above provision, it is also clear that ocular inspection of the
property applied for was only discretionary, not mandatory. Likewise, the
land registration court was not obliged to order the survey of the contested
lot, especially when another government agency had already submitted a
report finding that the contested lot was identical with that described in
private respondents certificate of title and recommending the dismissal of the
application for registration.
Further, the order of the land registration court for the LRA and DENR to
submit reports was in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration
Law:[11]
The purposes of the land registration law, in general, are: to ascertain once
and for all the absolute title over a given landed property; to make, so far as it
is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land
absolute proof of such title; to quiet title to the land and to put a stop forever
to any question of legality to a title; and to decree that land title to be final,
irrevocable and, undisputable. (citing Benen vs. Tuason, L-26127, June 28,
1974, 57 SCRA 531.)

It is true that a court of first instance acting as a land registration court has
limited and special jurisdiction. It can not be denied, however, that when the
law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it
effective. (citing Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388, 391.) The purpose of
the applicant is to prove that he has an absolute or simple title over the
property sought to be registered, otherwise his application will be denied. An
absolute oppositor claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the
applicant. If successful, registration will be decreed in favor of the
oppositor. As to whether or not private respondents have absolute or fee
simple title over the property sought to be registered necessarily requires a
resolution of the question as to whether or not the oppositors had a dominical
right totally adverse to that of the applicants. x x x
Based on the reports submitted, the land registration court correctly
dismissed the application for original land registration. An application for
registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the
existing title. It behooves a land registration court to determine the veracity
of any and all adverse claims, bearing in mind Section 46 of Act No. 496
which provides that (n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. The trial courts order to the LRA and DENR was a mere
cautionary measure in cognizance of the well-settled rule that a torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked. In other words, the title may be challenged
only in a proceeding for that purpose, not in an application for registration of
a land already registered in the name of another person. After one year from
its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is no longer open to
review. The remedy of the landowner, whose property has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in anothers name, is to institute an ordinary action
for reconveyance or -- if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value -- for damages. [12] In view of the nature of a
torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of a new certificate alters a valid and existing certificate of title.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the approval by the assistant chief of
the Bureau of Lands Survey Division of the survey conducted on the land
applied for by petitioner did not prove that the said land was not covered by
any title. It merely showed that such land has been surveyed and its
boundaries have been determined.
Also noteworthy is the finding of public respondent that "the same
order (issued by the land registration court) [which set] aside the order (of)
general default insofar as private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. was
concerned, directed the NLTDRA to make the plotting of the relative
position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and [that which was]
embraced in TCT No. N-7873.[13] The intention of the land registration court
was to avoid duplicity,[14] that is, to rule out the possibility that the land he
sought to register was already covered by a certificate of title. In this case,

the land he applied for was found to be within the land described in private
respondents transfer certificate of title.
Petitioner also alleges that the land he applied for was located in
Barangay Mambogan, while the registered land of private respondent was
in Barangay Mayamot. In his reply filed with public respondent, however,
he himself admitted that Barangay Mambogan is a part of Barangay
Mayamot [which is] a bigger barrio in Antipolo, Rizal, and Mayamot covers
a big parcel of land running from Antipolo up to Marikina. [15] In view of
petitioners declaration, it was not impossible for the land owned by private
respondent to be located in Barangay Mayamot and in Barangay
Mambogan. At any rate, whether the two lands are located in Mambogan
or Mayamot or both is a factual question, and its resolution by the trial and
the appellate courts is binding on this Court. Petitioner failed to provide a
reason, let alone an adequate one, to justify the reversal of such finding of
the lower courts.
Petitioner also argues that the plotting made by NLTDRA was
anomalous because Survey Plan FP-1540, on which private respondents
title was based, could not be located. This argument lacks merit. The law
does not require resorting to a survey plan to prove the true boundaries of a
land covered by a valid certificate of title; the title itself is the conclusive proof
of the realtys metes and bounds. Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or
Act No. 496, provides that (t)he original certificates in the registration book,
any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of the
register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and the
seal of the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be received
as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive
as to all matters contained therein except so far as otherwise provided in this
Act. It has been held that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence with
respect to the ownership of the land described therein and other matters
which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. [16] Thus,
this Court inOdsigue vs. Court of Appeals[17] ruled:
x x x. Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified the
property sought to be recovered as required by Art. 434 of the Civil
Code. He alleges that Sitio Aduas, where the land in question is located, is
at the boundary of Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay Lagundi,
Morong, Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner maintains, the parcel of land he
is occupying is located in Barangay May-Iba. He claims that the technical
description in the title does not sufficiently identify the property of private
respondent and that a geodetic survey to determine which of his
improvements should be demolished should first have been conducted by
the private respondent. x x x.
But private respondents title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is
located in Barangay Lagundi. Likewise, the certification issued by the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer at Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner was
occupying a landholding at Barangay Lagundi.

For our purposes, a survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is

conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also its
location. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No.
4050. Accordingly, petitioners required to demolish only whatever is
constructed within its boundaries. (Underscoring supplied.)
The old case of Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby[18] explains the nature of
a torrens certificate of title, as follows:
x x x. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner
any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he
can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The
certificate of registration accumulates in one document a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in
the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not
even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
All in all, the land registration court did not err in relying on the certificate
of title instead of the survey plan; likewise, the appellate court did not commit
any reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision.
Second Issue: Denial of Due Process
Petitioner claims that he was denied due process because he was
unable to take the witness stand. We disagree. The essence of due process
is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is
repugnant to due process.[19] In this case, petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present three. However,
petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the
trial court ordered the submission of the parties memoranda which signified
the termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the
termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the witness stand.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that his own counsel
hardly participated in the proceedings. The records show that said counsel
did cross-examine Engineer Silverio Perez by propounding clarificatory
questions to the latter. In any event, the client is generally bound by the acts
of his counsel. Petitioner has not shown at all that his previous counsel had
acted in such grossly negligent manner as to deprive him of effective
representation, or of due process.[20]
In support of his contention, petitioner cites Tirona vs. Naawa[21] which
held:
We hold the view, however that respondent Judge erred when he ordered
the dismissal of the registration case over the objection of the oppositors;
and when he refused to reconsider the order of dismissal and reinstate the
case he had neglected to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty

resulting from an office, and had thereby deprived the oppositors of a right to
which they are entitled.
Such ruling finds no application to the present case, because neither
Respondent Mariano Raymundo (the applicant in the land registration case)
nor Petitioner Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case) was a
holder of any certificate of title over the land intended for registration. Such
being the case, the land registration court was ordered to act in accordance
with Section 37 of Act No. 496[22] either by dismissing the application if none
of the litigants succeeded in showing a proper title, or by entering a decree
awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition
is
hereby DENIED and
the
assailed
Decision
and
Resolution
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------11. Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995], also Gatchalian v. de
Leon [GR 121245], and Lejano v. de Leon [GR 121297]
Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and
involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other
persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of
prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to conduct
the preliminary investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on 30 June
1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde, and sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Paraaque. During the preliminary investigation,
the NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro, 2 former
housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane passenger), Lolita Birrer
(live-in partner of Biong), 2 of Vizcondes maids, Normal White (a security guard) and
Manciano Gatmaitan (an engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report
involving Estrellita (12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab
wounds); and the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence of
spermatozoa. The NBI submitted photocopies of the documents requested by Webb
in his Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents, granted by
the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not
commit the crime as he went to the United States on 1 March 1991 and returned to
the Philippines on 27 October 1992. The others Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano,
Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong submitted sworn statements, responses, and a
motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only
Filart and Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with
subpoena in their last known address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26page Resolution "finding be filed against Webb, et. al. On the same date, it filed the
corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with the RTC Paraaque. Docketed
as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by Judge Zosimo V.
Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who
issued the warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano

voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality
considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The
case was re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued
new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et.
al. filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest
issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita
Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95- 404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting
any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal
case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and Lejano
likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before the
Court.

Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of
their right to fair trial.
Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however,
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors; and their long
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. At no
instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any member
of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity. Further , on the contention of the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial
investigation, records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. Still, the Supreme
Court reminds a trial judge in high profile criminal cases of his/her duty to
control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The ability to
dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal
prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary
is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done,
and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of
public opinion.

12. PEOPLE vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., G.R. Nos. 111206-08

October 6, 1995
The facts:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home
at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman
went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop
about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the
way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that
late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and
listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi
box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up
from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted
from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you? (Show me your)
I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the
I.D., without bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked
accused: Why are you bothering us? Accused pushed Chapman, dug into
his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body,
staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot me? Chapman
crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but
accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then
turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a
trouble? Leino said no and took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her
senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She
repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun. Hes gonna kill us. Will
somebody help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from
Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit
down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away.
Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be
hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accuseds car.
Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accuseds car,
trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a
minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined
her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino
on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced
them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on
the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and
saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening
and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his
knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the
incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed

against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with:
MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED
MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN
HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement
at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for
Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.
The defense:
Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that
during the shooting incident, he was not anywhere near the scene of the
crime, but in his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to know
the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the newspaper
reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic
gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed
that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in
an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in
the garage of his mothers house in Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this
car since then. Accused conceded that although the car was not in good
running condition, it could still be used.
The ruling:
Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification.
The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3
eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, he
vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone
surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leinos
identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly
irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the
newspapers before he identified him; Third, that Leinos interview at the
hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based
on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the
NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence
turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the
investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of
the accused. The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period,
his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunmans face. His senses
were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court
identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error.
Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases,
decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness
identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the
scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA

testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as inherently

suspect.
The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a
crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event
actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event.
Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately.
Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three
stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve
information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and
suggestive influences.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways.
It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with
the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for
the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the
integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of
and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz:
(1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities
cited by the accused did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied
due process. There is nothing wrong in Leinos identification of the accused
in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode
was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The need for security
even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes
Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the house where he
was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification
at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk.
Leinos fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had
been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions
in the metropolis.
There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are
identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often
done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of
the victim.
Accused cant also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio
and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. The
records show that while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown 3
pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified the accused as

the gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that,
before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of accused or
read any report relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on accused to
prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of
impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of
his out-of-court identification by Leino.
There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accuseds identification by
Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a lamp post. The accused
was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for
a full 5 minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against the accusedt.
His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal
cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his
identification of the accused. When asked how sure he was that the accused
was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: Im very sure. It could
not have been somebody else.
The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the
investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by
Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that
Leinos extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his
mobility. The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically
unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat.
There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the
testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to
writing.
The SC also rejected the accuseds contention that the NBI
suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description
given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was
turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the
sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble the
accused is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was
incredible for Leino to have remembered the accuseds face when the
incident happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short
time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience
shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed
before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. The
natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant create
an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In this case,
there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to
the accused. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other
before their chance encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be
because the accused was the real culprit.

The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two

witnesses. As to the testimony of Cadenas, his initial reluctance to reveal to
the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial
he feared for his and his familys safety. The Court has taken judicial notice of
the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes
considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks,
the court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses
to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. As
to the testimony of Mangubat, the SC found nothing in the records to suspect
that Mangubat would perjure himself.
2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not holding that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First, he
claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous
shooting incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to
compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the
bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution
eyewitnesses described the gunmans car as white, but the trial court found it
to be silver metalic gray. Fourth, the accused could not have been the
gunman, for Mangubat said that he overheard the victim Hultman plead to
the gunman, thus: Please, dont shoot me and dont kill me. I promise
Mommy, Daddy. The accused also contends that a maid in a house near the
scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard
Maureen say: Daddy dont shoot. Dont. Fifth, the NBI towed accuseds car
from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was
not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted
on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS
HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as
having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy.; and, (b)
JOSE MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a
white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply
because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he
considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This rule has long
been laid to rest. The harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction.
In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court examines its
damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the
impact is slight and insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not
overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the
prejudiced party.
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not
the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in

convicting the accused. As aforestated, the accused was convicted mainly

because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the
fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission,
however, cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted comparison cannot
nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of the accused.
There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer
car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when
the NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it was parked to the
NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that
said car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was
then in the possession of the accused. Clearly, the car was towed not
because it was not in running condition. Even the accuseds evidence show
that said car could run. After its repairs, the accuseds son, Claudio
Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to
Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it was parked.
Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the
eyewitnesses description of the color of the gunmans car. Leino described
the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white (medyo
puti); Mangubat declared the car was white; and Cadenas testified it was
silver metallic gray. These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than
shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors
white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and
shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn,
these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the
prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
The accuseds attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman,
the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. The
accused cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard as
saying to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy. The evidence on
record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the
gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered said
statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she
addressed Anders Hultman as Papa, not Daddy. Moreover, Leino
outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when
informed that the Makati police were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly
stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. Leino is a reliable
witness.
The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he
was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin
test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can
definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the
hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have
handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,

fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and

alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits
on his hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized
several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on
the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing
the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a
strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In the case at bar, NBI
Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive
perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may
also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the
conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the
time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the
nitrates could have already been removed by washing or perspiration. In the
Report on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist
Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the accused was tested for the presence
of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the
alleged shooting.
3. The right to an impartial trial.
The the accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the
publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He
postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government
officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than then
Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon attended some of the
hearings and, President Aquino even visited Hultman while she was still
confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him
from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the
prosecution of the cases.
The SC did not sustain the accuseds claim that he was denied the
right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. Its true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high
profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field
. . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused
to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day,
gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it
is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and
other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of

our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our

breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair
and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world.
We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected
from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the
law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances
of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the
part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as
we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records
do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial
judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. The
accused has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged
the burden. There is no evidence showing that the trial judge allowed the
proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any
manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom
during the trial of the case at bar.
Parenthetically, the accused should be the last person to complain
against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he
presented in court no less than 7 newspaper reporters and relied heavily on
selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defenses documentary
evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation
of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press
cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, but the SC, nothing in the
conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial
judge, directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice.
4. The presence of treachery
The accused claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman
and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the
gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods
and forms in the execution of the crime. The accused asserts that mere
suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.

The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed the

crimes with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was
correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was
merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street since the
victims were unknown to the accused and vice-versa. It, however,
appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the
killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of
events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, the
accused suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen
Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After
Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked
what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and
inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and then, the accused
pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun
attack was unexpected. Why did you shoot me? was all Chapman could
utter. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left
him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on
record to prove that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted his
mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without
risk to himself. The accused acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting
was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the
initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of
Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of
the accused rather than a deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of the
attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Hence, absent
any qualifying circumstance, the accused should only be held liable for
Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery
clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after
shooting Chapman in cold blood, the accused ordered Leino to sit on the
pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of
appellants car. When the accused went after her, Maureen moved around
his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or two,
the accused got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the
pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were
gunned down by the accused . Clearly, the accused purposely placed his two
victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There
was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the
shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which the accused used to prepare
for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to
himself.

