KHOR MOR LPG Loading Facilities Revamp Project

PETROFAC PROJECT NO. : JI 2016

FIRE AND EXPLOSION STUDY

Doc No. 2016-S-RPT-000-0001

16/12/12

Reissued for Design

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CSS

CSS

SK

27/11/12

Issued for Design

DB

CSS

CSS

SK

03/11/12

Issued for Review

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CSS

CSS

SK

Prepared

Checked

Approved

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Approval

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No.

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Doc/Dwg
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Seq. No

Rev

2016

RPT

0001

Rev

Date

Description

Doc Title

FIRE AND EXPLOSION STUDY

2016-S-RPT-000-0001 REV.1

CONTENTS
1.0

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 4

1.1

Background ...................................................................................... 4

1.2

BLEVE ............................................................................................. 4

2.0

MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS ...................................................................... 4

2.1

LPG Truck Design ............................................................................... 4

2.2

LPG Fluid ......................................................................................... 5

2.3

Modelling Software ............................................................................. 5

2.4

Weather Data .................................................................................... 5

2.5

Impairment Criteria ............................................................................ 5

3.0

CONSEQUENCE RESULTS ......................................................................... 7

3.1

BLEVE radiation result.......................................................................... 8

3.2

BLEVE Blast Overpressure ..................................................................... 11

3.3

Flexible hose leak/rupture ................................................................... 14

4.0

CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................... 18

5.0

REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 19

APPENDIX-1: PHAST BLEVE RADIATION REPORT .................................................... 20

APPENDIX-2: PHAST BLEVE OVERPRESSURE REPORT............................................... 21

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ABBREVIATIONS
BLEVE

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

HSE

Health, Safety and Environment

LPG

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

NGL

Natural Gas Liquid

tdu

Thermal Radiation Dose Units

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FIRE AND EXPLOSION STUDY

1.0
1.1

2016-S-RPT-000-0001 REV.1

INTRODUCTION
Background
On 22 of June 2012, an incident occurred at the Khor Mor LPG facility involving two
LPG road tankers. The subsequent fire and explosion caused damage to the LPG
loading area. With the exception of the LPG bullets and the LPG pumps, all of the
LPG loading facility will be rebuilt.
Petrofac has investigated the worst-case hazard consequence scenario, a Boiling
Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) of a fully loaded 18MT LPG road tanker.
This report presents the results of the BLEVE investigation.

1.2

BLEVE
A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) is one of the serious hazards in
the LPG industry. Following description is given for BLEVE in Reference 1.
When a vessel containing liquid under pressure is exposed to fire, the liquid heats
up and the vapour pressure rises, increasing the pressure in the vessel. When this
pressure reaches the set pressure of the pressure relief valve, the valve operates.
The liquid level in the vessel falls as the vapour is released to the atmosphere. The
liquid is effective in cooling that part of the vessel wall which is in contact with it,
but the vapour is not. The proportion of the vessel wall which has the benefit of
liquid cooling falls as the liquid vapourises. After a time, metal which is not cooled
by liquid becomes exposed to the fire; the metal becomes hot and weakens and
may then rupture. This can occur even though the pressure relief valve is
operating correctly. A pressure vessel is designed to withstand the relief valve set
pressure, but only at the design temperature conditions. If the metal has its
temperature raised, it may lose strength sufficiently to rupture. A large fraction of
the flammable liquefied gas released, vapourises and forms a burning vapour cloud,
often called a fireball.

2.0

MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS
This section presents the assumptions used for the BLEVE modelling.

2.1

LPG Truck Design

The BLEVE modelling has been carried out for the failure of one fully loaded LPG
road tanker containing 18MT (38.3m3) of LPG. The road tanker details are
presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1: LPG ROAD TANKER OPERATING PARAMETERS
Scenario

Name

No.

