CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No.

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ULTRANATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES

IN SERBIA: THE POLICY OF NON-ENGAGEMENT EXAMINED
gauge the extent to which such goals
Marlene Spoerri
are being met. This is accomplished by
PhD Candidate in the Department of
examining current US policy towards
European Studies,
ultranationalist political parties in the
Universiteit van Amsterdam,
Republic of Serbia.
M.S.Spoerri@uva.nl
Introduction
1
Abstract
With the process of democratic
In Serbia, as in much of the Western consolidation in the Western Balkans
Balkans, established democracies face now under way, the question of whether
both a moral and political dilemma: to and how the governments of Western
acknowledge ultranationalist parties Europe and North America should
democratic legitimacy as popularly approach the most conspicuous vestige
post-communist
politicsthe
elected actors or to isolate them as of
symbols of the regions authoritarian prominence of ultra-nationalist political
past. In Serbia, the US has opted for the partiesis becoming increasingly
latter, erecting a cordon sanitaire poignant. Policies aimed at isolating
similar to those employed domestically such groups by banning diplomatic,
against ultranationalist parties in financial and other forms of contact
Western Europe. This article seeks to have failed to deny them their popular
identify
the
goals
underlying appeal; to the contrary, ultranationalist
isolationist policies and in so doing, to forces are making electoral gains
precisely where foreign opposition to
their existence is most severe. Thus,
1
A version of this article was first presented at
despite a decade of intense international
the 3rd Central European University Graduate
citizens
in
BosniaConference in the Social Sciences, Budapest, pressure,
Hungary. I am grateful for the constructive Herzegovina continue to vote along
comments and criticisms of Matthew Adams, ethnic lines for parties that espouse
Vasyl Buchko, Kate DeBusschere, Jonathan
intolerant rhetoric. While in Serbia, the
LHommedieu, David Jijaleva, Tamas Meszerics,
and Julien Theron. I am also grateful for the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party
comments and criticisms offered by colleagues at could very well be on the verge of
the American Graduate School of International forming a coalition government. Having
Relations and Diplomacy where embryonic ideas
failed to
abolish
support
for
related to the central argument of this article were
forces
in
these
presented in April 2006. I also acknowledge the ultranationalist
support of David Lundberg, the School of countries, the time has come to review
International Studies, the Division of Education, such policies.
Arts and Social Sciences and the University of

South Australia in preparing both the conference

paper and this article. The author also This article takes an initial step in this
acknowledges the comments of two anonymous direction. In addition to identifying the
reviewers.

25

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

goals underlying isolationist policies in

the Western Balkans, it gauges the
extent to which such goals are being
met. It does so by examining current
US policy towards ultranationalist
political parties in the Republic of
Serbia.2 On the basis of interviews
conducted with local politicians, US
diplomats and aid-providers, the article
concludes that the policys impact is
limited and is thus in need of revision.
This argument is developed in three
stages. First, the reader is presented
with an overview of the current policy
of non-engagement, along with an
introduction to the ultranationalist
parties in question: the Serbian Radical
Party (SRS) and the Socialist Party of
Serbia (SPS). Next, the goals of the
policy are identified. Finally, these
goals are examined in light of recent
events in Serbia and conclusions
regarding their effectiveness are drawn.
The cordon sanitaire: A policy of nonengagement
Since the fall of the Milosevic regime in
October 2000, Serbias ultranationalist
parties have been met with markedly
different fortunes. Long chastised for its
anti-reformist and anti-democratic

sentiments, the SRS is the only party in

Serbia to have enjoyed a solid base of
support since the pro-reformist coalition
centered on the Democratic Party (DS)
left government in early 2004. For over
four years, support for the party has
hovered at 30 percent, making the SRS
the most popular party in Serbia by a
significant margin.3 The SPS, by
contrast, has witnessed little but setback
following its heyday at the helm of
Serbian politics in the 1990s. Following
the extraditions of its former President,
Slobodan Milosevic, to The Hague in
mid 2001, its popularity has dwindled
to the single digits. Whatever its losses,
however, the SPS is one of just ten
parties
in
Serbian
parliament,
occupying a total of 16 seats.4 As a
consequence, ultranationalist parties
currently make up just under 40 percent
of Serbias 250-seat parliament.
Although
Serbias
ultranationalist
parties have failed to form a governing
coalition since reformist parties
assumed power in October 2000, fear
that they will do so in the future
continue to challenge the longevity of
Serbias liberal trajectory.5

While this article focuses on US policy, it should

be noted that the European Union also employs a
cordon sanitaire. Given that the EU does not have
a
joint foreign
policy,
however,
the
implementation of the ban is not always run
smoothly, a prime example being the divergent
steps taken following SRS Deputy Nikolics
appointment as Speaker of Parliament. Notably
however, none of the major European political
party institutes target ultranationalist parties in
their programs.

26

Steven Woehrel, Serbia and Montenegro:

Current Situation and US Policy, CRS Report for
Congress (June 21, 2006), 4.
4
Four of the ten parties in Serbias parliament are
minority parties, each of which boasts no more
than one to three seats in parliament.
5
At the time of writing, Serbias ultranationalist
forces were in coalition talks with the Democratic
Party of Serbia. It remained unclear as to whether
such a coalition would actually be forged. Should
these parties succeed, they would represent the
first ultranationalist coalition government since
Milosevics ouster in 2000.