13.People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001]

Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio
"Boy" Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took
the two and loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which was parked in
front of Caf Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea,
Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while
Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were also with the group,
stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated
in Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of
Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought inside the
resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly
beaten up by
Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. At
around 1:00 a.m. of the next
day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea
her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and
stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van
by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the
ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van
pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already
drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a
single gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away.
Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay
Mabacan, Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio
Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawits turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen
with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded the ambulance and
proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens remains
behind. Initially, the crime was attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared
general (Dictador Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated
therein. However, further investigation, and forensic findings, pointed to the
group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the
prosecution's theory. On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the
Regional Trial Court (Pasig City, Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez,
Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, ordering them
to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount
of P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as
additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the Supreme Court, through
Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the
trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit
seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Office of
the Solicitor General filed its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers
that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity, besides claims that
principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility, that the testimony
of his 13- year old daughter should have been given full faith and credit, and

that the gargantuan damages awarded have no factual and legal bases.
Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were
sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent statements pertain to material
and crucial points of the events at issue, besides that independent and
disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecutions version of events.
On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09.
The motions for reconsideration was assigned to Justice Melo for study and
preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September 2001.
Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge
handling the case.
Held: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to
fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a
day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. The right
of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible
reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Ourjudges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of
parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts
does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et.
al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and
trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has
not discharged the burden.
14. SEE 16 AND 17
15. SUPRA 13

16. Perez v. Estrada, AM No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001

RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA PLUNDER TRIAL
FACTS:
13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas sent
a request letter to SC for media coverage of the Plunder Trial of former
President Estrada in the Sandiganbayan. Less than a month later, Cesar
Sarino sent a 2nd letter to CJ Davide for the same request, later followed
suit by Sen. Cayetano and Atty. Ricardo Romulo. 12 days later, Sec. Nani
Perez, Secretary of Justice, filed this petition to allow "Radio and Television
Coverage of the Court Hearings on the Plunder and Other Criminal Cases of
Joseph Estrada" alleging that:
the foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former
highest official in the land et al, and therefore it cannot be overemphasized
that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern
and interest, or a matter over which the whole citizenry has a right to be
aware of.
that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the
media coverage of the said trial.
media coverage will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to show the
supporters of the past regime that there will be no attempt whatsoever to
"railroad" the instant criminal cases against the former President, despite all
unfounded notions.
In effect, the petition is asking for a re-examination of the resolution
of the COurt in this matter, in a case of libel filed by then President Corazon
C. Aquino, which in part read, "The records of the Constitutional Commission
are bereft of discussion regarding this matter of cameras in the courtroom.
Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the
question squarely."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TELEVISION AND RADIO COVERAGE OF
THE PLUNDER CASES BE ALLOWED.
RULING: NO.
In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal
defendant: "witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become
nervous. they are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that
might affect their testimony." "telecasting increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant. "for the defendant,
telecasting is a form of mental harrassment and subjects him to excessive
public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his

defense." "finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which

intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the
eyes of the public."
the right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be
installed in the courtroom. this right might be fulfilled by less distracting,
degrading and more judicial means.
in a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the
accused shall take precedence over the people's right to information. the
accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his
to make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance.
a public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness
intended to ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate
upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not
subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity of
a few grandstanding lawyers."
court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance
forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply
them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns
heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17. Perez v. Estrada [A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. September 13, 2001]
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners
request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the
Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really
no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the
freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be
resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people,
as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live
media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the
courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his
objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its
allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience
with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for socalled "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed

at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the

other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may
be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial
than live TV and radio coverage.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important
issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way
modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or
television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of
its members,[1] the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the
Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of
eight (8) Justices,[2] has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the
trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices[3] vote against the audiovisual recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of
former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records
thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of
the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but
for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public
showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in
every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.[4]
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be
inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement of TV crews
will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public
pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No
comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which
may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audiovisual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the
hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our
commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God
and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et
Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our
people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is
conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third,
audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of
the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings
for documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the
essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do

because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be
primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the
proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or
becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast,
concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the
cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their
roles whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges will be
allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the
bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination
of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be
rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own
will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial which, it may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of
those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not
be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the
Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem
posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials
can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the
accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, [5] this Court set
aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day
Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of
then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA
people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy
has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure
and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about
him constitute matters of a public character."[6]
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at
least, if a documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that
may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such
documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of
celebrated cases or causes clbres was made way back in 1971 by Paul
Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay
friends found similarly moving. An educational television network filmed a
trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and
broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the
case was concluded - concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for
the painstaking way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways

whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions

and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury
carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for
the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for
documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with the
safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I
would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable
commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment
that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our
educational system, is now a desperate need.[7]
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made
thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed
to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially
when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the
same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of
the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition,
after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the
account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial
shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119,
21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall
be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c)
the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only
and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision
in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of
contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition;
(e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of
the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audiovisual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited
in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office
for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

18. Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]

Facts: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers,
who were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of
leather materials. The National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the National
Workers Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that
Toribio discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he
allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU, due to
the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLUs allegation that the
lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89
workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor
General, in behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for
reconsideration, while the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

Issue: Whether the CIRs freedom from the rigidity of procedural

requirements prescribe special requirements of due process in administrative
cases.
Held: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from
the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character, to wit:
a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case andmsubmit evidence in support thereof.
The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given
an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without
the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is
presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.
c. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right,
it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates

from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional

government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is
both a grant and a limitation upon power.
d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion
but the evidence must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance
of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only
by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see
that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but
their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR may
refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board
or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary,
but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of
its powers (Section 10)
f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular
heads of the CIR personally to decide all controversies coming before them.
There is no statutory authority to authorize examiners or other subordinates
to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to solve
the difficulty.
g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

19. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, vs. JUDGE FILOMENO

PASCUAL, [A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996]
Intimating as to what the ideals of a good judge should be, Sir Francis
Bacon wants judges to remember that their office is jus dicere and not jus
dare, to interpret law, and not to make law or give law. They ought to be
more learned than witty, more revered than plausible, and more advised
3than confident. Above all things, INTEGRITY is their portion and proper
virtue.[1]
The Constitution and the statutes, however, limit the legal qualifications
of judges to only three bare essentials: citizenship, age and experience. The
virtues of probity, honesty, temperance, impartiality and integrity, most often
used to measure an aspirant to the bench, lose their meaning in individual
perception. While people perceive judges to be above the ordinary run of
men, they know that a perfect judge, like a perfect priest, exists only in
fantasy. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the integrity of respondent
judge in this administrative case stands challenged for committing acts of
extortion or bribery.
The following antecedent facts appear on record:
Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter,
addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator
of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and corruption were being
committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Angat, Bulacan. On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal
and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered[2] to
conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco
were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo
Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat,
Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI
team realized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas,
they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in
respondents sala.
In his affidavit[3] executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta,
Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged
with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the
preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed
was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction
over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the
respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to
respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a
drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused
respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought

