1. PETER T. DONTON vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O.

YANSINGCO
A.C. No. 6057
JUNE 27, 2006

FACTS:
Peter D. Donton filed a disbarment case against Atty. Emmanuel O. Yansingco for serious
misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property constitutes
serious misconduct and a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent
be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in vilation of law and assisting Stier in carrying
out a dishonest scheme. After referring the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, IBP
Commission on Bar Dsicipline found respondent liable for taking part in a scheme to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines.
The Commission recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
years and the respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months. The Commission
forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT VIOLATED CANON 1 RULE 1.02
RULING:
The Court finds him liable.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that will involve defiance of
the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.
Respondent admitted that Stier, being a US citizen was disqualified from owning a property.
Respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of lands by preparing the Occupancy Agreement and several documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constotution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code
when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign
ownership of lands.

2. A.C. NO. 7062 (Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355)

September 26, 2006

RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS AND FREDILYN BACULBAS

vs. ATTY. JOSE, A SUING
A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Jose A. Suing on the grounds of deceit, malpractice,
violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, respondent
presented a fake Release Waiver and Quitclaims which eventually caused the dismissal of the
ULP and Illegal Dismissal Case before the Labor Arbiter. Herein complainants denied that they
signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the
considerations therefor.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS OF RESPONDENT CONSTITUTE MISCONDUCT.
RULING:
The acts of respondent constitute misconduct.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is
an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct.
The investigation of Commissioner Hababag reveals that respondent did not only try to coach
his client or influence him to answer questions in apparent attempt not to incriminate him
(respondent). His client also contradicted respondents claim that the Release Waiver and
Quitclaim which he prepared was not the one presented at the Arbiters Office, as well as his
implied calim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the money for and in
consideration of the execution of the documents.
While the disbarment case of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to
the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds
that respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.

3. GR NO. 104600

JULY 2, 1999

RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO AND AFRICA

vs. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and PHILIPPINE TELEPHONE LONG DISTANCE
COMPANY
FACTS:
Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. (ETPI) availed the services of San Juan, Africa, Gonzales, Africa
(SAGA) law firm. During the period when the court granted ETPIs application for preliminary restrictive
and mandatory injunctions, SAGA law firm was dissolved. The junior partners of SAGA formed RADA
(RIlloraza, Africa, de Ocampo & Africa), now complainants. On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the
RTC a notice of attorneys lien, furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination
letter and PLDT. On the same date, it sent a letter to ETPI containing its partial billing statement. In its
notice, RADA informed the court that there were negotiations towards a compromise between ETPI and
PLDT.
ETPI and PLDT compromised. The complainant law firm now demands for attorneys fees.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES FOR HANDLING THE CASE OF
ETPI THOUGH ITS SERVICES WERE TERMINATED IN MIDSTREAM AND THE CLIENT DIRECTLY
COMPROMISED THE CASE WITH THE ADVERSE PARTY
RULING:
The court agrees that petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees. It is however not convinced with
petitioners argument that the RADA is entitled for its claims. It is true that Atty. Rilloraza played a vital
role during the inception of the case and in the course of the trial. But the Attorney-client relationship
already ceased during the culmination of the case by amicable settlement. To award attorneys fees
amounting to 15% of the sum of P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too
unconscionable.
In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation which
lawyers may receive for their professional services. A lawyer has the right to e paid for legal services he
has extended to his client, which compensation must be reasonable. A lawyer would be entitled to
receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on a
quantum meruit basis.
Quantum Meruit, meaning as much as he deserved is used as a basis for determining the lawyers
professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client. Recovery of
attorneys fees on the basis of quantum merit is authorized when (1) there is no express contract for
payment of attorneys fees agreed upon between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although there is a
formal contract for attorneys fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the
court; and (3) when the contract for attorneys fees, the fees is void due to purely formal defects of
execution; (4) when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion;
(5) when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorneys fees.

