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Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC

A.C. No. 5305

March 17, 2003

MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner,


vs.
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES,
JR., respondent.
Facts:
In this petition for disbarment, complainant
Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the respondent,
Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully
violated a lawful order of this Court in A.M. No.
MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v.
Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. In the
aforesaid case, respondent is DISMISSED from
the
service
with forfeiture of
all
leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reappointment in any branch, instrumentality or
agency
of
the
government,
including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
Respondents dismissal in the aforesaid case
was ordered after he was found guilty of Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
during his incumbency as presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated
our decree of perpetual disqualification imposed
upon
him
from
assuming
any
post
in government service, including any posts in
government-owned and controlled corporations,
when he accepted a legal consultancy post at
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy included
an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the
Board of Directors of the Urdaneta Water
District. Upon expiration of the legal consultancy
agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a
Special Consultancy Agreement.
Petitioner
contends
that
while
both consultancy agreements
contained
a
proviso to the effect that nothing therein should
be construed as establishing an employeremployee relationship between LWUA and
respondent, the inclusion of this proviso was
only a ploy to circumvent our order barring
respondent from appointment to a government
agency. Petitioner points out in reality,
respondent enjoys the same rights and
privileges as a regular employee.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of
violating the lawful order of the Court.
Ruling:
There is no question that the LWUA is a
government-owned and controlled corporation,
created by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
198. As such, our ruling in the Atienza case,
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically
prohibits respondents appointment to any
position in any government-owned and

controlled corporation, clearly encompasses and


extends to LWUA positions.
In the instant case the respondent does not
deny the petitioners allegations. Instead, he
offers the existence of Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1993 (MC No. 27, s. 1993) to
exculpate himself from the charge against him.
However, it does not escape our attention that
the very Memorandum Circular that respondent
cites before this Court provides that the duties
enumerated in the consultancy contract are
mainly advisory in nature.
Without belaboring the definition of "advisory," it
appears obvious to us that the tasks and duties
that respondent performed pursuant to the
consultancy contract cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be deemed merely advisory in
nature.
An adviser does not exercise supervisory
powers over LWUA employees nor does he
issue written instructions to them. An adviser is
not entitled to a seat in such vital LWUA
committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee.
Also, respondents continuous receipt of
honoraria for sitting as a member of certain
LWUA Committees, particularly the BOT
Committee, belies his claim that he is a mere
consultant for the LWUA. The evidence on
record clearly shows that the LWUA Office
Order implementing National Compensation
Circular No. 75-95 refers to payments of
honoraria to officials/employees in consideration
of services rendered.
The lawyers primary duty as enunciated in the
Attorneys Oath is to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect
for law and legal processes. That duty in its
irreducible minimum entails obedience to the
legal orders of the courts. Respondents
disobedience to this Courts order prohibiting his
reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of government, including government
owned and controlled corporations, cannot be
camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special
consultancy contract. By performing duties and
functions of a contractual employee of LWUA,
by way of a consultancy, and receiving
compensation and perquisites as such, he
displayed acts of open defiance of the Courts
authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath
as an officer of the court. It is also destructive of
the harmonious relations that should prevail
between Bench and Bar, a harmony necessary
for the proper administration of justice. Such
defiance not only erodes respect for the Court
but also corrodes public confidence in the rule of
law.
What aggravates respondents offense is the
fact that respondent is no ordinary lawyer.
Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years,
he is very well aware of the standards of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession.

Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC


His propensity to try to "get away" with an
indiscretion becomes apparent and inexcusable
when he entered into a legal "consultancy"
contract with the LWUA. Perhaps realizing its
own mistake, LWUA terminated said contract
with respondent, but then proceeded to give him
a "special consultancy." This travesty could not
be long hidden from public awareness, hence
the instant complaint for disbarment filed by
petitioner. Given the factual circumstances
found by Commission on Bar Discipline, we
have
no
hesitance
in
accepting
the
recommendation of the Board of Governors,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that
respondent be fined and suspended from the
practice of law. The Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. For violating the Code as
well as transgressing his oath as an officer of
the court, his suspension for one (1) year and a
fine of ten thousand (P10,000) pesos are in
order.
Respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is
found liable for having willfully violated a lawful
order of this Court. He is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year and
ordered to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar conduct
shall be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,


vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
Facts:
Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for
Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for
"grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following
account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when
his then-fiancee Irene Moje introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had
three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000,
complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of
which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet
you at Megamall."