to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed
the following report:
On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ
met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal
Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of his
daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the
P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge
PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were
plenty of people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him
(Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993),
CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four (4)
pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously
marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and
after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled
to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already received the marked
money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed
Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything
from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was
found inserted between the pages of a blue book on top of his table.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he
was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subjects right
hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed
and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure
(S.O.P.).
On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person
of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation
that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized
under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. (Rollo, pp.
47-48.)
On May 11, 1994, by resolution of the Third Division of this Court, this
case was referred to Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon for investigation,
report and recommendation.[4]
In connection with this investigation, respondent filed a Memorandum,
dated July 28, 1995, wherein respondent presented his version of the case:
Sometime in February 1993, one Ceferino Tigas, a fictitious person
according to the NBI, wrote a letter to Court Administrator Ernani Pao of the
Supreme Court, alleging irregularities committed by the accused. Deputy
Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez endorsed the letter to the NBI
Director requesting `discreet investigation of the Tigas letter. An NBI tandem
of Agents Edward Villarta and Reynaldo Olazo proceeded to Angat, Bulacan,
to investigate. Said tandems assignment was merely to conduct discreet
investigation supposedly, but it led to incriminatory machinations, planting

evidence, unlawful arrest, illegal search and seizure. They contacted

Candido Cruz who was mentioned in the letter. They, however, discovered
that Ceferino Tigas, the alleged letter writer, was an inexistent person,
fictitious as shown by the synopsis report of the NBI agents (Exhibit
8). Having contacted Candido Cruz, the NBI agents persuaded him to
participate in what they called `entrapment operation. The NBI agents
prepared an affidavit, then a supplementary affidavit and had them signed by
Candido Cruz. They also went to the NBI Headquarters and had four (4)
P500 bills dusted with fluorescent powder which they used in theoperation
against the accused.
In the afternoon of March 25, 1993, the NBI, along with Candido Cruz,
proceeded to the municipal building of Angat, Bulacan, where the accused
judge was holding office. However, they learned that the accused judge was
not in his office but was then attending the graduation rites of his son at the
nearby Colegio de Sta. Monica, and so they decided to move their operation
to the school grounds. The ceremonies had not yet begun. Candido Cruz
saw the accused in one corner of the compound and approached him. He
tried to give the accused an envelope allegedly containing money, but the
judge refused to accept it and angrily drove Candido Cruz away. Rebuffed,
the NBI agents decided to reset their operation the following day.
At around 9:30 in the morning of March 26, 1993, the NBI agents and
Candido Cruz arrived at the municipal building of Angat, Bulacan. Cruz, as
planned, entered the accused judges chambers and placed an envelope,
allegedly containing marked money, right on his (judges) desk. He thought it
was a pleading for filing and he told Candido Cruz to file it with the office of
the clerk of court at the adjacent room. Cruz replied that it was the money
the judge was asking for. Upon hearing the reply, the accused suddenly
erupted in anger, he grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it to
Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor, the accused picked it up and inserted it
inside the pocket of Cruzs polo shirt and drove him out of the chamber.
Just seconds thereafter, agents Villarta and Olazo entered the door of
the chamber which door was open at that time. They introduced themselves
and told the accused that the money that Cruz gave him was
marked. Accused told them that he did not receive or accept money from
Cruz. But they proceeded to search the room, the table, its drawers, and
every nook and cranny of his room, including the pockets of the accuseds
pants. After scouring the place, the agents failed to find the envelope with
the marked money. And so, one of the agents called for Candido Cruz who
was waiting outside at a waiting shed fronting the municipal building, and
asked him where the envelope was. Cruz came back to the room and,
together with agent Olazo, approached the cabinet and said heto pala.
Then, the accuseds humiliating experience began. Thereafter, despite
the strident protestations of the accused, the envelope, which came from the
pocket of Cruzs polo shirt, was placed on top of the table of the judge,
pictures were taken, and the accused was arrested by the NBI agents.[5]

On August 11, 1995, Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon submitted the

following report and recommendation:
The Investigating Judge respectfully submits her findings based on the
evidence at hand.
As against the respondent judges denials, the undersigned submits that
the sworn affidavits of complainants and NBI Agents and documentary
proofs attached to the records are more convincing and nearer to the
truth. They have no motive for fabricating this charge, except to bring
justice. Credence should be given to the testimony of the NBI Agents
coming as it does from an unpolluted source. These Agents had no reason
to testify falsely against the respondent judge. They were just doing their
duty. On the other hand, the respondent judge had to protect himself against
the testimonial and technical/scientific evidence that he had received the
envelope and to reject its implications of such evidence.
Furthermore, his defense that he was just instigated to commit a crime
is likewise untenable. The principle evolved from the cases appears to be
that in a prosecution for an offense against the public welfare, such as
accepting bribe, the defense of entrapment cannot be successfully
interposed; x x x.
One may well wonder over the manner the envelope containing the
money was proffered to the respondent judge as he narrated his story on
how he got mad at Candido Cruz when he proffered the said envelope, how
he threw, picked it up and placed it in the pocket of the latter and how he
drove him away. He even testified that it was just planted by the NBI Agents
when the latter allegedly placed the envelope inside a directory which was
placed on top of a cabinet.
x x x. Why was he not surprised that somebody barged into his chamber
or was he really accustomed with people directly dealing or negotiating at his
chamber, as what Cruz did, instead of dealing with his staff. His angry
words and his actuations, according to his testimony, were not convincing at
all to show that he was that fuming mad at Candido Cruzs offer. More so,
his claim that NBI Agents connived with Candido Cruz just for their own
personal glory was not even persuasive. His excuse of the presence of
fluorescent powder on his hand was flimsy and incredible.
The act of the respondent shows that he can be influenced by monetary
considerations. This act of the respondent of demanding and receiving
money from a party-litigant before his court constitutes serious misconduct in
office. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how
nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are charged with the
responsibility of administering the law that will surely erode the peoples
respect for law and lose faith and trust in the courts which are expected to
render fair and equal justice to all.
Such act go against Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which state: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities and a judge should perform official duties honestly,
and with impartiality and diligence.

xxx
xxx
xxx
With the above, the Investigating Judge respectfully recommends that
appropriate penalty be imposed upon the respondent.
We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.
We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation
submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint,
the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at
the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to
open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and
present evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an
administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.
[6]
The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any
of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and
after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is
penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the
investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo
Olazo on several material points.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who
must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by
reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not
come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letterwriter, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or
illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general
terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid
answer or to otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations.
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the
Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a discreet
investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation
or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas
and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused
before respondents court who could possibly be respondent judges virtual
victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had
been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for
preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent
judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz
was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original
jurisdiction to try the case.
But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time
before Candido Cruz was persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI
agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune time to bribe the

respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz criminal

liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked
then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the
entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered
already.
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted [8] that, despite the
fact that he scoured the table of the respondent in search of the envelope,
with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call
Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the
allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 oclock in
the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents,
went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went
inside respondent judges chambers, located thereat, and placed before
respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge
thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he
told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a
room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money
the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge
suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled
it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then
picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz polo shirt and drove him
out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the
door of the judges chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent
judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge
told them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After
respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to
search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of
respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent
judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI
Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given
by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.
Candido Cruz, who had gone down to the waiting shed, was called for
by one of the agents. Candido Cruz was asked as to the whereabouts of the
envelope containing money. Candido Cruz went back to the judges
chambers and made the motions of conducting a search. Eventually, he
went straight to the top of a cabinet and, in the manner of a magician,
produced the envelope with marked money, saying, heto pala.
Thereafter, photographs were taken of respondent judge who was
humiliated no end by the fact that the envelope with marked money was
placed on top of his desk with respondent judge in front of it.
In his testimony before the Sandiganbayan, NBI Agent SI Reynaldo
Olazo stated that the marked money used in their entrapment operation
actually came from Candido Cruz and not from the NBI; [9] and he was not
able to see what actually transpired between Candido Cruz and respondent
judge inside the chambers of the judge. He was outside the judges

