Class, Power, and Patronage Landowners and Politics in Punjab

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Class, Power, and Patronage:

Landowners and Politics in Punjab
Hassan Javid
Published online: 23 Aug 2011.
To cite this article: Hassan Javid (2011) Class, Power, and Patronage: Landowners and Politics in
Punjab, History and Anthropology, 22:3, 337-369, DOI: 10.1080/02757206.2011.595006
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Class, Power, and Patronage:

Landowners and Politics in Punjab
Hassan Javid
In the century following their conquest of the province, the British in Punjab erected an
administrative apparatus that, like those of precolonial regimes, relied heavily upon the
support of the provinces landed class. The relationship between the landed class and
the colonial state was one of mutual benefit, with the latter using the former to ensure
the maintenance of order and collection of revenue in exchange for state patronage. In
this paper, it is argued that this administrative framework gave rise to a path-dependent
process of institutional development in Punjab, allowing for the different fractions of the
provinces landowning class to increasingly entrench themselves within the political order
in the postcolonial epoch. This paper outlines the mechanisms underlying this process of
institutional development, focusing, in particular, on the strategies adopted by the
landowning class to reproduce its power. This paper also considers the potentialities for
institutional change in Punjab, allowing for the creation of a more democratic and
participatory politics in the province.
Keywords: Land; Colonialism; Patronage; Class; Institutions
Landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed.
Adam Smith
Following the conquest of Punjab in 1849, the British were faced with the task of
erecting an administrative apparatus that would ensure order and accumulation.
Over the course of the century that Punjab remained in the hands of the British,
the construction of this framework for control and extraction took place through a
Correspondence to: Hassan Javid, Department of Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science,
Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: H.Javid@lse.ac.uk
ISSN 0275-7206 print/1477-2612 online/11/03033733 # 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/02757206.2011.595006
338
H. Javid
series of incremental adjustments, with institutional change and adaptation occurring

in response to changing societal contexts, political exigencies, and shifts in colonial
policy. Having aligned themselves with the provinces rich peasantry and traditional
aristocracy, recognizing that these elements of the Punjabi elite were instrumental to
the effective exercise of state authority, the colonial government actively undertook
institutional interventions that protected the interests of its landed allies. Under
colonial rule in Punjab, elements of the landowning class were able to virtually monopolize politics in the province, using their privileged position within the colonial
administrative schema to bolster their own position relative to other groups and
classes in society, while simultaneously using their influence and power to pursue
the interests of the colonial regime.
At one level, the British reliance upon Punjabs rural elites was not entirely unexpected. When the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh established their rule over Punjab in
1799, following decades of instability, war, and peasant rebellion directed against
the Mughals (Alam 1986; Gupta 1996), the potential had existed for a complete transformation of the political order. Instead, while the upper echelons of the political
hierarchy were reshaped, the hereditary landowning elites who had formed the core
of the Mughal administrative system at the local level were incorporated within the
new regime (Grewal 1990: 95). Similar opportunities for radical political change
arose as a result of the dislocations that accompanied the transition to British
control and the creation of Pakistan. While formal control over the state may have
shifted as regimes were replaced, these transitions were marked by a significant
degree of continuity as the co-optation and co-operation of Punjabs landholders
remained central to systems of governance instituted by successive unrepresentative
and largely authoritarian regimes. The enduring strength of this relationship
between the state and these large landowning classes, and its ability to reproduce
itself over time, is evinced by the fact that after partition, despite a range of economic,
political, and social changes, Punjabs rural power-holders continue to play a
significant role in Pakistans politics (Waseem 1994: 313).
This paper seeks to provide the start of an explanation for the persistence of this
landed power in Punjab. It will be argued that this persistence is a result of the reproduction and reinforcement over time of an institutional framework of politics
premised on a bargain in which Punjabs landholders have provided support and
other services to authoritarian regimes in exchange for state patronage. It will be
shown that this bargain has allowed the landed class to entrench itself within a dominant position in the political, social, and economic structure of Punjab. The concept of
path dependence is used in this study to understand this process of institutional evolution, showing how the institutions that emerge out of key founding moments can
come to shape future interactions between actors negotiating the distribution of
power within society, creating incentives for adhering to established institutional patterns while increasing the costs associated with alternative institutional paths. While
this paper will provide an overview of landlord state relations in the colonial
period, it will also provide one on the postcolonial period in order to identify and
339
examine some of the causal mechanisms that have given rise to this path-dependent
trajectory of institutional development in Punjab.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first section will elaborate on the
concept of path dependence and the ways in which it can provide insights into the persistence of landed power in Punjab. The second section will attempt to create a typology of class in rural Punjab, showing the differences between the landowning class and
other classes in terms of their economic, political, and social capacities. The third
section provides a historical overview of the period of colonial governance in
Punjab, describing in brief the evolution of the relationship between the state and
the landed class. The penultimate section will then briefly explore the mechanisms
through which landed power has been reproduced in the postcolonial context. This
paper will conclude with a section on strategies through which landed power could
be challenged in Punjab, allowing for the development of a more participatory
democratic politics.
Path Dependence
At the heart of path dependence is the assumption that institutions, as rules and
constraints governing human interaction (North 1991), are fundamental to understanding the decisions taken by actors in any given political context. Premised on
this framework, the concept of path dependence allows for an understanding of the
exact mechanisms underlying the evolution of the relationship between the state
and the landed class in Punjab. In the simplest sense of the term, path dependence
implies that events that take place at a particular point in history are likely to influence
subsequent events. Originally employed as a concept within economics to explain the
persistence of specific, often suboptimal, outcomes for a wide variety of phenomena
ranging from the adaptation over time of new technologies to the creation of
regimes for economic growth and policy-making, path dependence suggests that institutions, once put in place, become increasingly difficult to overturn as the benefits
associated with adapting to them outweigh the costs involved in switching to alternatives (David 1985; North 1991). Path dependence works with the assumption that
adopting a specific path of institutional development at a key point in history
makes it increasingly difficult to switch to viable alternatives that may have been available at that moment. This founding moment can be conceptualized as a critical juncture representing a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct
ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized
to produce distinct legacies (Collier & Collier 1991: 27). These events are crucial to
the analysis of path dependence because they constitute periods of uncertainty or
upheaval within which the conjunction of contingent factors or historical processes
yields specific outcomes from among a range of viable options (Mahoney 2000;
Thelen 1999). Additionally, for any given historical juncture to be critical, it must
have a generative element that gives rise to change, and it is the outcomes emerging
from critical junctures that subsequently trigger path-dependent institutional trajectories. Rejecting the rival paths present during a given critical juncture automatically
340
H. Javid
narrows the range of future choices available to actors within the selected institutional
framework, and the increasing returns associated with adhering to the chosen institutional path contribute to the persistence of that particular configuration.
One of the most fundamental methodological points about path dependence that
need to be addressed is the question of constant causes and the extent to which
path-dependent explanations of institutional development are able to outline mechanisms of institutional reproduction that are distinct from traditional historical narratives. In a nutshell, constant causes can be said to operate when the persistence of
an institutional framework can be attributed to the same factors that endangered
that particular framework, as opposed to distinct processes of reproduction rooted
in other mechanisms (Collier & Collier 1991: 37; Schwartz 2004). For a process of
institutional development to be truly path dependent, it would be necessary for the
mechanisms that produced a set of institutions to be distinct from those that perpetuate it. Mahoney (2000), therefore, emphasized the need for critical junctures to be
characterized by a high degree of contingency and indeterminacy in order to show
how relatively random, small, or exogenous factors can lead to the selection of
particular institutions (from among a cohort of equally viable possibilities) that are
subsequently perpetuated due to the ways in which they subsequently shape events
and structure interactions between different actors.
In many cases, however, the extent to which critical junctures can be contingent or
indeterminate is necessarily limited, due to the way in which an array of broader structural factors provide the context within which specific institutions emerge out of critical junctures (Schwartz 2004). In circumstances where critical junctures may not be
characterized by high degrees of contingency, the existence of constant causes does
not necessarily preclude the possibility of subsequent institutional developments
taking place along path-dependent trajectories. This is because responses to constant
causes can adopt a variety of different forms, particularly when the constant causes in
question are relatively abstract. For example, the need for different regimes to collect
revenue in a particular agrarian context could potentially represent a constant cause
independently influencing institutional development and change. Depending on the
conditions during a particular critical juncture, however, a variety of institutional
options could be available to actors seeking to address this imperative. Given that
there can never be pure contingency during any critical juncture, the presence of
constant causes does not preclude the emergence of path-dependent institutional
trajectories, provided actors are presented with at least two possible policy choices
(Pierson 2000).
Pierson (2004) used the notion of increasing returns to illustrate how institutions
and political processes subject to path-dependent developmental trajectories persist
due to the creation of self-reinforcing feedback loops that increase the costs, over
time, of adopting alternatives. As actors invest in the skills required to work within
a particular institutional context, and as corollary institutions emerge within the
extant framework, institutional reproduction tends to occur as a result of the increasing costs associated with switching to adopting alternative institutional choices. Given
that political processes are also often characterized by asymmetrical power relations,
341
actors who derive greater benefit from their position within an institutional framework can then use the resources at their disposal to impose constraints on the
actions of their rivals while endeavouring to maintain the institutional status quo
(Khan 1995; Pierson 2004). The increasing returns approach within path dependence
can be contrasted with a focus on reactive sequences (Mahoney 2000). While the
former focuses on how institutional paths once selected are reinforced over time
through processes of positive feedback, the latter emphasizes how the emergence of
particular institutions can influence subsequent actions by unlocking responses,
often unintended, that may not have otherwise occurred. The transitions from one
event to the next in a reactive sequence need not necessarily be marked by institutional
continuity, with institutional consolidation eventually taking place as a result of the
outcomes of several sequential events. What is important to note about increasing
returns and reactive sequences is that both approaches to path dependence allow
for the emergence of new social actors that can become sources of support or opposition for existing institutional frameworks. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive since path-dependent processes can be characterized by both increasing returns
and reactive sequences at different points in time.
Thinking in terms of the increasing returns made available to dominant actors over
time is a persuasive explanation for institutional reinforcement and stickiness.
However, as argued by Schwartz (2004), few institutional arrangements are able to
constantly provide increasing returns to actors and can potentially lead to diminishing
returns as resources are exhausted and avenues for further development exist. In situations where actors are confronted by diminishing returns, explanations rooted in
path dependence are unable to account for institutional persistence given that the
costs associated with sticking to an established institutional path may outweigh
those that would be incurred by switching to an alternative framework. First, as
suggested by Greif and Laitin (2004), the possibility of institutional change is often
dependent on the coordinative power of different actors, as well as on the degree to
which existing institutional rules provide actors with the necessary tools and knowledge required to facilitate such change. Even in situations where actors may be
confronted with diminishing returns, the above-mentioned factors can potentially
constrain their ability to initiate substantive change. Secondly, this criticism of path
dependence can be addressed by properly conceptualizing what is meant by increasing returns. Actors entrenched within extant institutional frameworks can use their
power and resources to derive benefits in a number of ways, ranging from material
rewards to more intangible goods such as access to political power and privilege. Inasmuch as powerful actors within a particular institutional setup would have an interest
in maintaining their dominance, the ability to constrain rival factions and groups
would represent a constant benefit resulting from the maintenance of the status quo.
In such a scenario, the capacity to continually exercise power over rivals or subordinates would represent a concrete benefit associated with the extant institutional framework, even if this level of power were to remain relatively static. Similarly, constant
access to specific resources, material or otherwise, could provide sufficient incentive
for actors to invest in particular institutional configurations despite the presence of
342
H. Javid
diminishing returns or even increasing costs. As such, the presence of diminishing

