Ford v. Surget

11/28/2014
Ford v. Surget :: 97 U.S. 594 (1878) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
EnterSearchTerms
Search
Justia U.S.Law U.S.Case Law U.S.Supreme Court Volume 97 Ford v.Surget Case
Ford v.Surget
97 U.S.594 (1878)
Annotate this Case
Sylabus|Case
U.S.Supreme Court
Ford v.Surget,97 U.S.594 (1878)
Ford v.Surget
97 U.S.594
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
Sylabus
1.The courtreafirmsthe doctrine inW iliamsv.Brufy, 96 U.S.176,thatanenactmentofthe
Confederate States,enforced asa law ofone ofthe statescomposing thatconfederation,isa
statute ofsuchstate withinthe meaning ofthe actregulating the appelate jurisdictionofthis
Courtoverthe judgmentsand decreesofthe state courts.

2.A.,a residentofAdamsCounty,Mississippi,whose cotonwasthere burntbyB.inMay,
1862,broughtanactionforitsvalue againstthe later,who setup asa defense thatthatstate,
whereofhe wasatthatdate a resident,wastheninsubjectionto and underthe controlofthe
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/97/594/case.html
1/24
11/28/2014
"Confederate States;"thatanactoftheircongress,approved March6,1862,declared thatit

wasthe dutyofalmilitarycommandersintheirservice to destroyalcotonwhenever,intheir
judgment,the same should be aboutto falinto the handsofthe United States;thatin obedience
to thatact,the commanderoftheirforcesinMississippiissued anorder,directed to hissubordinate
oficersinthatstate,to burnalcotonalong the MississippiRiverlikelyto fal into the handsofthe
forcesofthe United States;thatthe provostmarshalofthatcountywas charged withexecuting
withinitthatorder;thatA.'scotonwaslikelyto falinto the handsofthe United States;thatthe
provostmarshalordered and required B.to burnit;and thatB.did burnit inobedience to the said
actand the ordersofthatcommanderand the provostmarshal.Held l. thatthe said act,asa
measure oflegislation,canhave no force inanycourtrecognizing the Constitutionofthe United
Statenasthe supreme law ofthe land;2.thatitdid notassume to conferupon
Page 97 U.S.595
suchcommandersanygreaterauthoritythanthey,bythe lawsand usagesofwar,were entitled to
exercise;3.thatthe orders,asanactofwar,exempted a soldierofthe Confederate army who
executed them from liabilityto the ownerofthe cotonwho,atthe time ofitsdestruction, wasa
voluntaryresidentwithinthe linesofthe insurrection;4.thatthe plea should,upon demurrer,be
deemed assuficientlyaverring the existence ofsuchrelationsbetweenB.and the Confederate
militaryauthoritiesasentitled him to make the same defense asifhe had beensuchsoldier.
Ford filed hiscomplaintagainstSurgetinthe CircuitCourtofAdamsCounty,Mississippi,on the

2d ofOctober,1866,aleging thathe,
"athisplantationinsaid county,onthe fifthdayofMay,inthe year1862,waspossessed,asof
hisownpersonalproperty,oftwo hundred balesofcoton,averaging inweightfourhundred
poundsperbale,and ofthe value of$600 perbale;and thathe being so possessed,Surget,at
the place aforesaid,and uponthe dayand yearaforesaid,did wilfulyand uterly,and against the
consentand wilofthe plaintif,destroyoffire the said two hundred balesofcoton,"
to the plaintif'sdamage inthe sum of$120,000.
The defendantpleaded notguilty,and also filed numerousspecialpleas.
The defense,althoughpresented bythe specialpleasindiferentforms,isinsubstance

embraced bythe folowing alegations,namely:
Thatatand before the time the aleged trespasseswere commited,the people ofMississippi,
2/24
11/28/2014
and ofVirginia,NorthCarolina,SouthCarolina,Florida,Georgia,Alabama,Louisiana,
Arkansas,and Texas,had confederated togetherforrevoltagainst,and withintheirterritorial
limitshad entirelysubverted,the governmentofthe United States,and inplace thereof,and
withinand fortheirterritoryand people,had created a new and separate government,caled the
Confederate StatesofAmerica,having executive,legislative,and judicialdepartments;that
onthe 6thofMarch,1862,and from thatdate untilthe time whenthe aleged trespasseswere
commited,a warhad been,and wasthen,waged and prosecuted byand betweenthe United
Statesand the Confederate States,and againsteachother,asbeligerentpowersand nations;
thatthe Confederate States,forthe prosecutionofthe warand the maintenance
Page 97 U.S.596
ofitspowers,thenand before had maintained initsservice,inthe State ofMississippi,an
armyofwhichGeneralBeauregard wascommanderwherebythe territory,property,and
inhabitantsofthatstate were held insubjectionto and underthe controlofthe Confederate
States;thatonthe 6thofMarch,1862,and byanactonthatdayapproved and promulgated by the
Confederate Congress,itwasdeclared to be the dutyofalmilitarycommandersinthe service
ofthe Confederate state to destroyalcoton,tobacco,and otherpropertythatmightbe usefulto
the forcesofthe United Stateswheneverintheirjudgmentthe same should be about to falinto
theirhands;thatafterwards,onthe 2d ofMay,1862,GeneralBeauregard, commanding the
Confederate forces,inobedience to thatact,made and issued a general ordered,directed to
oficersunderhiscommand inthe State ofMississippiand inthe service ofthe Confederate
Statesto burnalcotonalong the MississippiRiverlikelyto falinto the handsofthe forcesofthe
United States;thatbefore and atthe date lastmentioned,and afterwardsuntilthe time the
supposed trespasseswere commited,AlexanderK.Farrarwas acting asprovostmarshalofthe
CountyofAdams,charged withthe duty,among others,of executing,withinthatcountythe
ordersofmilitarycommandersinthe State ofMississippiinthe service ofthe Confederate
States,and inpursuance thereofwascommanded bythe Confederate militaryauthoritiesto
burnalthe cotonalong the bankofthatriverlikelyto falinto the handsofthe forcesofthe United
States;thatthe cotoninthe complaintmentioned was nearthe bankofthe
Mississippiwithinthatcounty,and was,whenburned,likelyto falinto the handsofthe
federalforces;thatthe defendantwasthenordered and required bysaid Farrar, acting
asprovostmarshalunderthe ordersaforesaid,to burncertaincoton,including the