4. 26 SCRA 24 (WRONG CITATION)

5. 35 SCRA 378 (WRONG CITATION)

6. A.M. No. P-97-1236. July 11, 1997

CLERK II - MADONNA MACALUA, complainant,
vs. COURT AIDE - DOMINGO TIU, JR., respondents.
FACTS:
Madonna Macalua, Clerk II of Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 in Dumaguete City, filed before
Judge Alvin L. Tan of the same Branch, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct in
office against respondent Domingo Tiu, Jr., a Court Aide.
Complainants grievance stemmed from the quarrel transpired after her refusal to release the bail bond
of the son of one Mrs. Adela dela Pea because there is a standing order from the Judge not to release
the same as there is a need to have a new motion filed. Complainant told Mrs. Dela Pea to come back
the next day and talk with Attorney Ricafort, explaining that she is only a clerk. Mrs. Dela Pea was
adamant in getting the bail bond whether there was an order or not and said that she cannot wait as she
comes from a far place and that she is leaving for Manila the next day. Respondent all of a sudden went
to complainant and told her to release the paper saying, Don, you release the bail bond because this
woman comes from a far place. If you were in her shoes it would not be nice if her papers will not be
released. Complainant explained that the judge would not allow the release because the motion had
to be changed, and that she is not authorized to release it unless there is a court order but respondent
insisted the bail bond be released. While complainant was explaining to Mrs. Dela Pena why she cannot
release the bail bond, respondent got the record (of criminal case No. 8323) which was in front of
complainant in her table and placed it on the table of Paulina Valencia, Court stenographer and went
over the pages looking for the bail bond, muttering, Where is that bail bond? Where is that bail
bond. This Ricafort is bull shit. He should have been here. Ricafort is always absent. After Mrs. Dela
Pea left with the promise of respondent that he will personally bring the papers (bail bond) to
Guihulngan, a quarrel ensued between complainant and the respondent.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TIU IS GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT
RULING:
The Court Administrator who adopted the findings of the investigating judge recommended that
respondent Domingo Tiu, Jr. be found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT in the course of official
duties and meted the penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day.
Respondents administrative liability stems from the Revised Administrative Code of
1987 specifically the provisions on the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which covers him as
court personnel. Section 46(b) of Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V of said Code includes
misconduct and discourtesy in the course of official duties among the grounds for disciplinary
action.
As a court aide or utility worker, respondent has no authority to release court records nor
can he compel complainant to release the same. This is specially true since the latter being the
clerk and having access to said records, refuses to do that which she knows she is legally

barred from doing for lack of authority. Respondent moved by pity and sympathy, tried to help a
woman townmate secure official paper and even promised to deliver the papers to her upon
knowing that she hails from a place 117 kms. Away from Dumaguete City. Helping people is a
good trait rarely found among public officials who are true to their duties and plainly motivated
by pure public service. It is in no way an ignoble act yet the manner it was carried out by
respondent cannot be countenanced. Such manner is reprehensible and shows lack of
courtesy contrary to the precept of courtesy in the civil service.

7. G.R. No. L-56741-42 April 15, 1988

AURORA MEJIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL PAMARAN, HON. ROMEO ESCAREAL, HON. CONRADO MOLINA,
Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the First Division SANDIGANBAYAN,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Josefina Meimban returned to the court of Branch XVII of the Court of First Instance of
Manila sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first came to know Atty. Aurora
Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided because there was still one
party who has not signed the compromise agreement. Petitoner told them she would
help them provided they give Pl,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to which she replied
she would broach the matter to her companions. The next meeting, Atty. Mejia again
mentioned to Meimban the gift she was asking from the latter to be given to the Judge,
and added that if Meimban wanted to win the case and she wanted her help, they have
to give to the Judge because she was the one making the decision. Allegedly, petitioner
is always asking an amount from the parties in exchange of a favorable decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER
MISCONDUCT.

OR

NOT

PETITIONERS

ACTS

CONSITUTED

GRAVE

RULING:
The Court finds and so holds that the guilt of the petitioner of the offenses charged
against her has been established beyond reasonable doubt. She took advantage of her
position as branch clerk of court by persuading the offended parties Josefina Meimban
and Pilar Bautista to deliver to her the sums of P 1,000.00 and P500.00, respectively, in
consideration of a promise that petitioner WW get a favorable resolution of their cases
in court.
Those who are involved in the administration of justice from the highest to the lowest
level must live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity in the public service.
The general public should respect and support such imperative. No attempt to influence
them one way or the other much less to bribe them should be made. One cannot buy a
bad case nor sell a good one. No amount of money can make out a good case out of a
bad one. And even if one succeeds in so doing it would certainly be uncovered and
reversed on appeal. Justice will prevail.

