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Meanwhile, Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw his appeal and had immediately gone back to his
province upon release from prison. The Bureau of Corrections noted that there was nothing to show that Salle
and Mengeto accepted the pardon. Meanwhile, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its subsequent comment,
said that the the respondents acceptance of the conditional pardon implied that they admitted their guilt and
accepted their sentence, hence, the appeal should be dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a presidential pardon may be enforced if it is granted to and accused during the
pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court.
RULING: No, a pardon, whether conditional or otherwise, cannot be enforced when the accused granted of it
has a pending appeal on his conviction.
The Constitution limits the pardoning powers of the President by: 1) that such power does not extend to cases
of impeachment and; 2) no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
There had been conflicts in the application of the SC rulings on similar issues. However, in this case, the
Supreme Court finally took a decisive action on the matter and said:
We now declare that the conviction by final judgment limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted
upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has
not appealed from his conviction or he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a
certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon
shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a
pardon commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible
therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the
pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
In the case of Mengote, the SC gave Mengote 30 days from the notice of the ruling to secure a withdrawal of
his appeal and submit it to the high court. The conditional pardon will only be deemed effective once the
withdrawal of appeal is granted. Failure to comply will compel the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to take
Mengote into its custody.
reprieves. For the public respondents therefore contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of
an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
B. Civil Service Commission
Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al (G.R. No. 93023)
FACTS: Petitioner served as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In
1990, responding to the request of the President of the Philippines to all Department Heads, Undersecretaries,
Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads, and other government officials, petitioner filed a courtesy resignation.
The President accepted his resignation and consequently, the Secretary of Labor ordered him to vacate and
relinquish his post. Petitioner protested and refused to surrender his office claiming that his resignation was
not voluntary since it was only in obedience to the Presidents directive.
He argued that since he has a rank of undersecretary and is a member of the Career Service of the Civil
Service, he therefore enjoys security of tenure. Petitioner added that as such, it was beyond the prerogatives
of the President to require them to submit courtesy resignation. Petitioner furthered that his removal from
office was illegal since it was through a courtesy resignation which should not be recognized in the legal sense
since it did not necessarily reflect the officials intent to surrender his post. If such courtesy resignations are
filed, they should not be recognized since these were submitted under duress, otherwise, the President
would have the power to remove career officials at pleasure and even for capricious reasons.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that petitioner was not civil service eligible when he was appointed in
the POEA since he did not take the Career Executive Service Examination. Petitioner was holding office in
temporary capacity and did not enjoy security of tenure granted to permanent members of the Civil Service,
thus, he could be removed from office upon the discretion of the appointing authority. Petitioner insisted that
his position was intended to be permanent because temporary appointments were not for more than 12
months. He, however, had been in position for over three years.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner enjoyed security of tenure.
RULING: No, petitioner did not enjoy security of tenure.
The Supreme Court said that the law provides security of tenure only to permanent appointees, or those who
meet all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure
to its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the
nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to
the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The
appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions
by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. The
person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called upon to do so by the appointing authority.
One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at
the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause.
Instance in Cebu declared their termination as null and void because it did not bear the approval of the
Department Head which was a requirement . Respondents then filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may be reinstated in their positions in the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court but for different reasons. The high
court found that the reasons for the abolition of the positions of the petitioners were false and that there was
deception in their removal. The SC said that this constituted a violation of the security of tenure enjoyed by
permanent appointees provided for by the Constitution to employees under the Civil Service.
A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles, like
petitioners herein who have rendered long and honorable service, should not be sacrificed in favor of noneligibles given positions of recent creation, nor should they be left at the mercy of political changes
The Constitution provides that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law.
...while abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule is true only where the
abolition is made in good faith; that the right to abolish can not be used to discharge employees in violation of
the civil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons.
proven by the memorandum which led to his assumption of the said office, and he does not enjoy security of
tenure.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
B. General Provisions
E. Term of elective officials
Aldovino, et al. v. Comelec, et al. (G.R. No. 184836)
FACTS: Private respondent Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. On his third
term, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days because of a criminal case filed against him.
The suspension was lifted by the Supreme Court allowing him to resume his duties as councilor and finish his
term.
On the next election, Asilo again filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. Herein petitioners then
filed an election protest seeking for the cancellation of Asilos candidacy since it violated the three-term limit
provided by the Constitution. However, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) Second Division ruled in favor
of Asilo saying that the latter had failed to render complete service during his last term because of the
preventive suspension that he served which was an interruption of his term. The Comelec en banc refused to
reconsider the ruling of its second division hence the petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not service of preemptive suspension during an elected officials third term constitutes an
interruption that will exempt the official from the three-term limit rule of the Constitution.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court defined interruption of a term is one that involves no less than involuntary
loss of title to office. It occurs when the term is broken because the person holding office lost the right to
occupy the position. Meanwhile, failure to render service happens when an officer retains his title but cannot
exercise his official functions.
In the case of Asilo, his preventive suspension was not equivalent to an interruption of his term and could not
be used as a basis for his running for the same position a fourth time.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. Genera Provisions
f. Sectoral Representation
Supangan, Jr., v. Santos (G.R. 84663)
FACTS: Petitioner Supangan was elected as the Kabataang Barangay Chairman and consequently, was elected
as KB Provincial Federation Later on, he was appointed as a member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan by the
President. Three years later, respondent Domantay presented a letter from respondent Secretary Santos
before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan stating that the former was to assume office in replacement of
Supangan. Domantay took her oath and began attending sessions.
Supangan filed a petition assailing the appointment. He argued that Secretary Santos had no legal authority to
designate Domantay as a youth representative since Domantay was not elected as Kabataang Barangay
Provincial Federation President, a basic qualification for the position.
ISSUES: Whether or not Domantays appointment as youth representative of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan
was constitutional.
RULING: No, Domantays appointment was not valid. Batas Pambansa No. 51 provides for the composition of
the local governments and in explicitly stated that the president of the city federation of the Kabataang
Barangay may be appointed as one of the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Domantay was never
elected as Kabataang Barangay Provincial Federation President of the city which was a basic qualification for
the appointment as member of the Sanguniang Panlungsod.
acted in pari delicto and was not qualified to recover the money used to purchase the properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Frenzel is not qualified to recover the money used to
purchase the properties which were under the name of his former Filipino common-law wife.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the CA in toto. The SC cited Sec. 14, Art. XIV of the 1973
Constitution which stated that private land may only be conveyed to individuals, corporations or associations
that are qualified to own lands in Philippine public domain. Aliens individuals and corporations are effectively
barred from acquiring private lands. Frenzel purchased the properties in question despite knowing that he is
constitutionally prohibited, hence he is in equal fault, and therefore cannot recover the money he used to buy
the properties.