cotonincontroversy;and thatafterwardsthe defendant,inobedience to the actofthe
Confederate Congressand the ordersofsaid militarycommandersand provostmarshal,did
burnFord'scoton,whichisthe supposed trespasscomplained of.
To eachofthe specialpleasthe plaintifinerrordemurred,assigning numerouscausesof
demurrer.The demurrerswere
3/24
11/28/2014
Page 97 U.S.597
overruled and replicationsfiled.The cause,being atissue,wastried bya jury.Verdictforthe
defendant.Judgmenthaving beenrendered thereon,the plaintifremoved the cause to the
supreme courtofthe state.Uponthe afirmance ofthe judgment,he sued outthiswritoferror.
Page 97 U.S.602
MR.JUSTICE HARLAN,afterstating the case,delivered the opinionofthe Court.
W e cannotice onlythe ground ofdemurrer,whichsuggeststhatthe defendantinhispleas
soughtto rely
"forjustificationofthe trespasscommited byhim uponmatersinthemselveswholyilegal,
againstpeace and good policy,and contraryto the Constitutionofthe United States,the
supreme law ofthe land,and the governmentthereof."
Inview ofthe decisioninW iliamsv.Brufy, 96 U.S.176,butlitle need be said uponthe
preliminaryquestionofthe jurisdictionofthisCourt.W hatisthere decided would seem to be
conclusive inthiscase uponthe pointofjurisdiction.Thatwasanactionofassumpsitforgoods sold
inMarch,1861,bycitizensofPennsylvania to one Brufy,a citizenofVirginia.The
administratorofBrufyclaimed thatthe estate wasnotliable forthe debtsued forbecause,
pending the recentwar,hisintestate paid the debtto a receiverofthe Confederate States,in
pursuance ofa decree ofa Confederate districtcourtinVirginia,rendered inconformitywith the
provisionsofanactofthe Confederate Congresspassed Aug.30,1861,sequestrating the
lands,tenements,goods,chatels,rights,and creditswithinthe Confederate States,and of
everyrightsand interesttherein,held byorforanyalienenemyafterMay21,1861.That defense
wassustained inthe state courts,and,uponerror,itwasinsisted thatthisCourthad no
jurisdictionto review the finaljudgmentofthe Supreme CourtofAppealsofVirginia.Referring to
the provisioninthe statute conferring appelate jurisdictionuponthisCourt,
"where isdrawninquestionthe validityofa statute of,oranauthorityexercised under,any
state,onthe ground oftheirbeing repugnantto the Constitution,treaties,orlawsofthe United
States,and the decisionisinfavoroftheirvalidity,"
and referring also the provisionconferring suchjurisdiction

"where anytitle,right,privilege,orimmunityisclaimed underthe Constitution,oranytreatyor
statute of,orcommissionheld orauthorityexercised under,the United States,and the
Page 97 U.S.603
4/24
11/28/2014
decisionisagainstthe title,right,privilege,orimmunityspecialysetup orclaimed byeither

partyundersuchConstitution,treaty,statute,commission,orauthority"
--thisCourtdecided thatitsrightto review thatjudgmentcould be maintained uponbothof
those clausesofthe amended JudiciaryAct.
Some ofthe groundsofourdecisionare thusstated inthe opinionofthe Court:
"The pleasaverthata confederationwasformed byVirginia and otherstates,caled the
Confederate StatesofAmerica,and thatundera law ofthisconfederation,enforced inVirginia,
the debtdue to the plaintifswassequestrated.Now the Constitutionofthe United States
prohibitsanytreaty,aliance,orconfederationbyone state withanother.The organization whose
enactmentispleaded cannottherefore be regarded inthisCourtashaving anylegal
existence.Itfolowsthatwhatevereficacythe enactmentpossessed inVirginia mustbe atributed
to the sanctiongivento itbythatstate.Anyenactment,from whateversource originating,to
whicha state givesthe force oflaw,isa statute ofthe state withinthe meaning of the clause
cited relating to the jurisdictionofthisCourt....Bythe onlyauthoritywhichcanbe recognized
ashaving anylegalexistence --thatis,the State ofVirginia --thisactofthe unauthorized
confederationwasenforced asa law ofthe commonwealth.Itsvaliditywasdrawn
inquestiononthe ground thatitwasrepugnantto the Constitutionofthe United Statesand the
decisionofthe courtbelow wasinfavorofitsvalidity."
1W
e do notperceive thatthiscase,uponthe questionofjurisdiction,canbe distinguished from
2W
iliamsv.Brufy.The defendant,Surget,justifieshisburning ofthe cotonundermilitary
orders,issued bya Confederate general,inpursuance ofauthorityconferred byanactofthe

Confederate Congress.Ifwe regard substance ratherthanmere from ortechnicalaccuracy,the
defense rested uponthatact,the validityofwhichwas,interms,questioned bythe several
demurrersto the specialpleas.The generalordersofthe state courtoverruling the demurrers
mustbe accepted,ineveryessentialsense,asanadjudicationinfavorofthe validityofanact ofthe
Confederate
Page 97 U.S.604
Congress,recognized and enforced aslaw inMississippi,and whichact,according to the rule

laid downinthatcase,mustbe,therefore,regarded byusasa statute ofthatstate withinthe
meaning ofthe provisionsofthe actdeclaring the appelate jurisdictionofthisCourt.Itresults
thatwe have powerto review the finaljudgmentofthe Supreme CourtofMississippi.
W e come now to the considerationofthe meritsofthe case so farastheyseem to be involved
inthe demurrersto the specialpleas.
5/24
11/28/2014
The principlesofpubliclaw,asapplicable to civiland internationalwars,have beenso

frequentlyunderdiscussionhere thatwe shalnotavailourselvesofthe opportunitynow
aforded to renew thatdiscussionorenlarge uponwhathasbeenheretofore said.The
numerousdecisionsofthisCourt,beginning withthe Prize Cases,2 Black635,and ending
withW iliamsv.Brufy,supra,and Dewing v.Perdicaries, 96 U.S.193,renderanyfurther
declarationasto these principleswholyunnecessaryforthe purposesofthe presentcase. W
ithoutatempting to restate althe reasonsassigned inadjudged casesforthe conclusions
thereinannounced,we assume thatthe folowing propositionsare setled byorare plainlyto be
deduced from ourformerdecisions:
1.The districtofcountrydeclared bythe constituted authorities,during the late civilwar,to be in
insurrectionagainstthe governmentofthe United States,wasenemyterritory,and althe people
residing withinsuchdistrictwere,according to publiclaw,and foralpurposes connected withthe
prosecutionofthe war,liable to be treated bythe United States,pending the warand while
theyremained withinthe linesofthe insurrection,asenemieswithoutreference to
theirpersonalsentimentsand dispositions.
2.There wasno legislationofthe Confederate CongresswhichthisCourtcanrecognize as
having anyvalidityagainstthe United Statesoragainstanyofitscitizenswho,pending the war,
resided outside ofthe declared limitsofthe insurrectionarydistricts.
3.The Confederate governmentisto be regarded bythe
Page 97 U.S.605
courtsassimplythe militaryrepresentative ofthe insurrectionagainstthe authorityofthe United
States.
4.To the Confederate armywas,however,conceded,inthe interestofhumanityand to prevent
the crueltiesofreprisalsand retaliation,suchbeligerentrightsasbelonged underthe lawsof
nationsto the armiesofindependentgovernmentsengaged inwaragainsteachother--that
concessionplacing the soldiersand oficersofthe rebelarmy,asto almatersdirectly connected
withthe mode ofprosecuting the war,"onthe footing ofthose engaged inlawful war,"and
exempting "them from liabilityforactsoflegitimate warfare."

5.The cotonforthe burning ofwhichdamagesare claimed inthiscivilactionwas,asto the United
Statesand itsmilitaryforcesengaged inthe suppressionofthe rebelion,notonly
enemy,buthostile propertybecause,being the productofthe soil,and,whenburned,withinthe
boundaryofthe insurrectionarydistrict,itconstituted also,aswe know from the historyofthe
insurrectionitdid,"the chiefreliance ofthe rebelsformeansto purchase the munitionsofwarin
6/24
11/28/2014
Europe."Young v.United States,supra,p. 97 U.S.39; Mrs.Alexander'sCoton,2 W al.404.

