G, Plaintiff, v AN BORD UCHTALA and Others Defendants

Supreme Court
[1980] IR 32 at 52
HEARING-DATES: 2 November 1978 and 03 November 1978; 19 December 1978
19 December 1978
(See (1980) IR 32 for the judgment of the High Court)
Adoption - Consent - Withdrawal - Illegitimate child - Applicants seeking adoption order - Child
in care of applicants - Applicants applying for order authorising Adoption Board to dispense with
mother's consent to adoption - Principles applicable - Adoption Act, 1952 (No 25), s14, s15 Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 (No 7), s2, s3, s6, s10, s14, s15, s16 - Adoption Act, 1974 (No
24), s2, s3 - Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Art40, Art41, Art42.
S14 of the Act of 1952 states that an adoption order shall not be made without the consent of
the mother of the child, and that the consent may be withdrawn at any time before the adoption
order is made. S6 of the Act of 1964 states that the mother of an illegitimate infant shall be the
guardian of the infant; and s10 of that Act states that, unless otherwise provided, every guardian
under the Act shall be a guardian of the person and, as such, shall be entitled to the custody of the
infant and shall be entitled to take proceedings for the restoration of his custody of the infant. Where
a necessary consent has been refused or withdrawn, an applicant for an adoption order is enabled
by s3 of the Act of 1974 to apply to the High Court for an order under that section. If it is satisfied
that "it is in the best interests of the child so to do," the High Court is thereby empowered to make
an order giving custody of the child to the applicant for such period as the court may determine, and
may authorise the first defendant to dispense with the missing consent during that period.
The plaintiff, an unmarried woman aged 21 years, gave birth to a daughter on the 14th
November, 1977. The plaintiff did not inform her parents of the birth of her child as she was afraid
of her parents' reaction to that information. The plaintiff did not inform the father of her child and
she had decided not to marry him. While she was in hospital the plaintiff was advised to place her
child for adoption. As the plaintiff lived in a flat with three other girls and earned a modest salary,
she was unable to care for her child unaided. On the 6th January, 1978, the plaintiff placed her child
with an adoption society and signed a consent to the child being adopted. Towards the end of
January the plaintiff informed her parents that she had given birth to a child and that she had placed
it for adoption, and her parents agreed immediately to help the plaintiff to rear her child. On the 11th
February the plaintiff wrote to the adoption society stating that she wished to keep her child and
that she withdrew her consent, and on the 21st February the married couple who had applied for
an adoption order in respect of the child were so informed. Those applicants had received temporary
custody of the plaintiff's child from the adoption society on the 22nd January, pending the decision
of the first defendant on their application.
On the 11th May, 1978, the plaintiff issued a summons in the High Court in which she claimed
the restoration to her of the custody of her child. The applicants for an adoption order became notice

the first defendant to dispense with the consent of the plaintiff to the making of an adoption order
by the first defendant in favour of the notice parties.
Held by Finlay P, in giving judgment for the plaintiff and dismissing the application of the notice
parties, 1, that the plaintiff, as the mother of the child, had a right to the custody of her child, which
right was both a statutory right and a personal right within the meaning of Art40, s3, of the
Constitution; but that her said right was not an absolute one.
The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567 considered.
2. That the plaintiff's child had a right to have her welfare preserved, which right was also a
personal right within the meaning of Art40, s3, of the Constitution.
3. That the relevant statutory provisions should be interpreted so as to make them amenable,
if possible, to the provisions of the Constitution and the rights recognised therein.
East Donegal Co-Operative v The Attorney General (1970) IR 317 considered.
4. That the plaintiff had not abandoned or deserted her child, and had not been shown otherwise
to be unfit to have custody of her child.
5. That the welfare of the plaintiff's child would be served marginally better if the notice parties
retained custody of the child.
6. That, in the absence of desertion, abandonment or unfitness on the part of the respondent, the
test in determining an application under s3 of the Act of 1974 is whether the court should intervene
on the ground that the respondent has refused or withdrawn his consent capriciously or
irresponsibly, or on the ground that the welfare of the infant overwhelmingly demands that an order
should be made under the section.
7. That the welfare of the plaintiff's child did not require overwhelmingly that she should remain
in the custody of the notice parties, and that the plaintiff's consent to the adoption of her child had
not been refused or withdrawn capriciously or irresponsibly.
On appeal by the notice parties it was Held by the Supreme Court (Walsh, Henchy and Kenny
JJ, O'Higgins CJ and Parke J dissenting) that the trial judge had determined the issues raised by the
application of the notice parties, and that the appeal should be disallowed because - (a) per Walsh
J (i) The plaintiff mother had a natural right to the custody of her child, which right was a personal
right within the meaning of Art40, s3, of the Constitution but it was not an absolute right. (ii) The
plaintiff's child had a natural right to have her welfare safeguarded, which right was a personal right
within the meaning of Art40, s3, of the Constitution.(iii) The plaintiff's right to custody had not
been abandoned, waived or otherwise diminished. (iv) The facts established that the child's
constitutional rights would not be infringed by a refusal to make an order pursuant to s3 of the Act
of 1974.
(b) per Henchy J (i) The plaintiff's child had a natural right to have her welfare safeguarded,
which right was a personal right within the meaning of Art40, s3, of the Constitution. (ii) The
plaintiff had a statutory right to the custody of her child under s6 and s10 of the Guardianship of
Infants Act, 1964, but the plaintiff's right must yield, if necessary, to her child's constitutional right.
(iii) The facts established that the child's constitutional rights would not be infringed by a refusal
to make an order pursuant to s3 of the Act of 1974.

(c) per Kenny J (i) The plaintiff had a statutory right to the custody of her child under s6 and
s10 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, and that right had not been abandoned, waived or
otherwise diminished. (ii) The facts established that the child's rights would not be infringed by a
refusal to make an order pursuant to s3 of the Act of 1974.
(d) per Walsh, Henchy and Kenny JJ The trial judge had acted correctly in choosing to apply
the test of "the best interests of the child" in accordance with the requirements of s3 of the Act of
1974.
CASES-REF-TO:
The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567.
Murphy v Stewart (1973) IR 97.
M v An Bord Uchtala (1977) IR 287.
K v K (Supreme Court 31st July 1974.)
F, In re (1969) 2 Ch 238.
O'S v O'S (1974) 110 ILTR 57.
Quinn's Supermarket v The Attorney General (1972) IR 1.
J v C (1970) AC 668.
The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567.
M, In re (1946) IR 334.
Ryan v The Attorney General (1965) IR 294.
McGee v The Attorney General (1974) IR 284.
McDonald v Bord na gCon (1965) IR 217.
East Donegal Co-Operative v The Attorney General (1970) IR 317.
B v B (1975) IR 54.
Frost, In re (1947) IR 3.
The State (Kavanagh) v O'Sullivan (1933) IR 618.
Kindersley, In re (1944) IR 111.
O'Hara, In re (1900) 2 IR 232.
R v Gyngall (1893) 2 QB 232.
R v Hopkins (1806) 7 East 579.
Barnardo v McHugh (1891) AC 388.
Elliott, In re (1893) 32 LR Ir 504.
R v Nash (1883) 10 QBD 454.

INTRODUCTION:
A F Browne SC (with him P J P Carney)The adoption of illegitimate children (which is expressly stated at p641 of the report of
Nicolaou's Case (The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567) not to infringe any
constitutional right of a child) could never have any finality if the mother were to have the
constitutional right which the learned President appears to have conceded to the plaintiff. Once the
President had found as a fact that it would be "marginally" more conducive to the child's welfare to

the provisions of s2 of the Act of 1974, which require the welfare of the child to be the "first and
paramount" consideration, came into operation and should have been applied. The application of
that section ought to have disposed of the matter.
The constitutional rights of the child are the overriding consideration and they require the Court
to seek to obtain the optimum benefits for the child. If a conflict should arise between the
constitutional rights of a young child and those of its mother, the Court's primary duty is to protect
the rights of the child. Those rights are embodied in Article 40 and Article 42, s5, of the Constitution
but they do not necessarily include the right of a child to have its education controlled by its own
mother. While an unmarried mother has not a constitutional right to the custody of her child, it is
conceded that she has a statutory right to its guardianship by virtue of s6, subs4, of the
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964.
The evidence adduced by the notice parties established that the child's welfare would be more
than marginally better served by leaving her in their custody. That was a discharge of the burden of
proof imposed on adoptive parents by s2 and s3 of the Act of 1974. The President imposed an
excessive burden of proof on the notice parties, ie, the burden of showing that the welfare of the
child would be overwhelminglybetter if she were to be left in their custody. That burden could never
be discharged where, as in this case, the evidence is that the child will be brought up with care and
affection whichever party has custody of her.
H J O'Flaherty SC (with him N J Kearns)per Walsh J in Murphy v Stewart (Murphy v Stewart (1973) IR 97) at p116 of the report. (He
also referred to M v An Bord Uchtala (M v An Bord Uchtala (1977) IR 287)).
The adoption of a child is effected in two stages. The first stage is the placement of the child for
adoption and the second is the making of the adoption order. The mother is free to consent to each
stage. At the first stage, the mother's right to refuse to consent is absolute; it is only at the second
stage that the issue of the child's welfare (s2 of the Act of 1974) or best interests (s3 of that Act)
arises. The plaintiff's right to change her mind should be respected as she is acting neither
unreasonably nor capriciously, and it is obvious that her primary concern is for the welfare of her
child.
If s3 of the Act of 1974 applies to this case, this Court must determine the meaning of the
phrase "the first and paramount consideration" when applied to the welfare of the child under s3 of
the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964. It has been held by Mr Justice Walsh in K v K (Supreme
Court - 31st July, 1974)) to mean "the exclusive consideration" but in In re F ((1969) 2 Ch 238)
Megarry J took the view that the corresponding phrase in the corresponding English Act had no
such restrictive connotation and that a court, in considering an application of this type, might also
have regard to the conduct - and a fortiori to the respective rights - of the contending parties.
see M v An Bord Uchtala (M v An Bord Uchtala (1977) IR 287). (He also referred to O'S v O'S
((1974) 110 ILTR 57)).
In this case no conflict arises between the child's constitutional right to be educated and the
mother's right to custody of her child. (He referred to Quinn's Supermarket v The Attorney General
((1972) IR 1)).
D P M Barrington SC (with him J D Cooke), for the defendants, referred to s6, subs4, and to
s10, s14 and s16 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964.

A F Browne SC, in reply, referred to J v C ((1970) AC 668).

COUNSEL:
A F Browne SC (with him P J P Carney) for the notice parties.
H J O'Flaherty SC (with him N J Kearns) for the plaintiff.
D P M Barrington SC (with him J D Cooke) for the defendants.
B Vincent Hoey & Co.
Sheehan, Hussey & Gaynor.
Chief State Solicitor.

JUDGMENT-READ:
The appeal was heard on the 2nd and 3rd of November, 1978. Cur adv vult 19th December,
1978
PANEL: Walsh, Henchy, Parke and Kenny JJ, O'Higgins CJ
JUDGMENTS:
O'HIGGINS CJ
On the 14th November, 1977, the plaintiff gave birth to a baby girl. The plaintiff is unmarried
and the child was illegitimate. The plaintiff was and still is a civil servant. She is the second of a
family of four girls, and both her parents are alive. The plaintiff had been friendly with the father
of the child for some time but, although he is unmarried, marriage between them was neither
contemplated before the birth nor considered practicable since. The decision in this respect was that
of the plaintiff. When the plaintiff became aware of her pregnancy she kept the fact to herself and
informed neither the father nor her sisters nor her parents. The birth, which was a normal one, took
place in hospital, and the child was and is normal and healthy. The plaintiff spent less than one week
in hospital and after the birth of her child she informed only one married sister of the fact but did
not inform her parents or either of her other two sisters.
Upon leaving hospital she placed the child in a nursery. Having done so the plaintiff considered
what decision she should make as to the child's future. In hospital she had been urged by a member
of the nursing staff to have the child adopted. On leaving hospital, through the agency of the
hospital's social worker, she sought the advice of the director of an adoption society. The plaintiff
at that time hoped to keep the whole affair from her parents because she feared the effect on them.
Living as she did, sharing a flat with three other girls, she could not look after the child herself. For
this reason adoption had to be and was considered. The plaintiff had four interviews with the
director of the adoption society and finally decided to place her daughter for adoption. Having so
decided, the plaintiff on the 6th January, 1978, had an interview with a medical social worker
attached to the adoption society, and on that date the plaintiff signed a form of consent to the
placing of her child for adoption. The legal implications and consequences of what she was doing
were explained to her and she received in addition a printed memorandum dealing fully with these
matters. Amongst the matters so explained to her and detailed also in the memorandum was the

