A.M. No.

1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was
charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to
answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this
Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated
June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint.
On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to
as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent
fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being
terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which
properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while
the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract
with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential
subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT
No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as
attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said
property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the
Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same
document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as
I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his
client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis
before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office
by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally
tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying
the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on
March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant
presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness
and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective
memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in
the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and
speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to
dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous
requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to
file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a
reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court
required the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A.
Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the
following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the
case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development
agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement;
and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories
who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed
their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp.
403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested
that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a
supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in
his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention
that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether
or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has
to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP
since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:

This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled
DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the
Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those
cases where the investigation has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to
the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not
an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13
and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the
IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge
of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed
directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the
investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1,
1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed.
Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been
substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the
investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent
himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November
26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p.
353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a
thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the
respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to
further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to
the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample
opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was
therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for
himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to
cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of
misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the
Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its
disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the
Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the
Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area
of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was
executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No.
Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document
transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting
a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by
virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his

client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice
[Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that
Canon
10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the
litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that
while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for
disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied),
Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the
laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein."
And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138,
Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the
Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must
be held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from
purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is
disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship
with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of
Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon
17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a
specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new
Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase
by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary
action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the land
development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it
provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was
subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights
provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino,
married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered
to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the
said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our
rights and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found
therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute
and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land
development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a
public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction
was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in
an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and

was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no
duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold
at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent
argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back
of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to
Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up
to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn
duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt
respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of
their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned
the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of
the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe
honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against
him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true
copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by
respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land
development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T.
Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on December
9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro
Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties,
Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor
Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to
sign the said xerox copyattached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to
Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor
Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the
addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23,
1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly
misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor
Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a
manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional
Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by
respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8;
Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados,
which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon
Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Alfaro T.
Fortuna
do
[signed]
Editha
T.
Fortuna
do
[signed]

Nestor
T.
Fortuna
do
[signed]
C
O
N
F
O
R
M
E
Ramon
A.
Gonzale
s
[signed]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly
agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be
subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide
for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees
to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F.
Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney
has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing
in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these
contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor
General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil
Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the
Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized
exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to
the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics;
Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First Instance
and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q-18060
was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 765912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and
lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor
General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass
complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General
made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination

of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is no basis
for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion on
the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the
rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice
and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the
Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with
the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and
circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his
receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, JJ., took no part.
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D.
Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of
marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.

Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then
amedical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San
JoseRecoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with
Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their
relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve)
in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When
Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she
jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino
remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much.

Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and
Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao
City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to
Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her
hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really
so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed
the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in
Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his
oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there
was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that
they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had
married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his
wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured
medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child
Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise
because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had
already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the
complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good
moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy
with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral
conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he
is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not
glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of
immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit
of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding
circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the
legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and
morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels
himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or
"An open door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise
of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a
child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy,
Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an
abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V.
Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their
child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had
borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see
Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and
allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of
a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume
their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a
member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed
upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual
intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request.
After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno,
Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise
of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between
Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in
this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for
worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs.
Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).

(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia
Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became
pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of
Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with
Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse.
She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them
unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and
the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the
respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to
warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382;
Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil.
322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the
respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman) Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos and de Castro, JJ., are on leave.
Fernandez and Guerrero JJ., were designated to sit in the Second Division.
A.C. No. 215

December 29, 1962

MERCEDES H. SOBERANO, complainant,

vs.
EUGENIO V. VILLANUEVA, respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
On March 12, 1955, complainant Mercedes H. Soberano filed with this Court a petition alleging that, after
inducing her to take part, in December 1951, in a fake wedding under the belief, on her part, that it was a
genuine and valid one, respondent Eugenio V. Villanueva cohabited with her and later lived with her as
husband and wife, as a consequence of which she bore him two (2) children, and that, subsequently, he
abandoned her and their children, and praying, therefore, that he be disbarred. Soon thereafter, she filed a
communication, dated March 21, asking that her petition be "shelved"; that no action be taken thereon "until
after her mother have arrived and decided on the, matter"; and that meanwhile "no person", not even
respondent, be informed of said petition. This communication was followed by another, dated March 22, 1955,
stating that complainant's mother had just arrived and that she (the mother) had "decided that the case must go
on". On March 29, 1955, and, also, the next day, this Court received identify handwritten motions of the
complainant, dated March 28, 1955, stating that the filing of said petition was "not sincerely" her "own wish"
and had been "prompted by ill-advice unduly influencing" her, and "finally withdrawing" her complaint against
respondent Villanueva. However, on April 2, 1955, complaint filed another "manifestation" praying that said
motion for withdrawal of her petition be denied, respondent having secured the motion "by means of threats
and intimidation".