morning of the following day, and sometimes did


not go home from work. When he asked about
her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at
her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she
was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw
Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he
confronted them
following
which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house.
Complainant later found, in the master's
bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words
"I Love You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to
Irene.
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and
that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B
th
11 Street, New Manila where, as he was to
later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was
already residing. He also learned still later that
when his friends saw Irene on or about January
18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.
Respondent contends, in his Comment on the
present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him. Also, respondent, during
the pendency of the investigation of the case
before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation on March 22, 2005 informing the
IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of
his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been
granted, and that the criminal complaint for
adultery complainant filed against respondent
and Irene "based on the same set of facts
alleged in the instant case," which was pending
review before the Department of Justice on
petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.
Issues: Whether or not Eala is guilty of grossly
immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer's oath.
Whether or not the declaration of nullity
of marriage bars the institution of the disbarment
case.
Ruling:
1. While it may be true that the love letter
dated October 7, 2000 and the news
item published in the Manila Standard,
even taken together do not sufficiently
prove that respondent is carrying on an
adulterous
relationship
with
complainant's wife, there are other
pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant
against respondent.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually


went home very late at night or early in the

Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC


It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17
October 2002, respondent through counsel
made the following statements to wit:
"Respondent specifically denies having [ever]
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being [that]their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate
members of their respective families . . . , and
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of the
respondents with respect to his purely personal
and low profile relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his
Answer are an admission that there is indeed
a "special" relationship between him and
complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken
together with the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha
Louise
Irene
Moje sufficiently prove that there was indeed
an illicit relationship between respondent and
Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
"Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of
the child. Given the fact that the respondent
admitted his special relationship with Irene there
is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or
make any misrepresentation regarding the
paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied
that he is the father of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje.
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not
deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of
the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by
any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by
the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared
void." What
respondent
denies
is having flaunted such
relationship, he maintaining that it was "low
profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is
a negative pregnant, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it
was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which
carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying
or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, it has been held that the qualifying

circumstances alone are denied while the


fact itself is admitted.
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship
between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently
proven
by
more
than
clearly preponderant evidence that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party and,
therefore, has greater weight than the other
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a
woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly
immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances. The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly.
2.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
That the marriage between complainant and
Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and
void. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware
that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. In carrying on an extramarital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant
was null and void, and despite respondent
himself being married, he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private
offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for
review. But even if respondent and Irene were to
be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present
administrative complaint.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala,
is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC


A.C. No. 7940

April 24, 2012

RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN


G.R. NO. 161455 UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE
RULES OF COURT,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, Respondents
FACTS:
Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of
the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor
Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City,
requesting financial assistance for his team.
Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent
Abastillas letter to the City Treasurer for
processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated
Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor
Fuentes was away.
Respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D.
Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan
member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy
of Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June
24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren
for alleged illegal disbursement of P10,000.00 in
public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the
complaint a copy of what he claimed was a
falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it
was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who
approved the disbursement.
Aggrieved,
Ferraren
filed
with
the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a
complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification
of public document. The Sandiganbayan found
Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article
172. Atty. Pactolin appealed to the case to the
Supreme Court and it affirmed his conviction.
Since the Court treated the matter as an
administrative complaint against him as well
under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.

This Court has ruled that the crime of


falsification of public document is contrary to
justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to
disbar with great caution.1wphi1 Being the
most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is
imposed only for the most imperative reasons
and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted.
The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although
his culpability for falsification has been
indubitably established, he has not yet served
his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his
offense and shows that he falls short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that
they, of all classes and professions, are most
sacredly bound to uphold the law. The privilege
to practice law is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally. As such,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and
the public at large, with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach. Atty. Rodolfo D.
Pactolin
is
hereby DISBARRED and
his
name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney.
A.C. No. 5141 September 29, 1999
(Formerly CBD Case No. 317)

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be
disbarred after conviction by final judgment of
the crime of falsification.

