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Britain, Konfrontasi, and

the end of empire in
Southeast Asia, 196165
John Subritzky
Published online: 01 Jul 2008.

To cite this article: John Subritzky (2000) Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of
empire in Southeast Asia, 196165, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 28:3, 209-227, DOI: 10.1080/03086530008583106
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Britain, Konfrontasi, and the End of Empire

in Southeast Asia, 1961-65

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JOHN SUBRITZKY

In early 1965 Britain had over 60,000 servicemen deployed in the Far East,
together with a surface fleet of over eighty warships.1 The main reason for
this extraordinary level of deployment was Indonesia's Confrontation of
Malaysia. Started in January 1963, Konfrontasi had become, by 1965,
Britain's gravest colonial crisis of the 1960s. This essay places Britain's
Confrontation policy in its international context. No nation's foreign policy
is formulated in a vacuum. For British officials, both the creation and the
subsequent defence of Malaysia were inextricably linked to Britain's
relationship with the United States and, to a lesser degree, Australia and
New Zealand. It is contended in this essay that Britain's primary motivation
for establishing Malaysia was to preserve its influence in the region in an
era where formal empire was no longer tenable. A continued British
political and military presence in Southeast Asia, based in Singapore, was
regarded in London as a vital element in securing strategic partnership with
the Americans, and in maintaining Commonwealth solidarity with the
Australians and New Zealanders.
But Konfrontasi turned British plans on their head. The asking price to
be paid for remaining a Far Eastern power proved too high. Although
history records that Malaysia did eventually survive, albeit without
Singapore and Brunei, the same could not be said for British influence in the
region. Faced with enormous costs associated with protecting this influence
east of Suez, the Wilson government initiated plans for disengagement in
late 1965. For Britain, Konfrontasi was a pyrrhic victory. Insofar as British
withdrawal and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, not the destruction of
Malaysia per se, was his ultimate objective, the Indonesian president,
Sukarno, had succeeded beyond expectation.
I
The genesis of Konfrontasi lay in Britain's plans to divest itself of formal
empire in Southeast Asia. Although independence had been conceded to
Malaya in 1957, Britain retained significant colonies elsewhere in the

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region. The most important of these was undoubtedly Singapore. Britain's

largest overseas military base and a valuable entrepot for trade and finance,
Singapore was a substantial asset for a country which still regarded itself as
a major world power. In the colony itself, however, the large Chinese
population was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their colonial status.
Responding to this agitation for greater independence, Britain promulgated
a new constitution in 1958. The colony reverted to the status of a selfgoverning territory, with Britain's sovereign powers restricted to defence
and foreign affairs. The first elections under the new constitution were held
in May 1959 with Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party (PAP) winning on
a platform of complete independence.
Once in power Lee's outlook quickly changed. Mindful of the economic
value of both the military base and trading connections with Britain and the
Commonwealth, Lee moderated his demands for full independence. This
antagonized the left wing of his own party, causing a split in 1961, when a
significant number of Lee's colleagues formed the Barisan Socialis, or
Socialist Front. This communist-led party demanded formal independence
from Britain and the adoption of a socialist constitution for a new Republic
of Singapore. By July 1961, due to a by-election victory, the Barisan
Socialis trailed the PAP by only one seat in the Legislative Assembly, with
Lee relying on the Speaker's vote to retain power. Not surprisingly, these
developments were of grave concern to the British Prime Minister, Harold
Macmillan. Only one year after his famous 'wind of change' speech in
South Africa, Macmillan was well aware of the need to accommodate the
rising force of nationalism in Asia-Africa if Britain's influence was to
survive in the post-colonial world. Searching for possible solutions to
growing nationalist assertiveness in Singapore, British policy-makers
returned to a familiar objective: a federation of former British possessions
in Southeast Asia.2 The name given to such a future grouping was Greater
Malaysia.
The British viewed federation as a solution to two separate problems: it
would provide a viable political entity for the Borneo colonies, considered
too small and unsophisticated to survive by themselves as an independent
state; and it would allow the transfer to the Malayans of responsibility for
internal security in Singapore, thereby relieving Britain of an onerous,
costly, and politically demanding task.3 The Malayan government was no
longer so opposed to the idea of a federation which included Singapore,
particularly as concern mounted that the Barisan Socialis might obtain
power and create a communist state on Malaya's borders.4 The British were
also providing an incentive for union by including the Borneo colonies. This
would ensure that the Chinese would not outnumber other racial groups in
the new state. On 27 May 1961 the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul

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211

Rahman, announced his support for a 'closer understanding' at some future

date between Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo and the Sultanate of
Brunei. American State Department records indicate that, although British
officials had in fact made the initial suggestion, London willingly conceded
authorship to the Malayans in the hope that this would enhance the
credibility of Greater Malaysia with both the inhabitants concerned and
world opinion in general.5
Historians have differed as to the Macmillan government's overall
objectives in pursuing decolonization through Greater Malaysia. One view
is that federation was designed to facilitate British disengagement from the
region.6 With the Belgian Congo a recent tragic example, the British were
clearly averse to sudden withdrawal. Such rapid decolonization risked
leaving a political vacuum in which chaos reigned and communism
flourished. Federation was the means by which the British attempted to
exert greater control over the process and avoid political anarchy after their
departure. An alternative interpretation is that the British were responding
to a changed political environment in which formal rule from London was
no longer tenable. In its place, influence would be retained by more indirect
means, namely self-government within the British Commonwealth. By this
route, British elites hoped that still extensive bilateral financial and trade
ties, together with defence collaboration, would continue to bind Malaysia
to Britain, thus preserving British influence well after formal independence
had been conceded. Such an arrangement has been described by historians
as 'informal empire'. More recently, A. J. Stockwell has challenged the
contention that Malaysia was a neo-colonial creation, suggesting inter alia
that the British never had sufficient control over the process to realize their
objective - if indeed they had one - of perpetuating empire.7 As an
interpretation of the result Stockwell is undoubtedly correct. British
influence did not long survive after Malaysia was established. Nevertheless,
the documentary evidence clearly suggests that British intentions at the time
in creating Malaysia were to maintain rather than end Britain's historic
interests in the region. The extent to which they proved incapable of doing
so is a separate issue.
Given Lee's continued precarious position in Singapore, the Tunku was
eager to conclude arrangements as quickly as possible. Although the British
welcomed Malayan support, one substantial point of difference remained
between London and Kuala Lumpur. On 26 June the Tunku informed
Macmillan that, although Britain could retain its military bases in
Singapore, it would not be allowed to use them in support of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) once Malaysia was established.8 Such a
restriction, if implemented, could create major complications for British
defence policy in the region. The Chiefs of Staff were adamant that, to