In his answer respondent denied the main allegations of the petition, particularly those referring to the allegedly
simulated marriage and to his having lived with complainant as husband and wife, although he admitted having
been intimate with her. Upon investigation, the Solicitor General, to whom the matter was referred, filed the
corresponding complaint for disbarment, which is a substantial reproduction of complainant's petition for
disbarment. In his answer to this complaint, respondent reiterated the denials and allegations contained in his
answer to said petition, and, in addition thereto, he set up "special defenses" as well as expressed the wish to
present further evidence, which he was authorized to introduce and did introduce before an officer of this Court.
After due hearing and the submission of memoranda, the matter was deemed submitted for decision.
The first question for determination is whether or not there has been a simulated marriage between the parties
herein. The only evidence thereon is complainant's testimony. Although she introduced, by way of
corroboration, the testimony of one Beatriz Juada, the latter merely claimed to have seen a printed form
of marriage contract, with the names of the complainant and the respondent typewritten at the bottom thereof.
Beatriz did not even notice whether or not there were signatures at the bottom of said instrument.
Upon the other hand, complainant's behavior belies her claim to the effect that, believing, in view of the alleged
marriage ceremony in December 1951, that respondent was her husband, she consented to cohabit with him,
and later lived with him as his lawful wedded wife. Indeed, in her letter (Exhibit 16) to respondent, dated
January 23, 1955 or over three (3) years after the aforementioned ceremony she reminded him of his
unfulfilled promise to marry her after he passed the bar examination in 1954, thus leaving no room for doubt
that she did not consider him as her husband and that there had fake wedding in 1951. Again, her letters to
him, Exhibits 1, 26, 2, 3, 6 and 7, dated, respectively, July 19, and September 6, 10 and 12, 1950, and
February 24, 1951 made reference to their tryst in hotels, to her delayed menstruation, to the possibility of her
being in the family way and to the need of seeing a physician in connection therewith, and, accordingly, reveal
clearly that in relations had existed between them even prior to December, 1951. What is more, her letter to
him, Exhibit 9, dated October 1, 1951, contains expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar
nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction they must have had sexual intercourse
so often that she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing him with impudicity.
In short, having possessed her at pleasure, without benefit of clergy, it is most incredible that respondent would
subsequently resort to a simulated wedding order to cohabit with her. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that in
September, 1953, she went to the National Bureau of Investigation and expressed the wish a complaint against
respondent he having refused knowledge his offspring and failed to support her. When the Assistant Director of
said office inquired whether respondent and she were married, her answer was in the negative. It is clear,
therefore, that the alleged fake marriage was purely a figment of her imagination, without any factual basis
whatever.
l awphil.net

The next question is whether the extra-marital relations between the parties, before respondent's administration
to the Bar, warrant disciplinary action against him. The rule on this point is set forth in the American
Jurisprudence (Vol. 5, p. 416) from which we quote:
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct committed before his admission to the Bar,
and this notwithstanding that his certificate to practice was issued after a Board of Law Examiners, as
required by law passed its judgment upon his moral character and standing. In order, however, to
justify disbarment for breach of good faith committed before admission, the transaction or act must be
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.
Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, especially in the light of the circumstances
attending this case, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar. This is particularly true in the case
under consideration, for no less than the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
where respondent practices his profession, as well as Dean Jeremias Montemayor of the College of Law of the
Ateneo de Manila, and the Hon. Guillermo Santos, formerly Chairman of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission,
then Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations and Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
have vouched for the good moral character of said respondent as a worthy and distinguished member of the
Bar, attested by his subsequent election as president of the Negros Occidental Bar Association. Neither must

we overlook the circumstance that, in view of the facts adverted to above and others revealed by the record
which, for obvious reasons, need not be set forth in this decision it was rather difficult for respondent to
marry complainant herein.
One other point should be disposed of. It is the allegation in complainant's "manifestation" of April 2, 1955, to
the effect that her motion, dated March 28 1955 finally withdrawing her petition for disbarment of respondent
herein because said petition did "not sincerely" reflect her "own wish" and had been "prompted by ill-advice
unduly influencing her" had been secured by respondent through "threat and intimidation", and praying,
therefore, that said motion be denied. Suffice it to say that the only proof in support of said "manifestation" is
complainant's uncorroborated testimony, which is contradicted by respondent's testimony and deserves no
credence not only for the reasons pointed out above also, because said motion was twice handwritten entirety
by complainant herein, and her penmanship thereon is as good and firm as that of her aforementioned letters,
admittedly made without any semblance of duress, thus showing that there was no "threat and intimidation"
when she prepared said motion.
In the light of the peculiar conditions obtaining in this case, the complaint against respondent herein is
accordingly dismissed. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
A.C. No. 4921

March 6, 2003

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the
ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI).1 Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself
to be single.2 Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until
1997.3 During their affair, respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10,
1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar.4 It was only around the first week of May 1997 that
complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted
her about her relationship with respondent.5 On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer,
executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was
carrying as his.6 On December 9, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa.7 By this time
however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support.8
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but
mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was
already married and with children;9 complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he
is already married;10 the child borne by complainant it not his, because the complainant was seeing other men
at the time they were having an affair.11 He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but
explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that
complainant was seeing other men.12
After due haring, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral
conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
xxx

xxx

xxx

"CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession."
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
"x x x that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, butgrossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency."13
In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he declared explicitly:
"1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;
"2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;
"3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my own;
"4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal and medical needs,
education, housing, food, clothing and other necessities for living, which I will give through his/her
mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal age and capable to live on his/her own;
"5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my child; however,
my failure to sign does not negate the recognition and acknowledgement already done herein;
"6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I have full
knowledge of the consequence of such acknowledgment and recognition."14
More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:
"Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and
others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your daughter.
"Here's my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix amount for
monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not more than P1,000." 15
In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that:

". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct
demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than his
lawful wife fails to meet these standards."16
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of
every lawyer.17
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to
support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable,
unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.18
This Court has repeatedly held:
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards
of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."19
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from
the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous,"20 and that what happened between them was
"nothing but mutual lust and desire."21 The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible,
amoral attitude of the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo that complainant
entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross
immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondent's fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship
with him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:
"In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a
proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy
members, to protect the public and the courts."22
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations.
Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must
show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission
to membership of the bar.23 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession; 24 it is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law25 and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness
before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption
that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.
The Court held:
"The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be
heard."26

and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:

