C.

Constitutional Limitations
1. US vs. Bull 15 PHIL 7

f. deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.
While R.A. 6132 penalizes a violation of the provision it only punishes acts committed after the approval of the law

FACTS: H.N Bull, who was the master of a vessel transporting cattle,
carabao and other animals from Formosa to Manila, failed to provide suitable means for securing the animals while they are in
transit. Such neglect was a violation of Act. No. 275 of the Philippine Commission, which reads: The owners or masters of
steam, sailing, or other vessels,carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or otheranimals, from one port in the Philippine
Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels
carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the
ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such
animals to be provided with adequate forage and freshwater at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the
animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation. Bull contends that the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over
his offense.

4. People vs. Ferrer (48 SCRA 382)

Facts: On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in Tarlac concerning
the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of being an officer or a ranked leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion or any other illegal means. Co claimed that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970, Nilo
Tayag and five others were also charged in the same court with subversion. Tayag copied Cos attack on the law. The court
ruled the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague overbroad. Government appealed to the
SC as a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over this case.

Issues:

RULING: When a vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is
within the territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian
merchant vessel sailing tothe Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of thePhilippines if the illegal conditions existed
during the time the ship was within the territorial waters regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the
ship sailed from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas. In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found
guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.

Relevant: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder

2. CONCEPCION vs. GARCIA November 29, 1929

3. In Re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI [35 SCRA 429 (1970)] October 22, 1970
Facts: Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation. Questions the validity of RA No.
6132 Sec. 8 on the grounds that it violates due process,rights of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post
facto law.

Irrelevant: WoN it is vague and overbroad

Irrelevant: WoN it denies the defendants the due process of the law
Held And Ratio:
Relevant: No. Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. (US v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946)
Irrelevant: No. The contention about the word overthrow regarding the government (peaceful overthrowing) is clarified by
the provision of the clause: by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means.
Irrelevant: No. The freedom of expression and freedom of association is superseded by the right of the state to selfpreservation.

Issues: Provision violates due process, rights of association, and freedom of expression? Is it an ex post facto law?

Decision: The questioned resolution is set aside.

Held: Petition denied. It is a Constitutional act. Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive
effect. Penalty for violation of law is imposed to acts committed after the approval of the law.

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill
of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the
NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of
Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created
a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

1. Provision violates due process, rights of association, and freedom of expression? No, the questioned provision is a valid
limitation on due process, rights of association, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal
protection clause. R.A. No. 6132 is designed to prevent both prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal
protection of laws.
2. Is it an ex post facto law? No. Ex post facto law defined:
a. makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when done.
b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was
c. inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed
d. alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different tests
e. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of right which when done was
lawful

The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in
fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided
that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a
designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty
for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death.
Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of
expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following
requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government
for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the
same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to
further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable.
This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished? Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members
of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the
necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of
guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the
preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom
of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/
evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done
by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt
acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution
of the TRIAL COURT.
5. NASI-VILLAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 176169 November 14, 2008)
Facts: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Rosario Nasi-Villar assailing the
Decision dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals. This case originated from an
Information for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042 filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on 5 October 1998 for acts committed by petitioner
and one Dolores Placa in or about January 1993. The Information reads:

That on [sic] or about the month of [January 1993], in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Davao del Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another through fraudulent representation and deceitful machination,
did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment abroad[,] demand and
receive the amount ofP6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as placement fee[,] the said accused being a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority to engage in the recruitment of workers abroad to the damage and prejudice of the
herein offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 3 July 2002, after due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos City, Davao del Sur found the evidence presented by
the prosecution to be more credible than that presented by the defense and thus held petitioner liable for the offense of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code, as amended. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Recruitment and, in accordance with the penalty set forth under the Labor Code, as
amended, said accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR YEARS as minimum to
FIVE YEARS as maximum.
On the civil aspect of the case, there being no substantial proof presented to justify a grant of civil damages, this
Court makes no pronouncement thereon.
With respect to accused Ma. Dolores Placa, who is still at large, the records of this case are hereby sent to the
archives to be retrieved in the event that said accused would be apprehended. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for
the apprehension of said accused.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged error by the trial court in finding her guilty of illegal
recruitment on the basis of the trial court's appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 June 2005, following the principle that an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case wide open for review, noted that the criminal acts alleged to have been committed happened sometime in 1993.
However, R.A. No. 8042, under which petitioner was charged, was approved only on 7 June 1995 and took effect on 15 July
1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared that petitioner should have been charged under the Labor Code, in particular Art.
13(b) thereof, and not under R.A. No. 8042. Accordingly, it made its findings on the basis of the provisions of the Labor Code
and found petitioner liable under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b), and Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The appellate court affirmed
with modification the decision of the RTC, decreeing in the dispositive portion, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Br.
18, City of Digos, Province of Davao del Sur, finding Rosario Nasi-Villar guilty beyond reasonable doubt o the crime
of Illegal Recruitment is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION in that Rosario Nasi-Villar is ORDERED to pay Nila Panilag the
sum ofP10,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution dated 28 November
2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
D. Generality
1. United States vs. Philip K Sweet (GR No. 448) [1 Phil. 18 (1901)]