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

The parties quasi-fascist, populist

program[s]6 combined with their
refusal to renounce their roles in
wartime atrocities have made both the
SPS and SRS the bane of Serbias proEuropean majority. In Serbia, as in
much of the Western Balkans,
established democracies face both a
moral and political dilemma: to
acknowledge ultranationalist parties
democratic legitimacy as popularly
elected actors or to isolate them as
symbols of the regions authoritarian
past. In Serbia, the US has opted for the
latter, erecting a cordon sanitaire
similar to those employed domestically
against ultranationalist parties in
Western Europe. Cordon sanitaire,
literally quarantine line, refers to a
policy of non-engagement through
which extremist parties are politically
isolated with the aim of circumventing
their proliferation. Ultranationalist
parties, here defined as organizations
which advocate a brand of nationalism
so severe that it calls a states
international interests and cross-border
cooperation into question, often fall
within this category.

norm since 2000, the impact appears

negligible: the SRS has more support
today than it did when the policy was
first implemented. Although the policy
is reported to be unofficial insofar as
the origins of its mandate remain
unclear and a paper-trail is lacking,
interviews with US officials reveal that
it is rigorously adhered to.7 US
diplomats and donors are not permitted
to engage with representatives of
ultranationalist parties or to support
projects in which SRS officials partake.
As one representative of the National
Democratic Institute for International
Affairs (NDI)a US organization
specialized in the provision of political
party assistanceexplained, I can
have no contact with the SRS, not even
to send a letter.8 As a result, none of
the instruments typically employed to
reform parties in new or struggling
democraciesincluding
diplomatic
contacts and democracy assistanceare
applied in connection with Serbias
ultranationalist parties. The following
section examines these instruments in
greater depth.
Strategies of engagement

Little has been written regarding the

effectiveness of non-engagement but its
record appears to be mixed. In Serbia,
where a US policy of non-engagement
with the SRS and the SPS has been the

Until recently, it was common practice

to conceive of political transformation
as an exclusively domestic affair. Only
after the onset of the third wave of

This quote was made in reference to the SRS.

See: Judy Batt, The Question of Serbia,
Institute for Security Studies 81 (August 2005), 8.
Likewise, Balkans expert Sabrina Ramet labels
the SRS neo-fascist in her article, The Denial
Syndrome and its Consequences: Serbian Political
Culture
Since
2000,
Communist
and
Postcommunist Studies 40 (2007), 41-58, 48.

I collected a total of 80 interviews in Serbia

(March and June/July 2007) and the US (April
2007). Interviews were conducted with US
diplomats and donors, Serbian politicians,
academics, and journalists.
8
Anonymous, National Democratic Institute,
Interview conducted in Belgrade, Serbia, on
March 9, 2007.

27

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

democratization in the late 1970s did

exogenous factors receive systematic
attention. To this end, established
democracies have increasingly sought
to support, and in some cases, impose,
democracy in foreign contexts, a
practice referred to as democracy
promotion. This article examines a
subset of this field pertaining to
political parties. It seeks to understand
why and to what effect Western actors
may opt not to work with select parties
in new democracies.
In spite of their current malaise,
political parties continue to fulfill
unique functions which civil society
cannot adequately perform.9 Thus, in
their quest to bolster democracy abroad,
democracy
promoters
seek
to
strengthen political parties democratic
attributes, including their representative
capacities, their legislative competence,
and
their
ability
to
function
cooperatively with their opponents. The
US party institutes work to enable
select parties to engage directly with the
domestic electorate so that they may
become more receptive to their voters
preferences. Western Europeans, by
contrast, take pride in helping parties
develop more ideologically coherent

Some of the functions unique to parties include,

though are not limited to: the aggregation and
representation of citizens interests, the provision
of a structured vehicle of political participation,
and the translation of policy preferences into
public policies. For more on this see: Ivan
Doherty, Democracy Out of Balance: Civil
Society Cant Replace Political Parties, Policy
Review (April/May 2001), 25-35.

28

programs.10 Whatever their differences,

the ultimate goal of all democracy
promoters is clear: To help strengthen
or reform parties in new or struggling
democracies all around the globe.11
There are a number of ways to work
with parties. A combination of
diplomacy and political party assistance
forms the backbone of US efforts to
promote the democratic development of
Serbias political parties and party
system. While diplomacy aims to
encourage, assistance aims to enable
parties to implement the codes of
conduct conducive to a democratic
political party system. Each year, the
US devotes over 60 million dollars to
political party assistance.12 Such
assistance is meant to bolster parties
organizational structures, teach modern
campaign techniques, and enable
legislative competencies with the
ultimate goal of facilitating the
democratic
process
in
newly
13
democratizing countries To meet these
objectives donors posses a toolkit
10

The six German political party foundations, the

parteienstiftungen, are trendsetters in this regard.
They seek out ideological sister parties abroad in
an effort to assist platform building in manner
more in line with the classically left-right
ideological spectrum witnessed in Europe.
11
Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest
Link: Aiding Political Parties in New
Democracies (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment International Peace, 2006), 77.
12
Thomas Carothers estimates the total figure
spent in 2005 to stand at $68 million. See:
Thomas Carothers, (2006): 85.
13
USAID Political Party Development
Assistance,
United
States
Agency
for
International Development (Washington DC,
1999).

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

consisting of consultancy, commodity

assistance,
trainings,
seminars,
14
workshops, and study tours. In the US
such activities are implemented by the
two US political party institutes: the
International Republican Institute (IRI)
and NDI, both of which receive their
primary support from the United States
Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the National Endowment
for Democracy.
How the US government chooses to
employ diplomatic relations and
political party assistance characterizes
the strategy of engagement to which it
adheres. For parties to which the US
provides
diplomatic
support
in
combination with the full gamut of
political party assistance, we can speak
of full engagement. Where the US opts
to exclude one or more of these tools
and/or to employ them to different
degrees, a policy of limited-engagement
exists. The advantage of a policy of
limited-engagement is that it allows one
to straddle the line between cooperation
and support. When carefully crafted,
diplomacy and political party assistance
may be employed in such a manner as
to qualify as cooperation, rather than
support, thereby thwarting accusations
that the US is sanctioning a given
partys policies. In rare instances, the
US will employ a policy of nonengagement, which entails denying a
party all forms of diplomatic support or
contact and political party assistance.