returns would not, by itself, necessarily be sufficient cause for actors to adopt alternative institutional strategies. Theoretically, it would only be when costs outstripped
returns, increasing or otherwise, that actors would be induced to switch to different
institutional frameworks.
While increasing returns and reactive sequences do provide an explanation for institutional persistence, some of the criticism of the path dependence suggests that the
approach places too much of an emphasis on the mechanisms that underlie institutional reproduction. The notion that institutions may be locked into particular
historical trajectories often obscures the degree to which they are contested, and
path dependence sometimes fails to provide plausible accounts as to why alternatives
are selected despite the costs associated with such choices (Thelen 1999: 396399).
Focusing on the role of agency within processes of institutional development,
Crouch and Farrell (2004) argued for the need to examine the ways in which rational
actors can, within their societal contexts, calculate the potential benefits and pitfalls
associated with institutional switching and, based on the resources and information
available to them, choose alternative options even if the short-term cost is high. A
similar approach to understanding the mechanisms underlying the selection of particular choices by actors in path-dependent processes conceptualizes events within
causal sequences as constituting episodes of problem-solving (Haydu 1998). Following
this logic, actors at crucial points in time can draw on their various historically constituted power resources, capacities, and experiences to arrive at updated solutions for
recurring problems, triggering institutional transformations and the adoption of
alternative institutional paths. Using a game-theoretic model, Greif and Laitin
(2004) argued that endogenous institutional change can be explained by the extent
to which institutions possess mechanisms for self-reinforcement. As these mechanisms
strengthen or weaken over time, due to exogenous shocks or changing preferences,
actors can modify their behaviour and use their resources to influence processes of
negotiation and contestation leading to institutional change.
Thelen and Streeck (2005) provided additional insights into the processes of institutional evolution by providing an account of how endogenous, incremental changes
can, over time, lead to substantial institutional change. They argued that in addition to
the transformations engendered during critical junctures or other periods of upheaval
and crisis that receive emphasis in the literature on path dependence, institutions can
also change through processes of contestation in which established institutional rules
are contested and reinterpreted by different actors (Thelen & Streeck 2005: 13 15).
As a result of these kinds of small, but significant changes, substantial institutional
transformations can take place, resulting in the development of new institutional
forms based on the legacies of the old. This model of institutional change, when
employed within a broader framework of critical junctures, increasing returns, and
strategic decision-making, provides a compelling explanation for the way in which
actors and institutions adapt and modify over time.
In the case of Punjabs landholders, complementing the role played by exogenous
shocks in shaping the colonial order, much of the institutional innovation that
343
happened took the form of laws and bills that were incrementally implemented by the
colonial state. Even as they derived returns from the institutional framework of colonial rule and continued to invest in its reproduction and reinforcement, the Punjabi
landed class and the colonial state constantly refined the mechanisms through
which they exercised power, introducing changes through legislation and political
reform as part of a broader process of institutional tweaking. Similar processes of
adaptation took place after partition, with the landholding class using the idiom of
party politics, as well as their mutually beneficial ties to military regimes, in order
to perpetuate the power they wielded in the countryside.
Class in Punjab
The concept of class is crucial to understanding the social structure of Punjab not only
due to the economic stratification of rural Punjab, but also due to the enduring
relationship between class and political power in the province. Historically, control
over land formed the core of political authority within rural India, with the ability
to control cultivators and lay claim to the product of the land being of central political
significance during the Mughal and, indeed, subsequent epochs (Fuller 1982). At the
local and regional levels, political power inevitably came with control over land and
was buttressed by the fact that control over land was also often accompanied by
considerable amounts of prestige and loyalty from village- and regional-level kin
groups (Neale 1969).
In order to capture the different attributes and dimensions of class power in Punjab,
this paper draws on the work by Ahmad (1973), Patnaik (1980), Bhattacharya (1983),
and Prakash (1984) to create a typology of class that distinguishes between different
classes on the basis of three main features: capital/property ownership, labour exploitation, and social status. Fundamentally, the concept of class derived from these attributes is one that recognizes how class is not merely an economic category, but also a
relational one. Hence, while the ownership of capital/property may indicate economic
wealth, income and consumption alone are not sufficient for understanding the
constitution of a class, even though they may be important determinants of class
position and status. Instead, the ownership of capital/property is important precisely
because it implies the existence of a particular relationship of exploitation and
domination within the broader context of economic production. As such, in the
case of the Punjabi countryside, the ownership of land, or lack of it thereof, does
not just simply provide a basis by which to differentiate between different classes on
the basis of incomeit also suggests that those with ownership of land are in a
position to exploit the labour of those who lack property of their own. It is this
capacity to exploit and subordinate labour that guarantees the power of the different
elements of the landed classes in Punjab, particularly in the period preceding partition
in 1947. In addition to providing the landholding class with economic strength,
the control over labour that comes with the ownership of property enables the
landholding class to more effectively dominate political and social life in the
countryside.
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H. Javid
Table 1. Land distribution among landholding households in Punjab.

Size of landholding
Marginal holdings (up to 5 acres) (%)

Small holdings (between 5 and 12.5 acres) (%)
Medium holdings (between 12.5 and 50 acres) (%)
Large holdings (more than 50 acres) (%)
1925
1972
1980
1990
2000
58
26
12
4
46
30
21
4
47
30
19
3
54
28
15
2
61
27
11
1
Using data obtained from Calvert (1925) and Khan (2006), Tables 1 and 2 show the
evolution of landholding patterns in Punjab, showing changes in land ownership and
concentration over time. Table 3 indicates the number of landless households in
Punjab as a percentage of the total number of households, while Table 4 displays
trends in the use of wage labour in rural Punjab.
It is possible to arrive at some conclusions based on the data given above. Purely in
economic terms, there is a definite tendency towards the concentration of land ownership and the consolidation of the economic power of the different elements of the
landowning class relative to other segments of the population. Between 1925 and
2000, the number of landholders owning less that 12.5 acres increased significantly,
even as those owning more than this amount became fewer and fewer in number.
The declining number of medium and large landholdings can be explained by
taking into account land fragmentation and the operation of market forces after independence (amidst the elimination of laws enforcing primogeniture and the restriction
of land ownership to particular segments of the rural population). Indeed, the increase
in the number of marginal and small holdings points towards the increasing impoverishment of medium-level landholders over time, implying the emergence of an
increasingly large ownership divide between the largest landowners and everyone
else. The increase in the size of the landless in the same time period, as well as the
increase in the amount of casual labour employed in Punjab, points towards the
growth of wage labourers as a category in Punjab. The rise in wage labour, and the
increasing number of small and marginal holdings, can be attributed to a number
of factors, ranging from increased mechanization to land fragmentation and even
diversification away from agriculture, but the overall picture remains clear. The
Table 2. Landholding types as a percentage of the total farmed area.