nature and effect of s3 of the Adoption Act, 1974, to which I will refer in more detail later in this
judgment.
Towards the end of January, 1978, the plaintiff decided to inform her parents of the birth of her
daughter. Their reaction was that she should have told them earlier and that, if she had done so, they
would have helped her. They also said that if she now wished to keep the child they would help her
support her. As a result the plaintiff wrote on the 11th February, 1978, to the adoption society
expressing a wish to keep her child. She later had an interview with the director of the adoption
society in which she made it clear that she had changed her mind about adoption and wished to have
her child back.
Following the placing by the plaintiff of her child for adoption with the society on the 6th
January, 1978 the society on the 22nd January had given the child into the care of the notice parties
for the purpose of adoption. The notice parties were married in 1968 and the wife learned that she
could not bear children; in 1975 they adopted a daughter through the same adoption society. In the
autumn of 1975 they had applied again to the society to adopt another daughter. It was in these
circumstances that the plaintiff's child was placed with them. Having been informed through the
adoption society of the plaintiff's change of mind and of her determination to take back her child,
the notice parties decided to hold on to the child instead of availing of their rights under s3 of the Act
of 1974.
The Plaintiff's Proceedings
On the 11th May, 1978, the plaintiff commenced these proceedings in the High Court against
An Bord Uchtala (the Adoption Board) claiming the return of her child. The President of the High
Court, having regard to the reality of the issue which had arisen concerning the future of the child
and to the absolute necessity that the identities of those concerned should not be disclosed, put into
operation the procedures set out at the commencement of his judgment. These proceedings, as one
would expect from him, were devised with great care and concern both for the preservation of this
essential secrecy and in the interests of justice. The result is that the adoption society has been
added as a defendant, and that the persons now having custody have been added as notice parties
and a notice of motion on their behalf (seeking an order under s3 of the Act of 1974) has become the
true nature of these proceedings. Evidence was taken from both the plaintiff and the notice parties
with due regard to each other's rights but without any disclosure of their identities one to the other.
The learned President, having considered this evidence and having reserved judgment, decided against
the notice parties' claim for an order under s3 of the Act of 1974 and directed that the child be
returned to the custody of her mother. Against this decision this appeal has been brought by the
notice parties.
(Having referred to the provisions (see p43, ante) of s3 of the Adoption Act, 1974, the Chief
Justice continued). In considering the application of s3 of the Act of 1974 to this case, the learned
President came to the conclusion that the constitutional rights of the mother to the custody of her
child continued and prevailed, and concluded that she was entitled as of right in the circumstances
to the return of her child. In so concluding the learned President, while recognising the co-existence
of clear constitutional rights on the part of the child, was of the opinion on the facts that these were
neither interfered with nor endangered. Therefore, it seems appropriate that at this stage, I should
have regard to the constitutional rights of the persons primarily involved in this sad story, namely,
the mother and her child.

The Mother's Rights

In the first place it should be noted that the mother is not the mother of a family, in the sense
in which the term is used in the Constitution. Article 41 of the Constitution, which recognises the
family as the natural, primary and fundamental unit group of society and as a moral institution
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights antecedent and superior to all positive law, refers
exclusively to the family founded and based on the institution of marriage. It is this family which,
in Article 41, s1, subs2, the State guarantees to protect in its constitution and authority as the
necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the nation and the State.
But the plaintiff is a mother and, as such, she has rights which derive from the fact of
motherhood and from nature itself. These rights are among her personal rights as a human being and
they are rights which, under Article 40, s3, subs1, the State is bound to respect, defend and
vindicate. As a mother, she has the right to protect and care for, and to have the custody of, her
infant child. The existence of this right was recognised in the judgment of this Court in The State
(Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567). This right
is clearly based on the natural relationship which exists between a mother and child. In my view, it
arises from the infant's total dependency and helplessness and from the mother's natural
determination to protect and sustain her child. How far and to what extent it survives as the child
grows up is not a matter of concern in the present case. Suffice to say that this plaintiff, as a mother,
had a natural right to the custody of her child who was an infant, and that this natural right of hers
is recognised and protected by Article 40, s3, subs1, of the Constitution. Section 6, subs4, and s10,
subs2(a), of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, constitute a compliance by the State with its
obligation in relation to the mother of an illegitimate child, to defend and vindicate in its laws this
right to custody. These statutory provisions make the mother guardian of her illegitimate child and
give the mother statutory rights to sue for custody.
However, these rights of the mother in relation to her child are neither inalienable nor
imprescriptible, as are the rights of the family under Article 41. They can be alienated or transferred
in whole or in part and either subject to conditions or absolutely, or they can be lost by the mother
if her conduct towards the child amounts to an abandonment or an abdication of her rights and
duties.
The Child's Rights
The child also has natural rights. Normally, these will be safe under the care and protection of
its mother. Having been born, the child has the right to be fed and to live, to be reared and educated,
to have the opportunity of working and of realising his or her full personality and dignity as a human
being. These rights of the child (and others which I have not enumerated) must equally be protected
and vindicated by the State. In exceptional cases the State, under the provisions of Article 42, s5,
of the Constitution, is given the duty, as guardian of the common good, to provide for a child born
into a family where the parents fail in their duty towards that child for physical or moral reasons.
In the same way, in special circumstances the State may have an equal obligation in relation to a child
born outside the family to protect that child, even against its mother, if her natural rights are used
in such a way as to endanger the health or life of the child or to deprive him of his rights. In my view
this obligation stems from the provisions of Article 40, s3, of the Constitution.
At Common Law

At common law an illegitimate child was termed "filius nullius" and was regarded as being no
more than the "unfortunate offspring of the common failing of a man and a woman" - a burden on
the locality and a person to be shunned. In this unchristian treatment of a human being, natural rights
were forgotten and a lonely life was ordained merely because of the accident of birth. Not only is
this not so now under the Constitution, but the State has the added obligation to defend and
vindicate in its laws all natural rights of all citizens. In relation to illegitimate children and certain
others, the State has endeavoured to discharge this obligation by the Adoption Acts. The purpose
of these Acts is to give these children the opportunity to become members of a family and to have
the status and protection which such membership entails. I turn now to look at the provisions of
these Acts in so far as they bear on this case.
The Adoption Acts
The Adoption Act, 1952, enabled a child who was not less than six months and not more than
seven years of age, to be adopted if he was resident in the State and was either illegitimate or an
orphan. The Adoption Act, 1964, provided for the adoption of a legitimated child on certain
conditions, and the Adoption Act, 1974, removed the lower and upper age limits originally provided.
The Act of 1952 provided for a register of recognised adoption societies, and they were given the
sole right to make arrangements for adoption. The Act of 1952 enabled such societies to make the
necessary preliminary arrangements with the mother or guardian. While the term "placing for
adoption" (as used in the Act of 1974) is not defined, it seems clear that the phrase contemplates
the originating arrangements for adoption made by a mother or guardian with an adoption society.
The mother or guardian so entering into such arrangement, or placing, for adoption must be fully
informed of her rights, including the right to give or withhold consent at any time before the making
of the adoption order.
Up to 1974 the final adoption order, irrespective of what was said or done at the original placing
for adoption, could not be made without the final consent of the mother or guardian - except in
exceptional circumstances where such consent could be dispensed with by the Board. This meant
that, despite the placing for adoption and the giving of the child to the hopeful adopting parents and
the passing of time, adoption would become impossible if the mother or guardian, at any time before
the making of the adoption order, finally refused consent or withdrew a consent already given. The
consent in question here is the consent to the making of the adoption order.
It was to deal with anxieties and difficulties caused by this situation that s3 of the Act of 1974
was passed. Two conditions must be satisfied for the section to operate on the application of a
person entitled to apply. First, a person whose consent is necessary to the making of an adoption
order must have "agreed to the placing of the child for adoption." Secondly, that person must have
either failed, neglected or refused to consent to the final order or have withdrawn a consent already
given. The constitutionality of this section is to be assumed and, therefore, it must be interpreted
in so far as is possible to accord with this assumption. Applying this principle, it seems to me that
the section cannot be regarded as an attempt to diminish or restrict constitutional rights if another
interpretation is open. Accordingly, in relation to a mother and her child, the words "who has agreed
to the placing of the child for adoption" must contemplate a mother who has so agreed and acted in
such a manner as to abrogate her constitutionally-recognisedrights to the custody of her child. This
requires a free consent on the part of the mother given in the full knowledge of the consequences
which follow upon her placing her child for adoption.

If the mother's agreement to the placing for adoption is not such as to extinguish or drastically
modify her constitutional rights to custody, the section could not be operated against her. Once her
agreement is such as to permit the operation of the section then, in my view, the decision to grant
or refuse the order sought must be taken on the sole test as to what, in relation to the grant or refusal
of the order sought, is in the "best interests of the child." This will involve a consideration of the
circumstances of the mother, her reasons for refusing or withdrawing her consent, and the prospects
of how the child's future will be served by refusing the order sought. While the making of the order
merely permits the Board to proceed towards an adoption order (which it may or may not make),
it does have the effect of finally deciding the mother's claim. Obviously to be considered also are the
probabilities as to the child's future if the mother's consent is dispensed with. In suggesting matters
to be considered, I am doing no more than that, for I conceive that many other matters which I have
not adverted to may have to be considered in assessing "the best interests of the child."
This being my view as to the meaning and effect of s3 of the Act of 1974, I now turn to the
evidence adduced before the learned President and to the facts as found by him.
Placing for Adoption
The plaintiff, being pregnant of her child, concealed the fact from everyone close to her. As she
said in evidence, "the pregnancy was not showing." She went on to say that she was able to continue
at her work and to wear ordinary clothes right up to the time she entered the hospital. Having gone
to hospital and having given birth to her baby, the plaintiff confided in one of her sisters, who was
married and who lived nearby. The question of adoption then arose and was urged on the plaintiff
by a member of the nursing staff. On leaving hospital the plaintiff had four interviews with the
director of the adoption society and, finally, she had an interview on the 6th January, 1978, with
a social worker employed by the adoption society. Some seven weeks had then elapsed since the
birth of her child. It is clear on the evidence that the full implications of adoption were explained to
the plaintiff; and also explained were what her rights would be once she placed her child for
adoption. These rights included a right to refuse or to withdraw consent to final adoption, subject
to the possibility of an application being made to the High Court by a person seeking to adopt her
child for an order authorising the Board to dispense with her consent.
I am satisfied that it was explained to her that such an order could be granted if it was then
decided by the High Court that it was in the best interests of her child to do so. The evidence shows
that not only was this fully explained to her orally, but that she was given a typed memorandum
setting out the position in detail. It is clear that she was considering adoption because of her view,
which subsequently turned out to be incorrect, as to the possible reaction of her parents.
Nevertheless, can it be said on the evidence that she did not know what she was doing? In my view
this cannot be said. It is, therefore, not surprising that the learned President of the High Court found
as a fact that the various interviews with the director of the adoption society "concluded with a clear
decision by the plaintiff to place her child for adoption." The plaintiff signed this consent later on
the 6th January, 1978, having again been fully advised and having received beforehand the written
memorandum already mentioned. Therefore, it seems to me on the evidence and the findings of fact
made by the learned President of the High Court that one is driven to the conclusion that the
plaintiff agreed to the placing of her child for adoption with knowledge of the consequences. One
of these consequences being that, if she changed her mind before final adoption, her consent to such
adoption could be dispensed with by the High Court if it were satisfied that it was in the best

In my view, in agreeing so to place her child for adoption in the circumstances, the plaintiff
dispensed with her constitutional rights to insist on the custody of her child and agreed to its
custody being decided in accordance with the statutory provisions of which she was made fully
aware.
Incorrect Test Applied
I am of the opinion, therefore, that this case was proper to be dealt with under the provisions
of s3 of the Adoption Act, 1974, because the constitutional rights of the mother to the custody of
her child had been dispensed with by her in the manner indicated. To the extent, therefore, that it
came before the learned President to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that section,
I am in agreement with what happened in the High Court.
However, I am concerned as to the tests applied by the President in coming to his decision. In
my view, the section could not apply if the constitutional rights of the mother continued to exist,
since legislation could not affect or prevail over these rights. Accordingly, the section could only be
operative in circumstances in which the agreed "placing of the child for adoption" constituted a
consensual abandonment of constitutional rights and an acceptance by the mother of the provisions
of the Adoption Acts in so far as her rights were concerned. As already indicated, I conceive this to
be the effect of the learned President's finding on the evidence before him.
Nevertheless, in deciding in favour of the plaintiff's point of view, the President was clearly
guided by the constitutional rights of the mother on the basis that these survived her clear and
definite agreement to place for adoption. This being his view and there being, as he put it, no
"overwhelming demands" otherwise in relation to the welfare of the child, he felt bound to make the
order required by these prevailing constitutionalrights. Whilst he dealt with the welfare of the infant,
having regard to the circumstances of each of the parties, he does not appear ever to have considered
the one question which arises under s3 of the Act of 1974, namely, what was "in the best interests
of the child." He came down in favour of the mother because of her constitutional rights and the
absence of any overwhelming reason to the contrary in relation to the child's welfare. He might have
come to the same conclusion, having regard to the child's age, its relationship with the plaintiff and
the probable home circumstances which the plaintiff could arrange, had he considered the issue
solely as to what was in the child's best interests. But he did not do so. I would like to feel that this
Court could do so, but I do not think it can. To do so, without seeing the witnesses, and by applying
to the cold words of a typed transcript a test which was not applied in the Court below, would be
to subvert this Court's function as a court of appeal. For this reason, with very much regret, I must
conclude that this case should go back to the High Court to have the issue under s3 of the Act of
1974 determined in accordance with what is "in the best interests of the child."
I wish to add that I interpret s3 as giving to the child the statutory right to have her interests
considered without regard to the clashing claims and competing rights of others. Further, I conceive
it to be the clear duty of this Court to ensure that this right is both recognised and protected. For
these reasons I would allow this appeal.
I wish also to add that I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment about to be delivered
by Mr Justice Walsh. In his judgment he expresses opinions, with regard to whether judicial powers
are exercised by the Adoption Board and as to categories of persons who may be adopted, which
do not directly arise in this case. As these matters have not been the subject of examination or
argument in the present case I express no opinion with regard to them.