Figure 1 provides an overview of what I

term the engagement continuum.
Serbian law prohibits political parties
from accepting material and/or financial
assistance from foreign states, foreign
legal entities, and humanitarian
organizations.15 As such, most parties in
Serbia enjoy a form of limited
engagement which includes various
degrees of diplomatic contact and an
array of assistance programs focusing
on
capacity
building,
platform
development, and voter outreach. In
keeping with the cordon sanitaire,
Serbias ultranationalist partiesthe
SRS and the SPSare denied even the
most limited forms of cooperation.
Given that diplomacy and assistance
aim to reform political parties in new
democracies, why are the SRS and SPS
not included in US programs? To
answer this question the following
section examines each of these parties
in greater depth.
The Serbian Radical Party
The SRS was founded in February 1991
as a union of two small, quasioppositional parties; the National
Radical Party and the Serbian Chetnik
Party. At outset, the SRS distinguished
itself from Serbias democratic
opposition by appeasing Serbias
President, Slobodan Milosevic. While
its program was ostensibly one of antiCommunism, the party consistently
15

14

Krishna Kumar, Reflections on International

Party Assistance, Democratization, 12 (August
2005) 4, 505-527.

See Article 6 of the Law on Financing of

Political Parties (Official Gazette of the Republic
of Serbia, No. 72/2003, 18 July and No. 75/2003,
25 July 2003).

29

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

supported the violent expansionist

policies lead by Milosevics SPS. The
partys
pro-regime
sentiments,
combined with its leaders manipulation
of domestic sympathy for the Serb
minority living abroad, ensured that by
1992 the SRS had won 73 of Serbias
250 parliamentary seats.1616The partys
rapid rise to prominence owed much to
the charisma of its leader, Vojislav

16

Vladimir Goati, Partije i Partijksi Sistem u

Srbiji (Belgrade: OGI Centar, 2004), 250.

30

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Figure 1: The Engagement Continuum

(Tool employed)
None

DC

DC & Limited PPA

Non-Engagement

DC and PPA

Limited-Engagement

D.S. & limited PPA

D.S. & PPA

Full-Engagement

(Type of Engagement)
D.C. = Diplomatic Cooperation, D.S. = Diplomatic Support, PPA. = Political Party Assistance
17

Table 1: SRS Results from Republican Parliamentary Elections 1992 - 2007

Elections
No. of MPs
% of total MPs
December 1992
73
29.2
December 1993
39
15.6
September 1997
82
32.8
December 2000
23
9.2
December 2003
82
32,8
182
January 2007
81
32,4
May 2008
77
29,4
17

Ibid, 250. Data after 2004 is drawn from the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID), at http://www.cesid.org/
Although the SRS actually increased its share of the national vote by 1% from 2003 to 2007, legislative reforms lowering the electoral threshold required
for minority parties to enter parliament meant that there were fewer seats to divvy up amongst the non-minority parties. Thus, despite increasing its share of
the vote, the SRS actually lost one seat in parliament.
18

31

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Seselj, whose affinity for nationalist

rhetoric and populist tactics struck a
chord throughout Serbia. By the late1990s the SRS was the party of choice
for many of those who questioned
Milosevics nationalist credentials in
the aftermath of the Dayton Accords.
Strong parliamentary results
in
September 1997 (see table 1) brought
the party executive powers: the SRS
formed a coalition government with
Milosevics SPS and Yugoslav Left; a
party lead by Milosevics wife, Mirjana
Markovic.
The SRSs grip on power was shortlived. Domestic and international
dissatisfaction with the Milosevic
regime culminated in October 2000,
when Milosevic was forced to step
down from the federal Presidency. Proestablishment parties met a similar fate
in the parliamentary elections of
December 2000, with the SRS taking in
just nine percent of the popular vote.
In February 2003 Seselj was indicted
for crimes against humanity and
violations of the laws or customs of war
by the ICTY.1 The charges referred to
two sets of activities: Seseljs close
relationship to the paramilitary group,
the Seseljevci, and his role as a verbal
instigator of war crimes. Despite
Seseljs indictment, the SRS refused to
distance itself from its leader, opting
instead to capitalize on public antipathy
toward the ICTY by toting Seselj as a
19

To see the initial ICTY Indictment against

Seselj,
go
to:
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/sesii030115e.htm.

32

victim of an anti-Serb agenda. With

support for DOS coalition parties
waning, the SRS achieved what the US
government
referred
to
as
a
spectacular victory, becoming by far
the largest party in the Serbian
parliament2, taking in almost 28
percent of the vote in the republican
Parliamentary elections of December
2003.3 Regardless of its success
however, the SRS was unable to
assemble the parliamentary majority
necessary to form a governing coalition.
An alliance between several of Serbias
centrist parties ensured that the SRS
would remain in the opposition. History
repeated itself in January 2007, with the
party taking in 29 percent of the vote,
once again proving unable to form a
governing coalition. Despite the partys
repeated failure to obtain executive
powers, Vojislav Seselj remains the
formal president of the SRS.
Seseljs leadership is not the only
source of continuity within the party.
On each of the most pressing political
issues the partys views remain
identical to those it held over a decade
ago. In fact, the SRS party program
issued in 1996remains virtually
unaltered to this day. Thus, the party is
(officially) opposed to transatlantic
22
integration 4, insists that Kosovo
20

Woehrel (2006), 4.
The partys greatest competitor at the time,
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunicas DSS,
received just 18 percent of the vote.
22
It should be noted that the SRS has wavered in
its opposition to transatlantic integration, in
particular its stance towards EU membership.
(See for example: Jovan Komsic, Politicke
21

