(1)Carlos Superdrug Corp. v.

DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007)

Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a)
of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional.
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy
of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
(2)REYES VS. ALMANZOR GR 43839-46 April 26, 1991 196 SCRA 322
FACTS: Petitioner are owners of parcels of land leased to tenants. RA 6359 was enacted prohibiting for one year an
increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units and said Act also disallowed ejectment of lessees upon the expiration of the
usual period of lease. City assessor of Manila assessed the value of petitioners property based on the schedule of market
values duly reviewed by the Secretary of Finance. The revision entailed an increase to the tax rates and petitioners
averred that the reassessment imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income derived from their properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not income approach is the method to be used in the tax assessment and not the comparable sales
approach.
RULING: By no stretch of the imagination can the market value of properties covered by PD 20 be equated with the
market value of properties not so covered. In the case at bar, not even factors determinant of the assessed value of
subject properties under the comparable sales approach were presented by respondent namely:
1. That the sale must represent a bonafide arms length transaction between a willing seller and a willing buyer
2. The property must be comparable property. As a general rule, there were no takers so that there can be no reasonable
basis for the conclusion that these properties are comparable.
Taxes are lifeblood of government, however, such collection should be made in accordance with the law and therefore
necessary to reconcile conflicting interests of the authorities so that the real purpose of taxation, promotion of the
welfare of common good can be achieved.
(3)CIR vs. CA261 SCRA 236
FACTS: On 22 August 1986, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income
taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. Availing
itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in October 1986 and November 1986,
its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B, respectively, and paid
the corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a
communication received by private respondent on 13 August 1986, assessed the latter deficiency income and business
taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71.
However, the request to cancel the deficiency taxes was denied.
ISSUES: WON private respondent can avail of the tax amnesty
RULING: YES. Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a simple application of its
provisions. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax
liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986,the law could have simply so provided in its

exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be
in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. It might not be amiss
to recall that the taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years immediately preceding the 1986revolution
during which time there had been persistent calls, all too vivid to be easily forgotten, for civil Disobedience , most
particularly in the payment of taxes, to the martial law regime. It should be understandable then that those who ultimately
took over the reigns of government following the successful revolution would promptly provide for a broad, and not a
confined, tax amnesty.
(4)Gomez Palomar 1st batch
(5)Eastern Theatrical Co. vs. Alfonso GR L-1104, 31 May 1944
Facts: The municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance 2958 (series of 1946) imposing a fee on the price of every
admission ticket sold by cinematograph theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical shows and boxing exhibitions, in
addition to fees imposed under Sections 633 and 778 of Ordinance 1600. Eastern Theatrical Co., among others, question
the validity of ordinance, on the ground that it is unconstitutional for being contrary to the provisions on uniformity and
equality of taxation and the equal protection of the laws inasmuch as the ordinance does not tax other kinds of
amusement, such as race tracks, cockpits, cabarets, concert halls, circuses, and other places of amusement.
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the rule on uniformity and equality of taxation.
Held: Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation; and the theater companies cannot point out what places of amusement taxed by the ordinance do
not constitute a class by themselves and which can be confused with those not included in the ordinance. The fact that
some places of amusement are not taxed while others, like the ones herein, are taxed is no argument at all against the
equality and uniformity of the tax imposition.
(6)Manila Race Horse v. Dela Fuente
Facts: This action was instituted for a declaratory relief by the Manila Race Horses Trainers Association, Inc., a nonstock corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, who allege that they are
owners of boarding stables for race horses and that their rights as such are affected by Ordinance No. 3065 of the City of
Manila approved on July 1, 1947.
They made the Mayor of Manila defendant and prayed that said ordinance be declared invalid as violative of the
Philippine Constitution. The case was submitted on the pleadings, and the decision was that the ordinance in question "is
constitutional and valid and has been enacted in accordance with the powers of the Municipal Board granted by the
Charter of the City of Manila."
Issue: WON the ordinance makes an arbitrary classification--- thus being violative of the constitution.
Held: In taxing only boarding stables for race horses, we do not believe that the ordinance, makes arbitrary classification.
In the case of Eastern Theatrical Co. Inc., vs. Alfonso, it was said there is equality and uniformity in taxation if all articles
or kinds of property of the same class are taxed at the same rate. Thus, it was held in that case, that "the fact that some
places of amusement are not taxed while others, such as cinematographs, theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical
shows, and boxing exhibitions and other kinds of amusements or places of amusement are taxed, is not argument at all
against the equality and uniformity of tax imposition." Applying this criterion to the present case, there would be
discrimination if some boarding stables of the same class used for the same number of horses were not taxed or were
made to pay less or more than others. From the viewpoint of economics and public policy the taxing of boarding stables
for racehorses to the exclusion of boarding stables for horses dedicated to other purposes is not indefensible. The
owners of boarding stables for race horses and, for that matter, the race horse owners themselves, who in the scheme of
shifting may carry the taxation burden, are a class by themselves and appropriately taxed where owners of other kinds of
horses are taxed lessor not at all, considering that equity in taxation is generally conceived in terms of ability to pay in
relation to the benefits received by the taxpayer and by the public from the business or property taxed. Race horses are
devoted to gambling if legalized, their owners derive fat income and the public hardly any profit from horse racing, and