"The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the
legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law."27
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize
and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent
violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be
given.28Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and
now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication
of respondent's effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession
of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension
should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to
show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he has instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral
integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.29
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and
ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ ., are on leave.
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten
(10) days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a

revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for failure to file an
answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit
before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of
complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on
25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25
February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to
appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the
hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her husband
had already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent
and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required
them to file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither
party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of Governors
submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of
immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children
were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his
family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province,
and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married
and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado
lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife,
and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to
establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate
family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent
promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to
neglect the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to
Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living
with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another
mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent
and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back
her daughter byhabeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband
and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that complainant
and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most
recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse
and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily
adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for
admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That

requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary,
that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued possession

... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law
... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a
ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as
essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities
of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the
respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who
subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was
particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter
cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was
disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of

his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with
the complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an
adulterous relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with a
married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate
family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform"
respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young
daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage
and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until
farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits
proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his
legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Adm. Case No. 1474

January 28, 2000

CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ABRAHAM A. SULLER, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on grossly immoral
conduct for having raped his neighbor's wife.
In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to
the complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.

As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in. Thereafter,
respondent began touching her in different parts of her body. When she protested, respondent threatened her
and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. At that moment, complainant returned home to get money
to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife and respondent having sexual
intercourse on the bed.1 She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and
other leg, preventing her from defending herself.
On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal complaint2 for
rape against respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance, Agoo, La Union.
On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller.3
On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from notice. 4
On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication.5
On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and
recommendation.6
From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both parties appeared with
their respective counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed for the suspension of
proceedings pending final termination of Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with the Court of First Instance, La
Union, Branch 3, Agoo.7
On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case having been referred
to him previously.8
In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. On August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to both parties.9
On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and considering the case
submitted for resolution as notice to complainant remained unserved while respondent failed to appear despite
due notice.10
On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution recommending
that the disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year be meted on
respondent.11
The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not determinative of this administrative
case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that
respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without
her consent in her very home.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.12
In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not
sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious
moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape.
He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who

are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.13 "Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to
maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity."14
WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his name be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

1wphi1.nt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be
denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth
attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath, however,
complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971.
Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the
1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their
intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. 1 It was after the child was born,

complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty
promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this
petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972.
On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's
failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies bydeposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested in the
resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by
respondent on September 17, 1979. 2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's

Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been
pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. 4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the
case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon
payment of the required fees. 5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainant's
opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed
to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality
made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia
Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent
from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry
suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The
Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act

which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a

woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit
on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. 9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not
find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see
and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of
amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him.
Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent
young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently
with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving
to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. 10 Respondent, who is

now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to
take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr., JJ., are on leave.

A.C. No. 7204

March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M.
Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the
respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he
sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility
of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as
demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car,
respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in
West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting,
respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was
wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along
Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she
was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the
other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his
criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer
the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications
transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant
At 5:33:46 pm

- forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer

replied by respondent
at 6:16:11 pm

- "does this mean I can not c u anymore"

(Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)

sent by complainant
at 6:17:59 pm

- I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage of the

situation.

Follow-up message
Sent by complainant
At 6:29:30 pm

- wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you dont have

relationship with her.

Replied by respondent
At 6:32:43 pm

- "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it
rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (Im very sorry. Its
not taking advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is an
expression of feeling)

Follow up message

- Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my

by respondent
at 6:42:25 pm

sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do it again. Will you still see
me so I can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I
dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know what to do so you may
forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm
saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry. Please next time behave
na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he met
with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case
which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a
sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed
complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and
Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it
would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness
filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the
legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana
because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6
December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was
living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it
was respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at
the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with
modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of
conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations shall have a
rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our
liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON
Ixxx
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing
condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral
character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar,
free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
no less than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect
errant lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I
kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We
said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my
right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force
used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened
very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City,
respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and
Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the
corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said
she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And
she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we
discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic)
order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her
case, so I said its about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so
I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I
told her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last
meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I
told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right
hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when shes already facing me I lightly kissed her on the
lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, thats it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside
my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down ,
before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a
little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x x. 14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the

bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral,
but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her and
maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of
appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence,
sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the
law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to
have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would
flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three
children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies
to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with
whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and
only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting
respondents disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still
valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court,
respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied
his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is
expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare.26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in
turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act,
even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure
her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the
complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence,
the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat;
cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to
comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being
kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology
to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant
and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious
designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could
freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct
requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those
who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.35 While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may
deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity
and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his
client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct
which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those
acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless
they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice
of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit
it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also
imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client.37 In the Matter of Darell
Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse
which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness
to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first offense,
reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor.
Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross
immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely
needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and
cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed
on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180363

April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan1 involved moral turpitude.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental
during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to
disqualify2 petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h),
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and
was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for
public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from public office.4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and assigned to the
COMELECs First Division.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member
of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was denied in its assailed
October 9, 2007 Resolution for being moot, thus:
It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of
member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant
Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007 filed by respondent
Edgar Y. Teves challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated on 11 May 2007 is
hereby DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN
THE COMELEC EN BANC DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
II.
THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF WILL
DETERMINE PETITIONERS QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN FUTURE
ELECTIONS.
III.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN
THE COMELEC EN BANC IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION WHICH RULED
THAT PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE
IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
A.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
SHOULD BE RESOLVED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
G.R. NO. 154182.
B.
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF FACTS" DOCTRINE,
PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.7
The petition is impressed with merit.
The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007 elections did not effectively moot the
issue of whether he was disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime he was
convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable issue which the COMELEC should have resolved
instead of merely declaring that the disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioners defeat.
Further, there is no basis in the COMELECs findings that petitioner is eligible to run again in the 2010 elections
because his disqualification shall be deemed removed after the expiration of a period of five years from service
of the sentence. Assuming that the elections would be held on May 14, 2010, the records show that it was only
on May 24, 2005 when petitioner paid the fine of P10,000.00 he was sentenced to pay in Teves v.
Sandignbayan.8Such being the reckoning point, thus, the five-year disqualification period will end only on May
25, 2010. Therefore he would still be ineligible to run for public office during the May 14, 2010 elections.

Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A.
No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
1avv phi1

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
l awphil.net

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
(Emphasis supplied)
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general.9
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he
has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a)
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having
such interest by the Constitution or by law.10
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest
in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the
public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest
in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an
interest by the Constitution or by law.11
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court
held therein:
However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit
filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his
renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit.
Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly
to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature.
His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management
of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of

the said entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over
the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990.
Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would
have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married
to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the
Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other

games
licensed by a local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest.13
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral
turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered.
Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies
in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves
moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided
by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not,
the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not.
It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself,
and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts
as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."
This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research
Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or
does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which
are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and
are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
(Emphasis supplied)
1awphi1

Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioners conviction and
found that the same does not involve moral turpitude.

First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELECs finding that petitioner used his official capacity in
connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife,
in violation of the trust reposed on him by the people.
The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioners conviction involved moral turpitude, misunderstood
or misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:
In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not involve moral turpitude,
still the totality of facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of
interest or any instance wherein the public official would favor his own interest at the expense of the public
interest. The [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by holding out that
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later on, he would aver
that he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw
through the ruse and declared that what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the
ownership. And even if the ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless have an
interest thereon because it would still belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, of which the [petitioner] is the
other half.
[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but he did
not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless
concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor selfinterest at the expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would
cling on and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral depravity
and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also
a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted
rules of right and duty, honesty and good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves
moral turpitude.15
On the contrary, the Courts ruling states:
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business
permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it based,
and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate
the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the
municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not
so anymore and is not even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have
intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as
alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 16
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary
or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by
transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity
of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December
1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the
effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his
wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit
registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28
January 1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the
said cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of
the cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992,
which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the

requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she signed her
name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit
is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof
necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old
LGC, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions.
Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:
x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions
enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the
LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in
connection with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden
appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although
ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter
penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)
The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum
to twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioners
violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of
awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.
Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring
forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our
culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality
thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
it was held that:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as
it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horseracing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That
function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience
and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May
11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of
Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve
moral turpitude.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his
oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of
not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment
all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on
the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying
with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took
advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength
and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to
their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack
upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of
an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is
the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble
profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause
of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find
room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We
are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be
rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the
lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of

Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for
everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on
a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
April 7, 1922
In Re MARCELINO LONTOK
Ramon Diokno for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino Lontok from his office of lawyer in
thePhilippine Islands, because of having been convicted of the crime of bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in
answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by
former Governor-General Harrison.
Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the crime of bigamy. This
judgement was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, while a further attempt to get the case before
theUnited States Supreme Court was unsuccessful. On February 9, 1921, a pardon was issued by the
Governor-General of the following tenor:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine Organic Act on August 29, 1916, the
sentence in the case of Marcelino Lontok convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of
bigamy and sentenced on February 27, 1918, to imprisonment for eight years, to suffer the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of the proceedings, which sentence was, on
September 8, 1919, confirmed by the Supreme Court is hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not
again be guilty of any misconduct.
The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the Attorney-General relies in asking for the
disbarment of Attorney Lontok, provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended form his
office of lawyer by the Supreme Court "by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." (Sec.
21) That conviction of the crime of bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law, cannot be
doubted. The debatable question relates to the effect of the pardon by the Governor-General. On the one hand,
it is contended by the Government that while the pardon removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash
out the moral stain; on the other hand, it is contended by the respondent that the pardon reaches the offense
for which he was convicted and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has on the right of a court of disbar an
attorney for conviction of a felony. On close examination, however, it will be found that the apparent conflict in
the decisions is more apparent than real, and arises from differences in the nature of the charges on which the

proceedings to disbar are based. Where preceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded
on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has
been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment
of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. (In re Emmons [1915], 29 Cal. App., 121; Scott vs. State
[1894], 6 Tex. Civ. App., 343). But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional
misconductinvolved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while
the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to
the disbarment proceedings, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney
does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law.
(People vs. Burton [1907], 39 Colo., 164; People vs. George [1900],186 Ill., 122; Nelson vs. Com. [1908],128
Ky., 779; Case of In re [1881],86 N.Y., 563.)
The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380, is directly in point. The petitioner in this case
applied for a license to practice law in the United States courts, without first taking an oath to the effect that he
had never voluntarily given aid to any government hostile to the United States, as required by statute. The
petitioner, it seems, had been a member of the Conferate Congress, during the secession of the South, but had
been pardons by the President of the United States. It was held, buy a divided court, that to exclude the
petitioner from the practice of law for the offense named would be to enforce a punishment for the offense,
notwithstanding the pardon which the court had no right to do; and the opinion of the court, in part, said:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all
his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interest
vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgement.
Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting justices, in the Garland case, appeals
powerfully to the minds of the court, we feel ourselves under obligation to follow the rule laid down by the
majority decision of the higher court. We do this with the more grace when we recall that according to the
article 130 of the Penal Code, one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by pardon.
We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely on the judgement of conviction for a
crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is
based solely on the judgment of conviction for crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, and that the
language of the pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature to a parole. It may be
mentioned however, in this connection, that if Marcelino Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the
condition of his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to disbarment.
It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney-General cannot be granted, and that the proceedings must
be dismissed. Costs shall be taxed as provided by section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Villamor; Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982
IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES

ESCOLIN, J.:
This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and the inclusion of his
name in the roll of attorneys.

The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in a decision promulgated on
September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of falsification of public document, penalized under Article 117 of
the RevisedPenal Code, and imposed on him an indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties to the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that petitioner, as a member of the bar
and in his capacity as anotary public, aknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the forced heirs of the alleged testatrix,
and the court, finding that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and upon finality thereof, petitioner
commenced service of the sentence.
Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this Court disbarment
proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961. 1
On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon"
and restored him "to full civil and political rights. 2
Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice of law, the first of which
was denied by this Court in a minute resolution dated August 30, 1968.
On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration thereof was deferred "until after
theintegration of the bar has been effected." 3
On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among others, of the following
documents, to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar Association signed by 78 members thereof,
indorsing his plea for reinstatement 4 ; the certificate of the mayor of the municipality of Bindoy, Negros

Oriental, where petitioner has been residing, to the effect that the latter "is a person of exemplary moral
character, a peace-loving and law-abiding citizen 5 a certification of Governor William B. Villegas of
Negros Oriental, attesting to the fact that since the grant of absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has
comported himself as a morally straight and respectable citizen and that he has been active and has
cooperated in civic and social undertakings, sincere and honest in his desire to lead a decent and
dignified life" 6 ; the certification of Dean Eduardo G. Flores of the College of Law, Siliman University,
vouching to petitioner's "honest, upright and moral life ... and because of his conduct he has earned the
sympathy of the people of the community and regained the confidence of the people and of his other
associates: 7 the statement of Atty. Alexander G. Amor, former president of the Negros Oriental Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, certifying "that Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces ... is a person of good
moral character, whose integrity is beyond question" 8 ; and the clearance certificates issued by Judge
Romeo R. Solis of the City Court of Dumaguete, Provincial Fiscal Andrew S. Namukatkat of Negros
Oriental, and City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug of Dumaguete City, to the effect that petitioner "is a person of
good moral character" and that since his release from the national penitentiary he "has never been
accused or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." 9
When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its then president, Atty. Marcelo D.
Fernan, favorably indorsed petitioner's request for reinstatement.
On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the original disbarment proceedings, filed an
opposition to the petitions for reinstatement; and this was followed by a telegram of Nicanor Vailoces, barangay
captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros, Oriental, addressed to his Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
and referred to this Court, opposing petitioner's readmission to the bar "on grounds of his non-reformation,
immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer."
Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Atty. Fernan, made the following
observations:

By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the following matters have been
referred to the Integrated Bar for comment:
(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de Jesus-Paras to respondent's
petition and supplementary petition for reinstatement in the roll of attorneys;
and
(2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of Nicanor Vailoces, Barangay
Captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, addressed to his Excellency
Ferdinand E. Marcos, requesting the Office of the President to oppose the
petition of Quinciano Vailoces for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys on
grounds stated therein.
It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
transmitted to the Honorable Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above stated
petition for reinstatement.
Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the Supreme Court, the
Integrated Bar received a petition dated February 14, 1978 signed by 'the people of the
Municipality of Bindoy, Province of Negros Oriental' vehemently opposing the reinstatement of
Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5, 1978 the President of the Integrated Bar
wrote to Mr. Vailoces asking him to comment on the above mentioned petitions and telegram.
This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces' comment dated November 3, 1978, which is
being forwarded herewith to the Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent
papers.
It is believed that Mr. Vailoces' comment is a satisfactory answer to the adverse allegations
and charges which have been referred to him. The charges of immorality (publicly maintaining
a querida) and gambling are general statements devoid of particular allegations of fact and
may well be disregarded. Then, too, the Municipal Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental - namely,
Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay - who tops the list of persons who have signed the February 14, 1978
petition vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces, appears to be the very same
official who on October 25, 1977 issued a Certification to the effect that Mr. Vailoces 'is
personally known to me as a person of exemplary character, a peace loving and law abiding
citizen' and that 'he is cooperative in all our civic and social activities and that he is one of our
respectable citizens in our community.' That this official should now sign a petition containing
statements exactly opposite in thrust and tenor is very intriguing, to say the least, and it is not
altogether difficult to believe Mr. Vailoces' imputations of politics in the conduct of Mayor
Mana-ay.
As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged absence of remorse on
the part of Mr. Vailoces, and his alleged belligerence and display of open defiance and
hostility, etc. are matters so subjective in character that her general allegations and charges in
this regard cannot be properly considered. It is significant that Mr. Vailoces in his comment
states: "If she is indeed that much desperately so in need of cash assistance, considering
really that she is an old woman being recently widowed the second time, for her satisfaction
and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to assist her but only with a modest amount because
I am only a small farmer with still three college students to support."
Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor Vailoces stating as grounds
for denial of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces' petition for reinstatement the alleged 'grounds of nonreformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer by soliciting cases,'
there is such a lack of specificity and particularity in such statement of grounds that one is at a
loss as to how a person in the place of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces could properly defend
himself against such charges.

Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of petitioner's "reinstatement in the rolls
of attorneys."
This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras and Nicanor Vailoces
to the Solicitor General for investigation and recommendation; and on August 4, 1982, the latter, after
conducting an investigation, submitted his report, recommending that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in
the roll of attorneys upon taking his oath anew of the corresponding oath of office."
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has sufficiently proven himself fit to be
readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President does not of
itself warrant his reinstatement.
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,
notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original admission to the
bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original evidence [7
C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815]
The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good
moral character' in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney ...
[7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].
Petitioner's conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has regained the respect and
confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his community. The favorable indorsements of
both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his
behalf by the provincial governor of Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings in the community attest to his moral
reform and rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the twilight
of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession for a period of 21 years. Adequate
punishment has been exacted.
Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor ... that if reinstated
in the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself honestly, uprightly and worthily." Indeed,
there is reasonable expectation that he will endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and maintain steadfast
fidelity to the lawyer's oath.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the roll of attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Aquino and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., took no part.
A.C. No. 126

October 24, 1952

In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero.

Tranquilino Rovero in his own behalf.
PARAS, C.J.:

The Solicitor General has filed the present complaint for disbarment against Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, on the
grounds that on March 31, 1947, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero, having been found in a final decision
rendered by then Insular Collector of Customs to have violated the customs law by fraudulently concealing a
dutiable importation, was fined in an amount equal to three times the customs duty due on a piece
of jewelry which he omitted to declare and which was subsequently found to be concealed in his wallet", and
that on October 28, 1948, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero was convicted of smuggling by final decision of the
Court of Appeals inCriminal Case No. CA-G.R. No. 2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila sentencing him to pay a fine of P2,500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, said case
involving a fraudulent practice against customs revenue, as defined and penalized by Section 2703 of the
Revised Administrative Code." The respondents admits the existence of the of the decision of the Collector of
Customs, and his conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not sufficient to
disqualify him from the practice of law, especially because the acts of which he was found guilty, while at most
merely discreditable, had been committed by him as an individual and not in pursuance or in the exercise of his
legal profession.
Under section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and this ground is apart from any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office as lawyer. Moral turpitude includes any act done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Basa, 41 Phil., 275.)
Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals certainly involves an act done
contrary at least to honesty or good morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor General is aggravated by the
fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private person, but the Government.
Wherefore, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, and he is hereby
directed to surrender to this Court his lawyer's certificate within 10 days after this resolution shall have become
final.
So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. L-363

July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945.
Incriminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of
Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to
the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956
(G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence
respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of
the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified
complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127,
section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding
pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt,
such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin
v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him
beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case.
The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a
subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name
from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates
to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has
been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on
the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio
decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott
vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could
no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in
evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford
"proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction
was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial
construction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v.
U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all
his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted
portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon
and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the
United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be
judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime
was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his
official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs.
Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental
and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of
academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are
neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur
the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the

very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of
lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
A.M. No. 2019 June 3, 1991
SHIRLEY CUYUGAN LIZASO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO AMANTE, respondent

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p
On 27 March 1979, Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a sworn Complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Sergio G. Amante charging the latter with deceitful and grossly immoral conduct. The Court required
respondent Amante to file an Answer to the complaint, and respondent did so on 25 May 1979. A Reply dated
23 September 1980 was filed by complainant.
By a Resolution dated 10 November 1980, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On 18 June 1981, complainant wrote a letter to this Court requesting an order restraining respondent from
leaving the country and an order restraining respondent's employer, the University of the East, from disbursing
monies that may be due to respondent on account of his retirement from the University's service. The Court
referred this request to the Office of the Solicitor General in a Resolution dated 15 July 1981.
The Office of the Solicitor General accordingly held hearings at which the complainant appeared and testified
on her own behalf and submitted documentary evidence to support her allegations of misconduct on the part of
the respondent Amante. Respondent Amante appeared at these hearings, testified on his own behalf and was
cross-examined. Respondent also presented documentary evidence on his behalf, but failed to complete his
presentation of evidence despite repeated notices to do so. Moreover, respondent Amante failed to offer
formally his documentary evidence.
The complainant's case was summarized by the Solicitor General in his Report and Recommendation dated 7
February 1990 in the following manner:
On August 7, 1978, complainant handed to respondent Prudential Bank Check No. 655615
dated August 4, 1978 in the amount of P5,000.00 (Exh. "A") payable to the latter and which,
per agreement between the two of them, was to be invested in respondent's business venture
in the casino. Complainant was enticed into investing in the business by respondent's
proposition that the business will guarantee her an interest of 10% profit a day. Complainant
was further convinced because she knows of her sister's friend who deals in the same
business in the casino and who even accepts jewelries from gamblers who have lost heavily.

The check was encashed by respondent as shown by his signature appearing at the back of
the check.
A written receipt (Exh. "B") for the amount of P5,000.00 was signed by respondent on August
7, 1978 and which states:
Mrs. Shirley Cuyugan Lizaso entrusted the amount of P5,000.00 to Atty.
Sergio Amante to be invested in business with a guarantee of 10% net profit
a day starting Aug. 7, 1978, capital to be returned after two months.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
y
:
S
.
M
A
m
a
n
t
e
(
s
i
g
n
e
d
)
The complainant originally prepared the check and the receipt on August 4, 1978. She tried to
seek respondent's signature on the receipt but it was only on August 7, 1978 when she was
able to see respondent and gave to him the P5,000.00 check for which respondent signed the
receipt/promissory note.
Three days after August 7, 1978, complainant tried to see respondent in order to collect the
interest on her investment but respondent failed to give her any. For the many weeks that
followed, complainant even begged respondent to return her money if he could not give the
interests but respondent merely made promises.
Afraid that her investment will not be returned, complainant sought the help of the U.E Legal
Department Head, Atty. Pedro Siojo and presented her written complaint dated August 27,
1978 against respondent (Exh. "C"). Atty. Siojo scheduled a confrontation but the respondent
failed to come. The second scheduled confrontation likewise resulted in respondent's failure to

appear. In view of these, Atty. Siojo informed her that he cannot do anything if respondent
refuses to appear.
Because of this, complainant sought the help of Mr. Antonio Ravelo, U.E Faculty President,
but the latter was not able to help her because respondent denied that he ever owed
complainant anything.
Again, complainant sought the help of the University President, Conrado Aquino, by her letter
of December 11, 1978 (Exh. "D"). Mr. Aquino, however, was of the opinion that this was a
personal agreement best left between the two of them to settle. 1
Respondent Amante presented a different version of the facts, which was substantially as follows. Sometime in
June 1978, complainant allegedly approached respondent for a loan of P20,000.00 needed to forestall
foreclosure of a mortgage on complainant's house. Respondent Amante allegedly lent P5,000.00 to
complainant, which loan fell due a month later. Complainant was allegedly very slow in repaying the loan. To
provide complainant with an incentive for repaying her loan from the respondent, the latter dangled the
possibility of a second loan for P20,000.00 to complainant, upon complainant's repayment of her first loan.
Thus, on 7 August 1978, complainant tendered to respondent Amante the P5,000.00 check referred to in the
complaint. Amante admitted he encashed the check, but' argued that he did so to realize the payment of
complainant's prior obligation to him. Respondent said he had no real intention of extending a second loan to
complainant. This outraged the complainant and she allegedly then tried to extort money from respondent
Amante by harassing him with her false and fabricated complaint.
The respondent also denied having signed the receipt for P5,000.00 with the wording appearing in Exhibit "B"
of the Complaint. At the same time, to substantiate his own version of the evidence, respondent offered in
evidence Exhibits "1" and "2" being a copy of a receipt for P5,000.00 allegedly given in payment of
complainant's loan from respondent, and purportedly signed by complainant.
After careful examination of the records of this case, we agree with the Solicitor General that complainant has
discharged the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that she had delivered P5,000.00 to
respondent Amante for investment purposes and that respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return
on the investment but also the principal thereof, despite repeated demands therefor. The reasoning and
conclusions of fact of the Solicitor General follow:
First. Most persuasive in lending credence to this is the fact that the check, at the time of
encashment by respondent, already contained the words "capital investment" at the back
thereof. The bank's microfilm copy of the reverse side of the check confirms it. This amply and
clearly substantiate the material fact that at the time the check was received by respondent
and presented by him to the bank, the agreement between him and complainant was to invest
the amount in respondent's business venture. It totally negates respondent's claim that the
check was in payment of a previous loan given by him to complainant.
Second. The receipt/promissory note (Exh. "B") dated August 7, 1978 clearly expresses the
terms of their oral agreement that the amount of P5,000.00 was entrusted to respondent to be
invested by him in his business venture, that said amount has a guarantee of 10% profit per
day starting August 7, 1978, and that the capital of P5,000.00 shall be returned to complainant
after two months from date thereof. Said receipt unquestionably bears the signature of
respondent. To all these terms, respondent affixed his signature.
Third. After complainant had repeatedly demanded the return of her P5,000.00 capital
investment which respondent failed to do, the latter wrote a note dated November 7, 1978
addressed to a certain Mr. Resty Noriega (Exh. "H") authorizing complainant to collect in his
(respondent's) behalf his fee from Mr. Noriega. Complainant presented this note to Mr.
Noriega who informed her that the note is not clear enough to entrust complainant with
payment of respondent's fee. Mr. Noriega then returned the note to her with the advice that
she should secure a letter from respondent to specify the amount to be collected by

complainant. Respondent's note does not show an admission of his obligation to return or
reimburse complainant's money.
Fourth. The tenacity and resourcefulness with which complainant repeatedly sought help from
various school officials, such as the U.E Head of Legal Department, the U.E Faculty President
and the University President himself, in separate written complaints, prior to finally securing
legal assistance from a private lawyer, all directed to seeking the return or reimbursement of
her P5,000.00 investment, are evincive of the credibility and faithfulness to the truth of
complainant's cause of action against respondent. 2
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General found respondent's version of the facts to be unreal and implausible.
Moreover, the exhibits submitted by respondent Amante appeared to have been fabricated by respondent. The
analysis of respondent's evidence by the Solicitor General follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Annex "1" photocopy of a stub in an actual size as short and as small as one inch by
three inches, dated August 7, 1987, addressed to "Gigi" which is the nickname of respondent
and embodying ten words: "Attached is check No. 655615 as payment of my "utang'" and
bearing the signature Shirley C. Lizaso. This evidence can only elicit disbelief as being
incredible if not manufactured for the following reasons:
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the situation raises the question why complainant would give and sign such a
note of receipt when, in the ordinary course of things as in the case at bar, it should be the
respondent who should sign and give a receipt for the check of P5,000.00, if indeed
complainant paid her loan to respondent.
d) Finally, the stub receipt had never been presented by respondent in any of the
investigations/confrontations set by the U.E. Legal Department Head or the U.E Faculty
President. If there was any truth to the genuineness of the stub receipt claimed by
respondent, he should have immediately presented this in the scheduled confrontations if only
to dismiss the complaint outright or the malicious rumor he claimed complainant was
spreading within the university. Instead, the stub receipt suddenly surfaced only during the
investigation of this disbarment case.
2. Annex "2", subsequently marked as Exh. "1", is the alleged receipt dated August 4, 1978
embodying the following words:
Received from Shirley C. Lizaso Check No. 655615C (P5,000.00) in
payment of her loan.
[Unusually long vacant space between the above words and signature
below]
S
e
r
g
i
o
G
.

A
m
a
n
t
e
(
s
i
g
n
e
d
)
Exh. "1" is fully handwritten. According to respondent, Exh. "1" and Exh. "B" are one and the
same and that in view of the long and big vacant space between the handwritten words and
his signature, he claimed that complainant inserted the words in Exh. "B" embodying the
agreement that the P5,000.00 was received by respondent as her capital to be invested in
respondent's business venture with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting August 7,
1978 and the same to be returned two months thereafter; and that complainant allegedly cut
off all the wordings of Exh. "1" that what remained is the receipt promissory note or Exh. "B" of
the complainant and the same signature of respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, it taxes credulity on why respondent in Exh. "1" would affix his signature so far
away below from the handwritten words, leaving a big void or vacant space in between which
any ordinary layman knows may be used to another's advantage and manipulated to the
prejudice of the signatory, even more so that respondent is a lawyer.
Furthermore, a comparison of the edge of the cut top portion of Exh. "B" with the last
handwritten line in Exh. "1" which consisted of only one word "loan" would readily show that
the handwritten loops appearing on the edge of the cut portion of the top of Exh. "B" do not, at
all, correspond to the last line of Exh. "1", which does not contain any tail loops at all. In other
words, the last line of respondent's Exh. "1" containing the handwritten word "loan" does not
have any tail loops that would correspond with those appearing on the edge of the top cut
portion of complainant's Exh. "B", if it were true that the paper showing Exh. "B" is a physical
continuation of Exh. "1" as respondent would want the undersigned Hearing Officer to believe.
Immediately clear, therefore, is the conclusion that Exh. "1" and "B" are not the same and are
far different from each other.
Lastly, Exh. "1", just like Annex "1" (stub receipt), had never been presented by respondent in
any of the confrontations set by the university officials between complainant and respondent,
but was only presented during the investigation at bar.
3. Respondent's claim that he enticed complainant to pay him the alleged P5,000.00 loan he
earlier gave to her, by promising to give her P20,000.00 if she pays the P5,000.00 loan, is
quite hollow and very unlikely. Any person, the complainant no less, who knows that she will
be given a P20,000.00 loan would very unlikely pay a previous loan of P5,000.00 but would
merely partially offset said amount and received instead the balance of P15,000.00.
Moreover, it must be remembered that complainant secured from the Prudential Bank a loan
of P5,000.00 on August 4, 1978 in order to invest it on respondent's business venture. To
follow respondent's twisted reasoning, it evokes wonder why complainant would secure a
P5,000.00 loan from the bank just to pay a P5,000.00 loan to respondent who promised to

give her, anyway, a P20,000.00 loan. If complainant really needed the balance of P15,000.00,
she could have very well secured the same from the bank and not from the respondent. In
other words, there was no necessity for complainant to obtain a subsequent loan from
respondent because she could, just as well, get the same loan from the bank as she was able
to.
xxx xxx xxx
5. For a lawyer, as the respondent is, it appears strange that he has not required complainant
to sign any receipt for the P5,000.00 loan he allegedly gave her "sometime in June, 1978." If
complainant, who is not a lawyer, was able to make him sign a receipt for P5,000.00 she gave
him, respondent, with all his legal expertise, would be doubly expected to protect his loan by a
similar receipt. And yet, respondent was not able to, as there was actually none to secure. 3
Thus, it appears to the Court that respondent failed to return and account for complainant's money
notwithstanding repeated demands of complainant for such return and accounting. It also appears that when
finally brought before the Office of the Solicitor General in the disbarment proceedings, respondent tried to
controvert complainant's charges by using in evidence documents that appear to be falsified and which try to
make it appear that complainant had delivered the P5,000.00 to respondent in payment of a prior loan from the
latter.
It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante and complainant
Cuyugan-Lizaso. The transaction that complainant entered into with respondent did not require respondent to
perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that transaction relate to the rendition of
professional services by respondent to any other person.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez 4 the principle that it can exercise its

power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client. In
that case, the respondent Vicente Pelaez, a member of the Bar, was appointed guardian of a minor child.
As such guardian, he came into possession of certain property, including some shares of stock in certain
corporations. Pelaez, while still guardian of the minor, borrowed money from the Philippine National Bank
and to guarantee that personal loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge or consent of the guardianship court,
pledged the shares of stock belonging to the minor. In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm
said:
. . . [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule
with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown,
through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty
as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the
legal business of others. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the
court which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court requires for such admission the
possession of a good moral character. 5

xxx xxx xxx

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client,, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of a good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the
law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. 6 (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness, whether relating to professional or nonprofessional matters, justifies suspension or disbarment, was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re
Disbarment of Peck, 7 with eloquence and restraint:
As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters
which may be entrusted to him, it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the
standard test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in the
determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-professional dishonor and
dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not
to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. So it is
that we, in common with other courts, hold, as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago,
that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or
non-professional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar.8 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo 9 in the following terms: that

an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined "not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed him
to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him." Mr.
Justice Malcolm went on to say:
The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep
out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attoney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe
and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him. 10
Finally, we should refer to Rule 191 set out in Chapter I entitled "The Lawyer and Society" of the "Code of
Professional Responsibility" which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." We emphasize here that "conduct," as used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in
connection with the performance of professional duties.
In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Amante in failing to account for and
return the P5,000.00 delivered to him for investment purposes by complainant, constituted dishonest and
immoral conduct. We are compelled to conclude that respondent attorney converted complainant's monies to
his personal uses. This dishonest conduct was compounded by the efforts of respondent attorney to deny and
dissimulate the transaction that he had entered into with complainant. As far as the records of this case show,
respondent has not to date returned complainant's monies.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio G. Amante is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice
of law. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts of the land. Copies shall also be finished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of
respondent attorney.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.