Truck Operating
pressure (barg)

Operating
Temperature(0C)

Inventory (kg)

LPG Road Truck

30

18,000

LPG Road Truck

11

30

18,000

LPG Road Truck

17

50

18,000

LPG Road Truck

22

50

18,000

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Note: Scenario 1 & 2 operating temperature is selected as 30OC so that the fluid
phase is liquid. Scenario 3 is assumed as normal operating case, however, Scenario
4 has been considered conservatively as the design case to determine safe distance
requirement.
2.2

LPG Fluid
The respective LPG compositions employed for the modelling is based on Reference
2 and presented in following table.
TABLE 2: LPG COMPOSITION
Component

2.3

Mol Fraction
Design Case (70:30 LPG)

Alternative Case (50:50 LPG)

Ethane

0.0105

0.0076

Propane

0.6992

0.5089

i-Butane

0.0956

0.1485

n-Butane

0.1802

0.3220

i-Pentane

0.0100

0.0100

n-Pentane

0.0045

0.0028

n-Hexane

0.0000

0.0000

M-Mercaptan

0.0000

0.0000

E-Mercaptan

0.0001

0.0001

Modelling Software
The assessment has been carried out using the BLEVE model available within PHAST
(Version 6.7) that predicts the explosion overpressure and fireball distances.

2.4

Weather Data
Table 3 presents the weather/atmospheric assumptions (Reference 2).
TABLE 3: ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS
Parameter

52oC

Temperature
Weather Conditions (Atmospheric Stability Class and Wind
Speed)
Relative Humidity

2.5

Criteria

2F and 5D
80 %

Impairment Criteria
The following tables (Table 4 & 5) indicate the general thermal radiation
(Reference 3) and overpressure criteria (Reference 4) that have been considered
for the consequence modelling and relate to the impairment of escape routes and
structural failure. In Table 4, impairment criteria definition for 6.3 kW/m2 is

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selected from API-521 which provides an unambiguous statement on radiation

impact.
TABLE 4: HEAT RADIATION IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA
Thermal Radiation
Intensity (kW/m2)

Impact Description

4.7

The onset of 1st degree burns. The pain threshold is reached in 15

- 20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds exposure.

6.3

Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency actions

lasting up to 30 s can be required by personnel without shielding
but with appropriate clothing. Appropriate clothing consists of
hard hat, long-sleeved shirts with cuffs buttoned, work gloves,
long-legged pants and work shoes (API-521).

12.5

37.5

Limiting radiation for escape actions lasting a few seconds. At

this level, the pain threshold is reached in about 4 seconds, and
second degree burns of exposed skin in about 40 seconds.
Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may
reach a thermal stress level high enough to cause structural
failure.
Criterion for immediate fatality. At this level, the pain threshold
is virtually instantaneous and second degree burns on exposed
skin occurs in about 8 seconds.
Threshold for the onset of structural failure of steel. Steel
supports for large vessels fail.

A person within a fireball is assumed to be a fatality. If the person

is outside the fire radius then they will likely suffer minor burns or
no effects. Fatalities are caused not only by the heat of the flame
Within fireball radius but also by the heat of the gases left after the fireball. The
breathing of hot combustion gases has effects due to three
distinct reasons breathing air with little or no oxygen, burning
of the lungs and breathing toxic by-products of combustion.

For short exposure (upto a few tens of seconds, typical of fireballs), thermal
radiation dose units (tdu) should be used [5].
Thermal Dose (tdu) = (I4/3)t
Where, I = incident thermal flux (kW/m2)
t = duration of exposure (s)
Unit of tdu: (kW/m2)4/3 s
For this project, tdu of 1000 (kW/m2)4/3s has been used which is equivalent to 1%
fatality as per the OGP guideline (Reference 5).

