EN BANC

[G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT BOARD, COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG and PETER T.
TABANG, Petitioners, v. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
NCJR, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila and TROADIO TECSON, Respondents.
The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.
Pacifico B. Advincula for Private Respondent.

DECISION

CORTES, J.:

This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), to
investigate and cause the prosecution of petitioner, a retired military officer, for violation of Republic Acts
Nos. 3019 and 1379.
Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order are the orders of respondent
judge in Civil Case No. 57092 Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila: (1) dated June
23, 1989, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Opposition, and (2) dated June 26, 1989, granting
private respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the petition seeks
the annulment of the two orders, the issuance of an injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding
with Civil Case No. 57092 and, finally, the dismissal of the case before the trial court.
The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, dated May 13, 1986,
which created the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board. The Board was created to
"investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active
service." The order further stated that" [t]he Board shall be primarily charged with the task of investigating
cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended)
and shall make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalities
with respect to the action to be taken thereon based on its findings."
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Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful
income, private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the Board to submit his
explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence by October 31, 1987 [Annex "B", Petition].
Private respondent requested, and was granted, several postponements, but was unable to produce his
supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.
Just the same, the Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988,
recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.
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The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case
on the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against
him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having
retired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board
opposed the motion to dismiss.
In a resolution dated February 8, 1989, the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the PCGG in a resolution dated March 8, 1989.
Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence on March

20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.

On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the
Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Case No. 57092 and raffled to Branch
151, respondent judges court. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556.
Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.
On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On June 26, 1989, respondent
judge granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from
investigating or prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Hence, the instant petition.
On August 29, 1989, the Court issued a restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing his
orders dated June 23, 1989 and June 26, 1989 and from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.
Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. A rejoinder to the reply was filed by
private Respondent. The Court gave due course to the petition and the parties filed their memoranda.
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.
The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

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I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER AND INTERFERING WITH THE ORDERS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.
II.
WHETHER, OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1989 ENJOINING
PETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF UNLAWFULLY
ACQUIRED PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19].
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the ruling of the Court in PCGG v. Pea the Board,
being a creation and/or extension of the PCGG, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On the
second issue, petitioner strongly argues that the private respondents case falls within the jurisdiction of the
PCGG.
The pivotal issue is the second one. On this point, private respondents position is as follows:

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1. . . . he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1 , 2 , 14 and 14-A as the alleged
illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance
Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony,
business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no
jurisdiction to investigate him.
If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his legal means, the procedure laid down by Rep. Act
1379 as already pointed out before be applied. And since, he has been separated from the government more
than four years ago, the action against him under Republic Act 1379 has already prescribed.
2. . . . no action can be filed anymore against him now under Republic Act 1379 for recovery of unexplained
wealth for the reason that he has retired more than four years ago.

3. . . . The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board (Annex "A", Petition) is null and void. Nowhere in
Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A is there any authority given to the commission, its chairman and
members, to create Boards or bodies to be invested with powers similar to the powers invested with the
commission .. [Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 117-118].
1. The most important question to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondent may be
investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts
Nos. 3019 and 1379. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent because he is a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. They cite the
PCGGs jurisdiction over
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. [E.O. No. 1, sec. 2.].
Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of Pres.
Marcos. However, what has to be inquired into is whether or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate"
of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG, when he allegedly
unlawfully acquired the properties.
A close reading of E. O. No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the
term "subordinate."
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The Whereas Clauses of E. O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and
abroad.
E.O. No. 2 freezes "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents, or nominees have any interest or participation."
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Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v.
Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and
close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O.
No. 2.
Thus, as stated by the Court in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27,
1987, 150 SCRA 181, 205-206.
The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by Proclamation No. 3 and E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] are
self-evident, these being:
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1) that" (i)ll gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime" ;
a) more particularly, that" (i)ll-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates, . . . located in the Philippines or abroad,
xx (and) business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during . . . (the
Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship;"
b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and properties pertaining to former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly,

through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government of the
Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking
undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines" ;
c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of
stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real
and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world;" and.
2) that certain "business enterprises and properties (were) taken over by the government of the Marcos
Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos." [Footnotes deleted].
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during
the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife. This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under existing general laws and
procedures on the matter. Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt
practices of any public officer. Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any
Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Procedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor General shall file the petition
and prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or city
prosecutor [Ibid].
Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being investigated for unlawfully acquired wealth
under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, and not under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Since private respondent was being investigated by the PCGG through the AFP Anti-Graft Board it would
have been presumed that this was under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A. But the record itself belies this presumption:
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(a) The letter of the chairman of the AFP Anti-Graft Board to private respondent, dated October 16, 1987,
states: "This letter is in connection with the alleged information received by the AFP Anti-Graft Board
indicating your acquisition of wealth beyond legal means of income in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." [Rollo, p. 39].
(b) The Resolution dated June 30, 1988 of the Board categorically states:
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:

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This refers to the case against Col Troadio B. Tecson PC (Ret) for alleged unexplained wealth pursuant to
R.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Act for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 43].
The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by taking advantage of his
office as Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the Boards resolution to link
him or his accumulation of wealth to former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of the PCGG, dated July 28, 1988, is clear:

chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan is the case folder of
COLONEL TROADIO TECSON (Ret) who after preliminary investigation of the case by the Board, found a
prima facie evidence against subject officer for violating Section 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP 195,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as an Act for
the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 46].
Moreover, from the allegations of petitioner in its memorandum, it would appear that private respondent
accumulated his wealth for his own account. Petitioner quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PC
sergeant, to General Fidel Ramos, the material portion of which reads:
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. . . After an official in the military unit received an Allotment Advice the same signed a cash advance
voucher, let us say in the amount of P5,000.00. Without much ado, outright, Col. Tecson paid the amount.
The official concerned was also made to sign the receipt portion on the voucher the amount of which was
left blank. Before the voucher is passed for routine processing by Mrs. Leonor Cagas, clerk of Col. Tecson
and its facilitator, the maneuver began. The amount on the face of the cash advance voucher is altered or
superimposed. The original amount of P5,000.00 was now made say, P95,000.00. So it was actually the
amount of P95,000.00 that appeared on the records. The difference of P90,000.00 went to the syndicate.
. . . Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecsons office took care of the work.
. . . In the liquidation of the altered cash advance amount, names of persons found in the Metropolitan
Manila Telephone Directory with fictitious addresses appeared as recipients or payees. Leonor and Boy got
their shares on commission basis of the looted amount while the greater part went to Col. Tecson. [Rollo,
pp. 184-185.].
Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A.
2. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board and
authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and
in active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private Respondent.
The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are limited. Its task is limited to
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The PCGG cannot, through
an order of its chairman, grant itself additional powers powers not contemplated in its enabling law.
3. Petitioner assails the trial courts cognizance of the petition filed by private Respondent. Particularly,
petitioner argues that the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This matter has already been
settled in Pea, supra, where the Court ruled that those who wish to question or challenge the PCGGs acts
or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction.
The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this
Court. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565].
The ruling in Pea was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, Soriano
III v. Yuson, G.R. No. 74910 (and five other cases), August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC,
NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 478, among others, to enjoin the regional trial
courts from interfering with the actions of the PCGG.
Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil Case
No. 57092 and issued the writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG.
4. Thus, we are confronted with a situation wherein the PCGG acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, hence,
may be enjoined from doing so, but the court that issued the injunction against the PCGG has not been
vested by law with jurisdiction over it and, thus, the injunction issued was null and void.
The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge issuing the writ of preliminary injunction is
therefore in order. Likewise, respondent judge must be enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.
But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private
respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding
with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule
of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted it.
5. The pronouncements made above should not be taken to mean that the PCGGs creation of the AFP AntiGraft Board is a nullity and that the PCGG has no authority to investigate and cause the prosecution of
members and former members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019
and 1379. The PCGG may investigate and cause the prosecution of active and retired members of the AFP
for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 only in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, i.e., insofar as
they involve the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his family and "cronies." But
the PCGG would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, as
in the case at bar. E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A did not envision the PCGG as the investigator and prosecutor
of all unlawful accumulations of wealth. The PCGG was created for a specific and limited purpose, as we

have explained earlier, and necessarily its powers must be construed with this in mind.
6. n his pleadings, private respondent contends that he may no longer be prosecuted because of
prescription. He relies on section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 which provides that" [t]he right to file such petition
[for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth] shall prescribe within four years from the date of resignation,
dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the officer or employee concerned." He retired on May 9,
1984, or more than six (6) years ago. However, it must be pointed out that section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379
should be deemed amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that" [t]he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel."
Considering that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was deemed amended or repealed before the prescriptive
period provided therein had lapsed insofar as private respondent is concerned, we cannot say that he had
already acquired a vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment.
Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten wealth would result in the validation or
legitimization of the unlawful acquisition, a consequence at variance with the clear intent of Rep. Act No.
1379, which provides:
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SEC. 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions
cannot be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect to any property unlawfully acquired
by him.
Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city or provincial prosecutor and the
Solicitor General under sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379, may still investigate the case and file the petition for the
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth against private respondent, now a private citizen. (On the other
hand, as regards respondents for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 who are still in the government
service, the agency granted the power to investigate and prosecute them is the Office of the Ombudsman
[Rep. Act No. 6770]). Under Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195
violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
7. The Court hastens to add that this decision is without prejudice to the prosecution of private respondent
under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other related penal laws.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26, 1989 in Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. 57092. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on August 29, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with
the investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No. 37, without prejudice to his investigation
and prosecution by the appropriate prosecutory agency.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol
VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II,
ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
SUELLO,respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and
similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975)
provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or
possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any
other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to
one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos
at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(2nd paragraph is omitted.)
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate
informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential
Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen
informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay
Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and
strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically
occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to
the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919,
accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended
party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a
portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has
deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for
has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area,
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant,
Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and
Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II
(Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated
December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the
accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should
be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or

tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not
apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy"
the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance
of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the
amended informations be admitted.
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree
does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of
Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The
appeal is devoid of merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because
its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more
particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating
complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of
Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National
Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of
Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing
and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and
District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and
along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without
permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban
communities all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public
and private lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this
illegal and nefarious practice.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and
private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the
relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing
lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any
person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law
provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or
occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture
land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the
provision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public

agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding
applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in
the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force
another to commit such acts.
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to
this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban
communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of
statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato
Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169435

February 27, 2008

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,

CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between
municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the
carrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the Congress can do.1
For Our review on certiorari is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing to a certain
extent that3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that
originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute
between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up "to the boundary
line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao."4 By this extension of Marcos'
eastern boundary, the CA allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.
The Facts
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran,
Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized
as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General
Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte,
united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916.
The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos
Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,
by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the
same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.
Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall be
derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan,
Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not mentioned.
Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a
source of territory of Marcos.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the
mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries
as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary."
It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase refers to the present
adjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a
single province.
Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and
Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695 which was enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14,
1995, the province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of Kalinga and Apayao,
was further converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to R.A. No. 7878.
The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the province of Apayao.
Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is
the present Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary.
On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that the
middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning
was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary,
part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained by it.6
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7 or only on
March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was
entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated
Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP, on
the other hand, required Marcos to submit its position paper.9
In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under R.A.
No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary, respectively, its
eastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary, which was
coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According to Marcos, its eastern
boundary should extend further to the east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant
to the description of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753.10
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut into
two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality must be compact and
contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory but
that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle portion11 of Nueva

Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were
within Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged
that since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an
indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos
must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.12
According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A. No.
3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should
comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.13
From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered to be aligned
and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras. However, based
on a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A.
No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part of Marcos.14 This was
the area of Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its position paper.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its
decision15 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no alternative but to dismiss, as it
hereby DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400
hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent Nueva Era.16
R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of Nueva
Era's barangayswere mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos.17
The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it would encroach upon a
portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:
x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern boundary of Marcos is indeed
Mountain Province, Marcos will then be claiming a portion of Abra because the province,
specifically Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era, is actually bounded on the East by the Province
of Abra. Abra is situated between and separates the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province.
This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should be construed in the light
of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be
given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the
benefits intended.18 (Citations omitted)
The SP further explained:
Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is
important. When the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and literal import of
its words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and reason,
disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed that congress did not intend to
have this absurd situation to be created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This

body, by the mandate given to it by the RA 7160 otherwise known Local Government Code,
so believes that respondent Nueva Era or any portion thereof has been excluded from the
ambit of RA 3753. Under the principle of "espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius," by
expressly naming the barangays that will comprise the town of Marcos, those not mentioned
are deemed excluded. In Republic Act 4354, where Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrios
comprising the City of Davao excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of the said City,
the court held that there arose a prima facie conclusion that the said law abolished Barrio
Central as part of Davao City.
Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the home of our brothers
and sisters belonging to peculiar groups of non-(C)hristian inhabitants with their own rich
customs and traditions and this body takes judicial notice that the inhabitants of Nueva Era
have proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture. With this common ancestral heritage
which unfortunately is absent with Marcos, let it not be disturbed.19 (Emphasis ours and
citations omitted)
RTC Decision
On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision20 of March 19, 2001.
The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC reasoned out in this wise:
The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of R.A. 3753 as regards its
boundary on the East which is the "Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province" should prevail.
On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory that only the barrios of the
Municipality of Dingras as stated in R.A. 3753 should be included in the territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan agreed with the position of
Nueva Era.
xxxx
An examination of the Congressional Records during the deliberations of the R.A. 3753
(House Bill No. 3721) shows the Explanatory Note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez,
2nd District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:
EXPLANATORY NOTE
This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a new municipality to be
known as the Municipality of Marcos, to be comprised by the present barrios of
Capariaan, Biding Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all in the Municipality
of Dingras of the same province. The seat of government will be in the sitio of San
Magro in the present barrio of Ragas.

xxxx
On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be adversely affected too
much because its finances will still be sound and stable. Its capacity to comply with
its obligations, especially to its employees and personnel, will not be diminished nor
its operations paralyzed. On the contrary, economic development in both the mother
and the proposed municipalities will be accelerated.
In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZ
Congressman, 2nd District
Ilocos Norte22
Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte from the barrios (barangays) of the Municipality of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte only. Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add any area beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion
might have been different only if the area being claimed by the Municipality of
Marcos is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras and not the
Municipality of Nueva Era. In such case, the two conflicting provisions may be
harmonized by including such area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Dingras as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Marcos.23 (Emphasis ours)
CA Disposition
Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a petition for review24 of
the RTC decision before the CA. The issues raised by Marcos before the CA were:
1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is within a Government
Forest Reservation in Barangay Sto. Nio, formerly of Nueva Era, is a part of the newly
created Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Nio on the East which is separated from
Nueva Era as a result of the full implementation of the boundaries of the new Municipality of
Marcos belongs also to Marcos or to Nueva Era.25
The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion, where Hercules
Minerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern portion of Nueva Era, which, according to Marcos,
was isolated from Nueva Era in view of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion.
Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be declared as part of its
own territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the middle portion of Nueva Era in view of the
description of Marcos' eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended that it was
entitled to the northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era when
Marcos was created. It posited that such isolation of territory was contrary to law because the law
required that a municipality must have a compact and contiguous territory.26
In a Decision27 dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the following
disposition:

WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions
of both the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Regional Trial Court of Ilocos
Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDEinsofar as they made the eastern boundary of the
municipality of Marcos co-terminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another
is rendered extending the said boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between the
province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same Decisions are AFFIRMEDwith
respect to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the detached northern portion
of barangay Sto. Nio which should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality
of Nueva Era. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and
Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the following explanation:
Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern boundary of Marcos is
only coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras and refused to
extend it up to the boundary line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province
(Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves no room for
equivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:
"On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the
Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and
Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South
by the Padsan River, which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest by the boundary
between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras."
To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern boundary also of Marcos
and refusing to go farther to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province
(Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to amending the law which Congress alone can do. Both the
SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of Congress.
It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any part of Nueva Era and
merge it with Marcos for it is chargeable with conclusive knowledge that when it provided
that the eastern boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision was already Kalinga-Apayao), it
would be cutting through a portion of Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be
applied. Dura lex sed lex!29
The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos and Kalinga-Apayao;
and that Marcos would not encroach upon a portion of Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao,
to wit:
Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of Marcos to the boundary line
between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would mean annexing part of
the municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as Abra is between Ilocos Norte and
Mountain Province is geographically erroneous. From Nueva Era's own map of Region 1,
which also depicts the locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and
Nueva Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province into the provinces of KalingaApayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far to the

south of Kalinga Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain Province, which
is farther south of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur while KalingaApayao is the eastern boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern boundary
of the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra.30
However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva Era was denied. The CA
ruled:
Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio that is separated from its
mother town Nueva Era and now lies east of the municipalities of Solsona and Dingras and
north of Marcos, it bears stressing that it is not included within the area of Marcos as defined
by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio, Marcos is laying claim to it to be
integrated into its territory by the SP because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.
We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the claim, for it will necessarily
substantially alter the north eastern and southern boundaries of Marcos from that defined by
law and unduly enlarge its area. Only Congress can do that. True, the SP may substantially
alter the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction. But this means the alteration of the
boundary of a barangay in relation to another barangaywithin the same municipality for as
long as that will not result in any change in the boundary of that municipality. The area in
dispute therefore remains to be a part of Sto. Nio, a barangay of Nueva Era although
separated by the newly created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local
Government Code which states:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
xxxx
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.31
The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the case
to it. The case, according to the CA, was appealable only to the RTC. Nonetheless, despite its
pronouncement that the case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the same by treating it as
one for certiorari, to wit:
A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of choosing between dismissing
outright the petition at bar or entertaining it. This is for the simple reason that a petition for
review is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the Local Government Code provides
for the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to the Regional Trial Court but not any
further appeal to this Court. Appeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it
is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting authority.
xxxx
By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not explicitly grant the right of
further appeal from decisions of the RTCs in boundary disputes between or among local
government units, Marcos town cannot exercise that right from the adverse decision of the

RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional
issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special
civil action for certiorari.32
Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Issues
Nueva Era now raises the following issues:
a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the Petition for Review on Appeal,
since Sec. 119 of the Local Government Code, which provides that "An appeal to the
Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to the Regional Trial Court,
without further Appeal to the Court of Appeals";
b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, in treating the Petition
for Review On Appeal, filed under Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court, as a Petition
for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that
MARCOS East is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras.
That it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit
(Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and
disintegrating Brgy. Sto.Nio, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, not
Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.33
Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the mode of appeal adopted by
Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary of
Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.
Our Ruling
Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42.
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the
disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.34
The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the SP
judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however,
lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.
The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable to it. It ruled
that no further appeal of the RTC decision may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local
Government Code35 which provides:
SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any
party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the

appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed
area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate court, the case may no
longer be further appealed to it. The CA stated that "(a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be
exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting
authority."36
The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring that: "because of the
transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating
the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari."37
The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.
True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by
law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely because the law allows it.
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A.
No. 7902,38vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under
Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition
for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented
by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such
judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of the creation of a local
government unit is not required.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.40
The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the Court through Justice
Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Aguirre,41 where it was held that:
The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the
sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA
revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of
the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the
boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign
capacity decide on a matter that affects them - direct democracy of the people as opposed to

democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with
the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.42
Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory43 plebiscite requirement for the creation of a
local government unit is applicable to this case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territory
should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.
We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over parts of its territory is not tenable.
However, the reason is not the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions
and the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below.
At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government
unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no
plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived.
Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.44 It is the basic norm that provisions
of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its
retroactive application is so provided.45
In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46 involving the City of Mandaue, the
Court has this to say:
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been
ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the
boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in
character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on June 21, 1969.47 (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).
Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the law that
created it. Its creation was already a fait accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further
require a plebiscite.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only a
prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise,
rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the
absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution.48
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in
R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's
territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to
operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and
natural workings of the human mind.50
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters.51 The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.52
Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration
of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have
been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally.53
Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of
the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only
Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.
Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to
clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.54
Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still
contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries,
a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,
by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the
same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a
portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the
Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to
reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva
Era.
Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its
northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.

We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description
of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and
contiguous territory.
Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is
ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.
The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application.55 We thus
uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.
Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled
by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only
a particular provision thereof, should be considered.56 Every section, provision or clause of the
statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated
by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law,
and every part of the act is to be taken into view.57
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very
purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in many cases involving the construction of
statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the
legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid
such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."58
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus, in construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the
statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.59
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100970 September 2, 1992

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA, respondents.
Aquino and Associates for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary
mandatory injunction to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11,
1991, 1 affirming the decision dated March 20, 1990 of the Insurance Commission 2 in ordering petitioner
Finman General Assurance Corporation to pay private respondent Julia Surposa the proceeds of the
personal accident Insurance policy with interest.

