BULILAN VS.

COA
GR No. 130057

turn over to Ms. Anicia C. Fernandez, VISCA Disbursing

Officer, the payroll money and collections to be needed by the
school while she was out on travel was another indication of
her non-compliance with the internal rules of VISCA.

FACTS:
Petitioner Bulilan was the Cashier of Visaya State
College of Agriculture (VISCA), whose responsibility,
as such Cashier, was to prepare the payroll of
employees of said State College.

VALENZUELA VS. CA
GR No. 115024

Petitioner withdrew from the Land Bank the needed

amount. Since she was scheduled to leave for Baguio
City on the day the payroll was to be released,
according to petitioner, she and her staff rendered
overtime service to make sure that payment of
salaries of the employees would be on time.

FACTS:

The methodology adopted by petitioner in preparing

the salaries of employees was simple. It was based
on the standard practice of government offices, by
placing the net pay of every employee in individual
pay envelopes. When the corresponding amounts
were put in the pay envelopes, the same became too
bulky for the petitioner to accommodate. Confronted
with the problem, she placed such pay envelopes in
a steel cabinet without a lock. According to
petitioner, when she left her office, she saw to it that
its main door was double-locked.

While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue

towards the direction of Manila, Valenzuela noticed
that she had a flat tire so she parked along the
sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency
lights and asked help.

While she was pointing her tools to the man who will
help her fix the tires, she was suddenly hit by
another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard who was
intoxicated and she slammed across his windshield
and fell to the ground.

She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days

and her leg was amputated and was replaced with an
artificial one.

ISSUE: W/N Richard was guilty of gross negligence and liable

for damages under Art. 2176.

A robbery took place resulting to the loss of the

government funds.

HELD: Yes. The only negligence ascribable was the negligence

of Li on the night of the accident.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner was guilty of negligence.

"Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which

creates an undue risk of harm to others."It is the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. Negligence is the want of care required by the
circumstances.

HELD: Yes. Negligence is defined as "the omission to do

something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
man
and
reasonable
man
could
not
do." Stated
otherwise, negligence is want of care required by the
circumstances.

The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the

court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent
in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was
driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy
downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street
slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to
show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these
conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing
conditions on the road were significantly lessened.

Negligence is therefore a relative or comparative concept. Its

application depends upon the situation the parties are in, and
the degree of care and vigilance which the prevailing
circumstances reasonably require. Conformably, the diligence
which the law requires an individual to observe and exercise
varies according to the nature of the situation in which
happens to be, and the importance of the act which he has to
perform.

DULAY VS. CA
G.R. No. 108017

Applying the above contemplation of negligence to the case at

bar, the irresistible finding and conclusion is that the herein
petitioner was negligent in the performance of her duties as
Cashier. She did not do her best, as dictated by the attendant
circumstances, to safeguard the public funds entrusted to her,
as such Cashier.

FACTS:

Upon verification and ocular inspection conducted by the

Resident Auditor, and as confirmed by the COA Director for
Regional Office VIII, it was found out that VISCA had a
concrete vault/room with a steel door secured by a big Yale
padlock, which was very much safer than the unlocked
storage cabinet in which petitioner placed the government
funds in question. It is irrefutable that a locked vault/room is
safer than an unlocked storage cabinet.

What is more, the storage cabinet where subject payroll

money and collections were kept could not be readily seen by
the guard on duty who was usually posted near the main
entrance of the building. The said storage cabinet could only
be seen by the guard whenever he would go to the teller's
window and peep sideways to the left through the window
glass.

Furthermore, it is worthy to consider against the petitioner

her failure to follow the frequency of deposit prescribed by
Joint COA-MOF Circular No. 1-81. It was firmly established
that she did not make a single deposit during the month of
March, 1990. Had she complied with the said circular, the illfated government funds would not have been exposed to the
danger of robbery. Not only that, the failure of petitioner to

On December 7, 1988, due to a heated

argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty
at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed
Atty. Napoleon Dulay
Maria
Benita
A.
Dulay,
widow
of
the
deceased Napoleon Dulay, filed an action for damages
against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm and Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard
Security Corp. (Superguard), the employer of the
accused, for negligence having failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision
and control of its employee to avoid the injury
Superguard
claimed
Torzuela's
act
of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and
was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, which states, Art. 100. Civil liability of a
person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged
that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed
by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under
Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private
respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint

is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in

a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability .
The RTC through Respondent Judge dismissed the
case of Dulay. The CA affirmed the decision.

recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,

married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Superguard and/or Safeguard committed an
actionable breach and can be civilly liable .