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

remain an integral part of Serbian

territory, denounces the ambitions of
the ICTY, denies Serbias complicity in
the atrocities of the Yugoslav wars, and
maintains territorial ambitions beyond
23
Serbias recognized borders .5 Indeed,
as Sabrina Ramet notes, the fact that
the neo-fascist SRS remains the
most popular party in Serbia continues
to shed doubt on the direction of
24
Serbias democratic trajectory .6
stranke u Srbiji i evropske vrednosti programi i
praksa in: Zoran Lutovac, Politicke Stranke u
Srbiji I Evropska Unija (Belgrade:Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2007), 9-49.) In 2003, SRS Deputy
Tomislav Nikolic stated that he fully supported
EU membership. Again, in March 2007 he
proclaimed himself not to be opposed to EU
membership. In May 2007 Nikolic reversed his
stance on the issue, expressing his transformation
from a mere Euro-skeptic to a full-scale EU
opponent. See: Nikolic: State of Emergency
Could Put off Elections, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
10
May
2007,
available at:
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b100507
_e.html#N2. In recent months, the partys position
has proven inconsistent, to say the least. During
the run-up to Presidential elections in 2008,
Nikolic campaigned on a moderately pro-EU
platform, stating that Serbias relationship with
Russia need not preclude EU membership.
Throughout the campaign, however, he was
adamant that Serbias interests in Kosovo would
prohibit EU accession; should the EU accept
Kosovos independence, Serbia would refuse EU
membership. Following Kosovos declaration of
independence in February 2008, the SRS
leadership was a vocal critic of select EU member
states decision to recognize the declaration. It is
worth noting that a similar position was also taken
by Serbias Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica,
president of the Democratic Party of Serbia.
23
These views were reiterated in Seseljs political
testament, released in late 2006.
24
Sabrina Ramet, The Denial Syndrome and its
Consequences: Serbian Political Culture Since
2000, Communist and Postcommunist Studies 40
(2007), 41-58, 48.

Socialist Party of Serbia

The founding of the SPS predates that
of its ultranationalist counterpart. In the
summer of 1990, the League of
Communists of Serbia merged with the
small, left-leaning Socialist Alliance of
Working People in Serbia to form the
Socialist Party of Serbia. Whereas the
political successors of communist
regimes had generally fared poorly
against their pro-democratic opponents
throughout Central and Eastern Europe
(with the notable exceptions of Bulgaria
and Romania), in Serbia the collapse of
the communist party was in name only.
The SPS proved victorious in Serbias
first-ever post-communist elections,
winning 77.6 percent of seats in
parliament (see table 2). Although it
failed to attain a majority of votes
caste, the partys lead was decisive: its
nearest opponent, the Serbian Renewal
Movement (SPO), received 16 percent
of the vote or 8 percent of seats in
parliament.
The SPSs electoral success stemmed
from its origins in the communist party.
The monopoly on state institutions and
national infrastructure that had once
belonged to the League of Communists
of Serbia was simply transferred to the
SPS. Slobodan Milosevic, the partys
charismatic leader, exploited this
advantage to its fullest. It was largely in
this manner that the SPS sustained its
predominant position in parliament
throughout the 1990s.

33

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Table 2: SPS Results from Republican Elections 1990 - 2007

Elections
December 1990
December 1992
December 1993
26
September 1997 2
December 2000
December 2003
January 2007
27
May 2008 3

25

251

No. of MPs
194
101
123
110
37
22
16
20

Goati (2004), 250. All data after 2004 were drawn from www.cesid.org.
The SPS ran for office in coalition with JUL and New Democracy.
27
The SPS ran for office in coalition with United Serbia and United Pensioners Party.
26

34

% of total MPs
77.6
40.4
49.2
44.0
14.8
8.8
6.4
7.6

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

The relationship between the SRSthe

embodiment of Serb nationalismand
the SPSthe successor of the
communist partyis something of a
paradox. Though not always symbiotic
(in late 1994 Milosevic even had Seselj
imprisoned), the two parties found
common ground on Serbias so-called
national question. Writes Ognjen
Pribicevic, although ideologically
almost poles apart, Milosevic and Seselj
shared very similar, sometimes
identical, approaches to most of the
problems related to the breakdown of
the Socialist Federated Republic of
28
Yugoslavia 1 More often than not,
Seselj provided the mouthpiece for
policies supported by Milosevic. By
virtue of its association with its founder
and President, the SPS should therefore
not be considered any less nationalistic
than its right-wing counterpart. Indeed,
the partys ultranationist sentiments
were on display when in May 1999 the
ICTY launched what would be the first
of three indictments against Milosevic
for war crimes committed throughout
the territories of the former Yugoslavia.
Like the SRS, the SPS refused to break
ties with its leader, despite his
extradition to The Hague in June 2001.
It was only after Milosevics passing in
March 2006 that the party elected a new
president, Ivica Dacic. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the party chose to
commemorate Milosevic as a hero,

28

Ognjen Pribicevic, Changing Fortunes of the

Serbian Radical Right in The Radical Right in
Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, ed.
Sabrina Ramet (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1999), 193-212.

whose aims were those of defending

29
the Serbian people.
Like the SRS, the policies of the SPS
have exhibited remarkable continuity
since October 2000. Although the party
introduced new programs in 2002 and
2006, its positions on the most pressing
political issues, including the so-called
national question and cooperation with
the
ICTY remain substantively
30
unaltered.
During the run-up to
Presidential elections in January 2008,
the SPS candidate, Milutin Mrkonjic
publicly stating that armed intervention
in Kosovo was a legitimate means of
defending state sovereignty. In his
words, We will defend every citizen of
Kosovo by arms.314In the aftermath of
Kosovos declaration of independence,
the partys president, Ivica Dacic, went
so far as to propose national legislation
explicitly
forbidding
domestic
organizations, political parties included,
from recognizing the territorys claims.
325
Indeed, whatever the partys