chambers and entered it only after Candido Cruz gave the signal that the
money was already delivered by him to the respondent. [10] Candido Cruz, on
the other hand, testified that the marked money used in the alleged
entrapment operation was given to him by the NBI [11] and, when he went out
of the judges chambers after giving the money, he signaled to one, Col.
Javier, who was then positioned immediately outside the chambers. [12]
In view of the foregoing facts, it is easy to conclude that the acts of the
NBI agents which triggered the incident that transpired inside respondent
judges chambers constituted instigation and not entrapment as claimed by
the prosecution. It is evident that Candido Cruz was induced to act as he did
in order to place respondent judge in a compromising situation, a situation
which was not brought about by any request of respondent judge. It is
surprisingly strange that an accused in a case would simply barge into the
judges chambers without rhyme or reason, place bribe money on top of the
judges desk without so much as explaining what the money was
for. Respondent judges action on Candido Cruzs case which favored Cruz
was effected long before. We can believe the fact that, under the
circumstances, respondent judge did react in anger and threw the envelope
at the accused Candido Cruz. The judge must have given back the money to
Candido Cruz and literally drove Cruz out of his chambers bringing the
money with him. This explains the reason why the NBI Agents
notwithstanding a relentless search did not find the money inside the
chambers. Four (4) NBI Agents made the search and they were unable to
find the envelope with the marked money in it. This fact NBI Agent Olazo in
effect admitted because he had to call back Candido Cruz in order to make
Cruz divulge as to where the bribe money was placed. When, after all,
Candido Cruz produced the money when he went back to the judges
chambers, it became obvious that the money when offered to respondent
judge was not received by the latter.
The foregoing set of facts smacks of unlawful prosecution and planting
of evidence amounting to persecution. It is reprehensible to say the least
that NBI agents should entrap the respondent judge by illegal means,
besmirch his reputation by the planting of evidence against him and make
public the foregoing charges of bribery against him in the face of the
unjustified and illegal incriminatory machinations perpetrated by the NBI
agents in connivance with Candido Cruz.
We, thus, hold respondent Judge Filomeno Pascual blameless of the
charge of bribery against him.
It should be noted that Candido Cruz insisted that he had participated in
the alleged entrapment operation only because of the fact that the NBI
agents made him believe that there was an order therefor from the Supreme
Court.[13] Considering that he is illiterate and is already more than 70 years of
age, it is understandable why he was easily persuaded by the NBI agents to
cooperate without need of any threat whatsoever. Inconsistencies in his
testimony is likewise attributed to his aforesaid personal circumstances for it
does not jibe with practical experience that a person telling the truth will still

have to struggle to remember everything that transpired, he having been a

participant in the operation. Gross mistakes on very important points not
easily forgotten are very strong indicia of the falsity of the story given by a
witness.[14] We reiterate the ruling in the case of Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr.,
[15]
that: The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established
beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the
removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption,
incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in
criminal trials apply.
Reasonable doubt is the inability to let the judicial mind rest easy upon
the certainty of guilt after a thorough investigation of the whole evidence.
[16]
The principle of reasonable doubt being applicable in the instant case,
therefore, we find that the alleged act of bribery committed by respondent
has not been sufficiently and convincingly proven to warrant the imposition of
any penalty against respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby
exonerated and the administrative case against him is DISMISSED.SO
ORDERED.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------20. Atty. NapoleonS. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo A.M. No.
MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000
Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the
constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own
choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics.
In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite
not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It
appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of
record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be
replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice
of Withdrawal, in conformity with his clients decision, Meriam Colapo.
Subsequently, he filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly
executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he
failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country
although she was willing to testify at that time.
Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of
counsel, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the
Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of
respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change her
counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court
found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to

substantiate the charges against him. The only evidence offered by

complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be
the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The
complainants failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other
evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given
credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being placed on the
witness stand.
The employment or profession of a person is a property right within
the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to
Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the
charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the said
witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be
infringed.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------21. Lumiqued vs. exevea [G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997]
FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by
Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses
under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements
and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also
complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the
two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the
complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted
by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992,
to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion,
but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen,
so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating
Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by
counsel during an administrative inquiry?
HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot
be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a
right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not
an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at
bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however,
was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for
the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under
the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

22. Fabella v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110379, 28 November 1997, 282
SCRA 256.
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work
order to allpublic school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and
strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990.
The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay,
allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990,
Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are
teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having
taken
part
in
the
mass
action
in violation of
civil
service
laws.Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents,
through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due
process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted
by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence;
second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove
their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted,
their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of
the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a
decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate
dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?
HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution ofproceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3)
a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well
as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The
legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna
Carta for Public
School
Teachers,
which
specifically
covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9
of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachersadministrative cases should be composed of the school
superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or

any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of

the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to
hear the administrativecharges against private respondents did not include a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in
these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was
this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to
be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process
is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was
complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City
Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in
their respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section
9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers organization possesses the
right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in
the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by
the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by
the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in said
committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a
subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is
an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------23. Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442, 6 April 2000]
Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro
Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies
at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four
(4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal,
Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken
the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it
accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane
plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at
high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and
the confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified
himself but the same had no effect.

PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them
and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed
for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City,
proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario
were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against
Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave
Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were
consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police
officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient
evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a
serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating
incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and
illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was
"in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he
allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in
the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for
20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita appealed
his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National
Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction
of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process
of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC
granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the
questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in
the performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by
petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the
reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity
considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach
of internal discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and
Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun
Ban.

administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses
mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the
performance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the
summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being charged with
breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment
finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged.
Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita
"committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings
referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular
performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell
of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at
the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a privatetrip fetching his
wife.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24. Office of the Ombudsman v. Coronel, G.R. No. 164460, June 27,
2006, 493 SCRA 392
In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by
substantial evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated photocopy of
an alleged receipt does not constitute substantial evidence to show that
respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the
photocopy is inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative
value.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the August 28, 2003 Decision[2] and the June 28, 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 77047. [3] The CA Decision
nullified petitioners Order of Disapproval dated March 23, 2001,[4] while the
CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
According to the CA, the facts are as follows:

Held: Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be

informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of specification of
the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper
observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process.
While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost allencompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which
one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without
violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12

[Respondent] Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior

Accounting Processor B with Salary Grade 10 of
the Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte. On September
26, 1997, the Board of Directors of Linamon Water District,
by virtue of Resolution No. 056[,] Series of 1997, designated
[respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effectiveOctober 1,
1997 until a General Manager shall have been appointed.

In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent]

called for a meeting the officers of the different Water
Districts in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, as well as
their advisors from the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group opted to
continue their meeting at Marvillas Store atBarangay Bunuun, Iligan City. The luncheon meeting, attended by more or
less ten (10) persons, was presided over by
Advisor Rhodora Gumban of the LWUA. As the host of the
said meeting, [respondent] paid for the lunch in the amount
of
One
Thousand
Two
[H]undred Thirteen
[P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736
dated October 14, 1998.

