A.M. No.

491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3,
1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:
NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en
banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who
had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some
newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and
Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials
to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The
Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on
June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of
Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno
took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that
characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989),
Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The
Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8,
1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign
by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly
"poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon
allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso
donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department
of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary)
campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the
U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government
positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the
Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort
to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were
reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their
votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to
twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in
IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a
room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held)
during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the
outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the
House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform
the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court,
appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental
principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be nonpolitical in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board
of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of
professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."

The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on
reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive
campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by
candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the
dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on
the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the
Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated
in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as
Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and
Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted
as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to
shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the
Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their
respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine
National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP
presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their
campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that
some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were
also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or
worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to
determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they
said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts,
but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given by
such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court,
after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No
lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment
to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial,
or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
"'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:

SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following acts and
practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective
office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or
manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the
biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial
or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the
advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving
of food, drink,
entertainment
, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3)
making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts
and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the
by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his
removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring
member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following violations were
established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice-president,
the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit
the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,
p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of
Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced
their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their
votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested
the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his
nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989
after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120
chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted
photocopies of his nomination forms which read:

"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V.
Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco,
Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G.
Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel
C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C.
Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar
C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo,
Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes
in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of those who had committed
their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695;
Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane
from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant,
Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu),
Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy
Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu
about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in
May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He
went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant
Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be
taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon
group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to
assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet,
Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He
recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain
regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of
May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity)
went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on
the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon,
Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In
Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989,
pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the election of
IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for
Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni
(Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B.
Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao),
Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador
Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine
(Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco
(Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L.
Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite
and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar
Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back.
Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him because Atty.
Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-atarms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use them,
because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July
4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of
Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente
Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of
Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as
Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO

Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his
headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three
suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He
paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge
Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva,
Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley
Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian
Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco,
William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito
Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro,
Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse
Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven
Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including
the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria
Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to
Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign
manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva,
Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine
Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who
first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to
be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the
Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone
conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine
Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down
payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP
embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid
seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza.
She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a
room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and
meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza:
Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee
Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson,
Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles,
Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes
Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio
Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano
Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta
for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group
(t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his
law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He
admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose
Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister,"
her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who attended the
legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid
P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he
knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of
29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58)
on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit
manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves to his
candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo
Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin,
Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo

Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A.
Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto
II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his
office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give
"some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho
Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the
husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma
Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu,
Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the
progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups The group had
sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from
his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco
(candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These
two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and
during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio,
Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of
lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the
member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election year.
This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec.
14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and
copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly
distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own printing
shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty.
Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in
previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of
the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the
convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n.
July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for
chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n.
July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the BaguioBenguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of
Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two
labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos')
vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also
tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the
Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to
Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay).
When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's
informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29,
1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead
(t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around
saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP
chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110).
He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He
testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the
DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar,
Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined
the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had their
headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the
Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to
Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by
Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said,
offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached
him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and
Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount,
the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol
Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga,
Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his
campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for
some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang
up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed
by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions
in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section
14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in
Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in fivestar hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the
120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of
tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon,
Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled
up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the
presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to
"assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of
tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign
materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of
Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to
the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and
some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by
inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these
practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain
from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02,
Canon
1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are
supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that
the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the
dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that
tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted
by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee
has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among
themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed
during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII)
providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of
the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the
lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the
corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore
the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices
which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored
profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court
in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77,
Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in
Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive
Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this
Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the
office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One
who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until
after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the
rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President
and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9)
regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex
oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and
Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeantat-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and
Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions
as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1)
Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the
region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region,
the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to
any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9,
1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3)
months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the
Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP
national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the
national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled
"Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of
the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for
any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs
of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due
time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino
and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 133090

January 19, 2001

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch
90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals1affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring
petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.
1wphi1.nt

The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case NO.
1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for
Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order
on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of
certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could
comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens.
On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to
the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the
court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5,
1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition
and Motion for Contempt of Court.3
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident
transpired:
ATTY. BUGARING:

For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

ATTY. CORDERO:

Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for
contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of Deeds is properly
notified for today's hearing.

COURT:

Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER:

Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

We are ready, your Honor.

COURT:

There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which directed
your office to register lis pendens of the complaint in connection with this case of Royal
Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the subpoena.