It appears on record that on October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner
Finman General Assurance Corporation under Finman General Teachers Protection Plan Master
Policy No. 2005 and Individual Policy No. 08924 with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa,
and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. 3
While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie Surposa, died on October
18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three (3) unidentified men without
provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin, Winston Surposa, were
waiting for a ride on their way home along Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after attending the
celebration of the "Maskarra Annual Festival."
Thereafter, private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written
notice of claim with the petitioner insurance company which denied said claim contending that
murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.
On February 24, 1989, private respondent filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission which
subsequently rendered a decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:
In the light of the foregoing.we find respondent liable to pay complainant the sum of
P15,000.00 representing the proceeds of the policy with interest. As no evidence was
submitted to prove the claim for mortuary aid in the sum of P1,000.00, the same
cannot be entertained.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to pay complainant
the sum of P15,000.00 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint
until fully satisfied. With costs. 4
On July 11, 1991, the appellate court affirmed said decision.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition alleging grove abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate
court in applying the principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance

policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance
policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate
and intentional act of the assailant in killing the former as indicated by the location of the lone stab
wound on the insured. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the very
nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified.
We do not agree.
The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not
acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary
and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which
happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place
without one's foresight or expectation an event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected.
. . . The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not result from accident
or accidental means within the terms of an accident-policy if it is the natural result of
the insured's voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death
or injury. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some
additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which
produces or brings about the result of injury or death. In other words, where the
death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if
something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the
resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring against death or injury
from accident. 5
As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its decision:
In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the course of
an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of
these crimes. In the first place, the insured and his companion were on their way
home from attending a festival. They were confronted by unidentified persons. The
record is barren of any circumstance showing how the stab wound was inflicted. Nor
can it be pretended that the malefactor aimed at the insured precisely because the
killer wanted to take his life. In any event, while the act may not exempt the unknown
perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the happening was a pure
accident on the part of the victim. The insured died from an event that took place
without his foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect
of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said that where was
a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to danger
considering that he was just going home after attending a festival. 6
Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved herein specifically enumerated only ten
(10) circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company for any injury,
disability or loss suffered by the insured as a result of any of the stimulated causes. The principle of
" expresso unius exclusio alterius" the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing
is therefore applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly
included in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy
cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for,
any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance

company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks leads
inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.
Moreover,
it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance
contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. 7
WHEREFORE, finding no irreversible error in the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, the
petition forcertiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146943

October 4, 2002

SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR
DOMINGUEZ,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC" for brevity) en banc2 dated June 10, 1999 and October 26, 2000. The assailed
Resolutions dismissed the complaint3filed by petitioner Sario Malinias ("Malinias" for brevity) and
Roy S. Pilando ("Pilando" for brevity) for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for
violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 66464 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881.5
The Facts
Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate for congressional
representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections.6
The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of election returns at the second floor of
the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province from May 11, 1998 to May 15, 1998.7
On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department for
violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against
Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was
then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor
Dominguez ("Dominguez" for brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion,
Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz ("Corpuz" for brevity) was then the Provincial Director
of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag ("Tangilag" for
brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan,
Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented them
from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that
policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless
eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds.
In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to
investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged unlawful acts.
"3. That on May 15, 1998 at the site of the canvassing of election returns for congressional and
provincial returns located at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building the public and
particularly the designated representatives/watchers of both affiants were prevented from attending
the canvassing.

xxx
4. That the aforementioned "Mass-affidavits" support our allegations in this affidavit-complaint that
we and our supporters were prevented from attending the provincial canvassing because of the
illegal checkpoint/blockade set-up by policemen in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mt. Province
and as an evidence to these allegations, Certification of the Police Station is hereto attached as
Annex "D" and affidavits of supporters hereto attached as Annex "E", both made an integral part of
this affidavit-complaint; and that said "mass-affidavits" show that the Provincial canvassing were not
made public or (sic) candidates and their representatives/watchers prevented because of barricade,
closure of canvassing rooms, blockade by armed policemen that coerce or threaten the people, the
candidates or their representatives from attending the canvassing;8
In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias and Pilando executed so-called "mass
affidavits" uniformly asserting that private respondents, among others, (1) prevented them from
attending the provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3) threatened the
people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. They likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of
Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and consented to the exclusion of the
public or representatives of other candidates except those of Dominguez.9
Consequently, the COMELEC's Law Department conducted a preliminary investigation during which
only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit.
In their Counter-Affidavit, Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of a checkpoint at
Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province and securing the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building,
to wit:
"3. We admit having ordered the setting up of check points in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan,
Mountain Province; as in fact, this is not the only checkpoint set up in the province. There are other
checkpoints established in other parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun ban and other
pertinent rules issued by the Commission on Election during the election period.
4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol grounds in response to earlier information
that some groups were out to disrupt the canvass proceedings which were being conducted in the
second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building. This is not remote considering that this had happened
in the past elections. In fact, during the canvass proceeding on May 15, 1998 a large group of
individuals identified with no less than affiants-complainants Roy S. Pilando and Sario Malinias was
conducting a rally just in front of the capitol, shouting invectives at certain candidates and their
leaders. This group likewise were holding placards and posted some in front of the capitol building.
x x x"10
After the investigation, in a study dated May 26, 1999, the COMELEC's Law Department
recommended to the COMELEC en banc the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause.11
In a Resolution dated June 10, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint of Malinias
and Pilando for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause against private respondents.
On October 26, 2000, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, Malinias filed the instant petition.
The Comelec's Ruling

In dismissing the complaint against private respondents, the COMELEC ruled as follows:
"As appearing in the Minutes of Provincial Canvass, complainant Roy Pilando was present during
the May 15, 1998 Provincial Canvass. He even participated actively in a discussion with the
members of the Board and the counsel of Congressman Dominguez. The minutes also disclosed
that the lawyers of LAMMP, the watchers, supporters of other candidates and representatives of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines were present at one time or another during the canvass
proceedings. The minutes does not indicate any charges of irregularities inside and within the vicinity
of the canvassing room.
Pursuant to Comelec Res. No. 2968 promulgated on January 7, 1998, checkpoints were established
in the entire country to effectively implement the firearms ban during the election period from
January 11, 1998 to June 10, 1998. In Mountain Province, there were fourteen (14) checkpoints
established by the Philippine National Police way before the start of the campaign period for the May
11, 1998 elections including the subject checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Thus, the checkpoint at Sabangan, Mountain Province was not established as alleged only
upon request of Congressman Dominguez on May 15, 1998 but way before the commencement of
the campaign period. Granting arguendo that the Congressman did make a request for a checkpoint
at Sitio Nacagang, it would be a mere surplusage as the same was already existing.
Furthermore, an alleged text of a radio message requesting advice from the PNP Provincial Director
at Bontoc, Mt. Province was attached to complainants' affidavit-complaint. However, said person by
the name of Mr. Palicos was never presented to affirm the truth of the contents and the signature
appearing therein."12
Finding that Malinias failed to adduce new evidence, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias' Motion for
Reconsideration.13
The Court's Ruling
The sole issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
Malinias and Pilando's complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged
violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881.
We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the tribunal or administrative body must
have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious and despotic manner.
"There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined,
or to act at all in contemplation of law."14
Such is not the situation in the instant case. The COMELEC dismissed properly the complaint of
Malinias and Pilando for insufficient evidence, and committed no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
First, Malinias charged private respondents with alleged violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No.
6646, quoted, as follows:

"Sec. 25.Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass. Any registered political party,
coalition of parties, through their representatives, and any candidate has the right to be present and
to counsel during the canvass of the election returns; Provided, That only one counsel may argue for
each political party or candidate. They shall have the right to examine the returns being canvassed
without touching them, make their observations thereon, and file their challenge in accordance with
the rules and regulations of the Commission. No dilatory action shall be allowed by the board of
canvassers."
In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim that private respondents
denied him his right to be present during the canvassing. There was even no showing that Malinias
was within the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents prevented him
from entering the canvassing room.
As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias, Pilando was present and even participated
actively in the canvassing.15 Malinias failed to show that his rights as a gubernatorial candidate were
prejudiced by the alleged failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing. Malinias claimed that
even though Pilando was present during the canvassing, the latter was only able to enter the room
after eluding the policemen and passing through the rear entrance of the Provincial Capitol
Building.16 This allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and convincing evidence. Pilando
himself, who was purportedly prevented by policemen from entering the canvassing room, failed to
attest to the veracity of this statement rendering the same self-serving and baseless.
In an analogous case where a political candidate's watcher failed to attend the canvass proceedings,
this Court held:
"Another matter which militates against the cause of petitioner is that he has not shown that he
suffered prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to attend the canvassing. Had the watcher
been present, what substantive issues would he have raised? Petitioner does not disclose. Could it
be that even if the watcher was present, the result of the canvassing would have been the same?"
There is therefore no merit in petitioner's claim that respondent Commission on Elections gravely
abused its discretion in issuing its questioned decision. And, as emphatically stated in Sidro v.
Comelec, 102 SCRA 853, this Court has invariably followed the principle that "in the absence of any
jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by the
respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost respect,
xxx." There is justification in this case to reiterate this principle."17
Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the canvassing room only after successfully evading the
policemen surrounding the Provincial Capitol grounds, Pilando could have easily complained of this
alleged unlawful act during the canvass proceedings. He could have immediately reported the matter
to the Provincial Board of Canvassers as a violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646. However,
Pilando opted simply to raise questions on alleged irregularities in the municipal canvassing.18 While
he had the opportunity to protest the alleged intimidation committed by policemen against his
person, it is quite surprising that he never mentioned anything about it to the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents apparently overlooked that R.A. No. 6646 does
not punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election offense. Section 25 merely
highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or candidate during elections, aimed at
providing an effective safeguard against fraud or irregularities in the canvassing of election returns.
Section 2719 of R.A. No. 6646, which specifies the election offenses punishable under this law, does
not include Section 25.

Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right, his supporters were blocked by a checkpoint setup at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province. This allegation is devoid of any basis to merit a
reversal of the COMELEC's ruling. Malinias' supporters who were purportedly blocked by the
checkpoint did not confirm or corroborate this allegation of Malinias.
Moreover, the police established checkpoints in the entire country to implement the firearms ban
during the election period. Clearly, this is in consonance with the constitutionally ordained power of
the COMELEC to deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.20
Second, Malinias maintains that Corpuz and Tangilag entered the canvassing room in blatant
violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881. His sole basis for this allegation is the affidavit of his
supporters who expressly stated that they saw Dominguez and Corpuz (only) enter the canvassing
room.21 Malinias likewise contends that "Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted that they were
inside or at least within the fifty (50) meter radius of the canvassing room as they were able to
mention the names of the persons who were inside the canvassing room in their Counter-Affidavit."22
The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag allegedly violated is quoted as follows:
"Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room. It shall be unlawful for any officer or
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the Philippine Constabulary, or the
Integrated National Police or any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging to an
extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home defense forces,
barangay self-defense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the security or police
organizations or government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities, or
government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries or of any member of a privately
owned or operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence agency performing identical or
similar functions to enter the room where the canvassing of the election returns are held by the
board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty meters from such room: Provided, however, That the
board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems necessary, may make a call in writing for the
detail of policemen or any peace officers for their protection or for the protection of the election
documents and paraphernalia in the possession of the board, or for the maintenance of peace and
order, in which case said policemen or peace officers, who shall be in proper uniform, shall stay
outside the room within a radius of thirty meters near enough to be easily called by the board of
canvassers at any time."
Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While
Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the
canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under Sections
261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for
an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but not
more than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to
order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P.
Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.
"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of
the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit
cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind.
They are predicated upon one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned."23
Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict interpretation in
favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts mentioned in Section 232
are criminally punishable under Sections 26124 and 26225 of B.P. Blg. 881. Since Sections 261 and
262, which lists the election offenses punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict
interpretation means that private respondents cannot be held criminally liable for violation of Section
232.
This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is without any sanction. Though not
a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the
imposition of administrative penalties. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC may recommend to the President the imposition of disciplinary action on any officer or
employee the COMELEC has deputized for violation of its directive, order or decision.26 Also, under
the Revised Administrative Code,27 the COMELEC may recommend to the proper authority the
suspension or removal of any government official or employee found guilty of violation of election
laws or failure to comply with COMELEC orders or rulings.
In addition, a careful examination of the evidence presented by Malinias shows that the same are
insufficient to justify a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Obviously,
the evidence relied upon by Malinias to support his charges consisted mainly of affidavits prepared
by his own supporters. The affidavits of Malinias' own supporters, being self-serving, cannot be
accepted at face value under the circumstances. As this Court has often stated, "reliance should not
be placed on mere affidavits."28
Besides, if Corpuz really entered the canvassing room, then why did Pilando and the representatives
of other candidates, who were inside the room, fail to question this alleged wrongful act during the
canvassing? Malinias' contention that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted they were inside the
canvassing room because they mentioned the names of the persons present during the canvassing
deserves scant consideration as the same is not supported by any evidence.
Finally, Malinias asserts that private respondents should be held liable for allegedly violating Section
261 (i) of B. P. Blg. 881 because the latter engaged in partisan political activity. This provision states:
"Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil
service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense
units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who,
directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity,
except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer."

Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the term "partisan political activity" as an act designed
to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office."29 Malinias
asserts that, in setting up a checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province and
in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and Tangilag unduly interfered with his right to be present
and to counsel during the canvassing. This interference allegedly favored the other candidate.
While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of the checkpoint, they did so to enforce
the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968, among others.30 There
was no clear indication that these police officers, in ordering the setting up of checkpoint, intended to
favor the other candidates. Neither was there proof to show that Corpuz and Tangilag unreasonably
exceeded their authority in implementing the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no basis to rule that
private respondents arbitrarily deprived Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during the
canvassing.
The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their
avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the vicinity of the canvassing site. Thus,
the act is untainted with any color of political activity. There was also no showing that the alleged
closure of the provincial capitol grounds favored the election of the other candidates.
In summary, we find that there is no proof that the COMELEC issued the assailed resolutions with
grave abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has limited power to review findings of fact made
by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute actions for
election offenses.31 Thus, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or
error of law, this Court may not review the factual findings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own
findings on the sufficiency of evidence.32
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public respondent
COMELEC are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 14129

July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiffappellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of
that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the
trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss
holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was
filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in
People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held
that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the
reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a
justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in
any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was
taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil

service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace,"
the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its
operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First
instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other
words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice
of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the
peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this
jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who,
by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422).
According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated
questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even
jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above
conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907,
and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments,
however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown
later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the
Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the
passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587
has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No.
357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved.
Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666,
657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again,
during the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history
of our election law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible
during the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or
Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in
any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty
of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for

a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January
9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or
employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly
election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or
employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a
term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on
August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10,
1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil
service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in
any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by
exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more
than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in
all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a
period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law
provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary
of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take
part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was
effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the

peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded
in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace"
would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion
that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not
intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as
already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which
might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as
indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records
proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No.
180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54
inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any
province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace
since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province"
necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are
municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt
that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the prohibition?
The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers
and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee.
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace
must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has
already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were
merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices
of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites
authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application
to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly
construed against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the
jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts
that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair

warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world
will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and
again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will
frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs.
Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the
policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider
the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford,
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to
deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best
harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3
Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes,
frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative
plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915)
25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute
is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now
within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the
justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the
Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and
justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used
"judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just
one class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special
courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe
the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken
rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in
the Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from
electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First
Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs.
103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and
exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office
the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do

not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to
create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or
executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v.The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No.
237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of
the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the
petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the
provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on
January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already
expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is
that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not
prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to
Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words,
House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it
was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to
contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the
individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376),
a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not
covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy
so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan
politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No.
1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which
expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered
by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known
as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an
intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . .
."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the
purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the
exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio
unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular
persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not
so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so
including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked.
(Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside
and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

G.R. No. L-13160

January 30, 1960

BIENVENIDO NERA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PAULINO GARCIA, Secretary of Health, and TRANQUILINO ELICANO, Director of
Hospitals, respondents-appellants.
Jose Tumanong Guerrero for appellee.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellants.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Respondents are appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated October 30,
1957, ordering them to reinstate petitioner Bienvenido Nera to his former position as clerk in the
Maternity and Children's Hospital, and to pay him his back salary from the date of his suspension
until reinstatement.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Petitioner Nera a civil service eligible, was at the time of his
suspension, serving as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital, a government institution under
the supervision of the Bureau of Hospitals and the Department of Health. In the course of his
employment, he served as manager and cashier of the Maternity Employer's Cooperative
Association, Inc. As such manager and cashier, he was supposed to have under his control funds of
the association. On May 11, 1956, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with
malversation, Criminal Case No. 35447, for allegedly misappropriating the sum of P12,636.21
belonging to the association.
Some months after the filing of the criminal case, one Simplicio Balcos, husband of the suspended
administrative officer and cashier of the Maternity and Children's Hospital, named Gregoria Balcos,
filed an administrative complaint case then pending against him. Acting upon this administrative
complaint and on the basis of the information filed in the criminal case, as well as manager and
cashier of the association, he was liable in the amount of P12,636.21, the executive officer, Antonio
Rodriguez, acting for and in the absence of the Director of Hospitals, required petitioner of the
communication, Exhibit D, why he should not be summarily dismissed from the service for acts
involving dishonesty. This period of seventy-two hours was extended to December 20, 1956. Before
the expiration of the period as extended, that is, on December 19, 1956, Nera received a
communication from respondent Director of Hospital suspending him from office as clerk of the
Maternity and Children's Hospital, effective upon receipt thereof. This suspension carried the
approval of respondent thereof. This suspension carried the approval of respondent Garcia,
Secretary of Health.
The petitioner asked the PCAC to intervene on his behalf, which office recommended to
respondents the lifting of the suspension of petitioner. Upon failure of respondents to follow said
recommendation, petitioner asked respondents for a reconsideration of his suspension, which
request was denied. Petitioner then filed the present special action of prohibition, certiorari and
mandamus to restrain respondents from proceeding with the administrative case against him until
after the termination of the criminal case; to annul the order of suspension dated December 19.,
1956, and to compel respondents to lift the suspension. After hearing of this special civil action, the
appealed decision was illegally suspended, first because the suspension came before he was able
to file his answer to the administrative complaint, thereby depriving him "of his right to a fair hearing
and an opportunity to present his defense, thus violating the due process clause"; also, that
assuming for a moment that petitioner were guilty of malversation or misappropriation of the funds of

the association, nevertheless, said irregularity had no connection with his duly as clerk of the
Maternity and Children's Hospital.
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative
complaint, suffice it say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of
dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and
the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending
his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and he given an opportunity to prove
his innocence.
As to the holding of the trial court about dishonesty or misconduct in office having connection with
one's duties and functions in order to warrant punishment, this involves an interpretation of Section
694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which for purpose of reference we reproduced below:
SEC. 694. Removal or suspension. No officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.
The President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or assistant chief of a bureau or
office and in the absence of special provision, any other officer appointed by him, pending an
investigation of his bureau or office. With the approval of the proper head of department, the
chief of a bureau in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge
against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty. (Emphasis supplied).
It will be observed from the last four lines of the second paragraph that there is a comma after the
words dishonesty and oppression, thereby warranting the conclusion that only the phrase "grave
misconduct or neglect "is qualified by the words "in the performance of duty". In other words,
dishonesty and oppression to warrant punishment or dismissal, need not be committed in the course
of them performance of duty by the person charged.
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the Civil Service Act on 1959, which refers to the
same subject matter of [preventive suspension, throws some light on this seeming ambiguity. We
reproduced said section 34;
SEC. 34. Preventive Suspension. The President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or
assistant chief of a bureau or office and in the absence of special provision, any other officer
appointed by him, pending an investigation of the charges against such officer or pending an
investigation of his bureau or office. With the approval of the proper Head of Department, the chief of
a bureau or office may likewise preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee in his
bureau or under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer, or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or to believe that the performance
of duty, or if there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
would warrant his removal from the service. (Emphasis supplied).
It will be noticed that it introduces a small change into Section 694 of the Revised Penal Code by
placing a comma after the words "grave misconduct," so that the phrase "in the performance or
neglect", as it did under Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, now qualifies only the last
word "neglect", thereby making clear the person charged is guilty merely to neglect, the same must
be in the performance of his duty; but that when he is charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct these need have no relation to the performance of duty. Thus is readily understandable.