8. G.R. No. 333-CJ November 24, 1976

ERLINDA PABALAN, complainant,
vs. JUDGE DONATO M. GUEVARRA, City Judge, City Court of Manila, Branch
VIII, respondent.
FACTS:
Erlinda Pabalan, in a letter-complaint dated December 3, 1972 to the Secretary of National
Defense, charge respondent City Judge with having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment
and/or with ignorance of the law or through inexcusable negligence as an aftermath of the
acquittal of Sgt. Cesar Mallari of the Manila Police in Criminal Case No. F-149450 for Slight
Physical Injuries.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGE RENDERED UNJUST JUDGMENT AND
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW THROUGH INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE.
RULING:
After a careful consideration of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings, We find
the complaint filed against respondent City Judge Donato M. Guevarra of Manila to be without
merit. Thus, the record shows that complainant's allegation, that respondent City Judge
prevented the private prosecutor from cross-examining defense witness Pat. Gelvas of the
Manila Metropolitan Police Force, is without factual basis. Similarly, the claim of Complainant
that respondent "displayed sheer ignorance of the law" in sustaining "nonsensical" objections of
the defense during the hearing of August 16, 1972, is likewise not true.
The whole thrust of complainant's accusations is predicated upon her contention that
respondent erred in his appraisal of the evidence. We find no basis of such contention. Even on
the assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be
held administratively or civilly liable for his judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to
account in a civil action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however
erroneous. In the words of Alzua and Analot v. Johnson, it is a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officers in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself." This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration
of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judiciary. This principle is of universal application and applies to all grades of judicial officer
from the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court.

9. A.M. No. 202 July 22, 1975

RENE P. RAMOS, complainant, vs.MOISES R. RADA, respondent.

FACTS:

Moises R. Rada a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II, is
charged with a violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government x x x Records reveal that Moises R.
Rada was appointed as a representative to manage and supervise real properties of Avesco
Marketing Corporation while working as a messenger in Court of First Instance.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MOISES RADA VIOLATED THE CIVIL SERVICE RULE
RULING:
Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting government employees from
engaging directly in a private business, vocation or profession or being connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department. But, indubitably, also, his private
business connection has not resulted in any prejudice to the Government service.
Thus, his violation of the rule the lack of prior permission is a technical one, and
he should be meted no more than the minimum imposable penalty, which is
reprimand.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that
his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the Government. Such being his
situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive
endeavor to augment his income, and to award a premium for slothfulness if he
were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a private undertaking
outside of office hours and without foreseeable detriment to the Government
service. His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated,
but he must secure a written permission from the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Norte, who is hereby authorized to grant or revoke
such permission, under such terms and conditions as will safeguard the best
interests of the service, in general, and the court, in particular.

10. G.R. No. 12510. August 27, 1917. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. CESAREO DURBAN, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
Cesareo Durban was appointed as a procurador judicial, with the right to appear in
the courts of the justices of the peace in the Province of Iloilo as the representative
of said Salvador Laguda, subject to certain restrictions which were set out in the
appointment. So far as affects the question involved in this case these restrictions
were that the said Durban should only be permitted to appear in matters signed
and presented by the said Laguda with his own signature and when the latter
should send the said Durban to attend to such matters; that the said Durban should
have no authority to make contracts to represent any person in any justice court;
that all contracts and appearances should be made by the said Laguda, and that
the latter could send the said Durban to represent him in said courts; and finally
that said Durban should not collect any sum for any service.
While Salvador Laguda was absent, Cesareo Durban received another case. He was
therefore engaged and did attend to suit in the justice of the peace court
successfully. Cesareo Durban collected P50 in all in respect to that business. The
suit in the justice of the peace court involved no more than the possession of a
piece of land worth about P20; and the fee collected by Durban was greatly in
excess of what he should have received. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as amended by Act No. 1919 provides that the compensation of a procurador
judicial shall not exceed P5 for all services rendered in any one case. But Durban
claims that he was representing the office of Laguda and therefore was entitled to
charge more.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CESAREO DURBAN VIOLATED A LAW
RULING:
It follows that the defendant was unauthorized by such appointment to represent
Eustaquia Montage in the court of the justice of the peace or to collect money for
services therein rendered. As to all these matters he is clearly in no better position
than if he had never been appointed procurador judicial. Section 34 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 1919.
"No person not duly authorized to practice law may engage in the occupation of
appearing for or defending other persons in justice of the peace courts without
being first authorized for that purpose by the judge of the Court of First Instance."
The defendant therefore has violated this provision of law; and the question is
whether or not he is guilty of estafa, under subsection 1 of article 535 of the Penal
Code, as having defrauded another by falsely pretending to possess a qualification
not actually possessed by him.