Percentage of farmed area
Holding type
Marginal holding (up to 5 acres)
Small holding (5 12.5 acres)
Medium holding (12.550 acres)
Large (more than 50 acres)
1925
1972
1980
1990
2000
12
26
35
25
5
30
50
20
7
33
46
21
11
40
41
29
16
47
39
14
345
Table 3. Landless households as a percentage of total village households.
Landless (%)
1972
1980
1990
2000
48.2
50.0
55.4
50.3
agrarian economy continues to be dominated by a small class of landowners who, as

the main sources of employment within the village, continue to wield a tremendous
amount of economic power in the countryside.
In addition to the criteria of property ownership and labour exploitation, it is also
necessary to understand the role played by social status in forging class identities. In
this context, social status broadly refers to the position of a given class in the rural hierarchy and can be said to approximate to membership within a biraderi. Historically in
Punjab, the distinction between those who did and those who did not have access to
land formed the basis of the biraderi1 system that structured social relations in the
province. Agriculturalist biraderis, namely those with de facto ownership over land,
or those who cultivated land, occupied an economic and social position that was
completely different from that occupied by the biraderis of the artisans who performed
non-land-related services in the village. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the
landless poor who were not members of the artisanal biraderis. Although biraderi
also regulated social life in a wide variety of areas, ranging from marriage to dispute
resolution, it was primarily a means through which to enforce occupational specialization and stratification.
In the precolonial and colonial eras, membership within land-controlling biraderis
brought with it political benefits. Seeking to co-opt the dominant elements of the peasantry with a view towards ensuring order and accumulation, these regimes actively
cultivated the support of landed biraderis like the Jats and the Rajputs. Indeed, the
majority of the provinces traditional aristocracy was drawn from these biraderis,
and the rich peasantry comprised almost entirely the biraderis. Linked through
bonds of kinship and, often, common economic interest, biraderis often formed the
basis of the political mobilization of Punjabs landholders and were instrumental in
consolidating the collective power of these actors.
What must be borne in mind when discussing biraderi, however, is that it does not
act as a completely perfect proxy for economic class. While biraderi did often determine a persons occupation and degree of access to land, biraderis were not completely
Table 4. Types of labour employed in agricultural households.
Family workers as percentage of family members (%)

Permanent hired labour (%)
Casual labour (%)
1972
1980
1990
2000
55
7
30
60
4
45
29
2
50
37
3.4
44
346
H. Javid
bounded categories. As such, members of a non-agriculturalist biraderi could potentially own land and vice versa. Related to this is the fact that differences could exist, in
terms of status and economic power, within biraderis occupying similar positions on
the occupational scale. Thus, for instance, Jats, Rajputs, and Arains were all agriculturalist biraderis, but they did not enjoy equal levels of prestige and power. More often
than not, the social dominance of any given biraderi would be dependent on geographical and demographic factors, like the region in which the biraderi was located
and the number of members it had in that particular area. At a purely political
level, however, particularly under the colonial regime, these nuances were of little significance. Notwithstanding these variations, biraderi membership was a reasonably
accurate indicator of land ownership and social position, and it was on this basis
that colonial policy was eventually constructed. The institutionalization of biraderi
as political power that took place under colonial rule would have an effect on developments in the postcolonial context.
Taking the different determinants of class togetherproperty ownership, labour
exploitation, and social statusit is possible to then identify two different sets of
capacities that can be used to further refine the distinction between different classes
and, indeed, fractions within classes. Broadly, and to varying degrees, classes can
possess the capacity to impose sanctions on rival groups and to engage in collective
action. Sanctions here are understood to be of two types. Negative sanctions are
those that impose costs, such as the use of violence or economic dominance against
rivals and subordinates. Positive sanctions, on the other hand, can include the provision of services such as access to the state and dispute resolution. The ability to
impose sanctions of either type depends on the economic strength of a class as well
as on its social status. In the case of the landowning class in Punjab, the capacity to
bring sanctions to bear against other classes in society forms the basis of its importance
to authoritarian regimes.
Social status and economic power are also linked to a class ability to undertake
collective action. As mentioned earlier, biraderi networks can form the basis for political mobilization, and the resources available to dominant classes can allow them
to use these means of informal organization to interact with the state and pursue
common interests. Collective action can also assume the formation of and participation within formal organizations, such as political parties and civic associations.
The Unionist Party and the Zamindar Association in colonial Punjab would be
examples of this, as would be association through political parties in the postcolonial
period. Ahmad (1973) suggested that economic independence is fundamental to the
capacity to organize collectively in Punjab and argued that the ties of dependence
that link the landless and poor to the landed in Punjab severely circumscribe the
extent to which the former can mobilize on a common platform.
Based on the attributes and capacities discussed above, it is possible to arrive at a
more nuanced picture of class in Punjab than one based solely on economic criteria.
While the primary determinant of class is property ownership, there are important distinctions to be made between different fractions of the landed class. The traditional
aristocracy, who have historically been at the apex of the rural hierarchy, are large
347
landholders possessing tremendous social status. The heads of regional biraderi groups
and large jagirdars would be examples of individuals belonging to this grouping.
Similar to the traditional aristocracy are the rich peasantry who, like the aristocracy,
possess both land and status, but not to the same degree. Village-level lumberdars
and chuadhris would be examples of the rich peasantry. Both the aristocracy and
the rich peasantry possess land beyond their capacity to engage in self-cultivation
and, hence, engage in labour exploitation either through the employment of wage
labour or by taking on tenants. Broadly speaking, these actors can also be conceptualized as constituting the dominant element of the landed class in Punjab, historically
enjoying the greatest access to the state, and control over politics, in the countryside.
Subordinate to the aristocracy and rich peasantry in Punjabs rural hierarchy are the
middle peasantry, defined as such by their possession of enough land to subsist
through self-cultivation (usually between 12.5 and 50 acres) without having to
exploit the labour of others. The bulk of the grantees in Punjabs canal colonies
would exemplify this group of autonomous peasant proprietors. By virtue of their
economic independence, this group also possesses the capacity for independent collective action and political mobilization, despite lacking the means through which to
impose any kind of sanctions on other classes in the rural political economy.
Finally, at the bottom of the rural hierarchy are the poor peasantry (possessing
small amounts of land that are insufficient for subsistence agriculture) and the landless, both of which are dependent on, and necessarily sell their labour power to, the
landed classes, consequently lacking both status and the capacity to engage in collective action.
One additional point about the class typology presented in this section is that it
allows for capturing changes in class attributes and composition over time. One of
the arguments presented in this paper is that actors and institutions adapt to
change over time. The transformation of the dominant elements of the landowning
class from coercive owners using labour-intensive techniques of cultivation to capitalist farmers represents such a process of adaptation. While the fundamental
sources of class stratification, namely property ownership and social status,
remain largely unchanged, differences arising from changed processes of economic
production can be incorporated within this framework. Similarly, the increase in
wage labour over time amidst the decline of the middle peasantry represents a
quantitative shift that does not bring into question the validity of the concept of
class that is used in this paper. Different types of tenancy arrangements are also
captured by this typology, in that the capacity to exploit the labour of others is
not restricted to the hiring of wage labour. Although landholding size does not
necessarily imply the presence or absence of tenancy (since members of the poor
peasantry could, for example, choose to engage in sharecropping or lease out
their land in order to explore alterative economic opportunities), it is assumed
that tenancy assumes a qualitatively different social relationship depending on
the size of the landholding. Members of the landed class, possessing land in
excess of their subsistence needs and their capacity to self-cultivate it occupy an
economic position that is different from that occupied by those entering into a
348
H. Javid
tenancy arrangement in order to guarantee subsistence due to an inability to do so

