Contents:

- Municipality vs. Dumdum - IBP vs. Zamora

- Kilosbayan vs.
Morato
- ATO vs. Spouses Ramos - Lim vs. Exec. Secretary - Espina vs. Zamora
- Magallona vs. Ermita
- Oposa vs. Factoran
- Republic vs. Lim
- Villavicencio vs. Lukban - Basco vs. PAGCOR
- Tecson vs. COMELEC
- Taada vs. Angara

- Pamatong vs. COMELEC - In re: Mallare

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs DUMDUM

Suits against Local Government Units

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao against Municipality
of Hagonoy, Bulacan and chief executive Ople for the collection of sum of
money and damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the
year 2000, Lim Chao doing business as KD Surplus, engaged in buying and
selling surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and
related supplies. She was contacted by Ople and they entered into an
agreement with the municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles,
which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental
undertakings in Hagonoy. Lim Chao claimed that because of Oples
earnest representation that funds had already been allocated for the
project, she agreed to deliver 21 motor vehicles whose value totaled
P5,820,000.00.
To prove this, she attached to the complaint copies of the bills of
showing that the items were consigned, delivered to and received by
petitioner municipality on different dates. However, despite having
made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondents claim
for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for the full payment of the said
amount with interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of
preliminary attachment against the municipality. The trial court issued a
writ of preliminary attachment directing the sheriff to "attach the estate,
real and personal properties" of the municipality.

The municipality filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim
on which the action had been brought was unenforceable under the
statute of frauds, pointing out that there was no written contract or
document that would evince the supposed agreement that they entered
into with the respondent. It also filed a motion to dissolve and discharge
the writ of preliminary attachment already issued, invoking, among
others, immunity of the state from suit. The municipality argued that as
a municipal corporation, it is immune from suit and it's properties are by
law exempt from execution and garnishment. Lim Chao on her part
counters that the municipality's claim of immunity from suit is negated
by the local government code which vests municipal corporations with
the power to sue and be sued. CA affirmed the trial court's orders.

ISSUE:
WON the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against the
municipality of Hagonoy is valid.

HELD:
No. The universal rule is that when the state gives its consent to be sued
by private parties either by general or special laws, it may limit
claimant's action only up to the completion of the proceedings anterior
to the stage of execution and that the power of the courts ends when the
judgment is rendered. Municipality is immune from suit notwithstanding
the charter says it can sue and be sued. Since the government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy judgments, it should be based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriations as required by law.

MAGALLONA vs. ERMITA (2011)

The National Territory; Archipelago Doctrine

FACTS:
In 1961, the Congress passed R.A. 3046, following the framing of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), codifying

the sovereign rights of the state over their territorial sea. However, the
breadth of which was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during
UNCLOS II in 1960 were also futile.

In March 2009, the Congress amended R.A. 3046 by enacting R.A. 9522,
aiming to be compliant with UNCLOS III in 1984, which prescribes the
water-land ratio, length, and contour of the baselines of archipelagic
states like the Philippines. RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized
the location of some basepoints around the archipelago, and classified
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as regimes of
islands generating their own applicable maritime zones.

(1) the petition's compliance with the case or controversy

requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners' alleged
lack of locus standi
(2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522

ISSUES:
1.

Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit;

2.

Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper

remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522;
Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

3.

HELD:
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their
respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or legislators," assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely:
(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power, in violation of Article
1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of

1.

constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the case

which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance. Owing to
the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to
find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest"
to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for
granting citizenship standing.

Paris and ancillary treaties, and

(2) RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's nuclearfree policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.

2.

Respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of

certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue in the
absence grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial
powers. However, when this Court exercises its constitutional
power of judicial review, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs
of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test
the constitutionality of statutes.

3.