this business demands relatively heavy police supervision. Taking everything into account, the differentiation against
which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discrimatory within the
meaning of the Constitution.
(7)Punsalan vs. Manila GR L-4817, 26 May 1954
Facts: Ordinance 3398 was enacted pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
imposing a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city. Various professionals filed suit
to annul the ordinance and the provision of law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance, and to call for the refund
collected taxes under the ordinance.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance violates the equal protection clause.
Held: The legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupation shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it
may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the other untaxed. Manila, as the seat of the National
Government and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other Philippine city or municipality, offers
a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to
pay a higher occupation tax than their brethen in the provinces. The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person
exercising or pursuing any of the occupation named in the ordinance, and does not make any distinction between
professional having offices in Manila and outsiders who practice their profession therein. What constitutes exercise
or pursuit of a profession in the city is a matter of judicial determination. The Ordinance does not violate the equal
protection clause.
(8)CITY OF BAGUIO vs. DE LEON 25 SCRA 938 GR No. L-24756, October 31, 1968
"There is no double taxation where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city."
FACTS: The City of Baguio passed an ordinance imposing a license fee on any person, entity or corporation doing business
in the City. The ordinance sourced its authority from RA No. 329, thereby amending the city charter empowering it to fix
the license fee and regulate businesses, trades and occupations as may be established or practiced in the City. De Leon
was assessed for P50 annual fee it being shown that he was engaged in property rental and deriving income therefrom. The
latter assailed the validity of the ordinance arguing that it is ultra vires for there is no statury authority which expressly
grants the City of Baguio to levy such tax, and that there it imposed double taxation, and violates the requirement of
uniformity.
ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendant-appellant tenable?
HELD: No. First, RA 329 was enacted amending Section 2553 of the Revised Administrative Code empowering the City
Council not only to impose a license fee but to levy a tax for purposes of revenue, thus the ordinance cannot be
considered ultra vires for there is more than ample statury authority for the enactment thereof.
Second, an argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is
imposed by the city, so that where, as here, Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute must be sustained
even though double taxation results.
And third, violation of uniformity is out of place it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in
the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the
state and the political subdivisions thereof.
(9)Sison vs. Ancheta GR L-59431, 25 July 1984
Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1) unduly discriminated
against him by the imposition of higher rates upon his income as a professional, that it amounts to class legislation, and
that it transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation.
Issue: Whether BP 135 violates the due process and equal protection clauses, and the rule on uniformity in taxation.
Held: There is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a conclusion that there was a violation of
the due process and equal protection clauses. Absent such showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. Equality and

uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where
the differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to the standards of equal protection,
it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the clause and is therefore uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into
different categories, such as recipients of compensation income as against professionals. Recipients of compensation
income are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes as there is no practically no overhead expense, while
professionals and businessmen have no uniform costs or expenses necessary to produce their income.
There is ample justification to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the
system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income.
(10)Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento GR L-3538, 28 May 1952
Facts: Juan Luna Subdivision is a local corporation which issued a check to the City Treasurer of Manila for amount to
be applied to its land tax for the second semester of 1941. The records of the City Treasurer do not show what was done
with the check (It appears that it was deposited with the Philippine National Bank[PNB]). After liberation (WWII), the
City Treasurer refused to refund the corporations deposit or apply it to such future taxes as might be found due, while
the Philippine Trust Co (to which the check was presented)was unwilling to reverse its debit entry against Juan Luna
Subd. Said amount is also subject of another
disagreement between the corporation and the City Treasure, with the corporation claiming

that the whole

amount of the check for the taxes for the last semester of 1941 have been remitted by Common wealth Act 703 (1945).
Issue:Whether the provision allowing the remission covers taxes paid before the enactment ofCommonwealth Act 703, or
taxes which were still unpaid.
Held: The law is clear that it applies to taxes and penalties due and payable, i.e. taxes owed or owing. The remission of
taxes due and payable to the exclusion of taxes already collected does not constitute unfair discrimination. Each set of
taxes is a class by itself, and the law would be open to attack as class legislation only if all taxpayers belonging to one class
were not treated alike. Herein, they are not. The taxpayers who paid their taxes before liberation and those who had not
were not on the same footing on the need of material relief. Taxpayers who had been in arrears in their obligation would
have to satisfy their liability with genuine currency, while the taxes paid during the occupation had been satisfied in
Japanese War Notes, many of them at a time when those notes were well-nigh worthless. To refund those taxes with
restored currency would be unduly enrich many of the payers at a greater expense to the people at large.
(11)Association of Custom Brokers vs. Manila GR L-4376, 22 May 1953
Facts: The Association of Customs Brokers, which is composed of all brokers and public service operators of motor
vehicles in the City of Manila, challenges the validity of Ordinance 3379 on the grounds (1) that while it levies a so-called
property tax, it is in reality a license tax which is beyond the power of the Manila Municipal Board; (2) that said ordinance
offends against the rule on uniformity of taxes; and (3) that it constitutes double taxation.
Issue: Whether the ordinance infringes on the rule on uniformity of taxes as ordained by the Constitution.
Held: While the tax in the Ordinance refers to property tax and it is fixed ad valorem, it is merely levied on all motor
vehicles operating within Manila with the main purpose of raising funds to be expended exclusively for the repair,
maintenance and improvement of the streets and bridges in said city. The ordinance imposes a license fee although under
the cloak of an ad valorem tax to circumvent the prohibition in the Motor Vehicle Law. Further, it does not distinguish
between a motor vehicle for hire and one which is purely for private use. Neither does it distinguish between a motor
vehicle registered in Manila and one registered in another place but occasionally comes to Manila and uses its streets and
public highways. The distinction is necessary if the ordinance intends to burden with tax only those registered in Manila as
may be inferred from the
wordoperating used therein. There is an inequality in the ordinance which renders it offensive to the Constitution.