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maintain a credible military posture in the region, Britain must be able to

employ its bases for SEATO-related operations.9 Similar concerns were
raised by Britain's principal regional allies, the United States, Australia and
New Zealand.10 They would not support Greater Malaysia if it meant the
loss of Singapore to SEATO. But not all British policy-makers regarded
such loss with alarm. Noting the considerable gap between commitments
and resources, the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, Lord
Selkirk, suggested to Macmillan that the time might be right for Britain to
avail itself of Greater Malaysia as means of swiftly cutting back its
commitments in the region."
Selkirk's prescription was too radical for policy-makers in London, the
majority of whom favoured as little disruption of the status quo as possible.
The Chiefs of Staff were particularly reluctant supporters of Greater
Malaysia. Accepting that political realities in Singapore rendered British
sovereignty untenable, they saw federation as offering the greatest chance
of stability but emphasized nonetheless that British military deployment in
the region - in support of either SEATO or Commonwealth operations would be compromised without the unrestricted use of the Singapore
bases.12 Crucial to the attitudes of British ministers was their belief that
Britain was, and should remain, a global power. 'The fact remains'* argued
Julian Amery, Secretary of State for Air, 'that if we want to maintain our
influence with Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and the United
States on the other, we must have the effective use of Singapore. Without it,
our influence in the area could sink to the level of France."3 The Prime
Minister himself shared this outlook. Macmillan was no revolutionary in
foreign affairs, still essentially believing in British global influence,
although he recognized that this power had to be projected differently in the
post-colonial era.14 As one former Foreign Office official put it later, 'the
Tories were always committed to imperial responsibilities and the world
role ... their instinct was to hang on and not give up until they were
convinced it was the only option'.'5
On 20 November 1961 the British received a Malayan delegation for
discussions on Greater Malaysia. During the talks the Tunku reversed his
earlier stance, accepting Britain's requirement for unfettered use of its bases
in Singapore. With this hurdle overcome, agreement was quickly reached in
favour of federation. Both parties agreed to work towards establishing the
new state by 31 August 1963. In the meantime, Britain made preparations
for transferring the troublesome problem of security in Singapore into
Malayan hands. As part of this process, substantial cuts were made in late
1961 to the level of British ground forces in Singapore. Macmillan's
administration pursued its vision of informal empire, hoping that influence
could be retained by less direct means, and with the employment of fewer

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213

resources. Some advisers feared these objectives were irreconcilable. 'We

seem to be pursuing two separate policies', warned Lord Selkirk. 'First, to
maintain freedom of military action in the area generally and in Singapore
in particular, and secondly substantially to reduce our forces in this area.
These two policies cannot be reconciled and we will have to decide which
we consider to be most important. In practice', he concluded, 'I have little
doubt that reasons of economy will compel us to accept the latter."6 During
1962 the British proceeded with preparations for rapid decolonization,
despite the concern of some, especially Colonial Office officials, that many
of the Borneo peoples were content with the status quo.17
II
A major concern of British planners was how Greater Malaysia would be
received by its neighbours, particularly Indonesia. There was considerable
relief when, during preliminary talks with the Indonesians, no objections
were raised.18 In retrospect, it seems that this silence from Jakarta was
largely due to their preoccupation with the campaign against Dutch rule in
West New Guinea. Acquiring sovereignty over this last territory of the
former Dutch East Indies had clear priority for President Sukarno. Once this
was settled in late 1962, he was then in a position to turn his attention to
British plans regarding Malaysia.
Indonesian foreign policy was dominated by Sukarno and his particular
view of the world.19 He trumpeted a philosophy in which emerging forces,
represented by new countries like Indonesia, were locked in a struggle with
the reactionary established forces, represented by former imperial powers
like Britain. A common method by which the old established states retained
their influence was through 'neo-colonialism'; in Sukarno's mind, the
granting of political independence was offset cunningly by the maintenance
of European control over extensive economic and other interests. Malaysia
appeared a classic example of the type of neo-colonialism about which
Sukarno had warned his country. Under the arrangements for independence,
Britain was to preserve significant military interests, including the
unrestricted use of its bases in Singapore. British finance and trade would
also play a crucial part in Malaysia's economy. The British were clearly
eager to retain a significant role for themselves in the region after Malaysia
had been established. Sukarno understood this, regarded it as a direct
challenge to Indonesia's political philosophy, and reacted accordingly.
On 20 January 1963 the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr R. Subandrio,
announced a policy of Confrontation against the proposed state of Malaysia.
The term was deliberately vague. Realizing that an open engagement with
superior British forces would be futile, Sukarno hoped to wear them down