If a Government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct,

even if said defects of character are not connected with his force, they affect his right to continue in
office. The Government cannot well tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his
duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample
opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of
the Government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys
and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct,
oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and
actuations. As the Solicitor General well pointed out in his brief, "the private life of an employee
cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer
or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morals of the service."
It may not be amiss to state here that the alleged misappropriation involved in the criminal case is
not entirely disconnected with the office of the petitioner. True, the Maternity Employee's
Cooperative Association that own, the funds said to have been misappropriated is a private entity.
However, as its name implies a, it is an association composd of the employees of the Maternity
Children's Hospital where petitioner was serving as an employee. Moreover, if petitioner was
designated to and occupied the position of manager and cashier of said association, it was because
he was an employee of the Maternity and Children's Hospital. The contention though indirect, and, in
the opinion of some, rather remote, exists and is there.
The trial court cites a cases of Mondano vs. Silvosa 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., [6], 284 Lacson vs.
Roque (92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93), and others to support its holding that an official may not be
suspended for]irregularities not committed in connection with his office.
These cases, however, involve elective officials who stand on ground different from that of an
appointive officer or employee, and whose suspension pending investigation is governed by other
laws. Furthermore, an elective officer, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible only to the
community that elected him. Ordinarily, he is not amendable to rules of official conduct governing
appointive officials, and so, may not be fortwith and summarily suspended, unless his conduct and
acts of irregularity have some connection with his office. Furthermore, an elective official has a
definite term of office, relatively of short duration; naturally, since suspension from his office said
suspension should not be ordered and done unless necessary to prevent further damage or injury to
the office and to the people dealing with said officer.
In view of the conclusion that we have arrived at, we deem it unnecessary to discuss and determine
the other questions raised in the appeal. In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby
reversed, with costs.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia,
Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-8782

April 28, 1956

MARCELINO B. FLORENTINO and LOURDES T. ZANDUETA, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent-appellee.
Marcelino B. Florentino for appellants.
Ramon de los Reyes for appellee.
JUGO, J.:
The petitioners and appellants filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union a petition
for mandamus against respondent and appellee, Philippine National Bank, to compel it to accept the
backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the
Philippines, to pay an indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P6,800 secured by
real estate mortgage on certain properties.
The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which reads as follows:
Parties herein represented by counsel, have agreed on the following facts:
1. That the petitioners are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6,800 plus
interest, the same having been incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2,
1954;.
2. That the said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties;.
3. That the petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No.
1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897
approved on June 20, 1953; and.
4. That on December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank
with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to
accept petitioner's offer to pay the said indebtedness with the latter's backpay certificate;
The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, which provides:
SEC. 2. Section two of the said Act (Republic Act 304) as amended by Republic Act
Numbered Eight hundred, is further amended to read:
SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in
section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Act, and under such rules
and regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file
requests for the recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as provided in section one
hereof, and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state
the total amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be
redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their
issuance without interest: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and
regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness
may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total
salaries or wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided

that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the
applicant may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval
of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to
any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the
Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such
settlement.
The question raised is whether the clause "who may be willing to accept the same for settlement"
refers to all antecedents "the Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the corporations
owned or controlled by the Government, etc.," or only the last antecedent "any citizen of the
Philippines, or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.
The contention of the respondent-appellee, Philippine National Bank is that said qualifying clause
refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last
antecedent.
Incidentally, it may be stated that one of the purposes of Republic Act No. 879 was to include
veterans of the Philippine Army and their wives or orphans among the beneficiaries of the Backpay
Law, Republic Act No. 304, in recognition of their great sacrifices in the resistance movement. as
shown by the following quotation from the Congressional Record:
. . . This particular bill, House Bill No. 1228, has been filed by this public servant for three
objectives: First, to serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or
disabled veterans, and to their wives or orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the
sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those who have given their all
for the cause of the last war. And thirdly, to eliminate the discrimination that has been
committed either through oversight, or on purpose, against the members of the Philippine
Army, the Philippine Scouts, and guerrillas or the so-called civilian volunteers, who joined the
resistance movement. (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session,
May 6, 1953, page 74; quoted in Appellant's brief, pages 13-14.).
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the
Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should
be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said
phrase from the preceding ones.
But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the appellee, still there are cogent
and powerful reasons why the qualifying clause should be limited to the last antecedent. In the first
place, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or
corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would
render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional, for it would amount to an impairment of
the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note
payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal
one.
The other reason is found in the Congressional Record, which says:
Mr. TIBLE: On page 4, lines 17, between the words "this" and "act", insert the word
"amendatory".
Mr. ZOSA: What is the purpose of the amendment?.

Mr. TIBLE: The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the provision of section 2. I believe,
gentleman from Cebu, that section 2, as amended in this amendatory bill permits the use of
backpay certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government.
(Congressional Record No. 64, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session May 11, 1953 page 41;
quoted in Appellants brief, p. 15.).
As there would have been no need to permit by law the use of backpay certificates in payment of
debts to private persons, if they are willing to accept them, the permission necessarily refers to the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies or other instrumentalities, etc.
Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the
Philippine Government, who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have already received
their backpay certificates and used them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and
its entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304.
The case of Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil., 608 (July 11, 1952), is different
from the present one. In the Diokno case, his debt to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was
incurred on January 27, 1950. He brought the action on November 10, 1950, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 304 (section 2), which was approved on June 18, 1948; that is, one year and
almost eight months before Diokno could not avail himself of the provisions of section 2 of Act No.
304, because said section provides that the application for recognition of backpay must have been
filed within one year after the approval of said Act No. 304, and the debt must be subsisting at the
time of said approval, Diokno having incurred the debt on January 27, 1950, and brought action on
November 10, 1950. It was, therefore, discretionary in the Diokno case for the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation to accept or not his backpay certificate in payment.
The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, held that the phrase "who may be
willing to accept the same for such settlement" qualifies only its immediate antecedent and does not
apply to the Government or its agencies.
The appellee asserts in his brief that the Secretary of Justice, in his letter of June 19, 1953,
remarked that the clause "who may be willing to accept such settlement" refers to all antecedents,
including the Government and its agencies. We are not impressed with this observation of the
Secretary, for we believe that his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, correct for the reasons we have
stated above.
In the present case, Marcelino B. Florentino incurred his debt to the Philippine National Bank on
January 2, 1953; hence, the obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was
approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of
the Amendatory Act No. 897.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellee is ordered to
accept the backpay certificate above mentioned of the appellant, Marcelino B. Florentino, in payment
of his above cited debt to the appellee, without interest from December 27, 1953, the date when he
offered said backpay certificate in payment. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is ordered.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA
PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A.
AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH
SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru
his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO
VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement
exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive
his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out,
though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they
were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito
Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The
victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as
the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of
earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees . 3On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved . 4

In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held
that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester
had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the
defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13,
1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the
implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.

The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents. The
private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of
submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had
already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important
because of an earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at
least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio
Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later
returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking any further action . 6 As Gumban
was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners
contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would
not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is
no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.

Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it
happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this
article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision,
to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be
briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.

In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy
Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade,
the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in
the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless
imprudence. In the separate civil action flied against them, his father was held solidarily liable with
him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the
15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the
school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of
arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred,
dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable Liability under this
rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in
particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads"
and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate
with a razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the
parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court
declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued that the school was not liable
because it was not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not
been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents." Justice

J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision
promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a
classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer
who was already of age was not boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in
charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious
act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and
the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed
to have been set aside by the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed,
in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the provision
since they were equally in the custody of the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three
others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the
rule should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only
in loco parentis.

In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case
but added that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await another case
wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded
and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the
question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not
schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical
in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon
ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads
of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde
where he said in part:

I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of
arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vice over their pupils?
It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of
watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons, so
long as they are in a position to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In
my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades"
used in Art.1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The phrase is only an updated version
of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil
Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of
Art. 1903 in someculpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to
have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the
parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not
the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the
child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools
insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the
teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school
where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would
make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any
student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would
attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the
head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the nonacademic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any
plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for
increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or
its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school
where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply
showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held
liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held
liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or
non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability
only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts
and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old
schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the
school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching

his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant control,
supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his
students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly
dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious
relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the
students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the
schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding
diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however,
remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to
its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation
subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when
the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents
and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to
repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school
authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the control and under the influence of the
school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that
such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending
upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of
registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises.
In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under
the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet
begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the
start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and thus placed
himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes
notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course,
such as submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the
student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released
altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility
of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying
the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the
discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students'
torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their
custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative
superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are
assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a

position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers
more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the
school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head
thereof under the general principle ofrespondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from
liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of abonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that
he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate
himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is
acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age.
Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by
the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc
Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer
was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting
opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the
increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting injuries in the
school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due
diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or
omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the
appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules
and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these
measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher
physically enforce those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it
has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him
directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they are in the school
premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect
from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over
the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child
because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that
such dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's
influence, besides being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of
the students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child than

the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed
by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is
already of age and therefore less tractable than the minor then there should all the more be
justification to require from the school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove
reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the
student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control,
there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of
the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to
submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As
previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the
school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school
authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of
them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general
authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was.
The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics
report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-incharge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to
school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the
teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not
been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable
especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from
one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not
been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for
the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have

been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles
herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on
Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their
son under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the
material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161 January 21, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete
and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Constancio S. Vitug for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:

1wph1. t

This is an appeal of defendant Teodoro Tamani y Marinay from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela, (a) sentencing him to "life imprisonment" for the murder of Jose
Siyang and ordering him to indemnify the victim's heirs in the sum of P6,000 and (b) further
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor for the
attempted murder of Eduardo Domingo and ordering him to indemnify the victim in the sum
of P2,000 (Crim. Cases Nos. II-192 and II-198).
Issue as to dismissal of the appeal.After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor
General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was
forty-seven days late. Appellant's counsel de oficio did not oppose the motion. Action
thereon was "deferred until this case is considered on the merits". (Resolution of March 7,
1967). The motion to dismiss is reiterated in appellee's brief. That preliminary question
should first be resolved.
The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was promulgated on February 14,
1963. A copy thereof was served on his counsel on February 25, 1963. On March 1, 1963 he
filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. A copy of the order of denial was served by
registered mail on July 13, 1963 on defendant's counsel through his wife. He had eleven days
or up to July 24, 1963 within which to appeal (if the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal
should be computed from the date of notification and not from the date of promulgation of
the decision). He filed his notice of appeal only on September 10, 1963 or forty eight days
from July 24th.
Silvestre B. Bello, defendant's counsel, filed a sworn statement, accompanying the notice of
appeal. In that affidavit, he stated that the trial court's order, denying his motion for
reconsideration, although admittedly received by his wife on July 13th, was never brought to
his attention and that he came to know of the order only on September 7th when he verified
the expediente of the case and discovered that an order of denial had been issued. He
averred that his wife must have lost the envelope containing the order.
The trial court opined that the wife's affidavit should have been submitted and that the
defendant should have filed a motion praying that the tardy appeal be given due course.
After considering the gravity of the two penalties imposed on the accused and the earnest
plea of defense counsel, the trial court gave due course to the appeal without prejudice to the

right of the Solicitor General to "raise the question of jurisdiction on the ground of a very
much belated appeal".
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6.When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for
new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the defendant or his attorney.
The word "must" in section 6 is synonymous with "ought". It connotes compulsion or
mandatoriness. The clear terms of section 6 leave no room for doubt that the appeal should
be effected within fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment.
The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so understood that import of section 6 (which is
confirmed by the practice in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that his motion for
reconsideration was filed on March 1st, which was the fifteenth or last day of the
reglementary period.
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a
copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not
well-taken. The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to
"judgment" (see section 6 of Rule 120), while the word "notice" should be construed as
referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis:
"referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let
each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively" (76 C. J. S.
175).
Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by
registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to
file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. That construction is an application by analogy
or in a suppletory character of the rule governing appeals in civil cases which is embodied in
section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late. A
regoristic application of section 6 justifies the dismissal of his appeal, as prayed for by the
prosecution.
However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of
his counsel's inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted, the
Court has resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice
(Cf. Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 135, 2 L. ed. 60, where Chief Justice Marshall discussed
the merits of a mandamus action although the Court held that it had no power to issue that
writ).
Uncontroverted facts.There is no dispute that sometime after twilight on the night of June
11, 1953 in the place called Centro at the commercial street of Angadanan, Isabela, Jose
Siyang (Syang), the town assistant sanitary inspector, was mortally wounded by gunfire.
Death resulted from internal hemorrhage caused by the following four (4) through and
through gunshot wounds which followed an oblique direction from the point of entry to exit:

1. Entry, chest about 2- inches from level of the nipple. Exit, at the back level
of twelfth dorsal vertebrae to the right side.
2. Entry, above right clavicle (suprasternal notch) middle portion. Exit, at the
back at the level of the right angle of scapula.
3. Entry, anterior aspect of left shoulder. Exit, at the back of shoulder about 2 inches from tip of armpit (left side).
4. Entry, anterior aspect of right forearm middle in slight oblique direction from
the point of entry to exit. (Exh. F. Certificate issued by Pablo H. Gaffud, M.D.).
By means of the same gunfire, an attempt was made to kill Mayor Eduardo Domingo. He
sustained a through and through wound in the palm of his right hand which caused his
confinement in the Isabela Provincial Hospital from June 11 to 22, 1953 (Exh. E, Certificate
issued by J. L. Maddela, Sr., Resident Physician).
More than three years from the time that tragedy transpired, or on October 2 and 3, 1956,
appellant Tamani signed and thumbmarked two sworn statements before the agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), wherein he confessed that he was the one who shot
Siyang and Mayor Domingo; that his companion on the occasion of the shooting was
Domingo Cadawan; that on the morning of June 11, 1953 he and Cadawan were dismissed as
policemen and that Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los
Santos instigated him to liquidate Mayor Domingo (Exh. A and B). The two statements are in
English, a language which Tamani understands (19 tsn II Valencia).
Inasmuch as the crimes, murder and attempted murder, have been proven, meaning that
the corpus delicti had been established, and appellant Tamani had confessed having
committed the same, there should be an airtight case against him. Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 3.Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (Same as See.
96, Rule 123, 1940 Rules of Court).
Tamani's confession is corroborated by the undisputed evidence of the corpus delicti.
However, during the trial, he repudiated his confession. He assailed its voluntariness. He set
up the defense of alibi. Through his principal witness, Francisco Siyang, the father of the
deceased Jose Siyang, he endeavored to prove that the latter was shot by Policemen Gaspar
Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng. Thus, a simple case, where the extrajudicial confession is
corroborated by evidence of thecorpus delicti, became controversial, complicated and
perplexing.
Version of the prosecution.In addition to Tamani's extrajudicial confession (Exh.A and B),
the prosecution offered the testimonies of complainant Domingo, Doctor Pablo H. Gaffud,
Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra, Emiteria Ibarra, Ilustre D. Mendoza, Mariano G. Almeda, Teodoro
Colobong and Martin Caniero.

The prosecution's evidence discloses that Domingo was the mayor of Angadanan since 1947.
Prior to June 11, 1953, he was suspended from office by the Governor. During Domingo's
suspension, Villamor Tamani, the vice-mayor, functioned as acting mayor. He appointed as
policeman his second cousin, appellant Teodoro Tamani who was then twenty-four years old.
The vice-mayor used to appoint Teodoro Tamani as policeman whenever Domingo was
suspended. Teodoro Tamani resigned as policeman shortly before June 11th. In the
afternoon of June 10th, Domingo was reinstated and he reassumed the office of mayor.
The reinstatement of Domingo was obviously resented by Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani
because it meant the termination of his tenure as acting mayor. On June 10th Teodoro
Tamani and Domingo Cadawan (also a former policeman like Teodoro Tamani) were
summoned for a conference by the vice-mayor to his house at Barrio Aniog, Angadanan.
Present at the conference were the vice-mayor and his men, Matias de la Fuente and Rufino
de los Santos. It was decided at that meeting that Mayor Domingo should be liquidated. De la
Fuente handed to Teodoro Tamani a carbine.
Appellant Tamani and Cadawan spent the night in the vice-mayor's house. On the following
morning of June 11th, Cadawan was sent on a mission to the poblacion of Angadanan to
ascertain the whereabouts of the quarry, Mayor Domingo. At around seven o'clock in the
evening, Cadawan returned to the vice-mayor's house and apprised appellant Tamani that
Domingo was in front of the store of Pedro Pua at the town's commercial street.
Cadawan and Teodoro Tamani proceeded with dispatch to the poblacion, making shortcuts
by passing through the yards of neighboring houses. Tamani carried the carbine. On entering
the yard of the house adjoining Pedro Pua's store, Cadawan stumbled. The resulting noise
attracted the attention of the owner of the house, Mrs. Ibarra, who focused a flashlight at
Tamani and, on recognizing him, uttered his nickname, Doro. She had known Doro since
childhood. She saw that he was carrying a gun.
She had just taken her supper. She and her daughter, Emiteria Ibarra, were sitting on the
veranda. It was while chewing her buyo that Mrs. Ibarra heard somebody trip in her yard on
the cement floor intended as the base of a tank. Almost simultaneously, she heard the
grunting (ngik-ngik) of her pig. When she trained her flashlight on the intruder and
recognized Doro (appellant Tamani) with a gun and called him, the latter answered, "Tia"
(Aunt).
Mrs. Ibarra saw that Teodoro Tamani passed under the eaves of her house, crossed the
bamboo fence separating her from the vacant lot of Pedro Pua and proceeded to the corner
of the vacant lot near the gate of galvanized iron sheets and the edge of the cemented
pavement which was in front of Pedro Pua's store (see sketch, Exh. C). As appellant Tamani
passed the fence, he produced a "cracking noise". Emiteria Ibarra testified:
Q. Who say (saw) Teodoro Tamani? A. My mother and myself,
sir.
Q. What was the appearance of Teodoro Tamani when you saw
him after your mother lighted him with the light of the flashlight?
A. When my mother flashed the flashlight towards him at the
same time my mother called, "Doro" and then he answered "TIA"
and he was carrying a firearm, sir.

Q. Why do you know that when you and your mother heard the
cracking of the fence Teodoro Tamani went inside the fence?
A. We know it because of the cracking of the fence, besides that
we saw him proceeded towards the fence, sir.
Q. After Teodoro Tamani entered that fence as you say, what
happened, if any? A. He proceeded towards the gate of the
Chinese, sir.
Q. What happened, if any, after Teodoro Tamani went to that
gate? A. Upon arriving at the gate we heard the gun reports,
sir.
Q. How many gun reports, if you remember? A. Maybe eight
(8) or nine (9), sir.
Q. Do you know where the gun reports came from? A. Yes,
sir, because I saw the sparks of the bullets when they were fired,
sir.
Q. Did you know who fired? A. I know, sir.
Q. Who? A. Teodoro Tamani, because he was the only one
who entered with a gun, sir (74-75 tsn Jan. 16, 1959).
Q. Who fired? A. Teodoro Tamani, sir.
Q. Why do you say that he was the one who fired? A. Because
the gun reports came from the place where he stood at the gate,
sir (77 tsn Jan. 16, 1959).
From the place where Cadawan and Tamani had positioned themselves, they had a good
view, through the holes of the gate, of Mayor Domingo and his group in front of Pua's store
(Exh. A). The mayor was engaged in conversation with a group of persons on the cemented
pavement ( pasillo of sidewalk) in the front of the store in Centro at the town's commercial
street. Standing near the wall of the store were Hermoso Alicam, Liberato Tanam, Primitivo
Tallog, Martin Caniero, Toedoro Colobong, Gaspar Ibarra, Francisco Siyang and Gonzalo
Siyang. Mayor Domingo was standing in front of the group, walking and gesticulating as he
talked. Jose Siyang was leaning against a post somewhat apart from the group (Exh. C, 6 tsn
March 3, 1959).
Mayor Domingo was recounting his experience in Manila during his suspension. He was
standing on the culvert which bridged the canal separating the pasillo and the street (See
Exh. C). As he talked, he gestured and swung his hands up and down with palms open,
facing Pua's store and his audience. Jose Siyang, who was apart from the group of listeners,
was about two to three meters on Mayor Domingo's right, leaning one of the post which
supported the roof shading the pasillo or cemented pavement. Jose Siyang was in line with
Mayor Domingo while, in contrast, the group of listeners was standing side by side close to
the galvanized iron wall of the store, facing Mayor Domingo who was telling stories.