Itwastherefore liable atthe time to seizure ordestructionbythe federalarmywithoutregard to
the individualsentimentsofitsowner,whetherthe purpose ofefectofsuchseizure or
destructionwould have beento strengthenthatarmyorto decrease and cripple the powerand
resourcesofthe enemy.
Itwould seem to be a logicaldeductionfrom these doctrines--a deductionstrengthened by
considerationsofhumanityand publicnecessity--thatthe destructionofthe same coton,
underthe ordersofthe Confederate militaryauthorities,forthe purpose ofpreventing itfrom
faling into the handsofthe federalarmy,was,underthe circumstancesaleged inthe special
pleas,anactofwaruponthe partofthe militaryforcesofthe rebelion,forwhichthe person
executing suchorderswasrelieved from civilresponsibilityatthe suitofthe ownervoluntarily
residing atthe time withinthe linesofthe insurrection.W e do notrestthisconclusionuponany
authorityconferred oratempted to be conferred uponConfederate commandersbythe statute
ofthe Confederate Congress,recited in
Page 97 U.S.606
the specialpleas.Asanactoflegislation,thatstatute canhave no force whateverinanycourt
recognizing the federalConstitutionasthe supreme law ofthe land.Itisto be regarded as
nothing more thana declarationuponthe partofthe militaryrepresentative ofthe rebelion,
addressed to Confederate commanders,afording evidence to those adhering to the rebelion
ofthe circumstancesunderwhichcotonwithinthe linesofthe insurrectionmightbe destroyed
bymilitarycommandersinthe service ofthe Confederate States.Ithoweverassumed to confer
uponsuchcommandersno greaterauthoritythan,consistentlywiththe lawsand usagesofwar,
theymighthave exercised,withoutthe previoussanctionofthe Confederate legislative
authorities,asto anycotonwithintheirmilitarylineslikelyto falinto the handsofthe federal
forces.Theyhad the right,asanactofwar,to destroyprivate propertywithinthe linesofthe
insurrectionbelonging to those who were cooperating directlyorindirectlyinthe insurrection
againstthe governmentofthe United Statesifsuchdestructionseemed to be required by
impending necessityforthe purpose ofretarding the advance orcrippling the military
operationsofthe federalforces.Ofthatmode ofconducting the waronbehalfofthe rebelion no
one could justlycomplainwho occupied the positionofanenemyofthe United Statesby

reasonofvoluntaryresidence withinthe insurrectionarydistrict.
Itisinsisted withmuchearnestnessthatSurgetshould notbe alowed to take shelterunder
these doctrines,since itisnotaverred inthe specialpleasthathe constituted anypartofor
held anyoficialrelationsto the militaryforcesofthe rebelion.Butsucha technicalnarrow
constructionofthe specialpleasshould notbe alowed to prevailina case like this.Itis
7/24
11/28/2014
distinctlyaleged thatthe Confederate governmentwas,atthe time ofthe burning ofthe coton,

exercising althe functionsofcivilgovernmentwithinthe State ofMississippiand overits
propertyand inhabitants.Itisfurtheraleged thatthe defendantwasaninhabitantand citizenof
Mississippi,subjectto Confederate power,authority,and jurisdiction,and thathe wasordered
and required bythe provostmarshal--charged bythe Confederate departmentcommander
withthe executionof
Page 97 U.S.607
the orderto burnthe cotoninAdamsCountylikelyto falinto the possessionofthe federal forces-to burnthe cotononFord'splantation,and thatitwasso burned inobedience to the actofthe
Confederate Congressand the ordersofthe militaryauthorities.These alegations seem to be
suficientlycomprehensive to admitevidence thatthe defendantacted under
duressorcompulsion.Taking into considerationthe extraordinarycircumstancesinwhichthe
people ofMississippiwere thenplaced,especialythe absolute authoritywhichthe Confederate
governmentand itsmilitarycommanderswere thenexercising overthatportionof the
territoryand people ofthe United States,the specialpleasshould be deemed,upon
demurrer,assuficientlyaverring the existence ofsuchrelationsbetweenSurgetand the
Confederate militaryauthoritiesasentitled him to make the same defense asanysoldier,
regularlyenlisted inthe Confederate army,acting underlike orders,could have made.W hether
Surgetwasinfactrequired to execute the orderofthe provostmarshaldoesnotappear.No bil
ofexceptionwastaken,and inview ofthe explicitavermentthatSurgetwasrequired bymilitary
authorityto burnFord'scoton,we cannotassume upondemurrerthathe wasa mere volunteer to
aid initsdestruction.
Itwilbe observed thatwe have assumed from the pleadings,aswe thinkwe are justified in
doing,thatFord resided onhisplantationinthe insurrectionarydistrictatthe time hiscoton
wasburned.The contraryisnotaleged,and wasnotclaimed inargument.He doesnotpretend
thathe resided ina loyalstate oradhered to the governmentofthe Unioninitsefortsto
suppressthe rebelion.There isno intimationthathisresidence inMississippiwasinany degree
constrained ortemporary.W hetherthe redresshere soughtcould,consistentlywiththe
provisionsofthe federalConstitution,be denied to one who,bythe lawsofwar,isto be deemed
anenemyto the lawfulgovernment,solelybyreasonofresidence withinthe

insurrectionarydistrictpending the struggle,butwho,inpointoffact,wasa loyalcitizen, adhering
to the United States,giving no voluntaryaid orcomfortto the rebelion,itisnot
necessaryforusnow to decide.No suchquestionishere presented,and we forbearany
expressionofopinionuponit.Itwilbe
Page 97 U.S.608
8/24
11/28/2014
time enoughto considerand determine thatprecise questionwhenitarises.

Ourconclusion,therefore,isthatthe actofthe Confederate Congressrecited inthe special
pleaswasofno validityasanactoflegislation,and while the demurrerscould nothave been
overruled uponthe ground thatsuchunauthorized legislationaforded protectionto Surget,
neverthelessthe generalfactssetoutinthe specialpleas,considered inconnectionwiththe
beligerentrightsconceded to the rebelarmybythe governmentofthe United States,do
constitute a defense to thisaction,and uponthislastground the demurrermighthave been
properlyoverruled.
W hetherthe state court,initsinstructionsto the jury,correctlyexpounded the law ofthe case
we cannotuponthisreview determine.No bilofexceptionwastaken,eitherasto the evidence or
the instructions,and we cannottherefore determine whaterrors,ifany,were commited inthe
trialofthe case.W e have limited ourinvestigationaltogetherto the federalquestionsraised by
the demurrerto the specialpleas.
Judgmentafirmed.
MR.JUSTICE CLIFFORD concurred inthe judgmentofthe court,and delivered the
folowing opinion:
Partiesbeligerentina publicwarare independentnations,butitisnotnecessarythatboth
partiesshould be acknowledged assuchinorderto the enjoymentofbeligerentrights,aswar
mayexistwhere one ofthe beligerentsclaimssovereignrightsagainstthe other,the rule being
thatwhenthe regularcourse ofjustice isinterrupted byrevolt,rebelion,orinsurrection,so that
the courtsofjustice cannotbe open,civilwarexistsand hostilitiesmaybe prosecuted to the
same extentasinpublicwar. Prize Cases,2 Black666;Vatel425.
Two hundred balesofcotonowned bythe plaintifwere burned bythe defendantduring the war
ofthe rebelionatthe time and place aleged inthe declaration,and the plaintif,since the
restorationofpeace,instituted the presentactionoftrespassinthe state courtto recover
damagesforthe loss.Service wasmade and the defendantappeared and pleaded the
generalissue and severalspecialpleas.
Page 97 U.S.609
Reference need onlybe made to two ofthe specialpleas:
1.Thatthe defendantburned the cotoninobedience to anorderofthe Confederate States,
giventhroughthe commanding generaloftheirarmyand the acting provostmarshalofthe
county.
9/24
11/28/2014
2.Thatthe Confederate Congresspassed anactthatitshould be the dutyofalmilitary