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in a guerrilla insurgency in the Borneo jungle. In early 1963 Indonesian

army regulars, posing as insurgents, began crossing the border. Far from
easing Malaysia quietly onto the international stage, Britain now faced the
considerable task of establishing it against the direct opposition of its closest
neighbour.
British policy-makers were agreed that the Indonesian challenge had to
be resisted.20 Britain was committed to creating a Federation of Malaysia on
31 August 1963, the Prime Minister advised the Foreign Secretary, Lord
Home, 'and there can, of course, be no question of not honouring that
undertaking'.21 Moreover, in doing so, the British recognized that they had
undertaken a potentially formidable commitment. A guerrilla war launched
from inside Indonesia's borders could be sustained by Sukarno for many
years. The human and military resources Britain might have to expend in
responding dramatically undermined London's basic objectives in
establishing a greater Malaysian state. As Philip de Zulueta, Macmillan's
Principal Private Secretary, recalled, the Prime Minister's civil and military
advisers had hoped that Malaysia would enable Britain to reduce its visible
presence in Southeast Asia, particularly in the form of garrisoned troops,
while nevertheless retaining significant political influence by more indirect
means. Sukarno's violent opposition made this impossible.22 This fact also
had important ramifications for the British government's economic
objectives. The Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, emphasized to Macmillan
that, 'so long as we are committed to defend Malaysia against attack, we
shall be unable - even if the attack is limited to infiltration - to make any
significant reduction in our forces in Southeast Asia. Little by little, the
defence "economies" which the Chequers meeting undertook to ensure, are
being shown to be impossible as a result of our overseas political
obligations.'23 Macmillan was well aware of the difficulties. 'I doubt
whether this is a situation,' he admitted to Home, 'if it really got out of
control, we could deal with single-handed.'24
British hopes that Indonesia might eventually be reconciled to Malaysia
were finally dashed on 16 September 1963, the date when the Federation
was formally established. An angry mob in Jakarta responded by attacking
and then looting the British embassy. Both Britain and Indonesia had
invested considerable international prestige in Malaysia, one for its
survival, the other for its destruction. Neither could easily back down for
fear of losing face. With Indonesian opposition seemingly entrenched,
British military advisers warned of the difficulties involved in protecting the
new state from its hostile neighbour. 'We are seriously concerned,' warned
Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'about the implications
which a long drawn out commitment, of the nature which we now envisage,
will have on our ability to meet other emergencies. At worst,' he concluded,

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'costs might well compare with those involved in the Malayan

emergency.'25 Despite these rapidly increasing costs Britain continued to
honour its commitments to Malaysia.
The importance of Southeast Asia to British national interests was not
immediately apparent. Both trade and investment between Britain and the
region had declined over the previous decade. 'Economic arguments alone,'
wrote Macmillan to Selkirk, 'would not justify, and have not for many years
justified, our very heavy expenditure on the maintenance of defence forces
in the Far East. Wider political and military interests are at stake.'26 What
were these wider political interests? Fundamental was the prevalent
Whitehall assumption that Britain was, and should remain, a global power.
It naturally followed from this world view, largely etched in historical
experience, that Britain should continue to contribute to the security of
Commonwealth allies. 'So long as Commonwealth defence has any
meaning at all,' advised Fred Warner, head of the Foreign Office's
Southeast Asia department, 'our obligations to Australia, New Zealand and
Malaysia, and more remotely India and Pakistan, command our continued
presence.'27 The reference to India exemplifies the difficulty faced by some
British policy-makers in disengaging themselves from traditional strategic
considerations and assumptions that had already become outdated.
Of decisive importance to Britain's global power pretensions was the
complex relationship with the United States. Macmillan's analogy of
Britain's Greece to America's Rome neatly summarized the hopes of the
British elite of influencing, albeit modestly, the foreign policy of the world's
greatest power. A significant British military presence in Southeast Asia
was one means of consolidating this idea of partnership with the Americans.
By contributing to the containment of communism in the region, Britain
was able to present its bona fides to the United States as a dependable senior
ally in the Western alliance. In return, the British hoped that, through this
influence, American power could be harnessed on occasion for the
furtherance of specifically British objectives.28 A stable Malaysia, with a
continued British military presence in Singapore, was therefore vital if
Britain was to retain these important linkages with not only the United
States, but also key Commonwealth allies, namely Australia and New
Zealand.29 This was a world with which Tory politicians, in particular, were
entirely comfortable. Indonesian Confrontation represented a major threat
to that world.
By the end of 1963 a stalemate had ensued in Borneo. Indonesian forces
had been unable to prevent Malaysia being established. On the other hand,
British forces could not prevent the easy flow of insurgents crossing from
Indonesian Kalimantan into Malaysian Borneo. The possibility of being tied
down in a long guerrilla campaign caused mounting concern in London.

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'Although we can certainly carry on for some time', wrote the Minister of
Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, 'it will not be possible for the present state of
affairs to continue indefinitely. The Indonesians can readily increase their
pressure, and we should then have no choice but to step up our own military
action and make further calls upon our strained military resources.'30 The
British made it clear, as prospects for a quick end to Confrontation
disappeared, that strong support from key allies was vital for eventual
success. The response from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand,
however, merely contributed further to the gloomy outlook.
The Kennedy administration had warned London early in the crisis that
American military intervention was highly unlikely. The President and his
advisers, noting the strategic importance of Indonesia, and the fragile
domestic political balance there between the Army and communists, did not
want to risk an open breach with Jakarta. They feared that escalation might
only result in a communist takeover in Indonesia, much to the detriment of
Western interests in the region. 'The real danger in the Far East', warned
Averell Harriman, Under-Secretary of State for political affairs, 'is
communist China and it is therefore essential to save Indonesia from
communist influence. If Indonesia did go Red there was no hope for other
countries in Southeast Asia.'31 To avert such a catastrophe was the
paramount objective of the Kennedy administration. 'To me,' argued
presidential adviser Robert Komer, 'it's worth every resource of
preventative diplomacy to forestall the kind of blow-up over Malaysia in
which our very success in blocking Sukarno may lose us Indonesia.'32
Australian and New Zealand politicians agreed with these sentiments.33
In its relations with these three allies, Britain faced a dilemma between
its interest in establishing Malaysia, and the Cold War imperative,
underlined continuously by the allies, that Indonesia must remain noncommunist. Crucial American support would be forthcoming only when
London's interest in Malaysia could be reconciled to Washington's wider
regional objectives, focusing on Indonesia. Until then, Britain would be
largely alone in bearing the full force of Sukarno's Confrontation. The
difficulty in balancing imperial against Cold War requirements was
recognized by Macmillan's successor as Prime Minister, Alec DouglasHome. 'We must defend Malaysia of course; but it will help neither
Malaysia nor ourselves, nor the Western cause in general, if in the course of
defending Malaysia we drive Indonesia into the arms of communist Russia
or China. It is probably considerations of this sort that make our friends and
allies less than wholehearted in our support.'34 R. A. Butler, the new Foreign
Secretary, did not disagree, but pointed out that Britain's available options
were limited. He saw little alternative but to retain a strong defensive
posture in Borneo until more favourable circumstances developed.35 The