In the meanwhile, Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan were standing on the vacant lot in close
proximity to the gate of galvanized iron sheets where the pasillo ended. Cadawan opened a
hole in the gate, about three inches in diameter, through which Teodoro Tamani inserted the
barrel of the carbine. Tamani fired at Mayor Domingo who was the target. Jose Siyang, a
second cousin of Teodoro Tamani, like Vice-Mayor Tamani, "was farther on the right side of
Mayor Domingo along the line of fire" (Exh. A). Appellant Tamani fired two volleys. Mrs. Ibarra
and her daughter saw from the veranda the flashes of fire emitted by the carbine of Teodoro
Tamani. They left the veranda and went inside the house.
<re||an1w>

At the moment the first volley of gunshots was fired, which was between seven and seventhirty, Mayor Domingo had raised his right hand. The palm of his right hand was hit. Jose
Siyang was also hit. Domingo and his listeners dispersed and sought refuge inside Pua's
store. While Domingo ran for cover, a second volley was fired. The volley's came from behind
the iron gate on the vacant lot or "from the southwest end" of the cemented pavement behind
the gate. While inside the store, Mayor Domingo heard the moaning of someone in an agony
of pain. That person turned out to be Jose Siyang who had sustained four gunshot wounds
and was hovering between life and death. Siyang died before eleven o'clock that same night.
Constabulary soldiers and peace officers arrived at the scene of the shooting and conducted
an investigation. Mayor Domingo was taken to the provincial hospital. Doctor Gaffud
conducted an autopsy on the body of Jose Siyang in the municipal building. On the following
day empty shells were found by the Constabulary soldiers near the galvanized iron gate (6
tsn. III Calixto).
Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan left the scene of the shooting. They ran, passing the same
route that they had taken in coming, and went direct to the house of Vice-Mayor Villamor
Tamani in Barrio Aniog. Teodoro Tamani stayed overnight in the house of the vice-mayor.
Cadawan, who reported to the vice-mayor that Mayor Domingo was dead, proceeded to
Barrio Clakcab and returned the murder weapon to Matias de la Fuente.
The trial court accepted the foregoing version as the basis of the judgment of conviction. It
noted that in 1956 when NBI Agent Mariano G. Almeda arranged a confrontation between
Teodoro Tamani and Mrs. Ibarra, she identified him as the person whom she saw in her yard
in the evening of June 11, 1953. During the confrontation, Tamani trembled, became pale and
remained silent.
Teodoro Tamani sometime after the shooting went into hiding at Cabagan and Santo Tomas,
Isabela, where he was arrested by Mayor Domingo by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued in
Criminal Cases Nos. 245 and 246 of the justice of the peace court of Angadanan (Exh. 3, 4, 5
and 6, 11 tsn March 3, 1959). Appellant went into hiding although his wife was about to
deliver her baby.
As to the motive for shooting Mayor Domingo, Teodoro Tamani explained that Vice-Mayor
Villamor Tamani, his second cousin, ordered the liquidation of the mayor so that he could not
assume office and the vice-mayor would become mayor (Exh. A). Appellant Tamani was
chosen to execute that task because he had lost his job as policeman when Mayor Domingo
was reinstated (Exh. A, p. 2).
On the other hand, Mayor Domingo said that when Teodoro Tamani was still a policeman, the
mayor had scolded him for not reporting for work and for working as cook of Vice-Mayor
Villamor Tamani and plowing his field. The other motive was that since Teodoro Tamani is a
relative of the vice-mayor, who was a "political enemy" of the mayor, he (appellant Tamani)

could act as a policeman when the vice-mayor became mayor after the elimination of the
incumbent mayor (11 tsn March 3, 1959).
On the credibility of the prosecution eyewitness, Mrs. Ibarra, the trial judge made the
following findings:
The Court concentrated attention on the attitude and observed the gestures,
features, demeanor and manner of testifying and the emphasis, gestures and
inflection of the voice of prosecution witness Juana Vitorri de Ibarra during all
the time she was on the witness stand in the direct and cross-examination, and
her answers were prompt, concise, responsive to interrogatories, outspoken,
and entirely devoid of evasion or any semblance of shuffling, and her entire
testimony was given with calm, self-possession, an erect front, and
unhesitating accent. The Court is convinced of her sincerity and credibility and
the truthfulness of her testimony, in great contrast with defendant's manner of
testifying. (pp. 859-60, Record).
The trial court concluded that the intended victim was Mayor Domingo and not Jose Siyang.
Appellant's version and contentions.In this appeal appellant's counsel de oficio argues that
the trial court erred (1) in disbelieving Tamani's alibi; (2) in assuming that his extrajudicial
confession was voluntary; (3) in not giving credence to the testimony of defense witness
Francisco Siyang, that his son, Jose Siyang, was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and
Melchor Tumaneng; (4) in giving credence to circumstantial evidence, and (5) in the
alternative, in not holding that appellant Tamani committed the complex crime of homicide
with lesiones grave.
Appellant Tamani, having abjured his confession, gave the following version of the case by
means of his testimony and the testimony of his other witness, Francisco Siyang(Syang):
Francisco Siyang was the father of Jose Siyang, the town sanitary inspector, who with his
wife and four children, resided with Francisco Siyang at his house in Centro, Angadanan.
Francisco Siyang is an uncle of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani. At around six-thirty in the
evening of June 11, 1953 Venancio Respicio dropped at the house of Jose Siyang and invited
him for a walk. Francisco Siyang followed his son to the store of Pedro Pua which was
around four blocks from their house.
Francisco Siyang noticed that Jose Siyang was in front of Pua's store with Mayor Domingo,
Policemen Alfonso Gomez, Gaspar Ibarra, Graciano Manguelod and Melchor Tumaneng,
teachers Primitivo Tallog, Teodoro Colobong and Martin Caniero, Mariano Dalodad (a barber)
and Juaning Aliangan, a farmer. Jose Siyang was leaning against a post, obliquely at the
right of Mayor Domingo. Francisco Siyang allegedly approached Jose and told him that his
wife and children were waiting for him so that they could take supper. Jose answered "yes,
father".
While Francisco Siyang and Jose Siyang were standing side by side in front of Pua's store,
Mayor Domingo made a signal by stretching and raising his hand with open palm and
bringing it down. Suddenly, Policeman Ibarra, who was standing in front of Jose Siyang, fired
his carbine at the latter, hitting Jose Siyang in the chest. Policeman Tumaneng followed by
firing with his carbine successive shots at Jose Siyang, hitting the latter in the breast.
Tumaneng was on the right side of Ibarra, obliquely facing Jose Siyang.

After Jose Siyang fell, Francisco Siyang went to his succor and raised him. Jose Siyang told
his father: "Father, I am dying, my children." When Jose Siyang was brought to the municipal
building, he was breathing feebly. He could not talk anymore. He expired in the municipal
building. His body was brought home by Francisco Siyang.
In the morning of June 12th, Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani with some Constabulary soldiers
arrived at the house of Francisco Siyang while the remains of Jose Siyang still lay in state.
After the burial of Jose Siyang in the afternoon, a Constabulary sergeant investigated
Francisco Siyang and took him to Ilagan, where he was further investigated. He gave a sworn
statement accusing Ibarra and Tumaneng of having killed Jose Siyang (Exh. 1).
On the basis of that statement, a criminal complaint for the murder of Jose Siyang was filed
on June 20, 1953 by Constabulary Lieutenant Tomas P. Gonzales in the justice of the peace
court of Angadanan against Venancio Respicio and Policemen Ibarra, Tumaneng and
Manguelod (Exh. 2, Crim. Case No. 244). The complaint was dismissed on August 12, 1953.
Other complaints for the murder of Jose Siyang and for frustrated murder perpetrated on
Mayor Domingo were filed in the justice of the peace court against Villamor Tamani, Teodoro
Tamani, Domingo Cadawan, Rufino de los Santos and Matias de la Fuente but they were later
dismiss (Exh. 3 to 6, Crim. Cases Nos. 245 and 246).
In October, 1956 Mariano G. Almeda of the NBI headed a team of agents that investigated the
shooting of Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. Francisco Siyang was investigated orally in
Ilagan by Almeda. The investigation was interrupted by former Congressman Samuel Reyes.
It was not finished.
Appellant Tamani, in support of his alibi, testified that Jose Siyang was his second cousin.
Tamani was a resident of Centro in the poblacion of Angadanan. At around three o'clock in
the afternoon of June 11, 1953 he was in the house of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in Barrio
Aniog. He wanted a recommendation for a job in the Angadanan Sawmill. The place known as
Centro in the poblacion, where Pedro Pua's store is located, is around two kilometers from
Barrio Aniog. Vice-Mayor Tamani gave to Teodoro Tamani the recommendation between four
and five o'clock. The vice-mayor prevailed upon Teodoro Tamani to stay and they agreed to
go to town on the following day.
So, Teodoro Tamani slept in the house of his cousin, the vice-mayor, on the night of June
11th. On the morning of June 12th, Vice-Mayor Tamani and Teodoro Tamani went together to
Centro in thepoblacion. When they reached Centro, they learned of Jose Siyang's death, for
which reason they viewed his body in the house of Francisco Siyang. They arrived at
Siyang's house at around eight and eight-thirty in the morning. They learned that Jose Siyang
was shot in front of Pedro Pua's store.
Teodoro Tamani did not go to the Angadanan Sawmill on June 12th. He delivered the letter of
recommendation on June 13th to the manager of the sawmill. He worked in the sawmill as
laborer for two weeks only. He resigned due to the heavy work. He could not remember the
name of the manager of the sawmill.
He denied that he shot Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. He did not participate in the
commission of the crime. He said that he was in the house of Vice-Mayor Tamani on the night
of June 11th.

On October 2, 1956 NBI Agent Almeda picked him up from his house for questioning in
connection with the shooting of Siyang and Mayor Domingo. Almeda was accompanied by
Alfonso Salvador, a Constabulary soldier. Tamani was brought to the municipal building.
From there, he was taken to Ilagan. He was brought by Almeda to the provincial jail at
Calamagui, Isabela, where he (Tamani) was delivered to Pedro Tamayo, a prisoner who was
acted as mayor of the cell (brigada). Tamani was formally received by the provincial guard
from Almeda at around six and six-thirty in the evening of October 2nd.
Upon delivering Tamani to Tamayo, Almeda allegedly told Tamayo: "Bahala kayo rian,
Tamayo, at ako ang bahala sa iyo". Twenty minutes later, Pedro Tamayo, Juanito Dassig,
Juan Pecano, Ernesto Castaeda and other convicts started maltreating Tamani. The alleged
maltreatment consisted of the following:
First, they ordered Tamani to squat on the cemented floor inside the cell
(brigada).
Second, after squatting on the cement floor, they ordered Tamani to stand and
then started boxing him for one hour.
Third, they removed all his clothings and put Tamani inside a drum where
prisoners dropped their human waste. He was required to stay inside the drum
for five minutes, after which they brought him out and poured on him water to
was his body from the human waste.
Fourth, they made Tamani pulverized pepper and they placed the pulverized
pepper in his anus, penis and testicles.
Tamani was maltreated because the tormentors wanted him to admit that he was the one who
shot Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. As he could not endure the maltreatment he admitted
he had shot Siyang and Domingo. The maltreatment was stopped after he made the
admission.
Around ten to ten-thirty on that same night, Almeda returned to the jail and asked Tamayo:
"Does he admit now?" Tamayo answered in the affirmative. Almeda then took Tamani out of
the jail and brought him to the second floor of Puring's Restaurant. Almeda called for NBI
Agent No. 101 who came out of a room with a typewriter. Agent No. 101 placed his typewriter
on a table. Almeda told Tamani "Now, I am going to take your statement that you shot Jose
Siyang and Mayor Domingo."
At first Tamani told Almeda that he knew nothing about the shooting because he was in
Barrio Aniog when Domingo and Siyang were shot. Thereupon, Almeda told Tamani not to
deny the shooting because Juana Vitorri Vda. de Ibarra recognized him when he stumbled
before the shooting at a place near the fence between the lots of Pedro Pua and Mrs. Ibarra.
Tamani maintained his innocence about the shooting.
Thereafter, Almeda and NBI Agent No. 101 slapped the face of Tamani. They brought him to a
toilet. They pushed his head into the toilet bowl (iniodoro). They held his hair and pushed his
face toward the mouth of the toilet bowl for five minutes. When Tamani could not endure the
torture anymore, he told Almeda that he would admit the crime. Almeda and Agent No. 101
brought Tamani to the table on the second floor of Puring's Restaurant. Almeda told Tamani:
"You better admit now that you shot the two victims, that you took the gun from Matias de la
Fuente and that Villamor Tamani and Rufino de los Santos are the masterminds".

Tamani admitted that version for fear that he would again be maltreated. His affidavit, Exhibit
A, was signed at Puring's Restaurant on the night of October 2, 1956. The contents of Exhibit
A "are all the versions of Director Almeda". Tamani admitted his signature and thumbmarks
in Exhibit A. On the following morning of October 3rd, Almeda and Agent No. 101 brought
back Tamani to the jail.
Tamani admits that he signed Exhibit B also, his supplementary confession. However, he
insists that he signed it on the night of October 2nd and not on October 3rd. He said that he
never excluded Domingo Cadawan and that he never incriminated himself as the triggerman.
He might have signed Exhibit B in connection with his signing of Exhibit A on the night of
October 2nd because when he signed Exhibit A, there were several sheets of paper which he
signed and thumbmarked. He allegedly did not know the contents of Exhibit B when he
affixed his signature thereon. He says that the incriminatory statements in Exhibits A and B
are not true. (See pp. 3-4, 17-28, Appellant's Brief).
The trial court rejected the foregoing version of the defense after noting the improbabilities in
Francisco Siyang's testimony and after concluding that the appellant had not overcome the
presumption that his confession was voluntarily executed.
The shooting incident was undoubtedly another episode in the political rivalry between
Mayor Domingo and Vice-Mayor Tamani. That circumstance has given a political complexion
to these two cases. It may explain why the evidence has become muddled, if not baffling. It
was to be expected that, to suit the ulterior motivations of the contending parties there would
be same insidious manipulation of the evidence.
Thus, on June 12th, the day following the shooting and before Jose Siyang was interred,
Constabulary soldiers, accompanied by Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, investigated Francisco
Siyang (51-52 tsn Aug. 26, 1960). On June 14, 1953, or four days after the shooting and while
Mayor Domingo was in the hospital, Francisco Siyang (the uncle of Villamor Tamani and the
star witness for the defense and the father of the victim, Jose Siyang) executed an affidavit in
Ilagan about the shooting. He made it appear in that statement that Patrolmen Ibarra and
Tumaneng, two followers of Mayor Domingo, were the killers of Jose Siyang and that they
commenced to shoot Siyang when Mayor Domingo made a prearranged signal (Exh. 1).
As already noted, on the basis of that affidavit, Constabulary Lieutenant Tomas P. Gonzales
filed in the justice of the peace court of Angadanan a complaint for murder against Policemen
Ibarra, Tumaneng and Manguelod and one Venancio Respicio, an alleged nephew of the
mayor (Exh. 2, Crim. Case No. 244). According to Francisco Siyang's affidavit, Respicio,
a compadre of Jose Siyang, acted as decoy in bringing Jose Siyang to the place where he
was assassinated. Domingo repeatedly denied that Respicio was his relative by
consanguinity or affinity. Francisco Siyang made it appear that his son was murdered
because he testified against Domingo in the case where the latter was charged with theft.
Because of that theft case Domingo was suspended. That murder complaint (Exh. 2) against
the followers of Mayor Domingo was dismissed.
After the mayor was released from the hospital, he and the chief of police investigated the
shooting. The chief of the police filed a complaint for murder dated July 8, 1953 against ViceMayor Tamani, Teodoro Tamani, Rufino de los Santos, Matias de la Fuente, Arsenio Dayang
and Medardo Tamani. The complaint was amended by including Domingo Cadawan as a
defendant and excluding Dayang and Medardo Tamani (Exh. 3 and 4, Crim. Case No. 245). For
the shooting of Mayor Domingo, a complaint for frustrated murder was filed by the chief of
police against the same persons (Exh. 5 and 6, Crim. Case No. 246).
<re||an1w>

Both complaints were dismissed apparently for lack of evidence. As the shooting was
unsolved crime, the intervention of the NBI became necessary.
On June 4, 1956 Francisco Siyang executed an affidavit in Ilagan before NBI Agent No. 39. He
deviated from his 1953 affidavit by naming Melchor Tumaneng alone ("Melchor Tomines") as
the assassin of his son, Jose Siyang. He stuck to his original theory that Mayor Domingo
masterminded the assassination of his son (Exh. G).
As already noted, four months later, or on October 2 and 3, 1956, an NBI investigating team
headed by Mariano G. Almeda, a lawyer and an assistant to the NBI Director, secured a
confession from appellant Teodoro Tamani that he, with the assistance of Domingo Cadawan,
shot Mayor Domingo and Jose Siyang (Exh. A and B). It may be assumed that the NBI was
asked to handle the case so that political considerations would not color and influence the
course and outcome of the investigation.
Before Tamani executed his confession, Almeda and his agents, assisted by Constabulary
soldiers, interviewed several persons in Angadanan and made an ocular inspection of the
scene of the crime. They investigated Mrs. Ibarra and her daughter. They learned that
Teodoro Tamani had entered Mrs. Ibarra's yard and was recognized by her and that,
immediately thereafter, she heard gunshots from the direction where Tamani had posted
himself. Thus, Tamani became a prime suspect. He was apprehended and brought to the
house of Mrs. Ibarra for a confrontation. Almeda testified:
Q. What did you do, if any, when Teodoro Tamani was brought
to the house of Juana Vittori Vda.de Ibarra? A. In the
presence of Juana Vittori Vda.de Ibarra and her daughter I
confronted them and asked Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra and her
daughter whether they knew Teodoro Tamani and both claimed
that he is the very same fellow who entered the yard that night
with a gun and also they heard shots from the direction of the
said accused Teodoro Tamani after which Teodoro Tamani was
trembling and he became pale.
Q. And did Teodoro Tamani say anything when he was pointed
out by Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra and her daughter? A. He
did not utter anything. He simply became pale and trembling. (16
tsn June 12, 1958, II Valencia).
Tamani's confession (Exh. A and B) was the basis of the information for murder and
frustrated murder against him in these two cases.
Findings: Appellant Tamani's defense of alibi, which can be fabricated with facility, cannot be
given serious consideration. Assuming that he was in Barrio Aniog in the afternoon and night
of June 11th, it was physically possible for him to be at the scene of the shooting at the time
that it was perpetrated and return to the house of Vice-Mayor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. That
place was only two kilometers from the store of Pedro Pua. The victim was shot in front of the
store.
The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such as to preclude the possibility of
the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission. "The accused must show that he was at some other place for such period of
time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed

at the time of its commission" (People vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, 1969, 2 SCRA 764,
768).
Appellant's alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement. Moreover, it was not corroborated
by Vice-Mayor Tamani or by any other person. Its concocted character is manifest.
Appellant Tamani argues that he signed his confession, Exhibit A, because he was tortured
or maltreated. He claim that he does not remember having signed his supplementary
confession (Exh. B) although he admits the authenticity of his signature and thumbmark
therein.
NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza testified that Tamani's sworn statements were freely
executed. Tamani's testimony on the alleged maltreatment was not corroborated. As
correctly noted by the Solicitor General, certain details in the confession, which only Tamani
could have supplied, are indications of its voluntariness and give it spontaneity and
coherence.
Those details are (a) that Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan conferred with Vice-Mayor Villamor
Tamani in the latter's house at Aniog at three o'clock in the afternoon of the day preceding
the shooting; (b) that Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos were present at the
conference and it was decided to liquidate Mayor Domingo to enable the vice mayor to act as
mayor; (c) that De la Fuente handed to Tamani and Cadawan the carbine to be used in the
killing; (d) that Cadawan and Tamani slept in the vice-mayor's house on the night of June 10,
1953; (e) that Cadawan went to the poblacion in the morning of June 11th in order to
ascertain the whereabouts of Mayor Domingo; (f) that Cadawan returned in the afternoon and
informed Tamani that Domingo was at Pua's store; (g) that Cadawan stumbled in the yard of
Mrs. Ibarra; (h) that after firing the shots, the two returned to the vice-mayor's house; (i) that
Teodoro Tamani slept in the house of the vice-mayor after the assassination; (j) that Jose
Siyang was standing on the right side of Mayor Domingo "along the line of fire"; (k) that Jose
Siyang was his second cousin and the second cousin of the vice-mayor and (l) that the hole
in the gate was three inches in diameter.
Those circumstances might not have been known if the confession had been executed under
duress. NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza could not have manufactured all these details.
There is one significant inconsistency in appellant Tamani's testimony on March 26, 1962
which impairs his credibility. He claimed that his supplementary confession, Exh. B, was
translate to him in Tagalog but that he did not understand Tagalog on or before October 3,
1956 (117 tsn I Valencia). However, when he testified on January 11, 1962 and he was asked
to repeat what NBI Agent Almeda told in Tagalog to the prisoner, Pedro Tamayo, Tamani was
able to repeat verbatim the word: "Bahala kayo rian Tamayo at ako ang bahala sa iyo" (83 tsn
II Calixto). He repeated the same Tagalog words in the later part of his testimony (86 tsn) and
at the hearing on April 5, 1962 (127 tsn I Valencia).
Agent Almeda testified that appellant Tamani understands English, being a former policeman,
and that Tamani read Exhibit B, which is in English and which NBI Agent Mendoza translated
to him in Ilocano. Tamani did not deny that he knows English. His petition to this Court that
he be granted bail, which petition bears his signature, is in English. (See Rollo).
There is no merit in appellant Tamani's contention that the trial court erred in not giving
credence to the testimony of Francisco Siyang (Syang) that Jose Siyang was shot by
policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng, the latter being allegedly a houseboy of Mayor Domingo.