through self-cultivation alone.
At this point, it is important to remember that the class structure of Punjab has not
remained static. Over time, particularly with the development and spread of capitalism, changes have taken place in the class structure of Punjab, leading to the introduction of new political actors over time. In the rural arena, changes had begun to take
place by the end of the nineteenth century with the increasing emergence of rural
wage labourers as a result of the decline of traditional artisanal occupations. This
change was accompanied by a more formal stratification of the hierarchy of landownership. As land grew scarce in the face of demographic pressures, and as access to it
was increasingly restricted and controlled by government policy premised on the colonial understanding of Punjabi tradition, a clear divide began to emerge between the
traditional aristocracy, the rich peasantry, and small peasant proprietors possessing
enough land to sustain themselves and their families. As the process of capitalist development progressed, and as colonial controls on the sale of land were relaxed in the
postcolonial period, the stratification of landholdings increased even further. Land
fragmentation over time and capitalist development also impacted the rural class
structure, widening the gap between the landed and the landless while also resulting
in the further development of a rural proletariat (Ahmad 1977).
Nonetheless, while there is evidence to suggest that a significant class divide
continues to exist in Punjab on the basis of ownership of, and access to, land, it is
important to acknowledge how the process of capitalist development has created a
new class of capital-owning businessmen and entrepreneurs in the province, spread
across dozens, if not hundreds, of small towns and cities. Distinct from Punjabs
small class of large capitalists, this new middle or intermediate class has been
the subject of considerable debate, not least of all because of the way in which it is
conceptualized as being key to economic flows and politics within the province
(Alavi 1998; Cheema 2003; Sayeed 1996; Zaidi 2006).
At a fundamental level, the emergence of the middle classes in Punjab is representative of the broader economic changes that have taken place in the province. Yet, while
it is possible to identify actors in Punjab who fit the economic criteria used to identify
these middle classes, it is difficult to argue that these actors constitute a single class
with clearly defined interests. For one, while these actors may be interested, at an
abstract level, in the transfer of land, capital, and state patronage away from the
more dominant economic classes (Sayeed 1996), it is necessary to recognize that the
middle classes in Punjab engage in a wide variety of economic activities that can
give rise to differing sectoral interests and political inclinations. Indeed, rather than
articulating themselves as a consolidated class, the middle classes tend to pursue
their interests strategically, aligning themselves in a fragmented fashion with the
classes and political groupings that can provide them with the most opportunistic
gain (Ahmad 1985). Thus, while the middle classes may occupy a substantial economic
and even demographic position within the calculus of power and politics, particularly
given their economic independence and corresponding capacity to engage in collective
action free from the constraints imposed by rival classes, their tendency towards
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fragmentation weakens their power as a class (to the extent that the label of class
accurately describes these actors).
This is a picture that is complicated by a further observation on the nature of the
middle classes and one that is more directly relevant to the argument presented in
this paper about landed power in Punjab. First, capitalists are not new to Punjab.
During the colonial period, a predominantly urban class of capitalist moneylenders
was an important source of credit for the rural economy and continued to grow
increasingly economically powerful until it was constrained by the intervention of a
colonial state that was wary of the ability of this class to disturb the rural social
order. While this class otherwise remained marginal to the political interests of the
colonial state due to its lack of mooring within the countryside itself and subsequent
lack of political and social power, it nonetheless constituted a class not dissimilar to the
middle classes present in contemporary Punjab (Banga 2005; Daechsel 2006). Once
this class had been constrained by the colonial state, however, the provision of rural
credit was a task that was taken up by large landholders with a surplus of capital.
This illustrates a second important point about the middle classes in Punjab. In
addition to being geographically and economically fragmented, it is necessary to
recognize that, particularly in the agro-industrial sector, many of the new capitalists
in Punjab are old landholders (Alavi 1998: 2930). In addition to the class of capitalist
farmers that emerged in the 1960s during the Green Revolution, dominant elements of
the landed class (both the aristocracy and the rich peasantry) were also able to situate
themselves within the processes of industrial diversification and accumulation that
were initiated in this period, cementing a coalition of class fractions that existed
during the colonial period as well. Indeed, in the 1960s, the government itself identified big landlords as being key to the development of industry in the province due
to their possession of surplus that did not necessarily have to be re-invested in agriculture.2 Rather than creating a dichotomy between a new class of capitalists and an
older class of feudals, the process of capitalist development in Punjab blurred the
distinction between these two types of propertied actors. While it would certainly
be overstating the case to suggest that the entire middle class in Punjab can be characterized in this fashion, particularly when bearing in mind the fact that not all of the
middle classes have roots in the countryside, just as many elements of the middle
class in the countryside may not have landowning antecedents, it is nonetheless important to recognize how a significant portion of this new class is not new at all and simply
represents another example of how the elements of the traditionally dominant landed
class are able to adapt to changing societal circumstances.
The implications of this for the exercise of class power in Punjab are clear. Instead
of representing an emergent class carving a niche for itself in an economic and political terrain dominated by the parochial interests of the traditional rural order, the
new middle class in Punjab, particularly in the countryside, may simply represent
the adaptation of the old elite to the new conditions of capitalist accumulation in
Punjab. As such, given their antecedents, many elements of the new middle class
may also be able to call upon historically evolved sources of power, similar to
those employed by the members of the landed class, to further expand their interests
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and entrench themselves within the institutional framework of Punjabi politics. Also,
while the propertied classes may engage in real conflicts of interest, between land and
capital or between the urban and the rural, they remain united in a common need to
continue the domination of the subordinate classes. In the final analysis, the interests
of the middle classes are not as antagonistic to the traditional order as might otherwise be expected.
Finally, with regard to the typology of class presented in this section, it is necessary
to qualify the class structure that has been put forward by acknowledging that class in
Punjab has never been a closed category. The boundaries of class often overlap and
intermesh, and it is by no means the case that individual members of any given
class will always act in similar ways or indeed have similar class attributes. Furthermore, within Punjab, the considerable variation in landholding patterns and economic
development from district to district makes it difficult to generalize about class. Nonetheless, class remains a key to the analysis of power in Punjab because of the way in
which it has been institutionalized, over time, as a political category. The relationship
between the landholders and authoritarian regimes in Punjab has been premised on
the ability of the former, as a class, to provide support to the state, and this is a role
that the landed elite have, on the whole, been able to perform with considerable effectiveness. When it has come to the question of pursuing their own interests, and those
of their patrons within the state, the landed class has historically shown considerable
ability to mobilize as a relatively homogenous collective.
The Antecedents of Landed Power in Punjab
Having established the criteria by which to determine the different class forces at work
in Punjab, it is possible to chart out the trajectory of institutional development that has
allowed dominant elements of the landowning class to consolidate and reinforce their
power over time. Following the logic of path dependence, understanding this process
of entrenchment and adaptation necessarily requires an understanding of how these
actors were initially incorporated within the formal apparatus of state control and
power. In precolonial India, where agricultural surplus formed the primary source
of revenue and wealth, control over land and, more importantly, cultivators and
their produce was of central significance to any ruling authority (Fuller 1989).
Lacking the infrastructural capacity to centralize control over land, the Mughal emperors in India relied upon a complex chain of intermediaries, ranging from provincial
governors and jagirdars to local-level clan leaders and zamindars, to provide the
means through which indirect rule could be established over the empire (DSouza
2002: 810; Hasan 1969). In addition to collecting revenue for the empire, these intermediaries also performed another incredibly important functionthe suppression of
dissent and rebellion. Recognizing the need to curtail the potential for revolt, either by
the peasantry or by disaffected local and regional power-holders, the Mughal emperors
actively sought to accommodate powerful allies who could use their own social and
economic influence, as well as military force, to ensure the stability of the system.
In return for these services, actors aligned with the Mughal regime received a share
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of the revenue collected and also acquired the political legitimacy that was borne out of
association with the Mughal emperor (Alam 1986; Habib 2000).
The systemic accommodation and incorporation of actors possessing land, and
controlling those who cultivated it, led to their being made an intrinsic part of the
ruling apparatus of the state. Effectively employed to pursue the economic and political interests of the state, these actors were able to enforce the writ of the regime and
strengthen its authority. As a corollary of this process, these landholders were also
able to consolidate their own economic and political power. The jajmani system
that enforced the division of labour between different castes and clans in the villages
of India ensured the existence of different occupational groups, each of which had
discrete links to the productive process (Fuller 1989). Thus, a clear divide existed
between landless workers, artisans, and landowners, which, in tandem with ties of
kinship and caste, provided the basis for the creation of strong group identities.
Within this social hierarchy, landholders tended to enjoy the most prestige and were
often able to buttress their power through the use of their influence within the
village and through their association with other landholders. In Punjab, the presence
of this village-level division of labour was the foundation for the biraderis that would
subsequently come to form part of the basis for social stratification and political
mobilization in the province. To the extent that landowners in this phase of history
represented a class in themselves, being part of the formal state apparatus afforded
a means through which class power could be strengthened and exercised.
The British annexation of Punjab in 1849 represented a critical juncture in which
the possibility was opened up for a radical renegotiation of the entire institutional
edifice of politics in the province. Significantly, the new regime was one that differed
substantially from its predecessors in terms of the infrastructural power that it ostensibly had at its disposal, giving it considerable institutional capacity, logistical reach,
and ability to penetrate society. By eventually setting up a formal, modern bureaucracy
that closely regulated and controlled agricultural production in the province on a scale
that had simply not been possible under previous regimes (Ali 1988: 9) and by putting
in place a legal system that could implement and enforce a plethora of laws designed to
protect the interests of the British government and its landed allies, the British government was able to engender an institutional transformation that greatly expanded the
power of the state and its ability to monitor, and respond to, developments at every
level of government. Linked to the growth of the states infrastructural power was
the increasing centralization of its military capacity. While the Mughal and Sikh
regimes had depended on local and regional allies to provide troops for campaigns,
the British Indian Army existed as a unified force under the sole command of the
central government. Given the colonial states increasing ability to micro-manage
governance through the expansion of its infrastructural power, and its military
independence, there was apparently little need for the British colonial government
to align its interests with those of the landowning class in Punjab.
Despite its considerable bureaucratic and infrastructural power, however, the power
exercised by the colonial state was never completely totalizing. The development of its
infrastructural power was a process that continued over the course of several decades,
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H. Javid
and while its reach exceeded that of the regimes that preceded it, the colonial state was
always unable to completely enmesh itself within the society it ruled over. As argued by
Seal (1973) and Bayly (1973), the strength of the British colonial state in India was
often exaggerated and its hold over society remained tenuous at best, dependent
always on the collaboration of indigenous elites and classes who played an instrumental role within the colonial system of governance. Though the state had a degree of
autonomy from social forces and pressures, its autonomy was circumscribed by its
reliance on the traditional power-holders that supported it. In the case of Punjab, a
number of potential factors explained the interest the British colonial government
had in nurturing the support of indigenous landholding elites. First, unlike the
Mughal state, which had been able to legitimize its rule through ideological appeals
to religion and tradition (Hintze 1997: 50), the British colonial government was
never able to successfully legitimize its occupation of the Indian subcontinent both
within India and even in England itself (Metcalf 1995). The absence of any kind of
legitimizing ideology complicated the task of governing a province with a long
history of peasant revolt and opposition to exploitative rule. Secondly, the need for
cost-effective and efficient administration efficiency, long a concern of the British in
India (Stokes 1980), lent itself readily to the outsourcing of particular functions to
indigenous collaborators, particularly in the areas of revenue collection and law enforcement. Local allies in Punjab, possessing both economic and social power through
their access to land and position within traditional networks of caste and kinship,
provided a means through which the colonial administration could overcome some
of the limitations it faced when governing the subcontinent. That these imperatives
guided the colonial state in Punjab was made abundantly evident as, over the
course of British rule in the province, members of the landowning class increasingly