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TABLE 5: EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE EFFECTS

Impact

1.0/0.069

Storage tank cone roof collapse

3.0/0.207

Storage tank uplift (half tilted)

3.5/0.241

Pipe support frame deforms

6.0/0.414

Pipe support frame collapse, piping breaks

CONSEQUENCE RESULTS
This section discusses the results of the modelling with respect to explosion over
pressures and fireball radius.
A sensitivity analysis is done with Design case LPG and Alternative case LPG. It has
been observed that overpressure effect distances using Design case LPG
composition are more than that using Alternative case LPG composition (refer
Figure 1). It was also found that BLEVE thermal radiation does not change
appreciably with LPG composition (refer Figure 2). Since the Design case LPG
composition shows the conservative result, detailed result with Design case LPG
composition has been reported.
It may also be noted that the blast overpressure effect distance does not depend
on weather stability.

Sensitivity on LPG composition

140
120
Overpressure distance, m

3.0

Explosion Overpressure
(psig/barg)

100

69mbar- Design case LPG

80
60

69mbar - Alternative
case LPG

40

241mbar - Design case

LPG

20

241mbar - Alternative
case LPG

0
0

20

40

60

LPG Temperature, C

Figure 1: Overpressure effect distance sensitivity with LPG composition at

17barg operating pressure.

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Radiation distance, m

Sensitivity on LPG composition

450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Radiation_2F_Design case
LPG
Radiation_2F_Alternative
LPG
Radiation_5D_Design case
LPG
0

10

20

30

40

Radiation_5D_Alternative
LPG

Radiation, kW/m2

Figure 2: Radiation effect distance sensitivity with LPG composition at

17barg burst pressure.
3.1

BLEVE radiation result

The following table summarizes the BLEVE radiation results for fully loaded LPG
road truck
TABLE 6: BLEVE RADIATION RESULTS

Sl. No

Name

Burst
pressure
(barg)

LPG tanker
1

Weather
Condition

Fireball
Radius
(m)

Fireball Distance Distance Distance Distance

Duration to 37.5 to 12.5
to 6.3
to 4.7
(sec)
kW/m2
kW/m2
kW/m2
kW/m2
(m)

(m)

(m)

(m)

2F

79

10.9

193

297

347

5D

79

10.9

23

205

312

366

2F

79

10.9

33

206

312

364

5D

79

10.9

52

219

328

384

2F

79

10.9

64

225

335

389

5D

79

10.9

79

237

352

410

2F

79

10.9

80

236

349

405

5D

79

10.9

91

249

367

426

8.0
LPG tanker
LPG tanker

11.0
LPG tanker
LPG tanker

17.0
LPG tanker
LPG tanker

22.0
LPG tanker

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Heat Radiation Contours from Fireball:

The heat radiation contours for scenario 4 with 5D atmospheric stability are
presented in Figure 3.

FIGURE 3: HEAT RADIATION CONTOURS FROM FIREBALL AT NEW LOADING

BAY LOCATION
For 1% fatality, the required thermal dose is 1000 (kW/m2)4/3s [refer section 2.1.2
in reference 4] and the corresponding thermal radiation from BLEVE having
duration of 10.9 seconds is 29.6 kW/m2. From the calculation, 29kW/m2 radiation
extends to approximately 129m. Hence compressor area and the main process plant
area may not experience radiation impact to the personnel due to BLEVE as this
area is outside the 1% fatality level. Since LPG & NGL pump locations are less than
129m from the tanker loading bay, these areas may see more than 1% fatality
radiation level if they are in open area.
Fireball Radiation:
The fireball radiation levels will decrease as the distance from the incident
increases. Figure 4 shows the effects of fireball radiation with distance for the
Design Case (scenario 4, 5D weather stability). PHAST radiation report is included
in Appendix 1.

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FIGURE 4: SCENARIO-4: HEAT RADIATION DESIGN CASE

Thermal radiation contour (Figure 5) based on existing loading location has also
been drawn to see the impact distances.