commandersinthe service ofthe Confederate Statesto destroyalcoton,tobacco,orother
propertythatmightbe usefulto the enemy(meaning the militaryforcesofthe United States)
wheneverintheirjudgmentthe same should be aboutto falinto theirhands,and thatthe
defendantburned the cotoninlitigationinpursuance ofthatactand the said ordersofthe said
militarycommanderand provostmarshal.
Sufice itto sayinthisconnectionthe plaintifdemurred to althe specialpleas,and the subordinate
courtoverruled the demurrers,and the partieswentto trial.Hearing washad before the jury,and
theyreturned a verdictinfavorofthe defendant.Judgmentwasaccordingly rendered uponthe
verdict,and the plaintifremoved the cause to the highcourtoferrorsand appealsofthe
state,where the partieswere againheard,and the state appelate courtafirmed the
judgmentofthe courtoforiginaljurisdiction.No exceptionswere filed bythe plaintifineither ofthe
subordinate courts,buthe sued outthe presentwritoferror,and removed the cause into
thisCourt.
Since the case wasentered here,the plaintifassignsthe folowing errors:
1.Thatthe supreme courtofthe state erred insustaining the circuitcourtinoverruling the
demurrersofthe plaintifto the specialpleasfiled bythe defendant.
2.Thatthe supreme courtofthe state erred inrefusing to grantcertaininstructionsto the jury,
whichcannotbe considered,itnotappearing thatthere wasanytrialbyjuryinthe supreme
court,norwould eitherpartybe benefited ifitwere otherwise,asalthe materialquestions
presented fordecisioninthe prayersforinstructionare involved inthe rulingsofthe courtin
overruling plaintif'sdemurrersto the defendant'sspecialpleas.
Insurrectionmayormaynotculminate inanorganized rebelion,and itmayormaynotassume
suchaggressive
Page 97 U.S.610
proportionsasto be justlydenominated territorialwar,the universalrule being thatrebelion
becomessuch,ifatal,byvirtue ofitsnumbersand the organizationand powerofthe persons
who originate itand are engaged initsprosecution.Butwhenthe partyinrebelionhold and

occupycertainportionsofthe territoryofthe rightfulsovereign,and have declared their
independence,castoftheiralegiance,and formed a new government,and have organized
armiesand raised suppliesto supportit,and to oppose,and ifpossible to destroy,the
governmentfrom whichtheyhave separated,the world and the law ofnationsacknowledge
them asbeligerentsengaged incivilwar,because theyclaim to be inarmsto establishtheir
10/24
11/28/2014
libertyand independence inorderto become a sovereignstate.

Historyfurnishesmanyexamplesofwarbetweenthe governmentde jure ofa countryand a
governmentde facto ofa seceding portionofthe same country,and insuchcasesjuristshold
thatotherpowersare entitled to remainindiferentspectatorsofthe contest,and to alow
impartialyto bothbeligerentsthe free exercise ofthose rightswhichwargivesto public
enemiesagainsteachother,suchasthe rightofsearch,the rightofblockade,the rightof
capturing contraband ofwarand enemy'spropertyladeninneutralvessels.Twiss,Law of
Nations(2d ed.)sec.239.
Rebelionsofthe kind,whentheybecome too formidable to be suppressed bythe duly
constituted civilauthorities,authorize the de jure governmentto blockade the portswithinthe
territoryoccupied bythe insurgentsand to notifythe same to foreignpowersthatthe same wil
be enforced pursuantto the law ofnations.Oficialnotice ofsucha proclamationmakesitthe
dutyofforeignnationsto conform to the internationalrulesofwarinthatregard,and the same
juristsaysthatthe foreignpowermustatonce decide uponone ofthree alternative coursesof
action.Itmayassistthe governmentde jure asanindependentpower,oritmayassistthe
insurgents,ineitherofwhichcasesitbecomesa partyto the war,oritmayremainimpartial,
stilcontinuing to treatthe governmentde jure asanindependentpowerwhilstittreatsthe
insurgentsasa communityentitled to the rightsofwaragainstitsadversary.Sucha concession
isindispensable,asthe neutralpowerwil
Page 97 U.S.611
find itimpossible to recognize the characterofone asa beligerentwithoutrecognizing the
beligerentcharacterofthe other,unlessthe warisconfined entirelywithinthe territoryofthe
contending partiesand doesnotextend inanyrespectto the highwayofnations.Id.,p.500.
Beligerentsengaged inwarmayexercise the rightofblockade,and theymaycapture
contraband ofwarand enemies'propertyladeninneutralvessels;and ifso,the contest,though
itoriginated inrebelion,mustinthe progressofevents,whenitassumessuchproportionsas to be
justlydenominated civilwar,be recognized asentitling bothpartiesto the rightsofwar
justasmuchasifitwaswaged betweentwo independentnations.
Lawfulblockade canonlybe established bya beligerentparty,the rule being thata neutral

countryhasa rightto trade withalothercountriesintime ofpeace,and whenintime ofwarthe
rightissubjected to the conditionsorrestrictionsresulting from blockade,the interruptionofthe
untrammeled rightcanonlybe justified because the partyimposing the conditionsand
restrictionsisinvested withbeligerentrightsunderthe law ofnations.Exparte Chavasse,In re
Grazebrook,4 De G.,J.& S.655;The Helen,Law Rep.1 Ad.& Ec.1;DeBurgh,Marine
11/24
11/28/2014
Int.Law,123; The Trinidad,7 W heat.340.

Independentpowersatwarmayseize and confiscate alcontraband goods,withoutany
complaintthe partofthe neutralmerchant,and thatrightisconceded evenwhenone ofthe
partiesisnotacknowledged asa de jure government,incase ofinsurrection,where the
contesthasassumed suchproportionsasjustlyconstitute ita civilwarinthe international
sense.1 KentCom.(12thed.)92.
Othernationsaswelasthe United Statesconceded beligerentrightsto the Confederate
States,asaladmit,whichrendersitunnecessaryto inquire whetherthe concessionwas
rightfulorpremature.Matersto be takeninto the accountindetermining sucha question,itis
said,are whetherthe insurgentspresentthe existence ofa de facto politicalorganization,
suficientincharacter,population,and resourcesto constitute it,ifleftto itself,a state among
the nationsreasonablycapable ofdischarging the dutiesofsuchanorganization.
Page 97 U.S.612
Due weightshould be givento the then-existing characterofthe actualconflict,having respect
to the militaryforce oneachside and the actionofthe partiesinconducting militaryoperations
againsteachother,aswhetherornottheyconductsuchoperationsinaccordance withthe rules
and customsofwar,asbythe use offlagsoftruce,cartels,and exchange ofprisoners,and
whetherthe parentstate treatscaptured insurgentsasprisonersofwar.Inquirymayalso
properlyarise whetherthe insurgentshave employed commissioned cruisersatsea and
whetherthe rightfulgovernmenthasexercised the rightto blockade the portsofthe insurgents
againstneutralvesselsengaged inmilitarycommerce,and thatofstopping and searching
neutralvesselsengaged inmaritime commerce.Ifalthese elementsexist,saysDana,the
conditionofthingsisundoubtedlywar,and itmaybe warbefore theyare alripened into
activity.Dana'sW heaton,p.34,note.
Applythose rulesto the case,and itisasclearasanything inlegaldecisioncanbe thatthe
Confederate Stateswere beligerentsinthe sense atached to thatword bythe law ofnations.
During the militaryoccupationofthe territorywithinthe Confederate lines,the sovereigntyofthe
United Stateswasso farsuspended thatthe federallawscould no longerbe enforced there,
and the inhabitantspassed undera forced alegiance,and were bound bysuchlawsasthe

