CARMEN DEL PRADO vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO L.

CABALLERO and LEONARDA CABALLERO

In 1985 a judgment in a cadastral case of the RTC of Cebu, several parcels of land was adjudicated in favor of Spouses
Caballero one of which is lot no. 11909 and in 1987 they had the issuance of the final decree of registration for their lots.
In 1990 lot no. 11909 was sold to petitioner Prado. The deed of sales states that 4,000 sqm more or less with its
boundary particularly described was sold for P40,000. However when the OCT for the said lot was issued in 1990, the
technical description states that it measures about 14,457 square meters, more or less. In 1991 petitioner filed in the
same cadastral proceedings a "Petition for Registration of Document Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1529" and alleged
that the tenor of the instrument of sale indicated that the sale was for a lump sum or cuerpo cierto, in which case, the
vendor was bound to deliver all that was included within said boundaries even when it exceeded the area specified in
the contract. Respondents opposed, on the main ground that only 4,000 sq m of Lot No. 11909 was sold to petitioner.
They claimed that the sale was not for a cuerpo cierto. They moved for the outright dismissal of the petition on grounds
of prescription and lack of jurisdiction. After trial on the merits, the court found that petitioner had established a clear
and positive right to Lot No. 11909. The intended sale between the parties was for a lump sum, since there was no
evidence presented that the property was sold for a price per unit. It was apparent that the subject matter of the sale
was the parcel of land, known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909, and not only a portion thereof. However, CA reversed and set
aside the trial courts decision and new one was entered dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction The "petition for
registration of document" is not one of the remedies provided under P.D. No. 1529, after the original registration has
been effected. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE TRIAL
COURT[;] II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE
SALE OF THE LOT IS FOR A LUMP SUM OR CUERPO CIERTO[;] III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 11 JUNE 1990
EXECUTED BETWEEN HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS[.] In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose
between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price contract or a lump sum contract as stated in Article 1542 where
the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that
distinguishes the determinate object. The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article 1542 is not hard
and fast and admits of an exception. It held:. The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity covers
only a reasonable excess or deficiency. Blacks Law Dictionary defines the phrase "more or less" to mean: The words are
intended to cover slight or unimportant inaccuracies in quantity, and are ordinarily to be interpreted as taking care of
unsubstantial differences or differences of small importance compared to the whole number of items transferred.
Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity. The difference in the area is
obviously sizeable and too substantial to be overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or deficiency that should be
deemed included in the deed of sale. More importantly, we find no reversible error in the decision of the CA. Petitioners
recourse, by filing the petition for registration in the same cadastral case, was improper. It is a fundamental principle in
land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Such indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of
entry of the decree of registration. Inasmuch as the petition for registration of document did not interrupt the running
of the period to file the appropriate petition for review and considering that the prescribed one-year period had long
since expired, the decree of registration, as well as the certificate of title issued in favor of respondents, had become
incontrovertible.

D.B.T. Mar Boy v. Panes

Subject land identified as Lot Plan Psu-123169, is included in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 200519, entered on
July 19, 1974 and issued in favor of B.C. Regalado & Co. which conveyed it through dation en pago to petitioner D.B.T.
which developed and sold it to some of the petitioners. The respondent, however, claimed that he has been in
possession of the property since the second World War and it was only when he was to perfect his title in accordance
with PD 1529 that he discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an overlapping of portions of the
land subject of Ricaredos application, with the subdivision plan which had already been conveyed by B.C. Regalado to
DBT. In essence, respondents alleged that B.C. Regalado and DBT used the derivative titles which covered properties
located far from Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City where the subject property is located, and B.C. Regalado and
DBT then offered the same for sale to the public. Respondents thus submitted that B.C Regalado and DBT through their
deliberate scheme, in collusion with others, used (LRC) Pcs-18345 as shown in the consolidation-subdivision plan to
include the subject property covered by Lot Plan Psu-123169.
1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in the latter's Motion for
Reconsideration?
2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject property?
Our Ruling
An action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must
be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the
issuance of the original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer
certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD constitutes constructive
notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of
registration. However, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when
the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against
him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title,
an action that is imprescriptible.