FIGURE 5: HEAT RADIATION CONTOURS FROM FIREBALL CONSIDERING

EXISTING LOADING BAY LOCATION

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FIRE AND EXPLOSION STUDY

3.2

2016-S-RPT-000-0001 REV.1

BLEVE Blast Overpressure

The BLEVE blast overpressure results are included in Table 7.
TABLE 7: EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE RESULTS

Operating Operating Distance to

pressure Temp. (C) 0.069 barg
(barg)
(m)
LPG tanker
8
30
107

LPG tanker

11

30

107

56

51

37

LPG tanker

17

50

121

63

57

42

LPG tanker

22

50

121

63

57

42

Sl. No.

Name

Distance to
0.207 barg
(m)
56

Distance to
0.241 barg
(m)
51

Distance to
0.414 barg
(m)
37

It may be noted that LPG at temperature 50OC is in vapour phase at both 8barg &
11barg operating pressure and hence 30OC has been selected for the calculation
with LPG as liquid. Although 14barg has been assumed as the plant operating
pressure, to keep conservatism in the design, 22barg LPG pressure with 50OC
operating temperature has been considered as the design conditions to evaluate
safe distances.
Overpressure contour assuming BLEVE location at the existing loading bay is shown
in Figure 6. Based on the explosion contours in Figure 6, it is concluded that the
present location is not suitable since there can be blast overpressure impact on
NLG tank and the NGL/LPG pumps along with the nearby piperack supporting
piping. Hence, the location of the new loading bay is required to be shifted away
from NGL tank and NGL piping to protect these items in case of BLEVE in the LPG
loading bay.
The explosion overpressure contours for Scenario-4 considering the BLEVE
occurrence at the new location are presented in Figure 7. Detailed overpressure
report from PHAST is included in Appendix 2. Based on the revised location the
overpressure values at the NGL piping and NGL tank are well below the explosion
damage criteria.
The report shows that blast overpressure at 70m away from BLEVE scenario is
approximately 0.18barg along with 131 N.s/m2 impulse (corresponding to 16ms
duration). Based on the explosion results it is suggested that the control room shall
be designed to protect an explosion overpressure of 0.2barg for 20ms duration
when located about 70m away from the nearest LPG loading bay.

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FIGURE 6: SCENARIO-4: EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE CONTOURS FROM BLEVE

CONSIDERING EXISTING LOADING BAY LOCATION

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FIGURE 7: SCENARIO-4: EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE CONTOURS FROM BLEVE

CONSIDERING NEW LOADING BAY LOCATION

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3.3

2016-S-RPT-000-0001 REV.1

Flexible hose leak/rupture

Four release scenarios have been considered for consequence analysis:
1. Flexible hose leak with maximum rated flow of 72m3/hr (9.42 kg/s with liquid
density 471.2 kg/m3) with which the tanker will be filled.
2. Rupture of flexible hose
3. A small leak (5mm)
4. Release from LPG tanker- slam shut valve malfunction (open)
In all above cases, normal operating pressure of 14barg & temperature 50OC has
been considered for calculations.
Leak case with maximum rated flow
Consequence analysis has been done with 9.42 kg/s. The LFL distances with 2F m/s
and 5D m/s weather stability are calculated as 45m and 41m respectively. The
0.5LFL (9301ppm), LFL (18600ppm) & UFL (92920ppm) contours are presented in
Figure 8 & Figure 9.

Figure 8: Flammable cloud dispersion contour with 2F weather stability

Figure 9: Flammable cloud dispersion contour with 5D weather stability

Page 14 of 21

Comment [Shaji1]: What is this contours?

it LFL, 0.5LFL or some other value. Please
make a statement which corelate the ppm to
LFL limit.

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Jet fire radiation (4.7 kw/m2) distances are found to be 62m & 57m with 2F and 5D
weather stability respectively. Thermal radiation contours are shown in Figure 10
below.