formed the bedrock of the local government, judicial, and revenue administrations.
The relationship between the landowning class and the colonial state was not,
however, one that emerged spontaneously out of some kind of institutional
vacuum. Indeed, the foundational years of colonial rule in Punjab, particularly
between 1849 and 1868, represented a juncture in which the new institutional order
was negotiated and implemented in the context of the interests of the British colonizers and the shifting circumstances of Punjabi society itself. It was in this initial period
of uncertainty that the first steps were taken towards setting in motion the pathdependent trajectory of institutional development that would come to inform
Punjabi politics and society in the later decades. Initially interested in emulating the
experience of the North-Western Provinces, where a system of independent peasant
proprietorship had been used to displace the traditional landed aristocracy in order
to guarantee more effective and efficient revenue collection, the British set about
affecting a revenue settlement that granted land to the occupancy tenants and smallholders who constituted the bulk of the rural cultivating population. While this
measure was undertaken at the expense of the traditional aristocracy, many of
whom had already been displaced as a result of the AngloSikh Wars, it was believed
at the time that the support of a large number of peasant proprietors would be sufficient to guarantee the stability of the new regime.
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This logic was called into question by the events of 1857, when a revolt spearheaded
by disaffected members of the traditional aristocracy in Oudh and the North-Western
Provinces impressed upon the colonial state the value in having the support of large
landholders who, in addition to commanding a tremendous amount of economic
power, could also call upon traditional sources of social and political status to
ensure the maintenance of order in the countryside (Metcalf 1962). In Punjab, this
translated into a reappraisal of colonial policy in the years following 1857, as well as
in 1857, resulting ultimately in the granting of titles, concessions, and patronage to
members of the traditional aristocracy who had supported the colonial state in its
struggles against the Sikhs. Where the colonial state had previously supported the
less dominant members of Punjabs landholders, it now threw its weight behind the
historically powerful members of this class.
While the debates that informed the eventual revenue settlement and administration of Punjab were often confused and contradictory,3 the regime that emerged
in the aftermath of 1857 events was one that was premised on the co-optation of
both the provinces landed aristocracy and the self-sufficient proprietors who constituted Punjabs middle and rich peasantry. As early as 1857, the constraints imposed by
path dependence on the colonial state can be made evident by considering how, having
granted land to the peasant proprietors of the province, the state could not fully revert
to a model of control and power that relied exclusively on the traditional aristocracy.
Dispossessing the new peasant proprietors would have resulted in a backlash the colonial state may not have been able to contain and necessitated the inclusion of these
actors in the emerging framework of colonial rule (Hambly 1964). As such, despite
some official opposition to the move, the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868 guaranteed
that the rights of extant peasant proprietors would be protected from the predations
of the traditional aristocracy, even as it was made clear that subsequent revenue settlements would explicitly seek to accommodate members of this class fraction as well.
The passing of the Punjab Tenancy Act in 1868 essentially enshrined the form that
would be taken by the colonial order in Punjab. Rather than being dependent on either
the rich and middle peasantry or the traditional aristocracy, the new dispensation was
one that created a coalition of these class fractions. Landed power was, thus, institutionalized by the colonial state, but at different levels involving different elements of
the landed class. Consequently, the traditional aristocracy would continue to dominate
politics at the provincial and even national levels, exercising the greatest amount of
power while enjoying the most preferential access to state patronage. The rich peasantry, in turn, formed the core of the colonial states institutional framework at the local
level, operating mostly at the village level and the lower tiers of formal colonial
government. The middle peasantry, while largely excluded from incorporation
within the state itself, nonetheless benefitted from legislative and institutional interventions aimed at protecting the interests of landowners and remained loyal to a colonial state whose interests coincided with theirs. Like the Mughals and Sikhs before
them, the British administration relied upon the services of a chain of landholding
intermediaries. Once implicated in the exercise of colonial governance, the different
fractions of the landowning class benefitted tremendously from their association
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H. Javid
with the British. In turn, they provided the colonial government with recruits, revenue,
and stability, using their position within kinship networks, village-level informal institutions, and the state, to ensure the maintenance of order in the countryside.
The mechanisms of path-dependent institutional reproduction and adaptation that
were at work during the colonial period can be observed by examining the imperatives
that underwrote the different legislative and political interventions that were made in
this period. Having linked their fortunes to the continued well-being of the landowning class, the British were constrained in their ability to undertake any measures that
could alienate these landed allies. Given the premium placed by the state on stability,
particularly as Punjab became an increasingly important military asset due to its
steady supply of recruits to the colonial army (Yong 2005), agrarian discontent represented a cost that outweighed any potential benefit that could have accrued to the
state as a result of institutional change. The controversy that resulted over revising
the revenue settlement in Punjab in the 1860s posed a dilemma for the colonial
state precisely because it ran the risk of dispossessing a potentially volatile constituency
of peasant proprietors that it itself had created during the first round of settlement.
Faced with the prospect of resistance in the countryside, the colonial state decided
to retreat, choosing instead to continue favouring both the provinces peasant proprietors and its landed aristocracy. A similar situation arose in 1907, when revolts by grantees in the canal colonies over property rights threatened colonial interests (Barrier
1967). Once again, the effort invested by the British in co-opting Punjabs landed
class, and using it to guarantee stability, essentially ensured that the state could not
risk losing its allies by choosing a course of action that could have resulted in an
alternative outcome. Even when it came to dealing with rival classes, the colonial
state intervened decisively in favour of the landed class. When urban moneylenders,
the kernel of an emerging bourgeoisie, threatened the stability of the countryside at
the turn of the century, the colonial state intervened by implementing the Land Alienation Act of 1900, effectively eliminating the market for land while simultaneously
guaranteeing the continued support of its increasingly powerful rural allies. When
deciding between the status quo and radical change, the costs associated with the
latter ensured that the colonial state would choose to maintain the extant institutional
arrangement. Ironically, as the power of the landowning class itself grew in response to
the favour it continually received from the state, the capacity of the British to defect
from the arrangement decreased. The bureaucratic authoritarianism of the colonial
state came to become structurally dependent on the Punjabi landed class.
Just as the state was dependent on the Punjabi landowning class, members of this
class themselves sought to gain little by withdrawing their support for the British.
As part of a framework of rule within which both the state and its allies derived
increasing returns from the deepening of their relationship, landowners would, over
time, come to enjoy an increasingly formalized and institutionalized role within the
colonial administration. Initially as revenue collectors and quasi-official headmen,
and then later as magistrates, commissioners, and politicians, the states landed
allies were able to exploit their relationship with the British to expand the range of
their capacities as a class. Bureaucratic power complemented the existing economic
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and coercive power of the landed class, placing it in a position where it could effectively
utilize their resources and collective capacity to monopolize economic, political, and
social life in the Punjabi countryside. Essentially, its bargain with the colonial state
increased the capacity of the landowning class to impose sanctions on its subordinate
classes, as well as on its rivals.
The bureaucratic incorporation of the landed class within the colonial state was
supplemented, towards the end of the nineteenth century, by the introduction in
the province of limited forms of electoral politics and representational government.
With elections to district-level boards beginning in the 1880s, and with legislative
councils featuring elected Punjabis being established in the first few years of the twentieth century, the British used the rhetoric of liberal democracy to garner greater legitimacy for their rule. As always, however, the introduction of limited democratization
was part of a broader strategy of ruling more effectively, in part by granting greater
power to local collaborators (Washbrook 1997). Right up until partition, exercises
in electoral politics in Punjab were based upon a limited franchise that, while expanding periodically, restricted the rural vote to relatively large landowners. Measures were
also taken to ensure that constituencies were drawn in ways that would allow local
influentials to utilize their biraderi connections to mobilize support. As a result of
these, and other interventions made to ensure the return of favourable electoral
results, members of the landowning classes were able to dominate elections in
Punjab. By 1937, repeated rounds of elections at the district and provincial levels
had continually returned candidates who were members of the Punjabi landed class
(Yadav 1987), with the elections of 1946 displaying a similar set of results despite
the fact that they had been won by the nationalist Muslim League.4
The introduction of electoral politics to Punjab represented an institutional intervention, made by the colonial state, that reinforced its capacity to rely on its landed
allies for support. Members of the landed class themselves used this newly opened
political space to further their own agendas. In addition to bodies like the Zamindar
Association, which were formed by the landowners to lobby the government for
additional support, formal political parties such as the Unionist Party were set up
by this class to further its interests, and these parties would, in turn, remain the
most powerful force in Punjabi politics for decades to come (Talbot 1988). In a
very real sense, political parties and their associated organizations provided the
landed class with an additional means through which to bolster the power derived
through their membership within networks of biraderi and kinship. Horizontal
links between members of the traditional aristocracy were strengthened even as the
existence of a party machine allowed for a reinforcement of the vertical links
joining this class fraction to the rich and middle peasantry. Indeed, the formal
organs of representational government fulfilled a similar function. In addition to
the new legislative councils, assemblies, and boards that provided the landowning
class with the opportunity to more directly influence state policy, membership
within these bodies also allowed for the transfer of state patronage. The few dozen
members of the traditional aristocracy who occupied the highest tiers of government
could, thus, use their position to provide patronage to the thousands of rich and
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H. Javid
middle peasants who were part of the district and tahsil boards in the province, as well
as to the local village-level administrative apparatuses.
The development of this multi-tiered model of governance would have three important implications for politics in Punjab. First of all, it guaranteed continuing economic, social, and political returns to both the colonial state and its landed allies,
who were able to use this institutional framework to pursue their interests and
reinforce their power. Secondly, it provided an institutionalized means through
which to ensure the continued cohesion of the coalition of landed class fractions
that underpinned colonial rule in Punjab. Given that the possibility did exist of
intra-class conflict between the traditional aristocracy, rich peasantry, and middle
peasantry, the provision of a method through which each class fraction could claim
state patronage reduced the need for intra-class antagonism. With the British acting
as the ultimate arbiters safeguarding the interests of each class fraction, the vertical
and horizontal linkages created by the administrative and electoral structure served
as a means through which class solidarity could be forged and resources could be effectively distributed. Thirdly, the logic of electoral and bureaucratic politics under colonialism also put in place the system of patronclient politics that would subsequently
come to dominate Punjab in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. As the ability
to acquire state patronage was linked to incorporation within the state itself, landowners came to represent the only means through which the rural masses could
gain access to the state. This strengthened the ties of dependence that linked the peasantry to the landowning class and served as a means through which the colonial state
could guarantee the continued compliance of the non-landowning majority of rural
Punjab. It also, however, granted additional power to those landowners who could
situate themselves as patrons within society, allowing them to more effectively
pursue their own interests. Public office under colonialism thus came to be associated
with personal gain, putting in place a formal culture of rent-seeking that was never
actively discouraged by the state.
The increasing power enjoyed by the landed class in Punjab represented the kind of
increasing returns that contribute to reinforcing path-dependent institutional development. Just as the British colonial state continued to reap the benefits of landowner
support, so too did the landowning classes prosper by entrenching themselves deeper
and deeper within the apparatus of rule. The effects of colonial collaboration with
Punjabs landowning class were made manifest by the turn of the century, when
India had begun to see the emergence of both an indigenous bourgeoisie and an educated elite that sought increasing representation within the state. At a time when
nationalist sentiment had started to envelop politics in much of the rest of the
country, Punjab remained largely undisturbed and stable. This was not least due to
the efforts of the landowning class, who used their influence and power to actively
retard the growth of nationalism in the province (Ali 1991). Cracks did eventually
appear in this arrangement, particularly in response to increasing government repression, the economic strain of the two world wars, and the logic of national electoral
politics (Jalal 1999; Puri 1985), leading to the eventual collapse of British rule in
Punjab and the defection of the provinces landholding classes to the nationalist
357
camp. Nonetheless, British policy with regard to Punjabs landholders had allowed for
a century of largely stable and profitable rule.
Class Power and Reproduction in Postcolonial Punjab