The inconsistencies on vital details in Siyang's two affidavits and his testimony signify that
he deliberately perverted the truth. His testimony exhibits the earmarks of untrustworthiness.
It was squarely refuted by Martin Caniero and Teodoro Colobong. It should be underscored
that Francisco Siyang is the uncle of the vice-mayor (58 tsn Aug. 26, 1960).
In his 1953 affidavit (Exh. 1) he declared that Policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng shot his son,
Jose Siyang, whereas, in his 1965 affidavit (Exh. G) he alleged that only Tumaneng (Tomines)
shot his son.
Francisco Siyang, a farmer, was already seventy-six years old when he testified in 1960. On
direct examination he testified that his son was shot in the breast by Gaspar Ibarra, who was
immediately followed by Melchor Tumaneng. Tumaneng allegedly hit Jose Siyang in the left
part of the breast below the clavicle (48 tsn I Valencia). That was also Francisco Siyang's
declaration in his 1953 affidavit (Exh. 1): that Ibarra fired first.
However, Francisco Siyang on cross-examination testified differently. He declared that
Tumaneng fired first and that the second shot was fired by Ibarra. Francisco Siyang said that
he was sure that Tumaneng fired first at his son (89, 92, 93 tsn I Valencia). The following is an
example of his confusing testimony:
Q. How many shots did Gaspar Ibarra fire at your son? A.
Only one, sir.
Q. Who fired the two first shots, if you know? A. Melchor
Tumaneng, sir.
Q. Did you actually see or not the two successive shots at your
son? A. I saw him, sir.
Q. Who fired the other two shots which according to you your
son was hit by five (5) gunshots A. Gaspar Ibarra, sir.
Q. Do you mean to say that Gaspar Ibarra fired first one shot and
then two shots, all in all three shots? A. Gaspar Ibarra fired
only one, sir. (93 tsn I Valencia).
Q. Who was the first who shot your son, according to you? A.
Melchor Tumaneng.
Q. Where was Melchor Tumaneng at the moment he shot you?
A. He was at the gate of the fence.
Q. But he was inside with the group of persons at the media de
agua of the store of Pedro Pua. Is it? A. Yes, sir (21 tsn I
Calixto).
NBI Agent Almeda, after investigating Francisco Siyang, found his theory incredible. Almeda
did not believe that Francisco Siyang could have seen or identified the assailant who was
behind the fence. According to Almeda, Francisco Siyang merely suspected certain person
as the killers of his son. He could not identify positively the killers.

Other grave inconsistencies in Francisco Siyang's affidavits and testimony are discussed in
the trial court's decision.
Appellant Tamani further contends that the trial court erred in relying on thirteen
circumstances in order to convince itself that Tamani was the culprit. Among those
circumstances are that Tamani went into hiding sometime after the shooting and that the
motive for the attempted murder of Mayor Domingo was to prevent his reinstatement and to
enable the vice-mayor to become permanent mayor and ensure that appellant Tamani would
again become a policemen.
Judge Pedro C. Quinto's painstaking analysis of the evidence and his conscientious scrutiny
of the discrepancies in the testimony and affidavits of Francisco Siyang demonstrate that the
guilt of Tamani has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. A thorough perusal of the record
leads to the conclusion that the trial court did not commit the errors imputed to it by the
appellant.
The act of shooting Siyang at a distance, without the least expectation on his part that he
would be assaulted, is murder because of the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery (alevosia). Appellant Tamani deliberately employed a mode of execution which
tended directly and specially to ensure the consummation of the killing without any risk to
himself arising from the defense which the victim could have made (Par. 16, Art. 14, Revised
Penal Code). Siyang, unarmed and without any intimation that the gunshots intended for
Mayor Domingo would hit him, was not in a position to defend himself against the unseen
assailant. Treachery may be appreciated even if there was a mistake as to the victim (People
vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307).
As to Mayor Domingo, the accused was not able to perform all the acts of execution which
would consummate the killing (Art. 6, Revised Penal Code). The accused was not able to do
so, not because of his spontaneous desistance but because he failed to inflict on the mayor a
mortal wound. The mayor was able to avoid the second volley by taking refuge in the store of
Pedro Pua. But there is no doubt that the accused was animated by the intent to kill and that
the shooting was perpetrated in a treacherous manner. Hence, the offense against the mayor
is attempted murder (People vs. Kalalo, 59 Phil. 715).
The alternative contention of appellant Tamani that should be convicted of the complex crime
of homicide with lesiones graves is not well-taken. As already pointed out, the killing of
Siyang cannot be characterized as homicide. It was qualified by treachery. There was intent
to kill in the shooting of the mayor. So, the wound inflicted on him cannot be regarded as a
mere physical injury. It was overt act manifesting the willful design of the accused to
liquidate the mayor.
The infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and of the wound in the palm of the
mayor's right hand was not the result of a single act. The injuries were the consequences of
two volley of gunshots. Hence, the assaults on Siyang and the mayor cannot be categorized
as a complex crime.
<re||an1w>

To convict the accused of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder would result
in the imposition of the death penalty. That eventuality would be worse for him.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed on the appellant for the killing of Siyang. (Arts. 64 [1] and 248,

Revised Penal Code). The use of the term "life imprisonment" is not proper (People vs. Mobe,
81 Phil. 58).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. So ordered

G.R. No. 109902 August 2, 1994

ALU-TUCP, Representing Members: ALAN BARINQUE, with 13 others, namely: ENGR. ALAN
G. BARINQUE, ENGR. DARRELL LEE ELTAGONDE, EDUARD H. FOOKSON, JR., ROMEO R.
SARONA, RUSSELL GACUS, JERRY BONTILAO, EUSEBIO MARIN, JR., LEONIDO ECHAVEZ,
BONIFACIO MEJOS, EDGAR S. BONTUYAN, JOSE G. GARGUENA, JR., OSIAS B.
DANDASAN, and GERRY I. FETALVERO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION
(NSC), respondents.
Leonard U. Sawal for petitioners.
Saturnino Mejorada for private respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioners assail the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC") dated 8 January 1993 which declared petitioners to be project employees of
private respondent National Steel Corporation ("NSC"), and the NLRC's subsequent Resolution of
15 February 1993, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners plead that they had been employed by respondent NSC in connection with its Five Year
Expansion Program (FAYEP I & II) 1 for varying lengths of time when they were separated from NSC's
service:

Employee Date Nature of Separated

Employed Employment
1. Alan Barinque 5-14-82 Engineer 1 8-31-91
2.Jerry Bontilao 8-05-85 Engineer 2 6-30-92
3. Edgar Bontuyan 11-03-82 Chairman to present
4. Osias Dandasan 9-21-82 Utilityman 1991
5.Leonido Echavez 6-16-82 Eng. Assistant 6-30-92
6.Darrell Eltagonde 5-20-85 Engineer 1 8-31-91
7.Gerry Fetalvero 4-08-85 Mat. Expediter regularized
8. Eduard Fookson 9-20-84 Eng. Assistant 8-31-91
9. Russell Gacus 1-30-85 Engineer 1 6-30-92
10. Jose Garguena 3-02-81 Warehouseman to present
11.Eusebio Mejos 11-17-82 Survey Aide 8-31-91
12.Bonifacio Mejos 11-17-82 Surv.Party Head 1992
13. Romeo Sarona 2-26-83 Machine Operator 8-31-91 2
On 5 July 1990, petitioners filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and
monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City.
The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated 7 June
1991, declared petitioners "regular project employees who shall continue their employment as such

for as long as such [project] activity exists," but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant
to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary
differentials. 3
Both parties appealed to the NLRC from that decision. Petitioners argued that they were regular, not
project, employees. Private respondent, on the other hand, claimed that petitioners are project
employees as they were employed to undertake a specific project NSC's Five Year Expansion
Program (FAYEP I & II).
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter's decision. It affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a
specific undertaking the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been
determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the
business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same
benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
Deliberating on the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioners have failed to
show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
NLRC in rendering its questioned resolutions of 8 January 1993 and 15 February 1993.
The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code which reads in full:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment The provisions of the written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, and employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work
or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that they are "regular" employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are "necessary,
desirable and work-related to private respondent's main business, steel-making"; and (ii) they have
rendered service for six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC. 4
The basic issue is thus whether or not petitioners are properly characterized as "project employees"
rather than "regular employees" of NSC. This issue relates, of course, to an important consequence:
the services of project employees are co-terminous with the project and may be terminated upon the
end or completion of the project for which they were hired. 5 Regular employees, in contract, are legally
entitled to remain in the service of their employer until that service is terminated by one or another of the
recognized modes of termination of service under the Labor Code. 6

It is evidently important to become clear about the meaning and scope of the term "project" in the
present context. The "project" for the carrying out of which "project employees" are hired would
ordinarily have some relationship to the usual business of the employer. Exceptionally, the "project"

undertaking might not have an ordinary or normal relationship to the usual business of the employer.
In this latter case, the determination of the scope and parameeters of the "project" becomes fairly
easy. It is unusual (but still conceivable) for a company to undertake a project which has absolutely
no relationship to the usual business of the company; thus, for instance, it would be an unusual
steel-making company which would undertake the breeding and production of fish or the cultivation
of vegetables. From the viewpoint, however, of the legal characterization problem here presented to
the Court, there should be no difficulty in designating the employees who are retained or hired for
the purpose of undertaking fish culture or the production of vegetables as "project employees," as
distinguished from ordinary or "regular employees," so long as the duration and scope of the project
were determined or specified at the time of engagement of the "project employees." 7 For, as is
evident from the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted earlier, the principal test for
determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as
distinguished from "regular employees," is whether or not the "project employees" were assigned to carry
out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time the
employees were engaged for that project.

In the realm of business and industry, we note that "project" could refer to one or the other of at least
two (2) distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or
undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company, but which is
distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company. Such
job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times. The typical example of this
first type of project is a particular construction job or project of a construction company. A
construction company ordinarily carries out two or more discrete identifiable construction projects:
e.g., a twenty-five- storey hotel in Makati; a residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a
domestic air terminal in Iloilo City. Employees who are hired for the carrying out of one of these
separate projects, the scope and duration of which has been determined and made known to the
employees at the time of employment, are properly treated as "project employees," and their
services may be lawfully terminated at completion of the project.
The term "project" could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is not within the
regular business of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and
distinct from the ordinary or regular business operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also
begins and ends at determined or determinable times. The case at bar presents what appears to our
mind as a typical example of this kind of "project."
NSC undertook the ambitious Five Year Expansion Program I and II with the ultimate end in view of
expanding the volume and increasing the kinds of products that it may offer for sale to the public.
The Five Year Expansion Program had a number of component projects: e.g., (a) the setting up of a
"Cold Rolling Mill Expansion Project"; (b) the establishment of a "Billet Steel-Making Plant" (BSP); (c)
the acquisition and installation of a "Five Stand TDM"; and (d) the "Cold Mill Peripherals
Project." 8 Instead of contracting out to an outside or independent contractor the tasks of constructing the
buildings with related civil and electrical works that would house the new machinery and equipment,
the installation of the newly acquired mill or plant machinery and equipment and the commissioning of
such machinery and equipment, NSC opted to execute and carry out its Five Yeear Expansion Projects
"in house," as it were, by administration. The carrying out of the Five Year Expansion Program (or more
precisely, each of its component projects) constitutes a distinct undertaking identifiable from the ordinary
business and activity of NSC. Each component project, of course, begins and ends at specified times,
which had already been determined by the time petitioners were engaged. We also note that NSC did the
work here involved the construction of buildings and civil and electrical works, installation of machinery
and equipment and the commissioning of such machinery only for itself. Private respondent NSC
was not in the business of constructing buildings and installing plant machinery for the general business
community, i.e., for unrelated, third party, corporations. NSC did not hold itself out to the public as a
construction company or as an engineering corporation.

Which ever type of project employment is found in a particular case, a common basic requisite is
that the designation of named employees as "project employees" and their assignment to a specific
project, are effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of evading
otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.
Thus, the particular component projects embraced in the Five Year Expansion Program, to which
petitioners were assigned, were distinguishable from the regular or ordinary business of NSC which,
of course, is the production or making and marketing of steel products. During the time petitioners
rendered services to NSC, their work was limited to one or another of the specific component
projects which made up the FAYEP I and II. There is nothing in the record to show that petitioners
were hired for, or in fact assigned to, other purposes, e.g., for operating or maintaining the old, or
previously installed and commissioned, steel-making machinery and equipment, or for selling the
finished steel products.
We, therefore, agree with the basic finding of the NLRC (and the Labor Arbiter) that the petitioners
were indeed "project employees:"
It is well established by the facts and evidence on record that herein 13 complainants
were hired and engaged for specific activities or undertaking the period of which has
been determined at time of hiring or engagement. It is of public knowledge and which
this Commission can safely take judicial notice that the expansion program (FAYEP)
of respondent NSC consist of various phases [of] project components which are
being executed or implemented independently or simultaneously from each other . . .
In other words, the employment of each "project worker" is dependent and coterminous with the completion or termination of the specific activity or undertaking
[for which] he was hired which has been pre-determined at the time of engagement.
Since, there is no showing that they (13 complainants) were engaged to perform
work-related activities to the business of respondent which is steel-making, there is
no logical and legal sense of applying to them the proviso under the second
paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
The present case therefore strictly falls under the definition of "project employees" on
paragraph one of Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended. Moreover, it has been
held that the length of service of a project employee is not the controlling test of
employment tenure but whether or not "the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee". (See Hilario Rada v. NLRC, G.R. No.
96078, January 9, 1992; and Sandoval Shipping, Inc. v. NLRC, 136 SCRA 674
(1985). 9
Petitioners next claim that their service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as
regular employees. We believe this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment
of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally
dissolve, their status as project employees. 10 The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a
regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees.

In the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 11 this Court ruled that the
proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to

those who fall within the definition of said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project employees. The familiar
grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of
the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof, unless the clear legislative intent is
to restrict or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions of
the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intent is observable in Article 280 of the Labor
Code, which has been quoted earlier.

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Resolutions of the NLRC dated 8 January 1993 and 15 February 1993 are hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 August 25, 1994
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary
of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and their
AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 August 25, 1994
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; PUBLISHING
CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L.
DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B.
DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 August 25, 1994
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 August 25, 1994
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.
CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE
ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V.
VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION, INC., PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC., and WIGBERTO TAADA,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 August 25, 1994

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115873 August 25, 1994
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B.
DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE BOOK-SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO,
as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for and in his behalf.
Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. David for petitioners in G.R. No. 115525.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for petitioner R.S. Roco.
Villaranza and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.
Carlos A. Raneses and Manuel M. Serrano for petitioner in G.R. No. 115754.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedon From Debts Coalition, Inc. & Phil. Bible Society.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 115873.
R.B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
Reve A.V. Saguisag for MABINI.

MENDOZA, J.:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well
as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross
value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the
sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art.VI, 24 of the Constitution?
B. Does it violate Art.VI, 26(2) of the Constitution?
C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?
1. 1
2. 4
3. 5
4. 10
B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?
1. Art. VI, 28(1)
2. Art. VI, 28(3)
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not
all of these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self
executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government are
equally charged with the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded ValueAdded Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated
in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with
the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the
President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the
proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the
House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:
Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Id., 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have

been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.
It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills 1 were
introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and
Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN

ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF
TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX,
AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on
November 17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on
Ways and Means.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No.
1630, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE
IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING
SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on
the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill
on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee
which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No.
11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy
of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees."
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
(VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR
THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was
thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2,
1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994,

signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published
in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its
implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business
entities. It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the
Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30,
1994.
First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the
result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection,
petitioners point out that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal
Constitution, 2 it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine
Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is
omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House,
Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which
is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third
version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note
is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of
the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not
only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to
the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills
in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power 3 and thereby equalize
its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We
are dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular
chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of
Representatives." 4 The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is
the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the
legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate 5 has never been thought of
as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

In the United States, the validity of a provision ( 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the
weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against
the claim that the provision was a revenue bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art.
I, 7 of the U.S. Constitution. 6 Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a
revenue bill emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills
following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out
everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House
subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what later
became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote
an extensive tax revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. 7 Given, then, the
power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect
to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of
another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H.
No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the
Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following
the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and,
on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case
the result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On
the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems
from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact
that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been
filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after
the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in
respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197
and the submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the
question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a
bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been
filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a
substitute of those earlier bills.
Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No.
1630. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings
on separate days as required by the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were done
on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22,
1994, 10 the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with
the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26(2) qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two
are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence.To construe the "except" clause as simply
dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three
days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very
premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is
certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is
dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any
use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity
of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy
enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for
President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven
days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. 11

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate
days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative
practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation
with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings
in the House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by
the President as urgent. 12
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with
the requirement of three readings on separate days, also.
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no
emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual
condition in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of
the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24,
1994, the Senate accepted the President's certification. Should such certification be now reviewed
by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up
on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the
time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law under Art.VII, 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, 23(2), is subject to judicial review because
basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills,
which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly
considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.
Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No.
11197. That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was
before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 the pending in the House.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the
Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that
the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate
bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is
made of the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met
behind closed doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result of the
give and take that often mark the proceedings of conference committees.
Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in
executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet
behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be
made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the
conferees on the basis solely of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything
into the incomplete remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by
ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer's own limitations or to the
incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in
recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the United States.