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stalemate therefore continued. Confrontation had become a war of attrition.

Not surprisingly, the likelihood that Confrontation would continue for
the foreseeable future deeply distressed British policy-makers and led to
them questioning whether a traditional military presence in Singapore was
the best means of promoting British interests in Southeast Asia. In
particular, the cost of maintaining defence establishments east of Suez
would not appear to be offset by the financial and trade returns from the
region. Furthermore, officials were becoming uneasy with aspects of
American-led Western strategy in Asia generally, suggesting that alliance
structures such as SEATO, and military bases like Singapore, might be
assisting, not hindering, communist infiltration.
Ill

During mid-1964 the Foreign Office conducted a review of British policy in

Southeast Asia. As a starting point, officials analysed the extent of Britain's
trade and economic interests in the region. These were found to have
steadily declined in importance over the previous 25 years. No longer was
Britain in particular need of primary products from the region, such as
rubber and tin. No longer was Malaysia a net contributor of American
dollars to the sterling area, but rather was in deficit and likely to remain so.
Put simply, the level of Britain's economic interest in the region had become
more negative than positive. Even so, there were still vital political interests
at stake. Critical amongst these was Britain's role, as a senior member of the
Western alliance, to ensure the region remained free from communist
domination. The salience of this objective went well beyond Southeast
Asia. Communist success in Asia could weaken American resolve
elsewhere. Britain's still substantial presence in the region was essentially
justified by officials as a crucial contribution 'to the global Anglo-American
partnership', which in turn maintained a degree of British influence over the
shaping of United States foreign policy. So long as this influence continued,
officials calculated that Britain's military presence east of Suez was 'worth
retaining for this reason alone'. A secondary consideration was the interests
of Australia and New Zealand. On grounds of race and sentiment, together
with the importance still attached to the Commonwealth, Britain felt obliged
to contribute to Australasian defence through a forward position in
Southeast Asia.36
The formal basis for Western intervention in the region was the SEATO
alliance. Under various contingency plans sponsored by SEATO, the United
States, Britain and their allies allocated specific forces for deployment in the
event that communist states committed aggression. These forces were
usually permanently stationed in the region itself. During Confrontation

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British policy-makers increasingly questioned the validity of the

assumptions supporting this strategy. Although not as pronounced as in the
Middle East, local nationalist resentment at the continuing and seemingly
permanent Western military presence in the region did exist. 'Military
alliances with Western countries', commented the Foreign Office, 'are
suspect to radical Asian sentiment in the same way as Western military bases
and for the same reasons. Their ultimate effect, like that of any other form of
overt Asian dependence on the West, is to drive nationalism into partnership
with communism. Since nationalism is still the dominant political emotion in
Southeast Asia, such a partnership is bound to be damaging to the noncommunist cause.'31 The British feared that such a partnership would
eventually undermine their own position in the region. Looking ahead, even
the Chiefs of Staff considered the retention of permanent military bases
untenable. 'However long we may wish to stay in Singapore', argued naval
chief Sir David Luce, 'the Malaysians are bound to ask us to go ... We
should accept this as an inevitable historical development for which we must
plan, and not wait for others to set the pace.'38
Given these expectations, the British were not sanguine about the West's
long-term chances of containing communist infiltration. 'If the Western
objective is to keep communism out', noted the Foreign Office, 'and if, as
our treaty obligations imply, we are prepared in certain circumstances to
fight for this objective, we must take it for granted that the communists may
also be prepared to go to extreme lengths to keep the West out.'39 In other
words, a potentially bloody stalemate could ensue. The British concluded
that regional stability depended upon some form of understanding, either
implicit or explicit, with the major communist powers, especially China.
The nature of such an arrangement would be a neutralized Southeast Asia,
in which neither the West nor the communists had a permanent military
presence. If adopted, such a strategy would have major ramifications for
Cold War policy in the region.
The creation of a neutralized Southeast Asia would involve the
abandonment of SEATO. The British also clearly envisaged the end of their
own military bases in Singapore. Indeed, gradual withdrawal leading to
eventual closure was foreseen, at an appropriate time, as the means by
which to engineer a political settlement between Malaysia and Indonesia.40
Such a settlement, however, should be negotiated only from a position of
strength. The Foreign Office was mindful that any precipitate British
departure could lead to political instability, and even greater interference by
outside powers. Confrontation would have to be brought to an end before
any renegotiation of the West's strategy and deployment could take place.
Nonetheless, the ideas expressed in the Foreign Office's review betrayed
clear unease over Britain's current predicaments in Southeast Asia.