Since 1947, repeated bouts of military rule in Pakistan have paradoxically been
accompanied by rounds of electoral competition. From Ayub Khan to Musharraf,
military dictators in Pakistan have used elections to garner legitimacy for their
regimes. However, there is little evidence to suggest that these exercises in electoral
politics have ever represented a substantive shift away from authoritarianism and
towards a more participatory politics. As argued by Cheema et al. (2006), the nonparty basis of all these elections has served to create a local-level tier of government
officials and politicians directly beholden to the state and military for access to patronage and power. Similarly, it is also clear that more often than not, elections in Pakistan,
particularly under military governments, have been dominated by the same traditionally powerful political actors who have historically dominated the different levels of
government in Pakistan (Akhtar et al. 2007; Waseem 2005). In Punjab, despite some
important changes that will be discussed below, this has essentially meant that politics
in the postcolonial period continues to be the preserve of the same elements of the
landed class who exercised power in the colonial period. Indeed, when considering
the dynamics of electoral competition under military rule, it is also possible to see
how the mechanisms through which the authoritarian postcolonial state exercises
power do not differ very significantly from the strategies employed by the British.
Recent work by Cheema et al. (2009) demonstrates that the favour and patronage
bestowed upon elements of the landed class in the colonial era have allowed for the
descendants of these actors to monopolize contemporary politics in the Punjabi countryside. The logic of path-dependent reinforcement and adaptation that underpins this
can be illustrated by the observation that areas lacking members of this class, primarily
due to the occupation of those areas by migrants and refugees after partition, are less
likely to have their politics dominated by traditionally powerful landholders (Cheema
et al. 2009). From this, it becomes clear that in addition to the initial endowment that
is required for members of the landed class to acquire power, this power needs to be
reproduced and entrenched over time for it to be manifest in the present day. An
insight into precisely what these mechanisms of reproduction might look like is provided by Nelsons (2002) study of local politics in Punjab. In attempting to explain the
microfoundational logic of postcolonial path dependence (431), Nelson argued that
the persistence of the colonial model of local-level politics cannot be traced to the
effect of formal administrative institutions. Instead, given the scale of agrarian transformation in Punjab since the end of colonialism, Nelson suggested that the power of
the landed class stems from its ability to use political networks formed around access
to land, traditional village-level informal institutions, and relations of kinship to
provide local constituents with access to the formal institutions of the postcolonial
state, particularly in matters pertaining to dispute resolution and the inheritance of
property.
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H. Javid
Although this explanation provides a compelling account of the dynamics of landbased, factionalized politics at the micro-level in Punjab, it leaves largely unexplored
the way in which these local-level processes channel into the structure of provincialand national-level politics. Despite changes in the nature of state and society in the
postcolonial epoch, politics in Punjab remains determined not only by issues of
control at the local level, but also by the crises of legitimacy that prompt an authoritarian state to buttress its rule through the exploitation of social networks dominated
by traditionally powerful landowners. The model of local politics in Punjab that
existed under colonialism continues to exist not just due to factional competition at
the local level, but also because of the historically embedded institutional continuities
between the postcolonial state and the regimes that preceded it, with the postcolonial
states search for legitimacy mirroring the quest for order and support that characterized the colonial epoch.
The initial endowments of the landowning class, in terms of economic and political
power, coupled with the authoritarian legacy of colonialism, are the key to understanding the persistence of landed power in Punjab after 1947 as well as the tremendous impediments to democratization in Pakistan. As argued by Jalal (1995) and Alavi
(1972a), the transition to independence in Pakistan was characterized by the reproduction of an authoritarian state formation characterized by the presence of a military
bureaucratic nexus that was able to act as an independent political actor in the
presence of relatively less powerful social groups. However, while Alavi argued that
the postcolonial state is guided by the structural imperatives of peripheral capitalism
while acting as a mediator between the often contradictory interests of the different
capitalist and feudal fractions of the ruling class, it is necessary to understand the
way in which the postcolonial states relationship with the landed class grew to
become one of mutual structural dependence. The postcolonial state in Pakistan has
historically been open to capture by a variety of different classes at different points
in time (Zaidi 2006), but the link between landed power and authoritarianism is
one that has been sustained for much of Pakistans history. Despite being in a position
to mediate between competing economic interests, the autonomy of the postcolonial
state is limited by its need to acquire legitimacy and support in the countryside
through the continued co-optation of the dominant landowners.
The foundational role played by Punjabs landholders in the postcolonial dispensation can be understood by focusing on the different dimensions of institutional
entrenchment that have allowed for the reproduction of the power of the landowning
class over time. As stated earlier, the structure of colonial governance in Punjab was
one that was premised upon the incorporation of the provinces landed class. By the
end of the colonial period, this had been formalized by the inclusion of elements of
this class within every tier of the British administrative framework. From the village
level upwards, an array of officials ranging from lamberdars to members of the legislative assemblies provided the means through which the interests of the landed class
could be articulated and pursued. Following independence in 1947, initial attempts
at governing the new state inevitably relied upon the continued use of the same government machinery that had underpinned the colonial state. Elements of the landed
359
aristocracy had been instrumental in the Muslim Leagues electoral victory in 1946 and
continued to play a dominant role in provincial- and even national-level politics after
partition, as observed in 1951, when barely four years after the end of British colonial
rule, the traditional aristocracy and rich peasantry were able to use their economic and
local-level social clout to dominate provincial-level elections in much the same way as
they had under the colonial government (Maniruzzaman 1966). At the lower tiers of
government, particularly at the local level, members of the rich and middle peasantry
remained entrenched in positions of social and economic power and were able to
retain their political clout despite the tremendous transformations that had ostensibly
been generated by partition. Inevitably, and in line with the notion of increasing
returns embodied in the concept of path dependence, the different fractions of the
Punjabi landed class were able to expand their networks of influence and patronage,
enmeshing themselves even more deeply, both directly and indirectly, within the
apparatuses of the state.
Focusing more on the formal electoral basis of landed power, Cheema et al. (2006)
and Waseem (1994) provided arguments to suggest that the landed class in Punjab has
been instrumental in making possible the non-party-based forms of electoral competition and governance that have been characteristic of military regimes in Pakistan.
Like the colonial state before them, military governments in Pakistan have deliberately
engineered electoral scenarios that, while conferring a veneer of legitimacy upon essentially authoritarian regimes, have also continued to ensure the empowerment of
Punjabs traditional landed class. However, what is interesting to note is that even political parties, working in periods of democratic rule, have bought into the logic of
landed power, making use of landed allies to garner political control in the countryside. Bearing in mind the predominantly rural electoral geography of the province,
as shown in Table 5, as well as the capacity of the landed class to acquire support
through a combination of sanctions and patronage, political parties in Pakistan
have actively sought to incorporate powerful landholders within their fold, continuing
the process that was put in motion by the Unionist Party and the Muslim League in the
colonial period. With patronclient politics being at the heart of political mobilization, service delivery, and access to the state in Punjab, landed class actors with
extant linkages to the state apparatus, as well as economic power, are indispensable
to political parties seeking to acquire political support. In practice, this has, over
Table 5. Categories of National Assembly constituencies in Punjab.a
Type of voter
Percentage of urban voters
Percentage of rural voters
Percentage of semi-urban voters
Type of constituency
24
50.90
25.10
Percentage of urban constituencies