[Respondent] filed her motion for reconsideration

dated February 2, 2001. On March 7, 2001, Graft
Investigation Officer I Grace H. Morales issued an Order, the
decretal portion of which statesWHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the Motion for reconsideration is
granted and the Decision of this Office dated
November 27, 2000 dismissing from the
service
respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby
SET ASIDE.
xxx

On November 13, 1998, [respondent] claimed for

reimbursement of her expenses covered by Voucher No. 9811-23, chargeable against the representation and
entertainment account of her office. That very same day, the
voucher was approved and [respondent] got her
reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand Two
[H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00).
On November 17, 1998, Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was
appointed General Manager of Linamon Water District. On
February 1999, he filed with the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao a sworn letter-complaint against herein
[respondent] for dishonesty. The case was docketed as
Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM 99-044. The complaint alleges
that [respondent] falsified the cash invoice she submitted for
reimbursement by making it appear that the luncheon bill
was
for
One
Thousand
Two
[H]undredThirteen
[P]esos (P1,213.00) when in fact, it was only Two
[H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P213.00), as reflected in the
photocopy of the original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736
dated October 14, 1998.
On November 27, 2000, Grace H. Morales, Graft
Investigation Officer I of the OMB-Mindanao, Davao City,
rendered
a
decision,
approved
by
the
then
OmbudsmanAniano A. Desierto on December 29, 2000,
On January 10, 2001, the Office of the
Ombudsman, Manila, issued an order directing the General
Manager of Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte, to
implement the decision dated November 27, 2000.

xxx

xxx
On March
23,
2001,
[Petitioner]
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto DISAPPROVED the above
order with a marginal note, the original decision stands.[9]
Originally, Respondent Coronel filed before this Court
a Rule 65 Petition,[10] seeking the nullification of petitioners
Disapproval Order for having deprived her of due
process. In that case,[11] we said that the Petition should
have been denied outright. After all, in Fabian v. Desierto,
[12]
this Court held that appeals from the decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. In that case, though, we ruled that in
the interest of justice, there was a need to suspend the
application of Fabian and Circular AM No. 99-2-02-SC. We
considered respondents Petition then as a petition for review
under Rule 43 and referred it to the CA for adjudication on
the merits.[13]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court nullified petitioners Disapproval Order and
reinstated the March 7, 2001 Order of Graft Investigation Officer I Grace H.
Morales, who exonerated respondent from the charge of dishonesty.
The CA took cognizance of the corroborating Affidavits [14] submitted
by respondent for the first time through her Motion for
Reconsideration[15] before the ombudsman. The CA held that those pieces of
evidence adequately supported her innocence. The court a quo reiterated
the investigating officers finding that her administrative liability for dishonesty
had not been proven.

The Courts Ruling

Further, the appellate court said that the OMBs disapproval was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[16] First, petitioner ombudsman did not
consider the credible evidence presented by respondent in her Motion for
Reconsideration. Second, he did not give any justification for his disapproval
of the investigating officers ruling. This shortcoming was in contravention of
the constitutional mandate that all decisions, even if rendered by quasijudicial and administrative bodies, should clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which they are based. The CA cited Eballa v. Paas,[17] in
which the Supreme Court had denounced some judges practice of merely
noting down their orders on the margin of the motions before them. [18]
Hence, this Petition.[19]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in its Memorandum:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondent was not guilty of falsifying the amount written in
the receipt.
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
it was grave injustice for then Ombudsman Desierto not to
have considered the evidence presented by respondent in
her Motion for Reconsideration.
III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondent was denied due process.
IV. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
it was grave injustice for then Ombudsman Desierto not to
give any justification in disapproving the Order of Dismissal
by GIO Grace H. Morales.[20]
Going over petitioners arguments, the issues may be reduced to the
following:
1.
2.
3.

Whether petitioners Disapproval Order, expressed as a

marginal notation, was a valid decision or order
Whether the investigating officer committed an error in
admitting respondents new evidence
Whether respondent was guilty of dishonesty.

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Validity of the Disapproval Order
Respondent maintains that Ombudsman Desiertos marginal notation
-- which reads, The original decision stands -- was violative of her right to
due process for failing to state the basis for the action. [21]
On the other hand, petitioner counters that the marginal notation met
constitutional standards. Citing Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan,[22] the OMB
maintains that by referring to the original Decision, the notation adopts the
findings of fact and law already discussed. [23]
We agree with petitioner. We held in Olivarez[24] that the ombudsmans
disapproval orders written as marginal notations were valid, even if they did
not specifically spell out their factual and evidentiary basis. [25] Indeed, this
doctrine was first established in Cruz v. People[26] and has consistently been
followed in recent cases.[27] In the present controversy, it is worthwhile to
quote a relevant portion of our ruling in Olivarez:
It may be true that, on the face thereof, the marginal notes
seem to lack any factual or evidentiary basis for failure to
specifically spell out the same. However, that is not all there is
to it. What is actually involved here is a situation wherein, on
the bases of the same findings of fact of the investigating
prosecutors, respondent special prosecutors were of the opinion
that, contrary to the formers recommendation, petitioner is
probably guilty of the offense charged. Obviously, therefore,
since it is merely a review of the conclusions arrived at by the
investigating prosecutor, another or a new preliminary
investigation is no longer necessary. [28]
The subject notation, The original decision stands, was a valid
resolution. It actually adopted the factual and legal conclusions of the
original Decision. Hence, respondent should find her bearings from that
holding.
The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due
process. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process lies
simply in the opportunity to explain ones side or to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of
notice or hearing.[29]

In this case, respondent was given every opportunity to be

heard. Significantly, her intelligible pleadings before the CA and this Court
indicate that she knew the bases for the ombudsmans Decision. In fact, she
very ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would merit our
review. Not having been left in the dark as to how it was reached,
respondents insistence on a denial of due process has no legal leg to stand
on.
Second Issue:
Admission of New Evidence
Petitioner cites Section 8 of Rule III of the Office of the Ombudsmans
Rules of Procedure (Administrative Order No. 07), which provides that a
motion for reconsideration may be filed if a newly discovered evidence would
materially affect the order or decision. He then posits that the Affidavits of
the restaurant proprietor and the members of the luncheon meeting, as well
as the Certification of the barangay captain, could not qualify as newly
discovered evidence. These were allegedly available and could have been
readily produced by respondent with reasonable diligence during the
administrative adjudication of the case.[30]
On the other hand, respondent cites Samala v. CA[31] to support her
claim that rules of procedure must not be strictly applied to frustrate
substantial justice.[32]
Newly discovered evidence refers to that which already exists prior
to or during a trial, but whose existence is not known to the offering litigant;
or, though known, could not have been secured and presented during the
trial despite reasonable diligence. [33] What is essential for a particular piece of
evidence to be properly regarded as newly discovered is that the offering
party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before
or during the trial, but nonetheless failed to secure it. Thus, a party who
knows of the existence of specific pieces of evidence cannot offer them as
newly discovered without any explanation for not presenting them earlier.[34]
Petitioner is correct in saying that the evidence presented by
respondent in support of her Motion for Reconsideration should not have
been considered. Her Motion for Reconsideration[35] did not explain the
belated presentation of her corroborating affidavits, but it merely contained
the following statements:
2. On the basis of the aforecited decision, the
respondent hereby invoke (sic) this Motion for Reconsideration,