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219

Beyond strategic considerations, Whitehall specialists were also

concerned at the rising financial cost, exacerbated by Confrontation, of
maintaining Britain's traditional military presence in the region. By late
1964 Britain was experiencing significant problems with its balance of
payments. This constraint challenged the arguments of those in favour of
the 'world role'. An interdepartmental long term study group warned that,
by continung obligations which imposed a serious strain on British
resources, a point might be reached 'at which the advantages of influence
are outweighed by the weakening of our economy. To maintain the
commitments beyond that point would be disastrous to our whole
position.'41 Nevertheless, the value and prestige Britain obtained from its
historic commitments could not be so easily ignored or dismissed. 'A
balance would have to be struck', observed the Defence and Oversea Policy
committee, 'between the pressing need to restore our own economy and the
value to us, as a trading nation, of being able to continue to exert through
our overseas commitments an influence in world affairs out of proportion to
our actual resources.'42
The task of doing so would fall to a new government. It is of course
unclear whether the Conservatives would have carried out a significant
reform of British policy east of Suez. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in particular,
was a strong supporter of 'the world role' and Britain's continuing status as
a global power.43 As Foreign Secretary he had strongly resisted the
Treasury's efforts to prune defence spending the previous year,44 but his
short tenure at Downing Street ended on 15 October 1964 when Harold
Wilson emerged victorious at the general election. It would be left to the
first Labour government in thirteen years to address the problem of an everwidening gap between Britain's commitments and the resources available to
meet them.
IV
Many traditional Labour supporters hoped that the Wilson government
would be a truly reforming one, modernizing the elitist state they believed
Britain still to be. Certainly Wilson promoted a number of prominent leftwing MPs to the Cabinet: Tony Benn, Frank Cousins, Barbara Castle and
Richard Crossman. However, the key positions of state were held by those
on the right of the party: Patrick Gordon Walker at the Foreign Office,
George Brown at Trade and Industry, and James Callaghan at the Treasury.
Wilson himself was no revolutionary, believing essentially in Britain's
continued status as a global rather than a regional power. The dominant
historical interpretation is of a Prime Minister who abandoned the
opportunity to implement radical change. 'When one surveys the entire field

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of foreign affairs', wrote Robert Rhodes James in 1972, 'it is difficult

indeed to detect any real differences of substance between the performance
of Labour and its predecessor.'45 Recent commentaries provide a similar
interpretation, emphasizing Wilson's support for Britain's 'world role' and
maintaining its historic commitments east of Suez.46 The documentary
evidence relating to Confrontation suggests, however, that while Wilson
may not have been a revolutionary, he was more willing to accept a radical
reappraisal of Britain's position east of Suez than has previously been
recognized by most historians.
It was not long after assuming office that the new government's resolve
in Southeast Asia was strongly tested. In late December Sukarno ordered an
intensification of Confrontation, despatching more Indonesian army
regulars across the border into Malaysian Borneo. The Labour government
immediately heeded the call for assistance from the Malaysians, sending
further reinforcements to the region during January 1965. Wilson's vigorous
response would appear to support the contention of his critics that he
favoured the status quo and was not prepared fundamentally to challenge
the basic principles of British foreign policy he had inherited from the
Conservatives. Nevertheless, rising defence expenditure, at a time when
Britain was facing a serious balance of payments crisis, did provoke
renewed calls from senior ministers and officials for a rapid reduction of
Britain's overseas obligations.
Military expenditure allocated for east of Suez commitments was a
favourite target of criticism. This was partly because it involved overseas
expenditure, thereby draining Britain's precious foreign exchange, and also
because it was still rising as a result of Confrontation.47 'We are bound to
state our opinion', outlineda Treasury briefing to ministers, 'that we cannot
see a satisfactory solution for the economic problems of this country in the
next decade unless an immediate halt is called to the increases in the
defence budget, and a steady reduction takes place in the proportion of the
nation's resources devoted to defence.'43 In light of these concerns
Callaghan made it clear to Gordon Walker that, while he supported the
objective of neutralization in Southeast Asia, it had to happen sooner rather
than later. In his view Britain simply did not have the luxury of waiting until
Confrontation was satisfactorily concluded before negotiating a withdrawal
from the area. 'The basis of our policy should be to lessen our commitments
as quickly as we can', he warned, adding that if this was not implemented
Britain was in serious risk of bankrupting itself.49 These economic concerns
undoubtedly lent considerable weight to those who believed Britain had
already outstayed its welcome in Southeast Asia. In reporting progress of
the 'neutralization' paper to overseas posts, the Commonwealth Relations
Office warned that 'the validity of its main theme has received fresh

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emphasis from our present economic difficulties: we do not want to retain a

substantial military presence in Southeast Asia longer than we can help.'50
Arising from these concerns London initiated a major review of all
aspects of defence spending. Although it was not completed until late 1965,
some key decisions had been made by June. Most importantly, ministers
agreed that defence expenditure must be reduced to 2,000 million (at 1964
prices) by 1969-70. To do so was not realistically possible without a
substantial reduction in commitments. The most viable strategic region
where cuts might be made was east of Suez.51 There Britain had neither
valuable industrial resources to protect, as was the case in the Middle East,
nor overriding political objectives to meet, like stability in Europe.
Ministers also recognized, albeit reluctantly, that only by forsaking its
capacity for independent intervention could Britain seriously reduce its
defence expenditure.52 'One of the most significant conclusions which
appears to have emerged from the work done so far', the Cabinet Secretary,
Burke Trend, warned the Prime Minister, 'is that we shall probably have to
plan in future on the basis that we shall not try to retain, as at present, the
capability of mounting any operations single-handed in the face of
opposition.'53
Important factors militated against a swift reduction of Britain's east of
Suez commitments. To attempt this while Confrontation remained
unresolved would effectively give final victory in the conflict to Sukarno.
Although the consequences of this could not be gauged accurately, political
instability, eradication of any vestiges of British influence, and the
dismemberment of Malaysia were all reasonable assumptions. In addition,
the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, strong supporters of a
British military presence in the region, would react harshly to any pull out.
It was simply not in Britain's power alone to implement a policy of rapid
withdrawal. 'It is essential that there should be no premature disclosure of
the way in which our minds are working', Trend emphasized to Wilson, 'if
only because, once it is thought that we are on the run, we have lost our
main negotiating card, and a process which ought to be a phased and
controlled contraction of commitments will degenerate into a disorderly and
ignominious retreat'.54 The government was faced with a contradiction
between its long-term goal of negotiated withdrawal, and its short-term
requirement to conclude Confrontation in a manner which recognized the
territorial integrity of Malaysia. Britain's predicament was well explained
by Michael Stewart, the new Foreign Secretary, in his memoirs.
Adaptation to our position in the second rank was not easy, as Britain
still had post-imperial commitments all over the world. We were like
a juggler who has a dozen plates circling in the air, and knows he