Figure 10: Jet fire radiation contour with 2F & 5D weather stability
Rupture of flexible hose
During a rupture case of the flexible hose, the pressure inside the hose will drop
suddenly. Excess flow check valve is connected in the upstream section of flexible
hose and slam shut valve is fitted at the liquid inlet of the tanker. In HAZID study
these valves have been considered as safe guards. In the event of hose rupture, it
has been assumed that both the valves will be closed immediately. The amount of
LPG released will be limited to approximately the inventory within the flexible
hose, which will be much less than the previously discussed leak case. A model has
been made considering rupture of a 3 flexible hose having 10m length resulting to
release of 0.0442m3 of LPG. The result shows that initially approximately 25m long
LFL cloud can be generated. The LFL cloud will be disengaged from the source soon
but it can travel to a distance of approximately 75m.

Figure 11: Flammable cloud dispersion contour with 2D weather stability from hose
rupture

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Comment [Shaji2]: If such small reelase

happen then how much is the cloud extent?

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Small release case

A small leak (5mm) release has been studied to decide the height of flammable gas
detector. A downward impingement model with releasing from 1m height has been
considered. It was found that 0.2 (20%) LFL cloud reaches a height of
approximately 1.1m (refer Figure 12). Since the flammable gas detector will be set
at 20% LFL level, detector height of 1.0m should be suitable to detect flammable
gas. Less than 1m detector height may create problem to the detectors due to dust
ingress.

Comment [Shaji3]: This is only a horizonta

jet and the cloud is only 0.5m above the leak
point. See if the spil falls on to ground and if
vapourises how much will be the cloud heigh
Check a pool vapourisation can help to bette
define the location of detector or not.

Figure 12: Flammable cloud dispersion contour m/s from 5mm leak leak
Release from LPG tanker- slam shut valve malfunction (open)
A scenario has been considered in the event of flexible hose rupture and at the
same time the slam shut valve is malfunctioning. A 2inch leak has been considered
for modeling. In such situation entire tanker content (18000 kg of LPG at 14barg
pressure) is assumed to be released through ruptured hose lying in the ground. The
result shows that 0.5LFL distance extends to 276m and 187m during 2F & 5D
weather conditions respectively. The 0.5LFL cloud coverage is shown in Figure 13 &
Figure 14. Such release can create a LPG pool of maximum radius approximately
17m.

Figure 13: Flammable cloud dispersion contour with 2F m/s weather stability from tanker
release.

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Comment [Shaji4]: What is the 20575.3m

and 28056.7m in the legend?

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2016-S-RPT-000-0001 REV.1

Figure 14: Flammable cloud dispersion contour with 5D weather stability from tanker
release.

Comment [Shaji5]: What is the 20575.3m

and 28056.7m in the legend?

The liquid LPG will be partially flashed and the remaining liquid will flow to the
open drain which is located towards east of loading area. The liquid LPG will flow
through the drain and ultimately flow outside fence to the adjacent wadi. Vapour
will be continuously generated during such liquid LPG flow until entire liquid is
converted to vapour.
Release calculation indicates that 54% of total release quantity (18000kg) can come
out as liquid amounting to 9720kg of liquid LPG. A part of this liquid will be
evaporated while flowing through loading area to open drain. The wet loading area
is assumed as 13.7mx3.8m (52.1m2) and the open drain length is considered as 90m
having 0.3m width (27m2). Thus total wet area is 79.1m2. Pool evaporation model is
used to calculate how much of liquid LPG can be evaporated until it reaches open
area outside the fence using a spreading pool model. It has been found that 1068kg
of liquid LPG can be evaporated within fence and the rest amount (8652kg) of
liquid LPG will be evaporated outside fence. Pool evaporation model shows that a
maximum spreading pool radius of approximately 12.5m is possible. A discharge
model is then developed to check the dispersing cloud length in open area. It shows
that the LFL and 0.5LFL cloud can reach approximately 125m & 175m respectively
in a flat terrain (refer Figure 15).

Figure 15: Flammable cloud dispersion contour with 2F weather stability with LPG release
from tanker and flowing into the open area outside fence.