11. NO EXACT CITATION

12.

A.M. No. 3048 June 3, 1991

JOSE C. MACIAS, ET AL., complainants,

vs.
MANUEL EB PACANA, MANUEL EB. VILLAMIL, MOUSILLINE ERIBERTO PACANA, AGUSTIN V. TAN,
JULITA V. TAN ANG, JACINTO V. TAN, ODONA V. TAN, EUFEMIA IGNACIO TAN, CATALINA VILLAMIL
VDA. DE TAYKO, PEDRO V. MIQUIABAS, PACITA V. MIQUIABAS, CARLOS V. MIQUIABAS, JUAN V.
MIQUIABAS, JESUS V. MIQUIABAS, MARINA V. MIQUIABAS, SALUD V. MIQUIABAS, ANTONIO
PENALOSA, VICENTE V. PENALOSA, MARCIANO O. KHO, ATTY. ERASMO B. DAMASING, JUDGE
ALEJANDRO B. PALLUGNA, JR., JUDGE EULALIO D. ROSETE, JUDGE SEVERO MALVAR, JUDGE
FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., ATTY. ELONIL J. TAYKO, ATTY. MARCELINO C. MAXINO, ATTY.
PACIFICO Q. MACALUA, ATTY. DIEGO R. ESPLAGO, ATTY. MANUEL, MA. UBAY-UBAY, ATTY.
FAUSTO DUGENIO, Atty. RAUL TITO BARIAS, ATTY. VICTORIANO H. BUNALES, ATTY. POTENCIANO
DE LOS REYES, AND ONE STILL UNKNOWN HEARING OFFICER, LRC, MANILA, respondents.
FACTS:

The facts alleged that Judge Pallugna acquired estate property contrary to Judicial
Ethics and that he also engaged in Notarial Work. That he also appeared as a
counsel and engaged in private practice.
WHETHER OR NOT HIS ACTIONS ARE VIOLATIONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS.
RULING:
When Respondent Judge filed the questioned adoption proceedings and appeared as
counsel for the oppositor in the intestate proceedings, he was authorized to engage
in private practice by the then existing law.
Judge Pallugna's acquisition of estate property, alleged to be contrary to Judicial
ethics, transpired after the proceedings had terminated and the property
adjudicated to the legal heirs. When the property was acquired, therefore, it was no
longer in litigation. No irregularity can be attributed to him either when he inquired
as to the status of. Civil Case No. 6644 involving the same property, being a
transferee of a portion thereof.
And as far as the adverse results to Complainants of the two (2) aforementioned
cases are concerned, as a result of which they had allegedly lost the inheritance
which is their due, the Court notes that Complainants neither appeared in Court to
oppose the petitions filed, nor did they take any steps to challenge the judgments
rendered, respectively, by the Courts of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
Branches III and VIII.
By and large, therefore, the questionable maneuvers attributed to Respondent
Judge in the handling of the subject cases do not provide sufficient basis for
disciplinary action.
Neither is there sufficient evidence that Respondent Judge had perjured himself in
the comments he submitted before the Tanodbayan and this Court. When he stated
in his Comment before the Tanodbayan that he had been a Judge since 1964 while

before this Court he stated that he was a practicing lawyer, what was obviously
meant was that as a Municipal Judge during the years involved, he was then
authorized to practice law.
The records, however, sufficiently provide a clear basis for a finding of Respondent
Judge's administrative liability for unauthorized notarization of three (3) private
documents, as follows: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 10 June 1977, executed by
Manuel E. Villamil, conveying a parcel of land to one Marciano Kho;(2)
Memorandum of Agreement, dated 8 October 1974, executed by Manuel E. Villamil
and Agustin Tan; and (3) Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Cristina
E. Vda. de Villamil, dated 20 August 1974, executed by Manuel E. Villamil.
It is well settled that Municipal Judges may not engage in Notarial work except as
notaries Public ex-officio.