Facts: Philip K. Sweet, an American has been employed by the United States, has committed an offense against a Prisoner of
War and claimed that he was acting in the line of duty. His statement however was not supported by the findings or any
evidence. Courts of first instance are given original jurisdiction for this case
ISSUES: Whether or not the Courts of first instance has the jurisdiction for this case
RULING: YES, the courts of First instance have the jurisdiction for this case. By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine
Commission section 56, Courts of First instance are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more
than six months imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars maybe imposed. Since the defendant has failed to
prove that he was acting in line of his duty, his actions are within the jurisdiction of the CFI. Military assault to the POW may
not be against the revised penal code but civilian physical assault charges maybe pressed.
U.S. v. SWEET
Nature: Appeal from an order of the City of Manila CFI
Facts: Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with the
CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now
contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was acting in the line of duty.
Issues: 1.WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty
more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater than $100may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try
offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the
accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to prove that he was indeed acting
in the line of duty.
2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offence under the penal code?
Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW isnt in the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC.
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, WON the military character sustained by the person charged with the
offence at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?
No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other
specialcharacter brought before them for trial (R.A. No. 7055).Appellant claims that the act was service connected. If this were
true, it may be used as a defense but this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case.
Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed An offense charged against a military officer in consequence of an act done in
obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction
of the courts of the Civil Government.
Per Cooper, J., concurring
2. SCHNECKENBURGER v. MORAN [63 Phil. 249 (1943)]

Issues: 1.WON the US SC has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al & such jurisdiction excludes
courts of the Phils.
No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A consul is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where here sides. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on
Nov. 15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the
land. It also provides that the original jurisdiction of this court shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al.
2. WON original jurisdiction over cases affectingambassadors, consuls, et. al. is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. According to Sec. 17. of Act No. 136 and by virtue
of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warrant to, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred
on the CFIs. As a result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time
the Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFIs.
The original jurisdiction conferred to SC by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction.
Judgment: CFI has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.
Digest 2: Facts: Petitioner was the honorary Consul of Uruguay at Manila. He was charged in the CFI of Manila with the crime
of falsification of a private document. He objected that the CFI had no jurisdiction over him. His objection was overruled and
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to prevent CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against
him. His counsels contended that the CFI has jurisdiction over him under the Article III Section 2 of the constitution of the
United States and that the Supreme Court of US has jurisdiction over him and that the Philippine constitution stated that only
the Supreme court has jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction over the Honorary Consul of Uruguay
RULING: Yes, the CFI has jurisdiction over the Honorary Consul of Uruguay. Diplomatic immunity is given to members that have
been sent by a certain country to the Philippines to represent their nation and to protect its nationalities who are in the
Philippine territory. This privilege is applicable to ambassadors or ministers, but is still subject to the rules and regulations of
the country to which he is accredited. A consul, however is not exempted from criminal prosecutions for violations of the laws
of the country where he resides. Therefore, the CFI Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner and that the writ of prohibition
has been denied.
3. VALDEZ vs. LUCERO. G.R. No. L-246

March 27, 1946

Facts: That Silverio Valdez was prosecuted for murder under an information filed by the provincial fiscal in the justice of the
peace court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, which information, in part, reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1945, in the barrio of San Julian, municipality of Bantay, province of Ilocos Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the above-named defendant, Silverio Valdez, with intent to kill, and
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with cruelty, by deliberately
and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of one Juan Ponce, kill the latter with bolo, dagger and other weapons and died
instantly.