anchored principally on the ground that, this Office committed

serious errors in [its] findings of fact and law, which if left
uncorrected will be prejudicial to the interest of the herein
respondent. The respondent has also discovered new
evidence, which if considered, will materially affect the decision,
which is being sought to be reconsidered.[36]
The seriousness and the adverse consequential impact
of the decision of this Office as against the herein respondent,
compelled the latter to clarify facts and things with MR.
MARIANO MARZO[,] JR., who is the owner of Marvillas By the
Sea, the same business establishment who (sic) issued Cash
Invoice Receipt No. 0736, dated October 14, 1998, which is the
gist (sic) of the complainants cause on the alleged tampering of
receipt which (sic) he accused respondent to have committed
the same.
After some initial backgrounder of the case, MR.
MARIANO MARZO[,] JR., personally volunteered to execute
and sign a SWORN STATEMENT, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, of the City of Iligan, detailing every fact as to the
real truth of the matter, the substance of which is reflected in his
SWORN STATEMENT x x x[.][37]
Additionally, in support and in order to corroborate the
Sworn Statement of Mr. Mariano Marzo, Jr., the affidavits of MR.
CEDRIC
D.
LAGUERTA,
General
Manager
of Kauswagan Water District, Lanao del Norte, MR. ROMEO J.
ANGELES,
General
Manager
of Wao Water
District, Lanao del Sur, MR. BEDE G. GATA, of the Local Water
Utilities Administration, of Balara, Quezon City, and that of MS.
RHODORA V. GUMBAN, also of LWUA, Quezon City,
Philippines,
[a]
Certification
issued
by
the PunongBarangay of Buru-un, Iligan City, certifying as to the
reasonableness of the price paid by the respondent, in relation
to the number of persons present during that luncheon meeting,
in relation to the prevailing price then for meals in that area
which
is
a
tourist
destination
in
the
City
of Iligan. The aforecited documents are herein simultaneously
appended and marked as Annexes C, D, E, F, and G,
respectively.[38]
We are convinced that the Affidavits do not constitute newly
discovered evidence. Respondent did not prove that, even with reasonable
diligence, she could not have obtained them during the investigation. There

is no showing whatsoever that her corroborating witnesses hesitated or

declined to give their testimonies.
As it is, the additional evidence offered by Coronel amount to no
more than forgotten evidence, the belated uncovering of which would not
have justified a reconsideration of the case. Forgotten evidence refers to
evidence already in existence or available before or during a trial; known to
and obtainable by the party offering it; and could have been presented and
offered in a seasonable manner, were it not for the sheer oversight or
forgetfulness of the party or the counsel. [39] Presentation of forgotten
evidence is disallowed, because it results in a piecemeal presentation of
evidence, a procedure that is not in accord with orderly justice [40] and serves
only to delay the proceedings. A contrary ruling may open the floodgates to
an endless review of decisions, whether through a motion for reconsideration
or for a new trial, in the guise of newly discovered evidence.
Third Issue:
Absence of Substantial Evidence
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the forgotten evidence of
respondent, there is a basis for reversing the ombudsmans November 27,
2000Decision[41] and for affirming the CA Decision [42] exonerating her. We
find the evidence presented by the complainant insufficient to support his
serious charge that she was dishonest.
Although sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is a question of fact
and is not generally subject to review by this Court, the instant case falls
under the recognized exceptions. The original Decision of the ombudsman
was not supported by the evidence, but was grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures.
The evidence of the prosecution consisted merely of the original
Official Receipt (OR) No. 0736, and a photocopy of the original duplicate of
that receipt. The first was a bill for P1,213; and the latter, for P213. Both
pieces of evidence refer to one and the same Official Receipt; yet, they
contain
different
amounts. Obviously,
one
of
them
was
falsified. Unfortunately, Complainant Sausal, Jr., failed to prove that it was
indeed respondents receipt that was falsified. As it stands, we do not know
for certain if the number 1 was inserted in OR No. 0736 or was deleted from
the unauthenticated photocopy of the original duplicate. The evidence is
equivocal. Besides, given that there were 8 to 10 attendees in the luncheon
meeting, a bill of P1,213 for meals was not entirely improbable, even in
1998.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding

of guilt is substantial evidence; [43] that is, such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [44] In the
instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support his theory
that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true amount, or that
OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That oversight was fatal to the
discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump
to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.
The complainants evidence to prove falsification consisted of an
unauthenticated[45] photocopy of the original duplicate. He could have
obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who had
issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and
authenticity. Absent any proof of due execution and authenticity, the alleged
photocopy of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not convince us that
it is an accurate reflection of the actual bill incurred.
While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of
proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently requires
some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of
documents. Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the
original duplicate should be considered inadmissible and, hence, without
probative value.[46]
Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against
respondent, there is no need for her to present additional evidence to
vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the
Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was
not proven by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of the
charge against her for lack of substantial evidence. No pronouncement as to costs.

25. Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000]

Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13
November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The
Senate, by way of Resolution 11,
expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed
its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7
thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition
request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the
Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez
to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371
(Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b)
26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343
(Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in
name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued
Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to
take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated
extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999requested copies of the
official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents
and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed
with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish
Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford
him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari
(to set aside the Justice Secretarys letter dated 13 July 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition
request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary

filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000,
by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the
Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file
his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary
timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of an extradition process.
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a
copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after
the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is
of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which
will be answered by the extraditee. There is noprovision in the Treaty and in
PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice
Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its
supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US
government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the
extraditee a right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an
international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the
extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
extradition process evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is
not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition
proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and
hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive
him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.

26. Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002

In the case of Government of the United States v. Hon. Purganan the

court had the occasion to resolve the issue as to whether or not extraditees
are entitled tothe right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending. Private respondent (extraditee) invoked the
constitutional provision under the 1987 Constitution, that persons are entitled
to bail except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
or death when evidence of guilt is strong. The court, in rejecting the claim of
private respondent held that said constitutional provision is applicable only in
criminal cases but not to extradition proceedings.Again, the court reiterated
its pronouncement in the Lantion case that the Ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether theextradition
request complies with the Extradition treaty, and whether the person sought
is extraditable.
Equally important, is the pronouncement that the courtof the
requested state has the discretion to grant or deny bail and that as a rule bail
is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But the court enunciated that
thereare exceptions to this rule if only to serve the ends of justice, (1) once
granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or danger to the community;
(2) that thereexist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
Having no statutory basis the applicant bears the burden of proving
these exceptions with clarity andprecision. Unfortunately, the court exercised
its discretion in denying bail to private respondent who considered him as a
flight risk when he fled the United Statesafter learning of the criminal
charges filed against him.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government
requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine
whether awarrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was
issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional
liberty.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before
issuance of warrant of arrest
2. Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
RULING:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.First,
extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to

theother.With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel,

the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of
committing crimeand evading prosecution has become more frequent.
Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with
criminals and crimes that transcendinternational boundaries.Today, a
majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon
extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in
thesuppression of crime.
It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the
jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordancewith municipal and
international law.xxxIndeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster
international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and
criminals, we cannot afford to be anisolationist state. We need to cooperate
with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our
own country.2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the
AccusedSecond, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto
have examined, and that both accept and trust, each other s legal system
and judicial process.More pointedly, our duly authorized representative s
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and
the willingness of the other stateto protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused
will be given, upon extradition to therequesting state, all relevant and basic
rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise,
the treaty would not have been signed, or wouldhave been directly attacked
for its unconstitutionality.
. The Proceedings Are Sui GenerisThird, as pointed out in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of theaccused are at fore; in
extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.An
extradition proceeding
is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in thecourt
of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights
that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannotbe invoked by an extraditee x x x.x x x x x x x x xThere are other
differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminalproceedings
involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the
rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of
evidenceunder less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence
to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction while afugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where