Petitioners claimed that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522's treatment of the KIG as

"regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area
but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

We recognize petitioners' locus standi as citizens with

the national territory" because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III

The respondents, in turn, raised issued regarding:

demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and

related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national
territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

FACTS:
This court, however, holds that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with
the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones,
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelves

The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, ordered the

segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been
permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. About
midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from
the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and Lukban, descended upon
the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and
placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The
women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken
to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that
they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked
if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly
nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The
involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The

women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco

that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of

decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing the States authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
Even under petitioners' theory that the Philippine territory
embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area
delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines
would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because
this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with
UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role
in the acquisition, enlargement or, diminution of territory.
RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines' maritime zones and continental shelf.
Absence of RA 9522 (a) sends an open invitation to the seafaring
powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and

Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and

submarine areas around our archipelago; and (b) it weakens the

Rafael Castillo. The governor and the haciendero Yigo, who appear

country's case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime

space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines
in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution
and our national interest.
The petition is DISMISSED.

as parties in the case, had no previous notification of the histories

of those women.

To

turn

back

in

our

narrative,

about

the

time

the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the

attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of
the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a
member of the Supreme Court.

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO vs. JUSTO LUKBAN (1919)

just

The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann,
admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation,
and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should
have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao,
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not
have any of the women under their custody or control, and because
their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city
of Manila.

women and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court
within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100).

RATIO:
1.

On the first issue, the courts decision is based on the principle of

Republicanism wherein, Ours is a government of laws and not of
men. Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed

that, No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of

The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, to bring

before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived
of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three

optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the
bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2)
they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or
infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the
court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not mayor Lukban who is an officer of the state, to

eradicate vices in its city, has the right to deport said women of
ill-repute?

2.

Whether or not the city of manila does not have a jurisdiction to

issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao city to produce the body of
the women since it is out of their jurisdiction and thus, disobeying
the writ issued by the court to produce the body of the women?

HELD:
The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of
court for not following the order of the court to produce the body of the

his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or

exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The
courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual
liberty and to punish official transgressors.
2.

On the second issue, the court believed that the true principle
should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and
thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to
set the individual at liberty.
In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under
no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of
Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same
means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person

who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The
great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Filipino First policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the

phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

NOTE: HABEAS CORPUS as defined by the Black Law Dictionary Literally

means- That you have the body. It is a writ employed to bring a person
before a court, most frequently to ensure that the partys imprisonment
or detention is not illegal. In addition to being used to test the legality of
the arrest or commitment, the writ maybe used to obtain review of (1)
the regularity of the extradition process (2) the right to or amount of bail
or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has imposed a criminal sentence.
In other words, it is a writ which compels someone to produce the body
of the person under the name of the law.

ISSUE:
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from
integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized?

RULING:
The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement
establishing the WTO.

TAADA vs. ANGARA

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from
FACTS:
Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of
the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization

participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic

globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the
Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

(WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of
the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended
that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,

services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality
and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It
did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an

exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on

foreign competition that is unfair.

The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national

economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community. As explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country
that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for
even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic
seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international
community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public
utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and
trade without discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional
as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and
reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust
industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed,
Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a
policy of laissez faire.

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles

require the State to develop an independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino
labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and
legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action.
Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles
relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy
that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion
of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the
alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and
judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity
with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism
by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not
impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members,
may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not
a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise
of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was
a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review.

That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to
whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people
should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO
Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political
desire of a member.

IBP vs ZAMORA
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, civilian supremacy over
military

FACTS:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on
constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to
join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around

Invoking his powers as commander-in-chief under Section 8 Article 7 of

the Constitution, Estrada directed AFP chief of staff and PNP chief to
coordinate with each other and he also declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign would be temporary until such time
the situation has improved.

IBP filed a petition to annul the LOI and declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
1. WON the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WON the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military. *
*mao ni ang important issue

the metro.

HELD:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, ordered PNP and the marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression.

Secretary of National Defense, Chief of Staff of AFP and Chief of PNP and
Secretary of Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute said
order.