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses

Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:

HELD:
YES. This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that
the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the
part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged
that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the
latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was
on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD
was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING

THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT III

It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for

homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action , reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action
before the prosecution in the criminal action presents
evidence is even far better than a compliance with the
requirement of express reservation. This is precisely what
the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private
respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the
same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the
shooting was not attended by negligence.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
QUASI-DELICTS,
ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT
CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN
HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE.
(page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffsappellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on
the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two
decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no

justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Wellentrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the

acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action
for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil
Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained
of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers

not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice
Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault. Thus, the opinion
holds:

Extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,

Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused.

BARREDO, J.:

It is most significant that in the case just

cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been
criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also
made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon

City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion
to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles

365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render

ELCANO VS. HILL

G.R. No. L-24803

almost lifeless a principle of such ancient

origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas

the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a

criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case,
preponderance
of
evidence
is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances
of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the

criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not
really full or absolute.

And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code

Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil
Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted
after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept
of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character
or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter.
Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the
new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations
derived fromquasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article

2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." In
the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on
his father, a situation which is not unusual.

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or

negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the

reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion
with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article
399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of
the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give
rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does
not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child
without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision

(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of
criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasidelict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction
between
criminal
negligence
and
"culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether
on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to

Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer

to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice
Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth
life.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the

trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion.

To borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.

Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability

AFRICA VS. CALTEX

GR No. L-12986
MAKALINTAL., J.:
This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dismissing petitioners' second
amended complaint against respondents.

The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of

the old Civil Code. It appears that in the afternoon of March
18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the
corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started
while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving
tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire
spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including
the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners,
among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex
(Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of
the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation.
Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the
cause of the fire.

fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a

reasonable presumption of negligence in its
installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as
observed by Chief Baron Pollock, "if there are any
facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the
defendant to prove."
It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do
not lay down doctrines binding on the Supreme Court, but we
do not consider this a reason for not applying the particular
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a
highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which
extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not
considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably
from some act of man. A case strikingly similar to the one
before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al., 171
So. 447:

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners
failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised
due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision
of their employees.

Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city

of Hammon which in the year 1934 was leased to the
Shell Petroleum Corporation for a gasoline filling
station. On October 8, 1934, during the term of the
lease, while gasoline was being transferred from the
tank wagon, also operated by the Shell Petroleum
Corporation, to the underground tank of the station,
a fire started with resulting damages to the building
owned by Jones. Alleging that the damages to his
building amounted to $516.95, Jones sued the Shell
Petroleum Corporation for the recovery of that
amount. The judge of the district court, after hearing
the testimony, concluded that plaintiff was entitled to
a recovery and rendered judgment in his favor for
$427.82. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed this judgment, on the ground the testimony
failed to show with reasonable certainty any
negligence on the part of the Shell Petroleum
Corporation or any of its agents or employees.
Plaintiff applied to this Court for a Writ of Review
which was granted, and the case is now before us for
decision.1wph1.t

The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of

certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and
Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the
cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part
of appellees. Both the trial court and the appellate court
refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case on the
grounds that "as to (its) applicability ... in the Philippines,
there seems to he nothing definite," and that while the rules
do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, "in the case
at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine."
The question deserves more than such summary dismissal.
The doctrine has actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in
the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co.
(CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949), wherein the
decision of the Court of Appeals was penned by Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes now a member of the Supreme Court.

In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of

Louisiana held:

The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that

the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence,
but the appellate court overruled the defense under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said:

Predicated on these circumstances and the further

circumstance of defendant's failure to explain the
cause of the fire or to show its lack of knowledge of
the cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the
doctrine may be successfully invoked and this, we
think, is one of them.

The first point is directed against the sufficiency of

plaintiff's evidence to place appellant on its defense.
While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant,
that in case of noncontractual negligence, or culpa
aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish that the proximate cause of his injury was
the negligence of the defendant, it is also a
recognized principal that "where the thing which
caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the
injury is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not occur if he having such control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of the explanation, that the injury arose from
defendant's want of care."

Where the thing which caused the injury complained

of is shown to be under the management of
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
absence of explanation by defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J. #768, p.
1193).