Page 17 of 21

Comment [Shaji6]: What is the 20575.3m

and 28056.7m in the legend?

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2016-S-RPT-000-0001 REV.1

CONCLUSIONS
Consequence modelling has been carried out for LPG road tanker failure scenario
leading to a BLEVE to evaluate thermal radiation and overpressure effects.
Following are the conclusions:
1. The full volume of the LPG truck (18MT, 38.3m3) has been considered as the
worst-case scenario for the purposes of this assessment. This worst case event
has been modelled for four different operating conditions (scenario 1 to
scenario 4) with two different LPG compositions (Design case LPG composition
(approximately 70:30 propane:butane) & Alternative LPG composition
(approximately 50:50 propane:butane)). Since Alternative LPG composition
provides lesser effect distances than that using Design case LPG composition,
only Design case LPG composition has been used for consequence assessment.
2. Overpressure contours drawn on the existing plot plan (Figure 6) indicates a
possibility of the NGL storage tank being impacted (roof collapse) if a BLEVE
occurs at the existing location of loading bay. Hence a new location of the
loading bay away from the existing location towards south direction is
suggested. The overpressure contours from the proposed loading location
(Figure 7) shows that the NGL tank is located away from 0.069bar overpressure
distance from the LPG loading location. The existing process area, NGL pump
area & the nearby pipe supporting structures are located outside 0.24bar
overpressure contour and hence do not pose any risk of damage from blast
overpressure impact.
3. The blast overpressure at 70m away from BLEVE scenario is approximately
0.18barg along with 131 N.s/m2 impulse (corresponding to 16ms duration). It is
recommended to design the LPG control room to protect explosion
overpressure of 0.2barg for 20ms duration and shall be located 70m away from
the nearest LPG loading bay.
4. The maximum fireball radius is 79m from the LPG road tanker loading bay. The
fireball can last for 10.9 seconds. The model assumes that the full mass of LPG
has been released from the truck before ignition and as such the different
operating conditions have no effect on the fireball results.
5. People working in compressor & other main plant areas are outside 1% fatality
zone. People working in LPG/NGL pump area are within 1% fatality zone. In the
event of any fire scenario at LPG loading area, all the personnel within the
plant must move away from the incident site and proceed to the Muster area
on West side of the plant. Those who are unable to reach the muster area can
take shelter against the radiation under a covered area to avoid direct
exposure to radiation.
6. Muster point located at the north-west corner & south-west corner will not be
impacted from BLEVE scenario since this is outside 6.3kW/m2 radiation
contour.
7. For a credible leak horizontal jet fire scenario, firefighting using monitor
should be done from the reverse side direction of the jet fire. However, onsite
judgment shall be made to decide on the selection of monitor depending on
size of fire & the direction of fire.
8. Flammable gas detector height should be selected 1.0m.

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9. Any open guard house should be located minimum of 275m away from the
loading bay.
5.0

REFERENCES
1. Loss Prevention In The Process Industries, F P Lees, Volume 2, Hazard
Identification, Assessment and Control, Third Edition, 2005.
2. Crescent Petroleum/ Dana Gas, LPG Loading Consequence Modelling Work
scope, Doc No. CPCI-20xxx September 2012 Rev.1 as referenced in
Consequence report by Risktec (Document no. DNG-04-R-01).
3. DNV Technica, A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore
Installations, Centre for Marine and Petroleum Technology (CMPT), 1999.
4. Vulnerability of plant/structure, Oil & Gas Producer (OGP) data, Report No.
434-15, March 2010.
5. Vulnerability of humans, Oil & Gas Producer (OGP) data, Report No. 434-14.1,
March 2010.

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APPENDIX-1: PHAST BLEVE RADIATION REPORT

(7 pages)

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APPENDIX-2: PHAST BLEVE OVERPRESSURE REPORT

(6 pages)

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