29

Dacic Takes over Socialist Party, B-92 Radio

and Television, 4 December 2006, available at:
http://194.109.152.234/eng/news/comments.php?
nav_id=38375.
30
See for example: Programska Deklaracija
Sedmog Kongresa SPS, Socialist Party of
Serbia,
2006,
available
at:
http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/progdekl7.pdf.
31
As quoted in: Mrkonjic: Branicemo gradjane
Kosova, b92 Radio and Television, January 15,
2008,
available
at:
http://xs4.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=200
8&mm=01&dd=15&nav_id=280668.
32
SPS Zabraniti one sto priznaju, B92 Radio
and Television, Febuary 18, 2008, available at:
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=20

35

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

rhetorical moderation, the SPSs

perspective on the Yugoslav wars and
Serbias conduct therein has changed
little since October 2000. Only when
the partys stances on such issues are
upturned,
will
the
label
ultranationalist lose its validity.
Considering these parties past and
current practices, it comes as little
surprise
that
the
established
democracies hesitate to embrace them
as potential harbingers of a peaceful,
democratic Serbia. That the US goes so
far as to employ a cordon sanitaire is
more so in light of its overriding aim to
support democratic transformation in
Serbia. Why, after all, refuse contact
with ultranationalist parties if doing so
might possibly bring about prodemocratic reforms within the party?
Why not attempt to make these parties
safe for democracy? The following
section answers these questions by
assessing the goals underlying US
policy towards the SRS and SPS.
The goals of the cordon sanitaire: Is it
working?
US policy towards the Western Balkans
is rooted in the desire to achieve peace
and stability after a legacy of violent
33.
conflict and ethnic-strife 6 Central to
such aims are efforts to mitigate the
power of ultranationalist forces (parties
among them), bolster liberal democratic
development, and finally, facilitate the
08&mm=02&dd=18&nav_category=640&nav_id
=285339.
33
Woerhol (2006).

36

regions future within a united Europe.

Bearing these overarching goals in
mind, what purposes might the cordon
sanitaire serve? The following list
includes goals which were explicitly
articulated during my discussions with
US representatives working in Serbia,
as well as those which logically stem
from the broader context of US policy
in the Western Balkans. Such goals
include:
Decreasing popular support
for ultranationalist parties: To
lessen the likelihood that either the
SPS or SRS enter government, the
US may seek to ensure that public
support for the parties decreases or,
at the very least, does not increase.
By erecting the cordon sanitaire
the US sends a very clear message
to Serbian voters that an SRS/SPSlead government would leave
Serbia politically isolated.
Keeping
ultranationalist
parties out of power: By denying
diplomatic contacts and political
party assistance to ultranationalist
parties, the US signals the
consequences likely to follow
cross-party cooperation with these
groups. In demonstrating its
antipathy towards ultranationalism,
the US hopes to prevent centerright parties (namely the DSS)
from establishing a coalition
government which would provide
ultranationalist
forces
with
executive control.

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Limiting
ultranationalist
parties influence on policymaking:
In outlining its aversion to
ultranationalist parties, the US may
also seek to lessen the extent to
which these parties programmatic
preferences impact upon Serbian
policy. The isolation of Serbias
ultranationalists could potentially
serve to undermine their base of
support, thereby challenging their
grip
on
Serbias
political
transformation.
Inciting
change
within
ultranationalist
parties:
By
isolating ultranationalist parties, the
US tacitly conditions its assistance
on programmatic and ideological
reform within these parties. Having
been refused US assistance and
cooperation, it is clear to SRS and
SPS representatives that unless
they reject ultranationalism, they
will continue to be ostracized by
the international community.
Maintaining
ideological
distance from ultranationalism: By
denying US assistance and contacts
to the SRS and SPS, the cordon
sanitaire may likewise seek to
highlight US opposition to
ultranationalism. In refusing to
communicate with these parties,
the US sends a clear message that it
opposes a politics based on ethnic
exclusion.
In sum, it is conceivable that in its
desire to bring peace and stability to the
Western Balkans, the US employs the

cordon sanitaire to serve a variety of

purposes, each aimed at eliminating the
relevance
and
prevalence
of
ultranationalist forces. The goals
sketched above are therefore directed at
cross-cutting levels: the Serb electorate,
the party system as such, the republican
parliament, ultranationalist parties
themselves, and the US public at large.
Given that the cordon sanitaire likely
serves an amalgamation of the
aforementioned purposes, to what
extent are its goals being met? The
following pages examine each of these
goals in greater depth.
Decreasing
support
ultranationalist parties

for

Perhaps the chief aim of the cordon

sanitaire is that of quelling further
support for Serbias ultranationalist
parties. Were this goal being met, one
would
expect
support
for
ultranationalist parties to stagnate and,
ideally, decrease, in the aftermath of the
policys implementation. The evidence
indicates that the policys record is
mixed in this regard.
If comparing the evolution of the
parties cumulative popular support
from the date of regime change
(October 5, 2000) to today, we see that
the policy has been largely ineffective:
the parties cumulative share of votes in
both parliamentary and presidential
elections, as well as these parties
combined share of seats in parliament,
has increased since the policy was first
implemented in 2000 (see figure 2).
Although
Serbias
ultranationalist
37

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Figure 2: Combined SRS/SPS Party Strength 1990-2008341

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10

Combined shareofvotes for

SRS/SPSinparliamentaryelections

Combined shareofvotes for

SRS/SPScandidatesin1stround of
presidentialelections

5
0

Combined shareofSRS/SPSseatsin
parliament

2000

34

2003/2004

2007

2008

The Presidential elections held in September 2000 were at a Federal level, as opposed to the Republican level. It should also be noted that in the
parliamentary elections of May 2008 the SPS competed in coalition with two small parties. As such, the share of votes for the SRS and SPS in parliamentary
elections is slightly lower than is reflected in this graph. All data concerning election results were drawn from Goati (2004), 250 and CESID, available at:
www.cesid.org.