And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to

establish that he has observed due care and
diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena,
244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680.) This rule is known by
the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks
for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at
bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had
every right to be on the highway, and the electric
wire was under the sole control of defendant
company. In the ordinary course of events, electric
wires do not part suddenly in fair weather and injure
people, unless they are subjected to unusual strain
and stress or there are defects in their installation,
maintenance and supervision; just as barrels do not
ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure
passersby, unless some one was negligent. (Byrne v.
Boadle, 2 H & Co. 722; 159 Eng. Reprint 299, the
leading
case
that
established
that
rule).
Consequently, in the absence of contributory
negligence (which is admittedly not present), the

This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has

been widely approved and adopted by the courts of
last resort.
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with
equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned
the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have
known how the fire started were appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano of the
Manila Police Department (Exh. X-1 Africa) the following
appears:

Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed that

the Caltex Gasoline Station complained of occupies a
lot approximately 10 m x 10 m at the southwest
corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo. The location is
within a very busy business district near the Obrero
Market, a railroad crossing and very thickly
populated neighborhood where a great number of
people mill around the gasoline

conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about

harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially
simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person's
innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor from
liability.' (Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, p. 1184,
#439). Stated in another way, "The intention of an
unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve
a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such
negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the
independent cause in the resulting injury." (MacAfee, et al.
vs. Traver's Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)

The actjvities of these peopleor lighting a cigarette

cannot be excluded and this constitute a secondary
hazard to its operation which in turn endangers the
entire neighborhood to conflagration.

The next issue is whether Caltex should be held liable for the
damages caused to appellants. This issue depends on whether
Boquiren was an independent contractor, as held by the Court
of Appeals, or an agent of Caltex. This question, in the light of
the facts not controverted, is one of law and hence may be
passed upon by this Court. These facts are: (1) Boquiren
made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the
time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and all the
equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised control over Boquiren
in the management of the state; (4) the delivery truck used
in delivering gasoline to the station had the name of CALTEX
painted on it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at the
station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees.
(Exhibit T-Africa; Exhibit U-Africa; Exhibit X-5 Africa; Exhibit
X-6 Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa).

Furthermore, aside from precautions already taken

by its operator the concrete walls south and west
adjoining the neighborhood are only 2-1/2 meters
high at most and cannot avoid the flames from
leaping over it in case of fire.
Records show that there have been two cases of fire
which caused not only material damages but
desperation and also panic in the neighborhood.
Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated,
this gasoline service station is also used by its
operator as a garage and repair shop for his fleet of
taxicabs numbering ten or more, adding another risk
to the possible outbreak of fire at this already small
but crowded gasoline station.

In Boquiren's amended answer to the second amended

complaint, he denied that he directed one of his drivers to
remove gasoline from the truck into the tank and alleged that
the "alleged driver, if one there was, was not in his employ,
the driver being an employee of the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or
the owners of the gasoline station." It is true that Boquiren
later on amended his answer, and that among the changes
was one to the effect that he was not acting as agent of
Caltex. But then again, in his motion to dismiss appellants'
second amended complaint the ground alleged was that it
stated no cause of action since under the allegations thereof
he was merely acting as agent of Caltex, such that he could
not have incurred personal liability. A motion to dismiss on
this ground is deemed to be an admission of the facts alleged
in the complaint.

The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police

officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his
own personal observation of the facts reported, may properly
be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These
facts, descriptive of the location and objective circumstances
surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question,
strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more
stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy
the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
There is no more eloquent demonstration of this than the
statement of Leandro Flores before the police investigator.
Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone
and without assistance, was transferring the contents thereof
into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He
said: "Before loading the underground tank there were no
people, but while the loading was going on, there were people
who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is
about a meter from the hole leading to the underground
tank." He added that when the tank was almost filled he went
to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back
turned to the "manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."

Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the

equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted at
the service station in question was owned and operated by
Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with
Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at
the time of the fire. There must have been one in existence at
that time. Instead, what was presented was a license
agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case, since
it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the oneyear period it was intended to operate. This so-called license
agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on November 29,
1948, but made effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to cover
the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This
retroactivity provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the
conclusion that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from
any responsibility with respect to the fire, as shown by the
clause that Caltex "shall not be liable for any injury to person
or property while in the property herein licensed, it being
understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an
employee, representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the
neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission
on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping
over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters
high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized
iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when
subjected to intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also
with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.