Percentage of rural constituencies
Percentage of semi-urban constituencies
25
49.30
25.70
a
Constituency categories delineated by referring to constituency maps available on the website of the Election
Commission of Pakistan http://www.ecp.gov.pk/Delimitation/ConstituencyMap/NA.aspx. Population figures
and constituency delimitation are both based on the 1998 census.
360
H. Javid
time, resulted in political parties courting rival landlord factions within any given constituency, limiting electoral competition to displays of strength between different
elites. Parties that do not conform to this established pattern of political mobilization
run the risk of losing out electorally, as the barriers to entry into politics erected by the
landowning class in Punjab would make it difficult, and politically costly, for parties
pursuing alternative strategies to contest elections with any hope of success. In the
absence of a credible alternative means through which to mobilize rural votes, as
well as an incentive through which to devise such means, political parties in Punjab
are essentially caught in a race to the bottom, where any party attempting to move
away from reliance on landholders in the countryside will most likely be unable to
capture political power. When taking into account the way in which elections under
military governments have tended to benefit landholders possessing reserves of economic and social power, decades of party competition for landlord support have
allowed the landowning class to entrench itself within the framework of democratic,
as well as authoritarian, politics in Punjab. Paradoxically, rather than resulting in
the emergence of a more inclusive and participatory politics, electoral competition
in Punjab has deepened the power of the landholders, allowing them to create networks of political associational power and patronage that virtually guarantee their
continued influence in Punjabs politics.
The persistence of landed power in Punjab is not simply made manifest in the
political arena alone. Particularly when it came to questions of land reform or agricultural taxation, the landowning class has been able to effectively use its political
clout to stymie successive attempts at reform (Hussain 1982), and by the 1980s,
this political clout yielded additional economic dividends, with many elements
of the traditional landowning class using their power to expand into industry.
Their ability to do this was, once again, rooted in their capacity to make use of
their position within the extant institutional framework to pursue their interests
as a class. Indeed, during the Green Revolution in the 1960s, it was members of
the historically dominant landholding fractions who were able to most effectively
make use of the subsidies and incentives offered by the government to increase
agricultural productivity (Alavi 1971). Additionally, they were also able to use
this increased government intervention in the agrarian economy as a means
through which to deepen their ties with the bureaucratic apparatus of the state
in a fashion not dissimilar to the way in which the colonial bureaucracy interacted
with peasant proprietors in the canal colonies. While the spread of capitalism, the
urban political economy, and expansion of Pakistans economic elite are arguably
factors limiting the power of the landed class to economically coerce the subordinate classes in the countryside, their ability to make use of the networks of bureaucratic and political power to provide patronage to clients at the local level ensures
that they are able to reproduce their power amidst broader societal transformations
(Wilder 1999).
When making the case for the persistence of landed power in Punjab, it is necessary
to acknowledge that while the dominant elements of the landowning class have been
able to retain their hold on power in Punjab, the configuration of the coalition of class
361
fractions at the heart of framework of politics in the province has undergone some
change. Burki (1980) and Zaidi (2006) both suggested that the 1960s and 1970s
represent an opening up of the political space in Punjab, with Ayub Khans Basic
Democracies and Bhuttos populist interregnum providing a previously disenfranchised and marginalized middle peasantry with the opportunity to participate in
politics. As has been argued above with regard to the middle classes in Punjab, it
needs to be remembered that the middle peasantry that captured political power
during these two decades did not represent a radical new class formation diametrically
opposed to the old elite. Instead, the rise of the middle peasantry is reflective of the
declining power of the traditional aristocracy relative to the rich peasantry and, to a
lesser extent, the middle peasantry as defined in this paper. As a result of (limited)
land reform, land fragmentation, the lifting of all de jure constraints on the market
in land, and economic diversification, it is undoubtedly true that the traditional aristocracy in Punjab no longer commands the same level of power that it once did.
However, rather than signalling the end of feudalism and a recasting of the rural political order, the ability of the rich and middle peasantry to fill the vacuum increasingly
left by the traditional aristocracy can only be understood when taking into account the
way in which these two fractions of the landowning class were also a part of the
colonial political order and, hence, possessed the institutional resources necessary to
claim a space for themselves in the new era of popular democratic politics. Where
they previously occupied positions subordinate to the traditional aristocracy in the
tiers of government and the rural political economy, the rich and middle peasantry
could now use their power to claim that which was being vacated by a dwindling
aristocracy.
Consequently, to the extent that politics has been transformed in rural Punjab, the
main difference lies in how the rich and, to a lesser degree, the middle peasantry have
been able to displace the traditional aristocracy. Predictably enough, elements of the
landed class have gradually come to form a quasi-aristocracy in their own right,
squeezing out rivals within the rural political arena while simultaneously using
their enhanced bureaucratic, economic, and political power to further entrench
their position and expand their resources. The entry of this group of landholders
into the realm of provincial and national politics was nothing more than the
logical end result of a process of institutional incorporation that had been underway
for over a century.
As has been discussed in this section, the institutionalized relationship between
authoritarian regimes and the Punjabi landowning class in the postcolonial
context evolved and adapted to a changing societal context as the decades wore
on, with the fundamental exchange of political support for patronage that
formed the basis of the relationship between the two remaining unchanged in
essence. Having entrenched themselves within the formal apparatuses of colonial
political control, members of the landowning class in Punjab were able to hold
on to their positions in the state and in the political parties for decades after
partition despite a wide array of societal changes that could have potentially
eroded their power.
362
H. Javid
Overcoming Landed Power: Potentialities for Resistance and Institutional Change