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cannot keep them going; but to fold his hands and let them crash
would be irresponsible. We had the grim story of the Belgian Congo
to warn us against precipitate abandonment of imperial rule. The
juggler must extract from the circle one plate after another and put it
safely on a table until his job has become manageable. The Cabinet
had already decided that we must divest ourselves of responsibilities
east of Suez, though we knew that this would be the work of several
years.55

By mid-1965 British policy-makers were searching, or perhaps more

accurately hoping, for a change in political circumstances that would allow
the process of disengagement to begin. Fortuitously, this occurred suddenly
in early August. Rising tension between Singapore and Malaysia, and the
two respective Prime Ministers, finally resulted in the Tunku expelling
Singapore from the Federation. This provided the Wilson government with
a convenient excuse to reassess Britain's defence commitments to Malaysia.
'Even if the lawyers are no longer confident that our Defence Agreement
has lost its juridical basis', the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, told
Wilson, 'no one would consider it politically or morally binding. It is for us
to decide whether, and on what conditions, we retain a defence commitment
to Malaysia.' Healey himself was in no doubt that Britain had to disentangle
itself from an increasingly untenable position, which was costing the British
taxpayer countless millions. 'Our basic objective should be to obtain the
early consent of the United States, Australia and New Zealand to a policy
aimed at negotiating the end of Confrontation and the withdrawal of British
forces from Borneo.'56 A number of his ministerial colleagues agreed.
Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, advised
Wilson that Britain's position regarding both Confrontation and tenure of
the Singapore bases had been drastically undermined by the Tunku's action.
'It is therefore all the more desirable and in our interests that Confrontation
should be brought to an end.'57 George Brown chimed in, noting his
agreement 'with the conclusion that some means must be found to bring
Confrontation with Indonesia to an end quickly'.58
With these objectives in mind, and using Singapore's expulsion as an
excuse for formal talks, British officials met with American, Australian and
New Zealand representatives in London in early September to discuss
possible options. The British delegation outlined its concerns regarding
tenure of the Singapore bases, and the need to end Confrontation in the near
future. This marked a blunt admission to the allies that Britain's ability to

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carry the weight of its commitments east of Suez was being rapidly eroded.
'By whatever means it may be contrived', outlined the British paper
released at the talks, 'we need an early end to Confrontation.'59 As a result,
the only option was to negotiate a settlement directly with Sukarno, even if
this damaged British prestige. Minimum requirements for Britain in any
such deal were that no part of the original Federation should be placed in a
position of complete helplessness in the face of future Indonesian
aggression, and that there should be an orderly withdrawal from Singapore.
The reaction of Britain's allies,. especially the Americans and
Australians, was scathing.60 United States officials took issue even with
Britain's basic premise: that tenure of the Singapore bases was now
uncertain and unlikely to remain beyond the medium term. They also felt
that any attempt to negotiate a settlement with Sukarno would fail.61 Once
the Indonesian leader received clear evidence of weakening British resolve
he would no doubt wait until virtually all Indonesian demands were met.
The result could potentially be disastrous for the Western position in
Southeast Asia.62 Over the previous twelve months Sukarno had
increasingly edged Indonesia towards communism, taking the country out
of the United Nations and into a de facto alliance with China. In contrast to
the first years of the crisis, the Western allies now wanted Britain to
maintain a strong military deployment in the region, principally as a means
of keeping Sukarno's ambitions in check. An abandonment of that role was
considered unacceptable in Washington, Canberra and Wellington. Britain
was in no position to ignore the representations of its allies. Australia and
New Zealand now had troops on the ground in Borneo. American
diplomatic support was vital to putting further pressure on Jakarta.
The Wilson government had little choice but to heed these concerns and
maintain existing force deployments in Malaysia. 'It is clear,' Burke Trend
told Wilson, 'that we could not insist on making an early move to end
Confrontation without causing grave offence to our allies and prejudicing
the prospect of their future collaboration.'63 In his messages to Menzies and
Holyoake reporting on the talks, Wilson assured them that there would be
no precipitate withdrawal and that further consultation would take place.
But he concluded by warning that 'our assessment of the situation is that
time is not on our side, either as regards our tenure in Singapore or the
continuation of Confrontation'.64
Less than a week after these messages were sent political violence
erupted in Indonesia. On 1 October 1965 a group of army officers, led by
Colonel Untung, attempted to seize power in Jakarta. The coup ended in a
dismal failure, the fledging rebellion being ruthlessly crushed by troops
loyal to Major-General Suharto, commander of the strategic reserve. This
event heralded a major transformation in Indonesian politics. Increasingly,

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INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND COLONIAL RETREAT