But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren

can hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under
that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal
sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the
equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex Products.
Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to
the approval, in other words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could
not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the
consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be
from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter
until terminated by Caltex upon two days prior written notice.
Caltex could at any time cancel and terminate the agreement
in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not
conduct the business with due diligence, in the judgment of
Caltex. Termination of the contract was therefore a right
granted only to Caltex but not to Boquiren. These provisions
of the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over

There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended

answer to the second amended complaint that "the fire was
caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority,
or permission of answering defendant, passed through the
gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the
premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but
assuming the allegation to be true certainly any
unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken
against Boquiren it does not extenuate his negligence. A
decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous
to those of the present case, states the rule which we find
acceptable here. "It is the rule that those who distribute a
dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of protection to the
public proportionate to and commensurate with a danger
involved ... we think it is the generally accepted rule as
applied to torts that 'if the effects of the actor's negligent

Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was virtually an
employee of the former.

Although Mateos infraction was not habitual, we must take

into account the substantial amount lost. In this case, LBC
lost a motorcycle with a book value of P46,000 which by any
means could not be considered a trivial amount. What
happened was not a simple case of oversight and could not be
attributed to a simple lapse of judgment. No amount of good
intent, or previous conscientious performance of duty, can
assuage the damage Mateo caused LBC when he failed to
exercise the requisite degree of diligence required of him
under the circumstances.

Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in the station

belonged to Boquiren. But no cash invoices were presented to
show that Boquiren had bought said gasoline from Caltex.
Neither was there a sales contract to prove the same.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and
respondents-appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants,
and ordered to pay them the aforesaid sum of P9,005.80 and
P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of the
complaint, and costs.

Cangco v. Manila Railroad

30 Phil 768 Civil Law Torts and Damages Distinction of
Liability of Employers Under Article 2180 and Their Liability

LBC EXPRESS VS. MATEO

GR No. 168215

for Breach of Contract

FACTS:

Respondent James Mateo was designated as a

customer associate by petitioner LBC Express
Metro Manila, Inc. (LBC). His job was to deliver and
pick-up packages to and from LBC and its customers.
For this purpose, Mateo was assigned the use of a
Kawasaki motorcycle.

On April 30, 2001 at about 6:10 p.m., Mateo arrived

at LBCs Escolta office, along Burke Street, to drop
off packages coming from various LBC airposts. He
parked his motorcycle directly in front of the LBC
office, switched off the engine and took the key with
him. However, he did not lock the steering wheel
because he allegedly was primarily concerned with
the packages, including a huge sum of money that
needed to be immediately secured inside the LBC
office. He returned promptly within three to five
minutes but the motorcycle was gone. He
immediately reported the loss to his superiors at LBC
and to the nearest police station.

A formal investigation was conducted, initiated by

LBCs Vice President. After investigation, he received
a notice of termination from LBC dated May 30,
2001. He was barred from reporting for work.

Mateo thereafter filed a complaint for illegal

dismissal, payment of backwages and reinstatement
with damages. , The labor arbiter found Mateos
dismissal to be lawful on the ground that he was
grossly negligent. On appeal, the CA ruled that
Mateo was illegally dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mateo was
performance of his duties? YES

grossly

negligent

in

FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of

Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter
and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for
free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he
arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop.
When he was about to alight from the train (which was still
slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of
watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it
was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and
he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered
other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more
as the trainslowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent
in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense
the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to
exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait
for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for
damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing

the

down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so

every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and

May habituality may be dispensed with, specially if the grossly

negligent act resulted in substantial damage to the company?
YES

agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for

him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act
would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also

RULING:
The services of a regular employee may be terminated only
for just or authorized causes, including gross and habitual
negligence under Article 282, paragraph (b) of the Labor
Code.

ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as

there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly
lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the

Gross negligence is characterized by want of even

slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference
to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected

liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for

breach of contract [of carriage]:

Mateo was undisputedly negligent when he left the motorcycle

along Burke Street in Escolta, Manila without locking it
despite clear, specific instructions to do so. His argument that
he stayed inside the LBC office for only three to five minutes
was of no moment. On the contrary, it only proved that he
did not exercise even the slightest degree of care during that
very short time. Mateo deliberately did not heed the
employers very important precautionary measure to ensure
the safety of company property. Regardless of the reasons
advanced, the exact evil sought to be prevented by LBC (in
repeatedly directing its customer associates to lock their
motorcycles) occurred, resulting in a substantial loss to LBC.

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any

negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the
servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever
done within the scope of his employment or not, if the
damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of
the contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always
based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful
intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to
say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by
contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability
to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course
of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself
the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its
essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the
right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.