usurping governmentsaw fitto recognize and impose. United Statesv.Rice,4 W heat.254.
"Civilwar,"saysVatel,
"breaksthe bandsofsocietyand government,oratleastsuspendstheiroperationand efect,
foritproducesinthe nationtwo independentpartieswho considereachotherasenemiesand
12/24
11/28/2014
acknowledge no commonjudge.Those two partiestherefore mustnecessarilybe considered

asthenceforward constituting,atleastfora time,two separate bodies,two distinctsocieties.
Thoughone ofthe partiesmayhave beento blame inbreaking the unityofthe state and
resisting the lawfulauthority,they,the two parties,are notthe lessdivided infact....Theystand
therefore inpreciselythe same predicamentastwo nationswho engage ina contestand, being
unable to come to anagreement,have recourse to arms."
Page 97 U.S.613
Publicistsand courtsofjustice everywhere concurinthese sentimentsand incertaincorolaries
whichthe authordeducesfrom the atending circumstances,to-wit,thatthe commonlawsof
war--those maximsofhumanity,moderation,and justice previouslypointed out--oughtto be
observed bybothpartiesinsucha conflict.Vatel425.
Forthe same reasonswhichrenderthe observance ofthose maximsa materofobligation
betweenstate and state,itbecomesequalyand evenmore necessaryinthe unhappy
circumstance oftwo incensed partiesinthe case ofcivilwar.Should the sovereignconceive
thathe hasa rightto hang up hisprisonersasrebels,the opposite partywilmake reprisals,as
inthe example giveninthe note,and ifhe doesnotobserve the termsofthe capitulationsand
alotherconventionswithhisenemies,theywilno longerrelyonhisword.Should he burnand
ravage,theywilfolow hisexample and the warwilbecome cruel,horrible,and everydaymore
destructive to the nation.
W ar,itissaid,mayexistwithouta formaldeclaration,and the decisionofthe Courtisthatthe
lawsofwarasestablished among nationshave theirfoundationinreason,and tend to mitigate
the crueltiesand miserieswhichsuchconflictsproduce. Prize Cases,2 Black669.Hence,said the
Court,the partiesto a civilwarusualyconcede to eachotherbeligerentrights,forthey exchange
prisonersand adoptthe othercourtesiesand rulescommonto publicornationalwar;
norisitnecessarythatthe independence ofthe revolted province orstate should be
acknowledged inorderto constitute ita partybeligerentina waraccording to the law of
nations,and the reasongivenforthe rule isone offrequentilustration,whichisthatforeign
nationsacknowledge itaswarbya declarationofneutrality,ofwhichtwo examplesare givenin the
opinionofthe Courtfrom whichthese rulesare drawn.

1.W henthe United Statesrecognized the existence ofcivilwarbetweenSpainand her
colonies. The Trinidad,7 W heat.283,327 [argumentofcounsel--omited].
2.W henthe QueenofEngland issued herproclamationofneutralityrecognizing hostilitiesas
existing betweenthe United Statesand the Confederate States.
13/24
11/28/2014
Othernationsfolowed witha similardeclarationorbysilent

Page 97 U.S.614
acquiescence,and inspeaking ofthatfact,thisCourtsaid thata citizenofa foreignstate,in view
ofsucha recognition,isestopped to denythe existence ofa war,withalits
consequencesasregardsneutrals.Theycannotaska courtto afecta technicalignorance of
the existence ofa warwhichalthe world acknowledgesto be the greatestcivilwarofthe
humanrace,and thuscripple the arm ofthe governmentand paralyze itspower.
Sucha warusualyoperatesasa temporarysuspensionofobedience ofthe revolting partyto the
lawfulsovereign,butothernationsmay,untilthe revolutionisconsummated,remain
indiferentspectatorsofthe controversy,treating the governmentassovereignand the new
governmentasa societyentitled to the rightsofwaragainstitsenemy,ortheymayespouse the
cause ofthe partywhichtheybelieve to have justice onitsside.Inthe firstcase,the foreign state
fulfilsalitsobligationsunderthe law ofnationsand neitherpartyhasanyrightto
complain,provided thatitmaintainsanimpartialneutrality;butinthe latercase,the foreign state
becomesthe enemyofthe partyagainstwhichitdeclaresand the alyofthe other. Lawrence'sW
heaton40 and notes.
Beligerentrightscannotbe exercised whenthere are no beligerents.Conquestofa foreign
country,ifpermanent,givesabsolute and unlimited right;butno nationcanmake sucha
conquestofitsownterritory.Ifa hostile power,eitherfrom withoutorwithina nation,takes
possessionand holdsabsolute dominionoveranyportionofitsterritory,and the nationbyforce
ofarmsexpelsoroverthrowsthe enemyand suppresseshostilities,itacquiresno new title,but
merelyregainsthe possessionofwhatithad beentemporarilydeprived.Id.,605;The Amy
W arwickand Cargo,24 Law Reporter494.
Cotonwasthe article destroyed,whichwasthe subjectduring the warofspeciallegislationby
eachbeligerentpower.Itwastreated bythe army,the navy,and the civilarm ofeachas
possessing extraordinaryqualitiesand asdiferentfrom otherproperty,eveninthe handsof
noncombatants.Itformed the basisofthe creditwhichthe Confederateswere seeking to
establishabroad forthe prosecutionofthe war.Itsretentioninthe Southernstatesand
withdrawalfrom marketexcept
Page 97 U.S.615
whenforwarpurposeswere considered bythe Confederate authoritiesasofvitalimportance,
foritwashoped thatitswithdrawalfrom marketwould hastena recognitionofthe independence
ofthe statesinrebelionand the raising ofthe blockade whichwasdestroying
14/24
11/28/2014
theirresourcesand crippling theirarmies.

Priorto the burning ofthe coton,the Confederate Congresshad directed bya legislative act,
asa warmeasure,thatcotonand tobacco liable to falinto the handsofthe federalforces should
be destroyed,and the historyofthe period showsthatimmense quantitiesofthese articleswere
accordinglydestroyed.Regulationsuponthe subjectwere adopted bythe authoritiesofthe
United States,and those regulations,aswelasthe decisionsofthe federal courts,show
thatboththe civiland militaryauthoritiesdeemed itofgreatimportance to prevent
itsaccumulationinthe handsofthe Confederate authorities.
Capture ofcoton,saysMr.ChiefJustice Chase,seemsto have beenjustified bythe peculiar
characterofthe propertyand bypositive legislation.Itiswelknownthatcotonconstituted the
mainreliance ofthe rebelsto purchase the munitionsofwarinthe foreignmarket,and itis
materofhistorythatratherthanpermititto come into the possessionofthe nationaltroops,the
rebelgovernmenteverywhere devoted it,howeverowned,to destruction.Mrs.Alexander's
Coton,2 W al.420.
Judicialhistoryshowsthat,earlyin1861,the authoritiesofsevenstates,supported bypopular
majorities,combined forthe overthrow ofthe nationalUnionand forthe establishmentwithinits
boundariesofa separate and independentconfederation.Pursuantthereto,a governmental
organizationrepresenting those stateswasestablished atMontgomery,firstundera
provisionalconstitutionand afterwardsundera constitutionintended to be permanent.Inthe
course ofa few months,fourotherstatesacceded to thatconfederation,and the seatofthe
centralauthoritywastransferred to Richmond.Itwasbythe centralauthoritythusorganized and
underitsdirectionthatcivilwarwasprosecuted upona vastscale againstthe United Statesfor
more thanfouryears,and itspowerwasrecognized assupreme innearlythe whole ofthe
territoryof
Page 97 U.S.616
the statesconfederated ininsurrection. Thorington v.Smith,8 W al.7.
Dificulty,saysthe ChiefJustice,would atend the efortto define the precise characterofsuch a
government,buthe continuesto remarkto the efectthatthe principlesrelating to de facto

governmentwilconductto a conclusionsuficientlyaccurate.Examplesofa de facto
governmentare givenbyhim,where the usurpersexpeled the regularauthoritiesfrom their
customaryseatsand functions,and established themselvesintheirplaces,and so became the
actualgovernment.
Suchadherentsto a usurping partyincertaincasesmaynotincurthe penaltyoftreason,asthe
15/24
11/28/2014
de jure governmentwhenrestored usualyrespectstheirpublicacts;butthe Confederate