WALSH J
The plaintiff was 21 years old on the 22nd September, 1977. She is the second eldest in a family
of five girls and is a civil servant earning 37 pounds each week. She is unmarried. On the 14th
November, 1977, she gave birth to a baby daughter. The father of the child was an unmarried man
with whom the plaintiff had been associating for some time and with whom she had had sexual
relations. She had never had such relations with any other person. She lived in a flat with three other
girls who were also in the public service and her family lives 30 or 40 miles from where she resided.
She visited her family at week-ends. She managed to keep the fact of her pregnancy completely
secret both from the friends with whom she resided and from her parents and family. She did not
inform the father of the child of the fact that she was pregnant. She had had no association of any
description with the father since the time of the conception of the child.
The plaintiff gave birth to the child without any difficulty whatever in a hospital which was a
considerable distance from where she resided. She never visited a doctor during her pregnancy. She
remained one week in the hospital in which the child was born. Before she left the hospital, a social
worker in the hospital advised her to get in touch with a nun, who worked in a particular adoption
agency or society in Dublin, for advice about adoption. The plaintiff arranged in the meanwhile to
have the child put in a nursery in Dublin under an assumed name. The reason for this was that she
was aware that one of the nurses in that nursery was from the plaintiff's own home town and she
did not want to disclose the situation. For the same reasons she did not visit the nursery while the
child was there. The child remained in the nursery until the 6th January, 1978. While the plaintiff
was in the hospital where the child was born it was urged upon her on a number of occasions by one
of the nurses in the hospital that she should consider having the child adopted and, as I have already
mentioned, a social worker in the hospital advised her to get in touch with a nun working in a
particular adoption society in Dublin.
The first person outside the hospital in whom the plaintiff confided was a sister who was
married and lived in the town where the hospital was. In January, 1978, the plaintiff informed the
father of the child of the event. Until then he had had no knowledge that she had been pregnant or
had given birth to a daughter. He inquired about the child and was told that the child was then in a
nursery. He expressed a wish to see the child but this was refused by the plaintiff; she has not seen
the father since about the end of March, 1978. He has continued to inquire about the child and
salutes the plaintiff in the street when they meet but she does not greet him or return the salute. He
appears to be interested in both the plaintiff and the child but the plaintiff has no desire to marry
him as she considers the marriage would not be successful. There is no evidence as to whether the
father has ever proposed marriage. It was not until towards the end of January, 1978, that the
plaintiff first informed her parents of the events which had taken place. At that stage she had the
child in the nursery and had already signed a paper consenting to the placing for adoption of the
child.
The events which led up to the signing of this paper appear to be as follows. Following the
advice she had received in the hospital, the plaintiff sought the advice and assistance of the director
of the adoption society in Dublin. Four interviews took place between the plaintiff and the director
of the society, who is a trained social worker. It was at first contemplated that the plaintiff's married
sister, who already had one child, might adopt the infant but, following discussions between the
plaintiff's sister and her husband, it was concluded that this would not be feasible. All this occurred

As to the final interview between the director of the adoption society and the plaintiff, the
President of the High Court has found that the plaintiff was undecided and confused at the beginning
of the meeting but had arrived at a clear decision to place her daughter for adoption before the
conclusion of the interview. The President has also found that her reasons for this were that her
parents were still unaware of the birth of the child and that she could not look after the child herself
as she shared a flat with three other girls. Her reason for not informing her parents was partly due
to the fact that her father had been ill in the autumn of 1977, and she feared that the news might
adversely affect him; but she was also uncertain, if not afraid, of the reaction of her parents to the
news.
The form of consent to the placing of her child for adoption was signed by the plaintiff on the
6th January, 1978, following a lengthy interview with a medical social worker from the adoption
society whom she had not previously met. The child was then only 53 days old. It was explained
to the plaintiff clearly and carefully on that occasion that, notwithstanding her consent to the placing
of her daughter for adoption, the plaintiff could withdraw that consent at any time before the making
of an actual adoption order. She was also informed that, if she gave that consent and later withdrew
it, the person with whom the child might be placed for adoption could apply to the High Court to
permit the making of the adoption order, notwithstanding the withdrawal of her initial consent.
Before the interview concluded and before the consent to placement for adoption was signed, the
plaintiff was no longer confused as to the nature of the transaction or as to the rights of the parties
concerned - except, of course, that she could have had no idea as to what would be the result if she
withdrew her consent and an application was made to the High Court. The plaintiff had made it clear
that she did not wish to have the child adopted by anyone living close to her own home area.
On the 22nd January, 1978, the plaintiff's daughter was placed with a married couple (the notice
parties) who had already adopted a child in 1975. Later in the month of January, 1978, the plaintiff
finally informed her parents of the birth of her daughter and of the fact that the plaintiff had
consented to place the child for adoption. The parents' reaction was clearly very much better than
the plaintiff had originally feared. They made it quite clear that, if she wished to retain the child,
they would be prepared to support and help her in so doing. When the parents' reaction became
known to her, the plaintiff's decided wish was to retain the child. On the 11th February, 1978, she
wrote to the director of the adoption society expressing her wish to keep the child. Following that
letter an interview took place between the diector of the society and one of her colleagues and the
notice parties, and the latter were informed of the plaintiff's desire to recover the child and retain it.
The notice parties were not willing to return the child, and they reiterated this attitude after a
subsequent interview with the director of the adoption society and after they had received the advice
mentioned in the evidence and in the judgment of the learned President of the High Court.
Soon afterwards proceedings were commenced in the High Court on behalf of the plaintiff by
a summons dated the 11th May, 1978, in which the plaintiff sought an order directing the return of
her child and such further or other order as might be necessary. The order sought was directed to An
Bord Uchtala (the Adoption Board), as naturally the plaintiff had never been made aware of the
identity of the notice parties. On the 18th September, 1978, notice was served on behalf of the
notice parties of their intention to apply in the plaintiff's proceedings for an order pursuant to s3
of the Adoption Act, 1974. At a later stage in this judgment I shall deal with the provisions of that
section and also with the provisions of s2 of the same Act.

At the date of the hearing of the matter in the High Court the age of the plaintiff's mother was
45 years and that of her father was 52 years. The plaintiff's father is employed in the public service
and the plaintiff's mother currently works in a factory, but she would be prepared to give up that
work to look after the child in her own home. The plaintiff earns a salary of 37 pounds per week and
would contribute to the financial support of the child, if not totally provide for it. As the parents'
home is but 30 or 40 miles from the present place of employment of the plaintiff, there is no great
physical barrier by way of distance between these places. In addition, the plaintiff has hopes of a
transfer in the public service to a town which would be perhaps only 12 miles from the residence
of her parents. The notice parties already have an adopted infant who is about four years old, to
whom they have been exemplary parents. They are economically better off than the plaintiff and
her parents.
The desire and intention of the plaintiff is that her child should be brought up in her parents'
home, that she would obtain a transfer in her employment sufficiently close to the home to enable
her to participate fully in the upbringing of her child, that she would be in a position to contribute
financially from her own resources to the rearing of her child, and that her father's salary would also
be available. The plaintiff believes that the contribution that she could make would compensate for
the loss of earnings which her mother currently brings into the household from her employment.
The President of the High Court was satisfied that, in the environment of the household of the
child's grandparents, and with the support and affection which they would give, and with the
assistance and presence of the plaintiff, the child would obtain adequate support and affection and
that the grandparents are not in any way inhibited by the fact that the child is the child of an
unmarried daughter. The notice parties, by reason of the affection they have already shown to the
young child that they have adopted, would also be suitable parents for the plaintiff's child; their
standard of living would be significantly higher than that of the household in which the plaintiff
desires her child to be reared. In addition, in the notice parties' household there would be a young
child who is only four years older than the plaintiff's child and, to that extent, it forms a household
that, it has been argued, approximates more to the ordinary situation than does a household where
everybody else is an adult and where there is whatever social disadvantage still attaches to the
presence or the existence of a single unmarried parent.
Evidence was received by the President of the High Court from a well-known child psychiatrist
who had not met or examined any of the adults or the child. He simply expressed a general opinion
based upon a reading of a note of some of the evidence, and upon other parts of the evidence which
he had actually heard, and he ventured out of child psychiatry into the area of the psychology and
mental attitude of the adult plaintiff, whom he had neither examined nor even met. He expressed the
view that the failure of the plaintiff to seek medical assistance or advice during pregnancy endangered
her own health and that of her unborn child, and that it must raise a query as to her capacity to care
responsibly for the child in the future. He also expressed the view that the plaintiff's rejection of the
father of the child and her refusal to permit him to see the child could raise a possibility that in the
future the child, if it remained in the custody of the mother, would receive information concerning
her father that might be harmful to her development. He further expressed the view that the evidence
of the relationship that had already developed between the child and the notice parties and their
four-year-old adopted child raised a possibility that separation from that environment would now
harm the plaintiff's child.

The learned President of the High Court discounted these fears and, in my view, he was correct
in doing so. There was no evidence whatsoever of any medical complications during the pregnancy
and all the evidence was to the contrary. The birth was a perfectly normal and an unusually easy
one. The motive of the plaintiff in concealing her condition is only too obvious to require any
explanation other than that it reflected a very natural and human reaction on the part of an unmarried
girl who found herself pregnant before she had even reached the age of twenty-one. The plaintiff's
attitude towards the father of the child showed a certain sense of responsibility. She obviously
wanted to prevent a relationship developing between the man, whom she did not consider suitable
to be her husband, and the child. It would be difficult to imagine anything more injurious to the child
than the possibility of a bad marriage between the parents of the child, particularly if brought about
by the pressure of the events which had happened. The relationship between the notice parties and
their adopted child and the plaintiff's child (who, when the evidence was given, was little more than
six months old) is scarcely a serious factor in the case in so far as the interests of the plaintiff's child
are concerned.
While the facts of the case are relatively simple, the points of law raised are complex. The
position of the unmarried mother and her child has always been an extremely difficult one in the
common law of England and subsequently in Ireland when the English common law came to be the
law of the land. It was not without jurisdiction that the late President of the High Court, Gavan
Duffy P, in In Re M ((1946) IR 334) described the approach of the common law to illegitimacy as
"barbarous." In his review of the law in that case, which I need not here repeat, he dealt with the
position of the illegitimate child and its mother under the common law of England.
It is a matter of history that the civil and canon laws did not allow a child to remain illegitimate
if the parents afterwards married, but a proposal by the Bishops in England to assimilate the law
of England to the canon laws in this respect was rejected by the English Parliament in 1235 in the
first Act of Parliament ever passed in England, namely, the Statute of Merton. In this respect the
law of England remained unchanged for almost 700 years until the Legitimacy Act, 1926. The
common law in Ireland in this matter remained unchanged until the Legitimacy Act, 1931. In
Scotland, however, and in most other Christian countries, including other countries of the common
law, legitimation of the children has always followed the marriage of the parents.
As Gavan Duffy P pointed out at p344 of the report of In Re M ((1946) IR 334)- "... the
accident that the law for vagabonds imposes that maternal liability is a sorry substitute for the
authentic claims of nature, which should not be thus depreciated under a Christian polity." When
Gavan Duffy P spoke of the "authentic claims of nature" he was speaking of the natural right or
rights of a mother in respect of her child and the natural rights of the child in respect of its mother.
These rights spring from the natural relationship of the mother and the child. So far as these
particular natural rights are concerned, it is immaterial as between the mother and her child whether
the mother is or is not married to the father of the child. During the hearing of this appeal counsel
for the notice parties advanced the bold but, in my opinion, totally untenable view that the mother
of an illegitimate child has no natural rights in regard to that child. This Court, in its decision in The
State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala ((1966) IR 567) (at p644) clearly recognised the natural right
of the mother of an illegitimate child to the custody and care of her child and held that this, and other
natural personal rights which she has, fall to be protected under Article 40, s3, of the Constitution.
The fact that such rights are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution does not support in any
way the submission made in this Court on behalf of the notice parties. It is now well accepted that