In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held in executive
sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only in November 1975 was a new
rule adopted requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of either chamber's conferees may vote in
public to close the meetings. 14

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been
explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to
make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to
which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a
difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal
originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause
and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now
altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill.
. . . 15
The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the
only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and
Senate bills. 16
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 17 If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it
cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After
all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act
of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18

Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and
a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions not
found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in support of this contention:
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives
on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a
conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their
composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in
accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be
signed by the conferees.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed
with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the
Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
85. Conference Committee Reports. In the event that the House does not agree
with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may
be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except
when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing
on any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the
conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the
changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are
distributed to the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session
period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above
provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
(Emphasis added)
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting
provisions. But Rule XLIV, 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no
Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines
shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The
following is then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences
committed to them. . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even
though germane to a question in issue.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be
to the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common
place in Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane,
have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be
provided in the Jefferson's Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative
practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is
not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI,
16(3) of the Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."
This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise
disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not
contain a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject
measure." The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard

practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee
violated the Rules of the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules
are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern." 19 Our concern is with
the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements
are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill,
therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only
alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference committee must be
appointed. But then again the result would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly
satisfying to both houses.
Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring
three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No.
11197 was passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first
reading and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not
report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into
consideration" the House bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills
and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter
approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We
cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the
provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of
Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be
resolved in its favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained 21 or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill 22 have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is
no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case 23 we "went behind"
an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation
to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be
to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.
Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, 26(1) which provides that
"Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of
exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the

Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its
title.
The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE- ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR
THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is 103, which originally read:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT
were those of PAL because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from
the payment of all "other taxes . . . now or in the near future," in consideration of the
payment by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, 103 of the NIRC now provides:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is
concerned.
The question is whether this amendment of 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of
Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those
which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to
expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the
exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in
addition to 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a
bill should be a complete index of its content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress
and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it.
If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not
because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although
published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the

title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under
P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO
ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do
not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title
expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject
thus expressed. 24
It is further contended that amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by special law, in
view of 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:
This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified,
amended, or repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically
modify, amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision thereof.
This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere implication
resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a
franchise is a contract which can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in Manila Railroad
Co. v.
Rafferty, 25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain
goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted
it from all taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended
by a general law.

In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No.
1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption under
P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution,
which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought
and Religious Freedom
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of
newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other
hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit organization
engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim
violations of their rights under 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the
VAT Law.
The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the press
under 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative
regulation with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of
the possibility that the exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the
Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's power
to grant exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax

exemption because this is vested in Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a majority of
all its members 26 and (2) the Secretary's duty is to execute the law.
103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the transactions
previously granted exemption were:
(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine,
review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription
and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements.
Republic Act No. 7716 amended 103 by deleting (f) with the result that print media became
subject to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue
Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the "circulation income of print media
pursuant to 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of
freedom of the press, among others." The exemption of "circulation income" has left income from
advertisements still subject to the VAT.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the authority of
the Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the exemption of the
circulation revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom
because of the imposition of the VAT on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and
on their acquisition of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that no
exemption has effectively been granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press
freedom in these cases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press
freedom. The PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom.
Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the
press is not immune from general regulation by the State. It has been held:
The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws.
He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must
answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. . . . Like others, he must
pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . . . 27
The PPI does not dispute this point, either.
What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions
involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled
out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law
discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully
examined this argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law,
much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a valueadded tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special
treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The
withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously
granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of
the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only
privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.

The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim
that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the
discriminatory purpose was clear either from the background of the law or from its operation. For
example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 28 the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the
gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of more than
20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement alone but was
measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in
Louisiana, leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and
120 weekly newspapers which were in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It
was well known that the thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Longdominated legislature of Louisiana respondent by taxing what Long described as the "lying newspapers"
by imposing on them "a tax on lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their
circulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise
of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional
guaranties." 29 The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is the power to
destroy.

In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because
everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax
on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the
privilege of "using, storing or consuming in that state tangible personal property" by eliminating the
residents' incentive to get goods from outside states where the sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota
Star Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature
amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The
law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax"
since the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid on an "intermediate
transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale." Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential
treatment and it failed to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory
because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink
used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all and
even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose was thus very clear.

More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which taxed
general interest magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was
discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a small group
within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e., between general interest
and special interests such as religion or sports) the law became "entirely incompatible with the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."

These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press creates
risks of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide
range of goods and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media whose
gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit
since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed.
The fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press along but to all sales. Nor is impermissible
motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed
on its transactions involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of
broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.

The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that "owners of newspapers are
immune from any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared
invalid because it was "one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom
of the
press." 34 On the other hand, Minneapolis Star acknowledged that "The First Amendment does not

prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and the Federal Government can subject
newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems."

35

What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the
exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their
printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 36 the Free
Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the
sale of religious materials by a religious organization.

This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, 37 although of general
applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its
essential freedom. The case ofAmerican Bible Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by both the PBS and
the PPI in support of their contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an
ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the business of general
merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other religious literature. This
Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 39 in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount
and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was
actually being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that
reason, it was held, the license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion
and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise." 40

But, in this case, the fee in 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise
of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration
requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits
because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects
an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative
fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends
the free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For
the same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in
G.R. No. 115931 that the increase in the price of books and other educational materials as a result
of the VAT would violate the constitutional mandate to the government to give priority to education,
science and technology (Art. II, 17) to be untenable.

B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process,

Equal Protection, and Impairment
of Contracts
There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom
of speech, press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have on the essential
freedom of the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of communication are
open and operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court's power of review.
There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that
taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process and that equal
protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an
eminent authority on constitutional law thus: "[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is
freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers'
judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of

constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the
due process clause." 41
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less
evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of
regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere
academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact is that there have even been no notices of
assessments issued to petitioners and no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims
so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding
so fundamental questions as those raised in these suits.
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the requirement
that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation." 42Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues:
Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that
"VAT payment by low-income households will be a higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures)
than payments by higher-income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners contend
that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who are in the higherincome bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic
commodities, which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.

Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by
respondents that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible
particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts
basic goods and services. It is thus equitable. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are
those used or consumed by higher-income groups. These include real properties held primarily for
sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses,
and the like. On the other hand, small business establishments, with annual gross sales of less than
P500,000, are exempted. This, according to respondents, removes from the coverage of the law
some 30,000 business establishments. On the other hand, an occasional paper 43 of the Center for
Research and Communication cities a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and
income distribution and that while additional expenditure for the lowest income class is only P301 or
1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.

Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion
whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-income group in
society harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R.
No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that
Congress' withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service
cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against the
constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, 15) but also
denies such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The
legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation.44
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), petitioner in
G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any
more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because
their profits from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while purporting to be
based on the financial statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the establishment
of facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and
confiscatory.

Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by
the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress,
just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human
dignity and the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, 1), or for the
promotion of the right to "quality education" (Art. XIV, 1). These provisions are put in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran 45 should have laid to rest the questions now raised
against the VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273)
were held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court found to be
"hearsay and [without] evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT
system and its coverage as provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and
wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress.

Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the
imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior
to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that "No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed." It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot,
through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State.
For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic
postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order
of society. 46
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's
power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid
consideration. 47 Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make
this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be
made by a general, but only by a specific, law.

The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form
because of the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private
cases; that public actions by "non-Hohfeldian" 48 or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided
they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, 1, 2 the Court has a
"special function" of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we
do not have before us in these cases a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our
adjudication the impact of actuality 49 to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded.
Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely
accused of having done in these cases to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.

We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on
this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we
decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art. VIII, 1, 2 is
cited in support of this view:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803,
to justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each. 50
Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. 51
This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in several
cases 52 of this Court following Angara.
It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention in what is
essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the
context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms
of "cases," and nothing but "cases." That the other departments of the government may have
committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power.
Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long
run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called
upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of
the day.
_______________________________
In the preceeding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act
No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before
us. To sum up, we hold:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the
enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes beyond
those prescribed by the Constitution have been observed is precluded by the principle of
separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the
free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive,
oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause
are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 118357 May 6, 1997

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the
November 27, 1992 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150 which disposed of Civil
Case No. 8109, "Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation, Geronimo
Velasco (in his capasity as the then Minister of Energy) and Philippine National Bank," an action for
rescission of contract and damages, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, and as plaintiff Industrial Enterprises, Inc.
was able to establish by preponderant evidence the allegations in its Complaint and
causes of action against defendants Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
and Philippine National Bank, the Court finds both defendants civilly liable to plaintiff
and, therefore, orders them to jointly and severally:
1. pay plaintiff the sum of P31.66 Million as of July 31, 1983, for the expenses
invested by plaintiff in the property subject of this case, as computed by Sycip,
Gorres, Velayo and Company and brought to current value per SGV formula, as
agreed in the Memorandum of Agreement;
2 pay plaintiff the sum of P37,569,733.00, for the indemnification and rehabilitation
cost, plus interest at the legal rate from March 31, 1991, until fully paid;
3. pay plaintiff the sum of P120 Million for unrealized profit for five (5) years from
August, 1983, the date of defendant MMIC's takeover of the property, to October,
1988, when plaintiff was re-awarded the contract, plus interest at the legal rate, from
the date of this decision, until fully paid;
4. pay plaintiff an amount not less than ten (10) percent of the losses it incurred and
its unrealized profits as indicated in Numbers 1 to 3, for the injury done to plaintiff's
business standing and commercial credit;
5. pay plaintiff an amount not less than five (5) percent of the above obligation as
reimbursement to plaintiff for litigation expenses and attorney's fees;
6. COST OF SUIT.
And finally, the extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on August 31, 1984, in Catbalogan,
Samar, over the property of plaintiff, part of the Giporlos Coal Project, is hereby
declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC) was founded by Jesus S. Cabarrus in
1949. 3 Four years later or in 1953, Cabarrus established J. Cabarrus, Inc. which subsequently was
renamed Industrial Enterprises, Inc. (IEI). During the period when most of the facts relevant to this case
transpired, Cabarrus and his family owned about 12% to 14% of the shares of stock in the MMIC 4 where
he was the President. He was also the President of IEI.

On July 27, 1979, IEI entered into a coal operating contract with the Bureau of Energy Development
(BED), with Cabarrus and then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco as signatories. 5 The contract
was pursuant to the Coal Development Act of 1976 (P.D. No. 972, as amended) and covered 2,000
hectares of two (2) coal blocks in Barrio Carbon, Magsaysay, Eastern Samar.

While exploring this area, IEI found the adjacent areas, comprising of three (3) coal blocks, to be
likewise coal potentials. Hence, upon confirmation by the BED that these three (3) adjacent coal
blocks were in the free area, IEI filed an application for another coal operating contract on August
12, 1981. Simultaneously, IEI applied for the conversion of its July 27, 1979 coal operating contract
from exploration to development/production. IEI also followed up its application on the three (3)
newly-discovered coal blocks. All of these coal blocks were collectively known as the Giporlos Coal
Project.
Sometime in April, 1982, Minister Velasco informed Cabarrus that IEI's application for exploration of
the three (3) coal blocks had been disapproved and that, instead, the contract would be awarded to
MMIC. Following Cabarrus' letter of May 4, 1982 6 requesting that the rejection of IEI's application be
made in writing, Minister Velasco wrote him a letter dated June 2, 1982, 7 where Minister Velasco said:

We appreciate your desire to increase Industrial Enterprises, Inc.'s (IEI) involvement

in coal development. In line, however, with the objective of rationalizing the country's
overall coal supply-demand balance, we believe that coal users who have the
capability to go into coal production themselves should, as much as possible, be
encouraged and given the preference to do so. This ensures maximum utilization of
local coal and will be beneficial to coal producer/user in the long run. In your area of
interest, therefore, we believe that the logical coal operator should be Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC) which is now developing the Bagacay coal
deposit in order to support MMIC's coal conversion program at the Nonoc Nickel
Refinery. As a member of the board of MMIC, I am fully aware that this coal
conversion program is critical to the profitability and the survival of the Nonoc Nickel
Refinery. It is, therefore, imperative that MMIC secure its own coal supply.
Consistent with the above rationale, you are aware that MMIC Board has in fact
taken concrete steps to consolidate the Giporlos and Bagacay coal areas under
MMIC and, for this purpose, has authorized Chairman Cesar C. Zalamea to create a
committee (of which I was asked to be Chairman) to evaluate the Giporlos coal
blocks of IEI to serve as basis for their acquisition by MMIC. As President of MMIC,
you are likewise aware that the Board has recently hired the services of SGV to
make an evaluation of the proper pricing for the IEI coal interest to be paid for by
MMIC. With these developments indicating the imminent formal acquisition of
Giporlos coal areas by MMIC, it would indeed be inconsistent now for us to award
additional coal blocks in the same area to IEI. We believe that these additional coal
areas, if at all, should be applied for and awarded direct to MMIC.
In view of the foregoing, please be advised that we are denying IEI's application, and
we suggest instead that MMIC apply for the same blocks.

On March 28, 1983, Minister Velasco informed Cesar Zalamea, Chairman of the Board of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and of the MMIC, that IEI's application for the
conversion of its coal operating contract for the Giporlos area from exploration to
development/production had been put "under advisement in the light of the ongoing discussion for
the transfer of IEI's rights and obligations" to MMIC. 8
Thereafter, MMIC and IEI, through Chairman Zalamea and President Cabarrus, 9 respectively,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby IEI assigned to MMIC all its rights and
interests under the July 27, 1979 coal operating contract. The MOA provided as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties have agreed, as hereby they agree, one with the
other, as follows:
1. That IEI, subject and conformably with the whereas clauses hereinabove stated,
hereby assigns and transfers all its rights and interests on the Coal Operating
Contract described in the first whereas clause; and MMIC shall in consideration of
the above assignment and transfer
(a) Undertake all the obligations required of IEI under said Coal
Operating Contract;
(b) Reimburse all costs and expenses actually incurred as of 31 July
1983 by IEI on the coal property and brought up to current values, as
shall be audited and confirmed by Sycip, Gorres and Velayo as of
said date of 31 July 1983; and
(c) Pay to IEI the total sum equivalent to P4.17 per ton of proven and
positive reserves of coal to be confirmed by an independent geologist
who shall be designated and appointed by mutual agreement of the
parties.
2. That the total sum due from MMIC to IEI under this agreement shall be paid upon
the effectivity of this agreement in the following manner
(a) An assumption by MMIC of the outstanding loan obligation
(evidenced by Promissory Note No. 1516 for P3.3 Million and
Promissory Note No. 11098 for P5.0 Million) of IEI to Manila Banking
Corporation which as of 31 July 1983 stands at P8.3 Million.
(b) Payment in cash to IEI of the difference between the above
amount of P8.3 Million and the sum total of subparagraphs (b) and (c)
par. 1, above.
3. That this agreement shall only become binding and effective upon its approval by
the BED, which approval shall be secured jointly by MMIC and IEI.
MMIC and IEI, again through Zalamea and Cabarrus, respectively, jointly informed the BED on
August 10, 1983, that they had entered into the MOA "at the instance and suggestion of the Hon.
Minister of Energy in one of the earlier meetings of the Board of Directors of MMIC." 10 MMIC and IEI
were informed of the approval of the MOA on August 29, 1983 by the then Acting BED Director
Wenceslao R. de la Paz. 11

MMIC took over possession and control of the two (2) coal blocks even before the MOA was
finalized. However, instead of continuing the exploration and development work actively pursued by
IEI, MMIC completely stopped all works and dismissed the work force thereon, leaving only a
caretaker crew.
Consequently, IEI made written demands to MMIC, pursuant to the MOA, for the reimbursement of
all costs and expenses it had incurred on the project which, as of July 31, 1983, had amounted to
P31.66 million as audited by the Sycip, Gorres and Velayo Company.
In view of MMIC's failure to comply with its obligations under the MOA, IEI filed a complaint against
MMIC and Minister Velasco on August 7, 1984, for rescission of the MOA and damages, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137. Docketed as Civil Case No. 8109, the complaint alleged
that MMIC acted in gross and evident bad faith in entering into the MOA when it had no intention at
all to operate the two (2) coal blocks and of complying with any of its obligations under the said
agreement. It likewise alleged that Minister Velasco was instrumental in causing the assignment of
the coal operating contracts to MMIC when he did not act on complainant IEI's application for
conversion of its coal operating contract from exploration to development/production and in rejecting
its application for another coal operating contract for the exploration of additional three (3) coal
blocks which he had reserved for MMIC.
Meanwhile, on July 13, 1981, for various credit accommodations secured from the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), aggregating to four billion pesos (P4,000,000,000.00) excluding interest and
charges as of November 30, 1980, as well as from the DBP, amounting to two billion pesos
(P2,000,000,000.00), MMIC entered into a Mortgage Trust Agreement (MTA) 12 whereby it constituted
a mortgage pari passu of its assets in favor of PNB and DBP. These assets are described in the third
"whereas clause" of the MTA as follows:

(1) all the MORTGAGOR'S assets described and covered under the Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgage executed by the MORTGAGOR in favor of PNB dated
October 9, 1978, acknowledged before Notary Public of Manila, Lucas R. Vidad, as
Dec. No. 1004, Page No. 94, Book No. VII, Series of 1978, as amended, which are
made integral parts of this Agreement by way of reference; and
(2) additional assets of the MORTGAGOR described and identified in the list hereto
attached as Annex "A", including assets of whatever kind, nature or description,
which the MORTGAGOR may hereafter acquire whether in substitution of, in
replenishment, or in addition thereto, (the "Mortgaged Properties"). 13
Under the MTA, the PNB was constituted and appointed as the trustee tasked with holding in trust
the mortgaged properties "for the equal and ratable benefit of the Beneficiaries in proportion to the
amount of the obligation of the MORTGAGOR to each of them" as provided therein. 14 One of the
conditions of the mortgage was that:

. . . Should the MORTGAGORS fail to deliver said properties, as aforestated, the

TRUSTEE, through its duly authorized representative, is authorized to take
possession of said properties and bring the same to the location of any of their
respective offices or to any, other place and the expenses of locating and bringing
said properties to such place shall be for the account of the MORTGAGOR and shall
form part of the sums secured by this mortgage; Provided, however, that the
TRUSTEE shall have the option of selling said properties at any place where their
respective offices shall be located or at any place where said properties may be
found. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)

The MTA also provided that:

For the purpose of extra-judicial foreclosure, the MORTGAGOR hereby appoints the
TRUSTEE, through its duly authorized representatives, its attorney-in-fact to sell the
mortgaged properties in accordance with the provision of Act No. 3135, as amended,
and/or Act No. 1508, as amended, and subject to the stipulations herein set forth, to
sign all documents and perform any act requisite or necessary to accomplish said
purpose and to appoint their representatives or substitutes as such attorneys-in-fact
with all the powers herein conferred. In extra-judicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135,
as amended, the auction sale shall take place in the City or Capital of the Province
where the mortgaged properties are situated. In extra-judicial foreclosure under Act
No. 1508, as amended, the auction sale shall take place in such City or Municipality
as the TRUSTEE at its option,
may elect by virtue of the provisions of the first paragraph of this
Condition. 16 (Emphasis supplied.)
The MTA was amended on April 27, 1984 with PNB Senior Vice President Gerardo Agulto, Jr. and
MMIC Senior Vice President Jose Luis Javier as signatories. 17 Premised on the fact that the
mortgagor (MMIC) had "acquired additional personal and real properties, including, but not limited to,
leasehold rights on mining claims, which pursuant to the terms of the Mortgage Trust Agreement are
deemed covered by the mortgage as after-acquired assets," the MTA amended Sec. 2.01 thereof to read
as follows:

As security for the prompt and full payment by the MORTGAGOR of the Secured
Obligations, the MORTGAGOR hereby establishes and constitutes in favor of the
MORTGAGEES a first lien and mortgage of the first rank in and to each and every
item of the Mortgaged Properties, together with any and all substitutes or
replacements for or renewals of or additions to any thereof, all of which belong to and
are in the possession of (or will belong to and will be in the possession of) the
MORTGAGOR, free end clear of any liens or encumbrances of any nature
whatsoever. (Emphasis supplied.) 18
MMIC defaulted in the payment of its loan obligation with PNB and DBP which, as of July 15, 1984
stood at P23.55 billion. As a consequence thereof, PNB and DBP simultaneously filed in the
provinces of Rizal, Samar, Negros and Surigao, joint petitions for sale on foreclosure under Act Nos.
1508 and 3135, 19 of the MMIC assets located at: (a) Island Cement in Antipolo, Rizal; (b) Sipalay
Copper Mine in Negros; (c) Bagacay and Giporlos Coal Projects in Samar, and (d) Nonoc Nickel Project
in Surigao. The petitions were premised on: (1) the MOA of July 13, 1984 which delineated MMIC's
mortgaged properties; (2) the April 27, 1984 amendment to the MTA in favor of DBP and PNB which
included in the mortgage MMIC's additional after-acquired assets; (3) the liabilities of MMIC secured by
the mortgage being past due, and (4) Presidential Decree No. 385 mandating PNB and DBP to institute
foreclosure proceedings when the arrearages of the borrower have exceeded twenty percent (20%) of the
principal obligation.

Deputy Sheriff Esteban G. Malindog of the Regional Trial Court in Catbalogan, Samar, Branch
XXVII, complied with the requirements of the law as to the posting and publication of the notice of
sale. Said notice, dated August 15, 1984, set for August 31, 1984 the auction sale of the various
mining equipment and other assets of MMIC, including the equipment at the Giporlos Project.
On August 15, 1984, IEI advised PNB and DBP at their respective Manila and Makati offices that the
purchase price of the Giporlos Coal Project that it had assigned to MMIC per the MOA, was still
unpaid. 20 However, despite said notice, the foreclosure sale proceeded as scheduled and the various
machineries and equipment of MMIC were sold to PNB as the sole bidder for P33,940,940.00.

In its letter of September 20, 1984 to PNB and DBP, 21 IEI requested that the movable properties in the
Giporlos Coal Project which were detailed in a list attached to its August 15, 1984 letter to said banks, be
excluded from the foreclosed assets of MMIC as the purchase price thereof under the MOA had remained
unpaid. IEI further informed PNB and DBP that a suit for rescission of the assignment of the Giporlos
Coal Project to MMIC (and damages) had been filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

On June 24, 1985, in view of the inclusion of the mining equipment and other movable properties at
the Giporlos Coal Project in the foreclosure sale of the assets of MMIC, IEI filed an amended
complaint impleading the PNB as an additional defendant. 22 The amended complaint was admitted by
the trial court on September 23, 1985.

23

On April 23, 1986, the lower court 24 rendered a decision finding that:
With respect to the plaintiff's claim against the Philippine National Bank, the evidence
on record is clear that said defendant bank is equally guilty of bad faith because it
was advised beforehand that the heavy equipment and movable property which are
part of the Giporlos Coal Project were still unpaid; however, despite that actual
knowledge or information, the said defendant bank proceeded to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage on the said properties; moreover, the foreclosure
proceedings were held in Catbalogan, Province of Samar, although the said movable
properties are actually found or located at Giporlos, Eastern Samar (Exhibit "ooo"), a
province, distinct and separate from, and outside the jurisdiction of, the Province of
Samar; these foreclosure proceedings in Catbalogan, Samar, are clearly contrary to
the provisions of Act 1508, as amended; likewise, the inclusion of the movable
properties which are part of the Giporlos Coal Project is contrary to the provisions of
the last paragraph of Sec. 7 of said Act No. 1508, as amended, which provides that a
chattel mortgage shall be determined to cover only the properties described therein
and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed
in the same depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the
mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding. 25
Noting the futility of proceeding with the trial of the case because there was "no genuine issue of any
material facts," the lower court rendered a summary judgment disposing of Civil Case No. 8109 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a declaring the memorandum agreement, Exhibit "C" as rescinded or annulled
and without further force and effect between the parties thereto;
b declaring and sustaining the continued efficacy and validity of the coal operating
contract, Exhibit "A" between plaintiff and defendant BED;
c ordering the reversion or return of the two coal blocks covered by the coal
operating contract dated July 27, 1979, Exhibit "A", from the defendant MMIC to and
in favor of the plaintiff together with or including all the pieces of equipment MMIC
received by said defendant in virtue of the rescinded memorandum of agreement,
Exhibit "C";
d ordering the defendant Bureau of Energy Development to issue its
corresponding formal written affirmation and confirmation of the coal operating

contract, Exhibit "A", and to expeditiously cause the conversion thereof from
exploration to development/production or exploitation contract in favor of the plaintiff;
e directing the Bureau of Energy Development and the Ministry of Energy to give
due course to plaintiff's application for a coal operating contract for the exploration of
the three additional coal blocks in the plaintiff's Giporlos Coal Project;
f condemning the defendant MMIC to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P3,431,645.00 representing expenditures on the two coal blocks covered by Exhibit
"A" from July 31, 1983 up to May 1984 and such further amounts from said date up
to the finality of this decision to be computed in accordance with the formula adopted
in the report of Sycip, Gorres and Velayo referred to in paragraph 14 of the Amended
Complaint;
g ordering the defendant MMIC to pay the plaintiff the sum of P6,500,000.00
representing rehabilitation expenses to be incurred by plaintiff in putting back the two
coal blocks and the pieces of equipment thereon in the same workable and operating
condition as they were at the time they were taken possession of by said defendant
MMIC and the defendant PNB shall be subsidiarily liable therefor;
h condemning the defendants MMIC and PNB jointly and solidarily liable to pay
the plaintiff moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, as exemplary damages of
P200,000.00 and the amount of P200,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
i declaring the extra-judicial foreclosure sale executed for and in behalf of the
defendant Philippine National Bank of the mining equipment and other movable
property which are enumerated in Exh. "ooo" and which are part of the Giporlos Coal
Project, as null and void and of no force and effect as against the plaintiff; in the
event of the loss or deterioration of the said mining equipment and other movable
property, the said defendants PNB and MMIC shall be held jointly and solidarily liable
to the plaintiff for the current market value thereof; and
j ordering the defendants MMIC and PNB to pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 26
PNB and IEI filed separately motions for the reconsideration of said summary judgment. 27 PNB
alleged that the lower court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the action as
the MOA between MMIC and IEI was an incident arising out of a mining claim which was within the
jurisdiction of the BED. Moreover, the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings which PNB
effected on said properties was a genuine material issue which was not determinable through summary
judgment. Inasmuch as the merit of the case was resolved through summary judgment, PNB was denied
its constitutional right to due process. Furthermore, the award of damages to IEI was improper as PNB
was not a party to the MOA.

For its part, IEI contended that the decision failed to award consequential damages in its favor
considering the finding that MMIC and PNB acted in bad faith and that it failed to realize profits of
about P14.5 million on the confirmed coal reserves of 3,485,915 metric tons computed at P4.17 per
metric ton.
On the other hand, the public defendant and MMIC filed their respective notices of appeal to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. 28

On July 14, 1986, IEI filed a motion for execution pending appeal 29 alleging that MMIC had failed and
refused to fulfill its obligations under the MOA and that it even allowed the PNB to unlawfully foreclose the
mortgage on the heavy equipment and other movable properties in the Giporlos Coal Project. According
to IEI, to allow this situation to persist would only aggravate the damages suffered by all concerned
parties. It added that the grant of the motion for execution pending appeal would not only stop the
continuing injury to the common weal but it would also hasten the day when the coal blocks could be
placed in useful production to provide gainful employment to the people in the community. By the same
token, IEI averred, granting of the motion would accelerate realization of scarce foreign exchange savings
occasioned by the local production of a substitute energy source that would thereby contribute to the
relief of an ailing economy.

This motion was opposed by the public defendant, the MMIC and the PNB. 30 The public defendant
averred that the execution of the decision "would cause great irreparable damage and injury to public
interest" and that there were no "good reasons" of superior circumstance that demand urgency of the
execution pending appeal. MMIC opposed the motion on the ground that the court had lost jurisdiction
after the perfection of its appeal while PNB's objection was on the ground that there were no good
reasons to justify the issuance of a writ of execution and that the issuance thereof was premature.

In its order of September 15, 1986, the lower court denied the motions for reconsideration of IEI and
PNB for lack of merit. It ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals
considering that the MMIC and the public defendant had filed their notices of appeal on time. It
likewise directed the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal to enforce the April 23, 1986
decision upon the filing of a bond in the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) conditioned on
the payment of damages the defendants might suffer should the court finally rule that the plaintiff
was not entitled to the writ.
In granting the writ of execution, the court held that "the immediate resumption of operation of the
two coal blocks in question became imperative and is of urgent necessity at this time when our
government is in dire need of capitalization to encourage the establishment of business to generate
employment and dollar-producing energy sources." In the court's perception, this was enough
reason to entitle IEI to execution pending appeal pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The corresponding writ having been issued on September 22, 1986, 31 on September 26, 1986,
Pioquinto P. Villapana was appointed Special Sheriff to assist and cooperate with Deputy Sheriff Arturo
Flores in its enforcement. However, execution of the writ was curtailed.

The appeal to the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 12660. On October 14, 1988,
IEI filed a motion to dismiss the case against Minister Velasco on the grounds of IEI's reapplication
for the two coal blocks with the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) and its loss of interest in pursuing the
case against Minister Velasco. 32 The motion was favorably acted upon by the Court of Appeals thereby
effectively dropping Minister Velasco as a defendant in Civil Case No. 8109 through the decision of May
29, 1989, 33 where the Court of Appeals disposed of the appeal as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and
the appeal of plaintiff Industrial Enterprises, Inc., is DISMISSED. The complaint
against the defendants Marinduque Iron Mines Corporation and Minister of Energy is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The case against defendant PNB is remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings.
Cost against appellant Industrial Enterprises, Inc.
SO ORDERED. 34

IEI elevated the decision to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari under G.R. No.
88550 while the PNB filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for the reconsideration of the same
decision. On September 21, 1989, the Court of Appeals resolved the motion for reconsideration with
the following findings:
Considering, therefore, that PNB was impleaded as party defendant only in
connection with its foreclosure of the mortgages on the properties of the principal
defendant MMIC, and considering that the main action against MMIC has been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, there appears to be no cogent reason to continue
the case against PNB which is merely a secondary defendant. There is thus merit in
PNB's contention that since the case against MMIC has been dismissed, the case
against PNB should likewise be dismissed, considering that PNB merely stepped into
the shoes of MMIC.
Moreover, there is no privity of contract between PNB and IEI. Hence, there is no
direct cause of action by IEI against PNB independently of MMIC, it being merely a
foreclosing mortgage creditor of the latter. At any rate, the record shows that there is
an on-going litigation between MMIC stockholders and PNB before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (Civil Case No. 9900) for the annulment of the PNB's extra-judicial
foreclosure of MMIC's mortgaged properties. 35
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals modified its decision of May 29, 1989 by dismissing the
case against the PNB.
Meanwhile, G.R. No. 88550 was eventually decided by this Court on April 18, 1990. 36 In denying the
petition of IEI, the Court held:

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the
question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity
should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the
competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration,
exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues
preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even
when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights
thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only
by our regular courts (Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing
Authority, 153 SCRA 399, at 407).
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the
dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within
the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal
purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.
Pursuant to this Decision, IEI lodged a complaint against MMIC and PNB before the OEA. After due
hearing, a decision was issued by Executive Director W. R. de la Paz on January 25, 1991, with a
decretal portion which reads:

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing, insofar as the Memorandum of Agreement is

concerned, such agreement may already be deemed rescinded and of no force and
effect in view of the re-award made in IEI's favor of the same coal areas subject of
this dispute. However, on the issue of the effects and consequences of the right to
claim damages for unpaid financial obligations and such other damages incidental
thereto, by one party as against the other, this matter may be referred to the regular
courts for appropriate adjudication.
Similarly, this likewise holds true insofar as the foreclosed properties involved in this
case are concerned where respondent Philippine National Bank was impleaded. 37
In accordance with this ruling of the OEA, on March 1, 1991, IEI filed in the lower court a motion to
set Civil Case No. 8109 for hearing. 38 On June 17, 1991, PNB filed a motion to dismiss 39 alleging that
the issue in this case, i.e., the validity of the foreclosure of MMIC's assets, was virtually the same issue
raised before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 9900, "Jesus S. Cabarrus, Jesus
Cabarrus, Jr., Jaime T. Cabarrus, Jose Miguel Cabarrus, Alejandro S. Pastor, Jr., Antonio U. Miranda &
Manuel M. Antonio v. Development Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank," a case filed by
the plaintiffs as stockholders of MMIC in their behalf as well as in behalf of other stockholders, which
prayed, among others, that the foreclosures effected by DBP and PNB on the assets of MMIC be
declared null and void. 40

The motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court on July 10, 1991 on the ground that there was
no substantial identity in the cause of action, the relief sought and the parties in the two cases. 41
As aforestated, the lower court rendered the decision of November 27, 1992 finding MMIC and PNB
jointly and severally liable to IEI for damages and declaring null and void the August 31, 1994
extrajudicial foreclosure sale in Catbalogan, Samar. This was affirmed on December 20, 1994 by the
Court of Appeals under CA-G.R. CV No. 40836.
MMIC did not interpose an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals but the PNB filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari questioning the following "conclusions" of the Court of
Appeals:
(1) there was implied conspiracy or community of design among the defendants to
ruin IEI;
(2) PNB acted in bad faith in including the IEI Giporlos equipment at the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale on August 31, 1984, and
(3) PNB is liable for a quasi-delict.
Petitioner PNB also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that (a) because
Minister Velasco had been dropped as party defendant, PNB was also absolved from liability
because it was solidarily liable with Minister Velasco, and (b) IEI's claim against PNB for
actual, consequential and moral damages including attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs of suit, has neither legal nor factual bases.42
In its comment on the petition, private respondent IEI contends in the main that the issues raised by
petitioner PNB are all factual in nature and, therefore, they have no place before this Court. We hold
otherwise.

At the core of the instant petition is the legal question of ownership of the chattels involved at the
time of foreclosure. This issue appears to have been glossed over by the courts below. Equally
appropriate for determination by this Court is the legality of the foreclosure proceedings on the
assets of the MMIC. These two issues are the keys to the resolution of the instant petition.
Privity between MMIC and private respondent was established by the execution of the MOA. An
important issue then is whether or not the chattels mortgaged to petitioner were covered by the MOA
so as to legally subject the same chattels to MMIC's ownership and, eventually, to the foreclosure
proceedings.
The MOA was an assignment of private respondent's "rights and interests on the Coal Operating
Contract described in the first whereas clause" thereof. In its most general and comprehensive
sense, an assignment is "a transfer or making over to another of the whole of any property, real or
personal, in possession or in action, or of any estate or right therein. It includes transfers of all kinds
of property, and is peculiarly applicable to intangible personal property and, accordingly, it is
ordinarily employed to describe the transfer of non-negotiable choses in action and of rights in or
connected with property as distinguished from the particular item or property." 43
An assignment is a contract between the assignor and the assignee. It generally operates by way of
such contract or agreement. It is subject to the same requisites as to validity of contracts. 44 Whether
or not a transfer of a particular right or interest is an assignment or some other transactions depends, not
on the name by which it calls itself, but on the legal effect of its provisions. This rule applies in
determining whether a particular transaction is an assignment or a sale. 45

As the aforequoted portions of the MOA state, its subject is described in the "whereas clauses"
thereof as follows:
WHEREAS, IEI is the duly authorized operator over two coal blocks over an area
outlined and more particularly described in Annex "A" of the Coal Operating Contract
entered into on the 27th day of July 1979 and between the Ministry of Energy,
through the Bureau of Energy Development ("BED"), and IEI; the Coal Operating
Contract and Annex A thereof being hereto attached and made an integral part of
this contract;
Annex "A" of the coal operating contract is the technical description of the 2,000-hectare
coal-bearing land in Carbon, Magsaysay, Eastern Samar. Therefore, as expressed in the
MOA, the subject of the assignment was only private respondent's rights and interests over
the coal operating contract covering said coal-rich land in Eastern Samar.
However, a close scrutiny of the contract reveals that the MOA includes all tangible things found in
the coal-bearing land. Unquestionably, rights may be assigned as they are intangible personal
properties. The term "interests," on the other hand, is broader and more comprehensive than the
word "title" and its definition in a narrow sense by lexicographers as any right in the nature
of property less than title, indicates that the terms are not considered synonymous. 46 It is practically
synonymous, however, with the word "estate" which is the totality of interest which a person has from
absolute ownership down to naked possession. 47 An "interest" in land is the legal concern of a person in
the thing or property, or in the right to some of the benefits or uses from which the property is
inseparable. 48

That the MOA conveyed to MMIC more than the title to or rights over the coal operating contract but
also the "things" covered thereby, is manifest in the manner by which the parties, particularly private
respondent IEI, implemented the MOA. It disclosed the intention to include in the MOA the

equipment and machineries used in coal exploration. This intention is evident in the following letters
of private respondent: (1) letter of April 16, 1984 to Alfredo Velayo, President of MMIC, where private
respondent, through Cabarrus, included in the conditions for the negotiated rescission of the MOA,
the payment to private respondent of the amount of ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) for expenses
such as those for the "recondition (of) the equipment which have been left to the elements;" 49 (2)
letter of May 2, 1984 to Velayo, where private respondent mentioned a "list of probable equipment(s) that
IEI would be interested to apply as part payment in the event of rescission of contract;" 50 (3) letter of June
4, 1984 to Zalamea as Chairman of the Board of the MMIC, 51 where private respondent attached an
updated statement of account and the expenses for rehabilitation of equipment, and (4) letter of August
15, 1984 to petitioner and the DBP where private respondent enclosed a copy of "the movable properties
included in said Memorandum of Agreement" of August 1983. 52Notably, all these listed equipment were
sold at the foreclosure sale initiated by petitioner. 53

Also worth noting is the absence of proof that, like a good father of the family, private respondent
exerted some effort to take the chattels out of the premises upon the execution of the MOA. All that
private respondent proved, through the testimony of Cabarrus, was that the equipment and
machineries were taken over by MMIC, piled up and left to rot that trees even grew on
them. 54 Coupled with this is private respondents' failure to prove the presence of insurmountable
force 55 that would have prevented it from retrieving its equipment and machineries from the Giporlos
Project area. All these show that private respondent considered these chattels as subjects of the MOA.

Private respondent had all the right to exclude these chattels from the MOA because they were not
expressly stipulated therein. However, its sheer inaction upon the execution of the MOA and its
subsequent admissions through the aforesaid letters, conclusively show that these equipment and
machineries were subjects of the assignment of rights to MMIC. It was only when the foreclosure
sale was about to take place that private respondent lifted a finger to object thereto on the ground
that the consideration stipulated in the MOA had not yet been paid by MMIC.
Moreover, while the MOA was expressly a contract for the assignment of rights and interests, it is in
fact a contract of sale. Under Art. 1458 of the Civil Code, by the contract of sale, one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing,
and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. By the MOA, private
respondent obligated itself to transfer ownership of the coal operating contract and the properties
found therein. The coal operating contract is a determinate thing as it has been particularly
designated in the MOA. The subject of the coal operating contract was physically segregated from
all other pieces of coal-rich Eastern Samar property by the technical description attached to said
contract. 56A list of the equipment and machineries found on the property might not have been attached
to the MOA but these were itemized with specificity in private respondent's letter of August 15, 1984.

Private respondent delivered the properties subject of the contract to MMIC, which immediately
gained control and possession of the Giporlos Project. This is explicit in private respondent's
numerous demand letters 57 which are exemplified by its letter of February 7, 1984 to Zalamea which
states:

Considering that all details necessary to determine the final purchase price are in
place; considering that the property has already been transferred in your name; and
considering finally that cash payment is stipulated in the contract, demand is hereby
respectfully made for the payment of the purchase price soonest. 58 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Another very telling letter of private respondent is that of April 16, 1984 to Mr. Alfredo Velayo,
President of MMIC, which partly reads:

After the Memorandum of Agreement was signed, BED promptly approved the
transfer from IEI to MMIC. After the price was fixed with the assistance of SGV and
BED, MMIC took over the entire project last July 1983. . . . 59
For its part, MMIC never denied that it had taken possession and control over the Giporlos Project.
In its replies to private respondent's demand letters, MMIC in fact acknowledged its obligations
under the MOA while professing incapacity to fulfill the same.
If the MOA merely embodied an assignment of rights over the coal-operating contract and the
properties found in the Giporlos Project and not a sale thereof, then private respondent would not
have insisted on the payment of MMIC's obligations under the MOA by attaching a statement of
account to most of its demand letters. 60 In assignments, a consideration is not always a requisite,
unlike in sales. Thus, an assignee may maintain an action based on his title and it is immaterial whether
or not he paid any consideration therefor. 61 Furthermore, in an assignment, title is transferred but
possession need not be delivered. 62 In this case, private respondent transferred possession over the
subjects of the "assignment" to MMIC.

Since the MOA was actually a contract of sale, MMIC acquired ownership over the Giporlos Project
when private respondent delivered it to MMIC. Under the Civil Code, unless the contract contains a
stipulation that ownership of the thing sold shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the
price, 63 ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery thereof. 64 In other words, payment of the purchase price is not essential to the transfer of
ownership as long as the property sold has been delivered. 65 Such delivery (traditio) operated to divest
the vendor of title to the property which may not be regained or recovered until and unless the contract is
resolved or rescinded in accordance with law. 66

Consequently, the properties in the Giporlos Project were, therefore, owned by MMIC
notwithstanding its failure to pay the consideration stipulated in the MOA. Private respondent, after
such delivery and MMIC's continuous refusal to pay the consideration for the contract, correctly
opted to rescind the contract. 67 That private respondent did not succeed in collecting payment prior to
the filing of the complaint for rescission with damages is a fault entirely attributable to MMIC which at the
time, acted upon the orders of government authorities.

