REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FIRST JUDICIAL REGION

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 3
DAGUPAN CITY, PANGASINAN

CARYL CLAVRERIA
Plaintiff,

Civil Case No. 12345

For: EJECTMENT

GARY ORDOEZ

Respondent.
X---------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENDANT
COMES NOW, Defendant by its Counsel, to this Honorable Court submits this position
paper.
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a Civil Case for EJECTMENT commenced by the Plaintiff, Caryl Claveria
against the Defendant, Gary Ordoez.
The subject matter of this action is a parcel of the land with an area of 250 square meters
located at Tapuac, Dagupan City, Pangasinan.

PARTIES OF THE CASE

Plaintiff, CARYL CLAVERIA is a Filipino,of legal age, single and resides at 16 Rivera
St., Dagupan City, Pangasinan, where she may be served with legal processes and notices issued by
this Honorable Court; and
Defendant, GARY ORDOEZ is a Filipino, of legal, age, married and resides at 33 Tapuac,
Dagupan City, Pangasinan.

SATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant is being sued for Ejectment by the Plaintiff over a parcel of with an area
of 250 square meters parcel of land located in Tapuac District, Dagupan City. The property was
said to be entrusted to Carl, father of the Plaintiff where the Defendant is presently occupying.
The defendant claims ownership due to prescription where they had actually, openly,
exclusively and notoriously in possession of the property for more than 30 years.
SATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Ted is the registered owner of the 250 square meters parcel of land located in Tapuac
District, Dagupan City.
2. He gave authority to Carl Claveria, as a usufructuary, to use the said property with the
undertaking to take care of the same.
3. In 1979, Carl allowed Vincent, Garys father to occupy the property.
4. That with the knowledge of Carl, Gary at the same time lived in the property.
5. That the defendant, his family and predecessors in interest have in been actually, openly,
exclusively and notoriously in possession of the property in the concept of owner.
6. And that they are now the owners of the said lot since the possession of his father in 1979
even after his fathers death in 1990 and even after the death of the registered owner in
1991 and Carl in 1992.

ISSUES
1. Does the plaintiff have cause of action to sue the defendant for Ejectment?
2. Who has a better right to possess the said property in dispute?
3. Is the defendants claim proper?
ARGUMENT/ DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has no cause of action against Defendant.
for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur, namely: (1) there must be
failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there must be demand both to
pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2, Rule 70, namely 15 days in
case of lands and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause

of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in
order that said cause of action may be pursued.
It is very clear that in the case at bar, no cause of action for ejectment has accrued.

Ejectment cases forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings designed to
provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to
the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. Thus, an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership
of the subject property.
Indeed, possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than actual physical possession, not
legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. In a forcible entry case, prior physical
possession is the primary consideration[.] A party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession,
if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. [T]he party in peaceable, quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.
The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is enforceable by or
against the heirs of the deceased. This judgment entitles the winning party to: (a) the restitution of
the premises, (b) the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the premises, and (c) attorneys fees and costs.
[T]he right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a
usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development deprives the heirs of the
usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment
judgment directs its restitution.
Thus, what actually survives under the circumstances is the award of damages, by way of
compensation. Rivera-Calingasan v. Rivera; G.R. No. 171555. April 17, 2013

The Defendant has a better right over the said property.

Ownership is never presumed.
x x x. Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property, to wit:
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership.
The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.

Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by
another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term judicial
process could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reivindicatory action, in which the ownership
claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed before this Honorable Court that the case be
dismissed for lack of merit.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, November 14, 2014.
ATTY. JUST CASE
Counsel for the Defendant
PTR No. 87654
Roll of Attorney No. 34567
IBP No. 12345
MCLE NO. 1111

Ejectment: Allegation of possession of the

property in dispute since time immemorial is
not a defense. Such possession, for whatever
length of time, cannot prevail over a Torrens
title, the validity of which is presumed and
immune to any collateral attack. - G.R. No.
182716
G.R. No. 182716
"x x x.