the view, first enunciated by my learned colleague, Mr Justice Kenny, in the High Court in Ryan
v The Attorney General (Ryan v The Attorney General (1965) IR 294) and confirmed by this Court
on appeal in the same case (that there are rights guaranteed by the Constitution other than those
which are enumerated in the Constitution itself) is the correct view.
At p344 of the report of In re M ((1946) IR 334)- "Under Irish law, while I do not think that
the constitutional guarantee for the family (Art41 of the Constitution) avails the mother of an
illegitimate child, I regard the innocent little girl as having the same 'natural and imprescriptible rights'
(under Art42) as a child born in wedlock to religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social
education, and her care and upbringing during her coming, formative years must be the decisive
consideration in our judgment." That view was confirmed by this Court in its judgment in Nicolaou's
Case (The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567)"Article 42, section 5, of the Constitution, while dealing with the case of failure in duty on the
part of parents towards the children, speaks of 'the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child'...
Those 'natural and imprescriptible rights' cannot be said to be acknowledged by the Constitution as
residing only in legitimate children any more than it can be said that the guarantee in section 4 of the
Article as to the provision of free primary education excludes illegitimate children. While it is not
necessary to explore the full extent of 'the natural and imprescriptiblerights of the child' they include
the right to 'religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social eduction.' An illegitimate child has
the same natural rights as a legitimate child though not necessarily the same legal rights. Legal rights
as distinct from natural rights are determined by the law for the time being in force in the State.
While the law cannot under the Constitution seek to deprive the illegitimate child of those natural
rights guaranteed by the Constitution it can, as in the Adoption Act, 1952, secure for the illegitimate
child legal rights similar to those possessed by legitimate children."
The mother and her illegitimate child are human beings and each has the fundamental rights of
every human being and the fundamental rights which spring from their relationship to each other.
These are natural rights. It has already been decided by this Court in Nicolaou's Case (The State
(Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567) that among the mother's natural rights is the right to
the custody and care of her child. Rights also have their corresponding obligations or duties. The fact
that a child is born out of lawful wedlock is a natural fact. Such a child is just as entitled to be
supported and reared by its parent or parents, who are the ones responsible for its birth, as a child
born in lawful wedlock. One of the duties of a parent or parents, be they married or not, is to
provide as best the parent or parents can the welfare of the child and to ward of dangers to the health
of the child. As was pointed out by this Court in Ryan v The Attorney General ((1965) IR 294) (at
p350), there is nothing in the Constitution which recognises the right of a parent to refuse to allow
the provision of measures designed to secure the health of the child when the method of avoiding
injury is one which is not fraught with danger to the child and is within the procurement of the
parent.
In my view, in this respect there is no difference between the obligations of the unmarried parent
to the child and those of the married parent. These obligations of the parent or parents amount to
natural rights of the child and they exist for the benefit of the child. The child's natural rights in these
matters are primarily to be satisfied by the parent or parents.
In so far as children born out of wedlock are concerned, it has been pointed out in Nicolaou's
Case ((1966) IR 567) (at p644) that there is no provision in Article 40 of the Constitution which

Article by the person entitled to them. Thus, in an appropriate case, the mother may transfer her
rights in favour of another or abandon them, but in a way in which the essential natural rights of the
child in respect of its care, welfare, health and upbringing are not infringed. The Adoption Acts
provide such a way. As in Nicolaou's Case (The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567),
it is not necessary for me in this matter to explore, or endeavour to give an exhaustive enumeration
of the guaranteed rights of either the mother or of the child. However, I think I should draw attention
to the words of my learned colleague, Mr Justice Henchy, in McGee v The Attorney General
(McGee v The Attorney General (1974) IR 284)"As has been held in a number of cases, the unspecified personal rights guaranteed by subs1 of
s3 of Article 40 are not confined to those specified in subs2 of that section. It is for the Courts to
decide in a particular case whether the right relied on comes within the constitutional guarantee. To
do so, it must be shown that it is a right that inheres in the citizen in question by virtue of his human
personality. The lack of precision in this test is reduced when subs1 of s3 of Article 40 is read (as
it must be) in the light of the Constitution as a whole and, in particular, in the light of what the
Constitution, expressly or by necessary implication, deems to be fundamental to the personal
standing of the individual in question in the context of the social order envisaged by the Constitution.
The infinite variety in the relationships between the citizen and his fellows and between the citizen
and the State makes an exhaustive enumeration of the guaranteed rights difficult, if not impossible."
In my judgment in the same case, I referred (at p310)- "The natural or human rights to which I
have referred earlier in this judgment are part of what is generally called the natural law."
Not only has the child born out of lawful wedlock the natural right to have its welfare and health
guarded no less well than that of a child born in lawful wedlock, but a fortiori it has the right to life
itself and the right to be guarded against all threats directed to its existence whether before or after
birth. The child's natural rights spring primarily from the natural right of every individual to life, to
be reared and educated, to liberty, to work, to rest and recreation, to the practice of religion, and to
follow his or her conscience. The right to life necessarily implies the right to be born, the right to
preserve and defend (and to have preserved and defended) that life, and the right to maintain that life
at a proper human standard in matters of food, clothing and habitation. It lies not in the power of
the parent who has the primary natural rights and duties in respect of the child to exercise them in
such a way as intentionally or by neglect to endanger the health or life of the child or to terminate
its existence. The child's natural right to life and all that flows from that right are independent of any
right of the parent as such. I wish here to repeat what I said in McGee's Case (McGee v The
Attorney General (1974) IR 284)- "... any action on the part of either the husband and wife or of
the State to limit family sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily not only be
an offence against the common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life
in question." In these respects the child born out of lawful wedlock is in precisely the same position
as the child born in lawful wedlock.
The Constitution rejected the English common-law view of the position of the illegitimate child
in so far as its fundamental rights are concerned. It guarantees to protect the child's natural rights in
the same way as it guarantees to protect the natural rights of the mother of the child.
At p345 of the judgment in In Re M ((1946) IR334)- "The absence from our Statute Roll of an
Adoption Act, on the lines of the English Adoption of Children Act, 1926, is regrettable and that
is an urgent matter for reform." Six years after the judgment came the enactment of the Adoption

amending Acts, the last of which was the Adoption Act, 1976. The Act of 1952 provides for the
adoption of children who are illegitimate and children who are full orphans, ie, children who were
born in lawful wedlock or who have been legitimated and both of whose parents are dead. It also
provides that where the mother of an illegitimate child is alive and may be found her consent alone
is necessary for the adoption of the child. If the mother is dead or cannot be found, then, if there is
a legal guardian, the consent of the legal guardian alone is necessary. If the mother cannot be found
and there is no legal guardian, then the consent of a person having charge of, or control over, the child
is to be sought. The same requirements exist in respect of the adoption of orphans save, of course,
for the reference to the possibility of the mother being alive. Orphans and illegitimate children are
the two classes of children for whose benefit the Act of 1952 was enacted. They are children who
might not otherwise have the advantage of a safe and secure home because of the circumstances
prevailing in their particular cases.
It is interesting to note that these two classes of children are subject to one important difference.
As has been held in Nicolaou's Case (The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567), the
illegitimate child and its mother do not constitute a family within the meaning of Article 42 of the
Constitution. On the other hand there is no doubt, in my view, that orphaned children who are
members of a family continue to constitute a family for the purpose of the Constitution even though
their parents have died. It can scarcely be contended that a unit consisting of four or five children
who range in age between five and sixteen years, and whose parents may have been killed
simultaneously in a car accident or may have died successively from illness, and who had been a
family during the life of both parents or of the surviving parent, cease to be a family on the death
of both parents. The family which is founded on marriage is recognised as the fundamental unit
group of society; the fact that the married parents of the children have died does not alter the
character of the unit.
In mentioning this aspect of the law, I am not to be taken as impugning in any way the validity
of statutory provisions allowing for legal adoption. In my view, there is nothing whatever in the
Constitution to prevent a member of a family passing out of that family. This happens naturally
when a child sets out to establish a family of her or his own; or when, by reason of age or maturity
or other circumstances, he ceases to be a member of a family in the sense of forming part of a unit
which lives together as such and is a recognisable family within the meaning of the Constitution. I
do not see any impediment in principle to a child passing out of one family and becoming a member
of another family in particular circumstances. However, as this process may involve in those
circumstances a consideration of the natural rights of the parents of the family which is being vacated
and those of the child who is leaving the family, it must necessarily be based upon consent. Natural
rights may be waived or surrendered by the persons who enjoy them, provided that such waiver is
not prohibited either by natural law or by positive law. Likewise, circumstances may arise which
necessarily lead to the inference that the rights have been waived or abandoned.
One of the most important questions of law to be examined in the present case is the provision
in s3 of the Adoption Act, 1974, relating to the question of dispensing with the consent of the
mother to the adoption of her child. This provision marked such a radical departure from the basic
structure of the adoption system hitherto existing that it is necessary to examine that system in
some detail.
The essential feature of the system established by the Act of 1952 was the fact that no adoption
was possible without consent. In the first instance, the consent of the mother of the illegitimate child

had to be obtained; where there was no mother or the mother could not be found, the consent of the
legal guardian was required; where there was no legal guardian, the consent of the person having
charge or control over the child had to be obtained. It followed that nobody could be compelled to
adopt a child and that nobody would be given a child for adoption unless than person consented to
the procedure. It would have been quite open for the Oireachtas to provide for legal adoption with
the effects which it has without the intervention of any adoption board, simply by allowing it to be
brought about by means of an intermediary or even by direct agreement between the person or
persons who wished to have the child adopted and the person or persons who wished to adopt it.
Thus adoption in our law is essentially a consent or voluntary arrangement. The Adoption Board
is, in effect, a ratifying agency and a safeguard. The Board ensures that the particular adoption is
made in accordance with the Acts of the Oireachtas and that the prospective adopters are suitable.
It also preserves the anonymity of the parties to the procedure. Undoubtedly, there have been many
cases where the arrangements for adoption have been made directly between the person seeking to
have a child adopted and the person seeking to adopt the child, but they were routed through the
Board for the simple reason that the statute provided that adoption would not amount to legal
adoption unless the machinery of the Board was employed and an adoption order was made by the
Board.
The Board has no function to settle disputes as to the custody of a child. Neither does it have
a jurisdiction to adjudicate upon anything that could be said to be in controversy or dispute between
parties, either in the cases where anonymity is maintained or in the cases where the parties are
known to each other. The Board is simply concerned with what I am satisfied is the administrative
function of seeing that the steps being taken are not contrary to the adoption legislation, are not
inimical to the welfare of the child, and that everybody concerned has had a full opportunity of
considering the matter carefully. It is quite clear that the Board was not invested with any power
to settle or decide any question as to the existence of a right or obligation or duty. This appears to
me clearly to have been the policy and the effect of the Act of 1952.
The Act of 1952 provides that certain persons, who are designated by reference to their
occupation or relationship to the child, are entitled to be heard on an application for adoption as well
as any other person whom the Board, in its discretion, decides to hear. It is obvious that there are
instances where the Board, like many other administrative tribunals or designated persons exercising
administrative functions, is bound to act judicially. As has already been pointed out by this Court
in McDonald v Bord na gCon (McDonald v Bord na gCon (1965) IR 217) see also the decision of
this Court in East Donegal Co-Operative v The Attorney General ((1970) IR 317).
The statutory consequences which flow from the making of an adoption order are that the
mother or guardian loses all parental and guardianship rights and is freed from all parental and
guardianship duties, and the child's legal status is substantially altered. By reason of the adoption,
the child stands in relation to the adopters as a child born to them in lawful wedlock. Marriage also
alters the status of the parties to it and, where it is one which results in the legitimation of a child,
it alters the status of the child. Adoption, like marriage, has far-reaching effects in the law of
succession. It is worth noting that all rights of succession, as distinct from the right to bequeath,
derive from statute. The legal consequences of adoption are matters in respect of which the Board
has no discretion or function. They are statutory consequences of the making of an adoption order
and could equally well have been statutory consequences of an adoption permitted by law without
the intervention of any adoption board.