Digest 1: Nature: Original action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

Facts: Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila was subsequently charged in CFI-Manila with
the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to this saying that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the
CFI has no jurisdiction to try him. After his objection was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the
CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from this, he contended that original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

The main issue here is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the case for murder filed against
petitioner Silverio Valdez, as above stated, because, he alleges, he was not only a member of a recognized guerrilla and hence
a member of the United States armed forces in the Philippines, in North Luzon, but was also later on absorbed into the
Philippine Army and therefore, he claims, he should be tried by a general court martial, which has jurisdiction over the crime
charged and the person of the accused pursuant to article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408).

Petitioner also contends that the whole of Ilocos Sur was at the time imputed in the information overrun by the enemy and
that any place of hiding of the guerrillas in the province was a military reservation for the safety of the Philippine and American
armed forces within the purview of the Articles of War.
Ruling: In Funk vs.. State ([1919], 208 S.W., 509; 84 Tex. Cr. R., 402), the following doctrines were also laid down:
A soldier of the United States who murders a citizen of the state offends against both the military and the state laws
and may be tried in the state courts.
Although under this section (Art. 92), military authorities have the prior right to try soldier who has murdered a
citizen, the soldier who has committed the crime cannot object to being tried by a state court, where the military
authorities have not asserted any right. (Emphasis added.)
In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur has jurisdiction over
the murder case against the petitioner and cannot be deprived of such jurisdiction. This being our conclusion, it is unnecessary
to pass upon the other questions of law raised by the petition.
Being without any merit whatsoever, the petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
4. Ruffy vs Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-533 75 Phil 875 August 20, 1956
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or military bases
all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and
organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their
position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt.
Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the
time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court head that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still
covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an
officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and
trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

HELD:
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in
accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in
accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention,
and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty
of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may
not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people have
greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not
governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.
6. JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 125865) March 26, 2001
Facts: Two criminal information for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a Chinese national who was employed as an
Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City.The MeTC,
acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal
information against him. The RTC Pasig City annulled and set aside the MeTCs dismissal. Hence, Liang filed a petition for
review before the SC which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is
limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Hence, the present MR.
Issue: WON Liang is immune from suit
Held: No.
Ratio: The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision.
The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB
officers and personnel. The issue of whether or not Liangs utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to
determine

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED. 5.

J. Punos concurring opinion:

5. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a political question. It is solely within the
prerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the
ADB Charter and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence
of international organizations against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow
such organizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is an
implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The exception allegedly has no application to
the case at bar."

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese
forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes
and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.
2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the
jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)
3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in
the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunities
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.
Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of
property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in
such cases the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the
latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."

Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not absolute.

Issues: 1.WON the offense has been committed within a US base thus giving the US jurisdiction over the case.

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he
may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy
"functional" immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of
its purposes. This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process
to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank
waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their
private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.

No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was committed is not w/in a US base for it is not names in Annex A or B of
AXXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) & is merely part of the temporary quarters located w/in presented limits of
the city of Manila. Moreover, extended installations & temporary quarters arent considered to have the same
jurisdictional capacity as permanent bases & are governed by AXIII pars. 2 & 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in the beyond
the jurisdiction of military courts.

Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process" accorded to ADB as an
international organization.
The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts. He
stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his secretary. Considering that the immunity
accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes necessary to make a factual
determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation to his official functions as a
senior economist
E. Territoriality
1. U.S. v. AH SING [36 Phil. 978 (1917)]
French vs. English rule
Facts: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on a steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which
arrived the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought 8 cans of
opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making the search found the cans of opium hidden in the
ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his
intention to import the prohibited drug.
Issue: WON the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has been proven?
Held: Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from which the drug discharged came into Philippine
waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In this case, it is to be noted that 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, Any person
who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands Import and bring should be construed as
synonymous terms. The mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. The
importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into the port, and
the importation is complete before the entry to thecustomhouse. Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely, judging
from the size of the amount brought.
2. MIQUIABAS v. COMMANDING GENERAL [80 Phil. 267 (1948)]
Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.
Facts: Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee of the US army in the Philippines who had been charged of disposing
in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the US army in violation of the 94th article of War of the US. He was arrested
and a General Court-Martial was appointed. He was found guilty. As a rule, the Philippines being a sovereign nation has
jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the US shall
exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within said portions of territory.