The point of inquiry is whether the respondents have the right to evict the
petitioners from the subject property and this should be resolved in the
respondents favor. Between the petitioners unsubstantiated self-serving claim
that their father inherited the contested portion of Lot No. 3517 and the
respondents Torrens title, the latter must prevail. The respondents title over
such area is evidence of their ownership thereof. That a certificate of title serves
as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title
over a land is entitled to the possession thereof[16] are fundamental principles
observed in this jurisdiction. Alternatively put, the respondents title and that of
their predecessors-in-interest give rise to the reasonable presumption that the
petitioners have no right over the subject area and that their stay therein was
merely tolerated. The petitioners failed to overcome this presumption, being
inadequately armed by a narration that yearns for proof and corroboration. The
petitioners harped that the subject area was their fathers share in his parents
estate but the absence of any evidence that such property
was indeed adjudicated to their father impresses that their claim of ownership is
nothing but a mere afterthought. In fact, Lot No. 3517 was already registered in

Marias name when Jose Sr. built the house where the petitioners are now
presently residing. It is rather specious that Jose Sr. chose inaction despite Marias
failure to cause the registration of the subject area in his name and would be
contented with a bungalow that is erected on a property that is supposedly his
but registered in anothers name. That there is allegedly an unwritten agreement
between Maria and Virginia that Jose Sr.s and the petitioners possession of the
subject area would remain undisturbed was never proven, hence, cannot be the
basis for their claim of ownership. Rather than proving that Jose Sr. and the
petitioners have a right over the disputed portion of Lot No. 3517, their
possession uncoupled with affirmative action to question the titles of Maria and
the respondents show that the latter merely tolerated their stay.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings

designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
the right to the possession of the property involved. The avowed objective of
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made
summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of
preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his
possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order
in the community.[17] The said objectives can only be achieved by according the
proceedings a summary nature. However, its being summary poses a limitation on
the nature of issues that can be determined and fully ventilated. It is for this
reason that the proceedings are concentrated on the issue on possession. Thus,
whether the petitioners have a better right to the contested area and whether
fraud attended the issuance of Marias title over Lot No. 3517 are issues that are
outside the jurisdiction and competence of a trial court in actions for unlawful
detainer and forcible entry. This is in addition to the long-standing rule that
a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which an ejectment proceeding,
is not an exception.

In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion,[18] a similar allegation

possession of the property in dispute since time immemorial was met with
rebuke as such possession, for whatever length of time, cannot prevail over a
Torrens title, the validity of which is presumed and immune to any collateral
attack.

In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns the property on the basis of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12892, which was issued in the name of Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married to
Nenita L. Songco. It is a settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof. Hence, as the registered owner of the subject property, respondent is preferred to
possess it.

The validity of respondents certificate of title cannot be attacked by petitioner in this case for
ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that
purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not petitioner has the right to
claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the trial court to determine in an action for
unlawful detainer.[19] (Citations omitted)

In Salandanan,[20] the prohibition

a Torrens title was reiterated:

against

the

collateral

attack

of

In Malison, the Court emphasized that when [a] property is registered under the Torrens system,
the registered owners title to the property is presumed and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially
in a mere action for unlawful detainer. In this particular action where petitioners alleged ownership
cannot be established, coupled with the presumption that respondents title to the property is legal,
then the lower courts are correct in ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to possession of the
subject premises.[21] (Citation omitted)

Given the foregoing, the petitioners attempt to remain in possession by

casting a cloud on the respondents title cannot prosper.

Neither will the sheer lapse of time legitimize the petitioners refusal to
vacate the subject area or bar the respondents from gaining possession
thereof. As ruled in Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association,
Inc.,[22] laches does not operate to deprive the registered owner of a parcel of
land of his right to recover possession thereof:

It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under
the Torrenssystem. In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation vs.
Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code, in relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529).

xxxx

Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by arguing that FETA as well as its
predecessor[-]in[-]interest, Don Dionisio M. Fabella, are guilty of laches and should, therefore, be
already precluded from asserting their right as against them, invoking, in this regard, the rulings of this
Court to the effect that while a registered land may not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of the
registered owners inaction and neglect, his right to recover the possession thereof may have been
converted into a stale demand.

While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners posture, a closer look at our
jurisprudence negates their submission.

To start with, the lower court found that petitioners possession of the subject lot was merely at
the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In this connection, Bishop vs. Court of Appeals teaches that if
the claimants possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latters right to recover
possession is never barred by laches.

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they
were aware of the petitioners occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as
the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by
laches.[23] (Citations omitted)

It is, in fact, the petitioners who are guilty of laches. Petitioners, who
claimed that Maria fraudulently registered the subject area inherited by their
father, did not lift a finger to question the validity of OCT No. 543, which was
issued in 1929. Petitioners waited for the lapse of a substantial period of time and
if not for the respondents demands to vacate, they would not have bothered to
assert their fathers supposed successional rights. The petitioners inaction is
contrary to the posture taken by a reasonably diligent person whose rights have
supposedly been trampled upon and the pretense of ignorance does not provide
justification or refuge. Maria was able to register Lot No. 3517 in her name as
early as 1929 and respondents acquired title in April 5, 1968 and knowledge of
these events is imputed to the petitioners by the fact of registration.

THIRD DIVISION

HEIRS OF DEMETRIO MELCHOR,

REPRESENTED BY CLETO MELCHOR,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 150633
November 12, 2003
-versus-

JULIO MELCHOR,
Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Municipal Trial Court would not have jurisdiction over a purported
unlawful detainer suit, if the complaint fails to allege jurisdictional facts.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify the August 16, 2001 Decision [2] and the October
18, 2001 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 63465.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as follows: chan robles virtual law
library

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED

DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Joint
Decision dated February 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of
Cauayan, Isabela which embodied the assailed judgment in Civil Case No.
20-1125 and affirmed the Decision dated September 1, 2000 of the

Municipal Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, dismissing the complaint for

ejectment of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 2325, entitled 'Heirs of
Demetrio Melchor represented by Cleto Melchor v. Julio Melchor,' is hereby
AFFIRMED and REITERATED. chan robles virtual law library
"Costs against the petitioners." [4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:
"Petitioners, who are the heirs of DEMETRIO MELCHOR, claim to be the
owners, by way of succession, of the subject property allegedly in
possession of respondent JULIO MELCHOR. The subject property is a portion
of the twenty (20) hectares of land registered in the name of PEDRO
MELCHOR, evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. I-6020 of the
Registry of Deeds for Isabela. The said property was purchased by the late
DEMETRIO MELCHOR from PEDRO MELCHOR, the deceased father of herein
respondent JULIO MELCHOR. During the lifetime of the late DEMETRIO
MELCHOR, a request for the approval of the Deed of Sale dated February 14,
1947 between DEMETRIO MELCHOR and PEDRO MELCHOR was made to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 4, 1953, which
was subsequently approved. Since February 14, 1947 up to the present,
petitioners further allege that respondent has been occupying the subject
property and has been harvesting crops thereon and using it for grassing
cows and carabaos. chan robles virtual law library
"A demand letter dated August 21, 1999 was allegedly sent by the
petitioners to the respondent, demanding him to vacate and surrender the
said property, but the latter refused. The disagreement reached the
barangay authorities, which case was not amicably settled, resulting in the
issuance of a certification to file action. chan robles virtual law library
"Petitioners filed against respondent a complaint for ejectment before the
MTC of Cauayan, Isabela which they subsequently refiled in their Second
Amended Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2325 and dated May 31,
2001, to accommodate additional allegations therein. chan robles virtual law library
"For his part, the defendant (now respondent) in Civil Case No. 2325
principally raised the matter of ownership by alleging affirmative/special
defenses, among others, that the parcel of land in possession of the
defendant is registered in the name of ANTONIA QUITERAS, the deceased
mother of the defendant, as per Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-274828
of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela, and that the same property is now
owned by the defendant and his three (3) sisters and one (1) brother,
having inherited the same from their late mother, ANTONIA QUITERAS.
"The Decision dated September 1, 2000, which was penned by acting MTC
Judge BERNABE B. MENDOZA, was rendered in favor of the respondent, the
pertinent portions of which read: chan robles virtual law library
'There is no allegation that plaintiffs have been deprived of the possession of
the land by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
'The dispossession was made in 1947. As such, ejectment is not the proper
remedy.
'WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case.
'No pronouncement as to costs.
'SO ORDERED.'
"On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela,
presided over by Executive Judge HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, rendered,

together with another related complaint for ejectment, i.e., Civil Case No.
20-1126, the Joint Decision dated February 5, 2001, the decretal portion of
which reads: chan robles virtual law library
'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
'1. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. Br. 20-1126 entitled, 'Heirs of
Liberato Lumelay, et al. vs. Heirs of Julio Melchor.' Costs against the
appellants.chan robles virtual law library
'2. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. 201-1125, entitled, 'Heirs of
Demetrio Melchor, et al. vs. Julio Melchor,' Costs against the appellants. chan
robles virtual law library

'SO ORDERED.'" [5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA ruled that petitioners had
failed to make a case for unlawful detainer. It opined that the MTC had
never acquired jurisdiction over the case, because there was no allegation
that the parties had entered into a contract express or implied or that
there was possession by tolerance. chan robles virtual law library
Furthermore, the appellate court held that the proper remedy should have
been a plenary action for recovery of possession, not a summary action for
ejectment.
Hence, this Petition. [6]
The Issue
In their Memorandum, [7] petitioners raised only one alleged error:
"The Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it ruled that the Second
Amended Complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action for x x x
unlawful detainer." [8] chan robles virtual law library
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Lone Issue: Sufficiency of the Complaint for Ejectment
Petitioners filed a summary action for ejectment based on Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 1 of the Rule, two separate remedies are
available one for forcible entry and another for unlawful
detainer. [9] Petitioners maintain that while the Complaint does not support
a cause of action for forcible entry, the allegations therein certainly indicate
one for unlawful detainer. They add that they did not commit any
jurisdictional infirmity in failing to allege prior physical possession, because
that fact is not an element of unlawful detainer.chan robles virtual law library
We do not agree. Even if petitioners may be correct in saying that prior
physical possession by the plaintiff need not be alleged in an action for
unlawful detainer, [10] the absence of such possession does not ipso facto
make their Complaint sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the MTC. chan robles
c ralaw

c ralaw

virtual law library

In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the

allegations of the complaint. [11] The test for determining the sufficiency of
those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
plaintiff. [12] chan robles virtual law library
A review of the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners discloses these
pertinent allegations: the absolute owner of the subject land was their
father, Demetrio Melchor, who bought it on February 14, 1947 from
respondent's father, Pedro Melchor; [13] being the heirs of Demetrio
Melchor, petitioners became the owners of the property by reason of

succession; [14] as such, they sent a formal demand letter to respondent,

who had been using the property since February 14, 1947, for grazing cows
and carabaos and for planting crops;[15] and in that letter, they asked him
to vacate and surrender the property,[16] but he failed to do so. [17] chan robles
virtual law library

Accordingly, petitioners prayed for judgment ordering respondent to vacate

the property and to pay P500,000, which represented the income earned
from February 14, 1947 to the present, as well the costs of the suit. [18] chan
robles virtual law library