As under the Act of 1952 no adoption order could normally be made in respect of a child
exceeding seven years old, no general provision was made for giving consideration to the wishes of
the child. However, in a special provision in s19 of that Act, which permitted the adoption of
children over that age (but under the age of 21 years) who were in the care of persons seeking their
adoption as from a date before the passing of the Act, the Board was obliged under the Act to give
due consideration to the wishes of the child having regard to his age and understanding. That was a
perfectly proper statutory provision because children also have constitutionally guaranteed natural
rights. These rights must be safeguarded and a child's consent, in so far as its age and understanding
warrant it, must be obtained before its status is altered by way of adoption. When a child has not
reached that stage its interests must be represented. However, it may well be that in many cases the
Board can adequately discharge that function. Naturally, where a child is of proper age and
understanding, its natural rights or status may not be altered against its will. Where a child's welfare
coercively requires a change in its custodial care, there is already ample power to deal with the
matter under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964.
The Act of 1952 was amended by the Acts of 1964, 1974 and 1976. For the purposes of this
case the Court is concerned principally with the Act of 1974. The first and, perhaps, most farreaching change made by that Act is that contained in s11 which, in effect, removed the upper age
limit of seven years and permitted the adoption of children where the Board was satisfied that in the
particular circumstances of the case it was desirable to make an adoption order, provided that the
adopted person was under 21 years old. It is to be noted in passing that no exception was made even
for the case where such child might already have been married. The whole adoption procedure,
except the exception with which I shall shortly deal, remained subject to the consents of all the
concerned parties. In my view since 1974 these consents must also include the consent of the child
where he or she is of the necessary age and understanding and, presumably, of the spouse of the
child where the child is married - that is, of course, if the adoption of a married child is
constitutionally possible. The fact that the Act of 1974, while increasing the age limit considerably,
omitted to deal with the aspect of the child's consent does not alter the fundamental right of the child
where his status is being altered.
Section 3 of the Act of 1974 makes special provision (See p43, ante) for the person who has
agreed "to the placing of the child for adoption" and who either fails, neglects or refuses to give
consent to the adoption or withdraws a consent already given. In such a case the applicant for the
adoption order may apply to the High Court for an order to the effect that the Board may dispense
with the consent of the person withholding the consent or seeking to withdraw it, if already given.
The High Court is also empowered to give custody of the child to the applicant for such period as
the court may determine. The test which the High Court is called upon to apply in this matter is that
it may not make an order unless it is "satisfied that it is in the best interests of the child" so to do.
There is no definition in any of the Acts of the phrase "the placing of the child for adoption."
However, I think one may reasonably assume that it means either the handing over of the child for
the purpose of its being adopted or even, if the mother retains the child, the giving of a clear and
unambiguous indication that it is her desire to surrender her natural rights in respect of the child and
that it be adopted. I am satisfied that, having regard to the natural rights of the mother, the proper
construction of the provision in s3 of the Act of 1974 is that the consent, if given, must be such as
to amount to a fully-informed, free and willing surrender or an abandonment of these rights.
However, I am also of opinion that such a surrender or abandonment may be established by her

conduct when it is such as to warrant the clear and unambiguous inference that such was her fullyinformed, free and willing intention. In my view, a consent motivated by fear, stress or anxiety, or
a consent or conduct which is dictated by poverty or other deprivations does not constitute a valid
consent.
It is significant that neither the question of the dispensing with consent (which, by its very
nature, could in many cases raise a controversy as to rights) nor the question as to the custody of
the child were placed within the powers of the Board but were assigned by the Oireachtas
exclusively to the High Court, thus preserving the consenting and voluntary basis of the Board's role.
The function of the High Court in this particular area is to decide whether or not to authorise the
Board to dispense with the consent of the mother, or guardian, or the person having charge of or
control over the child. For the reasons I have already stated, the High Court must be satisfied that
the consent already given (where it has been given) or the placing for adoption is such as to amount
to a surrender or abandonment of the natural rights which exist in the mother. I refer to the mother
in particular because a custodian or a guardian, or a person having charge of or control over the child,
does not have these natural rights and the point arises only in a case in which the mother of the child
is involved. As I have already indicated, the court should also take into account the wishes of the
child in appropriate cases.
Hitherto I have referred only to adoption, which is quite distinct from guardianship or custody.
The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, deals with questions of the custody of a child and it makes
provision for the transfer of the custody of a child or the giving of a child into the custody of a
particular person or persons (whether the child be the child of married parents or not) where the
welfare of the child so dictates. The Act also deals in a more restricted way with questions of
guardianship. It is quite clear from that Act that guardianship and custody are two different
concepts, and this has been made abundantly clear by the decision of this Court in B v B ((1975)
IR 54). It is interesting to note in passing that s6, subs4, of the Act expressly states that the mother
of an illegitimate child shall be the guardian of her child, thereby, in my view, reflecting a
constitutionally protected natural right, just as the parents of a child born in lawful wedlock are the
guardians of the child because of the natural bond between them, as was also mentioned in B v B
((1975) IR 54) - see also my own observations on the point in McGee's Case ((1974) IR 284) at
p311 of the report where I stated that in Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution parents are the
natural guardians of the children of the family. Guardianship may be surrendered or abandoned
provided that doing so does not infringe any constitutional rights of the child and is not inimical to
the welfare of the child. The test laid down in s3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, is that
the Court shall decide the matter having regard to the welfare of the child as the "first and paramount
consideration." This phrase is found in s1 of the (English)"In any matter, application or proceedings before the Board or any court relating to the
arrangements for or the making of an adoption order, the Board or the court, in deciding that
question, shall regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration."
It was submitted to this Court that that is the test which should have been taken into account
by the High Court in the present matter, notwithstanding that s3 of the Act of 1974, under which
the High Court operates, uses quite a different test, namely, that of the course chosen being in "the
best interests of the child." Prior to the setting up of the State in 1922 and prior to the enactment
of the Constitution of Saorstat Eireann, it was clearly recognised by the Courts in this country when

paramount consideration was the welfare of the child in the widest sense of the term. I do not see
that the position is made any stronger by the addition of the word "first" to "paramount" - if
anything, it probably tends to weaken it because, as has been pointed out in one English decision,
a reference to "first" indicates that there may be second, third, fourth and successive considerations.
The word "paramount" by itself is not by any means an indication of exclusivity; no doubt if the
Oireachtas had intended the welfare of the child to be the sole consideration it would have said so.
The use of the word "paramount" certainly indicates that the welfare of the child is to be the
superior or the most important consideration, in so far as it can be, having regard to the law or the
provisions of the Constitution applicable to any given case. However, when one turns to s3 of the
Act of 1974 and comes to deal with another matter, one finds that a different phrase is used.
Therefore, it must be accepted that the test in s3 is not intended to be identical with the test in s2
of the Act of 1974; one must examine the test in s3 in the light of the procedure in which it is
applicable. What is "in the best interests of the child" relates obviously to a temporary situation.
Custody orders are, of their nature, temporary only. The temporary nature of the situation is clearly
indicated by the fact that what the High Court is called upon to do is to decide whether or not the
Board should be given authority to dispense with the consent of the mother or the guardian or
custodian, as the case may be.
(Having referred to the provisions of s3 of the Adoption Act, 1974, the judge continued). It is
not very clear from s3, subs2, of the Act of 1974 whether the High Court must couple paragraphs
(a) and (b) or whether the High Court can refrain from making an order under paragraph (a) but make
an order under paragraph (b). If the provision means that the granting of custody of the child to the
applicant for such period as the court may determine is automatically to be coupled with authorising
the Board to waive the consent of the mother, then there must be serious doubt as to its validity.
If, however, it means that the High Court may do either, or both, then the grounds for the test to be
applied for the purpose of authorising the Board to dispense with the consent may be utterly
different from the grounds for the test to be applied in the giving or the refusal of custody, even
though the custody is to be only for a temporary period. The fact that the authority to dispense
with the consent may be given to the Board does not by any means end the case, because there still
remains an application for adoption to be processed by the Board. If the Board does not make an
adoption order then, if the custody of the child has been given to the applicant for adoption, the
child will obviously have to be given back unless proceedings for custody only may be successfully
maintained under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964.
In my view, the High Court must use the "best interests" test in s3 of the Act of 1974 in
considering whether or not to give custody for the temporary period and also in deciding whether
or not it should authorise the Board to dispense with the consent. If the High Court is satisfied that
it is in the best interests of the child that the Board should be permitted to examine and to process
the application for adoption, the High Court is not thereby directing that there should be an
adoption and is not in any way indicating to the Board how they should deal with the case.
I am quite satisfied that the President of the High Court did not err in adopting the test laid
down in s3 of the Act of 1974 instead of the test laid down in s2, which latter test appears to be the
one which binds the Board when it comes to consider whether or not it should approve of the
arrangements to make an adoption order. The references to the "court" in s2 are not very
illuminating. Save for the purpose of reference in deciding questions of law, the court, apart from s3,
has no function whatever in the matter of adoption as such. Section 2 specifically refers to "the

arrangements for or the making of an adoption order" and seems to imply that a court has some
function in these matters.
In the course of the judgment of the learned President of the High Court, there are certain
apparent ambiguities which might lead one to conclude that he had in mind the possibility that the
consent of the mother might be dispensed with under s3 of the Act of 1974 solely on the ground of
her misbehaviour or bad behaviour or, perhaps, on the ground of her general lack of fitness to have
custody of the child. In view of the fact that he was obviously very conscious of the constitutional
rights of the mother in this case, I do not think that this is the correct meaning to be attached to his
judgment. I think that what he had in mind was that type of abandonment of her rights, or that type
of misbehaviour or other activity on her part, from which it could be clearly inferred that she had
in fact surrendered or abandoned her rights. However, I do not fully agree with the President of the
High Court where he appears to suggest that, in a situation where there is a conflict between the
constitutional rights of the child and those of the mother, the misbehaviour of the mother alone may
justify a judicial intervention going so far as to dispense with the mother's consent to adoption in
order to protect the child's constitutional rights. In my view, the situation envisaged could be dealt
with appropriately by a custody order under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, which is a
completely different thing from an adoption order. The natural guardianship rights of the parent or
parents may still be maintained although the custody may be given to a third person. For the reasons
set out in the judgments in B v B ((1975) IR 54), the wishes of the parent or parents must in such
a case be consulted on the upbringing of the child; it is only when there is a dispute which cannot
be satisfactorily resolved that recourse to the court is necessary. Instances of the kind which worried
the learned President of the High Court, namely, whether the constitutional rights of the child were
to be upheld to the total or virtual exclusion of the constitutional rights of the mother, need not arise
as the problem may be catered for in the manner I have indicated. The important question in cases
such as the present one is whether there has been a surrender or an abandonment by the mother of
her constitutional or natural rights in respect of the child, such as to give rise to the possibility of
the child's being legally adopted.
There is nothing in the Constitution to indicate that in cases of conflict the rights of the parent
are always to be given primacy. It is important to recall that in In Re Frost ((1947) IR 3)"I cannot, however, accept his second proposition which was that the rights of the parents ...
are absolute rights, the exercise of which cannot in any circumstances be controlled by the Court.
That a child has natural and imprescriptible rights is recognised by the Constitution (Art42.5), and
if Mr Ryan's second proposition were accepted, it would follow that the Court would be powerless
to protect those rights should they be ignored by the parents. I am satisfied that the Court has
jurisdiction to control the exercise of parental rights, but in exercising that jurisdiction it must not
act upon any principle which is repugnant to the Constitution."
Article 42, s5, of the Constitution speaks of the case where parents fail in their duty towards
their children for physical or moral reasons; it provides that the State, as guardian of the common
good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of the parents, but always with due
regard for the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child. Under that section the State may very
well by legislation provide for the failure of the parents, and in appropriate cases it may very well
extend the law beyond simple provisions for a change of custody. A parent may for physical or
moral reasons decide to abandon his position as a parent or he or she may be deemed to have
abandoned that position; a failure in parental duty may itself be evidence of such an abandonment.