ATTY. BUGARING:

May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of
Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the record will bear
it out. Until now they did not file any answer, opposition or pleadings or pleadings with
respect to this motion.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy
Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our office regarding this
case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received this morning the subpoena, your
Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the respondent that
he was not informed.

COURT:

That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is recorded.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be [filing]
a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with this
manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance
of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned.

COURT:

Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording at
this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that such proceedings should be
taken.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied me this
morning.

COURT:

Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission of
this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.

COURT:

Why would he be bringing

camera
if you did not give him the go signal that shots should be done.

ATTY. BUGARING:

This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an occasion last
night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove your Honor please,
that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why
he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend
this Court your Honor please.

COURT:

It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or
permission should be secured.

ATTY. BUGARING:

In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.

COURT:

After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is personal
to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being .

COURT:

That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.

ATTY. BUGARING:

At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as part of
our motion for contempt, your Honor please.

COURT:

What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are
talking. I am willing now to testify.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal
proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.

COURT:

If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of
Deeds.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.

COURT:

That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply represented.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing.

ATTY. BARZAGA4:

Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our
documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and thereafter your Honor
please.

COURT:

You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly
appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately hired
counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt proceedings. How
much time do you need to go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case
in the meanwhile.

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Second call, your Honor.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COURT:

Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your
Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966 and
in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the record of the case shows up to the
filing of this motion, the Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court
Orders dated February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty.
Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated
September 18, 1996 addressed to the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens
pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor
for the annotation of the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in the
book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the attention of the Hon. Court that the
Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation
of the lis pendens was made by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996,
your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been
issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows, 'Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of
the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby
directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title
Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence.

COURT:

You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just
made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finished and
then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly proceedings in this
case.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your Honor,
considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has already been
revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that we be given a period of ten
days from today your Honor, within which to submit our formal written opposition your
Honor.

COURT:

Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in
connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of
certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the
earlier part of the record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending
subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May 1 have the record
please.

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor.

COURT:

This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.

COURT:

Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be guided
accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the matter started from that. After
the submission of the . What are you suppose to submit?

ATTY. BUGARING:

Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of
Court.

COURT:

After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel
for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within
which to submit his reply.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we will
be marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for today, your
Honor please.

COURT:

If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are we
going to receive as evidence.

ATTY. BUGARING:

If your Honor please

COURT:

Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of the
comment.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for contempt was
copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.

COURT:

Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This should
be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of record the comment has to
be in first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is
going to be put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.

ATTY. BUGARING:

My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished of
this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it in due time in
accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our
evidence and present to this Court, your Honor

COURT:

(Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am listening, your Honor.

COURT:

And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court,
your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor.

COURT:

If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do
whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the Court of
this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I will
be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.

COURT:

Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY. BUGARING:

Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.

COURT:

Do that right away.

ATTY. BUGARING:

We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.

COURT:

You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I did not.

COURT:

With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on anything but I
reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.

COURT:

You can do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.

COURT:

As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

COURT:

Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.

ATTY. BUGARING:

No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court.
Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in many certiorari cases, your
Honor.

COURT:

Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the
gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.

COURT:

You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am
protecting my client, your Honor.

COURT:

That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court.
(Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol cited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1) operating a
video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren
Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his documentary evidence
pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado
Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance of
the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a function, and that was
the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy
explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that
although the proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its
permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services
of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to present him, the case was
allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Burgaring started to insist that he be allowed to
mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting
that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so many
ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and
was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet
finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court
directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court
declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the uttered words insulting the Court;
such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate
Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the
Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the
discredit of the Court.

Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's sheriff to
arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an
open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious manner, he
is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment
of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus,
Cavite.5
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the
fine of P3,000.00.6
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6, 1996, petitioner filed another
motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Both motions were never resolved and
petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.7
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in direct contempt of court
and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol had no
factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for being
in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing
held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too
argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the
order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed
by the Rules of Court,10 and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it
rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated
December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the excess
fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF
OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW
IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.11
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject proceedings
would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and legal basis. It would also
show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he always addressed the court with the phrase
"your honor please."
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward
the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily
adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand

pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge
thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or
both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial court in
consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the proceedings is belied by
his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5,
1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party
(pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge "motives not supported by
the record or have no materiality to the case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13,
tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to
maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making
representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not
allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is
violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through
counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on
the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a
lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of
Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor
please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances.
Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is
to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.12
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of
interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of
the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the administration of justice. The power to punish
for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative
of justice.13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar,
and can be punished summarily without hearing.14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in
the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner
the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was
cited in contempt of court during he hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for
reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day.15

Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his
client by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge's contrary order
he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226
SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and
placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC,
Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance
with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
such lawyer's duty."16
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a
fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in
bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the
fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its
assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A.
Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of P3,000.00.
1w phi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 9604

March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty.
Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism,
Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority,
falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004
was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the
case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty.
Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus,
Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other
documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint
since the falsification of the counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaints validity. Also,
the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document 2 and
Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature
of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by
Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted
Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the
cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to
revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for
falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the refiling by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and
Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial
evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to
disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants alleged that they were
subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of
Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only
one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients,
allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the lettercomplaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same
person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and
unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute
innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional
Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office,
forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were
accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged
that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the
necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added
that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence.
Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the
Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference
was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear.
The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite
receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment
complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their
right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their respective
position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants position paper dated 18 October 2006
and respondents position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of

Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon
1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty.
Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint
filed against complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the
secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from
his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation
under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the
aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme
Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of
courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law
Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior
partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.

xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and
practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo
and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is
going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other
documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice
of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is
hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit. 8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29
January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants and
Atty. Bancolos motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and

limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice
of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate
the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of
Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for
delay.11 Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify
to these matters and give legal effect to the document.
1w phi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a
victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his
former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for
the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint
Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the
preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not
cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply
signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly,
Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to
a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or
even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign
pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively
liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also
find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective
upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974

In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City.

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:p
On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana, who was admitted to the
Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955, committed acts of misconduct as a notary public and "has exhibited such a
frame of mind and observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of a member of the legal profession,"
ordered his disbarment.
Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court petitions for re-admission, supported by resolutions from
members of the Bench and Bar, labor unions, newspaper editors and reporters, members of professional and
civic organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting to respondent's good conduct and moral character since
his disbarment, and petitioning for his reinstatement to the legal profession.
The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously disbarred, is to
determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the
effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled
to be re-admitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.
The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On June 13, 1972, he filed a verified petition for
reinstatement, submitting proofs of his honesty and integrity and other indications of his good moral character
(clearances from the City Courts and Court of First Instance of Cebu, Police Department of Cebu City,
testimonials on his character by fiscals, lawyers, Judges of City Courts and of the Court of First Instance,
resolutions of the Cebu Lions Club, Sto. Rosario Council No. 5508 of the Knights of Columbus, Bar Association
of Cebu, Cebu Lawyers League, Inc.), and after the hearing on the petition for reinstatement on July 18, 1972,
the Court issued a resolution on July 20, 1972, to wit:
... [A]cting on the respondent's prayer for reinstatement as a member of the Philippine Bar,
and considering (a) that respondent movant had been disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that
since then the said respondent may be considered as having undergone adequate
punishment; (c) that he has observed exemplary conduct since then, according to credible
certifications attesting to his repentance for the offense committed by him thirteen (13) years
ago, and may be reasonably expected to scrupulously observe the Canons of Legal Ethics in
the future; (d) but that, in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959, respondent
movant should offer some guarantee of his ability to render adequate service to his
prospective clients; the Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is
hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law
school, and that upon his filing with the Clerk of this Court of sworn certificates by the
individual professors of the review classes attesting to his having regularly attended and
passed their subjects, under the same conditions as ordinary students said movant Carlos C.
Rusiana be readmitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the lawyer's
oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of this Supreme Court.
Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in the Court's above-quoted resolution, as
evidenced by the sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review classes attended by him attesting
to his having regularly attended and passed their subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students, and
the separate letters, both dated February 25, 1974, of the Registrar and the Dean of the Gullas Law School, of
the University of the Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia, this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court and Acting Bar
Confidant, confirming the truth of the professors' statements.