Albeit the conclusion of the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001, which dismissed respondents' complaint on
grounds of prescription and laches, may have been erroneous, we, nevertheless, resolve the second question in favor of
DBT. It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[53]
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil
Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by
special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case,
proof of possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential. Moreover, it may be stressed that there was
no ample proof that DBT participated in the alleged fraud. There was no clear evidence that DBT participated in the
fraudulent scheme.

MANOTOK vs. BARQUE[1] (G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605; August 24, 2010; VILLARAMA, JR., J.)

FACTS:
Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)
The subject parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.
On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The
certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed under the administration of
the Director of Lands.
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on
June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot No.
823 with an area of 342,945 square meters GRANTED TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.
In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies
of the alleged owners duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the
property.
MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually
involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a
1 parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.
1997 Barques petition was DENIED. Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of the Manotoks.
--> Barques
MR was denied They appealed to the LRA LRA Reversed.
LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be
reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.
The LRA denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the
Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the
subject property.
2002 and 2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title
and to reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and existing TCT No. 210177.
Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004.
December 12, 2005, SC First Division affirmed both decisions of the CA. Manotoks filed MR Denied in April 2006
Resolution.
Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR attached. Denied in June 2006
Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the
meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks
filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments).
Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached
their petition in intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale
Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were
not as old as they were purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended to
the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the state.
Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry of judgment recalled and the CAs
Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside. The En Banc remanded the case to
the CA.
The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to
a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide
WON the title of the Maotoks should be annulled.
CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from the government in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. Notably lacking in the deed of

conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of
the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase
of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since occupied the land, built
their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.
Barques Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on
the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation to protect their
rights.
ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs to the National Government.

RATIO:
From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the DENR-LMB indicate the original
claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain Valentin Manahan, only the Manotoks were able to produce a sale certificate
in the name of their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB Records Management Division. In addition, the
Manotoks submitted photocopies of original documents entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920 and
1923.
Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The
Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured
from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise
lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of Lands.
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act
shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved
by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).

In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204,
sourced from the National Archives, shows on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and above it an even more poorly imprinted
impression of what may be a stamp of the Secretarys approval.

The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RDs task in issuing the TCT in the
Manotok name. The Manotoks contend that we can assume that the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact
approved by the Department Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer
Severino Manotok. FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the
performance of official duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then DENR
Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
in deeds of conveyances over friar lands.
o NO! These arguments fail.

Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State and Liao Cases the absence of approval by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null
and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.
o SC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a MADATORY requirement. Approval of the Secretary
of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate.
Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a deviation from this rule.

DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans, states that some Deeds of
Conveyance on record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretarys signature despite full payment for the

Friar Land. They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the applicant really paid the
purchase price and complied with all the requirements under the Friar Lands Act.
o The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department issuance because it makes reference only
to those deeds of conveyance on file with the records of the DENR field offices. The Manotoks copy of the alleged Deed
of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was sourced from the National Archives.

Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases reservation of its title once
the buyer had fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15[2] of the Friar
Lands Act.

Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however, the new rule Pugeda v. Trias, the
conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the
ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed
upon is not paid for in full.

Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to
the purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as evident from Sections 11[3], 12[4] and the 2nd paragraph of Section 15[5], in relation to Section 18.
CONCLUSIONS
Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them
by the Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources

The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and construction of
buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title
allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did
not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading
to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan,
it simply described the copy presented as DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually
existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner.
o As we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.

RE: MANAHANS No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR,
LMB or National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511
allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show that the
claimant Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or
paid the taxes due thereon.
Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 and Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 511 presented by the Manahans, the CA correctly observed that the claim had become stale after the
lapse of 86 years from the date of its alleged issuance. Citing Liao v. CA the certificates of sale x x x became stale after
10 years from its issuance and hence cannot be the source documents for issuance of title more than 70 years later.