The fact that a parent fails in parental duty or abandons parental duty for no more than purely
selfish reasons may well, by itself, be regarded in an appropriate case as a moral failure on the part
of the parent, or as a failure which may be classified as arising from a moral reason.
In Article 42, s1, of the Constitution the State recognises that the family itself is the primary and
natural educator of the child, but it goes on to say that the State guarantees to respect the inalienable
right and duty of parents to provide in accordance with their means for the religious and moral,
intellectual, physical and social education of their children. Therefore, such education is regarded as
a right and a duty of the parents; correlatively, it is the right of the children to look to their parents
and family for the fulfilment of their duty to supply, arrange for, or provide that education. If there
is a failure to perform the duty, then the circumstances may be such that a transfer of custody is
warranted. Where there is a complete abandonment of the parental right and duty, the State may be
justified in taking measures by statute or otherwise to protect the rights of the child; these measures
may include the enactment of adoption legislation. Where the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964,
defines "welfare" it is, as has been remarked in other cases, following the wording of the Constitution
itself. It is also to be borne in mind that some inalienable rights are absolutely inalienable while
others are relatively inalienable.
So far interventions authorised by the Constitution have been examined in the context of a
situation involving married parents and their children. In my view, they are no less permissible under
the Constitution in situations involving an unmarried mother and her child.
The findings of fact made by the learned President of the High Court are such that there is no
reason for holding that the defence of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff's child to an upbringing
that will not be injurious or inimical to her own constitutional rights requires that the natural rights
of the plaintiff (which are constitutionally protected) should be set aside. Neither the evidence nor
the findings of the President would indicate the existence of any danger of the child's interests being
in peril.
So far as the constitutional rights of the plaintiff are concerned, the findings of the President do
not indicate that she has surrendered or abandoned her constitutional rights by a fully informed, free
and willing surrender or abandonment of these rights, or at all, nor did the President so find. Before
anybody may be said to have surrendered or abandoned his constitutional rights, it must be shown
that he is aware of what the rights are and of what he is doing. Secondly, the action taken must be
such as could reasonably lead to the clear and unambiguous inference that such was the intention of
the person who is alleged to have either surrendered or abandoned the constitutionalrights. The facts
of the present case do not support any such conclusion. Less than eight weeks after the birth of her
child, the plaintiff had already signed a form consenting to the placing of the child for adoption. Prior
to that she had been subject to several representations urging her that it was in the best interests of
the child and herself to have the child placed for adoption. When the representations were initially
made to her, they were made to her within one week of the birth of her child and while she was still
in hospital. It is not difficult to imagine the anxieties and troubled state of mind of this lonely young
girl, who was but a short time past her twenty-first birthday and who, unknown to friend or family,
had given birth to her child far from home.
There is no suggestion of any impropriety on the part of any of the persons who made
representations or interviewed the plaintiff before and immediately after she had signed the form
placing her child for adoption. However, it is regrettable that such a degree of haste should have

her extreme youth. In so far as the evidence goes, she was not made aware of the possibilities which
exist for aiding persons in her position or of the several excellent societies which exist for the
purpose of enabling a woman who finds herself in the plaintiff's circumstances to retain her child
and, at the same time, to carry on her life as normally as is possible in the circumstances. By the
time the plaintiff did sign the form it may be that she was no longer confused but that is very far
from saying that she was a completely free agent or that she was aware of the result if she withdrew
her consent. All the circumstances indicate that she was not a free agent. The evidence discloses a
reluctance and an anxiety on her part throughout the transaction; the matter which appears to have
been operating mostly on her mind was her desire to maintain secrecy over the whole affair.
One can scarcely deny the great trauma and the medical, physical and psychological effects of
the birth of a child on an unmarried mother, particularly if she is young. The fact that her mind may
be such as to have a full appreciation of the fact and consequences of consent - even if such were
possible in the present state of the law - does not mean that, having regard to the particular
circumstances in which she finds herself, she should not have independent advice. This is specially
so in the case of a young girl who is frightened at the possible reaction of her parents, who may be
far away from her parents' home, and who is aware that her parents have no knowledge of the event
- more particularly when it turns out (as in this case) see s1 of the Infanticide Act, 1949.
It is of the utmost significance that, the very moment the plaintiff discovered that her parents'
attitude was far more understanding and helpful than she had feared it would be, she found herself
for the first time in a completely free position where she could make a fully free choice. She made
the choice without any hesitation. The choice was to keep and rear her baby.
I am satisfied that on the evidence the learned President of the High Court was correct in his
decision not to authorise the Board to dispense with the consent of the plaintiff mother. On the view
of the law that I have taken the question of "the best interests of the child" only falls to be
considered when the mother has surrendered or abandoned her rights. But even on the question of
"best interests," if that point had been reached, I am satisfied that on the evidence the learned
President of the High Court would be justified in holding that those interests would not have
required him to authorise the Board to dispense with the plaintiff's consent. His findings of fact are
to the effect that the constitutional rights of the child are not in any way exposed to danger and are
much less likely to be damaged by being brought up in the manner contemplated and planned by the
mother, and that the mother has not in any way surrendered or abandoned her own constitutional
rights to both the guardianship and the custody of her child.
One has the utmost sympathy with the notice parties in the disappointment they must feel if
they are not allowed to keep the child. However, their position is not comparable with that of the
natural mother of the child. It is undoubtedly true that the notice parties have an excellent home and
have brought up with loving care the child they have adopted. Even if they had received better legal
advice than that which they received from somebody (who did not act for them in this litigation),
I do not think that the position would be materially different. Be all that as it may, the fact remains
that in matters of this kind and at the stage they have reached, the notice parties have no
constitutional rights whatsoever in respect of the child they wish to adopt. The only legal rights
they possess are the rights given to them to apply for adoption if the child is properly placed for
adoption by the full and free agreement of the mother or, in a case where no consent is forthcoming
after the child is properly placed for adoption, to apply to the High Court under the provisions of

s3 of the Act of 1974. They have applied to the High Court but, in my opinion, their application
must fail for the reasons I have already given.
I think I should not conclude my judgment in this highly important case without drawing
attention to the danger of pressing, or urging, or advising the mother of an illegitimate child that the
best thing for her to do (and do quickly) is to have her child adopted. Earlier in the course of this
judgment I have referred to the possibilities that exist for aiding single mothers, and to the several
excellent societies that have been established for the purpose of helping and advising persons in the
position of the plaintiff to keep the baby and, at the same time, to carry on a reasonably normal life.
Doctors, nurses, social workers, those working in hospitals, adoption societies and others concerned
in these cases must always keep uppermost in their minds that the unmarried mother and her baby
each have all the fundamental rights of other human beings and also those rights which spring from
the relationship of the mother to her child and of the child to her mother, and that all these rights
must be respected. Furthermore, it must never be overlooked that the Oireachtas instituted legal
adoption in the interests of the child and not in the interests of those wishing to adopt a child legally,
albeit for the most laudable reasons, and thereby to make a child, or additional children, members of
their family. If, as I hold, adoption is not possible without consent, express or implied (which, in
the context, means a surrender or abandonment of constitutional rights), the question of competing
or comparative material or other advantages should never arise as between the mother of the child
and the applicants for adoption.
For the reasons I have given I am of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed.
HENCHY J
The essential facts of this case have been fully set out in the judgments just read; as they are not
in dispute I need not recount them again. The single issue arising from those facts is whether, in
pursuance of s3, subs2, of the Adoption Act, 1974, the Adoption Board should be authorised to
dispense with the consent of the plaintiff mother in the making of an adoption order in favour of the
couple (the notice parties) to whom the child was given for adoption. The case has been argued
within the framework of the terms of reference imposed by that issue, so I shall confine this
judgment accordingly. In so far as opinions or observations on wider and unargued topics emanate
from this case, I do not wish my silence on those obiter dicta to be taken as concurrence. In
particular, I refrain from expressing any opinion as to whether the making of an adoption order is
the exercise of a judicial function, as the point does not arise in this case.
To elucidate the constitutional and statutory provisions invoked in this case, it is necessary to
consider their background. When the Constitution was enacted in 1937 there was no statutory
adoption in existence in this State. In the case of illegitimate children, the right to their custody fell
to be decided by the common-law rules evolved in the courts consequent on the enactment of the
Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland), 1877, whereby the rules of equity were made available
(and, in case of variance from common-law rules, given precedence) in the courts set up by that Act.
As was apparently recognized by the Supreme Court in 1931 in The State (Kavanagh) v O'Sullivan
((1933) IR 618) and in 1944 in In re Kindersley ((1944) IR 111), the main principles governing
custody are to be found summarised in the judgment of FitzGibbon LJ sitting in the Irish Court of
Appeal in In re O'Hara ((1900) 2 IR 232). That was a case where a widowed mother, who was in
poor circumstances, had given her nine-year-old daughter to a farmer for whom she worked, to be
adopted by him under a written agreement. Two years later the mother, having remarried and being

in a position to bring up her child, commenced proceedings seeking to have the custody restored to
her. The Court of Appeal (Lord Ashbourne C, FitzGibbon and Holmes LJJ)- 1, At Common Law, the parent has an absolute right to the custody of a child of tender years,
unless he or she has forfeited it by certain sorts of misconduct; 2, Chancery, when a separate
tribunal, possessed a jurisdiction different from that of the Queen's Bench, and essentially parental,
in the exercise of which the main consideration was the welfare of the child, and the Court did what,
on consideration of all the circumstances, it was judicially satisfied that a wise parent, acting for the
true interests of the child, would or ought to do, even though the natural parent desired and had the
Common Law right to do otherwise, and had not been guilty of misconduct; 3, The Judicature Act
has made it the duty of every Division of the High Court to exercise the Chancery jurisdiction; 4,
In exercising the jurisdiction to control or to ignore the parental right the Court must act cautiously,
not as if it were a private person acting with regard to his own child, and acting in opposition to the
parent only when judicially satisfied that the welfare of the child requires that the parental right
should be suspended or superseded."
In the O'Hara Case ((1900) 2 IR 232) the appeal judges were satisfied that the welfare of the
child required that she be restored to her mother. Further, although the Custody of Children Act,
1891, prohibited the enforcement of the parental right in any case of abandonment, desertion, or
proved unmindfulness of parental duties, unless and until the parent satisfied the court that he was
a fit person to have the custody of the child, the court was unanimously of opinion that the
relinquishment by the mother of the child for adoption did not, in the circumstances, debar her from
getting custody. Rejecting submissions to the contrary based on the Act of 1891, FitzGibbon LJ (at
p244)'On the construction of the Act, I hold that the surrender of a child to an adopted parent, as an
act of prudence or of necessity, under the pressure of present inability to maintain it, being an act
done in the interest of the child, cannot be regarded as abandonment or desertion, or even as
unmindfulness of parental duty within the meaning of the Act."
At the time of the coming into operation of the present Constitution, the principles enunciated
in In re O'Hara ((1900) 2 IR 232) see The State (Kavanagh) v O'Sullivan ((1933) IR 618) at p630
of the report.
- "In exceptional cases, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards
their children, the State as guardian of the common good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to
supply the place of the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and imprescriptible rights
of the child."
The Constitution does not pronounce specifically on rights of custody, but it is necessarily
inherent in the provisions I have cited that, in the case of children whose parents were or have
become married, the primary right to custody is vested in the parents, for custody will normally be
necessary for the effectuation of the parents' constitutional right and duty to provide, according to
their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children.
It is only in the exceptional cases referred to in s5 of Article 42 that the State is authorised to
endeavour to take the place of the parents (ionad na dtuisti do ghlacadh), and then only with due
regard for the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child. The natural and imprescriptible rights
there referred to are those of a child whose parents have married (thereby creating a family in the

constitutional sense), and those rights necessarily comprehend the religious and moral, intellectual,
physical and social education of the child.
Rights and duties in regard to the custody of a child who was born out of wedlock and who is
not a member of a family (in the constitutional sense of the word) are not encompassed, expressly
or impliedly, by any of the constitutional provisions I have cited. Rights and duties arising under
those provisions are by the terms of their constitutional recognition confined to children of a family
founded on marriage, and they are vested not in one or other parent but in the parents. Of course,
where because of death, incapacity or unfitness, one of the parents is eliminated or debarred, it will
be for the other parent to exercise and be subject to the constitutional right and duty, not simply by
virtue of parenthood but by virtue of parenthood within a family.
Because of the central and fundamental position accorded by the Constitution to the family in
the social and moral order, there is a necessary and inescapable difference of moral capacity and
social function between parents or a parent within a family and the parents or a parent of an
illegitimate child. While Article 40, s1, of the Constitution recognizes that "all citizens shall, as
human persons, be held equal before the law," it adds the proviso that such a declaration "shall not
be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity,
physical and moral, and of social function." Thus one will find throughout the laws of the State
many instances where parents within a family are treated differently from the parent of an
illegitimate child. Likewise, with the same constitutional justification, instances may be adduced (eg,
in the law of succession) where illegitimate children are treated differently from legitimate children.
While the moral capacity and social function of parents are, in constitutional terms, not alone
distinguishable but necessarily distinguishable, depending on whether the children are legitimate or
illegitimate, all children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, share the common characteristic that they
enter life without any responsibility for their status and with an equal claim to what the
Constitution expressly or impliedly postulates as the fundamental rights of children. Since Article
42 recognizes the children of a marriage as having a natural and imprescriptible right (as the
correlative of their parents' duty) to the provision for them of religious and moral, intellectual,
physical and social education, a like personal right should be held to be impliedly accorded to
illegitimate children by s3 of Article 40. That was the conclusion reached (correctly, in my view) by
Gavan Duffy P in In re M ((1946) IR 334) where the issue was whether the mother of an illegitimate
child, who had given the little girl away for "adoption" (there being then no Adoption Act)"It is now universally recognised that the paramount consideration on such an application as this
must be the welfare of the child, the word 'welfare' being taken in its widest sense. Under Irish law,
while I do not think that the constitutional guarantee for the family (Art41 of the Constitution)
avails the mother of an illegitimate child, I regard the innocent little girl as having the same 'natural
and imprescriptible rights' (under Art42) as a child born in wedlock to religious and moral,
intellectual, physical and social education, and her care and upbringing during her coming, formative
years must be the decisive consideration in our judgment."
I share the view that, while the relevant constitutional rights of children are available equally to
legitimate and illegitimate children, the constitutional guarantee for the family does not avail the
mother (still less the father) of an illegitimate child. There is no parity of moral capacity or of social
function which would justify reading s3 of Article 40 as importing for such a mother the natural and
imprescriptible rights and duties of parents within a family.