(12)Ormoc Sugar vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City GR L-23794, 17 February 1968

Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United
States and other foreign countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case seeking to
invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.
Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none other.
At the time of the taxing ordinances enacted, the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification,
to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar authority to enforce the same. Further, Section 169 applies
to skimmed milk, which is different to filled milk.
Furthermore, Section 169 is only being enforced against the respondent companies nad not againstmanufacturers,
distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL,ENFAMIL, and OLAC. Such
kind of enforcement amounts to an unconstitutional denial of the equal protection of the laws, for the law, if not equally
enforced to persons similarly situated, would offend against the Constitution.
(13)Reyes vs. Almanzor GR 49839-46, 26 April 1991
Facts: JBL, Edmundo and Milagros Reyes are owners of parcels of land in Manila which are leased and occupied as
dwelling sites by tenants. In 1971, RA 6359 was passed prohibiting an increase of monthly rentals of dwelling units or of land
on which another dwelling is located for one year after effectivity for rentals not exceeding P300 but allowing an increase
of rent thereafter by not more than 10%. The Act also suspended the operation of Article 1673 of the Civil
Code (ejectment of lessess). PD 20 amended RA 6359 byabsolutely prohibiting the increase and indefinitely suspending
Article 1673. The Reyeses, thus, were precluded from raising the rentals and from ejecting the tenants. In 1973, the City
Assessor of Manila reclassified and reassessed the value of the properties based on the schedule of market values duly
reviewed by the Secretary of Finance. As it entailed an increase of the corresponding tax rates, the Reyeses filed a
memorandum of disagreement with the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals and averring therein that there assessments
were excessive, unwarranted, unequitable, confiscatory and unconstitutional inasmuch as the taxes imposed exceeded
the annual income derived from their properties; and that the income approach should have been used in determining land
values instead of the comparative sales approach which the assessor adopted.
Issue: Whether the reassessment is unequitable.
Held: Taxation is equitable when its burden falls on those better able to pay. Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up
depending on the resources of the person affected. Taxes are uniform when all taxable articles or kinds of property of
the same class are taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classification for purposes of taxation. Laws should operate equally and uniformly, however, on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different both in the
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Finally, under the Real Property Tax Code (PD 464), property must be appraised
at its current and fair market value. The market value of the properties covered by PD 20, thus cannot be equated with
the market value of properties not so covered. Should property covered by PD 20 has naturally a much lesser market value
in view of the rental restrictions. Although taxes are the lifeblood of the government and should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very
reason for government itself. As the Reyeses are burdened by the Rent Freeze Laws (RA 6359 and PD 20),they should not
be penalized by the same government by the imposition of excessive taxes they cancan ill afford and would eventually
result in the forfeiture of their properties, under the principle of social justice.
(14)Villegas vs, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho GR L-29646, 10 November 1978
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic
and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and

members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be employed or engage in
trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months
imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
Held: The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have
been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in
situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive. [ The
Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]
(15)Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary [G.R. No. 108524. November
10, 1994]
Facts: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members,
individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that
prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90,
copra was classified as agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore,
exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. Under Sec. 103(b) of the NIRC, the sale of agricultural food
products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. The reclassification had
the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural
food product under 103(b) of the NIRC. Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47-91 on various
grounds.
Issues: (1) Whether the BIR is the proper the competent government agency to determine the proper classification of food
products. (2) Whether RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Held: The court, as to the first issue, ruled in the affirmative. The BIR, as the government agency charged with the
implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect. In interpreting Section 103 of the NIRC,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue correctly gave it a strict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state. The ruling was made by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his power under 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in
connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of
articles for sales tax and similar purposes. With regard to the second issue, the court ruled in the negative. Petitioner
likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is violative of the equal protection clause because while coconut farmers and copra
producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil
millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers. The argument has no merit. There is a
material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and
dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid
the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently. It is not true
that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services.
(16)Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455 235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere
consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus
violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD: No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that
the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but also
of reading the bill on separate days.
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the
bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on
the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative
practice.