38

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Figure 3: Combined SRS/SPS Party Strength from 1990-2000 and 2000-2008352

80
Combinedshareofvotesfor
SRS/SPSinparliamentary
elections

70
60
50

Combinedshareofvotesfor
SRS/SPScandidatesin1st
Roundofpresidential
elections

40
30
20

CombinedshareofSRS/SPS
seatsinparliament

10
0
19902000

35

20002008

All data concerning election results were drawn from Goati (2004), 250 and CESID, available at: www.cesid.org.

39

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

parties fared minor cumulative losses

from 2003/2004 to 2007/2008, the
parties
recently
experienced
a
significant turn of fortunes in Serbias
Presidential elections held in January
2008, with their support increasing by
more than ten percentage points. This
suggests that the implementation of the
cordon sanitaire has failed not only to
diminish support for ultranationalist
parties but also to stabilize that support
at more modest levels.
If, however, the post-communist period
is viewed in its entirety (and the results
of 2000 are taken to represent an
anomaly), the outlook is less somber.
As figure 3 demonstrates, the combined
share of votes for the SRS and SPS in
parliamentary elections has decreased
considerably from 1990 to the present.
From 1990-2000 the combined share of
votes for the SRS and SPS in
parliamentary elections averaged 52.6
percent, while from 2000-2008 that
figure was just 40.6. Viewed in terms of
seats in parliament, from 1990 2000
the SRS and SPS occupied a combined
average of 72.2 percent of seats in
parliament, as compared to 2000-2008
when they held an average of just 34.8
percent of seats in parliament. There
has also been a cumulative decrease in
support for SRS and SPS presidential
candidates.
Unfortunately, such divergent findings
are ultimately inconclusive. While, on
the
one
hand,
support
for
ultranationalist forces has risen since
the policy was first implemented in
2000, it has diminished, in some cases
40

considerably, since the 1990s. This

speaks to a mixed record of success in
what is perhaps the policys chief goal.
Keeping ultranationalist parties out
of power
At the time of writing, more than seven
years have passed since Milosevic left
office and Serbias ultranationalist
parties have yet to regain control of the
republics executive branch. Despite
strong public support for the SRS, the
party has failed to reassume executive
powers. Likewise, the SPS has yet to
partake in a coalition government. This
indicates that at least one goal of the
cordon sanitaire; that of effectively
sidelining Serbias ultranationalists, has
been met.
On the surface, this is irrefutable. As of
May 2008, the SRS and the SPS have
failed either to form a coalition
government or to obtain the Serbian
presidency36. To date, the closest these
parties have come to executive control
was the silent support the SPS provided
the government of the DSS, the G17
Plus, the Serbian Renewal Movement,
and New Serbia. It is noteworthy,
however, that the election results of
May 11, 2008 have provided Serbias
ultranationalists
with
their first
opportunity to form a post-Milosevic
government.
Although
coalition
negotiations were still ongoing at the
time of writing, the SRS and SPS
coalition had already achieved what had
hitherto been beyond reach: a pledge of
support from Kostunicas DSS. In fact,
less than 24 hours after the election

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

results were announced, DSS and SRS

spokesmen confirmed that the two
parties were engaged in coalition
negotiations37.1 By May 13just two
days after parliamentary elections were
stagedthe parties announced that they
had drafted an agreement laying out the
character and goals of Serbias next
national government38.2 Were the
SPS coalition to agree to these terms,
Serbias ultranationalists would have
the number of mandates necessary to
form a governing majority. Such an
alliance would place executive powers
in ultranationalist hands.
By all accounts, the results of the May
11 elections have crowned the SPS as
the next governments kingmaker. It
is uncertain whether they will chose to
form a government with the SRS and
DSS or opt instead to forge an alliance
with the DS-lead coalition, For a
European Serbia. Regardless of their
options, two things are now clear: 1) the
DSS no longer opposes a republicanlevel
alliance
with
Serbias
ultranationalists, and 2) the next
Serbian government will most likely
include at least one ultranationalist
party: the SPS. Neither of these speaks
to the cordon sanitaires success.

Limiting ultranationalist
influence on Serbian policy

parties

Intimately
connected
with
the
aforementioned goals is that of limiting
ultranationalist parties influence on
Serbian policy. The cordon sanitaire
has been less successful in this regards.
Perhaps the clearest indication hereof is
offered by Freedom Houses Nations in
Transit Index. As figure 4 illustrates,
Serbias transition to liberal democracy
stagnated in the midst of 2002. This
period corresponds to an upsurge in
popular
support
for
Serbias
ultranationalist parties, which briefly
ebbed after Djindjics assassination in
March 2003 but increased markedly in
the months thereafter39.3
As a consequence of ultranationalists
resurgence, the DSS-led government
did not command the votes necessary to
pass legislation on its own. To get its
proposals accepted by parliament, it
depended on the support on the
opposition, including Serbias extremist
parties. According to the ICG, The
Kostunica government has also had to
rely covertly on that extremist party
[the SRS] to pass several key laws and
has often acted as though it were a
coalition partner. 40 Serbias first postMilosevic constitution adopted in 2006

37

DSS, SRS discuss next cabinet, b92 Radio

and Television, May 12, 2008, available at:
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politicsarticle.php?mm=5&dd=12&yyyy=2008.
38
Radicals, DSS come up with draft
agreement, b92 Radio and Television, May 13,
2008,
available
at:
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politicsarticle.php?mm=5&dd=13&yyyy=2008.