2. WON the offender is a member of the US armed forces

No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not considered as a member of the US armed forces. Even under the articles of war,
the mere fact that a civilian employee is in the service of the US Army does not make him a member of the armed forces.
F. Prospectivity
1. THE UNITED STATES vs. EL CHINO CUNA (alias SY CONCO) G.R. No. L-4504 December 15, 1908
Facts: On the 12th of August, 1907, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Isabela, an
information charging the defendant Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), with a violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461 of the
Philippine Commission, committed as follows:
That the said Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), on or about the 30th day of June, 1907, in the municipality of
Echague, in the Province of Isabela, in the Philippine Islands, sold for ten cents, Philippine currency, a small quantity
of opium, to Apolinaria Gumpal, a Filipino woman, who was neither a doctor, pharmacist, vender of opium with
license, nor an inveterate user of opium duly registered; all contrary to the law.
The trial court in its order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information held as follows:
After hearing he arguments of counsel and examining the record, the court finds that at the time when it is alleged
this accused committed the offense with which he is charged, Act No. 1461, known as the "Opium Law" was in
force, and continued to be in force until the 17th day of October, 1907, when it was superseded by a new Act, No.
1761, which, in section 33 thereof, repeals Act No. 1461, without excepting from the provisions of the repealing
clause cases pending at the time of its enactment, for the infraction of Act. No. 1461, and without prescribing what
disposition should be made of such cases. This being true, the court is of opinion that this case should be dismissed,
there being at this time no law in force, in accordance with which this accused, if he be tried and convicted, can be
punished for the offense committed in June, 1907. (U.S. vs. Tynen, 11 Wal., 88 Mongeon vs. People, 55 N.Y., 613;
State vs. Wilder, 47 Ga., 522). The court, therefore, sustains this demurrer, and dismisses the case, declaring the
costs de oficio.
Ruling: We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of English and American common law relied upon by counsel for defendant is
not and has not been the accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction, and that, in accordance with the accepted doctrine, the courts
in these Islands are not deprived of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders who have violated the provisions of Act
No. 1461 prior to the date when Act No. 1761 went into effect, notwithstanding the provision of the latter Act repealing Act
No. 1461; and that the penalty prescribed by the repealing Act for violation charged in the information not being more
favorable to the accused than that prescribed in the old law, the penalty to be imposed is that prescribed by the old law. But
we expressly reserve our opinion as to which penalty would properly be imposed in case wherein a later Act of the Commission
of the Philippine Legislature imposed more favorable penalty than that prescribed in a repealed Act.
The judgment of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the complaint interposed by the accused is reversed, and the record
will be returned to that court for further proceedings in accordance with the law. So ordered.
(A demurrer is a pleading in a lawsuit that objects to or challenges a pleading filed by an opposing party)

2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. CRISANTO TAMAYO March 19, 1935 G.R. No. L-41423 (full case)
Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos Sur, of a violation of section 2,
municipal ordinance No. 5, series of 1932, of said municipality. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
conviction resulted and a fine was imposed. From that decision this appeal was brought.
While this appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 in question, which repeal was duly approved by the
provincial board, and the act complained of, instead of being a violation of the municipal ordinances, is now legal in that
municipality.
Appellant has moved for a dismissal of the action against him on account of that repeal.
In the leading cases of the United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil. 241) and Wing vs. United States (218 U.S. 272), the doctrine was
clearly established that in the Philippines repeal of a criminal Act by its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not
destroy criminal liability. But not a single sentence in either decision indicates that there was any desire to hold that a person
could be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts no longer criminal.
There is no question that a common law and in America a much more favorable attitude towards the accused exists relative to
statutes that have been repealed than has been adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine, but
even in Spain, where the offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1 Pacheco Commentaries, 296.)
The repeal here was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by implication. Nor was there any saving clause. The
legislative intent as shown by the action of the municipal council is that such conduct, formerly denounced, is no longer
deemed criminal, and it would be illogical for this court to attempt to sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.
We are therefore of the opinion that the proceedings against appellant must be dismissed. So ordered. Costs de oficio.
3. PEOPLE vs.GERONIMA SINDIONG DE PASTOR and SANTOS T. PASTOR G.R. No. L-335 February 12, 1947
Facts: The accused Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were, on June 4, 1941, charged by the Provincial Fiscal of
Oriental Negros in an information filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Dumaguete, capital of the province, with a
violation of sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation with Act No. 3243, and section 2723 of the
same Code. The accused waived their right to a preliminary investigation, whereupon the proper information was lodged
against them with the Court of First Instance of the province on July 11, 1941. Probably as a consequence of the Pacific war
having supervened, no further proceedings were taken until January 27, 1946, when the accused filed a motion to quash. The
motion was upheld by the trial court in its order dated February 12, 1946 (Appendix A of appellant's brief).
The Government, not agreeing with such order, interposed this appeal.
The information alleges that these defendants during the period comprised between January, 1936, and March 31, 1938, being
such owners, managers and administrators of said "Magazine Center", with the deliberate purpose to evade the payment of
the percentage tax upon their receipts, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally neglected to make a return of their sales within the
time prescribed by law.
Issue: The question presented here is whether or not, in view of the express repeal of sections 1458 and 1459, in relation with
section 2723, of the Revised Administrative Code, and of Act No. 3243, by section 369 of Commonwealth Act No. 466,
otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, and in view of the later enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503
(vide section 5), violations of the provisions of the repealed acts, while they were in force, could be legally prosecuted after the
repeal but also after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503.
Ruling: In the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), the earliest Philippine case cited in the Solicitor General's brief, this
Court declared (p. 245):
. . . In other words, that the enactment of new penal laws, notwithstanding the fact that they contain general
repealing clauses, does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with