WHEREFORE, conformably with the Court's resolution dated July 20, 1972, respondent Carlos C. Rusiana is
hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to this court the
requisite fees.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz
Palma, Aquino, J.J., concur.
A.C. No. 6323

April 13, 2007

PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment and suspension2 against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by Pablo
R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02,

Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly sued
him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in Olivares Building in
Paraaque.3
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.4 The case was dismissed for improper venue.5
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with damages in the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274. 6 The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233, was dismissed for
failure to prosecute.7 Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal.8 The subsequent petition for
review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. 9
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
27410where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009.11 It was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and
prescription.12
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to protect
and prosecute the interests of his client.13 He denied that he was forum shopping as his client, in her certificate
of non-forum shopping,14 disclosed the two previous cases involving the same cause of action which had been
filed and dismissed.15 Respondent further claims he could not refuse his clients request to file a new case
because Al-Rasheed was the "oppressed party" in the transaction.16
This Court referred the complaint, together with respondents comment, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.17
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in repeatedly
suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter.18 It opined that respondent should have noted
that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute.19 Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.20 The CBD recommended the suspension

of respondent for six months with a warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt
with moreseverely.21
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum shopping. It, however, modified the
recommended penalty to reprimand.22
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty.

1a\^/phi 1.net

All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they take
their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold
the laws of the land. 23 As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall
uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes."24 Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."25
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Olivares. He
ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect of an adjudication on
the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint. Respondent appealed the
1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were dismissed for lack of
merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the 2004 complaint disclosed
that Al-Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract. As if such disclosure was a sufficient
justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced his 1999 26 arguments and assertions in the
200427complaint. Respondent obviously knew the law and tried to go around it. This Court therefore concludes
that respondent willfully violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice. 28 Lawyers have the duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the
Courts processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those
who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful
violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions
that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.29
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBDs
recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate to the violation
committed. However, in view of respondents death on September 27, 2006,30 the penalty can no longer be
imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms.
CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES
ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey
Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply
Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the
Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the
Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 217; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman
(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed
against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest
partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130);
Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring
developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime,
the STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the original supplemental manifestation"
(Rollo, p. 177).
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated
October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association
submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included

in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp.
210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in
Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:
(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly
defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of
July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the
said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious
falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in
their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent
Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached to Rollo without
pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that:
(a) "despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status
quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive
suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance
the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the
instant petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace
petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment
attached toRollo without paginations between pp. 613-614 thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested status
which preceded the present controversy was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of
the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually occupying
their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform
the duties of their respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may
be lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their
authority desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned
Resolution of September 22, 1992 until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after
p. 615 thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and
Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend
suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to
directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of
such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without
pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the
Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees connected with his office. Petitioners also
refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached
to Rollowithout pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to
LiftStatus Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay
in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A.
No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the
Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he
cannot order the preventive suspension himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall
haveinter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct
powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against public officials or employees
at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel
compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind
that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official
or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the
word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the
other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with
which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18
SCRA 247 [1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials
and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive
suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the
administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination

whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him
to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering
or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman
should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively
suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in
determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or
for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp.
496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted
liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently
the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions
dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of
the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190
N.E., 438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation,
the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases
who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or
employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with
preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or
employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or
employees, in his bureau or under his authority."
However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service
Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the Department
Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau"
was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only
mentions that the proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend
any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to
read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that

can be deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer
or employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials
and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office" or in
other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the
Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine
whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront
the charges against them during the preliminary conference and even after petitioners had asked for the
disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor
General contends that assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring
public officials and employees who are working in other departments and offices, the questioned order remains
null and void for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated
December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued
even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra,
petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not preventively suspend him before he could
file his answer to the administrative complaint. The contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed
perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera,
there was "nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against
him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive
suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the
charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees under
investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. In the
case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed
their answer to the administrative complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners,
which incorporated the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo,
pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of
harassment by petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp.
309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complainant and the respondents in the administrative
case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo,
pp. 336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo,
pp. 338-348).
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero
acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said
that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise
inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and
the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a
motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt

were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive
suspension of their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private respondents
hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent
Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental
Comment, pp. 4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or
written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his
behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use
of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the
dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not,
creates more heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is confined to
questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of
judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate
and apart from the present special civil action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution
dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Puno and
Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave