UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON, 2014

LAW SCHOOL

TELECOM SECTOR REFORM FOR ESSENTIAL FACILITATES IN WEST AFRICA: A

CASE STUDY OF THE CABLE CONSORTIUM OF LIBERIA (CCL)

CANDIDATE NUMBER
25268961

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE

REQUIREMENTS FOR LLM (INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
TELECOMMUNIATIONS LAW) BY DISTANCE LEARNING

WORD COUNT
14,659

THIS DISSERTATION IS ALL MY OWN WORK.

REFERENCE TO, QUOTATION FROM, AND
DISCUSSION OF THE WORK OF ANY OTHER PERSON
HAS BEEN CORRECTLY ACKNOWLEDGED WITHIN THE WORK

Declaration of Authors Rights

The copyright of this dissertation belongs to the author under the terms of the United
Kingdom Copyright Act as qualified by University of Southampton Regulations.

Due

acknowledgment must always be made of the use of any materials contained in, or derived
from, this dissertation.

Acknowledgments

And unto man he said, Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from
evil is understanding. Job 28:28

Sincere thanks and appreciation are due Madam Angelique Weeks, Chairperson of the
Liberia Telecommunications Authority (LTA) and the Board of Commissioners of the LTA
for the scholarship provided to earn this degree. I am indeed grateful!

Special thanks also go to Professor Ian J. Lloyd, Program Director and Project Supervisor,
Professor David Mellor, Lecturer, and all the other Faculty members of the Department with
whom I interacted and provided guidance along this academic voyage. Your collective
patience, wisdom and efforts were appreciated and have been worthwhile.

This work is dedicated to my late parents, Moses and Nora Howard, who taught me that, to
whom much is given much, is expected!

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments................................................................................................................................... 2
Chapter 1: Purpose and Progress of Telecom Sector Reform ................................................................. 5
1.0
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Purpose of Telecommunications Sector Reform................................................................................. 7
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 12
2.0
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 12
2.1 The Role of Telecommunications Sector Reform ............................................................................. 14
2.2 The Doctrine of Essential Facilities .................................................................................................. 20
2.3 Counter Essential Facilities Arguments ........................................................................................ 24
Chapter 3: Telecommunications Sector Reform in West Africa........................................................... 28
3.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 28
3.1 Regional Telecommunications Development ................................................................................... 29
3.2 Telecom Sector Reform within ECOWAS ....................................................................................... 32
3.2.1 World Bank Support ............................................................................................................ 33
3.2.2 ITU Support ......................................................................................................................... 36
4.0 Case Study of the Cable Consortium of Liberia (CCL) .................................................................. 41
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 41
4.2 Liberias Telecom Sector Reform ..................................................................................................... 43
4.3 The Cable Consortium of Liberia (CCL) .......................................................................................... 50
4.4 Remedies for CCLs Dominance ...................................................................................................... 53
4.5 Analysis............................................................................................................................................. 55
5.0 Chapter 5: Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 57
5.1 Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 57
5.2 Recommendations ............................................................................................................................. 58

Table of Figures
Figure 1: 2013 Regional Internet penetration rates ................................................................................. 6
Figure 2: Growth in mobile-cellular subscriptions ................................................................................. 7
Figure 3: Regulating Fixed-lines........................................................................................................... 19
Figure 4: Incentive regulation and growth in mobile services .............................................................. 19
Figure 5: Concept of Essential Facilities .............................................................................................. 21
Figure 6: Economic Community of West African States...................................................................... 28
Figure 7: West Africa's Undersea Cables ............................................................................................. 32
Figure 8: Map of Liberia ....................................................................................................................... 41
Figure 9: Liberia's fixed and mobile growth rates ................................................................................ 43
Figure 10: Decline in Liberia's fixed-line infrastructure ....................................................................... 45
Figure 11: Market Analysis process...................................................................................................... 52

List of Tables
Table 1: Privatization revenues per sector .............................................................................................. 6
3

Table 2: . Privatization revenues by sector, 1990-98 ............................................................................ 10

Table 3: Regional Integration and Membership Arrangements in West Africa ................................... 29
Table 4: Telecom performance indicators for ECOWAS & Mauritania .............................................. 31
Table 5: Status of ECOWAS Regulatory Instruments 2002/2003 ........................................................ 36
Table 6: Demographic and economic indicators for Liberia ................................................................ 42
Table 7: World Bank telecom technical assistance program to the NTGL ........................................... 44
Table 8: Liberia's GSM networks ......................................................................................................... 47
Table 9: LTA 2008 Interconnection price caps .................................................................................... 48
Table 10: Value-chain of related markets relevant to the CCL ............................................................ 53
Table 11: Proposed remedies for CCLs dominance ............................................................................ 54
Table 12: Equivalent price per E1 per month (US$) based on capacity commitment .......................... 54
Table 13: WARCIP Liberia Project M&E Results ............................................................................... 56

Chapter 1: Purpose and Progress of Telecom Sector Reform

1.0 Introduction

The growth in the telecommunications/ICT sector over the last decade has been phenomenal,
with amazing statistics for 2014:

Almost 7 billion mobile-cellular subscriptions world-wide with 3/4 of all

subscriptions from the developing world;

96% global mobile-cellular penetration rates expected - 90% from developing

countries and 69% for Africa;

2.3 billion mobile-broadband subscriptions with 55% from developing countries;

32% global mobile-broadband penetration expected, double the penetration rate of

2011 and four times as high as 2009;

3 billion people, almost 40% of the worlds population, using the Internet with 2/3 of
users from the developing world;

20% of Africas population online by end of 2014, up from 10% in 2010; and,

44% of global households with Internet access and 31% of households in developing
countries connected.1

In 2014 the volume of international traffic reflecting Internet, voice, and data in Liberia grew
to 2.93 Kb/s per person, Internet penetration rate is 3.72%, and access to telephone service,
both

fixed

and

cellular,

58.83%.2

Developing

countries

that

implemented

ICT/telecommunications sector reforms between 1990 and 2001 attracted more investments
in telecommunications than in any other sector; totaling $331 billion of private investment.3

Table 1: Privatization revenues per sector

Figure 1: 2013 Regional Internet penetration rates

Source: ITU

In 2005, global penetration for fixed mobile-cellular subscriptions was 33.9%, penetration for
active mobile-broadband subscriptions were unavailable, global fixed (wired)-broadband
subscriptions were 3%, households with Internet access 18.4% and only 15.8% of individuals
globally used the Internet.4 In 2001, Liberias fixed-line penetration was 0.1%, mobilecellular subscriptions 5%, with no fixed or mobile-broadband subscriptions and no household
Internet access.5
6

Figure 2: Growth in mobile-cellular subscriptions

The remarkably success of ICTs in Africa over the past decade has been driven by sector
reform; especially in the mobile market segment, resulting in improved availability, quality
and reduced cost of connectivity. Continent wide policy changes triggered reforms in the
telecommunications sector and how investments are financed; making telecommunications
unique among infrastructure sectors in Africa. The shift from politically driven decisionmaking to rules-based technocratic methods has increased investor confidence and allowed
the development of competition, greatly increasing the performance of Africas ICT sector.6

1.1 Purpose of Telecommunications Sector Reform

Globally, telecommunications has transformed from a public utility industry immersed in

natural monopoly rights to a strategic investment required for competitive advantages at the
national, regional and firm levels.7 Recognition of information as an economic commodity
needed as a factor of production has been a key factor driving this transformation.
Information is increasingly an economic commodity combined with the globalization of

capital flows and trade. Resulting economic activities have generated greater consumer
demand for diverse, higher quality and cheaper communications and information services.8
Rapid advances in telecommunications technology have changed cost structures of the sector
and related industries by reducing the cost of information transmission and processing;
making the provision of a wider range of communications facilities and services possible at
greatly reduced costs.9

Telecommunications services are widely consumed and regarded as essential public social
requirements for the effective performance of the economy. They constitute a significant
percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), are critical intermediary inputs for other
economic sectors, and are major determinants of the production cost and competiveness of
national economies. Accordingly, the presence of limited utility operators raises immediate
concerns about monopoly inefficiencies, abuse of market power and restrictions of freedom
of choice.10

The transformation of the telecommunications, computer and audio-visual industries by

digital technology heightened global concerns and created the information society. The
ability of nations to access, process and produce information efficiently became a necessity
for remaining competitive.11 Access to global markets and customers became a vital
requirement to remain at the forefront of the global information society and open network
access a prerequisite for successful development and continued competiveness.12

Economic stimulation and the need to attract investment in telecommunications infrastructure

catalysed governments to pursue telecommunications liberalization.13 Monopolistic and
monolithic telecom markets required transformation to introduce and safeguard some

measure of competition. The entrenched competitive positions of incumbent monopolies

necessitated urgent steps to prevent the perpetuation of public monopolies in the private
sector.14 The following issues required attention:

Identifying services/facilities, for economic or political reasons, to remain monopoly

based;

Determining rules governing competitive interactions between monopoly providers

and private operators;

Developing institutional arrangements to:

Monitor and enforce rules;
Resolve disputes amongst parties; and,
Review and amend rules and dispute resolution mechanisms as necessary? 15

Liberalization and telecommunications sector reform formed part of a broader economic

reform process initiated in the 1980s, influenced by the recognition of the importance of
pervasive access to telecommunications in promoting social and economic development.
While the goals of liberalization differ nationally, they are broadly classified as follows:

Interpretation of neoliberal ideology among decision making elites as a justification

for less state intervention;

1980s debt crisis and global recession justified scaling down the public sector burden
on the state, raising revenues through sale of state-owned operators and licensing new
operators;

The growing multilateral trading system and inclusion of basic telecommunications in

the WTOs General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) committing countries to
telecom sector liberalization;

Integration into the global economy required advanced telecommunications

infrastructure for attracting investment and maintaining national competitiveness;

The underperformance of the sector; and,

Rethinking economies of scale in telecommunications.16

These factors, combined with a revolution in telecommunications technology, resulted in a

global pursuit of telecommunications privatization, liberalization and regulatory reform in the
1990s unparalleled to any technological led reform since the beginning of the century. 17

Table 2: . Privatization revenues by sector, 1990-98

This dissertation shall examine telecommunications sector reform with an emphasis on the
liberalization of access to essential facilities and how the reforms have been applied within
the West African context, using Liberia as a case study. Chapter 2 will examine the literature
on telecommunications sector reform and liberalization with an emphasis on interconnection
and access to essential facilities. Chapter 3 will examine the process of telecommunications
sector reform and access to essential facilities within the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). Chapter 4 will present the Liberian case study of Cable
10

Consortium of Liberia (CCL) and the legal framework for assess to the Cable Landing
Station as an essential facilities. Chapter 5 will present a summary, conclusions and
recommendations.

11

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

In May 2001 the United Nations conducted an appraisal of the effectiveness of the Paris
Programme of Action (PPoA) adopted by the Second United Nations (UN) Conference on
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 1990. The appraisal revealed that the goals and
objectives of the PPoA had not been achieved. LDCs were being circumvented by the process
of globalization; further exacerbating their marginalization. The PPoA sought to implement
economic reforms in LDCs by substantially reducing tariffs and trade barriers, liberalizing
currency

regimes,

privatizing

public

enterprises,

establishing

and

strengthening

institutional/regulatory frameworks and adopting liberal investment policies. The outcomes

of reform efforts fell below expectations and LDCs faced declining financial resources,
unsustainable and heavy debt burdens, complex trade barriers, and supply-side constraints.
To address these challenges, the Brussels Programme of Action (BPoA) was adopted by the
UN Conference in 2001. The BPoA was based on seven Commitments:
1. Fostering a people-centered policy framework;
2. Good governance at national and international levels;
3. Building human and institutional capacities;
4. Building capacity for globalization within LDCs;
5. Enhancing the development role of trade;
6. Protecting the environment; and,
7. Mobilizing financial resources.18

Commitment 4 sought to increase telephone density to five main lines per 100 inhabitants and
Internet connections to ten users per 100 inhabitants by 2010. The International

Telecommunications Unions (ITU) Special Programme for LDCs was formulated to meet
these goals by prioritizing universal access, emergency telecommunications and concentrated
assistance to LDCs. Through Official Development Assistance (ODA) the ITUs Special
Programme has undertaken diverse activities and provided assistance to LDCs focused on:

Promoting universal access;

Bridging the urban/rural access gap and introducing new technologies;

Human resource development;

Rural communication development;

Spectrum management; and,

Developing appropriate ICT strategies based on sound policies, and appropriate

regulatory and legal frameworks.19

The role of the ICT sector in nurturing economic and social development is well documented.
Telecommunications investments influence economic development by reducing production
costs and increasing revenues and employment through direct and indirect effects. Unlike
other infrastructure investments, the benefits of increased telecommunications access result
from increases in information and knowledge.20 The potential for transferring information
provided by the telecommunications sector significantly impacts trade and economic growth
in a global economy.21 Major improvements in ICTs in Africa from 2001 2005, compared
with 1991 1995, added one percentage point to the continents per capita growth rate and
accounted for over half of improved growth performance observed between the two periods.
Every Ten-percentage-point increase in telephone penetration and Internet services increases
economic growth one percentage point.22

13

2.1 The Role of Telecommunications Sector Reform

ICTs offer major transformational opportunities and enhance productivity, competitiveness,

wealth creation and poverty reduction by facilitating knowledge based economies and
participation in the global economy. However, these opportunities can only be realized to the
extent that regulatory frameworks create an enabling environment supportive of cultivating
investment in, and widespread diffusion of, ICTs.23 This envisages a framework of market
access for service suppliers clearly intended to foster competition and participation of foreign
firms through a legal and regulatory environment conductive to market entry and elimination
of restrictions.24

Causality between telecommunications investments and economic growth does not

automatically translate investments into growth. Economic growth is not promoted by
telecommunications investments in and of itself. The economic impacts of new investments
are strongest where telecommunications facilities are either absent or inadequate to the extent
that they serve as bottlenecks to private economic activities. The key is not the correlation
between telecommunications and growth, but the institutional mechanisms that determine
how and when investments are made.25 Lack of regulatory stability and clarity is a
disincentive for private investment; conversely, stable regulatory environments can increase
private sector investment by 25% and reduce the cost of owning and using a mobile phone by
Ten%.26 Private investment is therefore contingent on an enabling regulatory environment.
Environments supportive of sustainable investment require NRA independence in decision
making that is transparent, non-discriminatory, objective and free of political influence.27

14

By 2010, 80% of International Development Association (IDA) countries had introduced

competition in the Internet and mobile markets and more than 85 % had established separate
NRAs. These achievements have deepen reforms and improved sector performance28 leading
to more liberalized fixed-line markets and international gateways, fully liberalized mobile
markets and liberalized provision of Internet services.29 These regulatory and institutional
accomplishments have translated into increased foreign direct investment in the
telecommunication infrastructure, especially in SSA. ICT policy harmonization projects such
as the West African Common Market Project has led to increased financial investments in
SSA from China, India and the Gulf States equivalent to the ODA provided by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) with commitments
totaling $2.16 billion.30 The harmonization of multilateral and regional commitments into
local laws by many countries were major accomplishments which served to accelerate
regulatory reforms, facilitate international best practice, and provide investors with regulatory
certainty and predictability.31

The opening of telecommunications markets to new infrastructure investments required

migration from government intervention, to development of coherent competition
frameworks. Frameworks grounded on efficient and practical laws guaranteeing private
sector rights and remedies and providing protection from anticompetitive behavior and abuse
of market dominance.32 Recognition of property rights and enforcements is positively
correlated with network expansion and efficiency.33

In historically developed monopoly markets with massive telecommunications infrastructure

built by public funding, general competition law principles are required to guarantee access to
scarce,

limited

or

essential

facilities

dominated

15

by

incumbents.

Liberalized

telecommunications markets necessitate the interconnection of rival networks through

regulatory intervention requiring that incumbents provide network access to new entrants to
enhance network externalities. Access to new entrants establishes competition by avoiding
unnecessary duplication of costly network components.34 Interconnection, in this context,
refers to the commercial and technical arrangements by which service providers connect their
equipment, networks and services to grant their customers access to the customers, services
and networks of other service providers.35 The goals of access policy are therefore to:

Ensure infrastructure owners operate efficiently and access terms do not distort the
process by which prices are adapted to consumer preferences and demand for
services; and,

Safeguard competitive parity through transparent non-discriminatory access and

charges that reflect the economic costs of performing the supply function.36

Telecommunications liberalization led to massive investments in alternative infrastructure;

however, the local loop remains the primary method of obtaining connectivity to the public
telecommunications network. The dominance of local access by incumbents has remained a
source of regulatory concern due to the propensity of incumbents to use their control over
essential facilities to obtain unfair competitive advantages over competitors in
complementary downstream markets.37 Interconnection, therefore, remains a major stumbling
block to the development of competition and liberalized telecommunications services.38

The most contentious interconnection issues are centered on prices and terms for
interconnection and access for interconnection. Prices are controversial because they affect
profitability and the development of competition. Terms of interconnection and access remain
controversial because they define what competitors receive and when, how and where they

16

obtain interconnection access.39 Therefore, the bottleneck owner must be required to charge
itself the same interconnection charges it levies on its competitors, minus the marginal costs
of providing that service. Also, the price charged for the final product must recover both the
access charge and the incremental cost of the suppliers own retail operations.40 To ensure the
benefits of liberalization are actualized, true competition must be supported by a regulatory
environment that clarifies the terms of interconnection and access between operators,
establishes the rules for interconnection, defines the guidelines for sharing infrastructure, and
institutes interoperability provisions.41

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) recognizes that access to and use of
public telecommunications infrastructure is indispensible for the competitive provision of
effective services covered by GATS. World Trade Organization (WTO) members are
therefore required to provide suppliers of scheduled services access to the public
telecommunications transport network and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms. The WTOs Reference Paper telecommunications reform checklist of success is
based on six necessary principles to remove regulatory barriers to market access and prevent
anticompetitive practices. They are:

Competitive safeguards: Members must establish safeguards preventing major

suppliers from engaging in anticompetitive conduct;

Interconnection: Major suppliers of Members capable of materially affecting terms of

market price and supply by control over essential facilities or position in the market
must provide interconnection upon request, on non-discriminatory terms and
conditions, and at transparent, feasible cost-orientated rates;

17

Universal service: Members may impose universal service obligations that are
transparent, non-discriminatory, competitively neutral and do not create unnecessary
burdens on service suppliers;

Public availability of licensing criteria: Members should make publicly available the
licensing criteria, the decision-making timeframe, and the terms and conditions of
individual licenses;

Independent regulators: Members should ensure that NRAs are separate from and not
accountable to any telecommunications supplier and that decisions are impartial and
based on equal, transparent and objective treatment of all market operators; and,

Allocation of scarce resources: Allocation and use of scarce resources should be

carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner and
made publicly available.42

Telecommunications sector reform in SSA has improved tremendously over the last decade.
Regulatory mandates and requirements have driven network expansion and introduction of
new services in the fixed-line market segments. Requirements for unbundling the local loop,
publication of reference interconnection offers and the setting of minimum quality of service
standards have improved competition in fixed-line markets and protected consumers.
However, growth has been slower relative to mobile markets which received a liberal
regulatory approach, less regulatory intervention and the creation of opportunities for mobile
market development.43

18

Figure 3: Regulating Fixed-lines

Source: ITU

Market liberalization involves the grant of licenses to ISPs and broadband service providers,
setting technical standards, defining price regulations, and designing interconnection
principles and dispute resolution mechanisms. It also requires the identification of key
bottlenecks to sector development and the formulation of appropriate regulatory actions to
address them. Liberalization must also go beyond the provision of mobile services.44

Figure 4: Incentive regulation and growth in mobile services

Source: ITU

19

Licensing restrictions in some SSA countries on terrestrial backbone networks, international

gateways and submarine cables limiting the size of operators networks, obstacles in
obtaining rights of way, and outright monopolies continue to hinder private investments.45

2.2 The Doctrine of Essential Facilities

The threat of market entry in contestable competitive markets is an important constraint on

firms already in markets. This constraint prevents them from anti-competitive pricing because
potential entrants would respond to the opportunity for profit by entering and reducing
prices.46 Markets are contestable where there are no barriers to entry and exit.47 In
telecommunications markets, barriers to entry may be due to legal restrictions, economies of
scale and scope, high fixed or sunk costs and essential facilities.48 As such, the three criteria
test for regulatory intervention applies where:
1. There are high and non-transitory entry barriers;
2. Market structure does not tend towards effective competition within a relevant time
frame; and,
3. Application of competition law is insufficient to address market failure.49

The essential facilities doctrine was developed by Professor A.D. Neale in his treatise of
United States (US) Supreme Court and lower-court rulings dealing with the refusal by a
vertically-integrated dominant undertaking to deal with a competitor. The standard elements
of essential facilities were established by the 1983 US Court of Appeals decision in MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T. The four-part test is the standard for imposing antitrust
liability for failure to deal with a competitor and applies where:
1. A monopolist controls access to an essential facility;

20

2. The facility cannot feasibly be replicated;

3. Access to the competitor is denied by the monopolists; and,
4. Granting access is possible and there is no valid justification for refusal to deal.50

Essential facilities are critical inputs to retail production at the wholesale level of the
production chain and are essential inputs in the supply of retail products or services.51
Monopoly control of essential facilities can create incentives for anti-competitive behavior to
repress competition and create artificial hurdles for rivals in the market for the final products
sold to consumers.52 Liberalization of the telecommunications sector resulted in the
emergence of two types of markets: provision of services to end users market and provision
of access to facilities market necessary to provide service to end users. Service providers
require access to one or more upstream, or downstream, facilities to provide services to
customers. NRAs must therefore ensure that the prospective access markets develop and
dominant incumbents do no use their control over access facilities to stifle development of
competition and new services.53
Figure 5: Concept of Essential Facilities

Source: ITU

21

Access, within the telecommunications industry, remains an important aspect of regulations

and antitrust.54 Effective competition requires that new entrants have access to facilities with
natural monopoly characteristics;55 this precludes incumbent operators from using ownership
of bottleneck facilities to control market developments.56 Essential facilities include
interconnection inputs provided to facilitate the logical linking of competing networks and
the exchange of traffic.57 Regulation of access terms and conditions to essential inputs by
competing firms remains the single biggest regulatory issue; competition and the success of
liberalization depend on the terms and conditions chosen.58

Particular attention is required when dominant undertakings own and use an essential facility
required by competitors to provide services to their customers; especially when access is
denied rivals without justification; or on terms less favorable than granted to their own
services.59 Within the context of the European Union (EU), Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome (March 25, 1957) specifically prohibit agreements that have as their purpose or
result, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the EU; or conduct
which constitutes an abuse of a dominant position.60 This is consistent with the probability
that incumbent undertakings may continue to remain dominant for some time, both in the
provision of access and services,61 and necessitate regulatory intervention over the long term.

The doctrine of essential facilities attempts to provide the legal certainty and predictability
for access to bottleneck facilities required to facilitate investments in new infrastructure and
services.62 This promotes consumer welfare by eliminating exclusionary, anticompetitive
behavior. The applications of the doctrine of essential facilities and antitrust law have
developed differently in the US and the EU. In the US, the focus of antitrust law is
prohibiting transaction intended to maintain or create monopoly power; in the EU the purpose

22

is to prevent abuse of a dominant position. In the US therefore, essential facilities cases are
considered exceptions to the general Colgate defense principle that undertakings are under
no obligation to deal where there are legitimate competitive reasons for refusal. In the EU the
essential facilities doctrine is a specification of a general duty of dominant firms to deal.63
The principle of obligating dominant monopolies in network infrastructure to contract is
premised on the fact that competition in downstream markets depend on the pricing and
conditions of access in upstream network services. An objective of increasing competition in
downstream markets is to facilitate higher value services than local infrastructure. This has
significance where the refusal of access renders provision of a new service impossible or
limits the development of different new markets, products or services for which there is
consumer demand64 not satisfied by existing products or services.65

In determining whether a dominant firm controlling an essential facility should be obliged to

grant access, the following conditions should be present:
a. Access is essential for competition on the relevant market and refusal of access makes
competition impossible;
b. Sufficient available capacity to provide access;
c. The owner does not satisfy demand, blocks new products or services or impedes
competition on existing or potential services or product markets;
d. The access seeker is prepared to pay a reasonable non-discriminatory price on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions; and,
e. There is no objective justification for refusal of access.66

Important considerations are:

1. Does access achieve or facilitate competition in downstream or upstream markets?

23

2. General public interest significance of access to the economy and impact on national
competitiveness of effective competition in the relevant market; and,
3. The legitimate interest of the facility owner.67

Essential facility cases are all linked by infrastructure owners also participating in a market
dependent on access to that infrastructure, constituting a conflict of interest. They also
involve vertically-integrated dominant firms in one market using their dominance in a manner
to strengthen their position and eliminate competition in a related market.68

2.3 Counter Essential Facilities Arguments

There are concerns that the enforcement of access conditions on owners of essential facilities
amounts to re-allocating monopoly rents accruing from the facilities amongst competitors
with little impact on consumers. Notably, antitrust law does not prohibit monopolies that are
earned;69 therefore it has been cautioned that:

The rights to choose trading partners and dispose freely of ones property are
generally recognized principles of law, therefore violations require careful
justification;

Using competition policy to interfere with a dominant undertakings freedom to

contract requires careful balancing of conflicting considerations. Easy accesses to
production, purchasing or distribution facilities reduce incentives to develop
competing facilities and competition in the long term. The mere fact that retaining a
facility for its own use gives a dominant undertaking competitive advantage cannot
justify requiring access to it;

24

The primary purpose of antitrust and competition law is to prevent distortion of

competition and safeguard the interests of consumers; not to protect the interests of
particular competitors; and,

The essential facilities doctrine is only justified when there is a genuine stranglehold
on the related market.70

Areedas six limiting principles cautions against imposing liability based on the essential
facilities doctrine; rather, he urges the allowance of defenses based on legitimate business
justifications, because:
1. Compulsory access should be very exceptional since there is no general duty to share;
2. A single firms facility is essential only where it is critical to the access requestors
competitive vitality, and the requestor is essential for market competition;
3. Firms should only be forced to deal where dealing substantially increases competition
by reducing prices or increasing output and innovation;
4. Denial of access is never unlawful per se and legitimate business purpose is a valid
defense;
5. Discernment of intent should seek to establish if the dominant firm sought to
exclude competition by improper means or merely to limit competition and increase
profits; and,
6. The duty to deal should not be imposed by a court that it cannot explain or adequately
and reasonably supervise.71

While the roots of the essential facilities doctrine are said to originate in the US from the
1912 Terminal Railroad decision, the Supreme Court in Trinko (2004) denied the existence
of such a doctrine. The Court ruled that essential facility claims are not relevant where there

25

is effective power to compel sharing and regulate its scope and terms. 72 Critics argue that
courts conclude too quickly that refusal to deal harms consumers and it remains unclear that
refusal of a monopolist to supply a downstream competitor is contrary to public interest. A
refusal to supply which eliminates a competitor, may not produce a significant reduction of
competition or have a significant anticompetitive effect on the market.73 The essential
facilities doctrine is also considered an assault on property rights of successful firms;
inappropriate application risks damaging incentives for economic efficiency which underpins
economic and technical progress. This is significant where intellectual property (IP) rights are
misrepresented as monopoly rights in a misuse of essential facilities arguments. Imposing
an obligation to supply on a facilities owner without specifying the details of that obligation
compounds the situation.74

The obligation to grant access to essential facilities creates a tension between static
competition and dynamic competition. Static competition increases where access is granted to
facilities essential for downstream markets, reducing more important dynamic competition.
Intervention also reduces incentives to invest in essential facilities, and the incentives for
possible third party duplication.75 Additionally, competition rules may be used, not to enable
expansion of efficient firms, but to protect smaller and medium sized firms at the expense of
efficient or larger firms. This subordinates the interests of consumers and the economy to the
interests of smaller traders.76 Calls therefore remain for the retention of high burden of proof
in essential facilities cases, with access granted only where each of the following questions is
answered affirmatively:
1. Was the monopoly earned and are there compelling external social or economic
reasons beyond monopoly exploitation for forcing access?

26

2. There is a mechanism in place for monitoring and regulating the price and terms of
access?
3. Is it inconceivable to circumvent the use of the facility?
4. Is it impossible in the foreseeable future for new technologies to substitute for the
essential facility?77

27

Chapter 3: Telecommunications Sector Reform in West Africa

3.0 Introduction
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created on May 28, 1975
by the Treaty of Lagos. It forged an economic union amongst 15 West African Member
States: Benin, Cte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Burkina Faso. Cape Verde
joined in 197778 and Mauritania withdrew in 1999 due to disagreements over the ECOWAS
Protocol for Conflict Resolution.79 ECOWASs objectives are economic trade, national
cooperation and monetary integration for the growth and development of West Africa80
through effective economic cooperation and integration.81

Figure 6: Economic Community of West African States

Source: The World Bank

Other sub-regional integration arrangements include the Communaute des Etats de lAfrique
de lOuest (CEAO), the Mano River Union (MRU), the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the West African Telecommunications Regulatory Assembly
(WATRA).

28

WATRA was established in November 2004 by ECOWAS Member States and Mauritania.
Its membership includes 15 independent NRAs and departments for regulation of
telecommunications

services.

WATRAs

formation

was

to

address

sub-regional

telecommunications industry challenges, develop a harmonized regulatory identity to increase

investors confidence and sector investments, and contribute to industry human resource and
capacity building efforts.82
Table 3: Regional Integration and Membership Arrangements in West Africa

Source: The World Bank

3.1 Regional Telecommunications Development

Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are important in enabling regional integration of

ICTs and trade.83 However, the small-scale economies of ECOWAS Member States inhibit
this role. Eight Member States have populations below 10 million, 11 Member States have a
GDP of less than $5 billion, while three Member States are landlocked and rely on
neighboring infrastructure to access critical markets. This prevents economies of scale in
infrastructure development and makes it difficult for governments to pay the high fixed costs
of infrastructure development.84 ECOWAS incumbent operators are also impeded by bad

29

management and poor underdeveloped infrastructure.85 In 2011 ECOWAS penetrations rates

were 2.41% for fixed-line, 61.65% for mobile-cellular and 3.43% for fixed-broadband.86

However, compared with other RECs, ECOWAS provides better access to ICTs, though at
higher prices. ECOWAS international bandwidth indicators of 16 bits per capita and mobile
subscriptions of 25 per 100 inhabitants are the second-highest in Sub-Saharan Africa after the
Southern African Development Community (SADC). ECOWAS broadband access rates and
Internet subscriptions are lower compared with SADC, possibly due to the late arrival of
international broadband capacity which may account for the relatively higher tariffs. The
monthly-averaged prepaid mobile basket cost of $14 is higher than in any other region except
the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and monthly Internet
access price of $80 is exceeded only by East African Community (EAC). The prices of
international telephone calls and fixed-line telephone service, however, are relatively low.87

WATRAs proactive regulatory intervention and large regional mobile operators has led to
relatively advanced regional mobile roaming arrangements. WATRA has been particularly
active in promoting regulatory ICT harmonization and the ECOWAS Department of
Transport and Telecommunications promotes key objectives of a single liberalized market,
harmonized laws and regulations, coordinating/integrating regional infrastructure projects,
and enhancing regional GSM service. ECOWAS Member States have embraced telecom
sector reform and are very open to foreign investment in mobile telecommunications, with
most countries having two or three foreign operators.88

30

Table 4: Telecom performance indicators for ECOWAS & Mauritania

Source: The World Bank

ECOWAS has international broadband connectivity from several submarine cables including:
1. South Atlantic 3 (SAT-3)/WASC: 14,350 km from South Africa, up West Africa to
Portugal and Spain, connecting 36 countries with 120 Gbps;
2. Atlantis-2: 8,500 km connecting South America, Cape Verde, Senegal, Portugal, and
Spain with 10 Gbps @ $370 million;
3. Glo-1: 9,800-kilometer connecting 17 African countries to the United Kingdom with
318.4 Gbps @ $170 million;
4. Africa Coast to Europe (ACE): 14,000 km from France to South Africa connecting 24
countries with 1.92 Tbps @ $650 million; and,
5. West African Cable System (WACS): 17,200 km from South Africa, along West

Africa to the United Kingdom connecting 15 countries with 3.84 Tbps, @ $650
million.89

31

Figure 7: West Africa's Undersea Cables

Source: Manypossibilities.net

3.2 Telecom Sector Reform within ECOWAS

ECOWAS has commenced several infrastructure projects and activities in cooperation with
the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the EU, the World Bank, USAID
and other donors.90 From 2002 up to 2013 the following sector reform milestones have been
achieved:

February 2002: World Bank launched regional telecommunications harmonization

study;

2004: ITU launched regional project to establish an integrated West Africa ICT
Market;

September 2005: Common Market Best Practice Guidelines adopted by the 3rd
Ordinary General Assembly of WATRA;

May 2006: ECOWAS ICT Ministers validate legislative and regulatory texts for the
establishment of a Common ICT Market;

32

January 2007: validated legislative and regulatory texts adopted by ECOWAS Heads
of States and Government as Supplementary Acts;91

November 2009: WATRA identifies access to submarine cables as most pressing

priority;

December 2010 and March 2011: draft submarine cable assessment report, guidelines
and regulation validated at WATRA and ECOWAS consultative and National ICT
Experts meeting respectively;

June 2011: Access to Submarine Cables Guidelines adopted at the 9th WATRA
Annual General Assembly;

October 2011: Regulation on Access to Submarine Cables in West Africa adopted at

the 11th Meeting of ECOWAS ICT Ministers; and,

2013: Access to Submarine Cables Assessment Report issued.92

3.2.1 World Bank Support

In the 1990s the Bank shifted its ICT strategy from support to large infrastructure projects to
smaller lending interventions of technical assistance (TA). The TAs focused on building
enabling sector environments to mobilize private investments, using competition as the
primary policy tool to promote efficiency and innovation while facilitating regulatory
capacity development. Within ECOWAS, the Bank has been involved in market
liberalization through privatization and licensing in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mail, Niger, and
Nigeria.93

The Bank and Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) provided support to
ECOWAS to develop a common framework to harmonize national telecommunications
33

sector policies amongst Member States and establish a common telecommunications market.
This was based on perceptions that NRAs within ECOWAS were not autonomous and lacked
the authority to make and enforce regulations.94 A telecommunications harmonization study
was launched in February 2002 and subsequently endorsed at validation meetings in Abuja,
Accra, and Lom.95 The study concluded that:

There was sufficient completed work to create the regional legal framework;

Some Member States had adopted laws and regulations in line with international best
practice;

The ECOWAS Treaty and Protocols provided the legal framework to achieve
harmonization in line with the centralized harmonization model;

Previous failures to implement expressed ideas and principles of the ECOWAS legal
framework were a disappointing track record in advancing Treaty initiatives;

Resources were insufficient to perform enforcement and other regulatory functions;

and,

Different legal traditions of Member States, different levels of liberalization, and

trade-offs affecting the relative gains of individual countries, posed additional
challenges.96

Recommendations were that ECOWAS adopt a centralized harmonization model based on

the existing legal framework for implementation at both the national and treaty levels. An
implementation schedule and draft Protocol were also proposed.97

ECOWAS connectivity gaps prevented Member States from deriving the full benefits of a
highly functional and effective ICT sector. This was due to higher communication costs and
capacity bottlenecks limiting the availability of end-to-end high-capacity bandwidth at
competitive pricing. A regional approach to bridging this connectivity gap was necessary to
34

facilitate better access to international infrastructure. Regional cross-border connectivity was

also impeded by costly routing of traffic through non-regional third-party countries, straining
regional economic and social development. Civil wars in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone
destroyed critical transmission infrastructure, leaving no functional cross-border links
between the countries. There are also no cross-border links connecting Guinea northward to
Mali, eastward to Cote dIvoire and southward to Liberia. This required a new approach to
create regional connectivity, provide redundancy to costly existing routes, rapidly reduce the
missing gaps between the countries, and reduce the fragmentation of existing member
systems.98

In this context, the Bank developed a $300 million99 West Africa Regional Communications
Infrastructure Program (WARCIP) to expand the geographical reach of broadband networks
and reduce communications costs within the region. In WARCIPs first phase, funding was
provided to Liberia and Sierra Leone in the amounts of $25.6 million100 and $31 million101
respectively. In the second phase WARCIP provided similar support to The Gambia, Guinea
and Burkina Faso.102 The WARCIP funding support has three components:
1. Supporting connectivity:
a. International connectivity - facilitating membership to the Africa Coast-toEurope (ACE) Cable Consortium;
b. Regional/national connectivity leveraging alternative infrastructure;
2. Creating an enabling environment for connectivity; and,
3. Project implementation support.103

35

3.2.2 ITU Support

By 2003 regulatory reforms within ECOWAS contributed to accelerated sector progress and
increases in penetration rates for mobile communications. The ITU directly assisted
governments, conducted studies, provided training tools, organized workshops and forums,
and sponsored regional and sub-regional organizations. Interventions were based on
implementation of the ITUs Telecommunications Development Bureaus (BDT) operational
plan and focused on accelerating creation of an environment to facilitate rapid extension of
access to ICTs. The ITU contributed to improvements in frequency and numbering
management and interconnection, which was a source of conflict amongst operators.104
Table 5: Status of ECOWAS Regulatory Instruments 2002/2003

Source: Evora-Sagna

Between 2004 and 2007, the ITU collaborating with the EU, implemented the West African
Common Market Project to harmonize policies governing ICT markets within ECOWAS.
This was as a pilot project to develop and promote harmonization of policies and guidelines
based on best practices within ECOWAS and develop a harmonized regulatory framework
for the ICT sector and build human and institutional capacity in the field of ICT. 105 The
36

project built on the recommendations and conclusions of the Banks Harmonization of

Telecommunications Policies in ECOWAS study leading to the development and adoption
of:
Harmonized regional ICT policy for:
a. National ICT Policy and Law;
b. Interconnection;
c. Licensing;
d. Numbering;
e. Radio Spectrum Management; and,
f. Universal Access and Universal Service.
Harmonized regional ICT legislation; and,
Harmonized regional regulatory guidelines.106

The regulatory guidelines were adopted by the 3rd WATRA Annual General Meeting (AGM)
of September 9, 2005 held in Dakar, Senegal.107 The harmonized regional ICT policies and
ICT legislation led to the development and adoption of ECOWAS Supplementary Acts by the
Thirty-First Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on January 19th, 2007. The adopted Acts were:

Supplementary Act A/Sa.1/01/07 On The Harmonization Of Policies And Of The

Regulatory Framework For The Information And Communication Technology (ICT)
Sector;

Supplementary Act A/Sa.2/01/07 On Access And Interconnection In Respect Of ICT

Sector Networks And Services;

Supplementary Act A/Sa.3/01/07 On The Legal Regime Applicable To Network

Operators And Service Providers;
37

Supplementary Act A/Sa.4/01/07 On Numbering Plan Management;

Supplementary Act A/Sa.5/01/07 On The Management Of The Radio-Frequency

Spectrum; and,

Supplementary Act A/Sa.6/01/07 On Universal Access/Service.108

Subsequent instruments adopted include the Supplementary Act A/Sa.21d1/1d On Electronic

Transactions Within ECOWAS, Supplementary Act A/Sa.1f01/10 On Personal Data
Protection Within ECOWAS adopted by the 37th Session of Authority of Heads of State and
Government in Abuja, Nigeria on February 16th, 2010 and Directive C/Dir. 1/08/11 On
Fighting Cyber Crime Within ECOWAS adopted by the 66th Ordinary Session of the
Council of Ministers in Abuja, Nigeria on August 19th, 2011.109

In 2009 WATRA identified access to submarine cables as a pressing priority of its members
and requested the assistance of the ITU in developing guidelines and regulations for access to
submarine cables. The ITU funded the preparation of draft guidelines and regulation by
consultants guided by the ECOWAS Commission and the WATRA Secretariat. The draft
documents were reviewed, discussed and validated during a WATRA workshop in Monrovia,
Liberia in December 2010 and at the ECOWAS National ICT Experts consultative meeting
in Lom, Togo in March 2011. The WATRA Guidelines on access to submarine cables were
adopted at the 9th WATRA Annual General Assembly in Accra, Ghana in June 2011. The
ECOWAS Regulation on Condition for Access to Submarine Cables Landing Stations was
adopted at the 11th Meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Telecommunication and ICTs in
Yamoussoukro, Cte dIvoire on 14 October 2011.110

The Regulations seek to ensure:

38

The grant of licenses to new cable landing stations (CLS);

Amendment of the existing licenses of CLS operators to conform to open access,

nondiscrimination and prohibition of anti-competitive practices on the international
capacity access market;

Withdrawal of restrictions on access to international capacities in licenses or

authorizations previously issued;

Fair and effective access to available capacity on all cable systems operated by an
SMP Operator are provided eligible operators upon request;

Provision by CLS operators of co-location and backhaul services to eligible operators;

Maintenance of a reasonable balance between the need to encourage competition and

preserve a reasonable return on the investments made for the co-location;

Publication by CLS operators of terms and conditions of all services in a Reference

Interconnect Offer;

Transparent charges for all services, operation and maintenance, in accordance with
the cost calculation framework set by the NRA;

Provision by SMP-CLS Operators of Service Level Guarantees consistent with best

practices and equivalent to those applied to their own services or to their
subsidiaries/partners; and,

Availability of equitable dispute resolution mechanisms.111

The design of terms and conditions of access to bottleneck facilities by competing

operators remains one of the most vexing regulatory tasks of NRAs within ECOWAS. 112 The
terms, conditions and pricing for access continue to be root causes of interconnection disputes
in the Region. Examples are disputes between Comium and Gamtel in The Gambia113;

39

Areeba and Ghana Telecom114 and Ghana Telecom and Spacefon in Ghana115; NITEL and
other GSM operators in Nigeria,116 and between Lonestar/MTN and Cellcom in Liberia.117

40

4.0 Case Study of the Cable Consortium of Liberia (CCL)

4.1 Introduction
Liberia is situated in West Africa and borders Cte dIvoir, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
Liberias 14 year civil war engulfed the country, led to substantial loss of human lives,
massive displacement population, widespread destruction of economic and social
infrastructure and the disruption of productive and commercial activities.118

Figure 8: Map of Liberia

Source: Nations Online Project

Liberias land mass is 43,000 square miles, its population 4,092,310 with a growth rate
of 2.52%. GDP per capita is $700; growth rate is 8.1% and inflation 5.2%. 119
Liberias Internet penetration rate is 3.72% and access to both fixed and cellular telephone
service 58.83%.120

41

Table 6: Demographic and economic indicators for Liberia

Source: United Nations

The

Liberia

Telecommunications

Corporation

(LTC)

has

historically

provided

telecommunications facilities and services in Liberia. The Corporation was created by the
LTC Act 1973 granting it the monopoly to provide telecommunications facilities and services
nationally. The LTC Amendment Act 1976 established LTC as a public corporation under the
supervision of a Board of Directors. The 1978 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
Executive Law transformed the Ministry of Postal Affairs to the Ministry and Posts and
Telecommunications (MP&T). It transferred all policy and regulatory functions from the
LTC to the Ministry.121

Liberias civil war destroyed the telecommunications sector, resulting in a fixed teledensity of
0.06%. Mobile communications kept Liberia connected internationally during the war and postwar communications are almost exclusively via mobile technology. Liberias mobile sector
was liberalized in 1998 and became competitive in 2003 with the introduction of two
additional mobile operators. Mobile density increased from 0.06% in 2003 to approximately
to 5% in mid-2005, well above SSA average. However, in 2003 mobile service was still a
luxury commodity for many Liberians. Internet access was also limited as 85% of users were
large multinational businesses or international organizations with VSAT-based Internet
services.122

42

Figure 9: Liberia's fixed and mobile growth rates

Source: ITU

4.2 Liberias Telecom Sector Reform

Liberia, like Benin, The Gambia and Sierra Leone, issued licenses for competition in the
mobile sector without the enabling legal framework.123 In 1998 the MP&T licensed I-COM
Communications (I-COM) and OMEGA Communications to offer mobile services via TDMA
and GSM technology respectively. LibNet Inc. and Data Technology were also licensed as ISPs
while UN Agencies, NGOs and banks were licensed to install and operate VASAT terminals for
their humanitarian and corporate uses. In 1999, I-COM ceased operations and Atlantic

Wireless Inc. (AWI), was licensed as a mobile operator using the AMPS standard. OMEGAs
license was withdrawn due to license performance conditions and Lonestar Communications
(Lonestar) granted the exclusive license to provide GSM service. By November 2001
Lonestars subscribers exceeded the number of LTCs customers, making Lonestar the largest
provider of telecommunications services in Liberia.124

The ITU prioritized assistance to Liberia, Sierra Leone and The Gambia; the three countries
without a formal regulatory body.125 The ITU conducted the first workshop on Telecom
Reform Policy in Liberia from April 11th 15th, 2000. The focus was developing an affective
telecommunications policy for a competitive environment, and formulation of both a
Telecommunications Improvement Policy for Liberia and Posts and Telecommunications
43

Policy Statement.126 Although funds were allocated in 2003 to complete the sector reform
assistance covering legal framework, spectrum monitoring and interconnection, the assistance
was cancelled due to security concerns.127

President Charles Taylor resigned on August 11, 2003 and the Accra Comprehensive Peace
Agreement of August 18, 2003 created the National Transitional Government of Liberia
(NTGL) to replace the Government of Liberia.128 The Bank approved Liberias Country
Reengagement Note (CRN) in 2004 and provided $0.85 million to the NTGL to create an
interim regulatory framework comprising of a National Telecom Policy & Strategy and
interim LTA (ILTA) legislation.129 The National Telecom Policy & Strategy presented the
NTGLs vision of sector liberalization to improve and increase telecommunications services
and develop an open, competitive market regulated by an independent NRA that reported to
the Head of State.130

Table 7: World Bank telecom technical assistance program to the NTGL

Source: World Bank

The Interim Liberia Telecommunications Authority (ILTA) was created by enactment of Bill
18 by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) on September 5, 2005. Bill 18
amended the Public Authorities Law creating the LTC, the Executive Law creating the
MP&T, and established an interim regulatory framework for telecommunications. The

44

purpose was to prepare a new telecommunications law and establish a longer-term regulatory
framework to recommend to the elected Government. It also established and clarified the
framework for regulation of the telecommunications sector prior to the assumption of powers
by the regulatory authority to be created under the new telecommunications law.131

In September 2007 the Telecommunications Act of 2007 (Telecoms Act 2007) was enacted
into law repealing Act No.18. The new Act established the legislative framework for policy
making, regulation and development of the Liberian telecommunications sector. The Act
defined the responsibility of the MP&T to develop policies for the telecommunications sector
in consultation with the LTA and support the establishment of a regulatory environment for
growth of the sector.132 The Telecom Act 2007 established the LTA as an independent
Commission of five Commissioners, nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Liberian Senate. One Commissioner is designated Chairman of the Commission and all
Commissioners are appointed to a four year term which may be renewed for another four
year term.133
Figure 10: Decline in Liberia's fixed-line infrastructure

Source: UN Data

Between August and October 2003 the MP&T issued 15 GSM licenses, in many cases, with
overlapping frequencies. A Presidential Telecommunications Committee was established by
45

the NTGL to review the issuance of licenses and revise the spectrum plan.134 The Banks
PPIAF provided support to Liberias elected government commencing 2007 to develop a
telecommunications fee and taxation policy, promote competition and improve access to ICT
services. A PPIAF-funded telecommunications sector fiscal-study subsequently led to Bank
support for:

Finalization of rationalized spectrum allocation;

Formulation of sustainable sector taxation;

Formulation of a methodology and license fee schedule for mobile operators;

Standardization of the licenses granted to existing mobile operators; and,

Issuance of GSM licenses.135

On April 24, 2009 four GSM licenses were issued operators for US$65 million in license fees
for 15-year licenses with payments schedule in installments until 2019.136 Licenses of the
three new operators (Libercell, Comium and Cellcom) are alleged to have been hurried,
opaque and without public tender or public assessment of capacity to perform; leading to
accusations of bias and corruption.137 Other support outcomes were finalization of:

Licensing and Authorization Regulations LTA-REG-001, September 2010;

Interconnection Regulations 2009 LTA-REG-003, September 2010;

Regulations for the Treatment of Confidentiality, Dispute Resolution, Compliance,

and Enforcement 2009 LTA REG-0002, March 1, 2010;

Resettlement Policy Framework for the Liberia ACE Cable Landing Project,
November 2010; and,

Environmental and Social Management Framework for the Liberia ACE Cable
Landing Project, November 2010.138

46

Table 8: Liberia's GSM networks

Operator
Lonestar Cell

License
2000

Service
2001

MHz
907915

Owners
PLC Investments (60%), originally Investcom Global
(BVI) now MTN Group (40%)

Libercell

2004

2004

Comium

2004

2004

Cellcom

2004

2004

890895
902902
895902

Atlantic Wireless International (45%) and HiTS

Telecom (55%)
Comium Group (Lebanon) apparently owned by
Dalloul family
Cellcom Telecommunications Limited (BVI) in turn
owned by Emerging Capital Partners (Washington,
DC), Cellcom (USA) LLC (Washington, DC) and
Dialogue Limited (Larnaca, Cyprus).

Source: Southerland

The LTA also issued the:

Tariff Moratorium Order LTA-TMO-003: placing a moratorium on tariff increases for

all services offered by GSM operators and Internet Service Providers (ISPs);139

Interconnection Tariff Order, LTAITO002A: mandating all licensed operators,

upon request from another licensed operator, to enter into agreements to establish and
maintain interconnection between networks and provide all other technically and
economically feasible related facilities necessary at established interconnection price
caps, pending the issuance of Interconnection Regulations by the LTA;140

LTA EXEMPTION ORDER-0004/EXO-01/09-16-11: exempts LTC (branded as

Libtelco in 2006) from requirements to pay license fees and defines its rights and
responsibilities as the National Operator;141 and,

Regulations on International Traffic, LTA-REG-0005: instituted policies and systems

to minimize fraud/grey routing and discourage unfair market practices by regulating
international call traffic to ensure revenues therefrom are appropriately accounted
for.142

47

Table 9: LTA 2008 Interconnection price caps

NO.
SERVICE TYPES
1
Mobile to Mobile
2
Fixed Line to Fixed Line
3
Mobile to Fixed Line
4
Fixed Line to Mobile
Price Caps: Floor is the lowest price to
charge

FLOOR PRICE
CEILING PRICE
$0.06
$0.10
$0.02
$0.04
$0.06
$0.10
$0.04
$0.06
charge and the Ceiling is the highest price to

Source: LTA

With the assistance of WARCIP Liberia Project funded consultants, the LTA in 2012
undertook a review of Licensing and Authorization Regulations, LTA-REG-001, and drafting
of a revised licensing and authorization regime. The purposes was to transition from a
technology-specific to a technology-neutral licensing framework, considering new market
realities introduced by the ACE cable system, and ensure conformity with the ECOWAS
Supplementary Acts.143 Draft Licensing Fees Regulations were also prepared to clarify and
confirm the obligations of licensees to pay licensing fees determined by the LTA pursuant to
the Telecom Act 2007.144 Draft Quality of Service identifying minimum Quality of Service
Standards to be met by service providers through periodic performance measurement reports.

For the full benefit of international broadband connectivity provided by ACE to be realized
an open and non-discriminatory access regime, consistent with loan contractual
obligations145, had to be implemented. The Telecom Act 2007 requires the LTA to determine
dominant operators in different telecom markets and if they, or may in future, abuse that
position by preventing competition in relevant markets. In considering the relevant market for
the CCL, it became apparent that changes to the Interconnection Regulations 2009 were
required to give effect to a finding of dominance and the principle of open access.146
Amendments were also required to ensure consistency and compliance with the ECOWAS

48

Supplementary Act A/SA.2/01/07 and give effect to applicable remedies for dominant
licensed providers in markets relevant to interconnection.147

Amended Interconnection Regulations were prepared to incorporate interconnection,

facilities-leasing and access; consistent with the definition of interconnection in both the
Act and Interconnection Regulations which refer to facilities leasing and granting access.
The amended regulations also highlight obligations of dominant operators to provide
interconnection upon request and provide access in terms of facilities-leasing and/or colocation. The inclusion of co-location in the access obligations confirms the extent of
access anticipated under the Act.148

Despite its importance, although drafted in 2012, the draft Regulations have not been
consulted on, finalized, or adopted by the LTA. This undermines the authority of the LTA
and supports perceptions that the LTA is unable to provide the leadership and environment
for the resolution of interconnection disputes and deliver on its regulatory responsibilities.149

The LTA in 2010 implemented a new National Numbering Plan (NNP) consistent with the
ITUs recommendation E.164. The NNP was implemented without the accompanying
Numbering Regulations. Therefore, in 2012 a draft Numbering Regulation was prepared to
validate the NNP, promote investment, facilitate competition and protect customers.150 The
LTA also prepared draft Siting Regulations on Telecommunications Infrastructure
Deployment to provide general conditions and guidelines on the deployment of telecoms
infrastructure.151 In 2013 the draft Regulations on Penalties, LTA-REG-0006, issued for

49

consultations, identified specific offences and penalties, fines and sanctions imposable on
licensees for violations of license conditions, regulations, rules and orders of the LTA.152

These draft regulations have been pending for two years or more and in that period, the LTA
has been unable to conduct required consultations to finalize the instruments designed to
improve sector interactions and governance. This strengthens sector perception of the LTA as
weak and ineffective153

although, the LTA has determined to finalize and adopt these

regulations by June 2014.154

4.3 The Cable Consortium of Liberia (CCL)

Under the WARCIP Liberia Project, Liberia joined the ACE Consortium and the Cable
Consortium of Liberia (CCL) was incorporated as a public-private partnership (PPP)
comprising Lonestar (10%), Cellcom (10%), Libtelco (20%) and the Government of Liberia
(60%). The CCL signed the ACE Construction & Maintenance Agreement on June 5, 2010
and formalized Liberias membership to ACE.155 The ACE submarine cable landed in
Monrovia on November 3, 2010156 and the ACE cable system was inaugurated on December
19, 2012 providing Liberia with its first international broadband connectivity.157

To implement WARCIP Liberia Project, the Bank and the Government of Liberia (GoL) on
February 8th, 2010 signed the Financing Agreement for the WARCIP Liberia Project. The
Agreement provided for a 40-year low interest loan of $25.6 million at a service charge of
of 1% annually to implement the Project.

50

In the design of the Project, the Bank identified implementation capacity and sustainability as
key project risks, due to the limited perceived capacity of policy makers and the inexperience
of the LTA with open access regimes.158 $3.32 million was allocated by the Project to support
the development of an enabling environment for the ACE cable landing to mitigate this risk.
This included building the capacity of the MP&T to develop and implement sectorial
policies, and support to strengthen the LTAs capability to regulate the sector.159

In 2011 under Project funding, the LTA conducted a market study and determined that the
relevant market for the CCL was the market for wholesale capacity and access to
international fibre-optic submarine cables. The CCL is the only licensed cable landing station
operator and no other technically feasible alternative is available. Considering the relevant
market, the LTA considered that:

High, non-transitory barriers to entry existed due to difficulty in securing investment

funding for a second landing point;

The lack of effective competition behind the barriers to entry with no credible
competitor for international cables; and,

Insufficiency of Liberias telecommunications/Competition law to resolve possible

market failures because application of the LTAs ex post powers to resolve abuses of
dominance would result in substantial damage to downstream retail markets before
the abuse was rectified.160

51

Figure 11: Market Analysis process

Source: Incyte Consulting

CCLs perceived market share of 100% exceeded the threshold for a presumption of
dominance and control of an essential facility within the relevant market combined with
anticipated pricing behavior strongly supported the hypothesis of dominance. Additionally,
six out of 11 other relevant factors* considered were significant indicators of dominance. The
LTA therefore concluded that CCL was dominant in the market for wholesale capacity and
access to international fibre-optic submarine cables and subject to remedies for dominance.161

The Telecom Act 2007162 and the Interconnection Regulations 2009163 both define a
dominant service provider as a service provider designated to have significant market power
in one or more telecommunications service markets. The ECOWAS Regulations on Access to
Submarine Cables164 adopt the definition of Supplementary Act A/SA.2/01/07 that a
52

company, either on its own or with other companies, holds a dominant position when it has
the capacity to act independent of its competitors, customers and consumers.165
Table 10: Value-chain of related markets relevant to the CCL

Source: Incyte Consulting

4.4 Remedies for CCLs Dominance

The Telecommunications Act 2007 provides that dominant undertakings must publish a
Reference Interconnection Offer (RIO), which should be cost-based and comply with all
regulations, rules and orders of the LTA.166 Dominant providers must also provide access to
network elements, physical infrastructure, ducts and masts, and network software systems.167
Their tariffs, in their markets of dominance, must be approved by the LTA and they may be
required to participate in market studies to develop tariff methods.168

In this regard, the following remedies in Table 10 were considered appropriate:

53

Table 11: Proposed remedies for CCLs dominance

Source: Incyte Consulting

On October 1, 2012 following appropriate consultations, the LTA declared the CCL to be
dominant in the market for wholesale capacity on, and access to, international fibre-optic
submarine cables. The decision requires CCL to set prices for wholesale capacity on the basis
of actual or predicted costs for the first three years using a methodology developed by LTA.
The first review of the caps will occur six months after CCLs RFCS and annually
subsequently. The price caps are as follows:169
Table 12: Equivalent price per E1 per month (US$) based on capacity commitment

Wholesale
capacity ordered
STM1
E3
E1

Year after Ready for Commercial Service Date

1
2
3
2,030
1,347
1,006
3,552
2,358
1,761
8,524
5,659
4,227

Source: LTA

54

4.5 Analysis
The LTAs interconnection regulations require dominant service providers to grant access to
infrastructure and network elements. However, specific regulations may be required for
access to infrastructure required for distribution of CCLs capacity on cost-based prices. This
includes LTCs Monrovia fibre-ring duct system, to avoid inhibiting Internet access and
diffusion of ICTs. LTA guidelines specifying the circumstances for infrastructure sharing and
imposition of penalties for non-compliance would also be helpful.170

The LTA is criticized because since it established the obligation on CCL to publish a RIO on
its website, the CCL has not published a public offer to date. The CCL has also not been
licensed, although it commenced operations in January 2013. Also, international connectivity
prices on the Liberian market for business data packages are substantially lower than the
price caps imposed by the LTA and continue to decline driven by competition from
Novafone, which recently bought. 5% share in the CCL. However, prices for retail data
packages have not declined substantially. The LTA also needs to address the monopoly
position of the LTC on the fiber backhaul for which it charges substantially more than the
cost for supply of fiber backhaul services. ISPs and other smaller operators are not supplied
capacity directly but are supplied capacity through CCL shareholders because CCL does not
have a de-multiplexer to supply capacity below a STM1.171 This was addressed during a
Banks Mission to Liberia in January 2014 when the Bank approved a request from the CCL
to purchase a de-multiplexer to supply E1 and lower capacity to ISPs.172

55

Table 13: WARCIP Liberia Project M&E Results

Source: WARCIP Liberia Project

It is argued that CCL market share is 0% on the wholesale capacity and access to
international fibre-optic submarine cables markets because only its shareholders have been
active in that market, negating the value of the price caps. Reduction of wholesale prices for
capacity far below the LTA price caps set indicates reasonable competition in this market.
The LTA should consider the potential of CCLs shareholders being jointly dominant in this
market and the necessity for price caps on the retail markets. Remedies for LTCs
monopolistic position on the Monrovia fibre-ring providing backhaul services and the market
for leased lines should also be considered. Further market analysis of all telecommunications
market segments must be conducted to identify other access bottlenecks, introduce more
transparency and ensure effective competition.173

56

5.0 Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Summary
Over the last decade the ICT/telecommunications sector has achieved tremendous outcomes
and grown phenomenally, driven by a revolution in telecommunications technology
combined with liberalization and telecommunications sector reform. The transformational
opportunities of ICT can only be realized to the extent that regulatory frameworks create an
enabling environment supportive of cultivating investment in, and widespread diffusion of,
ICTs. Liberalized telecommunications markets necessitate the interconnection of rival
networks through regulatory interventions mandating that incumbents provide network access
to new entrants to enhance network externalities.

Essential facilities are critical inputs to retail production at the wholesale level of the
production chain and are essential inputs in the supply of retail products or services.
Monopoly control of such facilities can create incentives for anti-competitive behavior to
repress competition and create artificial barriers for rivals in the market for the final products
sold to consumers. Telecommunications sector liberalization has led to two types of markets:
provision of services to end users market and provision of access to facilities market to
provide service to consumers. NRAs must therefore ensure that the respective access markets
develop and dominant incumbents are prevented from using their control over access
facilities to stifle development of competition and new services. However, the essential
facilities doctrine is only justified when there is a genuine stranglehold on the related
market.

57

ECOWAS has commenced several infrastructure projects and activities in cooperation with
the NEPAD, EU, the Bank, USAID and other donors. Sector reform milestones achieved
include regional telecommunications policy and regulatory harmonization, establishment of a
Common ICT Market and Supplementary Acts and Regulation on Access to Submarine
Cables.

The Bank, ITU and other donors have assisted Liberia implement major telecom sector
reforms and develop an enabling regulatory environment largely compliant with the
ECOWAS framework. This assistance has been critical in successfully implementing
Liberias participation in the ACE cable consortium and creating the open, transparent and
non-discriminatory environment for the success of the CCL. However, the LTA must take
urgent steps to reassert its sector leadership fulfillment of its regulatory responsibilities. This
is crucial with reference to interconnection and access to essential facilities.

5.2 Recommendations

It is in this regard that the following recommendations are made:

The LTA should urgently finalize and adopt the two amended Regulations on
interconnection and authorizations and the five draft regulations;

Obligations of the CCL to publish its RIO on its website and the requirement to be
licensed must be enforced;

Given present market developments all telecommunications market segments need to

be identified and analyzed to determine dominance and enforce appropriate remedies
as necessary;

58

Consideration should be given to a review of the CCL market study for access to
international fibre-optic connectivity for possible consideration of the declaration of
joint dominance in access to international fibre-optic connectivity by CCLs
shareholders; and,

Consideration should be given to imposing price caps on the retail access to

international fibre-optic connectivity market to reduce prices for ordinary consumers.

59

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Ridyard D (438)AD Essential facilities and the obligation to supply competitors under the
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Korah V (2006) Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules. Available at
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Nikolinakos NT (1999) Access agreements in the telecommunications sector - refusal to
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Faulhaber GR (2002) BOTTLENECKS AND BANDWAGONS: ACCESS POLICY IN THE
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Boddy-Evans A (No Date) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
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Michigan State University ECOWAS: History. Available at
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Boddy-Evans A (No Date) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
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81
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Revised Treaty (1975). Available
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International Telecommunications Union West Africa Telecommunications Regulators
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Yonazi, E et al. (2014) The Transformational Use of Information and Communication
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Ranganathan R and Foster V (2011) ECOWASs Infrastructure A Regional Perspective.
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Akoh B et al. (2011) Preparing the Ground for the West Africa Internet Governance
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Authors interpretation of data in the World Banks Little Data Book
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Ranganathan R and Foster V (2011) ECOWASs Infrastructure A Regional Perspective.
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88
Ibid
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Williams, M et al. (2011) Africas ICT Infrastructure Building on the Mobile Revolution.
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Kessides IN et al. (2009) Regionalizing Telecommunications Reform in West Africa. World
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ICT Market Harmonization for ECOWAS/UEMOA. Regulatory and Market Environment.
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International Telecommunications Union (2012) Establishment of Harmonized Policies for
the ICT Market in the ACP Access to Submarine Cables in West Africa ECOWAS Regulation:
HIPSSA Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Sahara Africa. Available at
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/events/2012/Kigali%20docs/Reports/ARTAO_finale_1%20ECOWAS%20Regulation.pdf [accessed 26 May 2014].
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Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (2012) World Bank Telecommunications
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elecom%20Sector%20Engagement%20March%202012.pdf [accessed 24 March 2014].
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Kessides IN et al. (2009) Regionalizing Telecommunications Reform in West Africa. World
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Guislain P et al. (2005) Connecting Sub-Saharan Africa A World Bank Group Strategy for
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96
Kessides IN et al. (2009) Regionalizing Telecommunications Reform in West Africa. World
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24 March 2014].
97
Kessides IN et al. (2009) Regionalizing Telecommunications Reform in West Africa. World
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Guermazi DB (2006) A Regional Approach Towards ICT Sector Development in MRU
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67

99

The World Bank (2010) REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA TECHNICAL ANNEX ON A

PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA.
100
Ibid
101
The World Bank (2010) REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE TECHNICAL ANNEX ON A
PROPOSED {LOAN/CREDIT} TO THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE.
102
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID) CONCEPT STAGE (2011). Washington
D.C. USA: The World Bank. Available at
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West Africa Regional Communications Infrastructure Program. The World Bank.
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EVORA-SAGNA M (2003) ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT PERIOD: 2003. Available at
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Bazzanella S and Le Bihan J-F (No Date) Support for Harmonization of ICT Policies in
Sub-Sahara Africa Implementation strategy. Available at http://www.itu.int/ITUD/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/docs/HIPSSA_implementation_strategy_EN_090608.pdf
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Maddens S (2005) West African Common Market Project: Harmonization of Policies
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International Telecommunications Union (2005) West African Common Market Project:
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SUPPLEMENTARY ACTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION AND
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Directorate. Available at
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November 2010].
109
Ibid
110
International Telecommunications Union (2012) Establishment of Harmonized Policies
for the ICT Market in the ACP Access to Submarine Cables in West Africa ECOWAS
Regulation: HIPSSA Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Sahara Africa. Available at
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/events/2012/Kigali%20docs/Reports/ARTAO_finale_1%20ECOWAS%20Regulation.pdf [accessed 26 May 2014].
111
International Telecommunications Union (2012) Establishment of Harmonized Policies
for the ICT Market in the ACP Access to Submarine Cables in West Africa ECOWAS
Regulation: HIPSSA Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Sahara Africa. Available at
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/events/2012/Kigali%20docs/Reports/ARTAO_finale_1%20ECOWAS%20Regulation.pdf [accessed 26 May 2014].

68

112

Kessides IN et al. (2009) Regionalizing Telecommunications Reform in West Africa.

World Bank. Available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5126
[accessed 24 March 2014].
113
Daily Observer (2013) Gamtel/Gamcel lost over D259M in 2012 -Acting Finance officer.
8 November. Available at http://observer.gm/africa/gambia/article/gamtelgamcel-lost-overd259m-in-2012-acting-finance-officer [accessed 28 May 2014].
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GHANA: GHANA TELECOM AND AREEBA SETTLE INTERCONNECT DISPUTE.
Telecom, Internet and Broadcast in Africa Balancing Act. Available at
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115
Kessides IN et al. (2009) Regionalizing Telecommunications Reform in West Africa.
World Bank. Available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5126
[accessed 24 March 2014].
116
NIGERIAS NCC TO RESOLVE GSM INTERCONNECTION DISPUTE -. Telecom,
Internet and Broadcast in Africa Balancing Act. Available at http://www.balancingactafrica.com/news/en/issue-no-144/telecoms/nigeria-s-ncc-to-res/en [accessed 28 May 2014].
117
LTA Position on Interconnection Dispute between Lonestar & Cellcom. Liberia
Telecommunications Authority. Available at http://www.lta.gov.lr/press.php?news_id=28
[accessed 25 May 2014].
118
Howard K (2001) PRIVATISATION OF INCUMBENT TELECOM OPERATORS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LESSONS FOR LIBERIA. Glasgow, Scotland: UNIVERSITY
OF STRATHCLYDE
119
Liberia. The World FactBook. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/li.html [accessed 26 May 2014].
120
West Africa Regional Communications Infrastructure Programme (WARCIP) Liberia
Project, Liberia Telecommunications Authority (2014) PROJECT MONITORING AND
EVALUATION FRAMEWORK.
121
Howard K (2001) Privatization of Incumbent Telecom Operators in Developing
Countries: Lessons for Liberia. Glasgow, Scotland: University of Strathclyde.
122
World Bank Global Information and Communications Technologies Department Policy
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Reform.
123
Evora-Sagna M (2003) Annual Activity Report Period: 2003. Available at
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2014].
124
Howard K (2001) Privatization of Incumbent Telecom Operators in Developing
Countries: Lessons for Liberia. Glasgow, Scotland: University of Strathclyde.
125
Evora-Sagna M (2003) Annual Activity Report Period: 2003. Available at
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/afr/AfricanActivityReport/documents/Sagna%28REVISED%29.pdf [accessed 30 March
2014].
126
International Telecommunications Union (2000) Workshop on Telecom Reform Policy in
Liberia.
127
Evora-Sagna M (2003) Annual Activity Report Period: 2003. Available at
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/afr/AfricanActivityReport/documents/Sagna%28REVISED%29.pdf [accessed 30 March
2014].

69

128

ECOWAS Peace Process for Liberia (2003) Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between
the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties.
Available at
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08
182003.pdf [accessed 7 June 2014].
129
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A TRUST FUND FOR LIBERIA (TFLIB)
PROPOSED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMPONENT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE
REHABILITATION IN THE AMOUNT OF US$5 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF
LIBERIA (2004). Washington D.C. USA: The World Bank. Available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/03/30/000011823_200503301
80004/Rendered/PDF/31071.pdf [accessed 5 June 2014].
130
Government of Liberia (2005) National Telecommunications Policy and Strategy Telecom
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131
AN ACT TO AMEND THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW CREATING THE LIBERIA
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION AND THE EXECUTIVE LAW CREATING
THE MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND TO ESTABLISH AN
INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION (2005).
132
Telecommunications Act 2007 (2010). Available at
http://www.mopt.gov.lr/doc/telecom_act_2007.pdf [accessed 13 August 2010].
133
Ibid
134
Thakur D et al. (No Date) Regulatory independence and the development of the
telecommunications sector: The Liberian Telecommunications Authority. Available at
http://mikeb.inta.gatech.edu/uploads/papers/lta.pdf [accessed 27 November 2011].
135
Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (2012) PPIAF Assistance in Liberia.
Available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/04/02/000442464_2
0130402155417/Rendered/PDF/757950PPIAF0As00Box374359B00PUBLIC0.pdf [accessed
3 June 2014].
136
op. cit.
137
Sutherland E (2012) A Short Note on Corruption in Telecommunications in Liberia.
Available at file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/SSRN-id2127082.pdf [accessed 4 June 2014].
138
PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY FACILITY (2011) PPIAF
Supports Telecommunications Reform and Liberalization in Liberia. Available at
http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/PPIAF-Impact-Stories-ReformingLiberia-Telecom-Sector.pdf [accessed 3 June 2014].
139
Tariff Moratorium Order, LTA TMO- 003 (2008).
140
Interconnection Tariffs Order, LTA ITO 002A (2008).
141
LTA EXEMPTION ORDER-0004 (2011).
142
Regulations on International Traffic (2012).
143
Draft Interconnection Regulations 2009 Amended (2012).
144
Draft Telecommunications Licensing Fees Regulations (2011).
145
The World Bank (2010) REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA TECHNICAL ANNEX ON A
PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA.
146
Liberia Telecommunications Authority (2012) Consultation document: Amended
Interconnection Regulations 2012 LTA-REG-0003 Republic of Liberia.

70

147

Incyte Consulting (2012) Development and negotiation of regulatory instruments in

connection with the ACE cable landing in Liberia - Final Report.
148
Ibid
149
Best M and Thakur D (2013) TELECOMMUNICATIONS GOVERNANCE IN POST CONFLICT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THE CASE OF THE AFRICA COAST TO
EUROPE (ACE) CABLE SYSTEM IN LIBERIA. In Ocho Rios, Jamaica. Available at
http://mikeb.inta.gatech.edu/uploads/papers/telco.governance.pdf [accessed 5 April 2014].
150
Draft Numbering Regulations (2012).
151
Draft Siting Regulations on Telecommunications Infrastructure Deployment (2012).
152
Draft Regulations on Penalties (2013).
153
Best M and Thakur D (2013) TELECOMMUNICATIONS GOVERNANCE IN POST CONFLICT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THE CASE OF THE AFRICA COAST TO
EUROPE (ACE) CABLE SYSTEM IN LIBERIA. In Ocho Rios, Jamaica. Available at
http://mikeb.inta.gatech.edu/uploads/papers/telco.governance.pdf [accessed 5 April 2014].
154
Liberia Telecommunications Authority (2014) Liberia Telecommunications Authoritys
Strategic Planning Matrix 2014/2015.
155
ACE Cable Consortium (2010) Africa Coast to Europe (ACE)) Submarine Cable
Construction and Maintenance Agreement (C&MA).
156
Pictures from ACE, Liberias first Fiber Optic Cable Lands on South Beach in the P.H.P
Community in Monrovia. TLC Africa The Liberian Connection - Africa. Available at
http://www.tlcafrica.com/Ace/ace_cable_1.htm [accessed 4 November 2010].
157
Pictures from the Launching of The Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) Submarine Cable
System. TLC Africa The Liberian Connection - Africa. Available at
http://www.tlcafrica.com/ACE_Banjul2/photo_ace_launch_1.htm [accessed 25 December
2012].
158
The World Bank (2010) REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA TECHNICAL ANNEX ON A
PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA.
159
West Africa Regional Communications Infrastructure Program Liberia Project (2013)
WARCIP Liberia Project Brief Media Kit.
160
Incyte Consulting (2011) Development and negotiation of regulatory instruments in
connection with the ACE cable landing in Liberia - Market Analysis Report for the Liberia
Telecommunications Authority.
*
These included size, technological superiority, absence of countervailing buying power,
access to financial markets, vertical integration, product diversification and absence of
potential competition.
161
Ibid
162
Telecommunications Act 2007 (2010). Part I, Section 2. Available at
http://www.mopt.gov.lr/doc/telecom_act_2007.pdf [accessed 13 August 2010].
163
Interconnection Regulations 2009 (2009). Part 1.4.
164
Regulation (ECOWAS) C/REG.06/06/12 On Condition for Access to Submarine Cables
Landing Station (2012). Available at
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/actes_add_telecoms/REG_Submarine_Cables.06-0612.pdf [accessed 15 November 2012].
165
SUPPLEMENTARY ACT (ECOWAS) AlSA.2101/07 ON ACCESS AND
INTERCONNECTION IN RESPECT OF ICT SECTOR NETWORKS AND SERVICES (2007).
Article 19. Available at
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/actes_add_telecoms/Interconnection_ECOWAS_Engl
.pdf [accessed 17 March 2010].

71

166

Telecommunications Act 2007 (2010). Part I, Sections 38, 39 and 37. Available at
http://www.mopt.gov.lr/doc/telecom_act_2007.pdf [accessed 13 August 2010].
167
LTA Interconnection Regulations (2009). Section 1.4
168
Op.cit. Sections 42 and 46.
169
Decision of the LTA on the Price Caps to be Applied to the Cable Consortium of Liberia
(2012). Available at http://www.lta.gov.lr/doc/DecisionoftheLTA.pdf [accessed 5 October
2012].
170
USAID Governance and Economic Management System (2010) Fast Track Action Plan
for Distribution of International Broadband Connectivity in Urban and Rural Liberia.
171
CADMOS Consortium (2013) Advisory services to assist the Government of Liberia in the
Public Private Partnership Design and the Divestiture of Government ownership on the
Cable Consortium of Liberia.
172
World Bank (2014) LIBERIA: WEST AFRICA REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT (WARCIP) Aide Memoire Mid-Term Review Mission
Monrovia, Liberia.
173
Op.cit.

72