PRISCILA L. TOLEDO, complainant,


vs.
ATTY. ERLINDA ABALOS, respondent.
FACTS:

HELD
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended
on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of
the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly
or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do.

On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos


obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila
Toledo, payable within six months from date,
plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee
the payment of said obligation, respondent
executed a Promissory Note. After the lapse of
six months, and despite repeated demands,
respondent failed to pay her obligation. Afraid
that she will not recover her money, Ms. Toledo
sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to
the Commission on Bar Discipline.1wphi1.nt

Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC


The Commission issued an order
directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the
letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of
said order, respondent did not answer the
complaint.
On August 17, 1995, Investigating
Commissioner Benjamin B. Bernardino, issued
an order setting the case for hearing on
September 29, 1995 at 2 p.m. Despite due
notice, respondent failed to appear. Accordingly,
complainant was allowed to present her
evidence ex-parte after which, the case was
considered submitted for resolution. Respondent
received this order as shown by the registry
return. However, she again did not do anything
about it.
The Commission passed a resolution
recommending the suspension from the practice
of law of respondent for a period of six months
"for her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the
Court and illustrating her despiciency of her oath
of office as a lawyer." The Commission,
however, declined to discipline her for failing to
meet her financial obligation, the same having
been incurred in her private capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the punishment imposed
upon Atty. Abalos is correct.
HELD:
The Commission is correct that the
respondent may not be disciplined either by the
IBP or by this Court for failing to pay her
obligation to complainant. Complainant's remedy
is to file a collection case before a regular court
of justice against respondent. The general rule is
that a lawyer may not be suspended or
disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily
assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for
misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 569 [1923];
Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]).
The recommendation to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for six
months to be grossly disproportionate to the act
complained of, i.e., her failure to appear before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
With her legal knowledge and expertise,
respondent may have known all along that the
Commission has no jurisdiction over a complaint
for collection of a sum of money which she
borrowed in her private capacity. Hence, her
adamant refusal to appear before said body.
The court does not ignore the fact that
by virtue of one's membership in the IBP, a
lawyer thus submits himself to the disciplinary
authority of the organization. However, as the
complaint lodged against the respondent in the
case at hand did not pertain to an act that she
committed in the exercise of her profession, the

IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline


respondent. As the Commission on Bar
Discipline correctly suggested, complainant's
remedy is to file the necessary collection case in
court for her to recover the amount respondent
owed her.
It was, however, still necessary for respondent
to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in
deference to its authority over her as a member
of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful
orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction.
Thus, her suspension from the practice of law
for one month is warranted.
A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant, vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

FACTS:
This is in relation to the administrative
case filed by Atty. Collantes, counsel for V& G
Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against
Atty. Renomeron, for the latters irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V&G
for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of
Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of
GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired
requirements, Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents with certain
special conditions between them, which was
that V&G should provide him with weekly round
trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus
P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu
thereof, the sale of respondents Quezon City
house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Eventually, Renomeron formally denied
the registration of the documents. He himself
elevated the question on the registrability of the
said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of
the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator
then resolved in favor of the registrability of the
documents.
Despite the resolution of the Administrator,
Renomeron still refused the registration thereof
but demanded from the parties interested the
submission of additional requirements not
adverted in his previous denial.
ISSUES:
Whether or notAtty. Renomeron, as a
lawyer, may also be disciplined by the
Court for his malfeasance as a public
official.
Whether or not the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to government
service in the discharge of official tasks.

Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC

HELD:
A lawyers misconduct as a public official
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer. The lawyers oath imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. The lawyers oath is a source of
obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to government service in the discharge
of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code
forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule
1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or
delay any mans cause for any corrupt motive
or interest (Rule 1.03).
Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron is
disbarred from the practice of law in the
Philippines, and his name is stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS
HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago,
have
been
commuting
to
this
Court
for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and
Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against
Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover certain machineries. In 1957
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs,
ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay
definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. After
remand, the trial court issued on August 25,
1961 a writ of execution for the sum of
P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution
but his motion was denied, and levy was made
on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City.
The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale
on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the
auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago
appealed.
On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the
dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff

from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his


family house and lot;" his motions were denied,
and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March
9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners
Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem,
and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the
final deed of sale in favor of the vendees
Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now
joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his coplaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City to annul the sheriff's
sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor
Ago upon which judgment was rendered against
him in the replevin suit was his personal
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half
share in their conjugal residential house and lots
which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff
could not legally be reached for the satisfaction
of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint
that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin
suit, that the judgment was rendered and the
writ of execution was issued only against
husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not
a party to her husband's venture in the logging
business which failed and resulted in the
replevin suit and which did not benefit the
conjugal partnership.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents, with the
assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen
years to doggedly resist execution of the
judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
court to another long denied the fruits of the
petitioners victory in the replevin suit.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court condemns the attitude of
the respondents and their counsel who, far from
viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who
seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert
the very ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public
servant and his exalted position as an officer of
the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth
and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with
candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we
do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit

Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC


of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his clients propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.

Adoption. Investment in the Phil.


US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

Treble costs are assessed against the spouses


Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be
paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison.

It is the submission of petitioner that the


advertisements
above
reproduced
are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in
his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993


MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the
respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor
as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein
petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET
MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767
LEGAL
5217232,
5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN
Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving
FREE BOOKS on
Guam
Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of
Marriage.
Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Nonquota Res. & Special Retiree's
Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN


Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr.
1
US Embassy CLINIC, INC. Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041;
521-0767

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits


the fact of publication of said advertisement at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services
should
be
allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
2
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent is
engaged in the practice of law.
2. Whether or not paralegals can perform
or engaged in the practice of law.
3. Whether or not advertisement regarding
with the practice of law is, as rule,
prohibited?
Ruling:
1. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court.
In the practice of his profession, a licensed
attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal

Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC


advice and instructions to clients to inform them
of their rights and obligations, preparation for
clients of documents requiring knowledge of
legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public
tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law.

The Supreme Court has to necessarily and


definitely reject respondent's position that the
concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this
should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption
as it has done.

When a person participates in the trial and


advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. One who confers with clients,
advises them as to their legal rights and then
takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes
a practice of law. One who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing
law.

In the Philippines, the Court still have a


restricted concept and limited acceptance of
what may be considered as paralegal service.
As pointed out by FIDA (Federacion
International de Abogadas), some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct


of cases on court. The practice of law, therefore,
covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, The Supreme Court agrees with the
perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
2. That fact that the corporation employs
paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby
brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it
has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the
services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court.

Accordingly, the Court has adopted the


American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person
who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration
of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and
unskilled person into the practice of law. That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state.
3. Anent the issue on the validity of the
questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.
He is not supposed to use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. Prior to the adoption of the code
of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that
lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment,
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning
the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like selflaudation.
The standards of the legal profession condemn
the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A

Case Digest in PALE, AMFCC


lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession.
The canon of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.
Exceptions:
Of course, not all types of advertising or
solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the
extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely,
those which are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions.
The first of such exceptions is the publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the
canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinction; public
or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships;
legal
teaching
positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings
in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly
represented."
The law list must be a reputable law list
published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
brief biographical and informative data in a daily
paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to

be published in a law list the conduct,


management or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar,
or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card
is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law.
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered,
the Court finds and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the
present situation of our legal and judicial
systems,
to
allow
the
publication
of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent
would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community
in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain
that level of professional conduct which is
beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the
legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the
part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable
instances or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic,
Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with
more severely.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to
RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication
or
dissemination
of
any
advertisement in any form which is of the same
or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and
"B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly
or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

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