Stateswere neveracknowledged bythe United Statesasa de facto governmentinthat
enlarged sense.Instead ofthat,itwasregarded assimplythe militaryrepresentative ofthe
insurrection,notwithstanding the durationand vastproportionsofthe revolt.Elevenstateswere
engaged init,and the priorexisting governmentswere overthrownand new governments
erected intheirstead,inviolationofthe Constitutionand the actsofCongress,and yetitcannot be
denied butthatbythe use ofthese unlawfuland unconstitutionalmeansa governmentinfact
waserected,greaterinterritorythanmostofthe Europeangovernments,complete inthe
organizationofalitsparts,containing withinitslimitsmore thanelevenmilionsofpeople,and
ofsuficientresourcesinmenand moneyto carryona civilwarofunexampled dimensionsfrom the
period ofitscommencementto itsfinaltermination,during alofwhichtime manybeligerent
rightswere conceded to itbythe United States,suchasthe treatmentofcaptivesbothonland and
sea asprisonersofwar,the exchange ofprisonersasininternationalwar,theirvessels captured
recognized asprizesofwarand dealtwithaccordingly,theirpropertyseized onland referred to
the judicialtribunalsforadjudication,theirportsblockaded and the blockade maintained bya
suitable force,and notified to neutralpowersthe same asinopenand public war. Mauran
v.Insurance Company,6 W al.1.
Governmentsde facto are described byMr.ChiefJustice
Page 97 U.S.617
Chase asdivided into classes,and,afterhaving givena descriptionoftwo ofthe classes,he
remarksthatthere isanother,caled bypublicistsa de facto government,butwhichmight
perhapsbe more aptlydenominated a governmentofparamountforce.Itsdistinguishing
characteristicsasgivenbythatmagistrate are asfolows:
1.Thatwhile itexists,itmustnecessarilybe obeyed incivilmatersbyprivate citizenswho,by
actsofobedience rendered insubmissionto suchforce,do notbecome responsible as
wrongdoersforthose acts,thoughthe actsare notwarranted bythe rightfulgovernment.Actual
governmentsofthissortare established overdistrictsdifering greatlyinextentand conditions.
Theyare usualyadministered directlybymilitaryauthority,buttheymaybe administered also
bycivilauthority,supported more orlessdirectlybymilitaryforce.

2.Historicalexamplesare thengivenofthatsortofde facto government,to-wit,the temporary
governmentatCastine during the warof1812 and the temporarygovernmentatTampico
during the MexicanW ar. United Statesv.Rice,4 W heat.253; Fleming v.Page,9 How.615;
The Nuestra Senora,4 W heat.502.
Those were caseswhere regularenemygovernmentsacquired the temporarypossessionof
16/24
11/28/2014
territoryduring warwiththe countryofwhichthe territoryso possessed wasa part,and this

Courtadverted to thatdiference inthe case underconsideration,butdecided unanimouslythat
the governmentofthe insurgentstatesmustbe classed among the governmentsofwhichthose
are examples.Among the reasonsassigned insupportofthe conclusionwere the folowing:
1.Thatrightsand obligationsofbeligerence were conceded to itinitsmilitarycharactervery
soonafterthe warbegan,from motivesofhumanityand expediency.
2.Thatthe whole territorycontroled byitwasthereafterheld to be enemies'territory,and the
inhabitantsofthe territorywere held,inmostrespects,asenemies,and,asa finalconclusion, the
Courtdecided thatto the extentofthe actualsupremacymaintained,howeverunlawfuly
acquired,the powerofthe insurgentgovernmentcannotbe questioned. Thorington v.Smith,8
W al.11;Haleck,Int.Law,c.3,sec.21,p.74;United Statesv.Klintock,5 W heat.144,18 U.S. 150.
Page 97 U.S.618
Atemptwasmade earlyinthe warofthe rebelionto maintainthe theorythatthe oficersand
seamenofthe Confederate cruiserswere pirates,and notentitled to beligerentrightsincase
ofcapture.Shipsand cargoesatsea were destroyed bysuchcruisers,and the owners,holding
policiesofinsurance,broughtsuitsto recoverforthe loss.Paymentincertaincaseswas
refused,the defense being thatthe policiesdid notcoverthe losswhere the capture wasby
pirates.Sucha case waspresented to the Supreme CourtofMassachusets,butthe court
decided thatthe personswho seized and burned the ship were notto be regarded aspirates
withinthe ordinarysignificationofthatword asused inthe law ofnationsorascommonly
understood and applied inmaritime contractsand adventures;thattheywere notcommon
robbersand plunderersonthe highseas.The courtadmited thatthe actsofthe cruiserswere
unlawful,and thattheycould notbe justified inthe courtsofjustice,butitproceeded to state that
the proofsofered showed thattheyacted undera semblance ofauthoritywhichtooktheircase
outofthatclasswhichcanbe properlytermed ordinarypiracy;thatthe proofsofered showed
thattheysailed undera leterofmarque issued bya governmentde facto,claiming to exercise
sovereignpowers,and to be authorized to clothe theiroficersand agentswiththe rightsof
beligerentsand to send outarmed cruisersforthe purpose oftaking enemy'svesselsjure beli.
Noristhatal.Itwasalso ofered to be proved thatatthe time ofthe lossthe de facto

governmenthad proceeded to raise armiesand putthem into the field,bywhichanactualy
existing state ofwarbetweenitand the United Stateswascreated,whichhad led two ofthe
leading nationsofEurope to recognize the personswho had thusconspired togetheragainst
17/24
11/28/2014
the authorityofthe United Statesasexercising the rightsand entitled to the privilegesofa

beligerentpower.Sucha seizure,undersuchcircumstances,byanarmed cruiserofsuchde
facto government,the courtheld wasa capture withinthe meaning ofthe policy,and thatthe
insurerswere notliable forthe loss.Dole v.Merchants'MutualMarine Insurance Co.,6 Alen
(Mass.)373; Planters'Bankv.Union Bank,16 W al.495.
Page 97 U.S.619
Two casesofa similarcharacterwere pending atthe same time inthe circuitcourtofthe United
Statesforthatdistrict,bothofwhichwere decided infavorofthe insurersuponthe same
ground.Inthe firstcase,the factswere agreed betweenthe parties,aswilbe seenbythe
reportofthe case.Dole v.New England MutualMarine Insurance Co.,2 Clif.394.Both
judgessatinthe case,and theirunited opinionisfulyreported.Theydecided thatwhere a ship
wastakenand burned bythe commanderofa rebelprivateerduring the late rebelion,the
capture wasnota taking bypiratesorassailing thieves,inasmuchasitappeared thatthe
policywasexecuted before the rebelionbroke outand thatthe commanderacted undera
commissionindue form issued bythe governmentofthe rebeliousstates,and itappearsthat
bothpartiesacquiesced inthe decisionofthe court.
Norcould theyweldo otherwise,asthe agreed statementshowed thatthe rebelstatesbefore
the lossoccurred had organized a confederacyand a governmentforthe same,and had
established a writenconstitution;thatsucha form ofgovernmentwasinfactorganized inalits
departments--legislative,executive,and judicial;thattheyhad raised and organized anarmy
and created a navy,elected a congress,and published a legislative actdeclaring thatwar
existed betweenthe United Statesand the Confederate States,and providing measuresforits
vigorousprosecution;thattheywere carrying onhostilitiesatthe time the lossoccurred against
the United Statesbyland and sea,and were inthe exercise ofalthe functionsofgovernment
overalthe territorywithintheiractualmilitarylimits.
Pressed withthose facts,the plaintifabandoned the furtherprosecutionofthe claim inthe first
suitand sued outa writoferrorinthe second,whichwassubsequentlyheard and decided in
thisCourt. Mauran v.Insurance Company,6 W al.1.Ofersofproofinthiscase occupied the
place ofanagreed statementoffactsinthe other,butthe Supreme Courtafirmed the judgment