judgment becomes executory uponbeing rendered final, in an extradition

proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the
President has the final discretion to extradite him. TheUnited States adheres
to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion
in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of thenation s foreign
relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.Given the
foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to
ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.
Suchdetermination during the extradition proceedings will only result in
needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistancethrough which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. It is not part of the function of theassisting authorities to enter into
questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in court is only to determinewhether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought
is extraditable.4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.Fourth, our executive
branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries thepresumption that its
implementation will serve the national interest.Fulfilling our obligations under
the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. On the
other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paintsa bad image of
our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other
states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extraditiontreaty that
hinges on reciprocity.Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply
in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that
we deliver the accused to therequesting country if the conditions precedent
to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law
require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the
proper warrant, and the other government is underobligation to make the
surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position
to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.5. There Is an Underlying
Risk of FlightFifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.
This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the
executive branch: nothingshort of confinement can ensure that the accused
will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state.The present extradition case further
validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity
to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would noteven begin, if only the accused
were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein
respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right beforethe conclusion of
his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested
state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and
thatthe crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his
aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his

predisposition to avoid them at allcost. These circumstances point to an everpresent, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the
capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?Due ProcessIs an
extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest?It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law,
uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would berendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
opposing parties, receiving facts and argumentsfrom them, and giving them
time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to
a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. Thelaw could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase if it appears, the
law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early
stage. The trial court is not expected to make anexhaustive determination to
ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of
the petition. From the knowledge and the material then availableto it, the
court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding
-- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
anddetention of the accused.xxxEven Section 2 of Article III of our
Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or
a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Itprovides:Sec. 2. The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons orthings to be seized. To determine probable
cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainantsand the
witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.x x xAt most, in cases of
clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the actof
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his
witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the
entiresystem. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to
present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest,what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of
defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima
facie finding? Such a procedurecould convert the determination of a prima
facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make
trial of the main case superfluous. Thisscenario is also anathema to the

summary nature of extraditions.That the case under consideration is an

extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of
a set of procedures more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure
were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be
justified in view of respondents demonstratedpredisposition to flee.Right to
BailExtradition Different from Ordinary Criminal ProceedingsWe agree with
petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule
114 of theRules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings,because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply toa case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.The provision in the
Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does notdetract from the
rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence,
the secondsentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken tomean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.That the offenses for which
Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which
he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminalcases against him, not before the extradition court.Exceptions to the
No Bail RuleThe rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in
extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb
grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to promulgate
rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe
that the right to due process is broad enoughto include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life,
liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic andresilient, adaptable to
every situation calling for its application.Accordingly and to best serve the
ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has
been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for
and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1)
that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or adanger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the

highestcourt in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in

extradition cases therein.Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above twotiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The
Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,not a judicial,
responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations.
In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistanceamongst
states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by
the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution,
sothat the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is
ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits
of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations. Bail is
a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------27. Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19, 2007)
Facts
Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants
of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order
of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a
petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a
petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law
granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was
granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that
accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised
in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders
and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court
even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors
handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and
day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his

undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue

In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA
699, respondent school was directed to allow the petitioning students to reenroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice
to any disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in connection with
their participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Facts:
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and
that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of
ones liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United
States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR
No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply
to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in
international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is
given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the
Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may
be allowed to post bail.

28. Guzman vs. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142
SCRA 699

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel

Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this
Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and
persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary
legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to
the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the
premises of the University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners
failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to
their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional
and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was
poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman is
facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent
University. The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good
scholastic standing.
Held:
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment
and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of
any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or
participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without
prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes
therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation,
slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of
University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for
damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner
Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents
to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may
be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE
DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------29. Alcuaz v. PSBA [GR 76353, 2 May 1988]
Facts: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas,
Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela
Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early
as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on
certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite
of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others
they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was
turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of
school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October
1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to
explain why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction
on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of
tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982,
the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter.
During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted
and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28
October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the
Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the
PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student
leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the
President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the
schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was
made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the
President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these
notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a
petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of
PSBA to readmit them.

Held: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any
existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers.
The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of.
The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said
students and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of
students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations
has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section
107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for
refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings
may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part
thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet
the demands of procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with.
The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school
authorities in the interest of
justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and
expertise gained from the
handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the
Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of
administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when
palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the
Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows
it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who
were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to
graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should be
allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.
30. Non v. Dames [GR 89317, 20 May 1990]

Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge
Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny
Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres,
students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed
to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding
semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet
(Branch 38) seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the
trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion
for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24
February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted for reenrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its
enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for
the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all
the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College
Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected students
filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
before the Supreme Court.

Herein, the students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings

in connection with the mass actions, but
the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the
offense committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements of
procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings
and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and
academic; as the students have been refused readmission or re-enrollment
and have been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been
more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have
committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that resulted in
the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings
would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained
relations between the students and the officials of the school which
necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle.

Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when
the cause for the action taken against them relates to possible breaches of
discipline.

31. ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO

CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993

Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given
by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools
to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a
term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still,
institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a
major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of
higher learning. The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic
standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who
exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise
there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. Thus, an institution
of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity
to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student
commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required
academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not
review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because of
failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably
related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process
but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the
failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked
academic deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from
the academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of information.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died
of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation
rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the
Capitol Medical Center. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent
students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice,
they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Investigating
Committee found a prima facie case against respondent students for
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the
formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the
charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students
guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing
activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of
the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the
penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed
with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted.
A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del
Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against

respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken

out by the respondents and
argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the
original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due
process. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead
of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies
of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and
hearing.
The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein,
thus:
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them
with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met.
When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo,
as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written
statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.
While of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly
submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements .
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled
out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be
noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules
of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was
addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters
dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent
students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf
and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the
investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty- Student Committee,
the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its
appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were
not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991
order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they
were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract
from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination.
An ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING conducted to investigate students'
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a
judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which
characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature
and that respondent students have no righ t to examine affiants-neophytes,
reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz .
Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to
consider their evidence is far from the truth because the February 14, 1992
ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the
Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a
hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to
answer clarificatory questions.
32. UP vs. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342 G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the
University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly
known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad consultations with the
various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V.
Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a
Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official
recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of
the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest
of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to
apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in
fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give
undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working
for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire
where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual
income of the

family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from
which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the
basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the
integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data
indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among those who
applied for STFAP benefits for School
Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.
A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo
conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta
Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home
visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found
discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith,
she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and
Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on
Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said
Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the
investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he
had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but
also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and
Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had
reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989,
unless he could
submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the
equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current
commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the
suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of
clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might
be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further
investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the
suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and
transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to
the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a
certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the
United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been
legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying
employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal
(SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately
withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad
and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT
imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and
required him to reimburse
all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make
reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal
action. The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the
Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the
U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified

the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective

immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP,
with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a
certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for
reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent
Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of the truth of Nadal's
claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from
the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification
issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a
student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared
that there was
as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge."
According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he
received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material
misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence,
he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's
claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V.
Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored
solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which
would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and
deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and
the reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a
certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship
grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special
meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR
found Nadal "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with
preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against
President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura,
Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due
process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges
against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.
Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent
considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process"
inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of
sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process,"
the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting.
However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate due process
in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR
meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR
meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of
the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have

been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no

time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of
the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for
deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal
was not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground
upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge.
Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28.
Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed
that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent
Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the
same charge" of withholding information on the income of
Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio
requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU
was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of
Nadal. In other words, he sought additional insights into the character of
Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU.
The Court in this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a mere
superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned,
Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who
could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that she was
supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another son. The
court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that Nadal
withheld
information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother.
The court also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the
professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail.
In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady
character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his
profession. With this the court ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent
has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in
connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of
the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner
University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary
sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. Therefore deciding that the
BOR did not violate Nadals right of due process. The lower court is hereby
ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.