In the normal state of things, the effectuation of the constitutional rights of an illegitimate child
will require that the mother be given custody, particularly in the case of a very young child. In such
a case the custody has a constitutional footing in so far as it satisfies a constitutional right of the
child; while the mother's own right to custody has a legal, as distinct from a constitutional,
foundation. In such circumstances, the mother's legal right to custody must always yield to the
constitutional rights of the child, so that the mother's claim to custody will not be given recognition
if (because of factors such as physical incapacity, mental illness, personality defect, chronic
alcoholism, drug addiction, moral depravity, or dereliction of parental duty) the mother's custody
would be incompatible with the child's constitutional rights.
It is true that the mother's right to the custody and care of her child was said in The State
(Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala ((1966) IR 567) (at p644 of the report) to be given constitutional
protection by s3 of Article 40, but that observation was not part of the ratio decidendi of that case.
The only matter in issue is that case was the nature and extent of the rights of a father of an
illegitimate child. If the mother of an illegitimate child had a constitutionally-protectedpersonal right
to its custody, it is difficult to see how, in a case such as the present one she could be held to have
lost that right when there is no evidence that she was ever made aware of the existence of the right.
In my opinion, however, the mother's rights in regard to the child, although deriving from the ties
of nature, are given a constitutional footing only to the extent that they are founded on the
constitutionally-guaranteed rights of the child.
see s5, subs3, of the Act of 1964. The mother of an illegitimate infant (ie a person under 21
years of age) is constituted guardian to the exclusion of the father (s6, subs4) see s10, subs1.
However, the mother's rights as guardian are qualified (s3) by the general mandate that in any
proceedings involving the custody, guardianship or upbringing of an infant, the court shall regard as
the first and paramount considerationthe religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social welfare
of the infant. In other words, whatever statutory or common-law rights are vested in the mother of
an illegitimate child, they must yield to the constitutional rights of the child in proceedings involving
custody, guardianship or upbringing.
It is against the background of the constitutional, statutory and common-law rights and duties
which I have mentioned that the Adoption Acts, 1952-1976, must be construed. The present case
does not call for a scrutiny of those Acts in general for the sole issue is whether, pursuant to s3 of
the Act of 1974, the plaintiff's consent to the adoption (which she refuses to give) should be
dispensed with. What she did consent to (in writing on the 6th January, 1978) was the placing of
the child for adoption. Prior to giving her written consent to placement, she has been informed in
writing that before an adoption order could be made following on that placement, her further consent
would be required, that is unless it was dispensed with under s3 of the Act of 1974.
Under the adoption code two separate and distinct consents are involved. The first consent
arises when, as in this case, the mother enters into a written consent to placement for adoption.
There is nothing final about this consent for the mother, for the adoption society, or for the
prospective adopters. It covers only an interim period during which the prospective adopters are,
with the consent of the mother, to have custody of the child in the expectation that an adoption
order will be made later. This consent acts to produce a temporary derogation or suspension of the
mother's right to custody. It does not amount to a waiver or abandonment so as to destroy the
mother's rights; only the adoption order can have that effect. Until the passing of the Act of 1974,

dispensed with. Now, under s3 of that Act, it may be dispensed with provided the High Court so
permits on being satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the child.
If, contrary to my opinion, it could be held that the mother of an illegitimate child has a
constitutional right to the custody of her child, a consent to placement for adoption could never
amount, in itself, to an extinguishment of that right, for it amounts to no more than a consent by the
mother to putting her rights (or some of them) in temporary abeyance. It is difficult to see how s3
of the Act of 1974 could be operated to defeat the mother's unforfeited or unabandoned
constitutional rights, when the test is what is in the best interests of the child rather than the
effectuation of the child's constitutional rights, which rights may be satisfied whether the adoption
order is made or not. The objective to be attained by an order of the High Court under s3 is not
simply the effectuation of the rights of either mother or child, but the attainment of a result which
will be in the best interests of the child, by either granting or not granting to the mother a power to
veto the adoption.
- "In any matter, application or proceedings before the Board or any court relating to the
arrangements for or the making of an adoption order, the Board or the court, in deciding that
question, shall regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration."
Whether a distinction is to be drawn (and, if so, to what extent) between the "welfare of the
child" and the "best interests of the child" is something I find unnecessary to consider for, in my
opinion s2 and s3 of the Act of 1974 are directed to mutually exclusive situations. Section 2 is
confined to one or other of two types of questions. The first is a question relating to the
arrangements for an adoption. By reason of the statutory scope given by s4 of the Act of 1952 to
"the making of arrangements for the adoption of a child," this type of question is limited to the
sphere of the initiation of a placement; so it does not arise here. The second type of question
envisaged by s2 of the Act of 1974 is one related to the making of an adoption order. While the
question of whether or not the mother's consent to the making of an adoption order should be
dispensed with might, broadly speaking, be said to be related to the making of an adoption order,
it is so related only in a preliminary or indirect way. The juxtaposition of s2 and s3 of the Act of
1974, with their differently worded specifications for the exercise of the court's discretion, must be
held to indicate differing subject matters. In my view, s2 must be held to refer to questions relating
to "arrangements," ie, the making of placements, or to the actual making of an adoption order. The
question whether the mother's consent will be judicially dispensed with is a separate and distinct
matter which arises only under s3 and is required by s3, subs2, to be decided in accordance with
what is adjudged to be in the best interests of the child. That is the only test which the court may
apply in a case such as this.
In the course of his judgment the President of the High Court said that he was holding that the
plaintiff mother has a constitutional right to the custody and to the control of the upbringing of her
child, that the child has a constitutional right to bodily integrity, and that she has an unenumerated
right to an opportunity to be reared with due regard to her welfare, religious and moral, intellectual,
physical and social. For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the mother of an illegitimate
child has a constitutional right to the custody or to the control and upbringing of the child. I consider
that such a right vests in her as a legal right.
As to a constitutional right to bodily integrity, such a right arises for judicial recognition or
enforcement only in circumstances which require that, in order to assure the dignity and freedom of

particular actual or threatened bodily injury or intrusion. No such question arises in this case. There
is no suggestion that, whether the proposed adoption goes through or not, the child will suffer any
bodily injury or intrusion.
As to the constitutional right of the child, it arises under Article 40, s3, by analogy with Article
42, s1, and it amounts to a right to be accorded, with due regard to what the circumstances
reasonably allow, an upbringing which will provide for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical
and social education of the child. Whereas this right, as guaranteed by Article 42, s1, to legitimate
children, is coupled with a correlative duty imposed on the parents - a duty which is related to their
means - the analogous right of illegitimate children which is to be implied under Article 40, s3, cannot
be necessarily exercisable in the context of a correlative duty imposed on the father or mother.
Article 40, s3, allows certain personal rights, but not personal duties, to be impliedly recognized.
So if it were held to justify the constitutional recognition of the mother's right as to education, it
would do so without attaching the attendant constitutional duty imposed by Article 42, s1, on
married parents. By that I mean that, whereas married parents are not allowed by the Constitution
to cast off with impunity their duty to educate their children (the duty being an inalienable one),
unmarried mothers are under no such constitutional inhibition. Indeed the Adoption Acts
specifically recognize their right to surrender their children to adopters, while withholding from
married parents the right to do so. To hold, therefore, that an unmarried mother has an implied
constitutional right in respect of the education and, therefore, of the upbringing of her child would
be to accord to her a preferred standing over that of married parents; and that would not be in
concordance with the constitutional attitude to marriage and the family.
A judge hearing an application under s3 of the Act of 1974 is not necessarily concerned with the
resolution of conflicting rights, legal or constitutional. He must, of course, ensure that the child's
constitutional rights will not be violated if he makes the order sought by the applicants. In the
present case it is clear from the transcript of the evidence and from the judge's findings that, whether
the plaintiff's consent is dispensed with or not and whether her child remains with the notice parties
or is returned to the plaintiff, there is nothing to suggest that the child will not receive, in the way
of upbringing and education, her constitutional due. The question to be resolved is not whether on
the merits an adoption order should be made in favour of the notice parties (for that is a decision
which is reserved for the Board and which has to be decided on material not all of which is before
the Court) but whether it would be in the best interests of the child to dispense with the mother's
consent. And the onus is on the notice parties to show that it would be in the best interests of the
child to do so.
It has for long been judicially accepted that in the case of a young child (the infant in this case
is only one year old) a court will not, save for exceptional reasons, make an order which will have
the effect of not recognizing the right of the infant to be with its mother or the right of the mother
to have the care of her infant. As Lord Esher MR said in R v Gyngall ((1893) 2 QB 232)"Prima facie it would not be for the welfare of a child to be taken away from its natural parent
and given over to other people who have not that natural relation to it. Every wise man would say
that, generally speaking, the best place for a child is with its parent."
In the O'Hara Case ((1900) 2 IR 232) the order to be made must be justifiable by the test of
what is best for the child. Having set out in the O'Hara Case (O'Hara, In re (1900) 2 IR 232), in the
passage I have quoted earlier, how a court should approach the question of the child's welfare,

"It appears to me that misconduct, or unmindfulness of parental duty, or inability to provide

for the welfare of the child, must be shown before the natural right can be displaced. Where a parent
is of blameless life, and is able and willing to provide for the child's material and moral necessities,
in the rank and position to which the child by birth belongs - ie, the rank and position of the parent
- the Court is, in my opinion, judicially bound to act on what is equally a law of nature and of
society, and to hold (in the words of Lord Esher) that 'the best place for a child is with its parent'."
I fully assent to the proposition that it is only in exceptional cases that a mother should be shut
out from the custody of her infant child or (as was proposed in this case) from having a say on a
matter crucial to its future rights and duties. It would have to be shown that there has been or is
something in the conduct of the mother, in her physical, mental or psychological capacity, or in the
special needs of the child having regard to the religious, moral, economic or other relevant
circumstances, before the court would be justified in passing over the prima facie valid claim of the
mother.
I am satisfied that the notice parties have failed to satisfy the onus cast on them. There is
nothing in the evidence to show any blameworthy conduct on the plaintiff mother's part in regard
to the child. Her decision to place her child for adoption was made in her then known circumstances,
and in the belief that it was all she could do and that it was in the best interests of the child. As soon
as she discovered that her parents would help her and make it possible for her to bring up the child,
she tried to get her child back. Having considered the child's welfare in its broad sense, the President
of the High Court adjudged the mother to be a fit and proper person to have custody of the child;
he did not think that the child would suffer any serious or permanent trauma as a result of being
transferred from the notice parties to the plaintiff. Furthermore, looking at the child's "welfare," as
that word is defined in s2 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, the President held that only a
marginal difference could be drawn between the notice parties and the plaintiff. In short, all that can
be said against the plaintiff's claim to be given the custody of her child is that she placed the child
for adoption.
Prior to the passing of the Act of 1974, the mother's right to veto the adoption was absolute.
Now that right is only a qualified one, in that s3 of the Act allows the High Court to dispense with
her consent if it is satisfied that to do so would be in the best interests of the child. The two-stage
nature of the adoption procedure, and particularly the requirement that the mother must be told at
the time of placement that she may change her mind, means that there must be something more than
a change of mind, something exceptional which is deleterious to the best interests of the infant,
before an order should be made against the mother under s3 of the Act of 1974. There are no such
exceptional circumstances in this case.
It is true that the President of the High Court, because of the view he took of the law, did not
in terms make any finding as to where the best interests of the child lie. If I thought it would be open
to him to make a finding adverse to the mother on that issue, I would favour remitting the case to
him. But we have all the evidence before us in transcript together with the President's estimation of
the witnesses, and it is possible to make an assessment of the full strength of the case for the notice
parties. In my judgment, it is not such as could possibly support the making of an order against the
mother under s3 of the Act of 1974. So I do not think that any necessary or useful purpose would
be served by sending the case back to the President.
Accordingly, I would dismiss this appeal and uphold the order made in the High Court.