It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to
constitute a case for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. These actions,
which deal with physical or de facto possession, [19] may be distinguished as
follows: chan robles virtual law library
"(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that
he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof,
while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is
unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is
originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right
of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts
of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be
specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is
demurrable." [20] chan robles virtual law library
As correctly held by the appellate court, "[f]orcible entry must be ruled out
as there was no allegation that the petitioners were denied possession of the
subject property through any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court." [21] chan robles virtual law library
Neither was unlawful detainer satisfactorily alleged. In determining the
sufficiency of a complaint therefor, it is not necessary to EMPLOY the
terminology of the law. [22] Not averred in this case, however, were certain
essential facts such as how entry was effected, or how and when
dispossession started. [23] Petitioners merely alleged their ownership of the
land, which had supposedly been possessed by respondent since 1947.
There was no allegation showing that his possession of it was initially legal
by virtue of a contract, express or implied and that it became illegal
after the expiration of his right to possess.
Neither did the Complaint claim as a fact any overt act on the part of
petitioners showing that they had permitted or tolerated respondent's
occupancy of the subject property. [24] It is a settled rule that in order to
justify an action for unlawful detainer, the owner's permission or tolerance
must be present at the beginning of the possession. [25] Furthermore, the
complaint must aver the facts showing that the inferior court has jurisdiction
to try the case; for example, by describing how defendant's possession
started or continued. [26] chan robles virtual law library
The prayer of petitioners contradicts, however, the existence of possession
by tolerance. It must be noted that they seek to be paid P500,000 as
payment for the use of the property by respondent from 1947 to the
present. This allegation implies that they never permitted him to possess the
land. chan robles virtual law library
Since the Complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid
cause for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the appellate court was correct
cra law

in holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case.

chan robles virtual law

library

Verily, the failure of petitioners to properly allege a case for ejectment does
not leave them without any other remedy. Under the proper circumstances,
what may be filed is a case either for accion publiciana, which is a plenary
action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion
reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. [27] This
principle was laid down in Ong v. Parel as follows: [28] chan robles virtual law library
"The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either
be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional
trial court.chan robles virtual law library
"If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this
suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the
ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial
court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or
forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession
thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or
material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a
summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession
thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the
circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment." chan robles
virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners. chan robles virtual law library
SO ORDERED. chan robles virtual law library
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ.,
concur. chan robles virtual law library

____________________________
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-18.

chan robles virtual law library

[2] Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama Jr. and concurred in by Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez Jr. (Division chairman) and Eliezer R. de los Santos (member); id., pp. 20-26.
[3] Rollo, p. 27.

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[4] CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 26.

[5] Id., pp. 1-3 & 20-22.

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[6] The case was deemed submitted for decision on October 22, 2002, upon this Court's
receipt of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Diosdado B. Ramirez.
Petitioners' Memorandum, filed on October 9, 2002, was signed by Atty. Ernesto S.

Carreon.
[7] Rollo, pp. 142-151.

chan robles virtual law library

[8] Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 144.

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[9] Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, provides:

c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

chan robles virtual law library

"SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the
next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express
or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs."

chan robles virtual law library

[10] Barba v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126638, February 6, 2002; citing Spouses Benitez v.
Court of Appeals, 334 Phil 216, January 16, 1997.

chan robles virtual law library

[11] Spouses Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, October 10, 2001; Hilario v. Court of
Appeals, 329 Phil. 202, August 7, 1996.
[12] Feliciano v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 499, March 5, 1998.
[13] Second Amended Complaint, par. 5, p. 2; rollo, p. 29.
[14] Id., par. 9; ibid.
[15] Ibid.

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[16] Id., par. 10; ibid.

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[17] Id., par. 12, p. 3; id., p. 30.

[18] Id., p. 3; ibid.

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[19] Amagan v. Marayag, 383 Phil. 486, February 28, 2000.

chan robles virtual law library

[20] Spouses Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, supra, p. 299, per Quisumbing, J.

library

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[21] CA Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 24-25.

chan robles virtual law library

[22] Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525, September 18, 2000.

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[23] Ibid.; Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao, 358 Phil. 83, October 8, 1998.

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law library

[24] Ong v. Parel, 355 SCRA 691, March 28, 2001.

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[25] Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, August 14, 2001.
[26] Hilario v. Court of Appeals, supra.

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[27] Heirs of Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, GR No. 146815, April 9, 2003.

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[28] Supra, p. 699, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J; citing Sarmiento v. CA, 320 Phil. 146, 156,
November 16, 1995, per Regalado J.

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