13.

14. G.R. No. 85590 August 10, 1989

FLAVIANO BALGOS JR., VIRGILIO F. DACAYO JESUS C. SISON and LEON CUARESMA, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION AND LETICIA ACOSTA-ANG respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act.That on December 27, 1984, in Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Flaviano D.
Balgos, Jr., a public officer, being the acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and also the Ex-Officio provincial sheriff of the said province; and
the other accused Virgilio F. Dacayo, Jesus C. Sison and Leon C. Cuaresma, all public officers,
being Deputy Provincial Sheriffs of said province, acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully enforce a Writ of Execution against a
Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia Acosta-Ang, despite their knowledge that the
registered owner is not the judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 4047 of the Regional Trial Court of
Nueva Vizcaya which is the subject of the said writ of execution, thereby causing undue injury to
the said Leticia Acosta-Ang (complainant) and giving unwarranted benefits to the judgment
creditor in said civil case.
Antonio Uy Lim, the plaintiff and prevailing party in Civil Case No. 4047 filed a complaint for
rescission of the sale of the car by Juanito Ang to private respondent Leticia Acosta-Ang for
being allegedly in fraud of creditors.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS VIOLATED SECTION 3 (c), RA 3019.
RULING:

Although at the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan was persuaded that in fact the sale of the car to
Leticia Ang was fraudulent, this did not necessarily clear petitioners of the aforesaid Anti-Graft
charge against them. Still the burden is on the petitioners to establish that they acted in good
faith in proceeding with the execution on the car even they were presented evidence tending to
show it did not belong to Juanito Ang anymore.
In its resolution dated August 11, 1988 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner,
the Sandiganbayan held that the arguments adduced relate to matters of defense. The Court
finds that the public respondent did not err in denying the motion for withdrawal of the
information.
By the same token, the denial of the motion to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground
of the pendency of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307 is wen taken. The doctrine of
prejudicial question comes into play usually in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be pre-emptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because whatsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.

15. G.R. No. 125938. April 4, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL JANSON and RICKY

PINANTAO alias OGCO, appellants.

FACTS:
In the Robbery with Rape case, Atty. Jorge Zerrudo testified that he only assisted appellant Janson
in waiving his right to counsel, and that the sworn statement was already prepared when he signed
it. Nevertheless, he asked appellant Janson if the contents of the statement were true, and whether he
.
wished to be assisted by counsel P/SGT. PEDRO IDPAN, JR. testified that during the investigation, there
was no lawyer present and that Atty. Zerrudo signed the affidavit only after the investigation was
conducted. He claimed, however, that prior to the custodial investigation, he informed Janson of his
constitutional rights and that despite being a Manobo, Janson fully understood Cebuano, which was the
language used during the custodial investigation.
Finally, P/SGT. ORTELLO ACHAS testified that he was at the police station when Teresa Alcantara
appeared on June 24, 1986, and requested that she be accompanied to the jail to identify the person who
was earlier apprehended and detained. She identified the person as appellant Joel Janson. On crossexamination, P/Sgt. Achas admitted that he was not the one who conducted the investigation on the
person of Joel Janson and that he could not remember whether appellant Janson who was then sixteen
(16) years old and a Manobo was assisted by a lawyer.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT INTERROGATIONS MADE DESPITE THE LACK OF COUNSEL IS

VALID.