It is erroneous for private respondent and the courts below to impute bad faith on the part of
petitioner for foreclosing the properties in the Giporlos Project. Petitioner was simply acting in
accordance with its rights as mortgagee. The MTA, as amended, clearly provides that the mortgage
covers even "after-acquired" properties. Because petitioner was simply implementing this contractual
provision of the MTA, its knowledge that MMIC had not yet paid the consideration stipulated in the
MOA could not have resulted in foreclosure in bad faith. After all, petitioner was a total stranger as
regards the MOA.
Similarly, neither may petitioner be deemed to have conspired with MMIC and government
authorities in divesting private respondent of its rights over the Giporlos Project. Petitioner's
involvement consisted in its exercising its right to foreclose the mortgage only after the MOA, which
effectively wrenched the Giporlos Project from private respondent's control, had become a fait
accompli. A lawful act, done in a lawful way, no matter how damaging the result, never lays the basis
for a claim of fraudulent conspiracy. 68 That a scheme to favor the financially strapped MMIC over
private respondent had been hatched and was in existence when the MOA was executed is now beyond
this Court's adjudicatory power. Suffice it to state that an action may be maintained against persons who
falsely and fraudulently recommend an insolvent person as worthy of credit, by reason of which plaintiff is
induced to trust him. 69

In view of the noninvolvement of petitioner in the alleged conspiracy to strip private respondent of
the its rights over the Giporlos Project, petitioner cannot be made solidarily liable with the MMIC for
damages. However, although petitioner's rights to foreclose the mortgage and to subject the
equipment of private respondent to the foreclosure sale are unassailable, we find that the
foreclosure proceedings fell short of the requirements of the law.
The provision of the MTA vesting petitioner as trustee with the authority to choose the place where
the sale of the properties involved therein should be made is clearly in contravention of the following
provisions of Act No. 3135 as amended:
Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside the province in which the property
sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be
made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the
municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.
The Giporlos Project is situated in Eastern Samar, a province separate and distinct from
Samar where the foreclosure sale took place. 70 Hence, the foreclosure sale is null and void.
Even the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508) relied upon by private respondent in assailing the
propriety of the public auction sale in Samar, provides that the said sale should be made "in the
municipality where the mortgagor resides" or "where the property is situated." 71It has not been
established that petitioner considered Catbalogan, Samar where the foreclosure sale was
conducted, as its "residence."

Moreover, the designation of a special sheriff to conduct the foreclosure sale is questionable.
According to Sheriff Malindog, he was designated as a special sheriff by the judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Samar, through the clerk of court, upon the request of petitioner's counsel, one Atty.
Aliena, even though there was a sheriff in Eastern Samar. 72
Appointment of special sheriffs for the service of writs of execution or for the purpose of conducting a
foreclosure sale under Act No. 3135 is allowed only when there is no sheriff in the area where the
property involved is located or when the sheriff himself is involved in the action. This restriction is
founded on the requirement of law that sheriffs who take delivery of money or property in trust must
be duly bonded. 73 The said situations calling for the appointment of a special sheriff being absent in this
case, the appointment of Malindog as a special sheriff by the judge of the Regional Trial Court of Samar
is unauthorized. Such lack of authority resulted in the nullification of the foreclosure sale conducted by
Malindog.

Ordinarily, by the nullification of the foreclosure sale, the properties involved would revert to their
original status of being mortgaged. 74 However, the situation in this case is an exception to that rule. The
MOA, the source of MMIC's right of ownership over the properties sold at the foreclosure sale, has been
rescinded. Consequently, petitioner should exclude said properties from the MMIC's properties which
were mortgaged pari passu to the petitioner and DBP through the MTA. However, since the foreclosed
properties had been turned over to the Asset Privatization Trust, 75 petitioner must reimburse private
respondent the value thereof at the time of the foreclosure sale.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar
as it renders petitioner solidarily liable with Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation for
damages and AFFIRMED insofar as it nullifies the foreclosure sale of August 31, 1984. Petitioner
Philippine National Bank shall exclude the properties sold at the foreclosure sale from the mortgaged
properties of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation and return the same to private
respondent Industrial Enterprises Inc. or, should such return be not feasible, reimburse said private
respondent the value thereof at the time of the foreclosure sale.

G.R. No. 172409

February 4, 2008

ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioners Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. and Oscar Tocmo assail the Court of
Appeals2 Decision dated 12 January 2006 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 87572 and its Resolution3 dated 10
April 2006 denying their Motion for Reconsideration.4
The following are the antecedents.
On 9 April 2002, private respondent Jose Martillos (respondent) filed a complaint against petitioners
for illegal dismissal and money claims such as the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
plus full backwages, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, litigation expenses, underpayment of
holiday pay and other equitable reliefs before the National Capital Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR South Sector Case No. 30-0401856-02.
Respondent alleged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic sometime in 1988 but was not
made to sign any employment contract by petitioners. As driver mechanic, respondent was assigned
to work at Carmona, Cavite and he worked daily from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at the rate of P200.00
a day. He was also required to work during legal holidays but was only paid an additional 30%
holiday pay. He likewise claimed that he had not been paid service incentive leave and 13th month
pay during the entire course of his employment. On 16 March 2002, his employment was allegedly
terminated without due process.5
Petitioners denied respondents allegations. They contended that respondent had been hired on
several occasions as a project employee and that his employment was coterminous with the
duration of the projects. They also maintained that respondent was fully aware of this arrangement.
Considering that respondents employment had been validly terminated after the completion of the
projects, petitioners concluded that he is not entitled to separation pay and other monetary claims,
even attorneys fees.6
The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent had been illegally dismissed after finding that he had
acquired the status of a regular employee as he was hired as a driver with little interruption from one
project to another, a task which is necessary to the usual trade of his employer.7 The Labor Arbiter
pertinently stated as follows:
x x x If it were true that complainant was hired as project employee, then there should have
been project employment contracts specifying the project for which complainants services
were hired, as well as the duration of the project as required in Art. 280 of the Labor Code.
As there were four (4) projects where complainant was allegedly assigned, there should
have been the equal number of project employment contracts executed by the complainant.
Further, for every project termination, there should have been the equal number of
termination report submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the

record shows that there is only one termination [report] submitted to DOLE pertaining to the
last project assignment of complainant in Carmona, Cavite.
In the absence of said project employment contracts and the corresponding Termination
Report to DOLE at every project termination, the inevitable conclusion is that the
complainant was a regular employee of the respondents.
In the case of Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 539, 556 [1998], citing capital Industrial
Construction Group v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 469, 473-474 [1993], it was ruled therein that a
project employee may acquire the status of a regular employee when the following concurs:
(1) there is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after the cessation of a project;
and (2) the tasks performed by the alleged "project employee" are vital, necessary and
indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Both factors are present in the
instant case. Thus, even granting that complainant was hired as a project employee, he
eventually became a regular employee as there was a continuous rehiring of this services.
xxx
In the instant case, apart from the fact that complainant was not made to sign any project
employment contract x x x he was successively transferred from one project after another,
and he was made to perform the same kind of work as driver.8
The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate sum of P224,647.17
representing backwages, separation pay, salary differential, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay
and 13th month pay.9
Petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision on 17 December 2003. On 29 December
2003, the last day of the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, petitioners filed a
Memorandum of Appeal10 before the NLRC and paid the appeal fee. However, instead of posting the
required cash or surety bond within the reglementary period, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension
of Time to Submit/Post Surety Bond.11 Petitioners stated that they could not post and submit the
required surety bond as the signatories to the bond were on leave during the holiday season, and
made a commitment to post and submit the surety bond on or before 6 January 2004. The NLRC did
not act on the motion. Thereafter, on 6 January 2004, petitioners filed a surety bond equivalent to
the award of the Labor Arbiter.12
In a Resolution13 dated July 29, 2004, the Second Division of the NLRC dismissed petitioners
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The NLRC stressed that the bond is an indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal by the employer and that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. In addition, the NLRC
restated that its Rules of Procedure proscribes the filing of any motion for extension of the period
within which to perfect an appeal. The NLRC summed up that considering that petitioners appeal
had not been perfected, it had no jurisdiction to act on said appeal and the assailed decision, as a
consequence, has become final and executory.14 The NLRC likewise denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration15 for lack of merit in another Resolution.16 On 11 November 2004, the NLRC issued
an entry of judgment declaring its resolution final and executory as of 9 October 2004. On
respondents motion, the Labor Arbiter ordered that the writ of execution be issued to enforce the
award. On 26 January 2005, a writ of execution was issued.17
Petitioners elevated the dismissal of their appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil
action of certiorari. They argued that the filing of the appeal bond evinced their willingness to comply
and was in fact substantial compliance with the Rules. They likewise maintained that the NLRC

gravely abused its discretion in failing to consider the meritorious grounds for their motion for
extension of time to file the appeal bond. Lastly, petitioners contended that the NLRC gravely erred
in issuing an entry of judgment as the assailed resolution is still open for review.18 On 12 January
2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the challenged resolution of the NLRC. Hence, the instant
petition.
Before this Court, petitioners reiterate their previous assertions. They insist on the application of Star
Angel Handicraft v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.19where it was held that a motion for
reduction of bond may be filed in lieu of the bond during the period for appeal. They aver that Borja
Estate v. Ballad,20which underscored the importance of the filing of a cash or surety bond in the
perfection of appeals in labor cases, had not been promulgated yet in 2003 when they filed their
appeal. As such, the doctrine in Borja could not be given retroactive effect for to do so would
prejudice and impair petitioners right to appeal. Moreover, they point out that judicial decisions have
no retroactive effect.21
The Court denies the petition.
The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a
monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten (10)
days from such decision.22 Article 223 of the Labor Code states:
ART. 223. Appeal.Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
xxx
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. Without
said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.23 Indeed, non-compliance with
such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.24 It
must be stressed that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from
the grant of statute.25
Evidently, the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners appeal within the ten (10)-day
reglementary period to perfect the appeal as the appeal bond was filed eight (8) days after the last
day thereof. Thus, the Court cannot ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC or error to the
Court of Appeals in refusing to take cognizance of petitioners belated appeal.
While indeed the Court has relaxed the application of this requirement in cases where the failure to
comply with the requirement was justified or where there was substantial compliance with the
rules,26 the overpowering legislative intent of Article 223 remains to be for a strict application of the
appeal bond requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal and as a burden imposed on
the employer.27 As the Court held in the case of Borja Estate v. Ballad:28
The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal may
be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it

perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the
employer to be
the exclusive means by which an employers appeal may be considered completed. The law
however does not require its outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that
the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. What petitioners have to pay is a
moderate and reasonable sum for the premium of such bond.29
Moreover, no exceptional circumstances obtain in the case at bar which would warrant a relaxation
of the bond requirement as a condition for perfecting the appeal. It is only in highly meritorious cases
that this Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being
done30 and this is not one of those cases.
In addition, petitioners cannot take refuge behind the Courts ruling in Star Angel. Pertinently, the
Court stated inComputer Innovations Center v. National Labor Relations Commission:31
Moreover, the reference in Star Angel to the distinction between the period to file the appeal
and to perfect the appeal has been pointedly made only once by this Court in Gensoli v.
NLRC thus, it has not acquired the sheen of venerability reserved for repeatedly-cited cases.
The distinction, if any, is not particularly evident or material in the Labor Code; hence, the
reluctance of the Court to adopt such doctrine. Moreover, the present provision in the NLRC
Rules of Procedure, that "the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of
the period to perfect appeal" flatly contradicts the notion expressed in Star Angel that there is
a distinction between filing an appeal and perfecting an appeal.
Ultimately, the disposition of Star Angel was premised on the ruling that a motion for
reduction of the appeal bond necessarily stays the period for perfecting the appeal, and that
the employer cannot be expected to perfect the appeal by posting the proper bond until such
time the said motion for reduction is resolved. The unduly stretched-out distinction between
the period to file an appeal and to perfect an appeal was not material to the resolution of Star
Angel, and thus could properly be considered as obiter dictum.32
Lastly, the Court does not agree that the Borja doctrine should only be applied prospectively. In the
first place,Borja is not a ground-breaking precedent as it is a reiteration, emphatic though, of long
standing jurisprudence.33It is well to recall too our pronouncement in Senarillos v. Hermosisima, et
al.34 that the judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was
originally passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the
passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, as
is the situation in this case.35
At all events, the decision of the Labor Arbiter appears to be well-founded and petitioners ill-starred
appeal untenable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3181

October 10, 1907

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, defendant-appellant.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellant.
Rafael Palma and P. Salas, for private prosecutors.

CARSON, J.:
The complaint charges the defendant with the crime of seduction (estupro) of a woman over 12 and
under 23 years of age, as defined and penalized in article 443 of the Penal Code, which is as
follows:
The seduction of a virgin over 12 and under 23 years of age, committed by any public
authority, priest, servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or by any person in charge of her
education or guardianship, under any name whatsoever, shall be punished with the penalty
of prision correccional, in its minimum and medium degrees.
Whosoever shall commit incest with his sister or descendant, even though she were older
than 23 years of age, shall incur the same penalty.
Seduction, when committed with fraud by any other person on a woman over 12 years of
age, but under 23, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor.
Any other unchaste abuse committed by the same persons and under similar circumstances
shall be punished with the same penalty.
It is alleged that the defendant seduced Teofila Sevilla under promise of marriage early in the year
1902, at which time she was less than 21 years of age. The complaint was not filed until February,
1906, when she was more than 24 though less than 25 years of age, and was signed, sworn, and
submitted by one Esteban Sevilla, at whose "instance" these proceedings were had, he appearing
as the private prosecutor and alleging that he is the father of the said Teofila Sevilla.
The facts as to the age of the woman were developed at the trial of the case and are not
controverted.
We think that since the complaint was not filed until after the offended party had attained her
majority, criminal proceedings based on the alleged seduction could only be instituted and
maintained at her "instance", and she, and she alone, could file a complaint which would give the
trial court jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complaint having been filed by her father, at
whose instance the proceedings in the case were had, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, and its judgment of conviction should be reversed and the complaint upon which it
was based dismissed. Article 448 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Criminal proceedings for seduction can only be instituted on the complaint of the offended
person or her parents, grandparents, or guardian.

In order to proceed in cases of rape and in those of abduction committed with unchaste
design, the denunciation of the interested party, her parents, grandparents, or guardians,
shall suffice even though they do not present a formal petition to the judge.
If the person injured should, by reason of her age or mental condition, lack the requisite
personality to appear in court, and should, besides, be wholly unprotected, not having
parents, grandparents, brothers, or guardian of person or property to denounce the crime,
the procurador sindico or the or the public prosecutor may do so, acting on the strength of
public rumor.
In all the cases of this article the express or implied pardon of the offended party shall
extinguish penal action or the penalty, if it should have been already imposed on the culprit.
The pardon shall never be presumed, except by the marriage of the offended party with the
offender.
It is contended that these provisions authorize the institution of criminal proceedings by the father in
all cases of seduction because the offense can only be committed upon a woman under age and
legally incapacitated to institute criminal proceedings on her own behalf. But if the father does not
institute such proceedings until after his daughter has attained full age, we are of opinion that he
loses the right so to do, and that this right vestsexclusively in the offended party, unless, of course,
there is some legal impediment, not arising out of nonage, which prevents her from maintaining such
criminal action.
The right to institute criminal proceedings in cases of seduction could not be reposed in the offended
person, her parents, grandparents, and guardian, at one and the same time, without occasioning
grave difficulties in the administration of justice, resulting from the attempts of some of these persons
to institute criminal proceedings contrary to the wish and desire of the others; and that this was not
the intention of the lawmaker becomes manifest in the light of the peculiar provisions of the abovecited article of the Penal Code, whereby the offended party is given the right to pardon the offender
and thus extinguish and destroy the cause of the criminal action, or remit the penalty prescribed by
law, where judgment of conviction has been actually pronounced and sentence imposed.
Hence, although these persons are mentioned disjunctively, the above provision of the Penal Code
must be construed as meaning that the right to institute criminal proceedings in cases of seduction
is exclusively andsuccessively reposed in these persons in the order in which they are named, so
that no one of them has authority to proceed if there is any other person previously mentioned
therein with legal capacity to appear and institute the action.
This construction of the law imposes upon the woman the obligation and the right to determine
whether criminal proceedings shall be instituted for seduction, if it appears that she is of age, and is
not otherwise legally incapacitated from appearing in court to maintain the action at the time when it
is imposed to institute such proceedings.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a woman 23 years old is of age. From that period she is in
the full possession of her civil rights, save only in certain exceptional cases expressly prescribed in
the code. The right to appear and prosecute or defend an action in the courts is not one of these
exceptions, and indeed, it is inherent to the full exercise of civil rights. (For the purpose of this
decision it is not necessary to consider the effect of American legislation as modifying this provision
by reducing the number of years at which woman becomes of age.)

Since the offended party in this case was over 23 but less than 25 years of age at the time when the
complaint was filed, it may be well to add that article 321 of the Civil Code, which is as follows
. . . Daughters of the family who are of full age but less than 25 years old can not abandon the
paternal roof without permission of the father or of the mother in whose company they live, unless it
be to marry, or when the father or mother have contracted another marriage" does not imply a
limitation to the right of a woman of full age to appear and defend an action, nor confer authority
upon the father to appear for and instead of his daughter in legal proceedings, for this article, since it
confers exceptional authority on the father, must be construed strictly and should not be extended
beyond its own proper terms and the object and purposes indicated therein. (Decisions of the
supreme court of Spain, October 13, 1890.)
lawphil.net

Counsel for the prosecution insists that since no objection was made to the complaint in the court
below, the appellant is not entitled to raise an objection thereto for the first time in this court, and
should be held to have waived such objection by his failure to urge it in the trial court. In support of
this contention, he cites the case of the United States vs. Sarabia (4 Phil. Rep., 566), wherein this
court, adopting the general rule in the United States, that an objection to the complaint to be
available in the appellate court must have been raised below, held "that no objection to a complaint
based upon a defective statement, either in the matter of form or substance of "the acts or omissions
complained of" as required by section 6, paragraph 3, of General Orders, No. 58, not made in the
court below" will be available in the Supreme Court.
It is to be observed, however, that under the provisions of the above-cited article 448 of the Penal
Code, jurisdiction over the crime of seduction is expressly denied the trial court unless such
jurisdiction be conferred by one of certain persons specified in the law; in this case, as we have
seen, by the offended person herself. The objection in this case is not, strictly speaking, to the
sufficiency of the complaint, but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court over the crime with which
the accused was charged. It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or
on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and, indeed,
where the subject matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero
motu. (4 Ill., 133; 1 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an
objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. Hence, the
accused in a criminal case can not, by express waiver or otherwise, confer jurisdiction on a court
over an offense as to which such jurisdiction has not been conferred upon such court by law.
(Harkness vs. Hyde, 98 U.S., 476; Nazos vs. Cragin, 3 Dill (U.S.), 474; 3 Tex., 157; 2 5 Mich.,
331; 3 Ohio St., 223; 4 82 Wis., 664; 91 Ill., 311. 5 ) Counsel further contends that since the offended
party appeared in court and testified, she may be said to have instituted the proceedings, as
provided in article 448, although the complaint is signed and sworn to by her father. It may be
sufficient answer to this contention to point out that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
proceedings were, in fact, had at the instance of the daughter rather than the father, the fact that she
appeared and gave testimony not justifying such conclusion because, being duly subpoenaed, she
would have been compelled so to do whether she appeared voluntarily or otherwise; but, as has
been shown before, the provisions of article 448 are so explicit and so positive that even though it
appears that she had, in fact, taken an active part in all the proceedings, this would not be sufficient
unless the complaint was submitted and the action formally maintained by her. That this is the
meaning of the provisions of the said article becomes clear upon a comparison of the language used
as to proceedings for seduction and proceedings in a case of rape. In proceedings for seduction the
language used expressly provides that they can only be instituted and maintained on the complaint
(a instancia) of the persons therein mentioned; while in cases of rape and those of abduction

committed with dishonest designs, the denunciation (la denuncia) of the interested party, or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, shall suffice, "though they do not present a formal complaint to
the judge" (aunque no formalicen instancias). (U.S. vs. Santos, 4 Phil. Rep., 527.)
The judgment of conviction of the trial court should be, and is hereby, reversed and the complaint
instituted in these proceedings should be, and is hereby, dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.