CONCORDIA MEJIA DE LUCAS vs. ANDRES GAMPONIA

G.R. No. L-9335. October 31, 1956

FACTS:
On March 13, 1916, free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land subject of the action in the name of Domingo Mejia.
This patent was transcribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916 and certificate of
title No. 380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia. On March 24, 1916, after the issuance of the patent but before the
registration of the same, patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to Zacarias Ciscar, who immediately took possession
thereof and enjoyed its fruits. Upon his death the property was included in the distribution of his estate and adjudicated
to Roque Sanchez. Roque Sanchez in turn sold the land on January 21, 1940 to Andres Gamponia, defendant herein.
Sanchez was in possession and enjoyment of the land from the time he acquired it by inheritance from Ciscar up to the
time he sold it to defendant Andres Gamponia, the latter has also possessed and enjoyed the property from the time he
bought it to date. Domingo Mejia, upon his death, left no descendants or ascendants and his only surviving kin was his
brother Pedro Mejia. Pedro Mejia is now also dead and is survived by his daughter Concordia Mejia de Lucas, plaintiff
herein. Upon the above facts the court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and void, as the
sale was made only 11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The
Court further held that since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the registered owner could have
been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or his successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez and defendant Andres
Gamponia. The main defense presented in the answer, is that plaintiff's right of action has already prescribed by virtue
of the possession of the land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest for a period of 37 years. This defense was
overruled by the court a quo on the ground that as the land is registered, with a certificate of title in the name of
patentee Domingo Mejia, title thereto may not be acquired by the defendant and his predecessors in interest against
said registered owner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land is subject to prescription
RULING:
We are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the
defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. No hold that the defense of prescription or adverse possession in
derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of
laches. In Go Chi Gun, et al., vs. Co Cho, et al., we held that the equitable defense of laches requires four elements: (1)
conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit,
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit
is not held to be barred. All the four elements mentioned above are present in the case at bar. The first element is
present because on March 24, 1916 Domingo Mejia sold the land which was covered by a free patent title dated March
13, 1916 and said sale or conveyance was made in violation of Section 35 of the Public Land Act. The second element is
also present because from the date of the sale on March 24, 1916 the patentee and vendor Domingo Mejia could have
instituted the action to annul the conveyance and obtain back the possession and ownership of the land, but
notwithstanding the apparent invalidity of the sale, neither patentee nor his successors in interest, his brother, or the
latter's daughter, plaintiff herein, who should have known of the invalidity of the sale because it is a matter of law and
had all the opportunity to institute an action for the annulment of the sale, instituted no suit to annul the sale or to
recover the land for a period of 37 years. Again the defendant and his predecessors in interest, the original vendee and
purchaser Zacarias Ciscar, as well as vendee's successors in interest, Roque Sanchez, and later, Andres Gamponia, never
expected or believed that the original patentee or his successors in interest would bring an action to annul the sale.
These circumstances constitute the third element of laches. The fourth element is also present, not only because
Zacarias Ciscar paid for the land but this same land was divided among the heirs of Zacarias Ciscar in the proceedings for

the settlement of his estate and Roque Sanchez, to whom the land was adjudicated, sold the property for P800 to the
present defendant Andres Gamponia. All of these transfer from Zacarias Ciscar to his heirs, to Roque Sanchez and to
defendant Andres Gamponia, acts which covered a period of 37 years, would all have to be undone and the respective
rights and obligations of the parties affected adjusted, unless the defense is sustained. Add to this the fact that the
original conveyance made by the patentee is not absolutely null and void. The prohibition against the sale of free
patents is for a period of seven years; after that period of time a patentee would be free to dispose of the land. Within
seven years from the conveyance the original patentee could have brought an action to recover back his property. Since
nothing of this sort was done by him, it was certainly natural for the purchase to have assumed that the original
patentee gave up his right to recover back the property and acquiesced in vendee's right and title. The successor in
interest of the original purchaser must also have believed in good faith that the patentee and his successors in interest
were reconciled to the idea of allowing the property to stay in the hands of the successors in interest.