In an essay on the prospects for democratization in Pakistan, Zaidi (2006) argued that
the country is likely to remain mired in what he calls praetorian democracy, whereby
a military that continues to remain directly or indirectly involved in governance will
permit only a limited form of electoral democracy to exist. According to Zaidi, this
formal electoral democracy is unlikely to give rise to a more inclusive and participatory politics because the classes most likely to mobilize in support of such a project
already possess access to the state. Following the argument posed by Cheema
(2003), Zaidi suggested that an increasingly economically and politically powerful
middle class, predominantly urban capitalists, represents the dominant grouping
in Pakistans politics, and the close links between this class and the bureaucraticmilitary oligarchy ensure that it is unlikely to engage in the types of contentious politics that could lead to a further opening of the political space. Moores famous claim
that no bourgeoisie meant no democracy (1966: 418) could, in the case of Punjab, be
reworked slightly to suggest that a politically reactionary bourgeoisie could also mean
no democracy. The picture is made even bleaker when considering how, as discussed
above, the middle capitalist classes in Punjab are themselves, to an extent, not a
new class as much as they are sections of the old elite, drawing on extant sources
of social, economic, and political power to achieve their agendas.
In this paper, it has been argued that one of the major impediments to democratization in Pakistan is the continued power wielded by a coalition of dominant elements
drawn from the traditionally powerful landowning class in Punjab. Through their
position within networks of political mobilization, economic flows, and the formal
institutional apparatuses of the state, these actors are able to exercise considerable
control over the subordinate classes that fall within their influence. Furthermore, as
has been discussed in this paper, the ability of these actors to exercise this power as
a class is the result of a long process of institutional development that has seen the deepening of the relationship between this class and a largely authoritarian state while
simultaneously providing the landed classes with the means through which to
strengthen their own position relative to other groups in society. While the increasing
influence of Pakistans urban capitalist classes cannot be denied, Punjabs rural powerholders continue to play a pivotal role in the countrys politics. The question as to how
to broaden and deepen the process of democratization in Pakistan is one that cannot
be answered without considering the means and mechanisms through which to
challenge the landowners and the entrenched system of patronage, power, and
control that aids their reproduction as a class.
While the logic of path dependence dictates that trajectories of institutional development have become increasingly difficult to change over time, the possibility does
exist for change to be engendered through a variety of mechanisms. Indeed, the persistence of landed power in Punjab is not so much a story of continuity as much as it is
one of adaptability, with the landed class using its extant resources and capacities to
resituate itself within a changing social, political, and economic context. The dislocations created by the debt crisis at the end of the nineteenth century, partition in
363
1947, and the populist politics of the 1970s constituted junctures that opened up the
possibility of challenging the established order. The survival of the landowning class in
these periods of upheaval was only made possible through institutional adjustments
that were undertaken by regimes that were structurally dependent on the continued
support of their powerful landed allies.
Nonetheless, it is precisely in these moments that the potential for reform exists.
Skocpol (1979) argued that successful revolutions can only take place during
periods of crisis in which otherwise previously powerful and relatively autonomous
authoritarian states are unable to effectively counter resistance, leading to radical
transformations in which previously marginalized social groups are able to fundamentally alter the entrenched order. While Skocpols study deals specifically with the case
of revolutions, it does offer some insights into the situation in Pakistan, particularly
when embarking upon an analysis of the moments at which seemingly strong
regimes have collapsed due to combinations of circumstances that have left them
unable to maintain their grip on power. Ayub Khans dictatorship, for all its talk of
development and progress, was brought to an end by a sustained campaign of
popular protest and resistance amidst rising and increasingly evident economic
inequality, infighting within the regime itself, and the fallout from an inconclusive
war with India (Burki 1980). The escalating campaign against Zia-ul-Haqs government gained momentum under similar circumstances, and the movement that
brought an end to the Musharraf dictatorship was one that, despite being triggered
by the regimes attack on the judiciary, was arguably successful due to rising
public disenchantment with a government crippled by militancy and economic
mismanagement.
Given the existence of an almost symbiotic link between authoritarianism and the
persistence of landed power in Punjab, it becomes possible to see how the fall of a military government could, in its wake, lead to a similar reversal in the fortunes of its rural
allies. However, as the experience of Bhuttos government in the 1970s shows, this need
not necessarily be the case (Burki 1980). Despite coming to power on a platform of
populist reform, Bhuttos government eventually came to accommodate the very
same landowners that it sought to displace. While this can be attributed to a variety
of different factors, some of which have been described above, the fact remains that
if the power of the landowning class in Punjab is to be overcome, it is likely to take
place under the same circumstances, and through the same processes of mobilization
and resistance, that have resulted in engendering successful transitions away from
authoritarian rule. Indeed, in contrast with Moores (1966) thesis, Rueschemeyer
et al. (1992) drew on a wealth of comparative data on democratization to suggest
that politically mobilized working classes, rather than the bourgeoisie, hold the key
to effective democratization.
That is not to say, however, that popular mobilization alone can provide the means
through which to trigger institutional reform, particularly when considering the limitations faced by previous attempts at mobilization. In the past, movements against the
state in Punjab have tended to suffer from an urban bias. In Pakistan, cities have
historically been the pivotal sites of opposition to the state, providing the space
364
H. Javid
within which coalitions of workers, intellectuals, students, and professionals have been
able to spearhead successful movements against authoritarian regimes. More often
than not, these mobilizations have remained relatively insulated from the countryside
and have failed to create the type of coalition of the marginalized that could create the
conditions for radical transformation in rural Punjab. Indeed, the failure of urban
movements to create a widely dispersed geography of opposition is a partial explanation for the ability of the landed class to survive these moments of upheaval relatively unscathed. The absence of resistance from below, from the poor peasantry,
the landless, and the agricultural proletariat, allows for the reproduction of the
same relations of domination and control that have entrenched the power of the landowners. While resistance movements in rural Punjab can and do exist, as exemplified
most recently by the struggle waged by tenants on the military farms in Okara, such
movements remain relatively sporadic, isolated, and fragmented. Given the tremendous impediments to collective action that characterize the poorer sections of the peasantry (Ahmad 1973), efforts aimed at broadening popular political participation need
to provide the means through which to effectively organize and incorporate these
elements of the peasantry within movements.
Secondly, the debate on democratization in Pakistan needs to be accompanied by a
recognition of the need for structural reform aimed at transforming the rural social
order in Punjab. As argued by Gazdar (2009), the discourse on land reform in Pakistan
has often been framed in economic terms, looking at the problem of inequitable access
to, and ownership of, land as one that can be resolved by the market and targeted
policy initiatives, with the intended aim being increased efficiency and productivity.
As a result, the limited apolitical measures that have been introduced to level the
agrarian playing field have largely been ineffective due to their inability to counter
the way in which history and institutions provide the means through which
members of the landowning class are able to reproduce their power. The question
of land reform, therefore, needs to be viewed as a political project aimed at empowering the dispossessed. Rather than focusing on the economic utility of land reform, it
needs to be understood that land in Punjab has a political character in that it plays a
fundamental role in shaping social relations at the local level. While the development
of capitalism in Pakistan has gradually eroded the economic power of the landowners
in Punjab and has also reduced the importance of land as a means of economic
control, land reform remains one of the key mechanisms through which the asymmetrical nature of class conflict in the countryside can be fundamentally altered, endowing the poor peasantry with the economic independence, as well as the potential for
collective action thus created, necessary for breaking the chains of coercion and
patronclient politics that have historically kept them bound to the institutional
order.
Finally, while the pessimism expressed by Zaidi (2006) with regard to the chances of
democratic survival in Pakistan may prove to be well founded, even formal praetorian democracy can potentially lead to an opening up of the political space that could,
over time, lead to positive institutional change. It is important to bear in mind that
while the landed class is deeply entrenched within the institutional framework of
365
politics in Punjab, its power is not absolute or uncontested. Indeed, the persistence of
landed power in Punjab does not preclude the possibility of conflict with other
classes or even within the landed class itself. As has been discussed earlier in this
paper, capital-owning classes have emerged in Punjab that, particularly in the urban
parts of the province, represent actors possessing interests that may not necessarily
be aligned with those of the rural elites. The rural elite themselves are often
victims of factional struggles, with different blocs of landlords, often aligned along
biraderi and party political lines, competing for state patronage. These forms of
contestation and conflict represent important limits to the power of the landed
class in Punjab and add complexity to the picture of relatively linear institutional
development suggested by the path-dependent model that has been employed in
this paper.
Perhaps more significantly, as increasing urbanization and capitalist development
transform the electoral geography and economic dynamics of Punjab, the landowning
classes could eventually be displaced by broader societal transformations that leave
them with fewer means through which to maintain their power. Indeed, in the
semi-urban ruralopolises that Qadeer (2000) argued are now home to almost half
of Punjabs population, the presence of urban population densities in predominantly
agrarian economies will inevitably, over time, result in a shift towards more urban
social relations and forms of accumulation. It can be argued that the resultant
weakening of the ability of the landholders to dominate the social and economic
life of the countryside could, in the presence of formal democracy, provide the rural
population with the space within which to expand their political participation.
While this outcome would not necessarily result in an end to patronage politics, it
would certainly allow for the possibility, over time, of alternative actors emerging as
sources of political influence and power in rural Punjab. Ideally, this could also
result in parties being forced to compete for rural votes that were previously tied to
different landowners. On the other hand, the gradual social transformation accompanying this particular set of institutional changes could also result in the traditional elite
engaging in yet another round of adaptation and diversification, using their existing
to power to carve a niche for themselves within the emerging dispensation.
History would certainly suggest that this remains a distinct possibility. As the
genesis of the middle classes in the Punjabi countryside shows, the provinces
landowning class is quite adept at reinventing itself amidst broader structural
transformations.
In conclusion, the power of the landowning class in Punjab, while formidable, can
nonetheless be overcome despite the tremendous barriers to change that characterize
the institutional framework of Punjabs politics. Popular resistance, land reform, and
sustained democratic participation offer potential mechanisms through which
change could be initiated. While Marx may very well have been talking about
Punjab, rather than about nineteenth-century France, when suggesting that the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living
(2000: 329), the aim of transforming Punjabs politics, although difficult, is by no
means unachievable.
366
H. Javid
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Anushay Malik, Ali Cheema, Imran Ali, Robin Archer,
Participants of the Pakistan Workshop 2010, and an anonymous referee for their
helpful comments and suggestions. The author is responsible for any errors that
may remain.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Often incorrectly equated with castes or tribes, biraderis are occupationally stratified, endogamous kin groups. While there can be a number of sub-divisions within a given biraderi, the
basic differentiation is between biraderis of landless labourers, artisans, cultivating tenants,
and landowners (see Ahmad 1977; Alavi 1972b; Rouse 1988).
Government of Pakistan, 1967, Industrial Potential of the Rural Areas of West Pakistan.
The details of which have been outlined at length by Stokes (1959), Metcalf (1962, 1964), van
den Dungen (1972), and Penner (1986).
Report on the General Elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly, 19451946.
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Class, Power, and Patronage Landowners and Politics in Punjab

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