The joint patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, was placed under the
leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Letter if Instruction was
formulated through Chief Police Superintendent Aglipay. LOI detailed the
patrol's concepts, purpose and mission.

NO. IBP failed to sufficiently show it is in possession of the requisites of

standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, Estrada did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction nor
did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the
constitution.

IBP anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
law and constitution, but they asserted no other basis in its support of its
locus standi (legal standing). Their invocation is solely on their duty to
preserve the rule of law. It is not sufficient to clothe its standing and it is
just a general interest which is shared by other groups.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court
may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there
is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of
the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents

decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to

discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the

Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation
of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does
not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in
the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint
visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Lim vs. Exec Secretary
Facts:
Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition attacking the constitutionality of Balikatan-02-1. They were
subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both
party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and
Ersando filed suits in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers.
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand, claimed that certain
members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and
hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in
Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that Balikatan-02-1 is not covered by the Mutual

Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and the United States.
Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military
assistance in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the
Philippines or the US. Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in
combat
operations
in
Philippine
Territory.
Issue:
Is the Balikatan-02-1 inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?
Ruling:
The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines
and the US and it is the VFA which gives continued relevance to it.
Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to the current Balikatan
exercise.
The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from
engaging war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided
for in the Terms of Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that
were raised by the petitioners was only based on fear of future violation
of
the
Terms
of
Reference.
Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of
Balikatan-02-1 joint military exercise has not intruded into that
penumbra of error that would otherwise call for the correction on its
part.
The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.

Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners

dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered - ordering
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber license agreements.
- and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the
TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of
humankind-- the natural lawand violative of plaintiffs' right to selfpreservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the
lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences
of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.

ISSUE:
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN (1993)
Declaration of Principles and State Policies

FACTS:
This is a class suit filed by 44 minors, through their parents, claiming that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn"
against the Secretary of the DENR. The petition bears upon the right of

Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children
had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment

carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the

succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to
sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on nonimpairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police

also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the
"new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987
Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and there
is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII
and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution.

power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation was created by
Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right

virtue of P.D. 1067 A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a

to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of Principles

franchise under P.D. 1067 B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish,

and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it

operate, and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the

territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. On June 22, 1978, P.D. 1399
was passed for PAGCOR to fully attain its objective. Subsequently, on
July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law.

does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights
enumerated in the latter:
[it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation,
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions.
The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is fundamental,
constitutionalised, self-executing and judicially enforceable. It
imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco
being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of
Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged
grounds mentioned above.

The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both

HELD:

for others of their generation and for succeeding generations as the

No. On petitioner's allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Section 11

(Personality Dignity), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II;
Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2(Educational
Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also
that these facts are merely statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be
passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principle. Every
law has in its favour the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, for
PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and
equivocal one. In other words, the ground for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. Based on the grounds raised by the petitioner
to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.

minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at

the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.
BASCO vs. PAGCOR

FACTS:
Petitioners, Atty. Humberto Basco, seek to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. They

PAMATONG vs. COMELEC

Declaration of Principles and State Policies

FACTS:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. COMELEC
declared Pamatong and 35 others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions
which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to equal access to
opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article 2 of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the constitutional provision ensuring equal access to opportunities
for public service grants a constitutional right to run or hold public
office.

HELD:
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Also, the equal access provision is a subsumed part of
Article 2 of the Constitution. The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self executing.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates and outlined instances
wherein the COMELEC may motu proporio refuse to give due course to or
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case

of candidates for national positions because the election process
becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign allowed are to run. Their names would have to be listed in the
Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and Official
Ballots. This would entail additional costs to the government.
It serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if
they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of
winning, no matter how slim. It would be then senseless sacrifice on the
part of the State.
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to
PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000
per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity.
Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may
purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was
filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of
Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It
is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding
public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of
the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease.
There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is
advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not
have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners
do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
contract

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without

discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the
standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on
real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually
involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is
not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law
of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed
upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question
in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause
of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding
involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form
separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is
free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of
the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.
STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the
petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

Category B

US$2,500,000.00 up but less

than US$7,500,000.00

For the first two years of R.A.