RULING:
In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to counsel was made knowingly
and intelligently. Appellant Joel Janson was illiterate, and a minor of sixteen (16) years at the
time of the offense. As held in the case of People v. Bonola, where the accused was
unschooled and only nineteen (19) years old when arrested, it is difficult to believe that
considering the circumstances, the accused made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In
such instances, the need for counsel is more pronounced.
It is also important to mention that the investigating officers already had a prepared
statement when they went to the lawyer who is supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving
his right to counsel.
This is not what is contemplated by law. In People v. Quidato, Jr., where the police officers
already prepared the affidavits of the accused when they were brought to the CLAO (now PAO)
lawyer, and the latter explained the contents of the affidavits in Visayan to the accused who
affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same, the court held that the affidavits are
inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. As also ruled in People v.
Compil, the belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day, even if prior to the actual
signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect of lack of counsel for the
investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from the accused
therein. Thus, in People v. De Jesus, we said that admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution.

As pointed out in People v. Deniega, if the lawyers role is reduced to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a priorly prepared document albeit indicating therein compliance with
the accuseds constitutional rights, the constitutional standard is not met.

16. A.M. No. RTJ-95-1283. July 21, 1997]

Exec. Judge DAVID C. NAVAL, Naga City and DSWD Secretary CORAZON ALMA DE
LEON, complainants, vs. JUDGE JOSE R. PANDAY, RTC, Branch 27, Naga City, JUDGE
SIMON D. ENCINAS, RTC, Branch 51, Sorsogon and JUDGE RICA H. LACSON, MTC,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, respondents.
FACTS:
Judge Jose R. Panday, Presiding Judge of Branch 27, same court, was a suspect in an alleged rape
incident which was reported by the local media. On 17 November 1994, the Court received a letter from
the then Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Hon. Corazon Alma
G. de Leon, confirming the report of the alleged rape of Cecile Buenafe by Judge Panday. Secretary de
Leon informed the Court that Ceciles father, Regino Buenafe, has entrusted her to the care and custody
of the DSWD Center for girls in Sorsogon. On the basis of reports received by her office from the DSWD
Field Director of Region V, Secretary de Leon further alleged that Judge Panday had attempted to settle
the case by offering to pay the father of Cecile the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P150,000.00) and that on 16 October 1994, MTC Judge Rica H. Lacson and RTC Judge Simon D.
Encinas, together with Regino, pressured Cecile into signing an Affidavit of Desistance without the
presence of the head or any social worker of the Center.
According to Judge Panday, the criminal charges against him are concocted by some people who
are out to extort money from him. With respect to the charges of abuse of judicial authority or deliberate
obstruction of justice, Finally, Judge Panday defends his dismissal of Criminal Case No. 94-5566 for rape
entitled People vs. Luciano Matias asserting that the order of dismissal was issued by him upon filing by
the prosecutors, both public and private, of a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss which was based on a
joint affidavit of desistance freely and voluntarily executed by the alleged offended girl and her parents.
Nothing in his aforesaid action in said case allegedly shows any bias, partiality, ignorance of the law,
or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Judge Panday concludes that complainants in the present
Administrative Matter have failed to prove by substantial evidence their charges against him.
For herself, respondent Judge Lacson denies the allegation that she, together with Judge Encinas,
forced Cecile into signing the affidavit of desistance. She claims that she was requested by Judge
Panday and Regino to administer the oaths of Cecile and Regino in connection with the execution of an
affidavit of desistance. Like Judge Lacson, respondent Judge Encinas also denies that he pressured
Cecile into signing the affidavit of desistance. He explains that he just finished playing tennis on that
Sunday of 16 October 1994 when he met Judge Panday at the Hall of Justice Building.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE PANDAY VIOLATED THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.

RULING:
Complainants were able to muster the requisite quantum of evidence to prove their charges against
Judge Panday. By having sexual intercourse with Cecile, who was then only fifteen (15) years old, Judge
Panday violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and
strict standards of morality required of members of the judiciary. In addition, his subsequent act of offering
Ceciles father a substantial amount of money in consideration for the withdrawal of their charges against
him is considered, by law, an obstruction of justice.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that:

Canon I

Rule 1.01: A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
The Court has repeatedly reminded members of the judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond
reproach and suspicion, and be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not
only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their every day life. For no position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and at all times expected to observe
irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency.

17.