violations of the old law prior to the date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the new law wholly fails to
penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law.
In accordance with this doctrine, where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal. This is our case, since, as already seen, the
National Internal Revenue Code, and for that matter even Commonwealth Act No. 503, wholly fails to penalize the acts
imputed upon the herein defendants.
Wherefore, it is the judgment of this Court that the order appealed from be, as it is hereby, affirmed with costs de officio. So
ordered.
4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WENCESLAO ALMUETE, FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION
and CIPRIANO FRONDA, defendants-appellees. [G.R. No. L-26551. February 27, 1976.]
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of Section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that in December, 1963, in Muoz, Nueva Ecija, the accused being
tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their
respective harvests of five (5) cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan (Criminal Case
No. SD-179, Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto. Domingo Branch Vl).
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed a motion for a bill of particulars as to the exact date of the
commission of the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion because they had already entered their plea.
Thereafter, they filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds (1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to
constitute the crime charged; (2) that there is no law punishing it, and (3) that the court has no jurisdiction over the alleged
crime. The fiscal opposed the motion.
The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order of August 11, 1966. It held that the
information is basically deficient because it does not describe the circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in
the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests and it does
not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal
harvest.
The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal.
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord is inferable from the fact that, as already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and prethreshing.
All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace the Agricultural Tenancy Law with the Code
of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the Agricultural Land Reform Code, at least as far as ricelands are concerned.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense
under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To
prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the
policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and prethreshing without notice to landholder.
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain, operates as a
repeal of anything omitted which was contained in the old act and not included in the amendatory act" (Crawford,
Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).

"A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for it,
operates to repeal the former statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). "The revising statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is
embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).

WHY? 1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal,
conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet. 2. They are
different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of firearms.

The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law
prior to its repeal (People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225; People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; People vs.Binuya, 61 Phil.
208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431; See dissent in Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247,
252, 254).

Anyway, let us go back to our concern which is the application of EXECEPTION TO THE RULE OF PROSPECTIVITY
Since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the accused, we can no longer charge
accused with RA 1700 even if the issue wasnt raised. PD 1866 should be amended to mere ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
without furtherance of subversion.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.

5. PEOPLE v. PIMENTEL [288 SCRA 542 (1998)]
Digest 1: Facts: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5, 1990, Tujan was
arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy
(Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; & Enrile v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the TC
& the CA.

Ruling: The subversion charged against Antonion Tujan is DISMISSED (RA 76736 = Subversion is no longer a crime. -
retroactive effect). The other information for the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion is
DEEMED AMENDED to SIMPLE illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The accused-appellant is hereby ordered
RELEASED IMMEDIATELY (this is so because even if he was convicted of I.P.o.F.A.a.A. hehethe length of his detention while
his case is still pending has ALREADY EXCEEDED the penalty prescribed by the new law.)
In short: Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release Tujan.
6. BENEDICTO and RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001]

Issue: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700.
Ratio: No.
1.
AIII of the Constitution & ROC 117 state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous
cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet.
2.

They are different offenses. RA 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of firearms.

But, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, & since this is favorable to the accused, we can no longer charge
accused with RA 1700 even if they didnt raise this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms
without furtherance of subversion
Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release Tujan.
Digest 2: Facts: In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion under RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law).
As a consequence thereof, a warrant for his arrest has been issued on July 29, 1983but it could not be served because he
could not be found.
7 years later (June 5, 1990), he was arrested on the basis of his warrant of arrest of the subversion case. When arrested, an
unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver and six rounds of live ammunition were found on his possession.
On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under PD
1866.
On July 16 1990, Tujan filed the motion to quash the second criminal case (illegal possession) contending that common
crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed by the crime subversion. He
is entitled to invoke constitutional protection against double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile v.
Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of appeals.)
SIDE ISSUE:
Issue: Whether or not the charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge
under RA 1700?
Ratio: NO.

FACTS: On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10
of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets
alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited
natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central
Bank. On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879
to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction,
forum shopping, absence of a preliminary investigation and extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No.
960.On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos
seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial
court in its order dated June 9,1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this
motion on October 18, 1994.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid preliminary
investigation.(2)Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and
Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners.
HELD : (1)NO. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an inquiry to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused
by statute, and can be waived, either expressly or by implication. When the records of the case were disclosed to them, in
opting to enter their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings, they are deemed to have made
an express waiver of their right to have a preliminary investigation.
(2)NO. In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same
reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Even the
most cursory glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly
providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular. A saving
clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present
case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to

prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under
investigation.
G. Scope of Application
1. People of the Philippines vs Wong Cheng GR no. L-18924
FACTS: Wong Cheng was on board the English vessel Changsa smoked opium while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay
two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the ship
RULING: International law has 2 rules regarding the jurisdiction of a court over a ship. The first one is the French rule where in
the court has no jurisdiction over a ship carrying a foreign flag. On the other hand, the English rule based on the rule that any
crime committed within the territory of a specific country is triable in courts of the country where the crime was committed.
During the time when this crime was committed by the defendant, the Philippines was an American territory, thus follows the
English rule which the United States is following. Mere possession of opium in a foreign vessel in transit is not considered a
disturbance if public order. However, to smoke opium within our territorial limits is a breach of public order because it causes
such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory.
H. Construction
1. THE UNITED STATES vs. ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS G.R. No. L-12262 February 10, 1917
Facts: The appellant here is accused of violating the Internal Revenue Law. He was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of
P10. He appealed.
A person who violates any provision of the Internal Revenue Law or any lawful regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
made in conformity with the same, for which delinquency no specific penalty is provided by law, shall be punished by a fine of
not more than three hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both
The appellant is the owner of a printing establishment called "The Excelsior" and as such was required by law to keep a book in
which he should make the entire required by the above quoted regulation. It is charged in the information that he violated the
provisions of said regulation in that he failed to make any entry for the 5th day of January, 1915, indicating whether any
business was done on that day or not.
Ruling: We are of the opinion that the accused must be acquitted. It appears undisputed that he regularly employed a
bookkeeper who was in complete charge of the book in which the entries referred to should have been made and that the
failure to make the entry required by law was due to the omission of the bookkeeper of which appellant knew nothing. Courts
will not hold one person criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed without his knowledge or consent, unless
there is a statute requiring it so plain in its terms that there is no doubt of the intention of the Legislature. Criminal statutes are
to be strictly construed. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be
pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. (U. S. vs. Madrigal, 27 Phil. Rep., 347.)
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted. Costs de officio. So ordered.
I. Cases on basic maxim
1. US vs. Ah Chong G.R. No. L-5272. March 19, 1910
FACTS: The accused, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in Fort Mckinley and was sharing the house with the
deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a house boy. The door of the room they were occupying was not furnished
with a permanent lock, and as a measure of security, they fasten the door by propping a chair against it. One evening, Ah
Chong was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of their room. The deceased and the accused had an

understanding that when either returned late at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his
identity. Ah Chong sat up in bed and called out twice, Who is there? but heard no answer. The room was quite dark, and as
there had been recent robberies in Fort McKinley, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, he leaped to his feet and
called out. If you enter the room, I will kill you. Suddenly, he was struck by the edge of the chair which had been placed
against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow and
wildly struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate, Pascual.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was criminally liable.
HELD: No. The rule is that one is not criminally liable if he acted without malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence.
In the present case, the accused acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more
than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense. Had the facts been as he believed them to be, he would have been wholly
exempt from criminal liability on account of his act. Moreover, the accused cannot be said to have been negligent or reckless
as the facts as he saw them threatens his person and his property. Under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability, as
the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
2.