8762's effectivity, foreign ownership
is allowed up to 60%. After the twoyear period, 100% foreign equity
shall be allowed.

Category C

US$7,500,000.00 or more

May be wholly owned by foreigners.

Foreign investments for establishing
a store in Categories B and C shall
not be less than the equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of US$830,000.00.

Category
D

US$250,000.00 per store of

foreign enterprises
specializing in high-end or
luxury products

May be wholly owned by foreigners.

On October 11, 2000, Espina, together with the other members of the
House of Representatives, filed a petition assailing the constitutionality
of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
a)

economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal

Espina vs. Zamora (2010)

Declaration of Principles and State Policies

FACTS:
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada signed into law R.A. 8762,
or the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, expressly repealing R.A.
1180 which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the
retail business in the Philippines. The new law, however, now allows
them to do so under the following categories:
Category A

Less than US$2,500,000.00

Exclusively for Filipino citizens and

corporations wholly owned by
Filipino citizens.

The law contradicts Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the

Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national

b)

c)

distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full

employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair
competition and trade policies.
It lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together
with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in
the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino
retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and

d)

e)

bring about more unemployment.

The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly
imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a
condition for the release of certain loans.
There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote
monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.

2. The provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations

The respondents contended that:
a)

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot

invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not
involve the disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the

b)

c)

d)

fact that they are members of Congress since they made no claim
that the law infringes on their right as legislators.
The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
Petitioners claim that, as members of Congress, they represent
the small retail vendors in their respective districts but the
petition does not allege that the subject law violates the rights of
those vendors.
Petitioners could not specify how the new law violates the
constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of
Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that
are judicially demandable.
The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition
of foreign investments.

ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and
2. WON R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative

failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in
the courts. In other words, although Article II requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a
policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The
objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are
given preference in all areas of development. It takes into account
the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade
policy on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino

goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality
and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has
prejudiced and can prejudice the local small and medium enterprises
since its implementation about a decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.

1. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law
must have locus standi or a legal standing to do so. More particularly,
he must show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the law he
complains of.
Here, there is no clear premise showing that the implementation of
the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts
damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM (2004)

FACTS:
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese
father and a Filipina mother, who never got married due to a prior
subsisting marriage of her father. The respondent petitioned that there
were few mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to wit:

election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine

citizenship.

1. That her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using
Yu in all of her school records and in her marriage certificate.
2. That her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To
(Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have
been Filipino considering that her father and mother got married.
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate
when in fact, it should have been illegitimate. Both the trial court
and Court of Appeals granted the respondents petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of
the citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim from Chinese to
Filipino despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any
compliance with the legal requirements for election of citizenship.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in allowing respondent to
continue using her fathers surname despite its finding that
respondent is an illegitimate child.

HELD:
1.

No. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority as mandated in Article IV, Section 1(3)
of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act
No. 625. The Supreme Court held that the two above provisions only
apply to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of the
respondent, who was an illegitimate child, considering that her
parents never got married. By being an illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon
birth, and as such, there was no more need for her to validly elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Also, she
registered as a voter inside the country when she reached 18 years
old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in

2.

No. The Republics submission was misleading. The Court of Appeals

did not allow respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did
allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which
she has been using ever since she can remember. The court held
that prohibiting the respondent to use her fathers surname would
only sow confusion. Also, Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142
which regulates the use of aliases as well as the jurisprudence state
that it is allowed for a person to use a name by which he has been
known since childhood. Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the
illegitimate children of their father from using his surname. While
judicial authority is required for a chance of name or surname,
there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname
which a person has already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the
false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the
extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability
cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general. In this case, the
Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably
be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition brought by the

Republic is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

TECSON vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the

forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,

residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence
before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited

representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in

stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of

1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent

Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born
on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which
constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is
legitimate or illegitimate.

position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the

birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ
and cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject.

IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write,
at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the
Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of
Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11,
1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such
death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San
Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of

The Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo, complained

and petitioned the Court for the investigation of the citizenship of
Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5,
1962, for the purpose of determining whether his name should be
stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the
Philippines.
After an investigation, a decision was rendered by the Court on April 29,
1968, holding that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that
respondent Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his
death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise
a Chinese national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was
declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was
revoked, and he was ordered to return to the Court, the lawyer's
diploma previously issued to him.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied
.On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening
of the case and for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, the introduction of which could alter the decision previously
promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of (1) an
entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at

Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare

(respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2)
testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his
mother during their lifetime. The court granted the reopening of the
trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of the respondent of his Filipino Nationality is
valid.

HELD:
To support his contention that respondent Florencio Mallare is not a
Filipino, the Commissioner of Immigration presented: Respondent and his
brothers and sisters had failed to establish their claim to Philippine
citizenship; the death certificate of Esteban Mallare dated June 7, 1945,
wherein he was reported to be of Chinese nationality; the birth
certificates of respondent, his brothers and sisters stating that their
father was a Chinese citizen, born in Amoy, China, and wherein
respondent was reported to be a Chinese, born in Macalelon, Quezon;
respondent's alien certificate of registration, dated August 25, 1950.
Upon the other hand, respondent submitted the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon in Civil Case No. 329-G, dated November 18,
1959, upholding the validity of a contract of sale, an order by the Acting
Commissioner of Immigration, canceling respondent's alien certificate of
registration on the strength of the court's decision in Civil Case No. 329G; identification certificate No. 11712 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, declaring respondent "as a citizen of the Philippines by
birth being the legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, a Filipino citizen as
'per order of this office dated 8 June 1960 CEBNO 4223-R'"; final order of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon, dated November 28, 1960, in
Special Proceedings No. 3925, ordering the Municipal Treasurer of
Macalelon, Quezon, to correct the entry in the Registry of Birth book of
the municipality by changing respondent's nationality from "Chinese" to
"Filipino"; respondent's affidavit dated October 7, 1961 showing him to
be a registered voter of Macalelon, Quezon; respondent's passport issued
on March 5, 1962, showing that he is a citizen of the Philippines; opinion
of the Solicitor General, dated July 25, 1962, recognizing respondent

Florencio Mallare as a Filipino citizen; landing certificate of Te Na

(respondent's mother), dated July 7, 1926, wherein she was certified as
"wife of P.I. citizen"; certification by the municipal treasurer of
Macalelon, Quezon that Esteban Mallare was registered in the Registry
List of Voters on April 14, 1928; and the entry in the baptismal registry
of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting
to show that Esteban Mallare was the natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina.
Respondent also presented residents of Macalelon, Quezon. A certain
Damiana Cabangon who attended Ana Mallare during the delivery, when
Esteban was born and baptized. Another is Rafael Catarroja, former
Mayor of Macalelon who declared that he knew Esteban when he was a
child and that he was living with his mother, Ana Mallare, a Tagala, who
was cohabiting with a Chinese. And 2 other witnesses.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of
the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban,
were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had
continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was
reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible
evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation has
been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry,
and on the question of whether a child was born alive.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship. Neither
could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino
divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an
alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14,
and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was
already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine

citizenship. Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a

formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of
Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was
required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to
the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935
Philippine Constitution.
With respect to the registration of respondent as a citizen of China in
1950, it was explained that this was secured by respondent's mother, on
the belief that upon the death of her husband, Esteban Mallare, she and
her children reverted to Chinese citizenship. At any rate, even assuming
that said documents were prepared with actual knowledge and consent
by respondent or by his parents, on the erroneous belief that Esteban
was a non-Filipino, such acts would not cause the loss or forfeiture of
Philippine citizenship which Esteban acquired from his Filipino mother.
The Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of
the decision of April 29, 1968, and a definitive declaration that
respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with
qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.