ofthe circuitcourt,holding thatthe Confederate Stateswere inthe possessionofmanyofthe
highestatributesofgovernment,suficientlyso to be regarded asthe ruling orsupreme power
ofthe countrywithintheirmilitarydominion,
Page 97 U.S.620
and thatcapturesmade bytheircruiserswere excepted outofthe policybythe warrantyofthe
18/24
11/28/2014
insured.
Questionsofthe same characterwere also presented to the Supreme CourtofPennsylvania
aboutthe same time asthose presented to the Supreme CourtofMassachusets,where the
questionswere decided inthe same way.Fifield v.Insurance CompanyofPennsylvania,47
Pa.St.166.Three opinionswere giveninthe case inadditionto the opinionofthe court delivered
bythe ChiefJustice.Hisfirstefortwasto show thatthe cruiserwasnota pirate,in whichhe
remarked thatifshe wasnota privateer,she wasa pirate,and thatifshe wasa privateer,she
wasmade so bythe commissionshe bore,the legalefectofwhichmustdepend uponthe
statusofthe Confederate States,inrespectto whichhisconclusionwasthatany
government,howeverviolentand wrongfulinitsorigin,mustbe considered a de facto
governmentifitwasinthe fuland actualexercise ofsovereigntyovera territoryand people large
enoughfora nation,and he quotesVatelinsupportofthe proposition,and finaly decided thatthe
cruiserwasa privateerand nota pirate,and thatthe losswasa capture within the excepting
clause ofthe policy,and nota lossbypirates,rovers,orassailing thieves.
Emerigon,Ins.,c.12,secs.28,412.
Mr.Justice Strong concurred inthe judgmentand gave anelaborate opinioninwhichhe stated
thathe could notdoubtthatthese revolting states,confederated astheyhad been,claiming and
enforcing authorityastheyhad done,were to be regarded asa governmentde facto.
Two objectionsto thatpropositionhad beenmade atthe bar:
1.Thattheirclaim ofsovereigntyhad beenconstantlyopposed;
2.Thattheirboundarieswere uncertainand undefined --to bothofwhichthe judge responded
to the efectthatneitherofthe objectionswere satisfactory:thattheywere none the lessa
governmentde facto because theyhad had no intervalofpeacefulexistence,norbecause
the geographicalboundariesofthe districtoverwhichtheirpowerisexclusivelyfeltwere notwel
defined.
Antecedentto that,the same courtdecided a similarcase,whichwasalso a marine risk,inthe
same way.Two pointsruled bythe courtinthatcase are pertinentto the present
Page 97 U.S.621
investigation:
1.Thatthe losswascovered bythe policy,itbeing a case ofcapture byarmed menprofessing to
actunderand byauthorityofthe Confederate States.
19/24
11/28/2014
2.Thatthe governmentofthe United Stateshad so conducted the contestand so treated the

Confederate Statesasto make ita warinsubstance asessentialyasitcould be between
foreignpowers.Monongahela Insurance Co.v.Chester,43 Pa.St.49; Hamilton v.Dilin,21
W al.87.
Supportto thatproposition,ofa decisive character,isfound inthe opinionofthe courtinthe Prize
Cases,inwhichMr.Justice Griersaysitisno loose,unorganized insurrection,having no defined
boundaryorpossession.Ithasa boundarymarked bylinesofbayonets,and whichcan be
crossed onlybyforce.Southofthisline isenemies'property,because itisclaimed and held
inpossessionbyanorganized,hostile,and beligerentpower. Prize Cases,2 Black674.
Corresponding litigationarose aboutthe same time inothercourts,and among the numberin the
Supreme CourtofMaine,where the case wasargued bythe same eminentcounselasin thatcited
from the Massachusetsreports.Dole v.Merchants'MutualMarine Insurance Co.,
51 Me.465.Somewhatdiferentviewsare expressed bythe court,butitadmitsinconclusion

thatthe decisionmighthave beenplaced ona diferentground,and proceedsto remarkthat
warinfactexisted atthe time ofthe loss;thathostile forces,eachrepresenting a de facto
government,were arrayed againsteachotherinactualconflict.Itsexistence,saysthe court,
would nothave beenmore palpable orrealifithad beenrecognized bylegislative action,and
thoughitwasa civilwar,itwasnotthe lessa capture forthatreason.51 id.478;Horn v.
Lockhart,17 W al.570.
During the late rebelion,the Confederate Statesand the statescomposing it,said the
Supreme CourtofNorthCarolina,were to alintentsand purposesgovernmentsde facto with
reference to citizenswho continued to reside withinthe Confederate lines;hence the
Confederate Statesand the Constitutionofthe state and the actsoftheircongressconstituted,
asto suchcitizens,during the rebelion,the law ofthe land.Franklin v.Vannoy,66 N.C.145;
Reynoldsv.Taylor,43 Ala.420.
Page 97 U.S.622
W here cotonwasdestroyed during the late warbetweenthe Confederate Statesand the
United Statesbyorderofthe countyprovostmarshal,acting inobedience to the ordersofthe
Confederate commanding general,the Supreme CourtofMississippiheld thatthe agentwho

obeyed these ordersisnotliable inanactionbythe ownerto recoverthe value ofthe property,
the courtholding thatthe Confederate Stateshad the rightsofa beligerentpower,and thatitis a
legitimate beligerentrightto destroywhateverpropertyisthe subjectofseizure and
condemnation,inorderto preventitsfaling into the handsand coming to the use ofthe enemy.
Ford v.Surget,46 Miss.130.Exceptionalcasessupporting the opposite view maybe found in
20/24
11/28/2014
the state reports;buttheyare notinaccord withthe decisionsofthisCourt,and are indirect