KENNY J
The plaintiff, who is 22 years old, is a civil servant. She was unmarried when she had a child at
a hospital in November, 1977. She had not told her parents that she was pregnant because she was
frightened by what she thought their attitude to her would be, and the effect of this news on her
father who was extremely ill at that time. She went away to another town to have the child so that
her parents and neighbours would not hear of the birth, and because she had a sister living there. She
is adamant that she will not at any time marry the child's father.
see s39 of the Adoption Act, 1952.
On the 22nd January, 1978, the child was placed by the adoption society with the notice parties
who had one child, a girl, whom they adopted in 1975. They wanted to adopt a second child and so
in October, 1977, they applied to the said society.
At the end of January, 1978, the plaintiff told her parents that she had had a baby, and that she
had signed a paper to have the child adopted. The plaintiff's parents were offended that she had not
told them of her pregnancy before then and they wanted her to keep her child if she so wished. Her
mother offered to give up the position she had in a factory nearby and to look after the child on a
whole-time basis. The plaintiff decided that she would keep the child and, on the 11th February, she
wrote to the director of the adoption society stating that she wished to have it back. On the 21st
February the director informed the notice parties of the plaintiff's decision. The notice parties have
refused to give up the child.
On the 11th May, 1978, the plaintiff issued a summons against the Adoption Board seeking
custody of the child. The notice parties, who were heard on a day which was not that on which the
plaintiff was heard (though her counsel were present), claimed an order that the plaintiff's consent
to adoption be dispensed with under s3 of the Adoption Act, 1974. The President of the High Court
heard the case on the 8th and 12th September, 1978. I wish to commend the President for the
remarkable expedition shown by him in hearing the case during the long vacation. I thoroughly
approve of the practice adopted by him of hearing the plaintiff in the absence of the notice parties
whose counsel were present, and of hearing the notice parties in the absence of the plaintiff but in
the presence of her counsel.
see The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala ((1966) IR 567).
(Having referred to s14, subs1 and subs2, of the Adoption Act, 1952, s3, s6 (subs4), and s10
(subs1 and subs2a) of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964; and s2 and s3 (subs1 and subs2) of
the Adoption Act, 1974, the judge continued). Before her child was born, the plaintiff lived in a flat
in the town where she worked. Her parents live at a place which is 30 or 40 miles from that town.
She earns 37 pounds per week net as a clerical assistant in the public service. If she gets custody of
the child, the plaintiff can arrange to be transferred to another office, which is about a dozen miles
from the parents' home. Her father is a civil servant who is 52 years old and her mother, who is 45
years old, has brought up five daughters. Her mother now works in a factory beside her home. If the
plaintiff is given custody, her mother will give up her position at the factory and devote herself to
taking care of the child and the household. This creates no financial problem as the earnings of the
father and of the plaintiff would suffice to enable them to live comfortably. In the household there
is also a young sister of the plaintiff's. The plaintiff proposes to live in her parents' bungalow which

has a sitting-room, kitchen and three bedrooms. She produced a letter (which was admitted by
consent) from her parish priest, testifying to her character. There is a school near the bungalow.
The notice parties have been an exemplary father and mother to the child they have adopted.
The husband is a production controller with a Dublin firm and he earns about 5000 pounds pa and
has pension rights. The plaintiff's child gets on very well with the other adopted child and a district
nurse gave evidence that a definite relationship exists between the plaintiff's child and the other child,
and that a parting of them would be harmful to both. Undoubtedly, for a short time it will; but it is
extremely unlikely that it will cause lasting damage.
The President said that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to the custody of her daughter and
to the control of her upbringing. When he said this he was, very properly, following a passage in the
judgment of this Court in Nicolaou's Case ((1966) IR 567) which appears at p644 of the report.
That case related to the alleged rights of the father of an illegitimate child and so the passage is obiter
and does not bind the members of this Court, at least when they are free of the considerable
handicap of Article 34, s4, subs5, of the Constitution. As it has found favour with some members
of this Court, I think it right to say that I do not agree with it and to give my reasons for doing so.
R v Hopkins ((1806) 7 East 579) and the speech of Lord Herschell in Barnardo v McHugh
((1891) AC 388). The Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland), 1877, provided in s28, subs10,
that in questions relating to the custody and education of infants, the rules of equity should prevail
and these were on the basis that the parents had not got an absolute right to custody but that the
court should decide this issue having regard to the mental, moral and physical welfare of the child
(In re Elliott) ((1893) 32 LR Ir 504) see In re O'Hara ((1900) 2 IR 232) at p241 of the report.
R v Nash ((1883) 10 QBD 454); Barnardo v McHugh (Barnardo v McHugh (1891) AC 388).
In some of the cases, the judges spoke of the "natural" right of the mother of an illegitimate child to
its custody, but in these cases the word "natural" referred to the tie by blood which exists between
mother and child; they were not thinking in terms of the philosophical doctrine of natural law and
natural rights which the Victorian and Edwardian judges and lawyers regarded with contempt. The
final step in the improvement of the legal position of the mother of an illegitimate child was the
enactment of the provisions (See p41, ante) of s6, subs4, and s10 of the Guardianship of Infants
Act, 1964.
While the Constitution deals with the rights of parents of legitimate children and "the natural and
imprescriptible rights" of the child, it says nothing about the custody of legitimate or illegitimate
children. As Article 42 acknowledges that the family is the primary and natural educator of the child
and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their
means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children, it
inferentially gives those who have married and are living together a constitutional right to the
custody of their children. That Article does not do this for the mother of an illegitimate child for she
cannot claim the benefits of Articles 41 and 42 and, in my opinion, is not given a constitutional right
of custody by Article 40, s3, of the Constitution.
The passage at p644 of the report of Nicolaou's Case ((1966) IR 567)- "For the same reason the
mother of an illegitimate child does not come within the ambit of Articles 41 and 42 of the
Constitution. Her natural right to the custody and care of her child, and such other natural personal
rights as she may have (and this Court does not in this case find it necessary to pronounce upon the
extent of such rights), fall to be protected under Article 40, section 3, and are not affected by Article

41 or Article 42 of the Constitution. There is no provision in Article 40 which prohibits or restricts

the surrender, abdication, or transfer of any of the rights guaranteed in that Article by the person
entitled to them." It seems to me that in that passage there is an equation of "natural rights" and
"constitutional rights." I do not accept that there is such a connection, particularly as the word
"natural" is so ambiguous. When used in connection with the relationship of mother and child, it may
mean the link between them formed by the facts that she has conceived the child, that it issues from
her body and is fostered and nurtured by her; or it may mean that the theory of natural law, on
which so much of that part of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights is based, recognises
such a right.
I reserve the question whether she has such a right under the second sense of that word. Counsel
for the notice parties properly conceded that the plaintiff has never abandoned or deserted her child,
and is not unmindful of her parental duties. She was naturally distressed and overwrought after the
birth of her child and she accepted the advice of a nurse that she should give the child for adoption.
She had completely changed her mind by the 11th February, 1978, which was three months after
the birth.
The President said that, if the case were analogous to that arising where parents who have
separated are seeking the custody of a child, he thought the the welfare of the child would be
"marginally" better served by leaving her with the notice parties, but that he was satisfied that the
welfare of the child did not in any sense "overwhelmingly" require that she should remain in the
custody of the notice parties. I do not agree with the argument of counsel for the notice parties that
this finding entitles his clients to succeed in their application to have the plaintiff's consent
dispensed with. It seems to me that it is not in the best interests of the child to allow it to remain
with the notice parties, though they would be wholly admirable in that role. The blood link between
the plaintiff and her child means that an instinctive understanding will exist between them which will
not be there if the child remains with the notice parties. A child's parent is the best person to bring
it up as the affinity between them leads to a love which cannot exist between adoptive parents and
the child. The child is now 12 months old and children of that age are infinitely adaptable.
see s15 of the Act of 1964. Counsel for the notice parties has now informed us that his clients
did not ask for any sum for their expenditure, and that they do not now ask for anything for this.
In my opinion, the President's order of the 19th September, 1978, should be affirmed in all respects.
Since writing this judgment, I have had an opportunity of reading that which has been read by
my colleague, Mr Justice Walsh. There was no adoption order made in this case and so the extremely
difficult question whether the Board are exercising administrativeor judicial powers when they make
an adoption order was not mentioned during the argument. I reserve my opinion on that matter until
it arises and is fully argued in a case before this Court.
PARKE J
I have had the opportunity of reading the judgments already delivered in which the facts and the
constitutional and statutory provisions relative to this appeal have been so fully set out that it is
unnecessary for me to repeat them. Therefore, I address myself at once to the fundamental question
which arises in this appeal, namely, the ascertainment of the rights of the plaintiff in respect of her
illegitimate child. I have no doubt whatever that such rights exist, but it is necessary to consider what
is the nature and origin of such rights.

They do not arise under Article 41 of the Constitution because the family there recognised as
the natural primary and fundamental unit group of society is that which is based upon the institution
of matrimony. In my view, however, they are among the personal rights which the State guarantees
in its laws to defend and vindicate under Article 40, s3, subs1, of the Constitution. The emotional
and physical bonds between a woman and the child which she has borne give to her rights which
spring from the law of nature and which have been recognised at common law long antecedent to the
adoption of the Constitution. An example of the recognition and enforcement of such rights is to be
found in In re O'Hara ((1900) 2 IR 232). In one respect the State has given statutory recognition to
these rights by providing in s6, subs4, of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, that the mother of
an illegitimate infant shall be the guardian of such infant. The right of such a mother to care for and
protect and have custody of her child has been recognised by this Court in The State (Nicolaou) v
An Bord Uchtala ((1966) IR 567).
However, the existence of such a right to custody does not decide the issue in this appeal
because there is a clear difference between an application for custody of an infant under the
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, and the relief which is sought by the notice parties under s3 of
the Adoption Act, 1974; that distinction has been recognised by the learned President in the course
of his judgment.
But before considering this, it is necessary to point out the important distinction which arises
between rights which derive from Article 41 as against those recognised by Article 40. The former
are declared to be "inalienable and imprescriptible," but the personal rights recognised by Article 40,
like other personal rights, are capable of being waived or modified by the person entitled to them
unless such waiver or modification infringes the constitutional rights of some other person.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether on the facts of this case the plaintiff waived or
abandoned her rights by placing the child for adoption. The phrase "placing for adoption" is not
defined by any of the Adoption Acts but, in the context of the procedure involved in, and leading
up to, an adoption order, its meaning seems quite plain. It is the act of handing over custody of the
child so that it may be placed with persons who may subsequently seek and obtain an adoption
order in respect of it.
On the evidence and on the facts found by the learned President there is no doubt that, during
the interview which the plaintiff had with the social worker immediately before she signed a consent
to the placing for adoption, the full implications and legal consequences of what she was doing were
explained to her and that she understood them. In particular she was made aware that, although she
could refuse her consent to an adoption order at any time before such order was made, if she did so
the proposed adoptive parents could apply to the High Court under s3 of the Act of 1974 for an
order dispensing with her consent if the court considered that it would be in the best interest of the
child so to do. In these circumstances I am satisfied that she waived or abandoned her rights so as
to leave the matter to be decided under s3 of the Act of 1974, unless by so doing she infringed or
injured the constitutional rights of her child. The child has personal rights to life, to be fed, to be
protected, reared and educated in a proper way; these rights are recognised by Article 40 of the
Constitution. In my view, a child has no constitutional right to have these obligations discharged by
his or her natural parent and, if there are other persons able and willing to satisfy such requirements,
then a child's constitutional rights are sufficiently defended and vindicated. For these reasons, I
consider the matter fails to be decided under s3 of the Act of 1974.

Because of the view which the learned President took of the mother's constitutional rights he
precluded himself, in effect, from making a finding under that section; but he indicated that, had he
been trying an issue relating to the custody of a child under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964,
he would have awarded custody to the mother. There is, however, a clear distinction between such
proceedings and applications under s3 of the Act of 1974. Custody orders are essentially transitory
and may be (and frequently are) reviewed from time to time to meet changing circumstances. Orders
under s3 of the Act of 1974, on the other hand, are perpetual in effect and it is difficult to imagine
any decision which could affect as profoundly as such an adjudication the life and future of a child
and, indeed, the lives of the mother and the proposed adoptive parents. It may be that this
distinction provides an explanation for the rather puzzling difference between the words "the best
interests of the child" used in s3 of the Act of 1974 and the expression "welfare of the infant" (as
defined) used in the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, because in that context the court is only
concerned with the welfare for the time being of the child. However, this is mere speculation.
Since there is no decision at first instance on the point, I respectfully agree with the Chief Justice
that the matter must be remitted to the High Court to have this issue decided. Like the Chief Justice
I do this with the greatest regret. Any course of action which could bring to an end as speedily as
possible the heartache and anxiety which all the parties must be enduring would be greatly desired,
but it seems to me that is would be beyond the powers of this Court, as an appellate tribunal, to
reach a conclusion on the facts now before us on a matter which is essentially within the province
of a court of first instance.
There is one other matter to which I wish to advert. In the course of his judgment, Mr Justice
Walsh has carried out a detailed analysis of the duties and obligations of the Adoption Board and
of the manner in which it discharges its functions; he has also considered in some detail possible
extensions in the scope and practice of adoption which had been brought about by the amending
Acts and in particular by the Act of 1974. None of these matters were the subject of any
submissions or arguments presented to this Court in the course of the appeal, nor do they appear
to me to be germane to the matters which this Court is now called upon to decide. Therefore, I wish
to say in the most explicit terms that I do not express any views upon such matters.
DISPOSITION:
Appeal disallowed. #LS010509LEuwaltla#_