39

For polling data pertaining to popular support

for Serbian political parties during this period,
see: Strategic Marketing Research, available at:
http://www.smmri.co.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=65
.
40
International Crisis Group, Serbia Spinning its
Wheels, Europe Briefing, 39 (23 May 2005), 2.

41

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Figure 4: Freedom Houses Nations in Transit Score for Serbia41

4,5
4
3,5
3
2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5
0
2001

41

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Nations in Transit examines the process of democratic reform in the post-communist states of Europe and Eurasia. Countries are given a score from 1 to 7,
1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of progress (Freedom House 2007).

42

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

is exemplary of this phenomenon. Not

only has autonomy to the Serbian
province of Vojvodina been limited, but
it has become considerably easier for
authorities to call a state of emergency,
and the independence of the judiciary
has been compromised. There is in fact
little doubt that the constitution was the
product of a bargain between the DS,
the DSS, the SRS, and the SPS.421

awarded lucrative posts in state-owned

firms as well as positions in public
service. There is thus little doubt the
third goal of the cordon sanitaire, that
of limiting ultranationalists influence
on Serbian policy, has not been
achieved.

Of perhaps even greater significance for

Serbias tardy trajectory was the silent
support the SPS provided to the
Kostunica government. In 2004, the
DSS-lead coalition formed a minority
government. To achieve the majority
necessary for a working quorum, the
coalition depended on the silent support
of the SPS. It goes without saying that
SPS support did not come without
concessions. It was thus reportedly
under SPS pressure that the government
halted forcible (i.e. involuntary)
extraditions to the ICTY43.2 Likewise, it
was thanks to SPS demands that the
governing coalition supported the
controversial Law on the Rights of
Indictees in the Custody of the
International Criminal Tribunal and
Members of their Families, entitling
Serbian indictees and their families to
free
legal
representation,
accommodation in The Hague, and
travel to and from the Netherlands.
Additionally, SPS representatives were

The cordon sanitaire has had even less

success in facilitating transformation
within ultranationalist parties. Although
there is a marked decrease in
inflammatory rhetoric, neither the SRS
nor
SPS
has
abandoned
its
ultranationalist sentiments. Both parties
renounce cooperation with the ICTY,
refuse to admit to Serbias complicity in
atrocities conducted
during the
Yugoslav wars, and have yet to
renounce the use of violence in Kosovo.
Thus, the SRS adheres to the same
party program that it did in 1996443 and
its party magazine is tellingly entitled
Velika Srbija (Greater Serbia). In fact
the most radical version of SRS
nationalism was put forth by Vojislav
Seselj as late as 2006. In his political
testament, Seselj instructed party
members never to abandon their pursuit
of a Greater Serbia and to persistently
fight to free Republika Srpska Krajina
and Republika Srpska and to unite all
Serbian territories.45 The SPS, for its
part, has publicly stated that violence is

Inciting
change
ultranationalist parties

within

42

International Crisis Group. Serbias New

Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards,
Europe Briefing, 44 (8 November 2006), 4.
43
Despite this policy, the voluntary nature of
DSS-lead extraditions, including that of General
Sretan Lukic, was in question.

44

Jovan Komsic (2006): 15.

Seseljs
testament
available
at:
http://www.srpskinacionalisti.com/sadrzaj.php?tip
=ves&is117328.
45

43

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

a legitimate means to maintain Serb

sovereignty in Kosovo and most
recently supported legislation which
would effectively deny domestic
organizations the freedom to recognize
Kosovos independence. A key
indicator
of
these
parties
ultranationalist sentiments can be
witnessed in parliament, which both
parties regularly exploit as a platform
from which to hurl rhetorical abuse at
colleagues from opposing parties. One
widely reported example took place in
late 2006, during the parliamentary
proceedings for the nomination of
Serbias Deputy Prime Minister. SRS
parliamentarian Zoran Krasic publically
branded the G17 Plus nominee, Ivana
Dulic-Markovic, as an Ustasha46.5 The
SRS proceeded to launch a virulent
campaign against Dulic-Markovic,
repeatedly questioning her loyalty to the
Serbian state, as well as that of her
brother and father. Indeed, both SRS
and SPS MPs regularly resort to
slanderous rhetoric, profanity, and
similarly provocative behavior.
To be sure, the parties are also
entertaining modest, if cosmetic,
reforms. In recent years, each party has
sought to target its public relations
effort at the so-called losers of
Serbias
transition.
Without
substantively altering their policy
46

Ustasha refers to a nationalist organization

aimed at securing independent statehood for
Croats. They came to power briefly in World War
Two, having allied with the Nazis. They are
accused of large scale atrocities against Serbs and
other minorities, including the establishment of
numerous concentration camps.

44

preferences, the parties now emphasize

socioeconomic issues such as pension
reform, privatization, and college
tuition fees, rather than high-profile
(and highly divisive) issues such as the
Greater Serbia project or cooperation
with the ICTY. According to the SRSs
socioeconomic program, for example,
the fight against corruption and
criminals ranks highest amongst its list
of concerns47.6 During his Presidential
campaign, the SRS candidate, Tomislav
Nikolic, even refrained from wearing
the standard party badge depicting a
portrait of Vojislav Seselj. According to
Nikolic, doing so would have served to
divide Serbs; as a presidential
candidate, his intention was to represent
Serbia in its entirety. As for the SPS, it
eagerly portrays itself as a run-of-themill left-of-center European party. As
one member stated, We are a left
party. We want to be included in the left
parties of Europe. Every country needs
a party to take care of the losers of
transition. 48 7 The SPS has also gone
to great lengths to stress its proEuropean
orientation.
It
thus
emphasizes its support for EU
membership and has been markedly less
emphatic about its opposition to NATO
membership.
Unfortunately, such changes remain
only skin-deep. Whatever its claim to
European ideals, members of the
Socialist
International
were
47

Party program as listed on the website of the

Serbian Radical Party.
48
Dejan Backovic, Socialist Party of Serbia,
interview conducted on 10 February 2007 in
Belgrade, Serbia.

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

unconvinced by the SPSs selfprofessed transformation; its application

for membership was denied on the
grounds of the partys unrepentant
ultranationalism and its leading role in
the Yugoslav wars. Moreover, despite
these parties alleged aversion to
corruption and criminality, past
practices on the part of the SRS and
SPS call the veracity of such statements
into question49.8 And, as stated above,
the parties positions on the so-called
national
question,
including
cooperation with the ICTY, have gone
unchanged. Clearly then, the fourth goal
of the cordon sanitaire, that of inciting
change within ultranationalist parties,
has gone unmet.
Maintaining ideological distance
The final goal of the cordon sanitaire is
that of indicating US disapproval of
ultranationalism. As regards this goal,
there is little doubt that it has been
achieved. Indeed, few have reason to
doubt the sincerity of this conviction or
the scope of the schism between US and
ultranationalist policies. On virtually all
fronts, US and SRS/SPS policies are
irreconcilable: Where these parties
officials
regularly
invoke
the
Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line US
representatives consistently condemn
49

The links between both parties to Serbias

underworld has been well documented. See for
example, Maja Miljkvic and Marko Attila Hoare,
Crime and the Economy under Milosevic and his
Successors, in Sabrina Ramet, Serbia since
1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and
After (London: University of Washington Press,
2007), 192-226.

the Greater Serbia project50.9 While the

US was one of the foremost advocates
of an independent Kosovo, the SRS and
SPS continue to insist on Serbias
territorial continuity. By refusing to
devote taxpayers money to the
establishment of contacts with or the
provision of assistance to Serbias
ultranationalists, the US has sent a clear
signal that such positions will not be
supported by the US administration.
Conclusion
In light of the assessment laid out
above, what course of action should US
democracy promoters take when it
comes to ultranationalist parties in
Serbia and the Western Balkans at
large? Should they maintain the status
quo or has the time come to consider
possible alternatives to the cordon
sanitaire?
As we have seen, in Serbia the policy
can claim modest successes. Two goals
of isolationism have thus far been met:
at the time of writing, neither the SRS
nor the SPS has gained hold of the
executive branch and ideological
distance from ultranationalism has been
attained.
Both
are
reputable
achievements: executive powers would
enable ultranationalists to determine the
course of Serbian politics, while its
condemnation
of
ultranationalism
provides the US with clear moral
authority. Unfortunately, the policys
50

The line is a euphemism for the Greater Serbia

project referring to the geographical borders of a
united Serbian nation.

45

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

successes end there. The goal of

lessening support for ultranationalist
parties has been only vaguely realized.
Compared to the support these parties
boasted in the 1990s, their popularity
has waned considerably. Yet since the
implementation of the policy in 2000,
support for these parties has actually
increased, so much so that few would
deny their corrosive impact on Serbias
liberal democratic trajectory. Notably,
two of the policys goals have not been
realized:
apart
from
cosmetic
alterations,
both parties exhibit
remarkable
continuity
with
the
Milosevic era and, despite their lack of
access to the executive branch, both
parties continue to exert pressures on
national policymaking. Such failures
are significant, not least because of the
growing likelihood of an SRS-DSS-SPS
alliance
and
the
numerous
consequences such a government would
have on Serbias international standing.
Table 3: Goals Met and Unmet5110
Goal
Result
Decreased party strength
2
Lack of power52 11
3
Policy influence
1
Change within party
1
Maintaining distance
3
Total 10

After all, when in May 2007 Nikolic

was appointed Speaker of Parliament,
the repercussions hereof were more
than rhetorical: the Serbian Dinar fell to
record lows against the Euro and the
Belgrade Stock Exchange declined
dramatically. Thus, if tallying the totals
of successes and failures, one is forced
to conclude that there is ample room for
improvement (see table 3).
As has been demonstrated, the policys
inability either to promote change
within ultranationalist parties or to
negate their impact on national policy is
worrisome, not least because the
direction of Serbias transition remains
so precarious. It is telling that an
increasingly vocal group of US
government officials and assistance
providers doubt the wisdom of
maintaining this policy. One USAID
official based in Serbia remarked that,
Personally, I think that we should be
reviewing that policy. 5312 Indeed, for
many of those working in Serbia, the
policy seems untenable, with one
USAID employee calling the policy
ridiculous 5413 and another silly 54.14
Whatever the policys successes, its
failures call its relevance into question.
The task now is to devise a policy that
would exert a moderating influence on
Serbias ultranationalist parties, without

51

3 = goal achieved, 2 = state of ambiguity, 1 =

goal unachieved. A score of 15 would represent
total success and a score of 5 total failure. The
score of 10 places the policy precisely in the
middle, reflecting a state of overall ambiguity.
52
At the time of writing, the SPS was on the
verge of forming a coalition with either the SRS
or the DS. Should they form either such coalition,
this score would decrease.

46

53

Anonymous, USAID Belgrade, interview

conducted in Belgrade, Serbia on March 2, 2007.
54
Anonymous, USAID Belgrade, interview
conducted in Belgrade, Serbia on June 21, 2007.
55
Anonymous, USAID Economics and
Governance Office, interview conducted in
Belgrade, Serbia on March 15, 2007.

CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

compromising the achievements that

have thus far been made.

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