conflictwiththe greatweightofauthorityderived from the same source.
W ithoutdue examination,itmaybe supposed thatsupportto the opposite theoryisderived
from the recentdecisionofthisCourtinwhichitisheld thatcertainconfiscationproceedings
prosecuted underanactpassed bythe Confederate Congressare void;butitrequiresno
argumentto show thatthe remarksuponthe subjectinthe opinionofthe Courtwere wholy
unnecessaryto the decision,asthe proceedingswere obviouslyinaid ofthe rebelion,the
intentand purpose ofthe prosecutionhaving beento raise meansto prosecute waragainstthe
United States.Conrad v.W aples, 96 U.S.279.Authoritiesto show thatalsuchactsare void are
too numerousforcitation,no materwhatmayhave beenthe statusofthe Confederate States.
CertaindecisionsofthisCourthold thatthe actsofa bodyexercising anauthorityinan
insurgentstate asa legislature mustbe regarded asvalid orinvalid,according to the subject
materoflegislation;butthe ChiefJustice decided inthe case hereafterreferred to thatthe
governor,legislature,and judgesofthe State ofVirginia,during the war,constituted a de facto
government,giving asa reasonforthe conclusionthattheyexercised complete controloverthe
greaterpartofthe state,proceeding inalthe formsofregularorganized government,and
occupying the capitalofthe state.Evansv.CityofRichmond,Chase Dec.551.
Page 97 U.S.623
Beyond aldoubt,the Confederate governmentatthe period ofthe aleged wrong wasthe
supreme controling powerofthe territoryand people withinthe limitsoftheirmilitarydominion,
and itisequalycertainthatthe citizensresidentwithinthose limitswere uterlydestitute of
meansto resistcompliance withmilitaryordersemanating from the commanding general,
especialywhengiveninobedience to anactofthe Confederate Congress.United Statesv.
Grossmayger,9 W al.75; Sprotv.United States,20 W al.459.
Cotonduring the warwasregarded bybothbeligerentsasthe subjectofseizure and
condemnation,and asfaling withinthatclassofpropertywhicha beligerentmightdestroyto
preventitsfaling into the handsofthe enemyand augmenting hisresources.Proofthatthe
orderswere givenasaleged issuficient,asthatisfulyadmited bythe demurrer.
Unlessthe Confederate Statesmaybe regarded ashaving constituted a de facto government

forthe time orasthe supreme controling powerwithinthe limitsoftheirexclusive militarysway,
thenthe oficersand seamenoftheirprivateersand the oficersand soldiersoftheirarmywere mere
piratesand insurgents,and everyoficer,seaman,orsoldierwho kiled a federaloficer
orsoldierinbatle,whetheronland orthe highseas,isliable to indictment,conviction,and
21/24
11/28/2014
sentence forthe crime ofmurder,subjectofcourse to the rightto plead amnestyorpardon,if

theycanmake good thatdefense.Once enterthatdomainofstrife,and countlesslitigationsof
endlessdurationmayarise to review old animositiesand to renew and inflame domestic
discord,withoutanypublicnecessityorindividualadvantage.W isdom suggestscaution,and the
counselsofcautionforbid anysuchrashexperiment.
Viewed inthe lightofthese suggestions,Iam ofthe opinionthatthere isno errorinthe record,
and thatthe decree ofthe supreme courtofthe state should be afirmed.
OficialSupreme Courtcase law isonlyfound inthe printversionofthe United StatesReports.
Justia case law isprovided forgeneralinformationalpurposesonly,and maynotreflectcurrent
legaldevelopments,verdictsorsetlements.W e make no warrantiesorguaranteesaboutthe
accuracy,completeness,oradequacyofthe informationcontained onthissite orinformation
linked to from thissite.Please checkoficialsources.
DAILY OPINION SUMMARIES

Subscribe to Justia'sFREE DailyOpinionSummaryNewsleters
Subscribe Now
SEARCH THIS CASE
In Google Scholar
Google Scholar
On the W eb
Google W eb Search
Bing W eb Search
In the News
Google NewsSearch
Google NewsArchive Search
Yahoo!NewsSearch
In the Blogs
BlawgSearch.com Search
In otherDatabases
22/24
11/28/2014
Google BookSearch
CONNECT W ITH JUSTIA
FIND A LAW YER
LegalIssue orLawyerName
City,State
Search
Browse Lawyers
Lawyers -GetListed Now!

Geta free fuldirectory profile listing
ASK A LAW YER

Question:
Please Ask YourQuestion Here.e.g.,Do Ineed a Bankruptcy Lawyer?
Add details
120
Ask Question
Copyright Justia : Company: TermsofService : PrivacyPolicy: ContactUs

23/24
11/28/2014 Ford v. Surget :: 97 U.S. 594 (1878) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
24/24

Ford v. Surget

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Ford v. Surget

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

11/28/2014

Courtoverthe judgmentsand decreesofthe state courts.

"Confederate States;"thatanactoftheircongress,approved March6,1862,declared thatit

Ford filed hiscomplaintagainstSurgetinthe CircuitCourtofAdamsCounty,Mississippi,on the

The defense,althoughpresented bythe specialpleasindiferentforms,isinsubstance

asprovostmarshalunderthe ordersaforesaid,to burncertaincoton,including the

and referring also the provisionconferring suchjurisdiction

decisionisagainstthe title,right,privilege,orimmunityspecialysetup orclaimed byeither

e do notperceive thatthiscase,uponthe questionofjurisdiction,canbe distinguished from

iliamsv.Brufy.The defendant,Surget,justifieshisburning ofthe cotonundermilitary

orders,issued bya Confederate general,inpursuance ofauthorityconferred byanactofthe

Congress,recognized and enforced aslaw inMississippi,and whichact,according to the rule

The principlesofpubliclaw,asapplicable to civiland internationalwars,have beenso

exempting "them from liabilityforactsoflegitimate warfare."

Europe."Young v.United States,supra,p. 97 U.S.39; Mrs.Alexander'sCoton,2 W al.404.

one could justlycomplainwho occupied the positionofanenemyofthe United Statesby

distinctlyaleged thatthe Confederate governmentwas,atthe time ofthe burning ofthe coton,

anenemyto the lawfulgovernment,solelybyreasonofresidence withinthe

time enoughto considerand determine thatprecise questionwhenitarises.

2.Thatthe Confederate Congresspassed anactthatitshould be the dutyofalmilitary

who originate itand are engaged initsprosecution.Butwhenthe partyinrebelionhold and

libertyand independence inorderto become a sovereignstate.

Lawfulblockade canonlybe established bya beligerentparty,the rule being thata neutral

Int.Law,123; The Trinidad,7 W heat.340.

and the inhabitantspassed undera forced alegiance,and were bound bysuchlawsasthe

acknowledge no commonjudge.Those two partiestherefore mustnecessarilybe considered

opinionofthe Courtfrom whichthese rulesare drawn.

Othernationsfolowed witha similardeclarationorbysilent

theirresourcesand crippling theirarmies.

government,buthe continuesto remarkto the efectthatthe principlesrelating to de facto

de jure governmentwhenrestored usualyrespectstheirpublicacts;butthe Confederate

bycivilauthority,supported more orlessdirectlybymilitaryforce.

territoryduring warwiththe countryofwhichthe territoryso possessed wasa part,and this

Noristhatal.Itwasalso ofered to be proved thatatthe time ofthe lossthe de facto

the authorityofthe United Statesasexercising the rightsand entitled to the privilegesofa

place ofanagreed statementoffactsinthe other,butthe Supreme Courtafirmed the judgment

2.Thatthe governmentofthe United Stateshad so conducted the contestand so treated the

51 Me.465.Somewhatdiferentviewsare expressed bythe court,butitadmitsinconclusion

Confederate commanding general,the Supreme CourtofMississippiheld thatthe agentwho

the state reports;buttheyare notinaccord withthe decisionsofthisCourt,and are indirect

Unlessthe Confederate Statesmaybe regarded ashaving constituted a de facto government

sentence forthe crime ofmurder,subjectofcourse to the rightto plead amnestyorpardon,if

DAILY OPINION SUMMARIES

CONNECT W ITH JUSTIA

FIND A LAW YER

Lawyers -GetListed Now!

ASK A LAW YER

Copyright Justia : Company: TermsofService : PrivacyPolicy: ContactUs

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi