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Samson v. Restrivera
March 28, 2011
Villarama, Jr., J.
Oswald P. Imbat
SUMMARY: Samson, Department Head, Population
Commission, Trece Martirez City, agreed to help her friend
Restrivera to register the latters lot. She received P50,000
to cover the initial expenses. Samson failed to obtain the
title because it was found out that the lot was government
property. Restrivera demanded the return of the P50,000.
Samson only paid when she was sued for estafa.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against
her before the Ombudsman, who found her guilty of
violating Section 4(A)(b), RA 6713, i.e., for failure to comply
with the standard of professionalism. The CA affirmed. The
SC, while disagreeing that Section 4(A)(b) applies, ruling
that it is not a ground for disciplinary action, still found
Samson guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer for
failure to promptly return the P50,000.
DOCTRINE: Failure to abide by the norms of conduct
under Section 4(A)(b), RA 6713 is not a ground for
administrative disciplinary action.
FACTS:
1. Filipina Samson is a Department Head of the Population
Commission, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.
a. In March 2001, she agreed to help register the lot of
her friend, Julia Restrivera.
b. Samson said that the expenses would reach P150,000
and accepted P50,000 to cover the initial expenses.
c. Samson failed to accomplish her task, because it was
found out that the land is government property.
d. Samson failed to return the P50,000.
2. Restrivera sued Samson for estafa and filed an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a public officer against her before the
Ombudsman, for allegedly meddling in an affair that
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DISPOSITIVE:
Samson is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.
PAGC v. PLEYTO
March 23, 2011
Justice Abad
tecskat
SUMMARY: DPWH USec Pleyto failed to disclose his wifes
business interests in his SALNs. The Court found that he was
only guilty of simple negligence for failing to provide more
details in his SALNs. The Court pointed out the fact that he
disclosed that his wife is a businesswoman so, naturally,
they would have business interests. This showed that there
was no intention to conceal his and his wifes business
interests. Pleytos negligence, though, is only simple and not
gross, in the absence of bad faith or the intent to mislead or
deceive on his part.
DOCTRINE:
Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there
is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable.
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FACTS:
1. In 2002, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
received an anonymous letter-complaint from alleged
employees of DPWH accusing DPWH USec Salvador Pleyto of
extortion, illicit affairs and manipulation of DPWH projects.
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PLEYTOs ARGUMENTS:
1. He and his wife has no business interests of any kind
2. His SALNs were prepared by his wifes bookkeeper
3. He should first be allowed to avail of the review and
compliance procedure in Sec 10 of RA 6713 before he is
administratively charged
4. His failure to indicate his wifes business interests is not
punishable under RA 3019
ISSUES:
RATIO:
ISSUE 1
1. This is the second time that Pleytos SALNs are before the
court. The first case was filed by PNP-CIDG wherein the
Court held that Pleyto is only guilty of simple negligence.
While the first case involves Pleytos 2001 and 2002 SALNs,
his omissions are identical. Since the facts and issues are
the same, the first case is conclusive upon the present case.
The Court merely quoted its ratio in the first case.
2. On the front page of Pleytos 2002 SALN, it is already
clearly stated that his wife is a businesswoman, and it can
be logically deduced that she had business interests. This is
inconsistent with the intention to conceal his and his wifes
business interests. That they had business interests is thus
readily apparent on the face of the SALN; it is just that the
missing particulars may be subject of an inquiry or
investigation.
3. An act done in good faith, which constitutes only
an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives
and/or purposes, does not qualify as gross
misconduct, and is merely simple negligence. Thus, at
most, Pleyto is guilty of negligence for having failed to
ascertain that his SALN was accomplished properly,
accurately, and in more detail.
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GSIS vs. CSC and Dr. Manuel Baradero; GSIS vs. CSC and
Matilde S. Belo
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The "per diem" received by Belo was actually paid for in the
performance of her duties as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a
holdover capacity not as the per diem referred to by section
1(c) of R.A. No 1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No.
186 (Government Insurance Service Act). A closer look at
the aforecited provision, moreover, reveals a legislative
intent to make a clear distinction between salary, pay or
compensation, on one hand, and other incidental
allowances, including per diems on the other. Section
1(c) provides:
(c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be construed as
to exclude all bonuses, per diems, allowances and
overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given
to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by
law or regulations.
In the sense in which the phrase "per diem" is used under
the Government Service Insurance Law, a per diem is a daily
allowance given for each day an officer or employee of
government is away from his home base. This is its
traditional meaning: its usual signification is as a
reimbursement for extra expenses incurred by the
public official in the performance of his duties. Under
this definition the per diem intended to cover the cost of
lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when the
latter are on duty outside of their permanent station.
On the other hand, a per diem could rightfully be
considered a compensation or remuneration attached
to an office. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case
of respondent Belo the per diems received by her
during the period that she acted in holdover capacity
obviously were in the nature of compensation or
remuneration for her services as Vice Governor of the
Province of Capiz, rather than as a reimbursement for
incidental expenses incurred while away from her
home base. It is to be noted that (1) he rendered services
to the government and was paid per diems for every session
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan he attended; (2) According
to CSC, [F]ormer Vice Governor Belo was on a full time
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Both Belo and Bradero assumed in good gaith that they are
covered by the GSIS insurance benefits. The deductions are
mandatory. If the GSIS did not deduct, it was by its own
choice:
contributions
were
exacted
from
petitioner before and after the disputed period. To assert
that petitioners would have been entitled to benefits had
they opted for optional deductions at that point misses the
principal fact in issue here, which is the question as to
whether or not the disputed periods should be credited as
service with compensation for the purposes of retirement.
Moreover, the source of GSIS benefits is not in essence
merely contractual; rather, it is a social legislation.
The situation as far as private respondents and the GSIS are
concerned could be rectified by deducting a reasonable
amount corresponding to the contributions which should
have been deducted during the period from the amount of
retirement benefits accruing to them. It would be grossly
inequitable as it would violate the spirit of the
government retirement and insurance laws to
permanently penalize both respondents Belo and Baradero
by ignoring the fact of actual period of service to
government with compensation, and deny them the
retirement privileges that they, for their unselfish service to
the government justly deserve. Under the peculiar
circumstances of the case at bench, the demand for equity
prompts us to regard spirit not letter, and intent, not form,
in according substantial justice to both respondents, where
the law, through its inflexible rules might prove inadequate.
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