Sukarno became a paper President, with real power being exercised by

Suharto and the army establishment. These generals, concerned with
restoring economic stability and suppressing the local communist party,
were now eager quietly to abandon Sukarno's radical agenda, including the
Confrontation. Although the crisis did not officially end until the signature
of the peace treaty in Bangkok on 11 August 1966, in reality it all but died
during the months immediately following Untung's intervention.
Britain was saved by these events from a potentially serious humiliation.
Although Sukarno did not succeed in 'crushing' Malaysia, as he once
claimed that he would, there is little doubt that his policy of Confrontation
helped to bring to an end British aspirations of remaining a Far Eastern
power. The asking price to be paid, as Confrontation cruelly showed, was
simply too high. By late 1965 the Labour government appeared to have
accepted this. The following February, Defence Minister Healey visited
Canberra to explain to Australian and New Zealand officials Britain's future
plans for deployments east of Suez. It was not an easy meeting. Healey
made it clear that Britain 'would never again be prepared to act alone
against an opponent like Indonesia, 10,000 miles away, nor undertake largescale counter-insurgency operations'.65 The British also 'envisaged' leaving
Singapore by 1970. Although North Australia was flagged as a possible
substitute base, both Canberra and Wellington regarded it as a non-starter.
The New Zealanders were under no illusions that the British were in fact
preparing to leave. 'The whole process of British withdrawal is likely to be
a hesitant and gradual one,' cited the Department of External Affairs, 'and
will be modified in accordance with political developments.'66 Although
such a process would make adjustment slightly easier, it could not
camouflage the fact that the preparations were already being made.
Greater Malaysia had originally been described as the 'grand design' by
Macmillan and his colleagues. Britain certainly had ambitious, and perhaps
in retrospect naive, hopes for the Federation. Recognizing direct imperial
rule from London as untenable, the British hoped that independence within
the Commonwealth would produce a new nation content to retain historic
trade, financial and defence ties with the former colonial power. By these
means Macmillan wanted to retain some measure of British influence and
power east of Suez. By declaring Confrontation, however, Sukarno denied
Britain the option of an easy transformation from formal to informal empire.
The cost of remaining a Far Eastern power, not to mention 'the world role',
was to be far greater than anticipated. In addition, addressing the Indonesian
threat proved to be a mostly lonely vigil for Britain. The United States,
especially under President Kennedy, placed a higher priority on securing a
non-communist Indonesia than on protecting Malaysia from external
aggression. Even Australia and New Zealand did not deploy forces in

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Borneo until April 1965, over two years after the crisis had begun. Early
that year, as Wilson recollected in his memoirs, the trooping the colour
ceremony was in risk of being cancelled if there had been one further
deployment of troops overseas.67 British military and financial resources had
been stretched to the limit. Although Sukarno failed in his task to 'crush'
Malaysia, it should also be recognized that the British failed in theirs. Any
ambitions of being a global power of substance, and retaining a significant
role for itself east of Suez, had vanished by December 1965. The Wilson
government had resigned itself to disengagement. Although implementation
took several years, there is little doubt that Confrontation hastened the end
of empire in Southeast Asia.

NOTES
1. John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation (London, 1988), 290.
2. The British had argued for many years that the most logical form of decolonization was a
union of Britain's territories in the region, starting with Malaya and Singapore. This had been
strongly opposed, however, by Malayan leaders; see A. J. Stockwell, 'Insurgency and
Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency', Journal of Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics, 15 (1987), 71-81.
3. Memo, by Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Cabinet, 7 April 1961, DO
169/25; see also David Easter, 'British Defence Policy in South East Asia and the
Confrontation, 1960-66', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1998, 400-03,
who emphasizes British concern about the future of the military bases, given the rise in
popularity of the Barisan Socialis and the inevitability of formal independence for Singapore.
4. Memo., Kuala Lumpur to State Department, 8 June 1961, 790.00/6-861, Decimal Files,
1960-63, RG 59, National Archives and Record Administration, Washington.
5. Memo., Singapore to State Department, 16 June 1961, 790.00/6-1661, ibid.
6. Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security
System, 1957-1971 (Cambridge, 1983), 179.
7. A. J. Stockwell, 'Malaysia: The Making of a Neo-Colony?', Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 26 (1998), 138-56.
8. The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed in Manila on 8 Sept. 1954 by
representatives of Britain, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the
Philippines and Pakistan. The crucial operative clause was Article IV: 'Each Party recognises
that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the Parties (or
against Cambodia, Laos or the territory under the jurisdiction of the free Vietnamese
government) would endanger its own peace and safety and agrees that it will in that event act
to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.'
9. Minute of Chiefs of Staff meeting, 3 Aug. 1961, DEFE 4/137.
10. State Department to London, 12 Oct. 1961, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, 'Malaya and
Singapore - general', National Security File, box 140; Australian Prime Minister R. G.
Menzies to Lieutenant-General Sir William Oliver, British High Commissioner to Australia,
28 Aug. 1961, PREM 11/3418; New Zealand Prime Minister K. J. Holyoake to Macmillan,
20 Oct. 1961, PREM 11/3422.
11. Selkirk to Macmillan, 30 Dec. 1961, PREM 11/3866.
12. Minute of Chiefs of Staff meeting, 3 Aug. 1961, DEFE 4/137.
13. Note by Amery, 4 Oct. 1961, D(61)66, CAB 131/2.
14. The literature on Macmillan's continued belief in Britain's status as a world power is

226

15.
16.
17.
18.

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19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND COLONIAL RETREAT

considerable: see in particular John Turner, Macmillan (London, 1994), 272; Peter Clarke, A
Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher (London, 1991), 229-31.
Sir James Cable, counsellor in the FO, 1961-63, head of Southeast Asia department
1963-66, interview with author, Cambridge, 16 Sept. 1994.
Selkirk to Macmillan, 30 Dec. 1961, PREM 11/3866.
John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand
Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-1965 (London, 2000), 37-8.
Leslie Fry, British embassy, Djakarta, to Fred Warner, head of Southeast Asia Department,
FO, 11 Aug. 1961, DO 169/28.
For leading commentaries on Indonesian policy during Confrontation, see J. A. C. Mackie,
Konfrontasi: the Malaysia-Indonesia Dispute, 1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur, 1974); Ide Anak
Agung gde Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 19451965 (The Hague,
1973), and Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London, 1983).
CC(63)6th mtg, 24 Jan. 1963, CAB 128/37; OP(63)4th mtg, 'The Future Defence of
Malaysia', 24 April 1963, CAB 134/2371.
Macmillan to Home, 3 April 1963, PREM 11/4347.
Minute by de Zulueta to Macmillan, 3 April 1963, PREM 11/4189.
Memo., Heath to Macmillan, 23 April 1963, PREM 11/4347.
Memo., Macmillan to Home, 3 April 1963, ibid.
Mountbatten to Thorneycroft, 30 Sept. 1963, DEFE 13/387.
Minute by W. I. McIndoe, Cabinet Office, to T. J. Bligh, Principal Private Secretary to
Macmillan, 24 Sept. 1963, PREM 11/4183.
Memo, by Warner, 'Four Years in South East Asia 1960-1963', 28 Nov. 1963, FO
371/169688/D 1051/41.
Ibid.
Warner to Marshall, 20 Sept. 1963, FO 371/169688/D 1051/37; memo., Lord Head, British
High Commissioner to Malaysia, to Sandys, 11 Dec. 1963, FO 371/169907/DH 1062/124.
Thorneycroft to Douglas-Home, 7 Jan. 1964, PREM 11/4905.
Memcon, FO, 16 Oct. 1963, FO 371/169909/DH 1071/31/G.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol.23, Southeast Asia (Washington DC,
1994), 742.
David Ormsby-Gore, British ambassador in Washington, to FO, 12 Feb. 1963, FO
371/169695/D 1071/23.
Minute by Home to R. A. Butler, Foreign Secretary, 19 Dec. 1963, FO 371/169894/DH
1051/102/G.
Memo, by Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary, to Home, 8 Jan. 1964, PREM 11/4905.
FO memo., 'British Policy Towards South-East Asia', 22 Sept. 1964, CAB 148/7. The
memorandum was approved by the Defence and Oversea (Official) Committee on 14
October, and later by the Cabinet; DO(O)(64)21 st mtg, 14 Oct. 1964, CAB 148/4; memo.,
Gordon Walker to Cabinet, 19 Nov. 1964, CAB 148/17.
Ibid.
Memo, by Luce to COS, 30 June 1964, DEFE 4/171.
FO memo., 22 Sept. 1964, CAB 148/7.
Ibid.
Report by long-term study group, 23 Oct. 1964, CAB 148/40.
DO(O)(64)21st mtg, minute of Defence and Oversea (Official) Committee, 14 Oct. 1964,
CAB 148/4.
D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home (London, 1996).
Memo, by Douglas-Home, 17 June 1963, CAB 131/28.
R. R. James, Ambitions and Realities: British Politics 1964-1970 (London, 1972), 61.
Austen Morgan, Harold Wilson (London, 1992), 270; Chris Wrigley, 'Now you see it now
you don't: Harold Wilson and Labour's foreign policy, 1964-1970', in R. Coopey, S.
Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson Governments (London, 1993), 132; Leslie Stone,
'Britain and the World', in D. McKie and C. Cook (eds.), The Decade of Disillusion: British
Politics in the Sixties (London, 1972), 126; Philip Ziegler, Harold Wilson: The Authorised
Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (London, 1993), 210-19; Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise:

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47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

227

Labour in Power 1964-1970 (London, 1989), 97-9; Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London,
1992), 383-6.
Easter, 'Confrontation', 412-3.
Treasury memo., 11 Nov. 1964, CAB 148/40.
Callaghan to Patrick Walker, 1 Jan. 1965, FO 371/180205/D 1051/7.
CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 19 Jan. 1965, FO 371/180206/D 1051/25/G.
Trend to Wilson, 11 and 14 June 1965, PREM 13/215.
Minute of COS meeting, 11 June 1965, DEFE 4/185.
Memo., Trend to Wilson, 14 June 1965, PREM 13/215.
Ibid.
Michael Stewart, Life and Labour: An Autobiography (London, 1980), 144.
Healey to Wilson, 13 Aug. 1965, PREM 13/431.
Hughes to Wilson, 13 Aug. 1965, ibid.
Memo., Brown to Wilson, 26 Aug. 1965, ibid.
London to New Zealand Department of External Affairs (NZDEA), 2 Sept. 1965, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Head Office, Multiple-Number Subject Files, ABHS, series
950, accession W 4627, 434/8/1, pt. 9, box 4670, New Zealand National Archives,
Wellington (hereafter NZNA).
Memcon, Stewart with Ball, 8 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/431; Canberra to Ministry of Defence,
7 Sept. 1965, FO 371/181529/IM 1193/135/G.
FO to Washington, 9 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/431.
Djakarta to State Department, 7 Sept. 1965, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin Texas,
'Indonesia country file', vol.4, National Security File, box 247.
OPD(65)41st mtg, 23 Sept. 1965, CAB 148/18; memo., Trend to Wilson, 21 Sept. 1965,
PREM 13/431.
Wilson to Menzies and Holyoake, 25 Sept. 1965, FO 371/181529AM 1193/152/G.
Report by NZDEA, 17 Feb. 1966, ABHS, series 950, accession W 4627, 434/8/1, pt. 10, box
4670, NZNA.
Report by NZDEA, 10 March 1966, ibid. pt. 11, box 4670, NZNA.
Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London, 1971),
42.